The concept of civil society is back on the agenda. However, ambiguity still surrounds the concept. While there is no need to strive for a universal understanding of civil society, it is nevertheless essential to scrutinize the concept thoroughly, for what is understood by it defines largely what can be expected from it. This article conceptualizes civil society as an arena, a public space with blurred borders, where diverse societal values and interests interact. It argues for a framework that is better able to take into account the entire range of civil society actors, by placing less emphasis on organizational forms and a stronger focus on the functions and roles of informal associations, movements, and instances of collective citizen action.

Introduction

During the last two decades, the concept of civil society has been, once again, on the rise. Today, it is on various agendas. As a concept it is much used, perhaps overused, certainly misused if not abused. Few political speeches, action plans, or program documents go without reference to civil society. But this presents a problem. Are we all talking about the same thing? As Grimond notes, it is universally talked about in tones that suggest it is a Great Good, but for some people it presents a problem: What on earth is it? All the talk with little action has downgraded the concept into a fashionable buzzword, a sort of an attention-directing device with limited usability. Such a development is deleterious, for it overshadows many of the ideas and accomplishments stemming from civic action.

Defining what is meant by civil society is a political project in itself. However, it is essential to scrutinize the concept thoroughly, for what is understood by it defines largely what can be expected from it. Using the term “civil society” in a global sense obscures as much as it illuminates. The basic premise here is that what is meant by civil society remains open to diverse interpretations (Cohen & Arato 1992; Wiarda 2003; Edwards 2004). Its definitions have changed over time, but even in the current use the concept means very different things in different countries and languages (Kocka 2004, p. 65). Certainly, civil society is a product of the “West,” but that tells us little, for there are several models of civil society in the West: the French one differs from the British; the American conception is quite different from that of, say, Germany.

In order to get to the root of the issue, one is forced to deal with some of the major divisions in social and cultural studies, and trace how the utilization of different traditions and

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1 Dr. Jussi Laine, jussi.laine@uef.fi, is a researcher at the University of Eastern Finland, Joensuu Campus, as well as the Treasurer and Vice Executive Secretary of the Association for Borderlands Studies.
models have led to different manifestations of civil society. This article aims to show that the frame of interpretation and the related assumptions about civil society vary greatly, depending on the tradition that is followed and the conception or model that is applied. The article outlines the historical premises for the formation of civil society and then discusses the current usage of the concept. It concludes by presenting an interpretation of civil society as an arena, with an argument that instead of fixating on civil society’s organizational form, the focus needs to be on what is actually being done.

**Bringing History Back In**

**Classical Civil Society as Partnership of Individuals**

Even though the contemporary understanding of civil society refers commonly to the public sphere, as set apart from the state and the market, it has not always been so. Many of early European political thinkers saw civil society as a synonym for a type of political association whose members are subject to laws which ensure peaceful order and good government (Keane 1989). The origins of the concept of civil society trace back to the communal life in the *polis*, the Greek city-state. Socrates proposed that “dialectic,” a form of public argument to uncover truth, was imperative to ensure “civility” (in contrast to barbarity) in the *polis* and “good life” of the people (O’Brien 1999). This rational dialogue was to test the individual’s arguments against societal arguments in order to find the proper balance between the needs of the two (Sietianto 2007). For Socrates’ prized student, Plato, the ideal state was a society that was just and allowed people to dedicate themselves to the common good and to practice civic virtues of wisdom, courage, moderation, and justice (Ehrenberg 1999, pp. 5–6).

Aristotle was the first to use the term *koinonía politiké*, a political association. For him, *koinonía politiké* was an independent and self-sufficient association of free, equal, and like-minded persons united by an *ethos*, a common set of norms and values approved and honored by its members (Barker 1946). As Cohen and Arato (1992, p. 84) bring forth, *koinonía politiké* was, however, only a *koinonía* among many; the term *koinonía* was used to designate all forms and sizes of human association, the members of which were held together by something they had in common and could share with each other. However, while all associations have an end, the political association has the highest: it channels the collective pursuits to serve the common goal of attaining a good society.

Whereas today a political association or a community is often understood as being a state, for Aristotle the state was a foreign concept. For him, *koinonía politiké* designated above all a politically united community, a city as a political “partnership” of individuals coming together not for the sake of social life but rather for the sake of performing good actions and attaining self-sufficiency (Barker 1946, p. 5). Aristotle thus saw that contiguity and consanguinity, as well as the social life arising from these ties, are the necessary basis, but that the essence is cooperation in a common scheme of good life, and the ultimate form of such cooperation is the *polis*, on which individuals are dependent. Individuals are by nature political animals; when perfected, they are “the best of animals” who engage in political pursuits because they are “furnished” with capabilities such as speech, which allows for communication and the ability to perceive and determine what is just (ibid. p. 7). Thanks to these capacities, human beings can be habituated to virtue, which can be best done through participation in the communal life in the *polis*, the civil society.
Cicero in turn referred to a civilized political community, which was the equivalent of *res publica* (commonwealth), “an assemblage [of men] associated by a common acknowledgment of right and by a community of interests” (Cicero 1966). It includes groups, communities, and individuals united by laws and institutions, which organize their activities in such a way as to create a flexible equilibrium among them. Because justice and reason are rooted in man’s natural “social spirit,” such organizations induced individuals to forgo a measure of self-interest in the interest of the common good (Islamoglu 2001, p. 1891).

