Sources: World Bank; The World Factbook. Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency; U.S. State Department 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: China

International and Regional Human Rights Agreements

* Category includes ratification, accession, or succession to the treaty

Constitutional Framework

The Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1982, as amended) includes the following relevant provisions which relate to the nonprofit, charitable and philanthropic sector:

Article 1 
The People’s Republic of China is a socialist state under the people’s democratic dictatorship led by the working class and based on the alliance of workers and peasants.
The socialist system is the basic system of the People’s Republic of China. Disruption of the socialist system by any organization or individual is prohibited.

Article 2
All power in the People’s Republic of China belongs to the people.
The National People’s Congress and the local people’s congresses at various levels are the organs through which the people exercise state power.
The people administer state affairs and manage economic, cultural and social affairs through various channels and in various ways in accordance with the law.

Article 5 
The People’s Republic of China governs the country according to law and makes it a socialist country ruled by law.
The state upholds the uniformity and dignity of the socialist legal system.
No laws or administrative or local rules and regulations may contravene the Constitution.
All state organs, the armed forces, all political parties and public organizations and all enterprises and institutions must abide by the Constitution and the law. All acts in violation of the Constitution or the law must be investigated.
No organization or individual is privileged to be beyond the Constitution or the law.

Article 28 
The state maintains public order and suppresses treasonable and other criminal activities that endanger state security; it penalizes criminal activities that endanger public security and disrupt the socialist economy, as well as other criminal activities; and it punishes and reforms criminals.

Article 33 
All persons holding the nationality of the People’s Republic of China are citizens of the People’s Republic of China.
All citizens of the People’s Republic of China are equal before the law.
The state respects and guarantees human rights.
Every citizen is entitled to the rights and at the same time must perform the duties prescribed by the Constitution and the law.

Article 35 
Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration.

Article 36 
Citizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of religious belief.
No state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion; nor may they discriminate against citizens who believe in, or do not believe in, any religion.
The state protects normal religious activities. No one may make use of religion to engage in activities that disrupt public order, impair the health of citizens or interfere with the educational system of the state.
Religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination.

Article 50 
The People’s Republic of China protects the legitimate rights and interests of Chinese nationals residing abroad and protects the lawful rights and interests of returned overseas Chinese and of the family members of Chinese nationals residing abroad.

Article 51
Citizens of the People’s Republic of China, in exercising their freedoms and rights, may not infringe upon the interests of the state, of society or of the collective, or upon the lawful freedoms and rights of other citizens.

Article 52
It is the duty of citizens of the People’s Republic of China to safeguard the unification of the country and the unity of all its ethnic groups.

Article 53 
Citizens of the People’s Republic of China must abide by the Constitution and the law, keep state secrets, protect public property, observe labor discipline and public order and respect social ethics.

Article 54 
It is the duty of citizens of the People’s Republic of China to safeguard the security, honor and interests of the motherland; they must not commit acts detrimental to the security, honor and interests of the motherland.

National Laws and Regulations Affecting Sector

Many of the key national laws and regulations affecting the sector are as follows, although this list is not exhaustive. For additional information, see Ministry of Civil Affairs and U.S. International Grantmaking.

