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THE JAMMING OF WESTERN RADIO BROADCASTS TO EASTERN EUROPE
AND THE SOVIET UNION: THE CSCE COMPROMISE AND ITS FUTURE

by Jonathan Eyal

Summary: Despite previously undertaken international obligations, some East European states had continued to interfere with Western radio transmissions. At the CSCE follow-up conference, which was recently concluded in Vienna, both East and West undertook, yet again, not to jam such broadcasts. The East Europeans were extremely reluctant to accept this obligation and did so only at the very last moment. The Soviet Union and its allies had hoped to obtain some concessions in return for the agreement, but they failed to do so. For the first time in postwar history, Western radio stations are being received without any hindrance throughout Eastern Europe. The system for verifying compliance with the agreement recently instituted at the Vienna meeting will have to be used to the full, if the rights of all Europeans to listen to whatever broadcasts they choose is not to be threatened again.

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Introduction. The follow-up meeting in Vienna of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) ended in January 1989 with the adoption of a concluding document that upheld the inadmissibility of interfering with international radio and television transmissions. Although the document only reaffirmed principles already enumerated in the Final Act of the CSCE conference concluded in Helsinki in 1975,¹ it upholds Western interpretations of these obligations² after years of noncompliance by East European states.

Jamming--electronic interference with transmissions that are deemed undesirable--had continued in many East European states with the guidance and active support of the Soviet Union. Although Moscow stopped jamming most Western radio broadcasts in 1973, the jamming of Radio Free Europe-Radio Liberty (RFE-RL) continued unabated, as did attempts to justify it.³ Indeed, on 30 August 1980 Soviet jamming activities were extended to Poland during the crisis caused by the emergence of the Solidarity trade union⁴ and Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria were also aided in their jamming activities against RFE-RL. (All skywave jamming originated from the USSR, because of the type of interference required. At the same time, groundwave or local jamming was done from the countries to which the broadcasts were directed.) In fact, only Romania and Hungary--which ceased jamming Western radio broadcasts in 1963 and 1964--continued to allow unhindered transmissions after 1975. It was because of the record of noncompliance in this and other matters related to human rights that the concluding document of the Vienna conference went further than just the reiteration of previous principles, by establishing a process of international conferences to monitor the compliance of member states with the terms of the agreement. The Western position--which has always asserted that interference in any radio transmissions is illegal--seemed to have triumphed, but only after lengthy negotiations. Given the fact that the Soviet Union and its East European allies were most reluctant to give up radio jamming and did so only at the very last moment, how secure is this apparent Western victory?

Gorbachev's Initial Approach to the Issue of Jamming. The East European governments' attitudes toward Western broadcasting beamed at the East have always been closely coordinated by Moscow. For instance, Romania and Hungary's decision to cease jamming in the first half of the 1960s mirrored the Kremlin's move to allow unhindered broadcasts of the Voice of America (VOA) and the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) until the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In many cases, the physical task of jamming transmissions beamed at Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Bulgaria in their own languages was actually performed by Soviet transmitters inside the USSR.⁵ All the East European governments also supported Soviet-sponsored efforts to enshrine in international law a right to jam unwarranted radio broadcasts, while at the same time refusing (as did the Soviet Union) to acknowledge that they were or had been engaged in jamming. The clearest indication of this concerted effort was in the early 1960s, when most East European states suddenly discovered a 1936 convention that had attempted to restrict Nazi Germany's propaganda machine.⁶ In quick succession, Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, and Czechoslovakia ratified this convention (Romania was party to the convention from 1936). This attempt to justify jamming did not escape the notice of the West: the United Kingdom repudiated the convention in 1965 and was followed by other West European states.

