

"NGOs and resources: getting a closer grip on a complex area"

Nuno Themudo

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E-mail: nunothemudo@yahoo.com

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NGO RESOURCES EXPLORED

This paper analyses the use of resources in NGOs. According to Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) finding resources is the most important activity for an organisation. Very little systematic empirical research has been carried out on NGO organisational environment, but NGOs tend to operate in environments described as resource dependent or resource scarce (Hudock, 1997; Lewis, 1999). There is a growing recognition that dealing with resource providers is one of the most important tasks in NGO management (Fowler, 1997).

During my interviews I repeatedly met with the quintessential worry of NGO managers: how to get resources. For instance, the leader of Natura-lia said that "the most time demanding job for me is fundraising. I estimate that I spend about 90% of my time in activities related to fundraising" (Oscar, Mx). "Who should we turn to for funding?" was a question commonly made to me during the interviews. As a person with knowledge about NGOs and coming from the North, NGOs often would see me as a potential source of information about their 'greatest organisational problem'. 'What do other NGOs do [to solve their funding problems]?' (Maur, Mx)

Safe from notable exceptions (Fowler, 1997; Hudock, 1995), there has been little effort at exploring in a systematic way NGO resource environ-

ment. That is the resources NGOs use, the environment NGOs get their resources from, or the influence of this environment on NGO management. Does NGO internal structure change according to type of resource provider? Why do NGOs not increase their supporter base? Do institutional resources compromise NGO independence? Most answers to these questions have been sketchy and unsystematic.

The literature on NGOs tends to analyse NGO relationships with resource providers one-by-one, e.g., relation NGOs and state, NGOs and official donors, NGOs and the public. This research revealed however that NGOs themselves have a more integrated picture where each actor is a potential source of resources. Their relation with official donors is not independent from their relation with the state or with volunteers. Their relation with the state is likewise dependent on all other relations such as for instance relation with the media. NGOs must face their complex environment and manage relations simultaneously. This is something the literature has only mentioned but never really explored.

Some mainstream organisational theories such as resource dependency perspective provide a very good starting point to the understanding of NGO resource environment. These theories however were developed based on companies in the North and their applicability to NGOs can only be hypothesised. Resource mobilisation theory on the other hand has been developed for social movement organisations, which arguably come closer to NGOs in resource needs. It too however was developed in the North. The North presents organisations with a much richer, much more resour-

¹ Nuno Themudo is a PhD candidate working at the Centre for Voluntary Organisation, London School of Economics and visiting researcher at the Programa Interdisciplinario de Estudios del Tercer Sector, Colegio Mexiquense. He is sponsored by the Programa Praxis XXI, Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia, Lisbon.

ceful, environment than the environment in the South. On the other hand interdependence may also be much higher in the North where social division of labour is higher. We lack a systematic and detailed observation of NGO resource environment. In this paper I take a closer look at the resource environment of NGOs. Theories developed for organisations in other sectors or geographical settings were used as hypotheses for testing against the empirical evidence on NGOs.

In the first part of the paper NGO resources are defined and assumptions used in this study are spelled out. After, resources used by Mexican and Portuguese NGOs are described and analysed based on typologies developed by Freeman (1979) and Fowler (1997), which distinguish resources according to their physical constitution, origin and function in the organisation.

Resource definition

Everything and anything could be seen as a resource. A resource is not only something concrete (tangible or intangible), but also a *use* of something. As with most basic concepts, resources are extremely difficult to define. McAdam (1982) has stated that there is no useful definition of resources in the literature. He complained that although so much of the literature on social movement organisations focuses on the issues around resource mobilisation most authors skirt the task of defining what they are referring to. He states that problem is probably the greatest weakness of such theories. It seems that today his criticism is still valid. Most writers take for granted the understanding of what is meant by 'resources'. Even resource dependency perspective does not provide a clear definition of resources, referring only that resources are fundamental for organisations' work and survival.

There is no universal rule to distinguish a resource from a non-resource. The distinction will lie on the ability to use the resource to accomplish something desired. If something helps accomplishing an objective now or in the future then it is a resource. A *relative* understanding of what resources are is adopted in this study. While not trying to solve the long lasting problem of defining re-

sources, this study hopes to shed some light into some aspects of an useful definition of resources. To make the concept of resources amenable to analysis I must draw its boundaries. For the purposes of this study I combined assumptions about resources derived from a variety of theoretical traditions:

1. Every resource has a strategic value. For a NGO the main value of a resource is its strategic value. This value is the extent to which it will help the mission being accomplished. For an organisation, strategic value is more important than market value although they are commonly related. This is the case of resources that can be traded by some resource which will help accomplishing the mission (e.g. money traded for staff wages). There is no intrinsic value to a resource. For a NGO, that value will depend on the management capacity and the strategic capacity of putting that resource to accomplishing the mission. A poorly used resource has little value even if it has a high market value. Even a previously done mistake could be a resource if it allows learning and improvement of the capacity to accomplish the mission. In this line of thinking, anything can be a resource, as long as it contributes to accomplishing the mission.
2. Resources need to be seen in a opportunity framework. This is a basic assumption in resource mobilisation theory and more recently in mobilising structures theory. Following the previous assumption, resources are only valuable to the extent that they can be used to accomplishing the mission. If there is no opportunity to use a resource it has no value. This does not apply to a resource that can be used in the future. This resource has a value as a reserve now and as a functional resource when used. Again the value of a resource will depend on management and strategic capacity to find or create opportunities to employ existing resources. Resource mobilisation theory recognises the importance of opportunities in the political structure for social movement organisations to attain their goals. Having resources is a necessary but not sufficient condition for social change. It is also

necessary to find or create opportunities to use the resources. Since often NGOs need opportunities to present themselves on areas which are well beyond their control (de Graff, 1987) NGOs may perform poorly even if they have resources.

3. Every resource has a cost. This is a basic assumption in neo-classical and neo institutional economics. Resources are not commonly up for the grab of NGOs. Instead to new access resources NGOs need to use existing resources which most NGOs do not have plenty of. Even the unexpected donation requires an organisational framework to receive and allocate the resource. That framework has a cost to the organisation. If the cost of accessing a resource is lower than the value of the resource than the organisation grows in its capacity to achieve its mission. If the cost is higher than the value then the organisation shrinks. Resource acquisition could be seen as investment where some resources are used in the hope of heaping more resources. Official donors rarely allow their resources to be 'invested'. They can only be used in operational expenditure. [Herein lies one of the main problems of NGOs. They cannot like other organisation borrow and invest. They have almost no access to credit.]
4. For every resource there is a demand. This is a basic assumption in some organisational theories such as resource dependency perspective and new institutionalism. Every resource is provided by someone or some institution which will make demands or conditions on the use of the resource by the NGO. The equivalent term in accounting is liability. This is true even if the demand is an implicit hope that the coin deposited on the street fundraising bucket will not be used for the benefit of whoever is holding the bucket but for a public cause. That is to say, at least there is a demand of honesty that resources given be used for the advertised cause. Demands can create problems for NGOs reducing their independence. [Dependence can go both ways. When a donor gives to a NGO dependence of the donor on the NGO may originate. Demands are commonly enforced by the threat of future withdrawal, i.e., discontinuation of resource

provision. In no case were demands enforced through court action.]

