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Venezuela*

*Note: This is an archived report, last updated on March 13, 2020. ICNL is no longer updating this report.

Introduction

The current Constitution of Venezuela was approved in 1999 and provided a considerable boost to the protection of human rights and citizen participation.  The Preamble states that one of the main Constitutional objectives is to promote civil participation in order to achieve a participatory democracy.  More than 100 articles included in the Constitution seek to promote and protect human rights and citizens’ right to participate as the foundation of democratic coexistence and social peace.

Nonetheless, since 2002 the government of Hugo Chavez and his successor, Nicolas Maduro, extensively modified more than 60 national laws regarding the form and functioning of the State. The basis for this was their proposal to substantively reform the Constitution that was rejected in a referendum held in December 2007.  The reform implied the State would monopolize all forms of social organizations and combine them into a new branch of the State called “Organizations of People’s Power”; annul the separation of powers; and militarize State-society relationships under the concept of “Civil-Military Unions”. Even after the reform was rejected in 2007, Mr. Chávez expressed that nothing prevented him from carrying his reforms forward via legislation.

With this new legislation, which has at its center the so-called “Laws of People’s Power”, at least 100 articles of the Constitution were changed and instances of direct participation in public affairs by independent CSOs were eliminated, while other social organizations that were politically affiliated with the government replaced independent CSOs. New regulations were also created to restrict and monitor the activities of independent CSOs, which excluded them from access to public institutions and democratic dialogue with various sectors of Venezuelan society. Independent CSOs also suffered discrimination, criminalization and restrictions on the exercise of freedoms of expression and association.

When the National Constituent Assembly (ANC) was elected in July 2017, “People’s Power” was established based on a new system of “direct democracy” with a regressive connotation that was contrary to the republican and Constitutional principles of democratic sovereignty, full liberties, pre-eminence of the rule of law and separation and independence of the public powers enshrined in the current Constitution. According to the Decree of Convocation and Judgment No. 378 of the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ), the ANC would personify a “popular constituent process” that has among its purposes the “Constitutionalization of People’s Power”, which is a term derived from the proposal of Constitutional reform rejected by the Venezuelan people in a popular referendum in 2007 but imposed in national plans and norms later denominated “Laws of the People’s Power”.

The concept of People’s Power, as dictated by Judgment No. 378, incorporates in a new Constitution arbitrarily drafted by the ANC all means of participation – representative and consultative – that the people exercise through sectoral and non-elected organizations and that are recognized and duly registered by the Executive to assume the purposes and functions of government as entities inseparable from the state. This has resulted in the nationalization of the people and the suppression of the free and democratic exercise of sovereignty. As dictated by Judgment No. 378: “… the depository of sovereignty is the people (…); but as regards its exercise (of sovereignty) it is necessary to distinguish direct exercise (direct democracy), (…) by the laws of People’s Power (…). In these cases, the people own sovereignty and exercise it directly through people’s power. In that sense, people’s power embodies direct democracy and it would be contradictory to pretend that its ‘expressions’ are chosen as if it were a ‘representation’ of the electoral body. ”

Another law that threatens CSO operations is the “Law for the Defense of Political Sovereignty and National Self-Determination”, which penalizes organizations working in defense of political rights and participation. The “Organic Law against Organized Crime and Financing of Terrorism” also ambiguously defines terrorism and organized crime so as to possibly prohibit various advocacy activities of organizations or deter their receipt of funding from foreign sources. In addition, the “Law on Registration and Enlistment for Integral Defense of the Nation” requires all associations with legal personality to register in military sub-divisions in order to participate in the “defense and security of the nation” and they must be subordinate to military authorities. Beginning in 2002, the Chavez administration and successor Maduro administration also used criminal charges to punish demonstrators and dissidents, while human rights defenders were attacked and even killed, restricted the right to expression by closing media outlets and harassing journalists, and attempted to cut off financing of CSOs.

Senior officials in the Maduro government have also used the media to stigmatize, discredit and intimidate human rights defenders and organizations that cooperate with international human rights organizations. The government often justifies its actions based on reports by anonymous informers who are called “cooperating patriots”. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in the third review of Venezuela in 2015 urged the government to guarantee that all human rights defenders can carry out their work free from any form of intimidation or threat. The unwillingness of the government to comply with these recommendations led to the joint statement “It is time to end televised reprisals against human rights defenders in Venezuela”, signed by UN Special Rapporteurs Michel Forst, Maina Kiai and David Kaye, and Inter-American Rapporteurs Jose de Jesus Orozco and Edison Lanza. Despite this, violations against human rights defenders and their organizations by the government, military and security forces, as well as non-state actors, have intensified in various regions of the country. In 2016, the Constitutional Chamber of the TSJ issued four judgments in which it unconstitutionally attributed powers to regulate the process of renewal of political parties and endorse undue restrictions on their performance, thus violating the right to the freedom of association of all persons and organizations for political purposes.

After the death of Hugo Chavez in 2013, the Maduro administration continued many of the same tactics as his predecessor. For example, when there were widespread assemblies against government policies in 2013 and 2014, the government responded with mass arbitrary arrests and torture, according to the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detentions in 2015. The Executive and Supreme Court also created new legal regulations to criminalize peaceful assemblies as “violent conduct”. As a result of these severe restrictions, the government of President Maduro responded with a systematic, excessive and indiscriminate policy of repression against peaceful protests in all states of the country, from April 1 to July 31, 2017, in rejection of the “rupture of the democratic constitutional order” declared by the National Assembly and the Attorney General’s Office when the TSJ issued in March 2017, the Supreme Tribunal of Justice (TSJ) issued Judgments 155 and 156, which seriously undermined the democratic order in Venezuela. Judgment 155 of March 28, 2017 contained precautionary measures against the National Assembly for having resolved to endorse the application of the Inter-American Democratic Charter of the OAS to Venezuela.

