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China

Last updated: June 13, 2025

Recent Developments

Chinese human rights lawyer Lu Siwei stood trial on April 18, 2025 and was sentenced to 11 months in prison. He was arbitrarily detained while transiting through Laos on his way to Thailand on July 28, 2023. Lu, who has been a staunch advocate for high-profile Chinese dissidents, was held in detention in the southwestern city of Chengdu. Family-appointed lawyers were prevented from meeting him and were informed that Lu had two lawyers arbitrarily appointed by authorities. Lu was nominated by several international human rights organizations for the 2024 Gwangju Prize for Human Rights. Please see the News Items section below in this report for additional details.

While we aim to maintain information that is as current as possible, we realize that situations can rapidly change.  If you are aware of any additional information or inaccuracies on this page, please keep us informed; write to ICNL at ngomonitor@icnl.org.

Introduction

Over the past few decades, civil society in China—and the legal framework that governs it—has grown considerably more complex. The number and diversity of nonprofit, philanthropic, and other social organizations (collectively referred to here as civil society organizations, or CSOs) have expanded rapidly. These organizations now operate across a wide range of sectors and increasingly engage in partnerships with government and business. Once situated on the margins, many CSOs are gradually becoming part of the mainstream of Chinese social and economic life.

While management of the emerging civil society sector by the Communist Party and state agencies is restrictive, regulatory systems have struggled to keep pace with the sector’s expansion. As noted by Yu Keping, a well-known scholar on civil society, the actual space for CSOs in China is much larger than the institutional space formally granted by laws and regulations [1].

The degree of state control varies widely. CSOs focused on social service delivery or other state-endorsed functions tend to face fewer restrictions. In contrast, groups engaged in advocacy, legal aid, labor rights, or religion are often perceived as threats to the state and therefore more closely monitored by Party and state authorities. Many of these organizations have been harassed or forcibly closed, and numerous civil society actors—including lawyers, journalists, academics, and bloggers—have been detained, tried, and imprisoned for their peaceful activities.

The legal foundation of this differentiated system of state control traces back to China’s 1982 Constitution and have evolved through an array of regulations introduced since the late 1980s. These regulations govern the full range of legally-registered non-profits, referred to in China as “social organizations” (shehui zuzhi, 社会组织).

[1] Yu Keping, “Civil Society in China: Concepts, Classification and Institutional Environment” in Deng Zhenglai, ed., State and Civil Society: The Chinese Perspective (Singapore: World Scientific, 2011)

This Civic Freedom Monitor (CFM) country note was made possible through the research conducted by Dr. Shawn Shieh, Director, Social Innovations Advisory (Taipei and New York), Co-founder, Freshwater Institute (Taipei), and Contributor, Rights CoLab (New York). Dr. Shieh may be reached via e-mail at: sshieh@siadvisory.org or shawn@freshwater.tw.

Civic Freedoms at a Glance

Organizational FormsSocial Associations (SAs, shehui tuanti), which are the equivalent of membership associations; Social Service Organizations (SSOs, shehui fuwu jigou, formerly known as Civil Non-Enterprise Institutions or minban fei qiye danwei); and Foundations (jijinhui). In addition, there are many different types of informal CSOs: those registered as businesses; those attached to a legal organization; small community-based organizations; rural cooperatives; religious organizations; and networks.
Registration BodyMinistry of Civil Affairs and local Civil Affairs Bureaus (for social organizations) and Provincial Public Security Departments (for overseas NGOs)
Barriers to Formation1. System of “dual registration” for all social organizations 
2. Extensive legal compliance and documentation requirements;
3. New requirements for Communist Party supervision in social organizations;
4. Broad informal prohibitions on fields of activity such as advocacy, labor, gender and sexuality, religion, and ethnic minority affairs;
5. Extensive discretion to deny registration.
Barriers to Operations1. All foreign NGO activities in China must be filed with the Public Security office for compliance with the Overseas NGO Law
2. Broad government discretion to intervene in internal affairs of the organization;
3. Burdensome reporting requirements;
4. Invasive government monitoring and inspections.
5. Requirement for Chinese organizations to report international contacts to authorities and to seek approval for visits, international cooperation, foreign donations, etc. 
Barriers to ResourcesWith the passage of the Charity Law and Overseas NGO Law, a clear distinction can be made between domestic and foreign resources. The Overseas NGO Law raises barriers for Chinese organizations (particularly unregistered grassroots groups) seeking foreign funding and collaboration. On the other hand, the Charity Law and the revised registration and management regulations for Foundations and other social organizations makes it somewhat easier for registered Chinese nonprofits to access domestic resources by lowering barriers to fundraising and provide greater tax incentives for donations to public benefit and charitable organizations and activities. Unregistered Chinese groups face increasing difficulty accessing both domestic and international resources.
Barriers to ExpressionThe Government has discretion to limit speech and advocacy for specific organizations and types of organizations and for specific cases that might be seen to negatively impact national security.
Barriers to AssemblyThe Assembly Law and Implementing Measures contain vague and restrictive provisions, including 5 days advance notification requirement; a prohibition on spontaneous assemblies; onerous obligations and liabilities on organizers; and excessive time, place, and manner restrictions.

This section provides a brief overview of China’s legal framework for the promotion and protection of civic freedoms. Click a subheading for more, or click here to expand all subheadings.

This section provides an in-depth assessment of China’s legal environment for civic freedoms, including the barriers to the exercise of the freedoms of association (formation, operations, resources), expression, and peaceful assembly. Click a subheading for more, or click here to expand all subheadings.

ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS

CSOs in China are officially referred to as social organizations (shehui zuzhi, 社会组织), and fall into three main legal categories:

  • Social associations (SAs, shehui tuanti, 社会团体), which are generally membership-based;
  • Social service organizations (SSOs, shehui fuwu jigou, 社会服务机构), formerly civil non-enterprise institutions (CNIs, minban fei qiye danwei, 民办非企业单位); and
  • Foundations (jijinhui, 基金会).

As of the end of 2023, there were 881,617 registered social organizations, comprising approximately 373,000 SAs, 499,000 SSOs, and 9,617 foundations. These figures indicate a slight decline in overall numbers in recent years, with the exception of foundations, which have remained stable or grown.