The assumptions about the strategic value of resources and the need for opportunities will be developed in this paper. I will focus on the former as there is much work covering the relation between opportunities and resources in the social movement organisations literature.

Resources used by NGOs

What resources do NGOs need? What resources do they use? The literature has overwhelmingly concentrated on two main resources: money and labour (normally volunteer). The real picture is however much more complex. Although money and labour are indeed the main resource used by NGOs other resources such as legitimacy or reputation also play a crucial role in NGO life.

According to my interviewing of NGOs themselves, NGOs need money, labour, space, equipment, information, and scientific expertise. Some less obvious resources were also mentioned such as tax deductibility status or closeness to the media. A closer inspection however revealed other perhaps less obvious resources which can often be as important. These include goodwill (good reputation), organisational learning, access to policy makers, availability of social entrepreneurs, institutional resources such as favourable legislation, availability of networking forums, and even the ability to speak English.

These resources will exist in different quantities (and qualities) in different environments and different NGOs. A major distinguishing factor between NGOs is the particular mix of resources they rely on (Freeman, 1979). They will be different and undertake different work depending on the resources they can attract and the resources needed which can vary with such diverse factors as their mission, organisational size, structure or type of work. This study suggests that, although commonly we think of the definition of mission and strategy as preceding resource procurement, NGOs will often reverse this order.

A full listing of all possible resources used by NGOs is impossible. Here I will concentrate on the main types of resources used. First, I will describe the main resources used by environmental NGOs in Mexico and Portugal by their physical definition. This classification is based on Freeman (1973). Second, I will suggest a typology of resources according to their origin. This is a very relevant classification for NGOs as it refers to issues of independence and accountability. It is based on Freeman (1973) combined with Fowler (1997). Third, I will apply a typology based on the function of resources in the organisation. This classification is based on Freeman (1973) and RDP. b) 5) a) b) The description of NGO resources in this paper emphasises resources that are less easy to understand or that are less frequently explored in the literature.

Physical definition

Freeman (1979) provides a very useful classification of resources according to their physical definition. The most obvious distinction among the variety of resources available to NGOs is that between tangible and intangible. These are interchangeable but only up to a point. Money can buy space but not always vice versa. According to Freeman (1979), the main tangible resources are money, space and a publicity space. Intangible resources can be divided into three categories: specialised resources (expertise, access to a network, access to polity decision-makers, status in polity), time, and commitment. This study suggests a need to expand these categories to include equipment, management capacity and social entrepreneurship.

Tangible resources

Money is one of the most important resources for NGOs. It is the first resource any organisation will mention when asked what resources it needs. Most of the literature NGOs also concentrates on funding as the main resource used by NGOs. The great value of money that it can be interchanged with other needed resources (e.g., labour). There is an over-attention to money in NGOs partly promoted by

demands from the state and donors to produce financial reports. When interrogated about volunteer labour no NGO was able to say with certainty how much had the organisation used. There was no effort at trying to give a financial value to volunteer labour.

It is however a mistake to judge the affluence of a NGO by its monetary contributions. Money will not normally buy commitment or ideological conviction, so important in NGOs (Freeman, 1979). NGOs are rich in unconventional resources, normally intangible resources, that accounting theorists have been struggling for years to include in their analyses of organisations. Such is the case of for instance goodwill (reputation) or employee commitment. NGOs also draw upon even harder to grasp resources such as access to the media or social entrepreneurship that are fundamental to NGO everyday work. These resources may mark the difference between success or failure to achieve organisational objectives. This study revealed a wealth of non-monetary resources NGOs draw upon to achieve their goals.

A common problem for NGOs is 'money-dependence'. NGOs that come to rely essentially on money become dependent on sources of money. They may not diversify their resource providers enough. In resource scarce environments this problem is amplified because all money provided for NGOs comes from a handful of actors. In Mexico a large part of the national funding for environmental NGOs is provided by FOMECO, an independent fund created by USAID and the Mexican government. In Portugal most funding comes from the state. The issue of 'money-dependence' and dependence in general is discussed below.

Normally the main use for money in bureaucratic and professional NGOs is to pay staff wages. Volunteer NGOs use money mainly to buy equipment for projects. They face a very different money-dependence.

Space is normally rented. Only two NGOs interviewed did not pay rent for their space. One ngo that did not pay rent had received a house at the death of a sympathiser. The other NGO had a special agreement with the state for a lease of a

house without pay. Most less formal NGOs do not however have a space for the exclusive use of the NGO. Their members meet at home or at someone's office.

Publicity medium was a very common resource among the studied NGOs. All the case studies and most interviewed NGOs had some kind of magazine or bulletin to communicate to members and sometimes to the public in general. NGOs thought that giving their members a magazine served three main purposes. First, keeping their members informed about NGO activities both to show their accountability and to ask for more resources for any activity. Second, use general articles to promote environmental education among members. Third, to provide a 'selective incentive' to members in an attempt to reduce free riding. Olson (1965) argued that in large, latent, groups (such as sympathisers of environmental protection) that desire a public good, collective action will only take place if selective incentives are offered. Selective incentives are goods which can be distributed according to the involvement in collective action. A magazine can serve such purpose being given only to those that become members of the NGO.

Only one Mexican NGO had a magazine widely sold to the public. Most NGOs could not get past the very complicated procedures for distribution of a magazine. Magazines were thus essentially a tool to communicate with NGO sympathisers and members rather than to the public in general. Many NGOs in Portugal however could easily draw on their contacts with the mass media to communicate their views to the general public. They did not therefore have as much use for a organisational magazine to do that.

Increasingly internet page is a medium chosen by NGOs to communicate that promises to revolutionise the relation between NGOs and their supporters. The internet lowers communication costs and widens the potential audience. All but one of the case studies had a web site. Among the NGOs interviewed the proportion of NGOs with internet presence is reduced to about one quarter. However about half of the NGOs mentioned the interest in developing a web presence in the near future.