The TSJ described the National Assembly’s endorsement as a “crime of treason against the homeland” and ordered President Maduro to take measures under the framework of the country’s State of Emergency against anyone who commits the crime of treason without immunity for parliamentarians. Judgment 156 of March 29, 2017 removed all of the legislative powers of the National Assembly and granted them to the TSJ. Measures to crack down on these peaceful protests caused grave violations of freedom of peaceful assembly and human rights, as reflected in the OHCHR Report published on 30 August 2017. There were 124 deaths (52% less than 25 years of age) and 1,958 people injured, according to the Attorney General of the Republic report of July 31, 2017.

The 2009 report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) “Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela” chronicled the deteriorating climate for human rights and the rule of law in the country. Among other issues, the IAHCR cited a “troubling trend of punishments, intimidation, and attacks on individuals in reprisal for expressing their dissent with official policy”. Decision 1,939 of the Venezuelan Supreme Court (TSJ) of December 12, 2008, however, declared as “unenforceable” a sentence by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights of May 8, 2008, and requested the Executive to denounce the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR) for “usurping functions” of the Venezuelan State.  After announcing in 2010 the start of preparations to withdraw from the “slanderous” IACHR, whose members were called a “mafia”, Venezuela carried out a formal denunciation on September 6, 2012. This was written in a Note from the Venezuelan Foreign Ministry to Secretary General of the OAS and came into effect in September 2013. Since then, Venezuela has been outside the jurisdiction of the IACHR.

After this, CSOs launched a campaign demanding the resignation of the Ombudsman, who justified Judgments 155 and 156; supported acts of repression against demonstrations; and issued a statement denying the request to dismiss Judgments 155 and 156 that was delivered by the Board of the National Assembly without taking into account the opinion of the Prosecutor. The campaign included a letter that was delivered to the Ombudsman’s Office and received more than 16,000 signatures from individuals and organizations on Change.org.

Faced with these serious developments in the past decade, there have been increasing actions carried out both by domestic and regional actors to pressure the Venezuelan government to end authoritarian measures against the Venezuelan people, although since September 2013 Venezuela has been outside the jurisdiction of the IACHR. Nonetheless, the IACHR issued a statement in June 2016 warning that State of Exception and Economic Emergency decrees provide the president with broad powers that may compromise the respect for the rule of law and separation of powers and lead to unlawful restrictions on the freedoms of expression, association and peaceful assembly. On June 23, 2016, the Permanent Council of the OAS also called for invoking Article 20 of the Inter-American Democratic Charter (IADC) as requested by the Secretary General of the OAS to start diplomatic actions to address the “serious disruption of the democratic constitutional order in Venezuela” and the “use of public powers to interrupt free association and activities of opposition groups and the media”.

The Permanent Council of the OAS also condemned the break of democratic order through several communiqués and demanded that the Venezuelan State respect and protect the freedom of peaceful demonstration, freedom of expression, due process and personal integrity of demonstrators. In March 2017, the Secretary General of the OAS updated his report, recommending to the member states of the Permanent Council the application of Article 21 of the Democratic Charter for the break of democratic order and the unsuccessful results of the “process of dialogue” led by former presidents Martín Torrijos (Panama), Leonel Fernández (Dominican Republic) and Luis Rodríguez Zapatero (Spain) with the support of the Vatican, started in 2016. Before this report, 14 OAS states issued a communiqué and 18 states requested a new special meeting of the Permanent Council to consider the situation in Venezuela. In April 2017, 17 OAS countries then passed a resolution condemning the “serious unconstitutional alteration of the democratic order” in Venezuela. These States requested a Meeting of Consultation of Foreign Ministers held on May 31, 2017, where three draft resolutions were presented on which no agreement was reached. In a second session of Foreign Ministers, in June 2017, a resolution was not approved and until now a new date for the next session is still open.

In July 2017, the Secretary General of the OAS published a new update of his report emphasizing the systematic nature of human rights violations in the context of the protests and could be considered crimes against humanity according to international laws and designated Luis Moreno Ocampo, former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court as Special Adviser for investigations. In August 2017, Venezuela was suspended from MERCOSUR with the application of the Ushuaia Protocol (Democratic Clause). Likewise, in August 2017, the IACHR condemned in a communiqué the installation of the National Constituent Assembly’s unlimited powers that usurped the functions of the parliament and affected the separation of powers and representative democracy. It also announced the decision to prepare a new country report on Venezuela after eight years since the last one was published in 2009.

The United Nations Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, through press communiqués and statements made by his spokesman has insisted on the need for government and opposition to engage in a dialogue to reduce tensions and prevent more clashes in a framework of respect for the separation of powers, holding of elections and respect and guarantee to human rights. The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, also expressed his alarm at the negative consequences of Judgments 155 and 156 for the separation of powers and reiterated the obligation of the Venezuelan State to guarantee and protect the right to vote, freedom of peaceful demonstration, due process and not to engage in any form of torture or cruel, inhumane or degrading punishments.

In addition, international organizations and governments in America and Europe have expressed their condemnation of the break of democratic order, especially after the installation of the ANC, and the use of the state apparatus to repress peaceful demonstrations. As of September 2017, more than 40 countries, including the 28 States of the European Union, had denounced the ANC and 18 states expressed their support for the Venezuelan parliament. The most important action has been the Declaration of Lima, which was  suscribed by  11 Latin American states and Canada and affirms:

  • The illegitimacy of the ANC (The 12 countries decided to denounce all decisions emanating from the ANC, considering them illegitimate.)
  • Support and recognition to the National Assembly. The signatory countries will only recognize legal acts under the Constitution approved by the National Assembly elected in December 2015.
  • Support of Attorney General Luisa Ortega Díaz, including demanding compliance with precautionary measures issued by the IACHR.
  • The rejection of any act of violence and condemnation of violations of human rights, political persecution, the holding of political prisoners and the violation of fundamental freedoms in Venezuela.
  • The condemnation of the government of Nicolás Maduro for not allowing the entrance of medicines or foods to the country to solve humanitarian crisis.
  • Support for the continuation of the process of implementation of the Inter-American Democratic Charter.
  • Approval of Mercosur’s decision on the suspension of Venezuela from that community.
  • The call to stop the transfer of arms to Venezuela, in the light of Articles 6 and 7 of the International Treaty on Arms Trade.
  • Follow-up on the situation in Venezuela until democracy is restored and holding a meeting on the situation in the country at the next session of the United Nations.