**Community with Virtues Derived from Natural Laws**

Willem van Moerbeke used *communicatio politica* and *civilis communitas* as translations of *koinonía politiké* in approximately 1260. It was not, however, until the fifteenth century that Leonardo Bruni, a Florentine humanist, challenged the earlier translation with *societas civilis*, a term that would famously enter into all European languages (Hallberg and Wittrock 2006, p. 30).

In the sixteenth century, Jean Bodin built upon Aristotle by arguing that the state is a natural fact: “The state is the civil society that can exist on its own without associations, and other bodies, but it cannot do so without family” (Bodin in Bobbio 1989, p. 35). Bodin claimed that there are various forms of the political ethos (*mores*), which affect the shaping of various forms of government: monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. Bodin’s main idea was to create an ethos of pacification, peaceful coexistence, and cooperation between citizens, which would secure the stability of public goods and institutions even in a society lacking consensus on its highest values. In Bodin’s eyes, the best way to guarantee this was through the absolute sovereignty of state power (Rhonheimer 2005, p. 21).

The Aristotelian logic of a society as a work of nature was not challenged until the seventeenth century, when most notably Thomas Hobbes and John Locke argued that societies are *formed as the result* of a social contract between human beings. Hobbes believed that in their original state of nature, people lived in a society of “all against all” and had to compete for scarce resources. This, he argues in *Leviathan*, creates a war in which every person is governed by his own reason and has a natural right to do anything to preserve his own liberty or safety (Hobbes 1909). As constant war and insecurity allowed no development and made the life “solitary, poore [sic], nasty, brutish, and short,” Hobbes saw that people needed agreements based on the natural precepts and the general rules of reason among each other in order to create peace and, hence, improve their lives (ibid.).

Through such mutual contracts between individuals, the state of nature could be left behind and the formation of a common power, the *Leviathan*, the civil government, the state, could become possible. Whereas individuals in the state of nature fought against each other, in civil society the impartial state maintained peace in a community of people acting in a civic manner (Hobbes 1909, pp. 105–109). The motive to come together was not that people were naturally inclined to do so, as Aristotle had asserted; they were driven by the fear of coercive common power (ibid. p. 101). The existence of such a power, the state, thus created a condition in which the state of nature gave way to civil society; i.e., it became rational for people to act in a civil manner and to cooperate rather than fight for their vested interest.

Skinner (1996) suggests that Hobbes actually repudiated the entire classical theory of eloquence and its ideal of the *vir civilis*, the good citizen, the virtuous, wise, rational man. Instead, according to Skinner’s interpretation (1996, p. 291), Hobbes had claimed that reason unaided by eloquence would be sufficient to persuade others of the truths of civil science,
that eloquent men would have not sustained but destroyed civil life, and that the most important
duties of citizenship are grounded in the private sphere.

Whereas Hobbes wanted all lawmaking, both judicial and executive powers, to be
exercised by a single body and to have authority even over the individual’s religious doctrines
and beliefs, Locke made a separation between the legislative and executive powers in order to
prevent the power of government from threatening the rights of the society (Locke 1965).
Locke’s ideas were grounded in the doctrine of a God-given Natural Law, which posits that
individual citizens have certain natural rights as human beings that cannot be taken away from
them (Locke 1965; Laslett 1960).

Locke promoted the civic virtue of tolerance and advocated that individuals be allowed to
meet together, to form associations, and to enter into relations of their choice – the government
being a unitary outgrowth of the freedom to form an association. He saw that communities are
formed when people unite in order to further their own and their community’s interests. By
agreeing to form a legislature, people give their individual power up to the community. Like
Hobbes, Locke did not generally hold that the state and civil society would be separate realms
but rather that they would coexist. In Two Treaties of Government, he did, however,
inconsistently assert that the dissolution of legislative power does not necessarily mean the end
of society, whereas if society is dissolved its government cannot remain.

**Enlightenment Ideal and the Epistemological Centrality of Morality and Reason**

During the Age of Enlightenment, a number of thinkers contributed to the advancement
of the concept of civil society. Human beings were rational and capable of shaping their own
destiny without an absolute authority exerting control over them. Montesquieu further developed
the distinction between a nonpolitical civil society (l’état civile) and the state (l’état politique).
Largely under Bodin’s influence, he came to believe in the “rule of law” within a civil society.
Whereas governments use laws to influence and steer human conduct, civil society uses moeurs
(nonlegal, internalized restraints established by custom) and manières (conduct not regulated by
law or religion) (Montesquieu 1949; Richter 1998). Rousseau maintained that Locke’s idea of
expanding individual rights ignored common goods and would ultimately lead to a war among
people. Instead he proposed a new social order that would maintain harmony and provide
equality and freedom for all. The State, as a supreme power, would govern, enact laws, and
define the common good (Colás 2002). Civil liberty would emerge when all people were willing
to abide by the general will out of a belief that it would lead to common good.