Equipment is a common resource need for NGOs. Freeman (1979) does not mention equipment as an important resource for social movement organisations. Maybe because in 1978 the computer or the fax had not entered every office having become absolutely indispensable today.

Equipment is an important resource for many ngo activities.

"We used all the money mainly to buy equipment (e.g., palas, picos), which we then lent to volunteers. We managed to do much with a little money. And the equipment can always be used again next year. However without [the equipment] it would be very difficult to have done any of the reforestation work." (Maur, Mx.)

Equipment is a favourite resource for givers. Its relation to the actual environmental work being undertaken is clearer than that of overheads and it is easily accounted for by receipts. Thus a large proportion of project funding is dedicated to equipment purchase.

SPECIALISED INTANGIBLE RESOURCES

According to Freeman (1979:172) "people are the primary intangible resource of a movement, and movements rely very heavily upon them". She referred to what came to be called later 'social movement organisations' (by for instance Jenkins, 1987). This study showed that the same could be said about NGOs. Freeman (1979), however, refers to intangible resources as belonging to people, such as expertise. There are resources however such as reputation or organisational learning that can belong to the organisation. Freeman's (1979) understanding of intangible resources should therefore be extended to include resources attributed to the organisation but not to individuals within the organisation.

By specialised intangible resources, Freeman (1979:173) refers to resources that

"are possessed by only a few participants [in a movement] - an only a few really need

to possess them as the point of diminishing returns is reached very quickly. These resources include expertise of various sorts; access to networks through which other resources can be mobilised; access to decision-makers relevant to the movement; and status, whether within the movement's constituencies or within the polity the movement is trying to influence".

Scientific expertise is a fundamental resource in a knowledge based subject such as environmental protection. The state often has to legitimise its policies on scientific grounds. "Scientific theory and evidence are a necessary condition for a rational ecological policy" (O'Neil, 1993:145). There is a normal requirement for environmental impact assessment (EIA) studies to be undertaken on all major public works in both Mexico and Portugal. NGOs are well positioned to understand those studies and even question their quality. In Portugal various public projects were cancelled or delayed because of NGO objections to EIA studies or lack of them in the planning phase. These include the construction of the Vasco da Gama bridge in Lisbon over the river Tagus, the construction of a commercial hotel unit in Troia on a natural reserve.

In Mexico NGOs do not have the legal rights to stop a public project with dubious EIA study. Therefore this is a less likely strategy for NGOs. In some cases however NGOs have been able to question the value and undermine the credibility of projects that destroyed the environment. One such example was an ecotourism project in the Isla Espirito Santo. One NGO invoked the absence of an environmental impact study and managed to stop the project.

Environmental expertise is complex needing a combination of skills from different academic disciplines such as chemistry, physics, biology, environmental sciences and increasingly social sciences. Even environmental engineers do not hold all the needed information. One NGO member said that

"[Most of the other managers in Quercus] are environmental engineers. They know nothing about conservation! Whenever they need information relating to conservation they ask me. [...] I on the other hand know very little about contamination and other chemical problems. We complement each other" (Joao, Pt)

This mix is particularly hard to manage when all involved are volunteers as in the case of most Portuguese NGOs:

"Our permanent commission gives technical opinions about environmental issues. It is mainly oriented toward press releases or questions. It is integrated by 6 members: one environmental engineer, one biologist, one lawyer, ... [...] We have already had problems of having disclosed an opinion without adequate, sufficient, deliberation. It is often not easy to coincide having the time of the person with the right expertise and sufficient knowledge about a specific problem or event" (Joao, Pt)

Technical expertise gives NGOs much power because they concentrate much of the existing expertise in the countries researched. This gives NGOs a privileged access to the media and to public opinion.

"before, environmental NGOs had much power as the only non-governmental experts on environmental issues. Often they would write the texts in news reports themselves. Now the media already have some specialists so they are less dependent on news sent by the NGOs" (Gil, Pt)

NGOs can create dependence of other actors on them. They can make the state dependent on NGOs for the supply of some technical expertise. The media too are often dependent on NGOs for environmental expertise. Holding appropriate expertise is one of the greatest resources for NGOs'

work and to trade for other resources from different actors.

Closely related to technical expertise is information as a fundamental resource for NGOs. Information about environmental degradation, laws, sources of funding, etc, are all important to help accomplish NGO mission. Technical expertise is understood to include both knowledge and information.

Another area of expertise deserving comment is management. There is a growing literature on NGOs and capacity building. Donors frequently sponsor programmes of NGO capacity building. A Mexican donor identified the lack of management capacity as one of the key obstacles to the effectiveness environmental NGOs in Mexico (Fomeco, Mx). This was echoed by some NGOs:

"Environmental NGOs in Mexico are often weak because (1) they are not formally constituted, (2) projects fall outside their mission (constitution), (3) they have difficulties administering financial resources, and (4) have marketing incapability" (Flavio, Mx).

One of the principal reasons for their lack of management capacity is the scarcity of institutional or organisational funding. A NGO manager stated that through their past experience "we have learnt that we need 15% for administration costs" (Mauricio, Mx). Yet most project funding does not cover administration costs or sets resources for administration at an unreasonably low level (Marta, Mx). Funders offer much resistance to paying wages and administrative costs (Marta, Mx).

"We had our phone cut! We did not have the money to pay the bill. We can not get institutional funding" (Maur, Mx)

A good example of this problem is fundraising itself. Fundraising is not generally recognised by givers as an activity worth supporting. NGOs have to bear the (high) cost of fundraising. This issue will be covered below when discussing the costs of resources.

In Portugal the great problem around management expertise is related to volunteer management. Volunteers normally have no management expertise – they are self-taught. This problem is aggravated by volunteers' desire for autonomy.

"Quercus had a very fragile financial situation. [...] Our local chapters had debts. They are normally managed by self-taught people, who know little about accounting or management. Their projects were not reviewed by the national headoffices, so strong was their autonomy. [...] We had a debt from our member magazine of Esc\$8m (£27,000). Our accountant said it was only Esc\$80,000 (£270)!! That was the result of lack of control over regional chapters spending" (Joao, Pt)

"NGOs have a difficult financial situation. Their accounts are not very clear nor transparent. Member participation is small. Their organisational infrastructure is very weak, with the exceptions of Geota and Mertola. The project management absorbs most of the leaders' time, who are volunteer. There is almost no board of directors [no involvement of]" (Henrique, Pt)

Access to a network is another important type of resources. Kurzinger et al. (1991) found that Mexican environmental NGOs saw networks as This study confirmed these views. In Portugal NGOs find similar benefits in networks.