In March 2017 the second round of the Universal Periodic Review of Venezuela at the United Nations culminated with the adoption of the Final Report by the Human Rights Council. That report collected 274 recommendations made by 102 States during the interactive session of the Review in November 2016. Compared with Venezuela’s first UPR in 2011, there was a 104% increase in the number of state representatives who participated and 85% in number of recommendations made. Countries also noted that freedoms of association, peaceful demonstration and expression were severely restricted; journalists, students, political activists and human rights defenders were subjected to stigmatization and criminalization, and detainees were subjected to torture and cruel treatment. In addition they noted that the TSJ, the National Electoral Council and the Ombudsman’s Office do not act independently, thus affecting the guarantees of protection of human rights.

Civic Freedoms at a Glance

Organizational FormsCivil Associations and Foundations
Registration BodySubsidiary Registry Office, according to the Venezuelan Civil Code (Article 19).
Approximate NumberIn Venezuela, the number of organizations currently in operation is unknown. However, in exploratory studies carried out by local organizations, a significant decrease has been observed in the number of CSOs that are active. Of approximately 960 organizations identified by Synergy in 2011, activities did not continue for nearly 60% of them by 2013 due to negative conditions in the legal and operational environment. Nonetheless, between 2013 and 2014, new organizations and networks were founded out of the demand for justice, rule of law and support to a population that suffers from the economic, social and institutional deterioration of the country.
Barriers to FormationPrior approval of a constitutive document is required, and it must be reviewed lawyers. 
There are special legal regimes for the registration of unions, political parties and educational communities.
There are cases of severe delays for the registration of CSOs because of unwritten criteria in legal forms and restrictions on associative purposes, which are enforced by lawyers in registry offices who arbitrarily reject documents without proper justification.
Legislation creates Organisations of People’s Power that carry out functions dictated and regulated by the State. (These are essentially Government-Organized NGOs, or GONGOs)
It is mandatory for CSOs to obtain Unique Registration of Fiscal Information and use it in the application and for tax materials, declarations, invoices and other documents.
It is mandatory for CSOs to register in military districts to participate in the security and defense of the nation.
Barriers to OperationsCSOs may not carry out activities not explicitly included in their governing documents.
Except for “Organizations of People’s Power”, CSOs are excluded from the organization or participation in public affairs, which has paralyzed or shut down activities of cultural, educational, environmental and social organizations.
CSOs have been excluded provide legal assistance or representing victims against officials about human rights violations.
There are often public threats by State against CSOs and their members, especiallly CSOs that receive international funding or that have collaboration with international human rights organizations.
There is no guarantee of access to public information and there is a general shortage of supplies, equipment, consistent internet, and water and electricity throughout the country, which severely limits the activities of CSOs.
Barriers to ResourcesCSOs devoted to the defense of rights, political participation and social control of public management are subject to a ban on receiving international funding.
There are restrictions relating to the exchange rate with an accelerated inflation rate (officially 180.9% in 2015).
Any financial activity that might be deemed as suspicious must be reported, even if the source of the funds is legitimate.
Decress of a State of Exception and Economic Emergency allow the suspending of contracts with international cooperation agencies, as such contracts are considered as “foreign interference”.
Only “Organizations of People’s Power” have access to public funding.
Tax exemptions have been eliminated for not-for-profit associations, and educational, academic, sports and scientific institutions do not.
Barriers to ExpressionNPOs dedicated to the “defense of political rights” or other “political objectives” are subject to funding constraints that undermine their ability to pursue advocacy. They also are precluded from possessing assets, or receiving any income from foreign sources.
It is common for the State to engage in intimidation and retaliation against members of CSOs that defend human rights or exercise their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights.
Barriers to AssemblyVague language in criminal laws allow the government to criminalize organizations that are critical of the government, thus chilling the freedom of assembly.
Anyone who disobeys or offends public authorities, obstruct roads, spreads false information that causes panic, helps or conspires with other countries and “terrorist groups or associations or paramilitary, insurgent or subversive groups” can be imprisoned.
Assemblies must be approved in advance by the local government or the Ministry of Defense when in security zones.
Assemblies are not allowed in security zones designated by law, border states under a State of Exception and Economic Emergency and all public spaces prohibited by state and municipal authorities.
All unauthorized assemblies are deemed to be “violent”. Security forces and the military are ordered to disband and use methods and weapons of war in cases of “deadly violence” or “life-threatening” situations.
Conveners, organizers and participants of assemblies are subject to criminal penalties, including imprisonment, for violations of the law.
During Decress of a State of Exception and Economic Emergency assemblies may be restricted throughout the country.

This section provides a brief overview of Venezuela’s legal framework for the promotion and protection of civic freedoms. Click a subheading for more, or click here to expand all subheadings.

This section provides an in-depth assessment of Venezuela’s legal environment for civic freedoms, including the barriers to the exercise of the freedoms of association (formation, operations, resources), expression, and peaceful assembly. Click a subheading for more, or click here to expand all subheadings.

ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS

Venezuelan law recognizes two primary forms of NPOs: civil associations and foundations.

Civil associations are recognized by the Civil Code (CC) [CC, article 19], though they are not specifically defined. Venezuelan courts have defined “civil association” as an assembly of persons organized in a corporate form to realize a common purpose that is non-profit in character.

Similarly, the Civil Code does not explicitly define foundations, but it establishes guidelines for their existence, recognizing that they may be formed only to conduct public benefit activities of an artistic, scientific, literary, charitable, or social nature. [Article 20] In Venezuelan jurisprudence, “foundation” has been defined as a collection of assets dedicated exclusively and permanently to the attainment of a specific objective.