Gorbachev's approach was similar to that adopted on other international issues. It consisted of an attempt to seize the high moral ground through a coordinated and highly active foreign policy. The offensive probed the limits of Western tolerance; identified a possible compromise that would preserve Soviet interests; and, finally, offered the minimum of concessions necessary in order to obtain the desired result. This entailed an initial reaffirmation of the right to jam Western broadcasts; East European delegates duly tabled proposals advancing this cause before the United Nations Information Committee in September 1985. As was indicated, however, by the stiff Western opposition to the creation of a "new information order" in which state regulation would play a decisive role, there was little benefit in seeking to obtain concessions on a wide front. The Kremlin therefore moved to specifics by publishing a lengthy study that attempted to justify the practice of jamming.⁷ Whereas before the Soviet authorities had supported the "theoretical" right of states to jam transmissions without admitting that they were themselves engaged in jamming, the study now openly asserted that jamming was applied against stations engaged in "aggressive propaganda" that was intended to disturb the internal order; in any case, it said, jamming was justified by the principle of the "unlimited sovereignty" of each state.⁸ While the argument was clearly nonsensical, contradicting as it did specific obligations freely undertaken by East European states in the past,⁹ this was the justification presented by the Soviet and East European delegations at the Budapest Cultural Forum, which met in October and November 1985. Nevertheless, it was clear to all observers that such a position could not be maintained for long, if only because traditional Soviet definitions of "state sovereignty" were also being questioned by CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.

Probing for the First Concessions. Gorbachev's real aims became clearer during the visit to the USSR of the Director of the United States Information Agency (USIA) in early 1986. The latter was informed that the need to jam Western transmissions might, indeed, abate but that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty were in a separate category over which no "concessions" would be made, since they were spreading propaganda and "malicious gossip."¹⁰ This campaign of differentiating RFE-RL from other Western stations slowly intensified: it was suggested, for instance, that while "governmental" radio stations were usually concerned with spreading knowledge about events in their parent state, RFE-RL was interested in reporting on events in the country to which it was broadcasting. Furthermore, RFE-RL was not staffed by nationals of the state that paid for its operations and was not based in the state that had ultimate editorial control. In legal terms, these were spurious arguments, for no international treaty differentiates between radio stations according to these considerations; but the approach had several advantages. First, it allowed the Soviet Union to probe the West's readiness for an agreement

classifying "propaganda" as illegal. Secondly, it isolated the stations that many East European governments feared most. Finally, it conformed to Gorbachev's personal predilection for tackling every Soviet problem by differentiating between the desirable and the essential. He may have considered that preventing inconvenient news from reaching the population of the USSR was, on the whole, desirable. Preventing the views of stations overwhelmingly concerned with reporting the domestic scene in Eastern Europe was, however, much more important. Moscow's shifting priorities were closely followed by the East European states. Bulgaria tantalizingly told the Federal Republic of Germany that Deutsche Welle's broadcasts might cease to be jammed, and Poland declared its readiness to allow unhindered access to all "state-owned" broadcasts. It is significant, however, that both said that RFE-RL's broadcasts would continue to be jammed since they "fomented unrest" in their countries.¹³

The Reciprocity Argument. The tactic was refined during the summit meeting between President Ronald Reagan and Gorbachev in Reykjavik in the autumn of 1986. In a Soviet suggestion that compromises on jamming could be envisaged on the basis of reciprocity. The Soviet Union might consider stopping jamming VOA's transmissions in return for Washington's help in setting up Soviet radio stations in the USA.¹⁴ Not only was this legally impossible¹⁵ but the suggestion was rejected as mischievous, since it attempted to gain concessions in return for the cessation of an act that contravened the USSR's international obligations. As such, it was roundly condemned by leading Western statesmen when the Vienna CSCE follow-up conference opened in November 1986.¹⁶ Nevertheless, the East Europeans took a very similar approach. In a concerted move, various radio stations were criticized in a number of East European states at the same time and all made the distinction between "state-owned" and "other" stations.¹⁷ Poland even went as far as to compare concessions on jamming to the reciprocity requirements on which the East was then insisting in negotiations on arms control.¹⁸ In order to confuse the issue even further, calculated rumors were spread claiming that a tacit agreement on these lines had already been concluded between the USA and the USSR and that, as a result, only RFE-RL would continue to be jammed. The Director of the USIA described these rumors as "totally preposterous"¹⁹ and the statements of all Western delegates in Vienna quickly disabused Moscow of the notion that Western concessions could be achieved by "mutual good will gestures," as the Soviet delegate in Vienna called them.