In addition to these three legal forms, the Charity Law, which went into effect on September 1, 2016, introduced two additional legal arrangements for carrying out charitable activities:

  1. Charitable organization status (cishan zuzhi, 慈善组织): This status can be granted to any lawfully established nonprofit organization whose main purpose is “carrying out charitable activities” and that does not have a “profit making purpose” (Article 8-9). A social organization can obtain charitable organization status in two ways: during the initial process of registration; or by applying according to the procedures in the Measures for the Designation of Charitable Organizations (issued in September 2016). As of September 2023, over 13,000 organizations had been granted charitable organization status.
  2. Charitable trusts (cishan xintuo, 慈善信托): While charitable trusts were first recognized under the 2001 Trust Law, ambiguity around their regulation and taxation hindered their development. The 2016 Charity Law clarified the legal framework, specifying management requirements and tax provisions, which significantly boosted interest in charitable trusts. Article 45 of the Charity Law requires charitable trusts to “file documents for the record” (bei’an) with the Civil Affairs authorities in order to qualify for tax benefits. As a result of these reforms, the number of charitable trusts has grown quickly, from 53 in 2019 to 1,184 by the end of 2022, with a total value exceeding CNY 5.16 billion (approximately $767.7 million), according to the China Charitable Trust Development Report 2022.

In addition to these legal forms, a significant number of entities register as for-profit businesses or operate without legal registration. Some unregistered groups gain legal status by attaching themselves to other legal entities such as social organizations or public institutions (e.g., universities and research institutes). Although these groups are not legally classified as nonprofits, in practice they function as voluntary, nongovernmental, not-for-profit, mission driven, and self-governing organizations that are founded by and governed by private individuals. Many rely on foreign funding from governments, embassies, international organizations, and foundations. To maintain credibility, they often document the not-for-profit nature of their activities in reports to donors.

Estimates of the number of such informal CSOs vary widely, ranging from a few hundred thousand to a few million, depending on the definition used. Broader estimates may include Party-controlled mass organizations, such as the Communist Youth League and Women’s Federation and their local branches, and rural cooperatives.

A substantial portion of legally registered CSOs—especially SAs and foundations—were either created by the government or maintain close ties with government agencies. These are often referred to as government-organized NGOs (GONGOs). In contrast, informal CSOs are generally more grassroots and independent from the state.

Another relevant organizational form is the public institution or public service unit (shiye danwei, 事业单位), which includes government-established entities such as universities, research institutes, and hospitals. These quasi-governmental agencies are generally formed by the government and staffed with government employees. They are a legacy of China’s centrally-planned system set up during the 1950s. Though not traditional CSOs, they are included in this report because they frequently receive foreign funding and are subject to some of the same tax rules as social organizations. China is currently planning to carry out a reform of public institutions by privatizing a portion of them and turning them into social organizations.

The Ministry of Civil Affairs is the primary registration body for CSOs in China. CSOs that operate as for-profit businesses register through the State Administration for Industry and Commerce to operate with more flexibility. International CSOs register with the Ministry of Public Security.

For more detailed analysis, see:

  • Andrew Watson, “Civil Society in a Transitional State: The Rise of Associations in China,” in Jonathan Unger, ed., Associations and the Chinese State (M.E. Sharpe , 2008)
  • Guosheng Deng, “The Hidden Rules Governing China’s Unregistered NGOs: Management and Consequences,” The China Review, 10:1 (Spring, 2010
  • ICNL’s infographic, the Universe of Chinese NGOs, and graphs showing the growth of foundations and social organizations.
PUBLIC BENEFIT STATUS

Chinese law distinguishes between CSOs that serve charitable or public benefit purposes and those with other aims.

Under the 2016 Charity Law, SAs, SSOs, and foundations can apply for charitable status. (Implementing regulations currently being drafted may automatically consider foundations to be charitable organizations, but SAs and SSOs will need to apply separately for this status.) To obtain charitable status, an organization must submit an application to the Civil Affairs Department, either at the national or local level. According to Article 9 of the Charity Law, a charitable organization must meet the following requirements:

  • Aim to carry out charitable activities;
  • Not have the goal of making a profit;
  • Possess a name and address;
  • Have an organizational charter;
  • Have necessary financial assets;
  • Have an organizational structure and person in charge in accordance with the requirements;
  • Meet other conditions stipulated by laws and administrative regulations.

Article 3 of the Charity Law defines “charitable activities” as public interest activities voluntarily carried out by natural persons, legal persons, and other organizations through the donation of property. These activities include:

  • Other public interest activities in accordance with this law.
  • Helping the poor and the needy;
  • Assisting the elderly, orphans, the ill, the disabled, and providing special care;
  • Alleviating losses incurred by natural disasters, accidents, public health incidents, and other emergencies;
  • Promoting the development of education, science, culture, health, sports, and other causes;
  • Preventing and alleviating pollution and other public hazards, protecting and improving the eco-environment;
  • Other public interest activities in accordance with this law.
BARRIERS TO FORMATION

CSOs in China face extensive barriers to entry based in policy, practice, and regulation. While the 2016 Charity Law and revised drafts of registration and management regulations for social organizations will ease some restrictions, they may also introduce new constraints. The analysis below is primarily based on the existing regulations and will be updated as implementing rules for the Charity Law and the revised registration and management regulations for social organizations are rolled out over the next few years. For more resources on the Charity Law, see ICNL’s Philanthropy Law Report and accompanying resources, which include an FAQ about the Charity Law.

Registration procedures for CSOs remain complex and cumbersome, with extensive documentation and approval requirements. Many organizations are required to operate under a “dual management” system, requiring sponsorship from a “professional supervising unit,” such as a government ministry or provincial government agency, before seeking registration and approval from the Ministry of Civil Affairs in Beijing or a local civil affairs bureau. They remain under the control of both agencies throughout their organizational life. In practice, obtaining such sponsorship is difficult, particularly for groups without strong connections in the government that are operating in sensitive sectors such as advocacy, legal aid, labor, religion, and ethnic minority affairs.