However, for a decade NPOs have faced an environment of constant pressure on their autonomy and independence and to exercise rights related to expression and participation in activities. In Decision No. 656 of June 30, 2000, the Constitutional Court interpreted the concept of “civil society” based on Article 296 of the Constitution to be ” associations, groups, and institutions (without external subsidy) that through their purpose, permanence, number of members or affiliates and continuous activity have been working from different angles of that society to achieve a better quality of life for its members, without being attached to the government or to political parties.” Such rulings established a tone for discrediting NPOs early in the Chávez government, especially with the line about “without external subsidy” that stigmatized the receiving of funds from foreign sources as not a part of civil society. This would inevitably exclude NPOs that receive foreign funding, thereby preventing them from exercising the rights to political participation that other NPOs enjoy.

Judgment No. 1050 of August 23, 2000 determined that there was a “lack of standing for all persons, groups or entities that (…) claim to represent the citizens, the people, civil society and other institutions, who have not been elected by anyone (…) It is unknown what their interests are, since there is no statute or law that governs and no to what community or society are known to represent (…) The civil service would be chaotic, if any association or group of persons, assuming the representation of citizenship or civil society, intended to be consulted before taking any decision… “.

Since 2010, there has been an extensive reform of the legal system, with the Executive promoting laws for the creation of “Organizations of People’s Power”, based on a new form of “State Community” in which social organizations are part of the state structure. The Organic Law of People’s Power defines “People’s Power” as “the full exercise of sovereignty by the people through their diverse and dissimilar forms of organization, which build the Communal State” (Article 2). Through them, the power is exercised directly by the people (…) in socialist society … (Article 8). Since these laws were enacted, the state supports Organizations ot the People’s Power that are registered and regulated by the state in accordance with their respective laws, including Community Councils, Communes, Communal Cities, Communal Federations and Communal Confederations. At least 60 laws contemplate the actions of Organizations of the People’s Power, which must meet objectives dictated by the state, and they are subject to devolution of governance and are regulated by the state’s comptroller organs.

PUBLIC BENEFIT STATUS

Civil associations may dedicate themselves to any purpose not contrary to law or public order.  A foundation must, by definition, pursue public interest in one of these areas: art, science, literature, charity, or social activities. [CC Article 20].

There is no formal governmental process which designates a not-for-profit organization as a “public benefit organization”. Nevertheless, the Tax Administration implicitly recognizes that particular organizations engage in public benefit activities by granting them tax exemptions under the LISR Articles 14 (3) and (10) and the accompanying regulation. Under the regulation, two types of organizations qualify for income tax exemption: charitable institutions and social assistance institutions. These are not distinct types of legal entities, but rather special designations conferred on eligible associations and foundations.

The Decree-Law of Income Tax Reform, passed in November 2014, eliminated paragraph 10 of Article 14, which provided for tax exemptions for not-for-profit foundations and associations, as well as educational institutes, academic institutions, and sports or scientific associations. This meant the exemption was only for charitable institutions and social assistance institutions, based on the determination of the tax administration.

BARRIERS TO FORMATION

The Venezuelan Civil Code creates a generally enabling framework for the formation of NPOs.  In order to establish a civil association or foundation, the law requires that NPOs be registered with the Subsidiary Registry Office in the district in which the NPO will be based. Registration with the Subsidiary Registry Office is a constitutive formality which grants legal personality to the NPO.

In practice, however, state implementation of registration procedures has made the process difficult and even impeded the registration of NPOs engaging in the defense and promotion of human rights. In 2014, the Ministry of the Interior, Justice and Peace issued Resolution 019, which attempted to simplify the procedures, counter corrupt practices and avoid “any requirement that is different or additional to that established by Law.” The only requirements to register are supposed to be that the NPO applicant has a copy of the identity cards of the members and a charter document that is drafted and approved by a freely chosen lawyer.

In addition, according to the Ley Orgánica del Trabajo de los Trabajadores y las Trabajadoras (Organic Labor Law of (Male) Workers and (Women) Workers), syndicates must be registered with the Syndicates Register, which has great discretionary power to establish entry barriers for syndicates. (Article 374-387 LOTTT)

BARRIERS TO OPERATIONS

Associations are allowed to pursue a broad variety of activities, provided that the activities are enumerated in the organization’s governing documents. Foundations may only dedicate themselves to public interest activities in the areas of art, science, literature, charity, and social activities.

Based on the concept of “People’s Power”, the state has been narrowing possibilities for NPOs to participate in public policy unless they become part of the state or follow the state’s guidelines. For most government agencies the right to participation is recognized only for “Organizations of People’s Power”; NPOs may be recognized as such provided that they adhere to the values ​​and ideological practices of the state. As a result, most associations working in the cultural field were dismantled after the government systematically evicted them from public offices and expropriated their offices. Most environmental organizations were excluded from the national decision-making processes, where they had been carrying out an important role in the promotion and development of policies. More than 20,000 associations or societies of parents and guardians of children in public and private schools were also shut down, thus violating the right to participate in decisions regarding the education of their children. Finally, indigenous organizations and leaders of indigenous communities have been excluded from decisions concerning them on the basis of their not being part of “Organizations of People’s Power”.

Politics and loyalty to political-ideological government projects are at the root of a pattern of discrimination and exclusion against human rights defenders and independent human rights organizations, especially in thematic areas, such as culture, food, health, education, prisons, and the environment, as well as in areas related to women, children and adolescents, indigenous peoples, persons deprived of liberty, unions, and cooperatives. For example, the Reform of the Criminal Procedure Code, 2012 abolished the right of the accused to communicate with legal aid associations, limiting communications to family and lawyers, and excluded human rights organizations from participating in the substantive stages of criminal proceedings, such as representing victims in judicial proceedings against officials who have been alleged to have been involved in human rights violations; this function was left only to individuals and the Ombudsman.

Barriers to International Contact

Foreign persons, natural or legal, are fully permitted to establish branch offices in Venezuela.  At the same time, however, there have been reported cases of direct governmental retaliation and threats against NPOs that work with foreign organizations.