• Constitution of the People’s Republic of China (1982, as amended, see selected provisions above)
• Law of the Red Cross Society of the People’s Republic of China (adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, October 31, 1993)
• Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations (adopted by the State Council October 25, 1998, currently in revision)
• Interim Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Civil Non-Enterprise Institutions (adopted by the State Council October 25, 1998)
• Interim Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Public Institutions (adopted by the State Council October 25, 1998)
• Public Welfare Donations Law (adopted by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress June 28, 1999)
• Law of the People’s Republic of China on Individual Income Tax and Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Individual Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China (as enacted in 1999 and later amended)
• Provisional Measures Regarding the Management of Social Welfare Organizations (issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, April 10, 2000)
• Trust Law of People’s Republic of China (adopted by the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress April 28, 2001)
• Non-State Education Promotion Law of the People’s Republic of China (adopted by the Standing Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress December 28, 2002)
• Circular of the Ministry of Finance on the Relevant Issues Concerning the Preferential Taxation Policies for the Poverty-Relief and Charity Donation Materials Imported for the Purpose of School Education. (issued by the Ministry of Finance, March 10, 2003)
• Regulations on the Management of Foundations (adopted by the State Council March 8, 2004, currently in revision)
• Regulations on the Administration of Names of Foundations (issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs June 23, 2004)
• Accounting System for Nonprofit Organizations (issued by the Ministry of Finance September 2004)
• Reply of the State Administration of Taxation on Tax Exemption of 33 Permanent Representative Offices of Foreign Enterprises, such as the Beijing Representative Office of the Ford Foundation (issued by the State Administration of Taxation June 11, 2004)
• Measures for the Information Disclosure of Foundations and Measures for Annual Inspection of Foundations (issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs January 12, 2006)
• Enterprise Income Tax Law of the People’s Republic of China; Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Income Tax and Detailed Rules for the Implementation of the Provisional Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Enterprise Income Tax (as enacted in 2007 and as amended)
• Notice of the State Administration of Foreign Exchange on Issues concerning the Administration of Foreign Exchange Donated to or by Domestic Institutions (issued by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange December 25, 2009): English translation
• National Security Law(adopted in July 2015)
• Counterterrorism Law(反恐怖主义法, sometimes translated as the Anti-Terrorism or Counterespionage Law) (approved December 2015 and went into effect on January 1, 2016)
• Charity Law (慈善法) (promulgated March 16, 2016 , goes into effect on September 1, 2016): English translation
• Law on the Management of Overseas NGOs’ Activities in Mainland China, (境外非政府组织境内活动管理法) (promulgated April 28, 2016, goes into effect on January 1, 2017): English Translation; Official Chinese Version
• Trial Regulations on Admonishment Meetings for Social Organizations by Registration Management Organs and Administrative Law Enforcement(March 16, 2016) (社会组织登记管理机关行政执法约谈工作规定（试行)
• Trial Notice on Registration Management Organs’ Acceptance of Complaints and Reports about Social Organizations(August 15, 2016) (社会组织登记管理机关受理投诉举报办法（试行)
• Central Committee and State Council Opinion on the Reform of the Social Organization Management System and Promotion of the Healthy and Orderly Development of Social Organizations (August 2016) (Original in Chinese; Original in English) (关于改革社会组织管理制度促进社会组织健康有序发展的意见)
• Measures for the Designation of Charitable Organizations(September 1, 2016) (慈善组织认定办法`)
• Measures on the Administration of Public Fundraising by Charitable Organizations(September 1, 2016) (慈善组织公开募捐管理办法)
• Notice on Social Organizations Initiating Party Construction Work During Registration(September 18, 2016) (民政部关于社会组织成立登记时同步开展党建工作有关问题的通知)
• Regulation on the Annual Expenditures and Management Expenses of Charitable Organizations Carrying Out Charitable Activities （慈善组织开展慈善活动年度支出和管理费用的规定） (October 2016): English Translation
• Measure for the Management of Charitable Trusts (慈善信托管理办法) (July 2017): Chinese
• Volunteer Service Regulations (志愿服务条例), August 22, 2017 (original in Chinese), which China’s first-ever regulation governing volunteers.
• Regulation on Social Organisation Credit Information Management (社会组织信用信息管理办法). (January 24, 2018): Chinese; English Translation
• Measure for Charitable Organizations’ Information Disclosure(慈善组织信息公开办法) (August 6, 2018): English Translation
• Provisional Measures for Investment Activities of Charitable Organizations for Capital Preservation and Appreciation(慈善组织保值增值投资活动管理暂行办法) (October 25, 2018): Chinese
• Measure on Management of Government Procurement of Services, January 3, 2020 (Original in Chinese) regulates government procurement of services from enterprises and social organizations.
• Announcement on Matters Concerning the Pre-tax Deduction of Public Welfare Donations《关于公益性捐赠税前扣除有关事项的公告》(May 21, 2020): Chinese
• Notice on Eliminating the Breeding Grounds for Illegal Social Organizations and Cleansing the Ecological Space for Social Organizations, March 20, 2021 (original in Chinese, English translation)
• Provisions on the Administrative Punishment Procedures of the Registration and Management Organs of Domestic Social Organizations, September 17, 2021 (original in Chinese)
• 14^th Five Year Plan for the Development of Social Organizations, October 8, 2021 (original in Chinese), which is the first time the Ministry of Civil Affairs has issued a Five Year Plan (2021-25) for social organizations.
• Regulations on the Management of the Evaluation of Domestic Social Organizations, December 2, 2021 (original in Chinese, English translation), which includes Ministry of Civil Affairs regulations for standardizing the management of the evaluation process for Chinese social organizations.
• Charity Law (慈善法) (2023 Amendment), promulgated on December 29, 2023 and entering into force on September 5, 2024 (bilingual version)

In addition to the laws above that directly regulate the sector, there are a number of other laws and regulations in other sectors that are relevant because they were drafted with input from civil society groups and have important implications for civil society groups. Below are two recent examples:

An Environmental Law was approved by the 12th NPC on April 24, 2014 and took effect in 2015. It lowered the barrier for NGOs to file public interest lawsuits. A previous draft had only allowed a few NGOs to file public interest lawsuits, but the final draft contained more liberal language that allowed any NGO registered with Civil Affairs at the city level or above to file a public interest lawsuit. That interpretation was later affirmed by the Supreme People’s Court. Soon after the Environmental Law went into effect, two well-known grassroots environmental NGOs filed a public interest lawsuit in Nanping city, suing four individuals for harmful mining activities in the area. That lawsuit was accepted by the Nanping Intermediate Court on January 1, 2015.

(Note: English-language translations of these laws can be found either on ChinaLawTranslate or China Development Brief’s website).

Pending NGO Legislative / Regulatory Initiatives

1. Draft Regulation for Registration and Management of Social Organizations (Original in Chinese; English Translation)

In June and September 2016, draft regulations governing the registration and management of the three different types of social organizations – Social Associations (SAs), Social Service Organizations (SSOs) and Foundations – were issued for public comment. These draft regulations were revisions of three earlier regulations that formed the heart of the regulatory system governing China’s social organizations: the “Regulations for the Registration and Management of Social Groups”, which were issued on October 25, 1998; the “Provisional Regulations on the Registration and Management of Civil Non-enterprise Units”, which were issued on October 25, 1998; and the “Foundation Management Regulations”, which were issued on March 8, 2004. They specify which government bodies are responsible for their registration and management, the registration requirements and procedures, the internal governance of the organization, their legal responsibilities, and so on.

It has been well over 10 years since any of these regulations have been revised, and many experts have been expecting them to be revised, particularly after the passage of the Charity Law. Yet the draft regulations issued in 2016 for public comment were pending for more than two years and never appeared in their final form. The mystery came to an end in August of 2018 when the Ministry of Civil Affairs issued a single draft regulation that combined all three of the earlier regulations into one for public comment.