"There is no money involved at the Confederacao [...] The main objectives of the Confederacao are [firstly] to defend the corporative interests. For instance, proposing a law regulating environment NGOs which include rights to access information, exemption of court costs, tax incentives. [Secondly] work as an umbrella organisation. To serve as a meeting and discussion point and a post box" (Joanaz, Pt)

Networks can strengthen a political claim made by NGOs

"Environmental NGOs in Portugal collaborate a lot in maintaining common public stances (*posturas publicas*). They do not however collaborate much in operations. [...] To get the support in a public stance it only took a couple phone calls from me to Francisco [Ferreira] and to the Engenheiro [Sequeira] telling them the conclusions of the study and the concluding position. I asked if they wanted to sign the public statement. That was it. There is much more weight to a stance that is endorsed by all the major NGOs" (Joanaz, Pt)

"Union makes us strong (*union hace la fuerza*). It is important that we face [the state] united with a common position. That is the only way we can ever be heard" (Oscar, Mx)

Despite the recognition of access to a network being a resource networks are still fragile in both countries. For environmental NGOs in Mexico there exists a myriad of networks most of them with only a few members. One of the largest networks the UGA has only 45 members. In Portugal networks are stronger than in Mexico with Confederação having just over 100 NGOs, that is about half of all environmental NGOs in Portugal. Also the Confederação has institutional powers being often involved in consultation exercises for the state. In both countries however networks are severely weakened by the absence of the major NGOs. In Mexico Pronatura and Greenpeace do not belong to any national network. In Portugal Quercus and LPN are also out of Confederação. NGOs in both Mexico and Portugal tend to network sparingly and generally only when there is a major political issue at stake.

Access to polity decision-makers and status in the polity, or political resources in general, have a fundamental importance for advocacy NGOs. Favourable changes in legislation and policy making enable NGOs to coopt state resources and enforcement capacity to accomplish their mission.

Unfavourable legislation on the other hand may easily jeopardise environmental protection. There is a clear interest in NGOs engaging in advocacy activity to help accomplishing their mission. Kortten (1990) made a similar argument emphasising the importance of NGOs engaging in advocacy work. All case-studies in both countries engaged in some form of advocacy. Also most NGOs interviewed saw advocacy as fundamental to accomplishing their mission.

Advocacy was particularly important for Portuguese NGOs. This is perhaps due to the greater availability to NGOs of institutional resources of the Portuguese state, the greater level of democratisation of Portuguese society where NGOs are not as easily repressed or silenced, and the greater participation of citizens in NGOs in Portugal that gives NGOs greater legitimacy to representation claims.

In Portugal NGOs have a high status with polity decision-makers and society. Citizens have often manifested in surveys that they are very concerned with environmental issues (Sequeira, Pt).

"Environmental NGOs have much political weight today. They conducted 'wars' on the government of Cavaco Silva [1987-9?] through the use of public opinion and the monitoring of state activities. [...] They conducted very successful campaigns [...] that gained them respect by both [the state] and society" (Gil, Pt)

"Quercus has much lobbying power. [...] Many changes to the legislation that we have suggested have been incorporated. [...] No-one wants to have Quercus breathing down their necks!" (Joao, Pt)

"Since 1986 ENGOS have increasingly gained respect [legitimacy] from decision-makers such as government, companies and local authorities. This respect [legitimacy] has come mainly from the technical expertise we hold and our not very extremist, radical, position. [...] But in the end, decision-makers have a different strategy and consider us some 'hippies' that only think about flowers and birds! At a time when the recognition of the

need for sustainable development is well recognised! Many believe environmentalists are like some form of fundamentalism" (Conceição, Pt)

Perhaps the most influential campaign of environmental NGOs has been the opposition to the construction of the bridge Vasco da Gama. The European Commission almost withdrew its support worth millions of Euros to the construction of the most expensive bridge ever built in Portugal. Environmental NGOs submitted evidence before the Commission that the construction of the bridge under the supervision of the Portuguese state was unnecessarily damaging the environment in breach of EU funding regulations. In the end the Portuguese government managed to assure the European Commission that the irregularities would be corrected and the funding was not interrupted. The NGOs had shown they could seriously damage and embarrass the government and the state.

The status in rural communities is somewhat low. NGOs are often mistaken for state agents and seen as urban outsiders that prevent the development of rural areas.

"Quercus is in the field, ICN (state) is not. ICN forbade fishing at a dam [in a park] which was not an important action from a conservation point of view, but to the locals we were responsible for that restriction. They do not distinguish Quercus from ICN" (João, Pt)

"there was a local discussion about the management of the NPA. The discussion happened through local institutions such as the fishermen association. It was common that local people confused ENGOS with the government! Even mayors! They shout 'You put the rules and we suffer the consequences of underdevelopment!'" (Conceição, Pt)

"ENGOS essentially urban. Dedicated essentially to environmental education. Quercus the exception with regional and local branches. But normally they are outsiders to areas sensitive to conservation" (Henrique, Pt)

In Mexico NGOs' status in polity and society is medium. They are respected but they have little popularity (Maria, Mx). Their impact is therefore much more limited. The entry of a famous environmental NGO activist - Julia Carabias - into the head of the environment ministry did much to improve the access of NGOs to the executive power. Many NGO members are personal friends of Carabias or at least know her well (Regina, Mx). The status of environmental NGOs in rural communities is normally high but sometimes NGOs are seen as outsiders.

"In Isla del Espirito Santo an ecotourism project was destroying a species of rabbit. Pronatura stopped it. The local community saw us as villains for stopping development. Local communities often resist our actions. Rumours are spread and Pronatura is said to be a foreign NGO set to control them" (Flavio, Mx)

UNSPECIALISED INTANGIBLE RESOURCES

Labour time is a fundamental resource for NGOs. Most environmental NGO activities are labour rather than capital intensive such as environmental education, lobbying or reforestation. Indeed labour is one of the sources of comparative advantage NGOs have. Afful (1992) found that access to relatively inexpensive by high quality human capital enables NGOs to make a major contribution to development. Labour time can normally be exchanged for money as NGOs hire paid staff. Volunteers too can contribute labour time. Labour time in Mexican NGOs was essentially supplied by paid staff. In Portugal it was mostly supplied by volunteers. There is a large literature on the value of paid staff and volunteers to non-profit organisations and NGOs.