In 2010, the Bolivarian Intelligence Service (SEBIN) and the Center for Situational Studies of the Nation (CESNA) were created. Both are bodies of the Ministry of Interior and Justice and share the purposes of national intelligence and counterintelligence for the detection and neutralization of external and internal actual or potential threats against the security of the nation. In 2013, the CESNA was replaced by the Centre for Strategic Security and Protection of the Homeland (CESPPA), which is attached to the Presidency of the Republic and reports on potential threats to sensitive national interests and strategic aspects of security, defense, intelligence, internal order and external relations, in order to neutralize and defeat destabilizing plans against the nation. In 2014, a regulation was issued to analyze the impact of information and social media on political and social stability. Additionally, in 2014, President Maduro created a Special Brigade against the actions of Generating Groups of Violence (BEGV) with the task of coordinating, analyzing and gathering information on all public security organs and intelligence units of the state and other public and private entities. The courts have relied on data obtained from anonymous “cooperating patriots” to prosecute suspected government opponents and senior government officials and have used the personal information collected by such “patriots” to intimidate government critics and human rights defenders.

In addition, the Law for Protection of Political Liberty and National Self-determination prohibits NPOs dedicated to the “defense of political rights” or other “political objectives” from hosting a foreign citizen who speaks in a manner that might offend state institutions or senior officials, or that might operate “against the exercise of state sovereignty.” Noncompliance with this provision could subject representatives of a Venezuelan organization to a loss of “political rights” for five to eight years, a fine of up to $100,000, and criminal law sanctions. Foreigners who are involved in such activities are subject to deportation.

Furthermore, Judgment No. 1395 of the Constitutional Chamber of November 21, 2000 ruled that “those who represent [civil society] cannot be foreigners, or organizations directed by, affiliated to, subsidized, financed, or sustained directly or indirectly by states or movements or groups influenced by those States; nor by transnational or global associations, groups or movements that pursue political or economic purposes to their own benefit.” This means that NPOs that receive funding from foreign sources cannot be considered part of civil society, nor can civil society be represented by foreigners.

BARRIERS TO RESOURCES

Foreign Funding

The Law for the Defense of Political Sovereignty and National Self-determination, 2010 prohibits any organization with political aims or any organization that protects political rights (organizaciones con fines políticos y organizaciones para la defensa de derechos políticos) from receiving any kind of foreign funding or economic aid, be it from a natural foreign citizen, or a foreign organization. Organizations that do not comply with this law face a fine of up to twice the funding amount received, and where there are repeated violations organizations can be prohibited from participating in the electoral process for a period of five to eight years.  The chairman of an organization – in his or her individual capacity – found to be in violation of this law can also face a fine as well as individual exclusion from participation in political processes.

The principal legal barrier affecting resources springs from the political context that affects all activity in Venezuela and not exclusively NPOs. Since Venezuela has for the past five years been subject to an exchange control regime, any donation must be converted to Venezuelan local currency, Bolivars. The Ley de IIícitos Cambiarios (Illicit Currency Exchange Law) (“ICEL”) establishes penalties for any legal person – including NPOs – that violates exchange control laws.  Penalties include fines and imprisonment.

Since NPOs are considered institutions susceptible to become instruments for money laundering, and other organized crime activities by the Organic Law Against Organized Crime (Ley Orgánica Contra el Crimen Organizado), they are subject to scrutiny and surveillance by the executive organ in charge of the fight against organized crime.

The Law Against Organized Crime and Financing of Terrorism, enacted in December 2011 and effective as of May 2012, requires that any financial activity that might be deemed “suspicious” must be reported, even if the source of funds is legitimate.

The Law on Financing Organizations of People’s Power (Community Councils, Communes, Cooperative Associations, Social Owned Enterprises, Production Family Units and barter systems) establishes such organizations as beneficiaries of financial support from government agencies along with individuals in vulnerable situations. They are also endorsed by the Ministry of People’s Power for Communes and Social Movements.

In Decision No. 656 of June 30, 2000, the Constitutional Court interpreted the concept of “civil society” based on Article 296 of the Constitution to be “associations, groups, and institutions (without external subsidy) that through their purpose, permanence, number of members or affiliates and continuous activity have been working from different angles of that society to achieve a better quality of life for its members, without being attached to the government or to political parties.” Such rulings established a tone for discrediting NPOs early in the Chávez government, especially the line about “without external subsidy”, which stigmatized the receiving of funds from foreign sources as not a part of civil society

Domestic Funding

There are no legal barriers that restrict domestic funding of NPOs. The law does require that all legal persons declare the income they receive and how it has been allocated.

An NPO may carry out any type of lawful economic activity compatible with its aims and with its not-for-profit legal personality. Although the Civil Code is silent on the matter, local experts state that Venezuelan courts require that NPOs pursue economic activities only as a means of advancing their non-profit goals, self-sustainability, and financial autonomy.

Due to the current political climate, domestic donors are very careful about funding activities related to human rights defense. In general, they prefer anonymity.

BARRIERS TO EXPRESSION

The Law for Protection of Political Liberty and National Self-determination, enacted in December of 2010, targets NPOs dedicated to the “defense of political rights” or other “political objectives.”  Specifically, the Law precludes these organizations from possessing assets, or receiving any income, from foreign sources. In so doing, the Law undermines their ability to engage in advocacy and expressive activity.

In addition, experience has shown that there are practical barriers to speech and advocacy. The government has retaliated against members of NPOs who have made studies, reports or declarations criticizing the government. The forms of retaliation vary but include informal threats against the personal integrity of members of NPOs, governmental pressure about donor funding, judicial prosecution of members of NPOs, and public stigmatization of NPOs and their members.

The stigmatization of human rights defenders has become systemic within the government. Their work is equated with criminal behavior by calling them “treasonous, agents of foreign interests, destabilizing, and generating anxiety”. They face the threat of being charged, prosecuted and penalized for these alleged crimes. The government even created a special commission of inquiry that opened the possibility for outlawing such organizations. In addition, “The Hammer”, a TV program created in 2014 by Deputy Diosdado Cabello, who is the ex-president of the National Assembly, was focused on accusing and ridiculing human rights defenders, social activists, party leaders and the entrepreneurial sector based on reports from “cooperating patriots”. Between January and August 2015, IPYS Venezuela recorded at least 578 people accused in this program of which 60 were human rights activists and members of NPOs. In monitoring done by DefiendoDDHH between July 2015 and September 2016, 59 programs of The Hammer were broadcast and 71% of them featured accusations against human rights defenders. 19 human rights defenders and 18 human rights organizations were repeatedly mentioned.