This draft regulation has attracted quite a bit of attention among academics, practitioners and commentators because of its importance. While the regulation preserved parts of the 2016 revisions, such as allowing four categories of social organizations to register directly without a PSU, other parts of the regulation were criticized for defining “charity” and “public welfare” too narrowly, for prohibiting social organizations from engaging in “for-profit, business activities”, and for not lowering some of the registration requirements to make it easier for smaller, community foundations to register. Some experts have noted that the Ministry of Civil Affairs only gave less than 30 days for the public to send in comments. They therefore called for the public comment period to be lengthened given the importance of this regulation.

Finally, the draft regulation includes articles on the need for social organizations to establish Communist Party organizations and carry out Party activities. Social organizations are required to prepare the conditions and provide a workplan for setting up such Party Organizations. None of this language requiring Party organizations was in the Charity Law or in the previous social organization regulations.

2.Draft Regulation for Registration and Management of Social Organizations

Recent news articles suggest that the draft Regulation for Registration and Management of Social Organizations has been delayed. It has been nearly three years since the Regulation was issued by the Ministry of Civil Affairs in August 2018 for public comment, and it is not clear why there is a delay, except for the news articles themselves and recent policy documents, such as the Notice on Eliminating the Breeding Grounds for Illegal Social Organizations and Cleansing the Ecological Space for Social Organizations (March 20, 2021) (original in Chinese, English translation). They suggest the political forces favor greater supervision and control of social organizations to make it more difficult for them to register. The news articles further suggest a bureaucratic reason for the delay, revealing for the first time that the Ministry of Civil Affairs is cooperating with the Ministry of Justice in drafting the Regulation. In the past, the Ministry of Civil Affairs drafted these regulations, so it is unclear why the Ministry of Justice is now involved or what it means for the content of the Regulation.

For a fuller discussion of the Charity Law and its implementing regulations, see ICNL’s Philanthropy Law Report and accompanying resources which include FAQs about the Charity Law. For a more detailed discussion of the ONGO Law, see ICNL’s Philanthropy Law Report and accompanying resources which include FAQs about the ONGO Law.

Organizational Forms

CSOs in China are officially referred to as social organizations (shehui zuzhi, 社会组织), and fall into three main legal categories:

• Social associations (SAs, shehui tuanti,

As of the end of 2023, there were 881,617 registered social organizations, comprising approximately 373,000 SAs, 499,000 SSOs, and 9,617 foundations. These figures indicate a slight decline in overall numbers in recent years, with the exception of foundations, which have remained stable or grown.

In addition to these three legal forms, the Charity Law, which went into effect on September 1, 2016, introduced two additional legal arrangements for carrying out charitable activities:

1. Charitable organization status (cishan zuzhi, 慈善组织): This status can be granted to any lawfully established nonprofit organization whose main purpose is “carrying out charitable activities” and that does not have a “profit making purpose” (Article 8-9). A social organization can obtain charitable organization status in two ways: during the initial process of registration; or by applying according to the procedures in the Measures for the Designation of Charitable Organizations (issued in September 2016). As of September 2023, over 13,000 organizations had been granted charitable organization status.
2. Charitable trusts(cishan xintuo, 慈善信托): While charitable trusts were first recognized under the 2001 Trust Law, ambiguity around their regulation and taxation hindered their development. The 2016 Charity Law clarified the legal framework, specifying management requirements and tax provisions, which significantly boosted interest in charitable trusts. Article 45 of the Charity Law requires charitable trusts to “file documents for the record” (bei’an) with the Civil Affairs authorities in order to qualify for tax benefits. As a result of these reforms, the number of charitable trusts has grown quickly, from 53 in 2019 to 1,184 by the end of 2022, with a total value exceeding CNY 5.16 billion (approximately $767.7 million), according to the China Charitable Trust Development Report 2022.

In addition to these legal forms, a significant number of entities register as for-profit businesses or operate without legal registration. Some unregistered groups gain legal status by attaching themselves to other legal entities such as social organizations or public institutions (e.g., universities and research institutes). Although these groups are not legally classified as nonprofits, in practice they function as voluntary, nongovernmental, not-for-profit, mission driven, and self-governing organizations that are founded by and governed by private individuals. Many rely on foreign funding from governments, embassies, international organizations, and foundations. To maintain credibility, they often document the not-for-profit nature of their activities in reports to donors.

Estimates of the number of such informal CSOs vary widely, ranging from a few hundred thousand to a few million, depending on the definition used. Broader estimates may include Party-controlled mass organizations, such as the Communist Youth League and Women’s Federation and their local branches, and rural cooperatives.

A substantial portion of legally registered CSOs—especially SAs and foundations—were either created by the government or maintain close ties with government agencies. These are often referred to as government-organized NGOs (GONGOs). In contrast, informal CSOs are generally more grassroots and independent from the state.

Another relevant organizational form is the public institution or public service unit (shiye danwei, 事业单位), which includes government-established entities such as universities, research institutes, and hospitals. These quasi-governmental agencies are generally formed by the government and staffed with government employees. They are a legacy of China’s centrally-planned system set up during the 1950s. Though not traditional CSOs, they are included in this report because they frequently receive foreign funding and are subject to some of the same tax rules as social organizations. China is currently planning to carry out a reform of public institutions by privatizing a portion of them and turning them into social organizations.