"Unilateral" Moves. The comparison that Poland made between discussions on jamming activities and arms control negotiations was not as inappropriate as it may first appear. In moves that clearly paralleled Gorbachev's approach to arms control negotiations, once it became clear to Moscow that the issue of jamming continued to present a source of discord in its

relations with the West, Poland quickly made a number of concessions, this time presented as "unilateral gestures of good will." It is now clear that these were coordinated with the heads of East European news agencies at a meeting held in Warsaw in January 1987.

At the end of that month, all Soviet jamming of the BBC stopped; Moscow described this as a "suspension" of activities that it still refused to regard as illegal. The move, which was timed to coincide with the arrival in the USSR of British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, was followed in May 1987 by a cessation in the jamming of the VOA's broadcasts. Again, this coincided with the arrival of the Director of the USIA in Moscow and the revival of Soviet demands for a parallel "concession" not only by the United States but by West Germany as well.²⁷ Poland took the lead in offering similar "concessions": VOA's correspondents were allowed to attend government press briefings, but RFE-RL continued to be the target of vehement criticism.²⁸ Indeed, Western engineering sources confirmed that jamming stations that had previously been used against other stations were being redirected to jam RFE-RL; this applied in particular to Radio Liberty's transmissions to the Soviet Central Asian republics.²⁹ Certainly--and again in a coordinated manner--some Soviet republics started blaming RFE-RL for "fomenting" the growing ethnic unrest.³⁰ In the summer of 1987 another concession was offered: Moscow stopped jamming some of the programs beamed by the Israeli station Kol Israel. Again, a reciprocal concession was expected, for Israel had recently agreed to allow the setting up of RFE-RL broadcasting facilities on its territory.³¹ At the same time, the pressure on RFE-RL was being stepped up; and Poland was accusing it of encouraging opposition to compulsory military service in the Warsaw Pact member states.³²

The tactic of separate concessions required a more thorough explanation, both within and outside Eastern Europe. Radio Moscow therefore started criticising the BBC's transmissions to Poland in its own Polish-language broadcasts³³ and, in response to a question from a Hungarian listener, castigated RFE-RL for "crudely interfering in Soviet internal affairs."³⁴ It is interesting that at the same time the Soviet leadership refused to abandon its support at international conferences for the creation of a state-controlled "new information order," although this support was voiced less and less for internal consumption³⁵ and was presented increasingly as evidence of Soviet support for Third World countries.³⁶ Criticisms of the Soviet Union continued in Vienna, however, and it was realized by the USSR that reciprocal moves, if applied by the West, might actually also damage Moscow's interests. The Soviet Union's offers of cooperation with Western radio stations were spurned, and in the fall of 1987 the US Department of State imposed restrictions on Soviet journalists residing in the USA in direct retaliation for Soviet refusals to allow American journalists more freedom in the USSR.³⁷

A New Approach. Thus, by the end of 1987 Soviet-coordinated attempts to single out RFE-RL for jamming were obviously failing. True, by ceasing to jam some radio stations Gorbachev appeared receptive to Western demands. These "unilateral concessions," however, failed to impress Western governments, who were perfectly well aware that a concession unilaterally given might also be taken away at will, as the Soviet Union had done in the 1960s and 1970s. Furthermore, the issue of jamming--and of human rights in general--was intertwined more than ever with that of arms control. With the negotiations on the elimination of intermediate-range nuclear forces nearing completion, it was clear to the Kremlin that the momentum for arms control negotiations in Europe could only be maintained by agreeing with the West that the issue of military security was bound up with that of confidence across the East-West divide and that human rights were therefore an essential ingredient. In vain did Moscow protest that this position was a mere subterfuge on the part of the West to conceal its reluctance to contemplate disarmament; Gorbachev's stance on jamming was increasingly dictated during 1988 by the growing realization of its impact on arms control.

