* Category includes ratification, accession, or succession to the treaty

** On March 20, 2021, a Presidential Decision was published to announce Türkiye’s withdrawal from the Council of Europe Convention on Preventing and Combating Violence against Women and Domestic Violence, which is widely known as Istanbul Convention. Türkiye subsequently reported the decision to the Council of Europe. On July 1, the decision came into effect and Türkiye officially withdrew from the Istanbul Convention.

The Constitution was adopted in 1982, immediately following a military coup. Although the Constitution is sometimes criticized for its lack of democratic principles, it still guarantees basic rights and freedoms. Relevant articles include:

Article 22: Everyone has the right to freedom of communication.

Article 25: Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and opinion.

Article 26: Everyone has the right to express and disseminate his thoughts and opinions by speech, in writing or in pictures or through other media, individually and collectively.

Article 33: Everyone has the right to form associations, or become a member of an association, or withdraw from membership without prior permission.

No one shall be compelled to become or remain a member of an association.

Freedom of association may only be restricted by law on the grounds of protecting national security and public order, or prevention of crime, or protecting public morals, public health.

The formalities, conditions, and procedures governing the exercise of freedom of association shall be prescribed by law.

Associations may be dissolved or suspended from activity by the decision of a judge in cases prescribed by law. In cases where delay endangers national security or public order and in cases where it is necessary to prevent the perpetration or the continuation of a crime or to effect apprehension, an authority designated by law may be vested with power to suspend the association from activity. The decision of this authority shall be submitted for the approval of the judge in charge within twenty-four hours. Unless the judge declares a decision within forty-eight hours, this administrative decision shall be annulled automatically.

Provisions of the first paragraph shall not prevent imposition of restrictions on the rights of armed forces and security forces officials and civil servants to the extent that the duties of civil servants so require.

The provisions of this article are also applicable to foundations.

Article 34: Everyone has the right to hold unarmed and peaceful meetings and demonstration marches without prior permission.

Article 35: Everyone has the right to property and inheritance.

Article 56: Everyone has the right to live in a healthy and balanced environment

Article 90: International agreements duly put into effect have the force of law. No appeal to the Constitutional Court shall be made with regard to these agreements, on the grounds that they are unconstitutional. In the case of a conflict between international agreements, duly put into effect, concerning fundamental rights and freedoms and the laws due to differences in provisions on the same matter, the provisions of international agreements shall prevail

National laws affecting the civil society sector include the following:

• Law 5253: Associations Law on Associations
• Law 5737: Law on Foundations
• Law 4721: Civil Code
  • Associations: Articles 56-100
  • Foundations: Article 101-117
• Law 8965: Penal Code
• Law 5326: Law on Misdemeanor
• Law 2860: Law on Collection of Aid
• Law 2911: Law on Meetings and Demonstrations
• Law 4982: Law on Right to Information
• Law 4962: Law on the Amendment to Certain Laws and Tax Exemption for Law on Foundations
• Law 6102: Commercial Law
• Law 193: Income Tax Law
• Law 5520: Corporate Tax Law
• Law 213: Tax Procedure Law
• Law 1319: Property Tax law
• Law 488: Stamp Tax Law
• Law 3065: VAT Law
• Law 1606: Law on the Exemption of Certain Associations and Institutions from Certain Taxes, All Fees and Dues
• Law 5072: Law on the Relations of Public Institutions with Associations and Foundations
• Law 4641: Law on the Establishment and Functioning of the Economic and Social Council
• Law 3335: Law on Establishment of International Organizations
• Law 5018: Public Financial Administration and Control
• Law 3713: Prevention of Terrorism Law
• Law 6698: Law on Protection of Personal Data
• Law 7262: Law on Preventing Financing of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Post-Internet Law Annulment Draft Law
Amendments adopted in April 2026 to Law No. 5651 on the Regulation of Publications on the Internet and Combating Crimes Committed through Such Publications introduced a new regulatory framework for social media and gaming platforms in Türkiye. The amendments were published in the Official Gazette on May 1, 2026, and the relevant provisions concerning social network providers and gaming platforms are scheduled to enter into force on November 1, 2026. The government is preparing secondary legislation that will determine how these obligations will operate in practice.