It was first and foremost the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers David Hume, Adam
Ferguson, and Adam Smith who began to refer to civil society clearly as a network of human
relationships separate from the State. The distinction, according to Ferguson (1995), was
necessitated by the rise of state despotism, i.e., the state’s endeavor to “cover” society by forcing
its way through it “from above” (Holenstein 2009, p. 16). Hume suggested that people set their
goals on the basis of morality but use reason in achieving them. By using reason to follow their
self-interests in an enlightened manner, people would eventually achieve the interests of society
as a whole. While rejecting the social contract theory, Ferguson presented civil society as a
developed and redefined society, where civil liberties were safeguarded by the government and a
certain level of social, political, and particularly economic advancement has been reached. He
saw civil society as opposed to a rude nation (Pietrzyk 2001) and believed that through
governmental policies, education, gradual knowledge, and development, rude society might be transformed into civil society (Setianto 2007).

Smith agreed with Ferguson that the binding principle of civil society is a private morality predicated on public recognition by one’s peers, joined through bonds of moral sentiment (Smith 1976). He laid the foundation for civil society as an economic society separate from but protected by the State and mediated by a social order constituted by private property, contracts, and “free” exchanges of labor (Smith 1993, p. 36). For Smith, civil society was not only a refuge from the economic realm but also a wellspring of economic abilities. In Smith’s view, liberal commercial society both required and encouraged civic virtue. Inspired by Ferguson and Smith, the firm distinction between the civil society, family, and the state became key to the German conception of civil society later advanced by Hegel.

Whereas Smith understood individuals to be motivated mainly by self-interest, for Immanuel Kant this was an inadequate basis upon which to construct a moral order because it was not grounded in a sense of mutual obligation and respect (Calabrese 2004, p. 318). Instead, for Kant, civil society meant that the ends sought by one should not be won at the expense of the wellbeing of another (Kant 1997, 28). For him, the public sphere was the place where the private interests of members of civil society could be reconciled with the universal moral obligations; he believed that individuals need to accept a political authority (the State) in order to achieve a condition of justice and rights (Kant 1991, pp. 54–55). Accordingly, the main purpose of civil society is to force human beings to respect one another’s rights (Setianto 2007). Kant was ahead of his time by suggesting that civil society would not need to be nation-bound but rather could be universal.

Classical Modernity and the Distinction between State and Civil Society

Whereas the classical thinkers emphasized the identity of the state and society, during the modern era the two began to be seen as independent entities. G. W. F. Hegel, the leading thinker of Romanticism, saw human needs, the satisfaction of individual interests, and private property as the defining features of civil society. He treated civil society as a “system of needs” in which individuals reconcile their particular private interests with social demands and expectations, which are ultimately mediated by the universal state (Hegel 1991).

For Hegel, the significance of civil society is that individuals find satisfaction only in relation to other free individuals who are not family members but rather independent persons (Peddle 2000, pp. 118–120). Hegel argued that civil society is well suited to balancing the diverse range of human needs and interests, but that the state, as the highest form of ethical life, gives order to the system of needs by ensuring the stability of private property, social class, and the division of labor. Occupying the realm of capitalist interests, civil society was not necessarily civil and without conflict. The state’s task was thus to correct the faults of civil society. In short, a well-functioning civil society cannot exist without the guidance of the state.

Hegel’s modern understanding of civil society changed the meaning of civil society entirely: whereas for Kant “bürgerliche Gesellschaft” and “Staat” had been synonyms, for Hegel they became antonyms (Zaleski 2008, p. 264). He used the German term “bürgerliche Gesellschaft” (bourgeois society) to denote civil society as “civilian society”; i.e., a sphere of economic and social arrangements regulated by civil code rather than directly dependent upon political state itself (Honderich 2005, pp. 367–368). In contrast to the preceding dyadic models, Hegel provided a triadic scheme, in which civil society as an intermediate moment of ethnicity...
(i.e., being ethical) became situated between the macro-community of state and the micro-community of the family (Bobbio 1989, p. 31). Whereas both the family and state had well-defined categories, Hegel’s civil society was a fuzzier concept that encompassed practically everything outside those two realms.

Hegel’s followers split based on their political leanings. To the right, Hegel’s theory led to a liberal distinction between political society and a civil society that encompassed all non-state aspects of society, including culture, society, and politics (Zaleski 2008, p. 263). Alexis de Tocqueville followed Hegel’s perception of social reality in general terms by distinguishing between political society and civil society but contested Hegel by putting weight on the system of civilian and political associations as a counterbalance to both liberal individualism and centralization of the state. According to his liberal stance, the effectiveness of civil society as an “independent eye of society” depends upon its organizational form (Tocqueville 1969). Building on Montesquieu’s template, Tocqueville used the term *mores* to denote the totality of intellectual and moral state of a nation, the totality of customs, public opinion, and beliefs, which he saw as having a greater influence upon democracy than laws and the physical environment (ibid.).