The change in approach was heralded by a gathering of communist news agencies chiefs in Moscow in November 1987. The meeting, which was presided over by the leading Soviet Politburo member Aleksandr Yakovlev (a man visibly associated with Gorbachev's policies on broadcasting since early 1986), called for "humanizing relations between states."²² Moscow's line of thinking became clearer from Yakovlev's subsequent appeals to the Soviet media to become more attractive and competitive in the "battle for ideas"²³ as well as the reaction in Eastern Europe, which divided along predictable lines. Hungary welcomed the results of the meeting²⁴ and Poland stopped jamming RFE broadcasts at the end of 1987,²⁵ concentrating instead on more specific criticisms of certain programs.²⁶ On the other hand, Czechoslovakia increased its criticism of RFE's "spiteful coverage"²⁷; and Romania published a vicious and personal attack on RFE employees that also revived the accusation that RFE's transmissions were "not regulated by international law," at a time when this argument was being discarded by other East European states.²⁸

It is likely that the period of dithering that followed was intended to probe the limits of Western demands at the negotiations in Vienna as well as to convince the more reluctant East European states to drop jamming should the need arise. TASS widely circulated through all its language services a report purporting to show that interest in Western radio stations had declined since they had ceased to be the "forbidden fruit" of Soviet citizens²⁹ (a statement that appears to be untrue³⁰) and at about the same time the Soviet journalists' monthly demanded improvements in the East European media's coverage of events, in order to deflect domestic reliance on Western sources.³¹ Although the quest for reciprocal "concessions" from

the West was not entirely abandoned,³³ it slowly faded away as Moscow highlighted the role of television discussions linking various countries in presenting a balanced view of East-West positions.³⁴ The coordination of a joint East European position took much longer, however. A meeting of party officials and media experts engaged in "ideological struggle and propaganda" in a "changing world" was held in Jablonna, near Warsaw, in February 1968. Romania refused to attend.³⁵ Days after the meeting, the Polish news agency circulated an appeal to the "American taxpayer" to stop financing RFE, since its transmissions were not jammed in Poland, the statement said, this money was going "down the drain."³⁶ For good measure, Poland also claimed--like the USSR--that its own opinion polls had revealed a drop in the audience of Western radio stations.³⁷ A completely different reaction was again recorded in Romania and Czechoslovakia. Romania's tightly controlled press continued with often crude criticisms of the station,³⁸ and the Czechoslovak press claimed that religious movements in Slovakia were coordinated by "foreign agents" at RFE.³⁹

It is likely that the Soviet Union regarded this criticism as pre-empting its attempts to ascertain how strong the Western position on the issue really was, attempts that were renewed during the Soviet-American conference on the flow of information that was held in Washington in April 1968. A Soviet protest about "anti-Soviet propaganda" published at the same time as the conference failed to single out RFE-RL's broadcasts⁴⁰; and, not much later, one Soviet newspaper hailed the WDA's coverage of President Reagan's visit to Moscow as better than the Soviet media's reporting.⁴¹ By the summer of 1968 it was clear, however, that the West's position on the issue of human rights in general and jamming in particular was firm enough to delay the conclusion of the CSCE follow-up conference in Vienna.⁴² It came as little surprise, therefore, that the possibility of ceasing to jam RFE-RL's transmissions began to be aired more freely. In June 1968, in the latter pages of the Soviet press, a reader questioned the advisability of continuing to jam "some broadcasts," on the grounds that this ran counter to the policy of glasnost and its "trust in people's maturity"⁴³; similar letters appeared in other Soviet journals.⁴⁴ Indeed, within weeks another landmark was reached, when the British Prime Minister answered questions from Soviet citizens on a live program of the BBC's Russian service.⁴⁵ Moreover, by the summer of 1968 the Soviet press was engaged in direct polemic with RFE-RL on the actual content of its broadcasts, a sure sign of an impending change in policy.⁴⁶ The Soviet press also joined in a debate about the future production of radio sets, which, since the end of World War II, have been deliberately produced without the facility to receive transmissions on the 13, 16, and 19 short-wave meter bands.⁴⁷ The quality of Radio Moscow's transmissions was also criticized in an obvious attempt to prepare the ground for the announcement of a change in policy.⁴⁸

