State Foreign Influence Legislation Impacting Nonprofits 

This piece does not attempt to analyze all of these new types of state foreign influence legislation impacting nonprofits. Instead, it focuses on describing the potential impact on nonprofits of (1) the new wave of foreign influence registration schemes, using the case example of Nebraska, and (2) the new Florida charitable solicitation restrictions. 

Given their broad provisions, foreign influence registration schemes or restrictions on charitable solicitation can have significant—and often unintended—consequences for charitable activity, First Amendment rights, the economy, and U.S. foreign policy, making this type of legislation ripe for constitutional challenge and problematic from a policy perspective. It is still unclear how states will enforce these types of laws, but for now they create a regulatory minefield for nonprofits and others.  

State Foreign Influence Registration Schemes and Nebraska’s Foreign Adversary and Terrorist Agent Registration Act 

Since 2014, 14 states have considered at least 18 bills that would create foreign influence registration schemes, many of which are modeled on the federal Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA). This includes not only enacted legislation in Nebraska and Arkansas, but also bills that passed at least one legislative chamber in Florida, California, Indiana, West Virginia, Oklahoma, and Arizona.  

These proposed or enacted registration schemes require registration with the state, and often extensive reporting requirements, for certain types of engagements with covered foreigners (or “foreign principals”). However, key components vary, including: 

• The “foreign principal” that triggers the law. Most of the registration schemes cover not just relationships with foreign governments, but also foreign companies, nonprofits, universities, and non-resident foreigners, as well as often U.S. companies with foreign ownership.  Many of the bills limit cover foreign principals to those from the federal list of foreign adversaries (China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and the Maduro Regime – Venezuela). Others add additional countries, such as Syria, Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, Pakistan, or Nicaragua. Still others define covered foreign principals as being from any country.  

• Covered activities. These registration schemes often copy (sometimes verbatim) covered activities in FARA, including soliciting or disbursing anything of value; attempting to influence public opinion or a public official on law or policy in the state; or publishing or disseminating any information for or in the interests of a “foreign principal”. Significantly, many of these state bills (but not all) do not have exemptions that exist in FARA, including for academic, religious, scientific, or humanitarian activities. Some states have more limited scope, but still often include attempting to influence public opinion on any state policy.     

• Covered relationship. Registration requirements are often triggered if one is acting as an employee or agent of a foreign principal or if one is acting at the foreign principal’s direction, control, or “request”. In some legislation, registration requirements are triggered only if one accepts money or something of value from a covered foreign principal.    

To better understand the implications of these laws, it is useful to consider Nebraska’s Foreign Adversary and Terrorist Agent Registration Act, which was signed into law in June 2025. This new Nebraska legislation, which will go into effect October 1, 2025, requires any “agent” of a “foreign principal” from an “adversary nation” or a foreign terrorist organization to register with the state attorney general if they engage in certain covered activities.  

Foreign terrorist organizations are defined as those designated by the U.S. State Department. Adversary nations are those designated as “foreign adversaries” under the U.S. federal code (i.e. China, Cuba, Iran, North Korea, Russia, and Venezuela). One can become an agent under the Nebraska legislation by acting at the direction, control, or mere “request” of a foreign principal from one of these foreign adversaries. A “foreign principal” includes foreign governments as well as companies, nonprofits, universities, and individuals from these “foreign adversaries.” It also includes a U.S. entity that is 20% or more owned from persons or entities from one of these countries.  

Proponents of Nebraska’s law’ claimed that this legislation was needed to deter Chinese government influence in the state, particularly related to lobbying. However, those lobbying for the Chinese government are already required to register under U.S. FARA. Moreover, this legislation requires registration for a much broader set of covered activities. Consider these examples that would seemingly require registration as a foreign agent under this Act:  

• A Nebraskan church or university that sets up a public talk at the “request” of a Cuban dissident living in Spain. This is because a covered activity includes being a “publicity agent”, which includes arranging a “lecture” or publishing materials on behalf of a foreign principal.  

• A Nebraskan farmer who sells their crop to a company with 25% Chinese ownership as one of the covered activities is “disbursing” or “dispensing” things of value to a foreign principal. 

• A Nebraskan state legislator who simply answers a factual question at the “request” of a representative of a Chinese owned company about Nebraskan agricultural policy. This is because a covered activity includes being a “political consultant” which is defined to include simply “informing” a foreign principal from an adversary nation of “the policies of the State of Nebraska”.  