Once effective, social network providers will be prohibited from providing services to children under the age of 15 and will be required to adopt measures, including age-verification mechanisms, to enforce this restriction. Platforms will also be required to provide parental-control tools.

Social network providers with more than 10 million daily accesses from Türkiye will also be required to implement urgent decisions on the removal of content and blocking of access immediately and, in any event, within one hour. The amendments further introduce new requirements for online gaming platforms, including an obligation for certain foreign-based providers to appoint a local representative. Gaming platforms must provide age-based classifications and parental-control tools. Non-compliance may result in escalating administrative fines and bandwidth-throttling measures, while certain violations by social network providers may result in fines of up to 3 percent of the provider’s global annual turnover, followed by advertising bans and, subject to judicial approval, bandwidth restrictions.

The planned measures may have significant implications for freedom of expression, access to information, privacy, and children’s digital rights. In particular, mandatory age-verification systems and accelerated content-removal obligations raise concerns about disproportionate restrictions on online expression, user anonymity, and access to lawful content.

Separately, leaked reports regarding the draft 12th Judicial Package indicated that the government was considering mandatory identity-verification requirements for major social media platforms and regulation of Virtual Private Network (VPN) providers under Law No. 5651. However, these provisions were removed from the version of the package submitted to Parliament. The 12th Judicial Package was adopted by Parliament on July 16, 2026 and published in the Official Gazette on July 31, 2026 without the proposed mandatory social-media identity-verification or VPN-regulation provisions.

“Agents of Influence” Developments

The government plans to pass a law to regulate the crime of “Agents of Influence” by expanding the scope of the crime of “Espionage” in the Penal Code. It was originally proposed as an article within the omnibus bill that was submitted to the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM) on October 18, 2024, and was passed by the TBMM’s Justice Commission. However, it alarmed CSOs, human rights groups, journalists, bar associations, and the political opposition because it reminded them of the “Disinformation Law” adopted in 2022, which was used to intimidate political opposition, civil society and especially journalists. Following public and political opposition, in November 2024, Article 339/A, which proposed a prison sentence of three to seven years for anyone found guilty of committing a “crime against state security or political interests,” was withdrawn. The law, however, is still expected to be resubmitted to parliament, and Article 339/A will be reviewed and examined with opposition parties.

Legislation on Volunteering

The government is preparing legislation related to volunteering through various ministries, which has concerned CSOs due to excessive regulation and oversight. The draft law has been circulated among government institutions for their opinions. However, CSOs have not yet been consulted during the process and the draft has not been shared with them. In bilateral discussions, the authorities have indicated that the proposal is not intended to lead to overregulation in the digital sphere. CSOs are closely monitoring the process.

Anti-LGBTI+ Draft Law

Throughout 2025, draft provisions commonly referred to as the “anti-LGBTI+ draft law” or “hatred law” came to the fore during the preparation of the 10th and 11th Judicial Packages. In February 2025, a leaked draft under the 10th Judicial Package, based on the Ministry of Justice’s 4th Judicial Reform Strategy Document and proposing amendments to the Turkish Penal Code and Civil Code, introduced prison sentences of one to three years for publicly encouraging or promoting attitudes deemed contrary to “innate biological sex” and “public morality.” The law also aims to introduce provisions that would significantly restrict and complicate gender affirmation procedures for trans people. This has raised serious concerns about potential criminal liability for LGBTİ+ people and CSOs and human rights defenders working on LGBTI+ rights and gender equality.