On the left, Hegel’s ideas became the foundation for Karl Marx’s civil society as an economic base, in contrast to the “superstructure” of the political society, the state (Marx 1977). Marx gave civil society a more politically charged name, “bourgeois society,” as for him it was a product of a historical subject, the bourgeoisie, which legitimated its struggles against the absolutist state in the language of the rights of man and citizen, whereas in reality it served only the particular interests of the bourgeois (Richter 1998, p. 33). He rejected the positive role of the state put forth by Hegel, as he believed that under capitalism, the state functions as a repressive apparatus, an instrument of class domination (Bobbio 1989, pp. 27–29; Marx 1970). He agreed with Hegel that civil society was where the real action is, yet he conceived it to be so robustly shaped by class antagonism that it could not ensure the common good among competing interests (Brown 2001, p. 74). In a bourgeois society, people treat one another as a means to their own ends and, in so doing, are isolated from other people (Anheier, Glasius and Kaldor 2001, pp. 12–13).

Gramsci (1971) followed Hegel in distinguishing civil society from the State, but preferred the Marxian thought that the historical development of society occurred in civil society and not in the State. However, whereas Marx had considered civil society as coterminal with the socioeconomic base of the state, Gramsci located it in the political superstructure and made it the locus of the formation of ideological power. For him, civil society was a sphere wherein ideological apparatuses operated and whose task it was to exercise hegemony and through hegemony to obtain consensus (Bobbio 1989, p. 29). While in Marx’s writings civil society is portrayed as the terrain of individual egotism, Gramsci described civil society as a sphere of both the individual and organizations with the potential for rational self-regulation and freedom.

Even though Gramsci portrayed civil society as the arena, separate from state and market, he specified that the distinction between the state and civil society was only methodological, for even a policy of non-intervention like *laissez faire* is established by the state itself (Gramsci 1971). He presented a fully developed civil society as a system able to resist the “incursions” of economic crises and to protect the state (ibid. p. 238). The state, narrowly conceived as government, is protected by hegemony organized in civil society, while the coercive state apparatus fortifies the hegemony of the dominant class. However, while Gramsci accepted a role for the state in developing civil society and in shaping public opinion, he warned against
perpetuating state worship (ibid. p. 268). Civil society, he came to believe, explained why a communist revolution had been much easier in Russia than in Italy. Whereas “[i]n Russia the state was everything…, in the West, there was a proper relationship between state and society, and when the state trembled, a sturdy structure of civil society was at once revealed” (ibid. p. 238).

As Fleming (2000) notes, Gramsci’s work drove twentieth-century analysts to add three crucial components to the understanding of civil society. First, it was understood that civil society was more than a mere transmitter of established practices or beliefs; it formed a site of social contestation, in which collective identities, ethical values, action-orienting norms, and alliances were forged. Second, the dynamic, creative side of civil society became emphasized in the formation of informal networks, initiatives, and social movements, which transcended the framework of formal associations. Third, largely thanks to Habermas (1991), civil society came to be seen as “public sphere,” a coercion-free arena for discussion and mutual learning, detached from the systematizing effects of the state and the economy, where people come together to form a common discourse, the public, and in doing so compel the state to legitimate itself before public opinion.

**Postmodern Influences**

Just as the French Revolution had fueled an adjustment of the concept of civil society in the early nineteenth century, so did the emergence of political opposition to the authoritarian regimes in the former Soviet bloc in the late 1980s. While civil society had been in limbo for decades, the concept was suddenly revived in the early 1990s as its role in democracy, democratization, and development became understood (Jensen and Miszlivetz 2005, p. 3). Since then, globalization and the related formation of a “global civil society” have been the leading forces behind the civil society development. The 1990s witnessed not only a multiplication of NGOs but also a globalization of New Social Movements (NSMs). Kumar (2000) explains that even though the NSMs had linked people together to bring about a social change at the regional or national level since the mid-1960s, with the help of global or international organizations, these movements were able to establish cross-border linkages and operate at international level, thus becoming mega-movements or trans-national social movements (TSMs).

Along with NSMs, postmodernism brought along, inter alia, a heavy emphasis on transformation theory (Collard & Law 1989), organization theory (Greenwood & Hinings 1996), social capital (Coleman 1988; Putnam 1995), political opportunity structures (Kitschelt 1986; Kriesi 1995), and resource mobilization (McCarthy & Zald 1987). Furthermore, New Public Management (Osborne & Gaebler 1992; Borins 1994; Hughes 1998) became an increasingly dominant paradigm for public sector reform. The “Washington Consensus” of the early 1990s, which combined neoliberal economic strategy with an emphasis on liberal representative democracy (Edwards & Hulme 1995), portrayed the state more as a problem than a solution, which in turn had a significant influence on the theoretical debate. The new conditionality presumed by the related funding mechanism portrayed civil society as a sort of panacea, the “magic bullet” (ibid.), replacing the state’s service provision and social care.