The Ministry of Civil Affairs is the primary registration body for CSOs in China. CSOs that operate as for-profit businesses register through the State Administration for Industry and Commerce to operate with more flexibility. International CSOs register with the Ministry of Public Security.

For more detailed analysis, see:

• Andrew Watson, “Civil Society in a Transitional State: The Rise of Associations in China,” in Jonathan Unger, ed., Associations and the Chinese State (M.E. Sharpe , 2008)
• Guosheng Deng, “The Hidden Rules Governing China’s Unregistered NGOs: Management and Consequences,” The China Review, 10:1 (Spring, 2010);
• ICNL’s infographic, the Universe of Chinese NGOs, and graphs showing the growth of foundations and social organizations.

Public Benefit Status

Chinese law distinguishes between CSOs that serve charitable or public benefit purposes and those with other aims.

Under the 2016 Charity Law, SAs, SSOs, and foundations can apply for charitable status. (Implementing regulations currently being drafted may automatically consider foundations to be charitable organizations, but SAs and SSOs will need to apply separately for this status.) To obtain charitable status, an organization must submit an application to the Civil Affairs Department, either at the national or local level. According to Article 9 of the Charity Law, a charitable organization must meet the following requirements:

• Aim to carry out charitable activities;
• Not have the goal of making a profit;
• Possess a name and address;
• Have an organizational charter;
• Have necessary financial assets;
• Have an organizational structure and person in charge in accordance with the requirements;
• Meet other conditions stipulated by laws and administrative regulations.

Article 3 of the Charity Law defines “charitable activities” as public interest activities voluntarily carried out by natural persons, legal persons, and other organizations through the donation of property. These activities include:

• Helping the poor and the needy;
• Assisting the elderly, orphans, the ill, the disabled, and providing special care;
• Alleviating losses incurred by natural disasters, accidents, public health incidents, and other emergencies;
• Promoting the development of education, science, culture, health, sports, and other causes;
• Preventing and alleviating pollution and other public hazards, protecting and improving the eco-environment;
• Other public interest activities in accordance with this law.

Barriers to Formation

CSOs in China face extensive barriers to entry based in policy, practice, and regulation. While the 2016 Charity Law and revised drafts of registration and management regulations for social organizations will ease some restrictions, they may also introduce new constraints. The analysis below is primarily based on the existing regulations and will be updated as implementing rules for the Charity Law and the revised registration and management regulations for social organizations are rolled out over the next few years. For more resources on the Charity Law, see ICNL’s Philanthropy Law Report and accompanying resources, which include an FAQ about the Charity Law.

Registration procedures for CSOs remain complex and cumbersome, with extensive documentation and approval requirements. Many organizations are required to operate under a “dual management” system, requiring sponsorship from a “professional supervising unit,” such as a government ministry or provincial government agency, before seeking registration and approval from the Ministry of Civil Affairs in Beijing or a local civil affairs bureau. They remain under the control of both agencies throughout their organizational life. In practice, obtaining such sponsorship is difficult, particularly for groups without strong connections in the government that are operating in sensitive sectors such as advocacy, legal aid, labor, religion, and ethnic minority affairs.

Broad legal clauses in the Charity Law bar the registration of groups perceived to oppose the state and/or Party. For example:

• Article 4 mandates that charitable activities must be lawful, voluntary, honest, and non-profit, and must not violate social morality, endanger national security, or harm societal public interests or the lawful rights and interests of other persons.
• Article 5 indicates that the government encourages and supports natural persons, legal persons, and other organizations in legally carrying out charitable activities that represent the core values of socialism and promote the traditional morals of the Chinese nation.

Other regulations further constrain entry. Under the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Associations (1999), applicant organizations must have:

• A minimum of 50 individual or 30 institutional members;
• A fixed location;
• Staff with appropriate qualifications; and
• Minimum assets of CNY 100,000 (currently $9,500) for national organizations and CNY 30,000 ($2,800) for local organizations.

To apply for legal status, organizations must submit a wide array of organizational documents to the registration and management agency.

Government agencies may rely on a wide array of reasons to deny registration. Furthermore, the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Associations (1999) and the Interim Regulations on the Registration and Administration of Civil Non-Enterprise Institutions (CNIs) (1998) both stipulate that SOs and CNIs cannot establish branch organizations or offices in other regions.  The revisions of these regulations that are currently being drafted will relax some of these requirements, but not do away with them completely.

After registration, an organization must navigate separate approval processes to obtain an official seal, open a bank account, establish a branch or subsidiary; modify its registration or amend its charter; or change its legal representative, among other actions. The government also has broad discretionary authority to shut down social organizations under the Interim Measures for Banning Illegal Non-Governmental Organizations (2000).

For some types of nonprofits, such as SAs and SSOs, regulations allow the government to bar the establishment of more than one organization in a field in any particular locality in order to prevent duplication, overlap, and competition and to maintain ties between such groups and their governmental sponsors. [2]

Given these challenges—including the dual management system, complicated registration and approval processes, onerous reporting requirements, and the opportunity for frequent government intrusion into organizational matters—many groups choose to register as for-profit business or operate without formal registration. According to the Interim Measures for Banning Illegal Non-Governmental Organizations, however, unregistered nonprofits are considered illegal, making them especially vulnerable to state control.

Over the last few years, local governments have piloted reforms aimed at lowering barriers to entry by reforming the dual management system for certain categories of social organizations. In most cases, this reform involves doing away with the requirement for social organizations to obtain the sponsorship of a professional supervising unit.