The type of labour, volunteer or paid, was a major difference between NGOs in Mexico and in Portugal. In Mexico NGOs had very few volunteers. Normally less than 10% of the labour supplied would be supplied by volunteers. The largest NGO

had over 200 paid staff and no volunteer involvement (apart from the board). In Portugal the reverse was true. NGOs had one or two paid employees for 50 to 70 volunteers. The largest NGO had four paid employees (full-time). Boards however were integrated by volunteers in both countries.

In Portugal volunteer labour is a major source of finance to the NGO through service donation system. All major NGOs employ this system of financing.

"The state gives money to pay wages which are then donated back to the NGO. The work is therefore donated. The NGO receives money to pay wages in a contract, pays them and then receives them back as a donation of its 'staff-volunteers'. It's services donation. Normally those that participate on this scheme are members and university students in their internship" (Joao, Pt)

One particular type of labour resource that deserves particular attention is the institutional volunteer or quasi-volunteer. Both Mexico and Portugal had examples of institutional volunteering. These schemes involve clear benefits to the volunteer which are given not by the NGO but by another source. In Mexico volunteers from *servicio social* (social service) were commonly used by Naturalia. In order to obtain a university degree in Mexico students are required to work for a socially beneficial organisation. They do so for no monetary reward although some NGOs tried to assist the volunteers by giving them transport and food subsidy. This is an institutional resource for NGOs. Naturalia would normally try to attract such institutional volunteers to undertake particular tasks that required technical knowledge, which these university students have. So for instance they used a social service volunteer to produce the Web page. They used another one to elaborate a marketing strategy for Naturalia.

In Portugal there is another example of institutional volunteer schemes. The most common one is *Jovens Voluntarios para a Solidariedade* (Young Volunteers for Solidarity). This scheme is run by the Youth Ministry. It pays Esc\$18,000 (£60)

per month for about 60 hours of work in an organisation working for the public benefit. The young applicants are given a list of possible organisations where they can work. NGOs have to apply every year to receive JVSS. They present proposals to the IPJ that allocates JVSS according to priorities and funding (Carmen). Often the administration and secretarial work at the regional branches of Quercus is undertaken by JVSS. (Carmen)

"From the Fernando Pessoa University come lawyers, who help us with the public denounces, literature, and marketing graduates. [...] They come to undertake the internship at the end of their degree (*estagio*). Sometimes they come only for 2 months!" (Carmen)

Staff receive wages from the NGO. NGOs however vary enormously in relation to how well they pay relatively to other sectors. Naturalia pays wages that are equal to similar positions in the public sector but pays less than the private sector. Despite Pronatura paying the best wages in a Mexican environmental NGO its staff still believe they should have wages equal to those of the Mexican chapter of WWF or FOMECO. "There is much philanthropy from staff at present. We should guarantee them better wages" (Flavio, Mx)

People have multiple motives and self interest may have a significant impact on management. These motives can make the survival of the organisation a greater priority than the service it gives to society (Hudson, 1999). Indeed, Burbank Jr. (1997) found that NGO staff seemed predominantly motivated by calculative self-interest rather than by moral imperatives to helping the poor. Staff were found to remember the organisational purpose statement but there was little evidence that this was a strong motivator.

Paying good wages can generate a low turnover of staff, which is a very important resource particularly when long term sustainability is an important parameter of success.

Commitment is another basic resource for NGOs. Particularly the advocacy ones that rely on motivated staff or volunteers committed to the NGO's cause. A particular type of commitment

resources is social entrepreneurs. They are fundamental resources for NGOs. Without them NGOs would not exist. Someone has to take on the burden of setting up an organisation and attracting others, following the necessary legal procedures, ensuring adequate management and governance. Entrepreneurs are normally associated with the early stages of organisational life. In voluntary organisations however entrepreneurs are associated with every change in leadership. Every change brings a new style and a new venture. That takes a very high level of commitment. Entrepreneurs, or social entrepreneurs, are responsible for overcoming the barriers to collective action (Olson, 1971). They promote enterprises with a social interest.

"[Volunteer] leaders are very important to the life of NGOs. Without them there would be no NGO. [...] They give time 'that they have and time that they don't' (*tempo que têm e tempo que não têm*)" (Conceição, Pt)

"It is difficult to administer the NGO, be a house wife and volunteer. [...] At times, when we are exhausted, we feel a bit fed up of subsidising the rest of society" (Maur, Mx)

INTANGIBLE ORGANISATIONAL RESOURCES

Only recently have we started to recognise the importance of intangible organisation resources as opposed to intangible people resources. Examples of this type of resources are organisational learning (Korten), reputation, mission and values, and legitimacy.

NGOs in both Mexico and Portugal had poor organisational learning. In general there were few procedures for learning. Evaluations were rare and aimed at reporting rather than learning. Most information about the organisation is located in the heads of those running the NGOs. As the employee turnover in the NGOs observed was very low the information was normally accessible.

Poor organisation learning was part of a wider issue of weak management capacity. As it was mentioned above the lack of sustained institutional funding and the volatility of volunteers are two main reasons for the weak ngo management capacity.

Most NGOs were very concerned with their reputation. They would always be very careful about not being associated with companies that had a poor environmental record. Their reputation is pivotal in attracting resources destined for environmental protection.

Alongside their reputation NGO mission and values represented fundamental resources to generate commitment by staff and volunteers and attract resources destined to environmental protection.

Tax deductibility status is an important resource that has not been very developed in the NGO literature. Tax deductibility is a resource that permits access to other resources. Tax deductibility allows anyone giving to NGOs a deduction in taxable income or profit equal to the amount donated. It makes donations cheaper. But it also gives donors greater assurance of the social interest and reliability of the NGO. In other words this status provides a signal to donors that the NGO is trustworthy (Alej, Mx). Many donors will not make any donation to organisations, which do not have tax deductibility status. Tax deductibility constitutes a powerful resource in the search for resources: it brings tax incentives, credibility, and financial discipline.

There is a diametrically different access to tax deductibility between Mexican and Portuguese environmental NGOs. In Mexico only a handful of NGOs have tax deductibility.

"Many in the state would prefer that environmentalists were an extinguished species themselves. One way of contributing to that is to deny tax deductibility status to them. [...] We have the need to grow. There is greater demand for our services greater conscience about environmental problems than before, but lack of tax deductibility is a great limitation" (Oscar, Mx)

In Portugal access to tax deductibility status is very easy and the fiscal incentive is very attractive.