Broad legal clauses in the Charity Law bar the registration of groups perceived to oppose the state and/or Party. For example:

  • Article 4 mandates that charitable activities must be lawful, voluntary, honest, and non-profit, and must not violate social morality, endanger national security, or harm societal public interests or the lawful rights and interests of other persons.
  • Article 5 indicates that the government encourages and supports natural persons, legal persons, and other organizations in legally carrying out charitable activities that represent the core values of socialism and promote the traditional morals of the Chinese nation.

Other regulations further constrain entry. Under the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Associations (1999), applicant organizations must have:

  • A minimum of 50 individual or 30 institutional members;
  • A fixed location;
  • Staff with appropriate qualifications; and
  • Minimum assets of CNY 100,000 (currently $9,500) for national organizations and CNY 30,000 ($2,800) for local organizations.

To apply for legal status, organizations must submit a wide array of organizational documents to the registration and management agency.

Government agencies may rely on a wide array of reasons to deny registration. Furthermore, the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Associations (1999) and the Interim Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Civil Non-Enterprise Institutions (CNIs) (1998) both stipulate that SOs and CNIs cannot establish branch organizations or offices in other regions.  The revisions of these regulations that are currently being drafted will relax some of these requirements, but not do away with them completely.

After registration, an organization must navigate separate approval processes to obtain an official seal, open a bank account, establish a branch or subsidiary; modify its registration or amend its charter; or change its legal representative, among other actions. The government also has broad discretionary authority to shut down social organizations under the Interim Measures for Banning Illegal Non-Governmental Organizations (2000).

For some types of nonprofits, such as SAs and SSOs, regulations allow the government to bar the establishment of more than one organization in a field in any particular locality in order to prevent duplication, overlap, and competition and to maintain ties between such groups and their governmental sponsors. [2]

Given these challenges—including the dual management system, complicated registration and approval processes, onerous reporting requirements, and the opportunity for frequent government intrusion into organizational matters—many groups choose to register as for-profit business or operate without formal registration. According to the Interim Measures for Banning Illegal Non-Governmental Organizations, however, unregistered nonprofits are considered illegal, making them especially vulnerable to state control.

Over the last few years, local governments have piloted reforms aimed at lowering barriers to entry by reforming the dual management system for certain categories of social organizations. In most cases, this reform involves doing away with the requirement for social organizations to obtain the sponsorship of a professional supervising unit.

These reforms have informed national policy. Under the 2016 Charity Law, and in the registration and management regulation for SAs, SSOs, and foundations that are currently being drafted, the “dual management system” will be removed for four categories of organizations: trade associations and chambers of commerce, science and technology associations, public benefit and charitable organizations, and urban and rural community organizations. As a result, these types of organizations will be able to register directly with the Ministry of Civil Affairs without getting sponsorship of a “professional supervising unit.”

[2] See, e.g., the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations (1999), Art. 13(2).

BARRIERS TO OPERATIONs

Operational barriers for CSOs in China vary, largely depending on how the activities are viewed by the party-state. Generally, nonprofits engaged in social services and charitable work are viewed more favorably than those engaged in advocacy and rights-based activism.

The regulatory framework also allows for significant government intervention and interference. Government intervention in operational matters can take many forms, including:

  • Raising questions about the appointment of directors, trustees, or senior staff;
  • Restricting allowable activities based on the government-approved organizational application or charter;
  • Micromanaging banking arrangements;
  • Using tax laws to undertake investigations of operational activities and terminate organizational activities;
  • Harassing organizations by exerting pressure through the organization’s landlord or utility company;
  • Burdensome reporting requirements; and
  • Intensive monitoring of activities that are considered sensitive by the party and state by security forces, including the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of State Security.

Under President Xi Jinping’s administration (2013 – present), civil society has experienced a sharp upturn in repression by the police and security forces. Many independent CSOs and law firms have been harassed and forced to close, and their staff and leaders interrogated, detained, and sometimes imprisoned. Notable cases include:

  • In 2013, Xu Zhiyong, founder of the Open Constitution Initiative (Gongmeng) and one of the leaders of the New Citizens’ Movement, was arrested and charged with “gathering a crowd to disturb public order” after publicly calling for Chinese officials to disclose their assets as a way to fight corruption. He was sentenced to four years in prison.
  • In 2014-15, several staff and board members of Yirenping, one of China’s foremost anti-discrimination CSOs, were interrogated and detained. As a result of this ongoing repression, Yirenping had to close most of its offices in China.
  • In December 2015, a major crackdown on labor groups in South China was carried out. Police targeted the Panyu Workers Center, which had been carrying out pathbreaking work on collective bargaining. Dozens of labor activists were interrogated and three staff of the Panyu Workers Center were detained and later tried.
  • In January 2016, Guo Jianmei, one of China’s best-known women’s rights advocates, was ordered to close down Zhongzhe Women’s Legal Counseling Center allegedly for accepting foreign funds.
  • Also in early 2016, police detained Peter Dahlin, a Swedish national and director of a CSO that organized trainings for lawyers and provided funding to Chinese rights defenders. State media accused his CSO of “jeopardizing China’s national security” and he was forced to confess on state television before being deported.
  • In December 2018, police in Chengdu, the provincial capital of Sichuan, raided the Early Rain Covenant Church, detained its pastor, Wang Yi, and took hundreds of church members into custody before eventually criminally detaining at least 20 members.
  • In July 2019, State Security detained three anti-discrimination advocates—known as the Changsha Three—on suspicion of “subversion of state power.” They are currently being held in the Hunan Provincial State Security Bureau Detention Center in Changsha and have been denied visits by lawyers and families.
  • In the first two months of 2020, police rounded up a number of people associated with an early December 2019 meeting in Xiamen where China’s democratic future was discussed. Some were released but Xu Zhiyong, Ding Jiaxi, and others remained in detention. On April 10, 2023, Xu and Ding were sentenced to 14 years and 12 years respectively for “subversion of state power.” (Source: Human Rights Watch)

In addition to these enforcement actions, additional regulations have been issued to further restrict nonprofit operations:

  • 2016 regulations require social organizations to initiate [Communist] “party construction work” and require them to submit to supervision by Communist Party groups.
  • 2018 regulations incorporate social organizations into the credit management system. Nonprofits that have poor credit records may be included on a blacklist that could lead to greater supervision and deny them opportunities to apply for financial support.
  • In March 2021, a Notice on Eliminating the Breeding Grounds for Illegal Social Organizations and Cleansing the Ecological Space for Social Organizations (see Section 8) was issued. This policy calls on public and private actors—including companies, public institutions, social organizations, media organizations, internet platforms, financial institutions, party members, and the public—not to associate with unregistered or “illegal” social organizations.
  • In March 2023, the Communist Party of China’s Central Committee and the State Council announced a planto create a Central Social Affairs Department to supervise party construction work within both private sector entities and social organizations. This signals continued centralization of control over civil society actors.