The Tocquevillean line of thought, which placed citizens’ associations in the core of civil society and thus of democracy, was famously refreshed by Putnam (1995), who stressed the production and accumulation of social capital. For him, social capital is an essential element of good performance of any society, for civic virtue is most powerful when embedded in a sense
network of reciprocal social relations. Putnam’s basic thesis was not, however, altogether new. Social capital had already been elaborated on by Bourdieu (1986) and Coleman (1988), both of whom stressed the less normative aspect of civil society, the importance of civic participation and the various social benefits generated by it. Nevertheless, Putnam popularized its utilization and fueled further interest on the topic. Forming associations—the coming together of people for a common purpose—is thought to teach the “habits of the heart” (Bellah et al. 1996) of social behavior and to bind individual citizens to an idea of unity larger than selfish desires, thus forming a self-conscious and active political society as well as a vibrant civil society functioning independently from the state.

**Current Understanding**

While the twentieth century, in aggregate, was about the neglect and even the systematic destruction of civil society through statist ideologies, the twenty-first century has so far allowed its rediscovery and restoration. Such a civic renaissance was an outcome of fresh outpouring of social entrepreneurship and civic reinvention, lost faith in centralized systems of government, and increased efficiency and credibility of CSOs, as well as a renewed quest for values and interest in volunteerism (Eberly and Streeter 2002, p. 3). Also, increased new and inherited wealth has made unprecedented resources available for charitable investment (Havens and Schervish 1999, p. 1). As a result, civil society has became understood as to form an essential mediating structure not only because it stands as a buffer between the individual and the large impersonal structures of the state and the market but also because it plays a crucial role in cultivating citizenship as well as generating and maintaining values in society. Without civil society, “values become another function of the megastructures, most notably the state” (Berger & Neuhaus 1977, p. 2).

That being said, the growth of the anti-globalization movement and obvious bumps on road towards democracy, for instance in Russia, caused the universality and legitimacy of civil society to be questioned. The neoliberal Washington Consensus became replaced by a “post-Washington Consensus” that now acknowledged that the state does indeed play an important role in democratic development (Öniş & Şenses 2005). As apparent particularly in times of challenging crisis, state-centered policies became again very en vogue and civil society relegated to the role of a supporting actor at best (Freise, Pyykkönen & Vaidelyte 2010). What also stands out is that the current use of civil society has been moving away from the field of politics and state building. It has become a sphere, an arena operating beyond the confines of national societies, polities, and economies. What hold it together are not the borders of a nation-state but rather ideas, values, networks, and social capital.

**Toward Social Economy**

Social economy (SE) has become a major institution of civil society, contributing to the organization of its associative fabric and the development of participative democracy but also of a potent economic and societal actor. As an activity, the SE is historically linked to grassroots associations and cooperatives, which make up its backbone (European Economic and Social Committee 2007, p. 7). In general, the social economy refers to the part of the economy proper that is neither private nor public but consists of constituted organizations, with voluntary members, undertaking activities for the greater good of local communities and marginalized groups, a possible surplus of which is used for the good of the community of members or for society. (Social Economy Lisburn 2012.) It can be further broken down into three sub-sectors:
1) **Community sector** (usually small, local, modestly funded, dependent on voluntary effort)

2) **Voluntary sector** (formal, independent, not-for-profit and strong volunteer input)

3) **Social enterprise sector** (businesses with primarily social objectives, surpluses principally reinvested for that purpose in the business or in the community)

In this view, the SE is interpreted in the broader sense of civil economy and constitutes a key component of the broader economy and not a parallel or niche market or a dependent sector (Restakis 2006, p. 10). According to the prominent definition of SE, it includes those organizations that are animated by the principle of reciprocity for the pursuit of mutual economic or social goals, often through social control of capital (ibid. p. 12).

What is noteworthy is that this definition includes also those for-profit businesses that share their surpluses and benefits with their members (and/or the wider community) in a collectively owned structure. However, the definition would exclude those non-profit and voluntary organizations that are entirely dependent on grants or donations (Restakis 2006, p. 12). Its applicability stems from the fact that it recognizes the central role of reciprocal (non-commercial and non-monetary) transactions as economic activities in their own right (Ninacs & Toye 2002). The various organization of the social economy can thus be seen as a sort of hybrid enterprises that perform a blend of commercial activities (sale of goods and services), non-commercial but monetary activities (public funding, donations), and non-monetary activities (volunteer work) to achieve their goals (Restakis 2006, p. 9).

The conceptual delimitation of SE has been presented in the Charter of Principles of the Social Economy promoted by the European Standing Conference of Co-operatives, Mutual Societies, Associations and Foundations (CEP-CMAF). The principles in question are (1) the primacy of the individual and the social objective over capital, (2) voluntary and open membership, (3) democratic control by the membership, (4) the combination of interests of members/users and/or the general interest, (5) the defense and application of the principle of solidarity and responsibility, (6) autonomous management and independence from public authorities, and (7) most of the surpluses have to be used in pursuit of sustainable development objectives, services of interest to members or the general interest.