Those who register under the Act with the Nebraska Attorney General must file a litany of paperwork, including details about an organization’s business and its employees as well as the activities they engaged in that further the interests of the foreign principal. Covered public communications or a request to a state agency must include a declaration that the person or entity is registered as an agent of a foreign principal under the Act.  

Failure to register under the Nebraskan Act can lead to a recurring penalty of $50,000. All businesses and nonprofits in the state must “attest they are cognizant of and in compliance” with the Act either on an annual or biennial basis. Universities in the state must adopt compliance policies, and students or staff that fail to comply with the Act must either be expelled or fired. The Nebraska Attorney General is vested with civil investigative demand authority to investigate noncompliance, a tool that can potentially be used for selective investigations given the breadth and vague language of the legislation.  

Many of the covered activities in the Nebraska Act are also covered activities in FARA – and, indeed, a number of key provisions of the act seem (often verbatim) modeled on FARA. However, while FARA is broader than the Nebraska legislation because it applies equally to foreign principals regardless of country, FARA has historically been enforced more narrowly than the scope of its provisions would suggest and includes a set of important exemptions absent in the Nebraska Act, including for commercial, religious, humanitarian, and academic activity.  

Further, U.S. FARA, which was enacted in the runup to World War II, has been widely criticized by those across the political spectrum as overbroad and vague, creating both compliance challenges and civil liberties abuses. W.E.B. Du Bois, for example, was prosecuted by the Justice Department under the Act during the McCarthy era. Indeed, key parts of FARA are arguably unconstitutional given the U.S. Supreme Court’s current First Amendment jurisprudence. Citing the potential for “weaponization” of legislation like it, U.S. Attorney General Pam Bondi issued guidance in February 2025 that criminal charges under FARA should be limited to “conduct similar to more traditional espionage by foreign government actors.”  

Given this context, three major arguments against state FARA copycat laws include:  

• Federal Preemption. U.S. FARA already requires agents of foreign principals engaged in certain covered activity to register with the Justice Department and report certain activity. State registration schemes are not only duplicative, but can have significant adverse foreign policy consequences, such as potentially undermining President Trump’s current trade negotiations with China. State foreign influence registration schemes can be challenged under the Supreme Court’s federal foreign affairs preemption or dormant commerce clause jurisprudence.  

• First Amendment Concerns. Requiring registration and reporting to engage in basic expressive activity raises clear First Amendment concerns. For example, requiring a church or nonprofit register to set up a public talk in Nebraska at the “request” of a Cuban dissident, limits the ability of Nebraskans to associate with or hear the perspectives of the Cuban dissident. Since the provisions in these foreign influence registration schemes are frequently broad they are also potentially more likely to be selectively enforced.  

• Unintended Consequences. There is limited to no evidence that state foreign influence registration schemes will deter actual malign foreign influence campaigns. However, if enforced, they will likely have significant, frequently unintended, costs. For example, they create a significant compliance burden on nonprofits, companies, and others, impacting both charitable and commercial activity. They also create a significant burden on state officials to enforce. The Justice Department’s FARA unit has specialized staff to address FARA enforcement questions, issue regulations and guidance, bring enforcement actions, and coordinate with relevant federal national security agencies. State governments generally do not have similar expertise or resources.  

While the foreign influence registration scheme legislation that has been recently introduced differs across states, these three concerns are often applicable to other versions of this legislation as well.  

In Arkansas, for example, HB 1800 was enacted in April 2025. Under this new law, a “foreign-supported political organization” must register with the Arkansas Secretary of State and meet a number of burdensome reporting requirements. A “foreign-supported political organization” is defined as including an “association, corporation, organization, or any other combination of persons” that within the last five years “received money or things of value from a hostile foreign principal or a representative of a hostile foreign principal and that engages in ‘political activities’”. A hostile foreign principal can include a nonresident alien from China, Iran, Russia, or other countries that are legally in the U.S. “Political activity” includes any activity that is performed to influence a public official or the public within Arkansas in regard to formulating or adopting state policy.  

As such, under the new Arkansas law a nonprofit or company that receives just $5 from a Chinese national nonresident alien in the U.S. and independently advocates for a change in Arkansas policy—for example, pushing to end the death penalty or less regulations for U.S. business—could be required to register. Beyond raising serious First Amendment concerns, most organizations, either commercial or charitable, do not have systems in place to monitor whether they may receive such a minor sum from someone who would then trigger registration under the Arkansas legislation.  