Foreign NGOs Operating in China

The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental Organizations in the Mainland of China (commonly referred to as the Overseas NGO Law or ONGO Law) established a stringent legal framework for foreign NGOs operating in mainland China. The law, which came into effect on January 1, 2017, defines overseas NGOs (ONGOs) as nonprofit, non-governmental social organizations legally established outside of mainland China—including in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau.

The law introduces significant barriers to cooperation between ONGOs and Chinese entities. Most notably, it shifts regulatory authority from the Ministry of Civil Affairs to the Ministry of Public Security—China’s principal internal security agency—marking a shift from administrative oversight to a security-oriented approach.

Under the ONGO Law, foreign NGOs may legally operate in China through only two channels:

  1. Registering a representative office in China; or
  2. Filing “documentation for the record” (bei’an) to carry out “temporary activities” in mainland China lasting no longer than one year. This requires an ONGO to have a Chinese partner and file materials about their collaboration and any necessary approvals with the Public Security office. They are also required to file reports on their activities to Public Security.

Article 9 of the ONGO Law explicitly prohibits ONGOs from engaging in activities—directly or indirectly—without going through one of the two authorized legal channels:

“ONGOs that do neither of these are not allowed to carry out activities either openly or covertly, or to authorize, fund or covertly authorize any Chinese work unit or individual to carry out activities.”

While the law does legitimize the status of ONGOs in China and establishes a formal channel between ONGOs and the government, it is highly restrictive and effectively bars Chinese organizations and individuals from cooperating with unregistered ONGOs.

For more resources for understanding the ONGO Law, see ICNL’s Philanthropy Law Report and accompanying resources which include FAQs about the ONGO Law.

In addition to these legal barriers, a number of extra-legal barriers restrict international contact. Chinese organizations have generally been required to report international contacts to authorities and, in some cases, obtain prior approval for certain kinds of visits, international cooperation, foreign donations, and other contact with foreign organizations or donors. Moreover, Chinese organizations that collaborate with or receive funding from foreign organizations are monitored closely and sometimes harassed. The State Security Ministry established an office several years ago to monitor both domestic and international NGO affairs. Foreign NGOs are regularly accused by Chinese media of supporting activities that undermine social stability and national security.

While the ONGO Law is the single greatest barrier to international NGOs carrying out activities in China, two recent trends pose additional challenges.

First, nationalism and authoritarianism have risen under the current leader, Xi Jinping. One manifestation of this is the National People’s Congress’ passage on June 30, 2020, of the National Security Law (NSL) for Hong Kong, which imposes criminal penalties for collusion with foreign powers or external elements that endanger national security.

Second, tensions between China and the United States and other Western countries have grown in response to China’s hardline response to its Uigher ethnic minority population in the province of Xinjiang and protests in Hong Kong. For example:

  • In April 2019, the party-state’s mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, published an article detailing the case of two foreign NGOs that posed threats to China’s “political security.”
  • In July 2019, an article appeared in a party-run paper in Shanghai accusing several U.S. NGOs of being behind the massive protests taking place in Hong Kong against a controversial extradition law.
  • After President Trump signed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in November 2019, the Chinese government announced that it would impose sanctions on five U.S. NGOs with offices in Hong Kong: Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, National Endowment for Democracy, International Republican Institute, and National Democratic Institute. Soon after, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announced the first investigation and penalty directed at a U.S.-based NGO, Asia Catalyst, for violating the Overseas NGO Law.
BARRIERS TO RESOURCES

Recent legislative and regulatory developments in China have created contrasting trends in CSOs’ access to resources: while foreign funding has been subject to heightened restrictions, opportunities for domestic fundraising, particularly through online platforms and tax incentives, have expanded.

Over the last few years, Chinese authorities have significantly tightened oversight of foreign funding of CSOs. Regulatory changes have been accompanied by official rhetoric and media messaging that cast foreign-funded CSOs as potential threats to national security and social stability.

A key development was the issuance of Notice No. 63 by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange in early 2010. The notice, titled “On Issues Concerning the Administration of Foreign Exchange Donated to or by Domestic Institutions,” introduced more complex compliance requirements for domestic nonprofits receiving foreign donations, including a need to submit:

  • an application attesting to the authority of the domestic organization and the foreign donor;
  • the domestic group’s business license;
  • a notarized donation agreement between the domestic group and the foreign donor organization describing the purpose of the donation; and
  • a registration certificate for the foreign nonprofit group.

While many organizations have continued to access foreign funding, the process has become more burdensome. Some organizations receiving support from foreign organizations that are perceived as sensitive because of their “democracy promotion” work—such as the National Endowment for Democracy, the Open Society Foundation, and the International Republican Institute—have faced heightened scrutiny and, in some cases, operational disruptions. [3]

The Overseas NGO Law, which went into effect on January 1, 2017, imposed additional barriers to foreign resources. It requires all foreign NGOs operating in China to report on their Chinese partners, funding sources, and project activities to the public security apparatus. This requirement disproportionately affects grassroots organizations, many of which are unregistered or registered as businesses, and are thus ineligible to receive foreign funding under the law. As a result, numerous foreign NGOs have confirmed that they are no longer able to legally collaborate with or fund such partners.