In several states, human rights defenders have also been subject to monitoring, persecution and death threats by state security organs and armed civilians. They have been subject to acts of harassment, assault, kidnapping, theft, arbitrary detention, temporary disappearance and murder committed by state and non-state actors. Most of the complaints made to competent national institutions have been dismissed or ignored. Both the Public Prosecutor and the Ombudsman have remained silent in spite of the intimidating discourse and have backed restrictive laws on the exercise of the freedoms of expression, peaceful assembly and association. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) has granted precautionary measures to protect several Venezuelan human rights defenders.

The OHCHR Report of August 2011 reports attacks by security forces against journalists and media professionals who were “victims of direct shots with shotguns and tear gas, arrests and theft of their equipment to prevent them from covering demonstrations. ” On the other hand, in the last two years numerous television and radio stations have been restricted from national programming, among them CNN in Spanish, Caracol TV, RCN, El Tiempo Channel of Colombia, and TN of Argentina. Independent Venezuelan media have also been subject to sanctions and closure measures, including 92.9 and 99.1 FM stations in Caracas.

BARRIERS TO ASSEMBLY

The Venezuelan Constitution, in Articles 53 and 68, enshrines the freedom of peaceful assembly.
Article 53 states, “Everyone has the right to assembly publicly or privately without previous permission, for lawful purposes and without weapons.” Assemblies in public places are governed by the law. In Article 68, citizens have the right to demonstrate, peacefully and without weapons, subject only to such requirements as may be established by law. The use of firearms and toxic substances to control peaceful demonstrations is prohibited. Law shall regulate the activity of police and the security corps in maintaining public order.

Advance Notification

The right to freedom of peaceful assembly in Venezuela is mainly regulated by the Law on Political Parties, Public Gatherings and Manifestations and the Organic Law for Police Service and National Bolivarian Police Corps. Under this law, notification must be provided 24 hours in advance in writing within business hours to the civil authorities indicating the place, date, time and objective of the assembly. At the time notification is given, the authorities must affix a stamp that indicates their acceptance of the holding of the assembly (Article 43). The authorities should take all preventive measures to avoid public gatherings and demonstrations that have not been notified or those carried out against the law (Article 49).

Simultaneous Assemblies

If there are substantial grounds that simultaneous meetings or other events may cause disturbances of public order, then by mutual agreement with the organizers the assembly may be provided another place, time or date (Article 44). However, mayors and governors have the power to prohibit public meetings and demonstrations in certain places based on decisions published in official gazettes (Article 46). Those who disrupt, interfere with or attempt to impede or hinder public meetings and demonstrations may be arrested from one to 30 days (Article 47), and those who participate in public meetings and demonstrations of a political nature with the “use of uniforms” may be arrested for 15 to 30 days (Article 48).

Restrictions on Locations of Assemblies

Regulations on peaceful assembly come along with restrictions imposed on military and criminal matters, which were the result of political conflicts in Venezuela from 2002 to 2004. The Organic Law on National Security, Presidential Decrees and Resolutions of the Ministry of Defense on Security Zones, 2002 established a ban on assemblies in areas declared “security zones” by military authorities. These are “areas of the country, which are of strategic importance… and are subject to special regulation, in terms of people, goods and activities” (Article 47) and may include security zones at the border or be adjacent to sea areas, lakes, islands and navigable rivers, transmission corridors for pipelines, pipelines, aqueducts and main power lines, areas surrounding military and public facilities, basic industries, spaces for strategic services essential for air military installations, areas adjacent to roads and air communication and “any other area of ​​security deemed necessary for safety and defense of the Nation” (Article 48). Those who organize, hold or incite activities to disrupt or affect the organization in such areas can be imprisoned five to 10 years (Article 56).

Criminalization, Excessive Crackdowns, and Impunity for the State

The reform of the Penal Code April, 2005 was challenged by the Attorney General of the Republic in 2006 before the Supreme Court. The court admitted the case but did not resolve it in Judgment No. 667 of the Constitutional Chamber on March 30, 2006. The court considered the Penal Code “the greatest involucionista [reactionary] coup against the democratic public order” without “a single real and rational evidence to prove the need for such reform.” In this Penal Code whoever offends with words or in writing the public authorities can be imprisoned from six to 30 months (Article 147 and 148); whoever intimidates or threatens public officials or their families can be imprisoned for two to five years (Article 283); whoever obstructs public highways can be imprisoned for four to 16 years depending on the severity (Article 357); whoever disobeys the authorities may be imprisoned for five to 30 days or fined (Article 483); and those who conspire or help other countries or “terrorist groups or associations, paramilitaries, insurgents or subversives” to go against the territorial integrity or republican institutions can be punished with 20 to 30 years in prison (Articles 128 and 140 ).”

Between 1989 and 2013, 10,400 people were arrested by security forces during assemblies. In the first four months of 2014, the number of arrests was equivalent to 30% of all demonstrators detained in those prior 24 years. During the first half of 2014, more than 20% of demonstrations were repressed, with the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) being the organization responsible for such repression.

According to records of two CSOs, Public Space and PROVEA, in 2014 the state responded disproportionately to demonstrations 82% of the time. 43 people were killed in separate demonstrations as a result of the actions of the security forces and other non-State actors. In addition, from the analysis of 37 cases of criminal court proceedings involving 399 people detained during the protests of 2014, Centro de Derechos Humanos – Universidad Católica Andrés Bello (CDH-UCAB) found there was an arbitrary nature to the arrests, concealment of evidence of torture and irregular judicial and other processes. No cases are known where the authorities compensated victims and, in the few cases in which an investigation was ordered and the aggressors were fully identified and called to testify, the victims were intimidated without any effective protection provided to them.