These reforms have informed national policy. Under the 2016 Charity Law, and in the registration and management regulation for SAs, SSOs, and foundations that are currently being drafted, the “dual management system” will be removed for four categories of organizations: trade associations and chambers of commerce, science and technology associations, public benefit and charitable organizations, and urban and rural community organizations. As a result, these types of organizations will be able to register directly with the Ministry of Civil Affairs without getting sponsorship of a “professional supervising unit.”

Barriers to Operations

Operational barriers for CSOs in China vary, largely depending on how the activities are viewed by the party-state. Generally, nonprofits engaged in social services and charitable work are viewed more favorably than those engaged in advocacy and rights-based activism.

The regulatory framework also allows for significant government intervention and interference. Government intervention in operational matters can take many forms, including:

• Raising questions about the appointment of directors, trustees, or senior staff;
• Restricting allowable activities based on the government-approved organizational application or charter;
• Micromanaging banking arrangements;
• Using tax laws to undertake investigations of operational activities and terminate organizational activities;
• Harassing organizations by exerting pressure through the organization’s landlord or utility company;
• Burdensome reporting requirements; and
• Intensive monitoring of activities that are considered sensitive by the party and state by security forces, including the Ministry of Public Security and the Ministry of State Security.

Under President Xi Jinping’s administration (2013 – present), civil society has experienced a sharp upturn in repression by the police and security forces. Many independent CSOs and law firms have been harassed and forced to close, and their staff and leaders interrogated, detained, and sometimes imprisoned. Notable cases include:

• In 2013, Xu Zhiyong, founder of the Open Constitution Initiative (Gongmeng) and one of the leaders of the New Citizens’ Movement, was arrested and charged with “gathering a crowd to disturb public order” after publicly calling for Chinese officials to disclose their assets as a way to fight corruption. He was sentenced to four years in prison.
• In 2014-15, several staff and board members of Yirenping, one of China’s foremost anti-discrimination CSOs, were interrogated and detained. As a result of this ongoing repression, Yirenping had to close most of its offices in China.
• In December 2015, a major crackdown on labor groups in South China was carried out. Police targeted the Panyu Workers Center, which had been carrying out pathbreaking work on collective bargaining. Dozens of labor activists were interrogated and three staff of the Panyu Workers Center were detained and later tried.
• In January 2016, Guo Jianmei, one of China’s best-known women’s rights advocates, was ordered to close down Zhongzhe Women’s Legal Counseling Center allegedly for accepting foreign funds.
• Also in early 2016, police detained Peter Dahlin, a Swedish national and director of a CSO that organized trainings for lawyers and provided funding to Chinese rights defenders. State media accused his CSO of “jeopardizing China’s national security” and he was forced to confess on state television before being deported.
• In December 2018, police in Chengdu, the provincial capital of Sichuan, raided the Early Rain Covenant Church, detained its pastor, Wang Yi, and took hundreds of church members into custody before eventually criminally detaining at least 20 members.
• In July 2019, State Security detained three anti-discrimination advocates—known as the Changsha Three—on suspicion of “subversion of state power.” They are currently being held in the Hunan Provincial State Security Bureau Detention Center in Changsha and have been denied visits by lawyers and families.
• In the first two months of 2020, police rounded up a number of people associated with an early December 2019 meeting in Xiamen where China’s democratic future was discussed. Some were released but Xu Zhiyong, Ding Jiaxi, and others remained in detention. On April 10, 2023, Xu and Ding were sentenced to 14 years and 12 years respectively for “subversion of state power.” (Source: Human Rights Watch)

In addition to these enforcement actions, additional regulations have been issued to further restrict nonprofit operations:

• 2016 regulations require social organizations to initiate [Communist] “party construction work” and require them to submit to supervision by Communist Party groups.
• 2018 regulations incorporate social organizations into the credit management system. Nonprofits that have poor credit records may be included on a blacklist that could lead to greater supervision and deny them opportunities to apply for financial support.
• In March 2021, a Notice on Eliminating the Breeding Grounds for Illegal Social Organizations and Cleansing the Ecological Space for Social Organizations (see Section 8) was issued. This policy calls on public and private actors—including companies, public institutions, social organizations, media organizations, internet platforms, financial institutions, party members, and the public—not to associate with unregistered or “illegal” social organizations.
• In March 2023, the Communist Party of China’s Central Committee and the State Council announced a planto create a Central Social Affairs Department to supervise party construction work within both private sector entities and social organizations. This signals continued centralization of control over civil society actors.

[2] See, e.g., the Regulations on the Registration and Management of Social Organizations (1999), Art. 13(2).

Foreign NGOs Operating in China

The Law of the People’s Republic of China on the Administration of Activities of Overseas Nongovernmental Organizations in the Mainland of China (commonly referred to as the Overseas NGO Law or ONGO Law) established a stringent legal framework for foreign NGOs operating in mainland China. The law, which came into effect on January 1, 2017, defines overseas NGOs (ONGOs) as nonprofit, non-governmental social organizations legally established outside of mainland China—including in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macau.

The law introduces significant barriers to cooperation between ONGOs and Chinese entities. Most notably, it shifts regulatory authority from the Ministry of Civil Affairs to the Ministry of Public Security—China’s principal internal security agency—marking a shift from administrative oversight to a security-oriented approach.

Under the ONGO Law, foreign NGOs may legally operate in China through only two channels:

1. Registering a representative office in China; or
2. Filing “documentation for the record” (bei’an) to carry out “temporary activities” in mainland China lasting no longer than one year. This requires an ONGO to have a Chinese partner and file materials about their collaboration and any necessary approvals with the Public Security office. They are also required to file reports on their activities to Public Security.