In contrast to these increased restrictions, recent legal reforms have opened up new pathways for nonprofits to raise funds domestically. The 2016 Charity Law, along with draft revisions to regulations on the  registration and management of social organizations, expand the pool of nonprofits that can engage in public fundraising and encourage philanthropy through tax incentives. In the past, public fundraising—understood to include funding appeals through the media, in public spaces, and online—was restricted to a small number of organizations generally with close ties to the government. These included government agencies, such as the Ministry of Civil Affairs; officially designated organizations such as the Chinese Red Cross and China Charity Federation; and public fundraising foundations. Other organizations, including non-public fundraising foundations, SAs, and SSOs, were not allowed to engage in public fundraising.

Under the new legislation, there will be no distinction between public and non-public fundraising foundations, and all nonprofit organizations, including SAs and SSOs, will be allowed to apply for public fundraising status after two years of operation. In addition, the Charity Law calls for more generous tax incentives to encourage charitable giving.

Another notable policy shift came with the May 21, 2020, “Announcement on Matters Concerning the Pre-Tax Deduction of Public Welfare Donations,” issued jointly by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Finance, and the State Administration of Taxation. The Announcement created a more streamlined process for social organizations to qualify for tax deductions on public welfare donations. Tax deductibility will also be valid for three years, instead of just one, and will be recognized nationwide. To qualify, social organizations need to maintain at least a 3A rating (with the highest rating being 5A) in their evaluation and comply with the provisions on expenditures and management fees specified in the Charity Law.

The rapid growth of online fundraising/crowdsourcing platforms over the last few years has also opened up new channels for Chinese CSOs to access resources. As of 2021, there were 20 online platforms certified by the Ministry of Civil Affairs. In 2018 alone, these platforms raised more than CNY 3.17 billion (about $461 million) for 1,400 charitable organizations. The vast majority of funds were raised through three platforms owned by major tech companies: Tencent Charity, Ant Financial, and Alibaba Charity. In 2022, ten new online fundraising platforms were certified, including charity platforms established by major companies such as ByteDance, Xiaomi, BiliBili, China Mobile, Ctrip, and Ping An. To regulate this emerging sector, the Ministry of Civil Affairs has issued two industry standards: the “Charity Organizations’ Internet Public Fundraising Platform Basic Management Rules” and the “Charity Organizations’ Internet Public Fundraising Platform Basic Technological Rules.”

BARRIERS TO EXPRESSION

Legal, administrative, and political barriers increasingly inhibit meaningful public expression and participation in China. A gap between constitutional guarantees of fundamental freedoms and the application of special regulations enables the state to exercise broad discretion in limiting speech, assembly, and advocacy by specific organizations and types of organizations—particularly when these activities are seen as harmful to national security.

These restrictions are enforced through a combination of legal tools including administrative decrees, such as the regulations governing social organizations and other kinds of groups. Additional regulatory barriers may restrict nonprofit organizations from engaging in policy advocacy, either by favoring government-affiliated groups or interpreting such activities as outside the scope of their officially approved activities or organizational charter. Barriers to organizational activity, such as those discussed above, may also restrict speech, assembly and advocacy.

Under President Xi Jinping, restrictions on freedom of expression have intensified. Human rights lawyers, civil society advocates, and bloggers who engage in public-interest advocacy have been subject to increasing surveillance, detention, and criminal charges. Universities, traditional media, social media platforms, and NGOs have all come under tighter ideological control.

One of the most visible crackdowns occurred in late 2018, when scores of workers protesting their dismissal from Jasic Technology Company in Shenzhen were detained along with university graduates who supported their cause.

Universities and nonprofit organizations have also had to submit to greater Communist Party supervision and control and demonstrate their loyalty to the Party through party-building activities. In September 2022, the Ministry of Civil Affairs held its first training session for leaders of national CSOs. The session emphasized the importance of aligning their activities with state priorities and enhancing political loyalty. An official leading the session explicitly instructed participants to ensure their work supported government objectives.

These trends have had a chilling effect on civil society. They have discouraged rights-based advocacy, silenced critical voices, and created a climate of self-censorship among CSOs, intellectuals, and activists.

BARRIERS TO ASSEMBLY

Vague Provisions

China’s legal framework for public assembly is rooted in the Assembly Law and its accompanying Implementing Measures, both of which contain vague and restrictive provisions. This vagueness gives authorities a great deal of authority and discretion to permit or deny assemblies. For example, Article 12 of the Assembly Law prohibits assemblies that might “oppose cardinal principles in the Constitution,” without clarifying what these principles entail. Clauses barring assemblies that may threaten “public security and public order”—without specific definitions—create further ambiguity and leave space for subjective interpretation by law enforcement and local officials. Assemblies related to territorial and ethnic minority issues are particularly vulnerable to restrictions.

Maximum Numbers of Participants

The Assembly Law does not stipulate a maximum number of participants for public assemblies. However, local authorities may impose such limits through separate regulations or informal practices. In Beijing, CSOs have reported hearing of participant limits of 50 or 200 individuals, though they have not been able to identify any publicly available regulations containing those limits.

According to a 2002 Human Rights Watch report, Dangerous Meditation: China’s Campaign Against Falun Gong, the Ministry of Public Security issued rules on November 24, 1999, that prohibited gatherings of 200 or more individuals for mass cultural or sporting events—such as concerts, sports meets, or public exercise (e.g., qigong)—unless prior approval was obtained from police authorities. This was reportedly based on a BBC Worldwide Monitoring article titled “China to regulate mass gatherings.”

It is important to note, however, that Article 2 of the Assembly Law explicitly states that the law does not apply to “recreational or sports activities, normal religious activities, or traditional folk events.” This suggests that there may be additional regulations issued at the local level by Public Security offices concerning other types of assembly.

Notification

Article 8 of the Assembly Law mandates that organizers submit a written application to the relevant authorities five days in advance of the planned event. According to Article 9, authorities are required to respond at least two days before the scheduled date of the event. If no response is issued, permission is legally presumed to be granted.

In cases of “unexpected occurrences,” last-minute applications are permitted, and authorities are obligated to review and decide immediately.