In its review on the evolution of Social Economy in Europe, the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC), a EU consultative body that proclaims itself as a “bridge between Europe and organized civil society” [emphasis added], acknowledges that the concept of the SE is closely linked to the concepts of social cohesion, local and regional development, innovation, and employment, as well as with the project of building Europe (European Economic and Social Committee 2007, pp. 29–33). SE has demonstrated its capacity to increase the levels of social cohesion by complementing and, above all, paving the way for public action. The SE has contributed to the social and work integration of clearly disadvantaged people and geographical areas, but it has also increased the entire society’s democratic culture, boosted its degree of social participation, and managed to give a voice and negotiating capability to social groups previously excluded from the economic process and from the process of drafting and applying public policies.

The SE also constitutes a strategic motor for local and regional development by contributing to endogenous economic development, restoring competitiveness to extensive areas
and facilitating their integration at the national and international level as well as rectifying significant spatial imbalances. The SE’s capacity for innovation stems from its direct contact with the broader society, which endows it with a special capacity for detecting new needs, channeling them into the public administration and traditional profit-making private enterprises, and, where appropriate, coming up with creative innovatory responses.

“To reach the levels of welfare and progress that the ‘Western’ countries of the European Union enjoy,” the EESC (2007, p. 33) explains, “the European social and economic model has needed the contribution of the SE, which has proved capable of occupying a space that balances economic and social aspects, mediates between public institutions and civil society and evens out social and economic imbalances in a plural society and economy.” At the European level, Social Economy Europe, the EU-level representative institution for the social economy, has represented and promoted social economy in Europe since 2000. The European Parliament’s “Social Economy Intergroup” provides a forum for a dialogue between all social economy players and members of the European Parliament. The social economy is also represented in the European Economic and Social Committee through the “Social Economy Category” that brings together members from cooperatives, mutual societies, associations, foundations, and NGOs with social aims (Social Economy Europe 2012).

Figure 1

As Restakis (2006, p. 5) notes, there are two broad currents of thought in the debate on the defining elements of the social economy (Figure 1). The first is commonly traced back to the French sociologist Frédéric Le Play, who saw the social economy as functioning apart from the market, which he interpreted to mean the economic sector that was populated by capitalist firms and the state. For him, the social economy was a niche, a sort of a parallel market that was also dependent on the state for its survival. It was needed in order to create an institutional order to correct the undesired effects of the market. The objective that Le Play was pursuing was not welfare or wealth, but social peace that is the reconciliation of morality and economics through the moralization of individual behavior.

According to Restakis (2006, p. 6), the second current reaches back to the idea of the civil economy, which is conceptualized as a dimension of the market. In this view, the market is not identified exclusively with private enterprise but rather as an open domain in which the state, the commercial sector, and the social economy all play a role. Within this current, the recent neoliberal attitudes that direct and restrict the social economy to utilitarian and economic
purposes have brought the term into closer association with the operations of the conventional market. The apparent outcome of this has been the equation of the social economy with “social enterprises” understood as revenue generating, non-profit activities that are meant to serve social or community purposes (ibid. p. 8.).

Figure 2

The three sectors of the overall market are distinct above all in that the institutions within them operate on different economic principles (Figure 2). The first sector is the domain of governments of various levels, and as such its central economic goal is greater equality. The economic principle central to the private sector is, in turn, efficiency, while social economists are working towards the reinsertion of social goals, reciprocity/solidarity, into economic thinking and decision-making. Even though distinct, these sectors are not hermetically sealed off from each other; there are incalculable transfers and borrowings. Moreover, certain organizations operate at the boundaries of these distinctions (Restakis 2006, p. 12; Lewis 2006, p. 3).

Figure 3

Pearce (2003) prefers to use the word “system” instead of “sector,” as the latter implies to him a homogeneous economy that can be divided into three parts. Otherwise his vision parallels closely with Restakis’s ideas. He argues there are three main ways of thinking about how to manage our economic life, each sector essentially stemming from a different way of managing the economy, from a different mode of production (Figure 3).
The first sector/system is about redistribution and planning, whereby it has come to be viewed by many as bureaucratic, paternalistic, centralized, and inefficient, and as such counterproductive to the profit-driven and competitive private sector seeking to maximize financial returns to individual owners. The third sector/system is about citizens working together to meet and satisfy needs themselves (Pearce 2003, p. 26).

**Who’s Making Whom?**

It is hard to define civil society without defining its relationship with state. Chambers and Kopstein (2008) have made an important move beyond the binary traditional division by suggesting that civil society does not have to be either against or in support of the state, but depending on the context it may also be apart from, in dialogue or partnership with, or even beyond the state. As a result, civil societies, Miller et al. (2009) propose, can be depicted as being contentious, manipulated, disciplined, competitive and interest-oriented, repressed, or normative.

All that is certain is that civil society is not a stand-alone concept. As the discussion above shows, it is paired historically with the concept of the state; they are not just linked but help define each other. Bobbio (1989, p. 42) argues that two processes, the state-making-society and the society-making-state, are contradictory. The completion of the former would lead to a state without society, i.e., the totalitarian state; the completion of the latter would lead to society without the state, i.e., the extinction of the state. As they are indeed contradictory, the two processes are unattainable. Society and state act as two necessary elements that are separate but contiguous, distinct but interdependent, internal articulations of the social system as a whole (Bobbio 1989, p. 44).