Article 9 of the ONGO Law explicitly prohibits ONGOs from engaging in activities—directly or indirectly—without going through one of the two authorized legal channels:

“ONGOs that do neither of these are not allowed to carry out activities either openly or covertly, or to authorize, fund or covertly authorize any Chinese work unit or individual to carry out activities.”

While the law does legitimize the status of ONGOs in China and establishes a formal channel between ONGOs and the government, it is highly restrictive and effectively bars Chinese organizations and individuals from cooperating with unregistered ONGOs.

For more resources for understanding the ONGO Law, see ICNL’s Philanthropy Law Report and accompanying resources which include FAQs about the ONGO Law.

In addition to these legal barriers, a number of extra-legal barriers restrict international contact. Chinese organizations have generally been required to report international contacts to authorities and, in some cases, obtain prior approval for certain kinds of visits, international cooperation, foreign donations, and other contact with foreign organizations or donors. Moreover, Chinese organizations that collaborate with or receive funding from foreign organizations are monitored closely and sometimes harassed. The State Security Ministry established an office several years ago to monitor both domestic and international NGO affairs. Foreign NGOs are regularly accused by Chinese media of supporting activities that undermine social stability and national security.

While the ONGO Law is the single greatest barrier to international NGOs carrying out activities in China, two recent trends pose additional challenges.

First, nationalism and authoritarianism have risen under the current leader, Xi Jinping. One manifestation of this is the National People’s Congress’ passage on June 30, 2020, of the National Security Law (NSL) for Hong Kong, which imposes criminal penalties for collusion with foreign powers or external elements that endanger national security.

Second, tensions between China and the United States and other Western countries have grown in response to China’s hardline response to its Uyghur ethnic minority population in the province of Xinjiang and protests in Hong Kong. For example:

• In April 2019, the party-state’s mouthpiece, the People’s Daily, published an article detailing the case of two foreign NGOs that posed threats to China’s “political security.”
• In July 2019, an article appeared in a party-run paper in Shanghai accusing several U.S. NGOs of being behind the massive protests taking place in Hong Kong against a controversial extradition law.
• After President Trump signed the Hong Kong Human Rights and Democracy Act in November 2019, the Chinese government announced that it would impose sanctions on five U.S. NGOs with offices in Hong Kong: Freedom House, Human Rights Watch, National Endowment for Democracy, International Republican Institute, and National Democratic Institute. Soon after, the Chinese Foreign Ministry announcedthe first investigation and penalty directed at a U.S.-based NGO, Asia Catalyst, for violating the Overseas NGO Law.

Barriers to Expression

Legal, administrative, and political barriers increasingly inhibit meaningful public expression and participation in China. A gap between constitutional guarantees of fundamental freedoms and the application of special regulations enables the state to exercise broad discretion in limiting speech, assembly, and advocacy by specific organizations and types of organizations—particularly when these activities are seen as harmful to national security.

These restrictions are enforced through a combination of legal tools including administrative decrees, such as the regulations governing social organizations and other kinds of groups. Additional regulatory barriers may restrict nonprofit organizations from engaging in policy advocacy, either by favoring government-affiliated groups or interpreting such activities as outside the scope of their officially approved activities or organizational charter. Barriers to organizational activity, such as those discussed above, may also restrict speech, assembly and advocacy.

Under President Xi Jinping, restrictions on freedom of expression have intensified. Human rights lawyers, civil society advocates, and bloggers who engage in public-interest advocacy have been subject to increasing surveillance, detention, and criminal charges. Universities, traditional media, social media platforms, and NGOs have all come under tighter ideological control.

One of the most visible crackdowns occurred in late 2018, when scores of workers protesting their dismissal from Jasic Technology Company in Shenzhen were detained along with university graduates who supported their cause.

Universities and nonprofit organizations have also had to submit to greater Communist Party supervision and control and demonstrate their loyalty to the Party through party-building activities. In September 2022, the Ministry of Civil Affairs held its first training session for leaders of national CSOs. The session emphasized the importance of aligning their activities with state priorities and enhancing political loyalty. An official leading the session explicitly instructed participants to ensure their work supported government objectives.

These trends have had a chilling effect on civil society. They have discouraged rights-based advocacy, silenced critical voices, and created a climate of self-censorship among CSOs, intellectuals, and activists.

Barriers to Resources

Recent legislative and regulatory developments in China have created contrasting trends in CSOs’ access to resources: while foreign funding has been subject to heightened restrictions, opportunities for domestic fundraising, particularly through online platforms and tax incentives, have expanded.

Over the last few years, Chinese authorities have significantly tightened oversight of foreign funding of CSOs. Regulatory changes have been accompanied by official rhetoric and media messaging that cast foreign-funded CSOs as potential threats to national security and social stability.

A key development was the issuance of Notice No. 63 by the State Administration of Foreign Exchange in early 2010. The notice, titled “On Issues Concerning the Administration of Foreign Exchange Donated to or by Domestic Institutions,” introduced more complex compliance requirements for domestic nonprofits receiving foreign donations, including a need to submit:

• an application attesting to the authority of the domestic organization and the foreign donor;
• the domestic group’s business license;
• a notarized donation agreement between the domestic group and the foreign donor organization describing the purpose of the donation; and
• a registration certificate for the foreign nonprofit group.