The State has also pressured mayors to crack down on assemblies and imprisoned a number of mayors in opposition to the government who did not participate in such crackdowns, such as the mayors of the Municipality of Chacao in Miranda state; the Municipality of San Cristobal in Tachira state; the Municipality of Diego Bautista Urbaneja in Anzoategui state; and the Municipality of Maracaibo in Zulia state.

In January 2015, the Ministry of Defence issued Resolution No. 08610 on “Standards for the Performance of the Bolivarian National Armed Force’s Control Functions for Public Order, Social Peace and Citizen Coexistence in Public Meetings and Demonstrations”, which allows the army, navy and air force to use weapons of war and “deadly” or “life-threatening” violence, if there is risk of death for officials who are controlling public demonstrations.

In March 2016, the alliance of opposition parties “Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD)” initiated a procedure to convene a recall referendum on the presidential term before the National Electoral Council (CNE), which is enshrined as a political right in Article 72 of the Constitution and regulated in Resolution No. 070906-2770 CNE. Allegations of undue obstruction and delay by the CNE and interference by the Executive in its decisions led to calls for peaceful demonstrations against the CNE headquarters. After this, Judgment 1478 of the Second Administrative Court ordered the National Guard and Bolivarian National Police to prevent “unauthorized acts, marches, protests, unpermitted rallies and violent demonstrations called by political and civil organizations, which may limit the access of workers and disrupt the normal functioning of the headquarters of the National Electoral Council, at the national level.”

CODHEZ and the Inter-institutional Commission of Human Rights in Zulia state also studied 150 of about 453 cases of arbitrary detention reported in the protests in 2014 in the city of Maracaibo, Zulia state, and found frequent violations to liberty and personal security, due process, and physical, mental and moral integrity carried out repeatedly by the Venezuelan State against demonstrators. In most interviews, victims reported being labeled as “guarimberos” (similar to “hooligans”), “bourgeois” and many other derogatory words and phrases. 16 victims said they had received threats against their families and 87 reported personal attacks against them in detention with verbal attacks such as, “We know where you live”; “If you want to disappear…”; “You will not leave alive” or “We will kill you.” Nearly 60 victims were beaten by government troops at the time of the arrest, including 29 while in transfer to the detention center and 26 while in the detention center. In the case of two sisters who were arrested, an officer grabbed one sister behind her neck and forced her to watch how they beat the other sister. Lawyers also stated that there was a marked delay of prosecutions. In 56 cases, the Public Ministry presented no evidence with any reasoned basis; 108 victims were prevented from contacting their families; and 40 of the accused said they had no contact with lawyers until the time of the conclusion of the hearing. In 20 cases, the court granted alternatives to punishments, with measures such as a ban on the accused approaching any kind of protest of a political nature, making use of caps, shirts or banners to protest, or using the national flag.

CivilisDDHH also documented 204 attacks on civilians in residential areas of Bolivar, Zulia, Lara and Táchira states between February and May 2014, and recorded similar situations in other 10 states. These attacks were carried out with military equipment and without a State of Emergency and Exception. The attacks consisted of the use of excessive and indiscriminate repressive force against individuals and families in their neighborhoods and housing developments, houses and buildings during the time demonstrations were held. In 81% of attacks the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB) was involved; in 17% state police were involved, in 12% of attacks the Army was involved and in 8% the Bolivarian National Police were involved (sometimes two or more entities attacked together). In 26% of attacks armed civilians were involved and 64% of the cases they attacked jointly with military and police.

Despite the above-mentioned reports, in the 4th periodic review of Venezuela to the Human Rights Committee, the State alleged that the demonstrations of 2014 had been “a violent offensive aimed to depose the legitimate authorities chosen by the people in free elections”, for which the security organs were ordered to apprehend people engaged in the “flagrant commission of crimes”. However, the Committee warned about violations committed, including cases of excessive and disproportionate use of force, torture or ill-treatment, arbitrary detention, and disregard of legal safeguards, for which only 7 officials of the State had been charged. Also, the Committee was concerned about the participation of military personnel at public meetings and demonstrations, the death of 43 people and 878 injured, of which 68% were civilians, in demonstrations; and 242 complaints reported by the State compared with 558 by the Ombudsman; the misuse of firearms and riot gear against demonstrators in residential areas; and 437 attacks by pro-government armed groups against demonstrators, with complicity and acquiescence of the security forces. The Committee also expressed concern about the existence of a number of rules, including some of those contained in the Organic Law on National Security, which could adversely affect the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly in practice, including a judgment of the Supreme Court of Justice, which set a requirement of authorization before holding a public meeting or demonstration.

In 2017, the serious irregularities in the political rights of Venezuelans, the application of States of Emergency and Exception outside Constitutional norms, the disqualification of the legitimate powers of the National Assembly, the indefinite suspension of elections and refusal to seek international assistance, and severe difficulties to resolve the widespread deterioration of health and food rights were the main demands of opposition members and of a majority of the population. These demands were accompanied by a wave of intense and massive peaceful protests in rejection of the “rupture of the democratic Constitutional order” and requesting the dismissal of the TSJ magistrates.

From April 1, 2017 to May 17, 2017, there were 45 days of peaceful protest in all of the states of the country during which the government responded with a systematic, excessive and indiscriminate policy of repression, which caused serious human rights violations, with 42 deaths, 48% of whom were youths under 26 years of age, and 904 people injured, according to figures published by the Attorney General’s Office. The pattern of repression used against demonstrations in 2013 and 2014 was used against this new wave of peaceful protests but now on a more repressive scale and in a context where the government took the path of abandoning democratic principles and norms. This included the April 18, 2017 activation of a coordinated plan between the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Justice and the Ministry of Defense called the “Zamora Special Strategic Civic-Military Plan” (“Zamora Plan”) that transferred control of public order to the armed forces and provided for the delivery of rifles to the Bolivarian National Militia, which is a body of civilian “combatants” in defense of the government’s political projects.

In summary:

1. The resolutions of the Executive and the Judgments of the TSJ of 2014 established the requirement of prior authorization for public demonstrations; if prior authorization is not received, then public demonstrations would automatically be deemed “violent”, thereby depriving the demonstrators of their fundamental rights.