All Jamming Ends. During the night of 29 November 1988 the jamming of Radio Liberty's broadcasts to the USSR was suddenly stopped, allowing the station unhindered reception in the Soviet Union for the first time in more than 30 years. Deutsche Welle's transmissions also ceased to be jammed.⁶⁰ The Hungarian media quickly reported this reversal of previous policy⁶¹; but elsewhere in Eastern Europe jamming transmitters continued to operate for a little longer.

What forced the Soviet Union finally to abandon all jamming? It is known that jamming was one element behind the opposition of Britain and the USA to the conclusion of the CSCE follow-up conference and the decision to hold a meeting in Moscow in 1991 on human rights, another project dear to Gorbachev's heart. The Soviet decision to stop jamming certainly softened this opposition and was quickly followed by Czechoslovakia's cessation of jamming of RFE broadcasts⁶² and Bulgaria's similar decision a few days later.⁶³ Immediately after the New Year recess, the CSCE follow-up conference adopted its final document, thus opening the way for talks on the reduction of conventional weapons in Europe. How permanent is this achievement likely to be?

Possible Future Developments. The Soviet Union and Eastern Europe dropped their insistence on jamming Western broadcasts at the very last moment. It was, in fact, the concession for which the West had to wait the longest during the negotiations in Vienna. Nevertheless, it is clear that the approach taken by Western states had produced the desired result. Not only is the issue of the free flow of information inextricably linked to questions of security, but a future reimposition of jamming could easily have a serious effect on East-West relations. Moreover, while the question of jamming was one of the last to be settled in Vienna, it is also one of the first that will be examined in the follow-up conferences already decided upon: an "Information Forum" will start examining these issues on 18 April 1989, in London.

This achievement nevertheless needs to be put in perspective. First, the Soviet Union and Poland justified their cessation of jamming without any reference to international obligations. The USSR presented the move as a further sign of its openness and Poland specifically related it to its "sovereign right" to do so. What is more disturbing, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria have so far said virtually nothing about their decision to stop jamming. Ideally, the inadmissibility of jamming should be anchored in official statements by the states concerned. Not only did this not happen--with the exception of Hungary--but Romania (which has already notified the conference that it will not respect certain provisions of the agreement arrived at in Vienna) is busily preparing legal justifications for jamming,⁶⁴ even though no technical prerequisites appear to be in the making. Paradoxically, Ceausescu's regime now also has to take into

account the broadcasts of Radio Moscow in Romanian, which persistently advance ideas at variance with Bucharest's views.²²

Secondly, it is important to remember that the decision to stop jamming broadcasts is hardly a concession as such: it merely signifies a newly found desire to respect obligations already undertaken many years ago. Finally, much will depend on its application. Gorbachev has realized that electronic jamming of radio transmitters is no longer a very important consideration; much more important for the future is the prospect of direct television broadcasting, with its powerful combination of picture and sound.²³ The Soviet media have shown increasing interest in beaming their own television programs to Eastern Europe and thus seizing the initiative.²⁴ Indeed, the vast resources allocated to jamming radio broadcasts, which currently cannot leave much change from \$850,000,000 a year in operating costs alone, are probably the most important argument against its repositioning, except in particularly serious circumstances.