While many organizations have continued to access foreign funding, the process has become more burdensome. Some organizations receiving support from foreign organizations that are perceived as sensitive because of their “democracy promotion” work—such as the National Endowment for Democracy, the Open Society Foundation, and the International Republican Institute—have faced heightened scrutiny and, in some cases, operational disruptions. [3]

The Overseas NGO Law, which went into effect on January 1, 2017, imposed additional barriers to foreign resources. It requires all foreign NGOs operating in China to report on their Chinese partners, funding sources, and project activities to the public security apparatus. This requirement disproportionately affects grassroots organizations, many of which are unregistered or registered as businesses, and are thus ineligible to receive foreign funding under the law. As a result, numerous foreign NGOs have confirmed that they are no longer able to legally collaborate with or fund such partners.

In contrast to these increased restrictions, recent legal reforms have opened up new pathways for nonprofits to raise funds domestically. The 2016 Charity Law, along with draft revisions to regulations on the  registration and management of social organizations, expand the pool of nonprofits that can engage in public fundraising and encourage philanthropy through tax incentives. In the past, public fundraising—understood to include funding appeals through the media, in public spaces, and online—was restricted to a small number of organizations generally with close ties to the government. These included government agencies, such as the Ministry of Civil Affairs; officially designated organizations such as the Chinese Red Cross and China Charity Federation; and public fundraising foundations. Other organizations, including non-public fundraising foundations, SAs, and SSOs, were not allowed to engage in public fundraising.

Under the new legislation, there will be no distinction between public and non-public fundraising foundations, and all nonprofit organizations, including SAs and SSOs, will be allowed to apply for public fundraising status after two years of operation. In addition, the Charity Law calls for more generous tax incentives to encourage charitable giving.

Another notable policy shift came with the May 21, 2020, “Announcement on Matters Concerning the Pre-Tax Deduction of Public Welfare Donations,” issued jointly by the Ministry of Civil Affairs, Ministry of Finance, and the State Administration of Taxation. The Announcement created a more streamlined process for social organizations to qualify for tax deductions on public welfare donations. Tax deductibility will also be valid for three years, instead of just one, and will be recognized nationwide. To qualify, social organizations need to maintain at least a 3A rating (with the highest rating being 5A) in their evaluation and comply with the provisions on expenditures and management fees specified in the Charity Law.

The rapid growth of online fundraising/crowdsourcing platforms over the last few years has also opened up new channels for Chinese CSOs to access resources. As of 2021, there were 20 online platforms certified by the Ministry of Civil Affairs. In 2018 alone, these platforms raised more than CNY 3.17 billion (about $461 million) for 1,400 charitable organizations. The vast majority of funds were raised through three platforms owned by major tech companies: Tencent Charity, Ant Financial, and Alibaba Charity. In 2022, ten new online fundraising platforms were certified, including charity platforms established by major companies such as ByteDance, Xiaomi, BiliBili, China Mobile, Ctrip, and Ping An. To regulate this emerging sector, the Ministry of Civil Affairs has issued two industry standards: the “Charity Organizations’ Internet Public Fundraising Platform Basic Management Rules” and the “Charity Organizations’ Internet Public Fundraising Platform Basic Technological Rules.”

Barriers to Assembly

Vague Provisions
Both the Assembly Law and the Implementing Measures contain vague and restrictive provisions, and give enforcement authorities a great deal of authority and discretion. For example, Article 12 of the Law prohibits assemblies that might “oppose cardinal principles in the Constitution,” although those principles are never specified. The Law also makes it difficult to hold assemblies related to territorial and ethnic minority issues. There is also a broad clause prohibiting assemblies that will harm “public security and public order,” without any qualifying provisions.

Maximum Numbers of Participants
There is no maximum number of participants in the Assembly Law, but various local regulations may define a specific limit. In Beijing, NGOs cited 50 and 200 as ceilings that they have heard of by word of mouth, but they could not cite specific regulations containing those limits. A 2002 Human Rights Watch report titled “Dangerous Meditation: China’s Campaign Against Falun Gong” states that “On November 24, 1999, the Ministry of Public Security issued new public assembly regulations prohibiting gatherings of 200 or more for mass cultural and sporting activities, such as concerts, sports meets, and public exercise sessions such as qigong practice without explicit police approval, citing an article, “China to regulate mass gatherings,” from BBC Worldwide Monitoring (November 24, 1999). It is important to note, however, that Article 2 of the Assembly Law states that the Law “does not apply to recreational or sports activities, normal religious activities or traditional folk events.” This suggests that there may be additional regulations issued at the local level by Public Security offices concerning other types of assembly.

Notification
Article 8 of the Assembly Law states that “the responsible person(s) must submit an application in writing to the competent authorities five days prior to the date of the activity.” The regulatory authority is required to give a response two days prior to the activity. According to Article 9:
… after receiving an application for an assembly, a procession or a demonstration, the competent authorities shall inform the responsible person(s) in writing of their decision to grant or not to grant permission two days prior to the date of the activity applied for. If no permission is granted, the reasons thereof shall be given. Failure to serve notice within the time limit shall be construed as the granting of permission.

The Assembly Law does, however, provide for last-minute applications in the event of an unexpected occurrence. Article 9 states:
If an assembly, a procession or a demonstration is truly necessitated by unexpected occurrences, a report must be made immediately to the competent authorities: upon receiving the report, the competent authorities shall immediately examine it and decide to grant or not to grant permission.