Charitable Solicitation Requirements: Florida SB 700 

In May 2025, Florida enacted SB 700. Among other provisions, the law amends the state’s charitable solicitation law to ban nonprofits that solicit funds in the state of Florida from soliciting or accepting “contributions or anything of value from a foreign source of concern.”   

While so far this type of legislation has seemingly only been adopted in Florida, it is likely to have national impact as many nonprofits, even if based elsewhere, fundraise in Florida. Further, given Florida’s prominence in national politics, this legislation may serve as a model for similar legislation in other states.  

Under the new Florida legislation, that went into effect July 1, 2025, a “foreign source of concern” is defined as a government or official; a political party; an organization or company; or a non-U.S. citizen based in a “country of concern”. It also includes an agent acting on behalf of a foreign source of concern or an entity in which a foreign source of concern has a “controlling interest” (which includes over 25% voting rights in a company).  

A “country of concern” is defined as China, Russia, Iran, North Korea, Cuba, Venezuela, or Syria. Violation of this ban can lead to a range of penalties including a cease and desist order, fines of up to $10,000, or suspension or cancellation of the nonprofit’s registration for charitable solicitation in the state (essentially barring the nonprofit from fundraising in Florida). Nonprofits will have to annually attest that they are in compliance with the law.  

As such, this law bans nonprofits from engaging in a range of constitutionally protected activity if they want to solicit funding in Florida. While certain nonprofits, such as educational and religious institutions, are exempt from the state’s charitable solicitation law, this new legislation would seemingly bar the following organizations from fundraising in the state:  

• A nonprofit hospital that accepts payments for services from those based in a country of concern or receives a small donation from a US company that unknown to the hospital has 26% Chinese ownership.  

• An anti-trafficking organization that sends staff to Venezuela where they receive accommodations and food from a church partner while visiting the country (i.e. accepts something of “value” from a foreign source of concern).  

• A human rights nonprofit that is engaged in publicizing labor rights violations in China that receives information and services from a Chinese dissident that they contract with (i.e. something of “value”) to help inform and write its publications on China. 

The bill also creates an “Honest Services Registry” which will list nonprofits that attest that the nonprofit does not accept contributions or services from a foreign source of concern and that “the organization’s messaging and content are not directly or indirectly produced or influenced by a foreign source of concern.” It is unclear how one would determine if “messaging” is “indirectly . . . influenced by a foreign source of concern”.  

This new Florida charitable solicitation law raises a number of substantial constitutional and policy issues, including: 

• First Amendment Concerns. Multiple U.S. Supreme Court decisions have found that “the solicitation of charitable contributions is protected speech”. While a state can have legitimate reasons to regulate charitable solicitation, such as combatting fraud, any such regulation has to be narrowly regulated to this legitimate government interest. The Florida legislation though is a blunt ban.  

• Federal Preemption. The Florida impacts both federal foreign affairs and interstate – and international – commerce as it can ban nonprofits that, for example, provide health care services to those from a country of concern from fundraising in the state.  As such, it might be potentially challenged under the Supreme Court’s federal foreign affairs preemption or dormant commerce clause jurisprudence.  

• Unintended Consequences. The Florida legislation seems to discourage any type of engagement with foreign sources of concern no matter the purpose. For example, it limits a nonprofit’s engagement with a Chinese dissident as much as with the Chinese communist party. Further, this use of charitable solicitation law restrictions creates a slippery slope that could easily be used in other contexts. For example, a state could adopt a charitable solicitation requirement that a nonprofit cannot receive anything of value from a tobacco or oil company.   

States are Not Well Positioned to Enact these Types of Foreign Influence Laws 

While some states have enacted foreign influence laws that can capture nonprofits and others, many others have rejected this type of legislation so far out of concern that states are not well positioned to enact regulatory schemes to address foreign influence. Not only do states frequently lack the foreign policy expertise to do so in a strategic manner, but having 50 different regulatory schemes to combat malign foreign influence creates significant compliance challenges for nonprofits, companies, and others. These laws also frequently raise significant First Amendment concerns, have adverse economic consequences, and can unintentionally undermine U.S. foreign policy.  

For more information contact Nick Robinson at nrobinson@uscnl.org