Despite widespread objections from civil society following the leak, a similar and broader bill titled the “Bill on Amendments to the Turkish Penal Code and Certain Other Laws” was submitted to Parliament in April 2025 by HÜDA PAR, though it was not placed on any relevant committee’s agenda. In October 2025, the proposal resurfaced through another press leak within the scope of the 11th Judicial Package, reportedly containing even harsher provisions targeting LGBTI+ people and organizations. This draft once again triggered strong criticism from LGBTI+ and women’s groups, bar associations, human rights organizations, trade unions, journalists’ associations, opposition parties, and international actors. When the 11th Judicial Package was formally submitted to Parliament on November 27, 2025, these restrictive provisions were ultimately removed from the draft.

In June 2026, leaked information concerning the draft 12th Judicial Package indicated that restrictive LGBTI+-related provisions had again been included. The reported measures would have raised the minimum age for gender-affirming procedures to 25, introduced additional medical and procedural requirements, and established new criminal offenses concerning the public expression, promotion, or advocacy of LGBTI+ identities, including penalties related to same-sex engagement or marriage ceremonies. The proposals prompted renewed opposition from LGBTI+ and women’s rights organizations and other civil society actors.

When the 12th Judicial Package was submitted to Parliament on June 22, 2026, however, the reported LGBTI+-related provisions were removed from the bill. As of August 2026, no such provisions had been enacted, although the Minister of Justice stated that further parts of the judicial reform package would be introduced in October 2026.

FATF-related Amendments to the Law on Foundations

The Directorate General of Foundations is working on amending the Law on Foundations to comply with the AML/CFT recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF). The proposed amendments, however, do not fully comply with FATF standards and threaten over-regulation. Therefore, CSOs are seeking to be consulted before any amendment to the Law is submitted to the Parliament.

Law Proposal to Broaden MASAK’s Oversight and Intervention Power

A draft bill has been proposed that would grant the Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) real time monitoring and immediate freezing powers over bank accounts to enable rapid intervention in suspected cyber fraud and other financial crimes. The initiative aims to broaden oversight of unusual or high-risk transactions by updating rules on suspicious transaction reporting and information-sharing obligations. These measures were formally included in the 11th Judicial Package submitted to Parliament on November 27, 2025, although the specific provisions granting these powers have not yet been adopted. However, no amendments concerning MASAK were introduced under the 11th Judicial Package adopted on December 25, 2025. While the previously proposed provisions were not enacted, further legislative developments on this matter may emerge in the upcoming legislative period. If the draft law is enacted, it might allow excessive interference with the property rights of all individuals and legal entities, including civil society, and pave the way for practices that could result in violations.

Please help keep us informed; if you are aware of pending initiatives, write to ICNL at ngomonitor@icnl.org.

There are two legal forms of CSOs in Türkiye: associations and foundations. The right to establish these organizations is guaranteed under Article 33 of the Constitution, which affirms the freedom of association. Both forms must operate on a not-for-profit basis.

Article 56 of the Civil Code defines an association as “a society formed by unity of at least seven real persons or legal entities for realization of a common object other than sharing of profit by collecting information and performing studies for such purpose.” 

Article 101 of the Civil Code defines foundations as “charity groups in the status of a legal entity formed by real persons or legal entities dedicating their private property and rights for public use.”

The criteria for obtaining “public benefit” status for associations and “tax exemption” status for foundations remain vague and poorly defined, and the decision-making process is often seen as highly political. Moreover, the privileges associated with these statuses are limited. Tax incentives for individual and corporate donors apply only to donations and contributions made to foundations with tax exemption status and associations with public benefit status. Associations with public benefit status are exempt from obligations under the Stamp Duty Law, Fees Law, Real Estate Tax Law, Inheritance and Gift Tax Law, and Municipal Revenues Law. Similarly, foundations with tax exempt status benefit from tax advantages provided under the Stamp Duty Law, Fees Law, Real Estate Tax Law, and Inheritance and Gift Tax Law, as well as the Foundations Law.