The weaker the layer of civic association, the stronger the vertical relationship of the individual and the state becomes—a relationship characterized not by voluntary action and cooperation but by power, authority, and dependence (Eberly and Streeter 2002, p. 8). The reciprocal, interdependent, and constantly realigning interaction between civil society and the state is well explained by Putnam’s (1988) two-level game theory. It admits a reciprocal interaction between the domestic and the international arenas affecting the foreign policy construction in a given country. At the national level, the domestic groups pressure the government to adopt politics favorable to their interest and the politicians seek power while constructing these coalitions. At the international level, the national government seeks to maximize its own ability to satisfy domestic pressures, while minimizing the adverse consequences of the actions developed abroad (ibid.).

Increased transnationalism on the one hand and international agreements and coalitions on the other can make the game more complex. In the EU context, for instance, the two-level game model can be inserted in the relation between the member states and their domestically organized civil society. On the other hand, Putnam’s model can be applied in the relation between the European-level organized civil society and the EU. Civil society no longer acts only at the national level but has become more transnational and asserted its role as an independent actor in the world society. As the EU increases its supranational mechanisms, it also increases the importance of organized civil society in the EU multi-level governance system.
**Plurality of Civil Society**

Recognizing that civil society does mean different things to different people is one of the keys to moving forward, because it gets us beyond false universals and entrenched thinking (Edwards 2004). Civil society is equally traditional and modern (Kocka 2007, pp. 85–86). As described above, its meaning has changed on a number of occasions. Despite its opposite origins, in everyday contemporary practice civil society is assumed to form the antithesis of the state. If civil society is defined in opposition to the state then it is difficult to provide a positive definition of “civil society” because it is a question of listing everything that has been left over after limiting the sphere of state (Bobbio 1989). It is, however, even more important to acknowledge, as Giner (1995, p. 304) has done, that “[t]here is no such thing as the classical conception of civil society. There is a Lockean interpretation, but there is also a Hegelian one; and then there are Hobbesian, Marxian and Gramscian theories of it.” Different conceptions are based on different interpretations of classical traditions. These interpretations lead to different outcomes and expectation on what can be expected from civil society.

Wiarda (2003, p. 137) makes the valid observation that in theory civil society sounds wonderful, yet in reality it is often less than that. Civil society cannot be seen as a magic formula that will inevitably lead to democratic and socially just outcomes and save the world. It can be seen to include also less civil actors, operations, and objectives that are, for instance, disintegrative, clientelistic, unrepresentative or otherwise biased, divorced from power realities, or even illegal. It is beneficial where it works; yet it has also been conceived in statist and corporatist terms or as an arena of elitist competition rather than self-sustaining cooperation underpinned by a strong popular base (ibid.).

Civil society is a product whose origins are inherently and distinctly Western (Kocka 2004, p. 76). Western, particularly Western European and North American, urban societies are regarded to have been better suited to the development of a stable pluralist civil society than others, yet even there the development might have occurred as an “unintended outcome” of the efforts of state-makers as argued by Tilly (1975, p. 633). Be it as it may, this type of ethnocentric account overlooks the great diversity of the concept of civil society, and fails to see its different manifestations in different (non-Westerns) societies.

Being fundamentally Western ought not to be taken to suggest that civil society cannot exist elsewhere. Rather an analysis has to acknowledge and address this bias (Warkentin 2001). It has become palpable that transplanting a workable model from its original context to another with dissimilar history, economy, societal structure, and political culture is a problematic task. Recognizing that civil society does indeed mean different things to different people provides us with the keys to move forward for it gets us beyond broad generalizations and normative thinking.

In general terms, “Western” is used to refer to an emphasis on individualism, absence of feudal and semifeudal restraints, freedom of association, liberty, and participatory and pluralist politics, along with middle-class, entrepreneurial, and free-market economics (Wiarda 2003, p. 13). Most frequently, it refers to the Montesquieuan understanding of civil society as a multitude of independent citizens’ associations that mediate between the individual and the state and, if needed, defend the freedom of the individual against usurpation by the state. The logic stressing the civil society’s associational core and the development of individual meaning and identity was then promoted and developed further by Tocqueville and fuelled the contemporary
communitarian theorists, such as Etzioni, Bellah, Taylor, and Putnam, in their critique of the presentation of humans as atomistic individuals put forth by Locke, Hobbes, and more recently Rawls (1971).

Edwards (2004) suggests that in addition to civil society as “associational life” or as “the good society,” its function as the “public sphere,” as the arena for argument and deliberation as well as institutional collaboration, ought not to be forgotten. Edwards, acknowledging that all of these three schools of thought have something to offer, yet none of them provide complete and convincing picture of civil society by themselves, calls for integrating these different perspectives into a mutually supportive framework. In all three schools civil society is an essentially collective, creative, and value-based action, providing thus an essential counterweight to individualism, cynicism, and overbearing influence of state authority (ibid.).