The law does not address counter-demonstrations. However, spontaneous assemblies—those not pre-approved—are strictly prohibited. Article 29 criminalizes unauthorized gatherings and allows organizers and participants to be investigated under Article 158 of the Criminal Law if public order is deemed to be seriously undermined.

Obligations of Organizers

The Assembly Law imposes substantial obligations and liabilities on organizers of assemblies. Article 25 requires organizers to maintain order and prevent unauthorized participants from joining. Organizers may be required to appoint special personnel to assist the police, who must wear identifying marks.

Organizers can face penalties for administrative violations. Article 28 authorizes police to issue warnings or detain organizers for up to 15 days if an assembly deviates from the approved time, location, route, or messaging—or is held without approval.

Restrictions on Participants

Participants are also subject to penalties. Article 30 allows police to detain individuals for up to 15 days for disrupting a lawful assembly. In more severe cases, criminal prosecution may follow. Article 15 prohibits residents of one city from organizing or participating in assemblies in another city, while Article 34 requires foreigners to obtain approval from relevant authorities to participate in assemblies organized by Chinese citizens.

Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions

The law places strict limits on when and where assemblies can occur:

  • Article 23 bans assemblies within 10 to 300 meters of critical sites such as government offices, military installations, transportation hubs, and locations housing state guests.
  • Article 24 restricts the timing of public assemblies to the hours between 6:00 a.m. and 10:00 p.m., unless special permission is granted.
  • Article 12 bans assemblies that “harm the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state.” This provision is used to discourage assemblies related to ethnic minority issues—particularly in regions such as Tibet or Xinjiang where there has been vocal dissatisfaction with Communist Party governance

Enforcement

China has a history of using force to suppress assemblies. The most infamous example remains the Tiananmen Square crackdown of 1989, where an unknown number of civilians were killed. The government has never provided an official death toll.

In 1999, a peaceful vigil by Falun Gong practitioners near Zhongnanhai (the government compound in Beijing) prompted a wide-ranging crackdown. Human rights organizations report that Falun Gong adherents have since been subject to arbitrary detention, forced labor, torture, and psychiatric abuse.

More recently, the state has used force to break up demonstrations over land seizures and corruption in rural areas.

Other issues

Many CSO representatives report that they would not apply for permits to hold assemblies knowing that their requests would almost certainly be denied. In addition, filing an application can draw attention from public security, placing organizers at risk of surveillance or reprisal.

Nevertheless, some demonstrations do occur—typically those aligned with government interests or conducted in partnership with government-affiliated organizations. In October 2012, large anti-Japanese demonstrations were held in Beijing and a few other cities. Though it remains unclear who organized them, many observers believe the demonstrations had tacit state support. That same month, a Beijing-based gay rights NGO held an AIDS walk along a section of the Great Wall that involved hundreds of participants. No formal application was submitted, but the event was organized in cooperation with a government-run AIDS foundation.

Additional Resources

This section contains links to external reports and news reports relevant to civic freedoms. The Historical Notes section contains links to past developments which ICNL has reported on. Click a subheading for more, or click here to expand all subheadings.

Global Index Rankings
Ranking BodyRankRanking Scale
(best – worst possible)
UN Human Development Index75 (2023)1 – 193
World Justice Project Rule of Law Index95 (2024)1 – 142
Transparency International76 (2024)1 – 180
Foreign Policy: Fragile States Index99 (2024)179 – 1
Freedom House: Freedom in the WorldStatus: Not Free
Political Rights: -2
Civil Liberties: 11 (2024)		Free/Partly Free/Not Free
1 – 40
1 – 60
Civicus MonitorStatus: Closed (2024)closed, repressed, obstructed, narrowed or open
Reports
UN Universal Periodic Review ReportsUniversal Periodic Review: China
Reports of UN Special RapporteursChina
USIG (United States International Grantmaking) Country NotesUSIG: China
U.S. State Department2023 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: China
Failed States Index ReportsForeign Policy: Fragile States Index
IMF Country ReportsChina and the IMF
ICNL Philanthropy Law ReportChina
ICNL Online LibraryChina

In 2018, ICNL published a China Philanthropy Law Report, and accompanying resources (infographics, graphs, timelines, factsheets and FAQs) for understanding the philanthropy and civil society sector in China that can be found here.

News of importance to the nonprofit sector will be updated on a continual basis on China Development Brief, China’s only bilingual platform covering the sector.

Regular updates and monitoring of the Overseas NGO Law can be found at ChinaFile’s China NGO Project.

Regular analysis and reflections on Chinese civil society can be found on Shawn Shieh’s NGOs in China blog.

While we aim to maintain information that is as current as possible, we realize that situations can rapidly change.  If you are aware of any additional information or inaccuracies on this page, please keep us informed; write to ICNL at ngomonitor@icnl.org.

News

Chinese rights lawyer Lu Siwei sentenced to 11 months in prison (April 2025)
Prominent Chinese rights lawyer Lu Siwei, who was arrested and deported from Laos in 2023, was sentenced behind closed doors in China to 11 months in prison. Lu, 52, who was accused of illegal border crossing, plans to appeal the sentence by the Chenghua District Court in Chengdu. An insurance attorney by profession, Lu is well known for taking on many politically sensitive cases, including defending one of the 12 Hong Kong activists jailed in the southern Chinese province of Guangdong after they were caught fleeing by boat to Taiwan in 2020.

Key points of China’s Amended Charity Law (January 2024)
China’s amended Charity Law, which will enter into force on September 5, 2024, includes a new chapter on the role of charitable organizations in responding to emergencies, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, and provides more guidance and standards for online charitable fundraising platforms as well as charitable trusts, both of which have grown rapidly in recent years. In line with recent high-level policy directives emphasizing the leadership role of the Communist Party in all walks of life, the law stipulates that charity work comes under the leadership of the Communist Party. Several key changes in the amended law generally contravene the recommendations made by more independent NGOs, such as Zhicheng Public Interest Law, to give charitable organizations more autonomy, remove limits on spending and management fees, and simplify the process for non-profit organizations to gain charitable organization status.