Following a major change in 2018, Presidential authority over these statuses increased. Article 19 of Presidential Decree Law No. 703 of July 2, 2018 (which amended Article 27 of the Associations Law) and Article 57 of Decree Law No. 698 of July 2, 2018, granted the President the power to confer public benefit status on associations and foundations. Previously, this authority rested with the Council of Ministers, which made decisions based on the opinion of the Ministry of Finance and a proposal from the Ministry of Interior. Under the earlier system, the process was bureaucratic, opaque, and influenced by political considerations. No independent, transparent, or easily accessible body existed to oversee the process. Furthermore, the eligibility criteria were neither clearly-outlined nor uniformly applied, and the conditions for obtaining public benefit and tax-exempt statuses differed. The presidential decrees did not improve the transparency or fairness of the process.

Although Turkish law provides for public benefit status, only a small fraction of CSOs have been granted this designation. As of September 2026, only 371 of Türkiye’s 103,008 active associations (0.36 percent) held public benefit status. Among foundations, just 345 of 6,852 (5.03 percent) were tax-exempt—a ratio that has remained largely unchanged in recent years.

Further restrictive changes were introduced at the end of 2024 through amendments to the General Communiqué (Series no: 1) on the Provision of Tax Exemption to Foundations. Under the new rules, transfers from a foundation to its economic enterprises are no longer considered expenses related to the foundation’s purpose, even if these enterprises operate in line with the foundation’s mission. This rule makes it more difficult for foundations to meet the legal requirement of spending at least two-thirds of their annual income within the same fiscal year to maintain tax-exempt status. Furthermore, what was previously a one-time condition for obtaining tax exemption—meeting a specific threshold of income-generating assets and annual income—has now become an ongoing requirement to maintain this status. These changes have made it more difficult for foundations to both qualify for and maintain tax-exempt status.

On November 5, 2025, the Revenue Administration published a new Guide on the Taxation of Associations and Foundations, which outlined the obligations and procedures applicable to these legal entities within the Turkish tax system. The guide provides explanatory information on their general tax status, applicable exemptions, the taxation of their economic enterprises, and the procedures for granting or revoking public-benefit or tax-exempt status by presidential decree.

On February 26, 2026, the Revenue Administration published an updated version of the Guide on Donations and Aid from the Perspective of Tax Legislation. It concerns the deductibility of donations and aid in the determination of the tax base under the Income Tax Law and the Corporate Tax Law and sets out explanations and practical examples regarding the conditions under which donations and aid may be deducted from the tax base.

Although Türkiye’s National Development Plan and Annual Presidential Program emphasize the importance of participation in decision-making processes, there is no overarching policy or strategy that defines, encourages, or institutionalizes cooperation and participation mechanisms. The Regulation on the Procedures and Principles of Drafting Legislation contains provisions regarding CSO participation in decision-making processes, but these provisions fail to make consultation mandatory.

Article 33 of Türkiye’s Constitution guarantees the freedom of association. It states that everyone is free to establish associations without prior permission, that individuals may freely join or leave associations, and that no one can be forced to become or remain a member of an association.

Both individuals and legal persons with legal capacity have the right to establish associations and foundations. However, specific legal restrictions apply to certain groups, including members of the Turkish Armed Forces, the police, and civil servants, as outlined in relevant special laws.

The registration process for CSOs is regulated by the Law on Associations and the Law on Foundations.

For associations, the process is relatively straightforward. At least seven individuals—citizens or foreigners with residence permits—must submit the required documents to the provincial office of the Directorate General for Relations with Civil Society. No registration fee is required. Associations are considered legally established as soon as they initiate the registration process and may begin activities immediately. The Directorate General has up to 60 days to review the application. If any documents are missing or the application violates existing rules and regulations, the association is given 30 days to resolve the issues. Under Article 62 of the Law on Associations, newly founded associations must hold their first generally assembly within six months and are expected to have at least 16 members and establish their mandatory governance structures (executive board, internal auditing committee, and general assembly) within this period.

The registration process for foundations is more complicated. Establishing a foundation requires the allocation of assets—immovable and movable property, including cash, securities and bonds, or any rights with economic value—to the foundation’s specified purpose. The Council of Foundations, the highest decision-making body within the General Directorate of Foundations, sets the minimum asset requirement annually. As of 2026, this threshold stands at TRY 5,000,000 (USD 103,275 as of September 2026). Foundations must submit a charter, verified by a court, which outlines the foundation’s title, purpose, assets, governance structure, and administrative procedures. Legal personality is granted once the court approves the charter and the foundation is registered by the General Directorate of Foundations. The registration timeline varies depending on the court’s workload.