"Before 1987 [law regulating environmental NGOs] it was difficult to obtain the status of 'public purpose' (*utilidade publica*) [which gives tax deductibility status]. Now it is enough to be registered at the IPAMB. This has made it easier for local NGOs to register. The ease of registration may however have become too complacent. Many registered NGOs did it only for convenience rather than any real interest in the environment" (Gil, Pt)

"In Portugal we have fiscal incentives for donations to environmental NGOs (*mecenato ambiental*): 140% deductibility for every donation. However there is a limitation in that it is only valid for companies and not individual givers" (Sequeira1, Pt)

Legitimacy is a complex resource. Organisations need to have legitimacy to attract most resources (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). NGOs have legitimacy to do some things and not others. NGOs' legitimacy rests on a number of qualities. The most common ones are the pursuit of the public benefit, the non-governmental status, their independence, their proximity to certain groups, their scientific expertise, and their ability to represent the views of citizens.

The pursuit of the public good often through the generous donation of their time and skills is a source of legitimacy for NGOs.

"Who do environmental NGOs represent? They represent the defence of a public good. They represent all that can benefit from a better environment, they represent society. Therein they derive their legitimacy. They work for the national interest as civil society" (Gil, Pt)

NGOs' non-governmental status gives them legitimacy to monitor the government and offer an alternative to opposition parties (Joanaz, Pt; Gil, Pt). This legitimacy is greatest where state repu-

tation (and legitimacy) is most damaged. In Mexico the state's reputation for corruption, incompetence and undemocratic ways gives greater legitimacy to non-governmental actors such as NGOs.

"We [GEOTA] are uncommitted with political parties or economic lobbies. This independence attracts more attention from the media. [...] We are the watchdogs of power. This position leads to [occasional] conflict with power which attracts the attention of the media. [...] only football has more attention in civil society! Even economic lobbies that spend money on the media do not get as much coverage" (Joanaz, Pt)

There are however also instances of illegitimate NGOs in Portugal. "Many local NGOs are pseudo-NGOs under the power of local autocrats" (Henrique, Pt). The same is true in Mexico (Santiago, Mx; Regina, Mx).

Membership size is an important resource for NGOs. NGOs strong membership basis is an important source of legitimacy in a plural society. Moreover members contribute resources such as money or time that are crucial in a healthy diversification of resource providers.

Origin of resources: who, what quality and temperature?

Probably as important as what the resource is (physically) is where the resource came from. RDP alerts to the issues involved when organisations become dependent on outside actors for resources. Organisations may become vulnerable to social control by outsiders, diverting them from accomplishing their mission. One of the most important NGO strategies to reduce dependency is diversification of resource providers (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978; Hudock, 1997).

Freeman (1979:174) provides a very useful typology based on the origin of resources.

"There are three major sources of mobilisable resources: the beneficiary constituency, any conscience constituencies

Table 1
summarises the use of resources by Mexican and Portuguese NGOs.

Table 1:
Use of resources according to their physical constitution

Resources	Mexican NGOs	Portuguese NGOs
Tangible		
Money	High	Low
Space	High	Moderate
Publicity	Low	High
Equipment		
Specialised		
Scientific expertise	High	High
Management capacity	Moderate	Moderate
Access to networks	Low	High
Access to decision makers	Moderate	High
Status in polity and society	Moderate	Moderate
Unspecialised		
Time	High	Moderate
Volunteers	Low	High
Institutional volunteers	Moderate	High
Commitment	Moderate	High
Social entrepreneurship	Moderate	High
Organisational (selected)		
Tax deductibility	Low	High
Membership	Low	High

Source: own data collection

and non-constituency institutions. As defined by McCarthy and Zald, the beneficiary constituency consists of political beneficiaries of the movement who also supply it with resources, and the conscience constituency of those sympathisers who provide resources but are not part of the beneficiary base. Institutional resources are those available independently of the movement's existence that can potentially be coopted by it. For example, if a law exists prohibiting discrimination, the power of the state to enforce this law can theoretically be coopted to help a movement eradicate discrimination"

Fowler (1997) introduced the concept of funding temperature based on how anonymous

and impersonal the funding origin is. The more identifiable and personal the funding origin is the hotter the funding is. Personal contributions based on personal income are hot. Institutional contributions based on tax money are cold. In this paper I will generalise Fowler's (1997) concept of funding temperature to include any resource.

CONSTITUENCY RESOURCES

In the case of environmental NGOs the distinction between beneficiary constituency and conscience constituency is not very useful as everyone in a society is a beneficiary of environmental protection. Only in very special projects can the product of an environmental project be said to benefit a well defined group and not others. The distinction between constituency and institutional resources

is however a very important one indeed. As it will be shown below NGOs normally work with a weak resource base and institutional resources provide fundamental support for NGOs. Although the importance of institutional resources has been well understood in the social movement literature it has received surprisingly little attention in NGO literature. The NGO literature has tended to concentrate on resources provided by institutions which are transferred to the control of NGOs such as donor funding. There has been little attention however to the importance of resources such as media, universities, or supra-national legislation.

Constituency resources tend to be hot they carry with them strong and emotive demands for immediate use to "better the world".

INSTITUTIONAL RESOURCES

Adapting Freeman's (1979) definition of institutional resources to NGOs they are resources that exist independently from NGOs' existence. The NGOs interviewed were very aware of their need for institutional resources in order to achieve their mission of environmental protection. Legislation is one of the most important ones. Institutional resources offer the opportunity of cooptable resources.

The state offers the most obvious source of cooptable institutional resources. The state can provide money, information, management expertise, legislation, tax breaks, reduction in court costs, etc...

NGOs can influence the supply of institutional resources but they cannot control it. There are two main strategies to influence it: lobbying and creating co-dependence.

In Mexico there were many ways to influence national policy and legislation: personal influence, advisory councils, and public pressure.

A very common institutional resource in Mexico is having a seat in advisory councils. There are advisory councils at all levels of government: local, state, and federal. Although advisory councils do not have decision powers they provide an important centre for the meeting of different organisations interested in a common theme. One

example is Biocenosis participates in the Environmental Management Committee to the hydrological region of Valle de Bravo. Many institutions are represented in this committee: two government levels, ENGOS, ejido associations, in all about 20 organisations (Maur, Mx). Participation in this council gives NGOs current information as well as access to decision-makers in the polity.

In Portugal there were two main ways to influence national policy: a national and an international route. The national route implied influencing the media which influenced public opinion which influenced the state (Gil, Pt).

"Quercus acquired greater protagonism than other environmental NGOs. We are always appearing on television. We can get our view across to the public through the media. [...] The government is wary of our statements on the media" (Joao, Pt)

"To reach the public we undertake some form of local action [...] like dressing up as buildings and invading the beach to represent a dangerous urbanisation plan of a beach in Troia, [...] we tell the media about the local action, and in turn they will tell the national public" (Conceição, Pt)

NGOs may find support in parties that are temporarily in the opposition.