Proposed changes to the Amended China’s Charity Law (December 2023)
During the public submission period for the draft amended Charity Law, one of China’s more independent NGOs published their recommendations, which emphasized more autonomy and less regulation for charitable organizations.

The 14th Five Year Plan for Social Organizations and the future of civil society in China (January 2022)
In October 2021, the Ministry of Civil Affair issued its 14th Five Year Plan (FYP) for the Development of Social Organizations. The FYP is the first of its kind for the social organization sector and is must reading for anyone interested in understanding how the Chinese government intends to reshape the future of China’s nonprofit sector. It puts forth a grim blueprint for the sector’s development over the next five years drawing on high level policy documents and major laws and regulations issued over the last few years.

The 14th Five Year Plan for Social Organizations: Opportunities for NGOs (January 2022)
In my last blogpost, I wrote about the 14th Five Year Plan (FYP) for Social Organizations released in October 2021 and its blueprint for imposing greater controls and supervision over Chinese social organizations in an effort to create a “high-quality” social organization sector. While the FYP instills little optimism for the development of an independent civil society, it does identify areas in which NGOs in China can contribute to the development of the sector, and to sustainable and inclusive development in China and globally.

Archived News

Will There Be a Civil Society in the Xi Jinping Era? (July 2021)

The 14th Five-Year Plan Outlines Policies for Social Organizations (July 2021)

Altering the Approach to Non-State-Approved Social Organisations (April 2021)

China Tightens Political Security Operations Against ‘Potential’ Dissent (December 2020)

To Fight the Next Pandemic, the World Needs Chinese Activists (November 2020)

How and why the Charity Law could be amended (October 2020)

Shenzhen Gives Green Light for Legal Action to Stop Environmental Destruction (September 2020)

Reckoning with Hong Kong’s National Security Law (July 2020)

92.72% of social organisations in Beijing impacted by COVID-19 (July 2020)

CDB conducts survey on needs of Chinese charities during the pandemic (June 2020)

Is HK about to Get Its Own Foreign NGO Law in the Name of ‘National Security’? (June 2020)

The remarkable online volunteers of the COVID-19 Outbreak (March 2020)

China Alters Civil Society Rules (March 2020)

Civil society finds new paths in Wuhan (February 2020)

Coronavirus in China: International NGOs’ response (February 2020)

Report Released on Online Fundraising in China in 2018 (May 2019)

Second “Silk Road NGO Cooperation Network Forum” in Beijing (April 2019)

Citing Foreign NGO Law Requirements, NGO Opts out of China Summit (March 2019)

Eight highlights of the 2019 Government Work Report (March 2019)

China’s social credit system takes on fake charities (February 2019)

Inside China’s crackdown on young Marxists (February 2019)

Shenzhen labour activists formally arrested (February 2019)

Young Activists Go Missing in China, Raising Fears of Crackdown (November 2018)

Law professors respond to the “Social Organization Regulations” draft (August 2018)

The new draft on the registration of social organisations (August 2018)

How China’s new individual income tax amendment affects charitable donations (September 2018)

Remaking China’s Civil Society in the Xi Jinping Era, by Shawn Shieh (August 2018)

242 overseas NGOs register in China (November 2017)

China NGO Law Still Hazy (June 2017)

The Origins of China’s New Law on Foreign NGOs (January 2017)

Implementing the Overseas NGO Law: 26 NGOs Register in Beijing and Guangdong (January 2017)

Implementing the Overseas NGO Law: Six NGOs Register in Shanghai (January 2017)

More FAQs on the Overseas NGO Law: Reading the Fine Print (January 2017)

Follow up on the Overseas NGO Law : The List of Professional Supervising Units Has Been Issued (December 2016)

Draft Guidelines for the Overseas NGO Law Announced at a Shanghai Forum (October 2016)

Some Insights from a Q&A with the Ministry of Public Security on the Overseas NGO Law (September 2016)

China’s first Charity Law takes effect to upgrade industry (September 2016)

A new dawn for China’s charity sector (September 2016)

Charity overhaul in China, but only with government approval (September 2016)

A Hokey-Cokey in State Intervention or a Breakthrough for Chinese NGOs? (August 2016)

China’s new NGO rules call for organisations to adhere to party leadership (August 2016)

How Should Global Stakeholders Respond to China’s New NGO Management Law? (May 2016)

How Foreign Nonprofit Organizations Should Respond to China’s New Overseas NGO Law (May 2016)

Clampdown in China Restricts 7,000 Foreign Organizations (April 2016)

China Passes Law on Security Controls on Foreign NGOs (April 2016)

It Just Got Harder to Make a Difference in China (April 2016)

The Good—and Bad—About China’s Charity Law (March 2016)

The Pros and Cons of China’s NGO Laws (March 2016)

China Adopts Charity Law (March 2016)

Is China’s New Overseas NGO Management Law Sounding the Death Knell for Civil Society? Maybe Not (February 2016)

Charges Against Chinese Rights Lawyers Draw Foreign Criticism (January 2016)

China Passes Controversial Counter-Terrorism Law (December 2015)

China’s Latest Crackdown on Workers Is Unprecedented (December 2015)

Grassroots NGOs Win Landmark Environmental Public Interest Lawsuit (November 2015)

China’s Xi Defends Censorship Amid Support For Embattled Rights Community (September 2015)

White House sends tough message on NGOs as Chinese President visits (September 2015)

Draft anti-terrorism law should be revised (January 2015)

Guangzhou OKs foreign cash for NGOs (November 2014)

China Approves Security Law Emphasizing Counterespionage (November 2014)

New Signs that China is Scrutinizing Foreign NGOs (June 2014)

People Power in the People’s Republic of China (June 2014)

Pray for Gao Zhisheng on Easter (April 2014)

Government Must End Reprisals Against Activists Demanding Participation in UPR (August 2013)

Social Media in China Fuel Citizen Response to Quake (May 2013)

The changing face of service society (May 2013)

‘Spring’ in the air for NGOs? (April 2013)

Government’s NGO funding peaks in 2012 (February 2013)

NGOs praised for role in fighting HIV/AIDS (November 2012)

State to tighten oversight of international NGOs (September 2012)