**Civil Society as an Arena**

A number of conclusions can be drawn from what is described above. From civil dialogue come great ideas that can lead to important solutions. While not all civil society organizations are necessarily civil nor do they necessarily pursue the common good, the democratizing role of civil society as a whole cannot be denied. By virtue of their mere existence as *autonomous* actors, the various types of CSOs have pluralizing effect and consequently strengthen the institutional arena and the entire society. As Mercer (2002, p. 8) explains, “more civic actors means more opportunities for a wider range of interest groups to have a ‘voice,’ more autonomous organizations to act in a ‘watchdog’ role vis-à-vis the state, and more opportunities for networking and creating alliances of civic actors to place pressure on the state.” Given that many CSOs work at the grassroots level and include marginalized groups, they not only widen but also deepen possibilities for citizen participation (ibid.).

This being said, civil society remains one of the most misunderstood and misused concepts there is. The reason is obvious. What has been meant by the term has fluctuated considerably through time. In addition, the concept continues to mean very different things in different countries and languages. Using it in a global context easily obscures more than it illuminates. As a concept, it remains normative, loaded, complex, and context-dependent. The liberal democratic assumptions that often shine through Anglophone literature on civil society only restrict the exploration of this complexity and limit the extent to which these studies may actually engage with broader debates about the politics of development. A less value-laden and more contextualized approach is needed to better understand the role that various civil society organizations play in different contexts.

Looking back to the very beginning and going back to the basics, the concept of civil society is very revealing in this respect. The largely undisputed linkage to the concept of the state, which has formed the very basis of the Western (post-Hegelian) thought, should be rethought or at least broadened as to allow for more innovative solutions to issues commonly restricted within the national frame. After all, civil society is a social construct invoked not just in debates on democracy and governance but also with respect to intercultural understanding, progress, and social cohesion.

Civil society preceded the state. Aristotle knew no concept of state as we know it today. His *koinonía politiké* was a coercion-free association that channeled the collective pursuits to serve the common goal of attaining a good society. Not until the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers, most notably, was a clearer distinction developed between a nonpolitical civil society
and the state. No matter what the linkage is—be it juxtaposition, symbiosis, or something in between—it restricts the concept of civil society within the frame of a particular nation state. In so doing, it limits civil society’s characteristic intent of building an association of free, equal, and like-minded persons united not by a citizenship but by ethos.

The commonly used concept of the third sector is misleading in two crucial respects: It is not the third and it is really not even a sector. Through recent years, the borders between the public, private, and the community sectors have become increasingly blurred. A substantial range of practices and new organizational arrangements that blend their own missions either with business practices or public service production have emerged, creating something that is now referred to as a “fourth sector.” While the three-sector model surely helps us to make sense of society, the boundaries it implies remain arbitrary. Civil society is not so much embedded in the third sector as it is linked to the processes that that produce social capital and common action. As Gilbert (2004, p. 116) suggests, “[i]f state-supported nonprofit groups enlarge the social capital of civil society, then why not for-profit, company sponsored bowling teams.”

Inspired by the model put forth by CIVICUS, the World Alliance for Citizen Participation, this article aims to conceptualize civil society as an arena, a public space or realm where diverse societal values and interests interact. The borders of this space are complex, fuzzy, blurred, negotiated and yet easily penetrable as people come together to discuss and seek to influence the broader society. As such, it does not belong to the distinct arenas of the market, state or family but exists where these amalgamate (Figure 4). There are clear overlaps and incalculable transfers between the different arenas. For some organizations located at or near the
border, these distinctions form the very core of their existence. Social economy organizations that have both value and profit-based goals are good examples of this.

Civil society is the arena that occupies the space where the other arenas of the society—namely the family, the state, and the market—interact and overlap and where people associate to advance common interests. To associate refers to uncoerced and self-generating collective action that is not part of the formal political decision-making process, controlled directly by state institutions, or dependent on the state interests. While it is true that voluntary associations form the basic building blocks of Western notions of civil society and the Putnamian idea of their ability to foster social capital is by now well established, one cannot but ponder whether participation in associations really makes individuals more “civic” and active. Could it simply be that active citizens tend to join associations more often their less-engaged counterparts?

The civil society arena more generally is part of a complex dual transition from industrial to postindustrial society and from national state to transnational policy regimes (Anheier 2008). The further it develops, the further it comes to compose not just an increased number and range of groups and organizations but also increased linkages between them. This only amplifies the corrective voices of civil society as a partner in governance and the market (Connor 1999). Civil society should not be seen only passively, as a network of institutions, but also actively, as the context and product of self-constituting collective actors (Cohen and Arato 1992). It occupies the space reserved for the formation of demands (input) for the political system and to which the political system has the task of supplying answers (output) (Bobbio 1989, p. 25). A framework that places less emphasis on organizational forms and allows for a broader focus on the functions and roles of informal associations, movements, and instances of collective citizen action makes it more difficult to dictate strictly who is in and who is out. Only such an action/function-oriented definition is able to take into account the entire range of civil society actors.

References


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