"Parties have a different relation to environmental NGOs [depending on] whether they are on the government or on the opposition. Opposition parties tend to sympathise and often back NGOs's propositions while the government tends to oppose itself to them" (Gil, Pt)

A potential institutional resource is the existence of a Green party in both Mexico and Portugal. There is however a relation of enmity between the Green Party and environmental NGOs in both countries. In Portugal the Green Party was created by the Communist Party to attract people who they could not attract otherwise (Joanaz, Pt). In Mexico the Green party was created by people who saw

an opportunity to fill a niche in Mexican politics. It is a generalised opinion among NGOs that the Green party in both countries was created by opportunists who were and are looking more for their personal advancement than that of the environment. NGOs are thus deprived from a very useful medium of representation of their interests in formal political arena.

"Relation with the Green Party: NO!! they are a bunch of opportunists having used the green flag to obtain positions and benefits. They had a project of introducing the Royal Eagle in D.F.'s Zocalo! Totally mad! They don't even care about the recycling of the paper used in Congress" (Oscar, Mx1)

This absence of an institutional resource such as a committed Green party influenced NGOs to adopt alternative strategies. These strategies took very different forms in Mexico and in Portugal. In Mexico NGOs have tended to use personal lobbying while in Portugal NGOs have tended to use public opinion to influence public policy. These responses clearly follow a trend in resource environment that these NGOs face. In Mexico the entry of a famous environmental NGO activist - Julia Carabias - into the head of the environment ministry did much to improve the access of NGOs to the executive power. Many NGO members are personal friends of Carabias or at least know her well.

"Julia Carabias facilitates but not always. She acts very constrained. Cooptation- it is easier to hit a politician I do not know than her. She shows that the problem is deeper than government, it is structural, e.g., lack of culture in Civil Society, industrialisation process and urbanisation (land has been distributed but not education)" (Regina1, Mx)

In Portugal some environmentalists have also integrated governments but never in the highest positions. Relationship with the media has however been stronger. The use of courts (mainly EU) has

also proved to be a resourceful strategy to influence policy.

"There was already a Green party. At the same time there were already some efforts inside the main parties to give attention to environmental matters. There was a need to support these efforts instead of creating another party" (Joanaz, Pt)

"We set up interviews (*audiencias*) with the environment minister and we tell the media about it. We create news. It is not important what was said to the minister. The important part is the declarations made to the media when leaving the interview which appear in the media and to which the minister later responds. The media are attracted to this 'dialogue' to see if a 'war' starts between NGOs and the minister. That is news. [...] We take advantage of the holiday season when there are less news to do our press releases. At that time there is less attention to [party politics] as the parliament is closed" (Joanaz, Pt)

The international route implied using supra-national executive and judicial powers to put a check on the national state.

"Immediate action by NGOs is divorced from the participation of members. There is a choice for a greater influence [of public policy than before] through means other than civil society participation" (Gil, Pt)

Supra-national institutions are important sources of institutional resources. Mexico's entry to NAFTA and Portugal's entry to the EU brought along new environmental legislation and judicial powers. They also opened new lines of institutional funding.

"CEMDA has already used the new judicial powers under the NAFTA parallel agreements to present a law suit to stop an environmentally damaging project in

Consumel. The project was stopped" (Blanca, Mx)

"[NAFTA Parallel] Agreements are very litigious; Mexico can be fined for almost anything. The law is quite 'advanced' but Mexican environmental NGOs understand the paradox of advanced law and retrograde enforcement. If application of the law is forced the state can debilitate the 'implementing law' over which it has discretion. [...] An instrument to strengthen the law would result in its weakening" (Blanca, Mx)

"There was a plan to build a dam in the Ria de Aveiro. Various NGOs made a complaint to the EU commission. The state had not conducted the environmental impact assessment that is needed in development projects such as this one" (Bernardim, Pt)

NGOs in Mexico are increasingly using supra-national institutions.

NGOs can also use international agreements to bind state action to environmental protection. There was no case however of such use.

NGOs can also use co-dependence to influence the supply of institutional resources. NGOs have often tried to create dependence by the state on NGOs. Under new ideas of mixed economy of welfare provision the state has to increasingly seek other partners to deliver public goods. NGOs have acquired a new position of power in the relationship with the state. In the countries researched, NGOs made the state dependent on them by controlling a critical resource (e.g., technical expertise), by providing cheap services, and by conferring legitimacy to state projects.

Institutional resources need not necessarily only come from the state. In Portugal universities provide an important source of coopable resources.

"Universities are important centres for the formation of activists and experts [for NGOs]. Also they allow freedom of expression for NGO leaders – they can say whatever they want without fear of losing their jobs. [Universities] have an

important relation with environmental NGOs" (Joanaz, Pt)

"The origins of environmental NGOs in Portugal is mainly institutional, normally universities. The first groups were leftist. The new groups opposed the leftism. The previous leftism (activist) and the new academic, educated, origins of the NGOs led to a close relationship with the media" (Gil).

A researcher of the Portuguese environmental movement refers to the importance of student activism for environmental NGOs.

"Students are a fundamental part of environmental NGOs [in Portugal]. They often provide technical knowledge which is very important to NGOs, as they [students] come from akin disciplines [...]. Some of the most important activists today were members of the students union while at university" (Gil, Pt)

NGOs also tend to use 'multipliers' to get more effectiveness out of their scarce resources. NGOs will try to coopt as many resources as possible from sympathetic actors such as teachers or community leaders.

"We regularly conduct cycles of environmental debate with 'reproductive' people such as teachers. [...] We give them sensitisation and environmental education, some with written and informatic support so that they can teach others what we taught them" (Conceição, Pt)

"We deal essentially with community leaders. We have little time to talk to all community members. [...] We capacitate future participation promoters giving them environmental education. They in turn will capacitate others and so on" (Maur, Mx)

The existence of cognate movements can also provide important institutional resources.

"The reason many different movements tend to appear during the same historical period is not that different groups just happen to discover their grievances at the same time, or even that the example of one group alerts others to opportunities to alleviate their own grievances. Rather it is that the resources one movement generates can be used for cognate movements. Organising or publicising skills gain in one movement are readily transferable" (Freeman, 1979:176)

The fact that Portugal had a revolution to end its long lasting authoritarian regime seems to have played an important role in the dynamism of the environmental movement today. After the revolution in 1974 there was a boom in Portuguese associativism (Joanaz, Pt). Many groups were then formed some leading to today's NGOs. Mexico's lack of a similar transition to democratic life may be an important factor why Mexican NGOs are more shy. Their strength was not able to survive the state's attempt at weakening them in the late-1980s (Regina, Mx).