Activist and artist Ai Weiwei loses appeal on tax evasion charges (September 2012)

China’s door “wide open” to foreign NGOs (September 2012)

Chinese turn to microblogs for donations instead of government charities (August 2012)

NGOs get boost from Shenzhen register reforms (August 2012)

Government wants more transparency, which means more control over NGOs (August 2012)

New regulations on the management of charitable foundations issued (July 2012)

Changing climate for religious NGOs? (July 2012)

Clinton comments on human rights blocked in China (July 2012)

Eric Schmidt: The Great Firewall of China will fall (July 2012)

Charity Law submitted to State Council (June 2012)

Environmental NGOs grow across China but struggle for support (June 2012)

Corporate-NGO Partnerships in China: Fostering Employee Volunteer Programs (June 2012)

China keen to scale down EU human rights talks (June 2012)

Law to give new start to embattled charities (June 2012)

China tells Tibetan NGOs to register or else face closure (May 2012)

Will pressure make Chinese aid more transparent? (March 2012)

Revisions of law to ensure human rights related to detention, arrest and surveillance (March 2012)

Charities open to religious groups (March 2012)

Political advisers argue that legislation on the charity law is “vital” for the NGO sector to grow (March 2012)

China develops law on philanthropy (October 2011)

Social groups may get right for litigation (October 2011)

China human rights group blocked from EU-China dialogue (September 2011)

China jails veteran democracy activist (September 2011)

Breakthrough judicial interpretation of freedom of information regulations (August 2011)

New breakthrough for grassroots charity groups (August 2011)

Chinese civilian NGOs seek charity legislation (August 2011)

Calls for greater transparency, supervision in philanthropy (July 2011)

Carefully cultivating NGOs (July 2011)

China to ease NGO registration policy (July 2011)

Amnesty International accuses China of silencing human rights lawyers (June 2011)

China seeks to expand modern philanthropy (May 2011)

Labor question threatens China’s social compact, divides ruling party (May 2011)

China creates new agency for patrolling the Internet (May 2011)

Biden, Clinton lecture China on human rights (May 2011)

Fears in China as another human rights lawyer disappear (May 2011)

Teng Biao, Chinese human rights lawyer, released after detention (April 2011)

West needs more ‘muscular’ approach to defending China’s dissidents (April 2011)

End the silence on Ai Weiwei (April 2011)

China’s human rights crackdown – interactive guide (April 2011)

EU and US urge China to free Ai Weiwei (April 2011)

Investigate police assaults against foreign journalists (March 2011)

Crack down on Egypt-inspired protests in China (February 2011)

Experts assess the progress of civil society in China (February 2011)

Historical Notes

In the late 2000s, the Chinese government began revising the legal framework governing CSOs, charitable donations, and fundraising. These efforts were partly intended to improve regulatory capacity and coordination between the state and CSOs. Local governments were encouraged to pilot reforms—such as easing registration procedures, contracting social services to CSOs, and developing support and incubation platforms—that would later inform national policy.

The concept of “social management innovation” [shehui guanli chuangxin] was a focal point of the 12th Five Year Plan (2011 – 2015). It referred to improving the party-state’s ability to manage and coordinate with a range of CSOs and other non-state actors to address common goals. From 2009 to 2013, numerous local governments launched initiatives to support this agenda, including lowering barriers to CSO registration, contracting social services to CSOs, building programs and platforms to coordinate, support and incubate CSOs, and creating more detailed regulations and standards to guide the development of the CSO sector.

The administration of Xi Jinping, who became president of China in March of 2013, reaffirmed these reforms in November 2013 at the Third Plenum Decision of the 18th Central Committee. The final language in the Decision used the term “social governance” rather than social management—a term that civil society actors initially welcomed as it implied a more collaborative model of state–society relations.

However, even before the Plenum’s Decision came out, the new administration began implementing a more restrictive approach. Starting in 2013, authorities launched a wide-ranging crackdown on certain segments of civil society, particularly those engaged in rights-based advocacy, ethnic minority issues, religion, and other politically sensitive areas. This dual-track strategy signaled that reform efforts were intended primarily for state-aligned CSOs—such as charitable, social service, and professional associations—while critical or independent groups would remain tightly controlled.

These developments occurred alongside a broader campaign to consolidate the party-state’s authority and legitimacy. Thus, the Xi administration also launched an unprecedented anti-corruption campaign that targeted many high-level leaders; a campaign to encourage ideological orthodoxy in state agencies, universities, the media and the blogosphere; and a rule-of-law campaign emphasizing greater adherence to rules both inside and outside of the Party. These campaigns were infused with a renewed emphasis on national sovereignty, security, and territorial integrity, reflecting both China’s rising global stature and its internal concerns about unrest, dissent, and external influence—particularly in Xinjiang, Tibet, the South China Sea, and Hong Kong.

Within this broader context, Chinese CSOs have found themselves entangled in the state’s efforts to reassert control over civil society. These developments constitute a major top-down effort by the party-state to mold a “civil society with Chinese characteristics”—one that aligns with Party priorities and rejects what officials describe as Western-style rights discourse. This vision has been codified through a series of landmark laws and regulations, including the Charity Law (2016), the Overseas NGO Law (2017), and a unified Regulation for the Registration and Management of Social Organizations.

Together, these reforms represented a regulatory “Great Leap Forward” for the sector—constituting the most ambitious legal overhaul of nonprofit government in the People’s Republic of China to date. These legislative developments have been accompanied by substantial state investment in CSOs working in the priority areas of poverty alleviation, education, disaster relief, child and elder care, and community services.

In sum, the period from 2016 to 2021 marks a decisive turning point for civil society in China—arguably the most consequential since the 1989 democracy movement. This period has seen an unprecedented cascade of top-down policy and regulatory initiatives aimed at remaking the nonprofit sector. While observers differ on whether there is still meaningful space for civil society to operate, few dispute the state’s intent. As outlined in the 14th Five-Year Plan for the Development of Social Organizations, the party-state’s vision for civil society is now clear: a managed, state-aligned nonprofit sector that complements rather than challenges official policy, and that exists within firm political boundaries.