The law does not address counter-demonstrations. However, spontaneous assemblies are not permitted. Article 29 of the Assembly Law states:
In a case where no application has been made for an assembly, a procession or a demonstration in accordance with the provisions of this Law or no permission has been granted for the application or where it is conducted not in accordance with the starting and finishing time, places and routes permitted by the competent authorities, when the disbanding order is disobeyed and public order seriously undermined, the person(s) responsible for, the assembly, procession or demonstration and the person(s) who is directly responsible shall be investigated for criminal responsibility in accordance with the provisions of Article 158 of the Criminal Law.

Obligations of Organizers
The Assembly Law places a number of onerous obligations and liabilities on the organizers of assemblies.  For example, Article 25 of the Assembly Law states:
The person(s) responsible for an assembly, a procession or a demonstration must assume responsibility for maintaining the order thereof and strictly guard against participation by others. The person(s) responsible for an assembly, a procession or a demonstration shall, when necessary, appoint special personnel to assist the people’s police in maintaining order. The personnel responsible for the maintenance of order shall wear identification marks.

In addition, Article 28 of the Assembly Law states that “the police may punish by warning or by criminal detention of not more than 15 days the organizers if the assembly involves one of the following circumstances:
(1)  failure to make an application in accordance with the provisions of this Law or to obtain permission for the application; or
(2)  failure to act in accordance with the purposes, manners, posters, slogans, starting and finishing time, places, and routes permitted by the competent authorities, and disregard of instructions to stop acting without permission.”

Enforcement
The government has used excessive force in breaking up assemblies. The most notorious example is the protests that occurred in the spring of 1989 in various cities in China, culminating in the June 4 crackdown on protestors in Tiananmen Square Beijing. To this date, it is unknown how many civilians were killed in that crackdown.

There was also a brutal reprisal against Falun Gong demonstrators in the fall of 1999 after they staged a silent vigil outside of Zhongnanhai, where the top Chinese leaders live and work. Human rights groups and other journalistic and academic studies report that Falun Gong practitioners in China are subject to a wide range of human rights abuses. Tens and perhaps hundreds of thousands are believed to have been imprisoned extrajudicially, and those detained are subject to forced labor, psychiatric abuse, torture, and other coercive methods of thought reform at the hands of Chinese authorities.

More recently, the state has used force to break up demonstrations over land seizures and corruption in rural areas.

Restrictions on Participants
A number of articles in the Assembly Law address various criminal and other sanctions that participants can face. As but one example, Article 30 states:
Those who disturb, break into or undermine by other means an assembly, a procession or a demonstration held in compliance with law may be punished by the public security organ by warning or by criminal detention of not more than 15 days; if the circumstances are serious and a crime is constituted, they shall be investigated for criminal responsibility in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Criminal Law.
In addition, Article 15 of the Assembly Law states that “No citizens shall, in a city other than his place of residence, start, organize or participate in an assembly, a procession or a demonstration of local citizens.” This means that a person residing in one city cannot start, organize or participate in an assembly in another city.

Article 34 of the Assembly Law also states that foreigners need approval by “the competent authorities” to participate in an assembly held by Chinese citizens.

Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions
Articles 23 and 24 of the Assembly Law place restrictions on holding assemblies at certain places or times.

Article 23 states as follows:
No assembly, procession or demonstration shall be held within a peripheral distance of 10 to 300 meters from the following places, with the exception of those approved by the State Council or the people’s governments of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government:
(1)  premises of the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, the State Council, the Central Military Commission, the Supreme People’s Court and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate;
(2)  places where state guests are staying;
(3)  important military installations; and
(4)  air harbors, railway stations and ports.

The specific peripheral distances from the places listed in the preceding paragraph shall be defined by the people’s governments of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government.

In addition, Article 24 states that “The time for holding an assembly, a procession or a demonstration shall be limited to 6 a.m to 10 p.m., with the exception of those held by decision or approval of the local people’s governments.”

Although there are no content-based restrictions, Article 12 prohibits assemblies that will harm “the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the state” and instigate “division among the nationalities.” This discourages assemblies related to ethnic minority issues, particularly those connected to regions such as Tibet and Xinjiang where there has been vocal dissatisfaction with Communist Party governance.

Other issues
Many CSO representatives perceive the Assembly Law as largely irrelevant. They noted that they would not apply to hold an assembly in the first place because they know they would be turned down. In addition, the police would then have a record of who they were, which could cause trouble for them later.

At the same time, assemblies and demonstrations do occur in China, but generally not because the organizers have applied and been approved to hold the assembly. In October 2012, large anti-Japanese demonstrations were held in Beijing and a few other cities. While it was never clear who organized the demonstrations or whether the organizers had applied, it was suggested by a number of people that the demonstrations had been in part organized and had the support of the government.  Also in October 2012, a Beijing gay rights NGO conducted an AIDS walk along a section of the Great Wall that involved hundreds of participants. The organizer did not apply to hold the walk. Instead, the organizer held the walk with the cooperation of a government-run AIDS foundation. These examples suggest that assemblies organized by government or quasi-government organizations have more leeway and are not bound by the Assembly Law.

In 2018, ICNL published a China Philanthropy Law Report, and accompanying resources (infographics, graphs, timelines, factsheets and FAQs) for understanding the philanthropy and civil society sector in China that can be found here.

News of importance to the nonprofit sector will be updated on a continual basis on China Development Brief, China’s only bilingual platform covering the sector.

Regular updates and monitoring of the Overseas NGO Law can be found at ChinaFile’s China NGO Project.

Regular analysis and reflections on Chinese civil society can be found on Shawn Shieh’s NGOs in China blog.