Even the simplest institutional resource of literacy may be a fundamental requirement for NGOs to influence the public. While literacy can be taken for granted in the North it is not so in intermediary development countries. Especially in rural areas where much environmental protection activity takes place. Environmental education inserted into the national curriculum can be another fundamental resource for NGOs. At least two NGOs (one in each country) have made attempts to change the secondary education's curriculum to include environmental education.

Many NGOs and researchers on NGOs referred to the lack in Mexico and Portugal of a culture of philanthropy and citizenship. Normally comparing Mexico to the US and Portugal to Northern Europe.

"People in Mexico do not have a philanthropic culture like people in countries such as the US or Britain. People in Mexico are very philanthropic in times of crises, like the 1985 (Mexico City)

earthquake. They do not however have a custom of giving regularly" (Mira99, Mx)

Moreover there is a lack of awareness about the environment problems in society. "Before such a scenario [of lack of environmental awareness in both the public and the state] the only possibility is the environmental education of the new generations" (Sequeira1, Pt) – lack of institutional resources.

Culture can also be an institutional resource in terms of the image that people have of NGOs. In both Mexico and Portugal this image may be as much a resource as a liability. It is common for NGOs to be mistaken for urban outsiders in rural areas. In urban areas however NGOs normally enjoy a positive image. Particularly in Mexico as NGOs speak out against the government??

There is potentially a pitfall to the use of some institutional resources. They will replace the need for NGOs to strive for greater closeness with their grassroots supporters in favour of institutionalised powers. In terms of the classification of resources proposed above, NGOs will mobilise less constituency resources in favour of institutional resources. The reasons for this may include the relative cheapness of institutional resources. Although institutional resources may carry greater demands to influence NGO strategy and thus increase NGO dependence, NGOs elect them because of their relative cheapness.

"ENGOS are lazy. They bypass Civil Society and go directly to the European Comission. To correct the wrongs of conservation in Portugal. Instead, they should involve portuguese Civil Society and thus attain greater social sustentability. They use institutional terrorism attacking the state through the media and the European institutions. For instance, the case of the Vasco da Gama bridge. Instead of talking to the government they went straight to the EU and almost made the latter withdraw the funding for a work which in the end benefits the national interest! [they threaten the government of embarasement before international institutions and

hurting potential structural funding too]"
(Henrique, Pt)

HOT AND COLD RESOURCES

Fowler (1997) provides a classification of resources according to the demands they entail. He developed the idea of 'hot' and 'cold' resources to denote the 'temperature' of the claims made on resources provided. Fowler's typology provides a useful departure from what resources are to the organisation to the very important question to NGOs of what resources entail in terms of associated demands.

Fowler also attempted to tie resource temperature with source. He states that hot resources are provided by supporters from the public while cold resources are provided by institutional donors. He also tends to associate hot resources with small quantities and cold resources with large quantities. Here the model needs refinement. Although Fowler's contentions about source and quantity are often right, there were many instances in the cases studied that showed the opposite relations. So often individual givers do not demand or have any expectation other than the money being used in the cause they support. Also some institutional donors can attach very high expectations to the resources provided and evaluate not only the programme supported but also the whole organisation to decide about future giving. NGOs have far more complaints about donor demand imposition than individual giver demands. Almost all NGOs studied had plans to increase their base of individual givers. One of the most important reasons for doing so was precisely the freedom of action they allow NGOs.

In Mexico NGOs tend to receive mainly cold resources. This is one important factor explaining why Mexican NGOs have a more institutionalised organisational structure. In Portugal NGOs tend to rely mainly on hot resources. The adoption of a more participatory and decentralised structure comes as no surprise, matching the demands of this type of resources.

Function of resources

Alongside what the resource is and where it comes from is the issue of what use will the organisation give to the resource. What is their function in the organisation. Freeman (1979:182) believes that

"The key strategic concern in [the structure] is the extent to which resources are directed toward group maintenance needs and the extent to which they are aimed at goal attainment"

Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) divide resources into critical and non-critical depending on their function in the organisation. These functional typologies will not be developed in this paper.

The money-dependence of NGOs will be largely based on the extent to which money is used to the critical functions in the organisation. NGO dependence on resource providers cannot be divorced from this issue.

FORTUITOUS RESOURCES

Freeman (1979) mentions fortuitous resources but does not develop it in her typology. Fortuitous resources are "fortuitous circumstances that might benefit a particular movement's goals and the accidents of history that are often so crucial in a movement's success or failure" (Freeman, 1979:189). Freeman does not develop the concept much because "unless their availability [of fortuitous resources] can be reasonably predicted or controlled by a social movement organisation, they play little part in strategic decision making" (ibid.:189). For our purposes however fortuitous resources should be included in an analysis of NGO resources given their importance in creating opportunities for action or presenting threats to the NGO. I disagree therefore that fortuitous resources play no part in strategic decision making. Strategic decision making should always include the analysis of unforeseen opportunities or threats and the setting of contingent action.

Certain event or accident may also provide an important resource to the advancement of the environmental NGOs' cause.

"The Open Presidency project of Mario Soares about the environment gave great profile to environmental NGOs (with the support from universities) in April 1994. It was also the best school about environmental issues to journalists" (Joanaz, Pt)

(1997) was developed to understand NGOs working in Mexico and Portugal.

The opposite of an opportunity is a threat. One example of the importance of opportunities is the influence of a draught when trying to stop a dam from being built.

"In relation to the Alqueva the positions [of NGOs and government] are very radicalised. The long process and 5 years of draught have been against the environmentalist position" (Gil, Pt)

Strategic value of resources

Management is a special type of resource in that it can be a normal input into NGO work but it can also be a meta-resource. By meta-resource I refer to a resource that potentiates the value of all other resources. In a sense whenever there is interdependence between resources the presence of one of the necessary resources potentiates all other. But since resources can be understood as having a strategic value the process of strategic management can affect the value of all other resources.

Conclusion

This paper described the variety and complexity of the resources used by NGOs. The list presented here is by no means exhaustive although care was taken to include all major resources for the NGOs studied. NGOs use many resources other than money and volunteer work. NGOs access a number of different resources, often intangible, from a number of sources, with different costs and demands attached. To analyse these resources a framework based on the works of Freeman (1979) and Fowler

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