The current approach toward broadcasts from the West is, therefore, likely to be different from what it was until recently. All East European states persistently criticize the content of radio broadcasts beamed at their citizens. While this criticism (which has become a daily event in the Polish media) is unobjectionable in principle, it is also true that it is presented as an appeal to Western "taxpayers" to stop wasting money on such transmissions. This approach still leaves RFE-BL in an exposed position²⁵ by suggesting that a station that was set up out of a desire to keep East Europeans informed about their own affairs and staffed mainly by emigre employees cannot be accurate and unbiased and is, therefore, an "anachronism" at the time when the Cold War is "dead." The Polish government has made this appeal openly and was joined by the Hungarian Leader Karoly Gross, who, during his visit to the USA in early February called for a "study" on the influence of RFE broadcasts on the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution in 1956.²⁶ As long as this differentiation between radio stations exists, as long as a particular radio station is criticized for what it is rather than what it broadcasts, the issue of jamming will remain on the agenda of international gatherings, if only because the trend in Western Europe is toward more, rather than less, international programming from government-related stations.²⁷

The only guarantee against a recurrence of past efforts to interfere with Western broadcasts lies in the public assurance of East-bloc governments that this practice will not be repeated as well as the dismantling of the jamming devices. One of the last public statements in office of US Secretary of State George Shultz included a demand for the complete dismantling of such devices.²⁸ His appeal appears to have been met only (partly) in Estonia,²⁹ although the Soviet First Deputy Minister of Communications has said that some transmitters elsewhere in the

Soviet Union may be converted for domestic use.¹⁰ At the same time, Czechoslovakia has only recently said that it can "not sit at home with its hands folded" while Radio Free Europe continues to encourage dissident groups to protest against their government.¹¹ The Soviet Union and its East European allies may well expect to be asked for more evidence of their long-term intentions at the conference scheduled to convene in London this spring. The final verdict on this episode in East-West relations is still awaited.

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- 1 For the text, see US Department of State Bulletin, vol. LXVIII, no. 3,689, 1 September 1975, pp. 321-322.
- 2 President Gerald Ford's interpretation at the time is printed in Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 11, 26 July 1975, pp. 780-781.
- 3 J. Eyal, "Recent Developments in the Jamming of Western Radio Stations Broadcasting to the USSR and Eastern Europe," *SL* 415/76, 7 November 1984.
- 4 *Broadcasting Magazine*, September 1980.
- 5 US Department of Commerce, *Monitoring of Harmful Interference to the HF Broadcasting Service*, December 1981, pp. 48-50.
- 6 League of Nations Official Journal, December 1936, Document C.299.N.323.
- 7 *Klor and Viktorov, Aggressive Broadcasting: Psychological Warfare* (Moscow: SPK, 1983).
- 8 *Ibid.*
- 9 For an analysis of the legal arguments, see J. Eyal, "Recent Developments in the Jamming of Western Radio Stations Broadcasting to the USSR and Eastern Europe," *SL Supplement* 8/87, 23 September 1987.
- 10 *UPI*, 23 January 1984.
- 11 *Radio Warsaw*, 24 September 1984.
- 12 *Pravda*, 23 October 1984.
- 13 *The Washington Post*, 24 October 1984.
- 14 *The Washington Times*, 5 November 1984; *The Times*, 4 November 1984; *Le Monde*, 7 November 1984.
- 15 Compare *Sakotskii'skoe Delo*, 5 November 1984, with *Radio Moscow*, 4 November 1984, and *Radio Prague* (in English), 7 November 1984.
- 16 See the article in *Stranar Niodych*, 7 November 1984.