2. The agents of the security forces have systematically blocked access roads of the routes and places where peaceful protests have been planned by means of deploying gangs and erecting pickets and metallic walls to close passage. This confines demonstrators to spaces where they cannot be heard. Meanwhile, the government mobilizes its supporters and public employees with ample logistics and facilities on the same days and times of peaceful protests that oppose government measures.

3. Security agents indiscriminately use large amounts of toxic gases and ambush demonstrators in confined spaces with lethal weapons at close range. These methods and the intensification of the use of firearms by the security forces have caused the deaths of demonstrators.

4. Groups of people dressed in civilian clothes and armed groups called “collectives” move on motorcycles, attack demonstrators and fire on them with firearms to disperse them. They have also been involved in attempted searches of homes and looting of commercial premises in reprisals against protesting neighbors. These groups have become part of the government structure by being declared “support forces” for military bodies in the “Zamora Plan”.

5. Arbitrary detention has intensified with numerous cases of protesters becoming “incommunicado” while in detention and suffering torture and cruel and inhuman and degrading treatment. The judges impute crimes without evidence or accusations of the Prosecutor. In 45 days of peaceful protests, 2,371 people have been arrested and 730 people have been detained, according to the NGO Penal Forum. In the “Zamora Plan”, obstruction of roads is considered a public disturbance and detained protesters are tried in a military jurisdiction. Of 730 people arrested, 275 have been tried in the military jurisdiction and 159 people have been deprived of their liberty in military jails, according to the Criminal Forum and Human Rights Watch.

6. In at least seven states of the country, tear gas has been used against buildings and homes where protesters are residents, inflicting damage to infrastructure and causing some fires. It has also been deployed inside health centers, causing suffocation of people being treated and to health personnel, and has been used against teams of volunteers assisting injured protesters in the street.

7. High-level officials have launched a permanent propaganda campaign of hatred against the people who summon or participate in peaceful protests, defining them as “enemies” of the State with the threat of imprisonment. Social media posters have been posted with photographs of people in peaceful protests and opposition leaders in order to get them indicted. The ruling party, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV), has broadcast these posters through public media in the operative manuals of its members.

8. Attacks on journalists and media workers have increased, and journalists have been subject to arbitrary arrests, seizure or theft, and physical assaults by agents of the “collectives”. Several webpages and social networking accounts of CSOs have also been repeatedly hacked in this context.

Additional Resources

This section contains links to external reports and news reports relevant to civic freedoms. Click a subheading for more, or click here to expand all subheadings.

GLOBAL INDEX RANKINGS
Ranking BodyRankRanking Scale
(best – worst possible)
UN Human Development Index121 (2023)1 – 193
Transparency International178 (2024)1 – 180
Freedom House: Freedom in the WorldStatus: Not Free
Political Rights: 0
Civil Liberties: 13 (2025)		Free/Partly Free/Not Free
40 – 0
60 – 0
Fund for Peace Fragile States Index30 (2024)179 – 1
REPORTS
UN Universal Periodic Review ReportsVenezuela UPR page
Reports of UN Special RapporteursVenezuela
Reports of OAS Special RapporteursReport of the OAS Secretary General may request the immediate convocation of the Permanent Council on Venezuela, May, 30 2016
Council on Foundations Country NotesVenezuela country note
U.S. State DepartmentVenezuela human rights report 2024
Fund for Peace Fragile States Index ReportsVenezuela
IMF Country ReportsVenezuela and the IMF
Amnesty InternationalVenezuela page
Human Rights Watch• A Decade under Chavez: Political Intolerance and Lost Opportunities for Advancing Human Rights in Venezuela (2008)
• Punished for Protesting: Rights Violations in Venezuela’s Streets, Detention Centers, and Justice System (2014)
• Unchecked Power: Police and Military Raids in Low-Income and Immigrant Communities in Venezuela (2016)
• Venezuela’s Humanitarian Crisis (2016)
• Venezuela’s Crisis
• World Report 2025
Organization of American States (OAS)• The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) Report on Democracy and Human Rights in Venezuela 2010
• Secretary General presents updated Report on Venezuela to the Permanent Council (March 14, 2017)
International Commission of JuristsVenezuela: weak legal system threatens democracy (2014)
Observatorio Venezolano de Conflictividad SocialVenezuela: 6.729 protestas y 163 fallecidos desde el 1 de abril de 2017
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law Online LibraryVenezuela

ARCHIVED NEWS

Peru’s Incoming President Pressures Venezuela on Human Rights, Economic Crisis (June 2016)

Venezuela’s Highest Court Rules Amnesty Bill Unconstitutional (April 2016)

Venezuela’s National Assembly Passes Amnesty Bill (March 2016)

Machado to Face Charges over Alleged Plot to Assassinate Maduro (November 2014)

Venezuela’s military admits excesses during deadly protests (April 2014)

Venezuela issues arrest warrant for opposition leader after clashes (February 2014)

Civil Society Post-Chavez (May 2013)

Constitutional Conundrum in Venezuela (January 2013)

Venezuela writer defends Chavez government (November 2012)

Human Rights Council Elections: Pander Time (November 2012)

NGO calls for debate on cable TV regulation in Venezuela (October 2012)

Call to sign petition condemning Venezuela denunciation of the American Convention on Human Rights (October 2012)

IACHR regrets decision of Venezuela to denounce the American Convention on Human Rights (September 2012)

IACHR Report keeps Venezuela on the human rights blacklist (April 2011)

New Laws in Venezuela Aim to Limit Dissent (December 2010)

Legislative Assault on Free Speech, Civil Society (December 2010)

In Venezuela, Accusations Against Ronald McDonald House, Among Other U.S. Charities (August 2010)

Chávez furious as OAS rights watchdog accuses him of endangering democracy (February 2010)

IACHR publishes report on Venezuela (February 2010)

Venezuela sees clashes as anti-Chavez TV station closed (January 2010)

Vice President, government officials resign (January 2010)

OAS expresses concern over closings of TV channels in Venezuela (January 2010)

The foregoing information was collected by the ICNL Civic Freedom Monitor partner organization in Venezuela.