- 17 The Washington Times, 13 November 1986.
- 18 Moscow Central Telestation, 25 June 1987.
- 19 The New York Times, 19 June 1987; The Independent, 19 June 1987.
- 20 The Washington Post, 13 June 1987.
- 21 See the speech by Moldavian party leader Simion Ciocan in Sovetskaya Rossiya, 3 October 1987; Radio Vlasia (in English), 3 October 1987, 11:00 PM EDT; Rabotnikii Rabochii (Baku), 23 October 1987.
- 22 The Independent, 19 June 1987.
- 23 Zolotaya Molochat, 18 September 1987.
- 24 Radio Moscow (in Polish), 4 September 1987, 3:00 PM EDT.
- 25 Ibid., (in Hungarian), 20 September 1987, 7:00 PM EDT.
- 26 See, for instance, Teoriya i Praktika Sredstv Massovoi Informatsii i Propagandy (Moscow, 1981).
- 27 Harody Arid i Afrika, September-October 1987, pp. 115-121; Radio Moscow (in English to Africa), 19 December 1987.
- 28 The Independent, 18 October 1987.
- 29 TASS, 26 November 1987.
- 30 Pravda, 3 December 1987.
- 31 Magyar Hirlap featured on 21 December 1987 the Hungarian Post Office's call for "order" in short-wave bands.
- 32 The Economist, 18 January 1988, p. 46.
- 33 Additionally, from October 1987 Radio Warsaw's home service transmitted excerpts from Western broadcasts in Polish, including those of RFE, in its program "The West Calling."
- 34 Pravda (Krasnodar), 24 November 1987.
- 35 Contemporanul, 15 January 1988, p. 13.
- 36 TASS, 23 December 1987.
- 37 Letters to the BBC's Russian service increased eightfold in the year since jamming has stopped and the VOB is receiving more telephone calls than ever before from the USSR (The Daily Telegraph, 19 January 1988; International Herald Tribune, 10 October 1988).
- 38 Zhurnalist, January 1988, pp. 12-13.

- 39 It was briefly revived at least twice in 1968 (Moscow News, no. 1, 1968, pp. 6-7; The Washington Times, 25 January 1968.
- 40 V. Yessman, "Soviet Telecircles in 1967," SL 31/90, 28 January 1968.
- 41 Trybuna Labo, 12 February 1968.
- 42 PAP, 15 February 1968.
- 43 Ibid., 7 March 1968.
- 44 Cronica, 4 March 1968.
- 45 Pravda (Bratislava), 28 March 1968.
- 46 Sovetskaya Kossips, 28 April 1968.
- 47 Moscow News, 30 May 1968.
- 48 International Herald Tribune, 17 June 1968.
- 49 Investiya, 21 June 1968.
- 50 Argumenty i Fakty, 25 August 1968.
- 51 The Times, July 1968.
- 52 Compare Investiya, 18 August 1968, with SSSR, 23 August 1968; Investiya, 23 August and 24 September 1968.
- 53 Investiya, 31 August 1968.
- 54 Sovetskaya Kultura, 7 October 1968.
- 55 Moscow News, 18 December 1968.
- 56 Daily News, 2 December 1968.
- 57 International Herald Tribune, 22 December 1968.
- 58 AFP, 28 December 1968.
- 59 See, for instance, Aulsteia, 10 September 1968; Press Mostra, October 1968, p. 27; revista romana de Studii Internationale, vol. XXII, September-October 1968, p. 417, and Viata Militara, December 1968, p. 15.
- 60 See Romanian Situation Report/11, Radio Free Europe Research, 16 September 1968, item 6.
- 61 See V. V. Kasin, "Satellite Television for Eastern Europe: Signposts in a Changing Landscape," SAD Background Report/90 (Eastern Europe), 1968, 28 May 1968.
- 62 New Times (Moscow), English edition, 11 November 1968, pp. 13-14.

- 63 Time, 19 December 1988, p. 59
- 64 International Herald Tribune, 11 July 1988.
- 65 J. Tass, "British Broadcasting to Western Europe: The Way Ahead," The World Today, December 1988, pp. 208-212.
- 66 International Herald Tribune, 17 January 1989.
- 67 Moscow News, 15 January 1989.
- 68 Pravda, 3 January 1989. Various Soviet sources have indicated that jamming devices operated at unsafe levels of transmissions; this may serve as a prelude to their dismantling.
- 69 Radio Prague, 19 January 1989. The leading Czechoslovak dissident Vaclav Havel is still charged with organizing demonstrations with "the help of Western radio stations" (Financial Times, 7 February 1989).

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