The Law on Associations contains vague limitations that invite administrative discretion and restrict CSO activities, particularly at the time of registration. For example, Article 56 of the Turkish Civil Code prohibits the formation of associations “for an object contrary to the laws and morality.” Similarly, Article 101 limits the establishment of foundations whose objectives are “contrary to the characteristics of the Republic defined by the Constitution, Constitutional rules, laws, ethics, national integrity and national interest, or with the aim of supporting a distinctive race or community.”

Additional hurdles exist at the local level. For example, according to implementing regulations for the Law on Associations, associations seeking office space within residential buildings must secure the permission of all residents of the building—a burdensome and often unfeasible requirement. Failure to secure office space may be a barrier to the process of registration for associations. Moreover, associations are prohibited from sharing offices with other legal entities or individuals. This restriction lacks a statutory basis and stems from an opinion issued by the Ministry of Interior’s law department.

The formation of federations and confederations is also tightly regulated. The Law on Associations requires at least five associations to establish a federation and at least three federations to form a confederation. Furthermore, all member organizations must have the “same purpose,” an unnecessarily restrictive condition that limits coalition building across different but related fields.

Foreign CSOs face serious bureaucratic hurdles when seeking to establish branch offices in Türkiye. Foreign organizations must first obtain permission from the Ministry of Interior, based on the opinion of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The legislation does not impose a specific timeframe for the Ministry to respond to applications. According to guidelines published by the Directorate General for Relations with Civil Society, the length of the review process varies depending on factors such as the organization’s field of activity, the region where activities will be carried out, the country of origin, and their international recognition, among other things. Furthermore, under Article 22 of the Regulation on Associations, the establishment of branches or representative offices by foreign foundations in Türkiye is subject to reciprocity and is restricted to situations deemed beneficial for international cooperation. As of September 2026, only 104 foreign CSOs were authorized to operate in Türkiye.

Permissible Purposes

Legislation does not explicitly limit the permissible purposes of associations and foundations. However, the Civil Code prohibits organizations from adopting aims “contradictory with law or morality.” While associations and foundations are not prohibited from directly engaging in political activities, rights-based CSOs reportedly face more government interference in practice than other organizations.

Internal Affairs 

Associations are required to maintain four official ‘books’ and comply with strict reporting and notification requirements, with sanctions for non-compliance. They must also submit standardized forms when receiving or utilizing foreign funding or opening new branches or offices. (See “Barriers to Resources” for more details.)

Although CSOs enjoy autonomy in their internal affairs, existing legislation lacks sufficient safeguards to prevent state interference. Public authorities have broad powers to audit CSOs, extending beyond the limited circumstances recognized under international standards. These audits can address organizational operations, such as examining whether associations and foundations are carrying out activities consistent with their stated purposes. Moreover, audits are conducted by multiple public bodies, leading to overlapping mandates, inconsistent findings, and additional administrative burdens for CSOs.

As a positive development, the Directorate General of Foundations has enabled Activity Certificates to be obtained online through the Foundation Information Management System (VBYS 2.0) as of November 25, 2025. With this update, foundations no longer need to apply to Regional Directorates in person, as the entire process, including application, automatic generation, and download of the certificate, can be completed digitally. The Directorate General of Foundations also published a user manual to support effective use of the system.

There has been a sharp decline in association membership. The number of members fell from 11,239,693 in 2017 to 8,729,363 in September 2026. This decrease may be partially attributed to the member notification requirement introduced in 2018, which obliges associations to submit personal data on their members. Authorities have cited reasons such as resignations, deaths, and the correction of double-recordings in membership records for the decline. Moreover, the regulations requiring the disclosure of personal data upon joining associations discourage potential new members.

Counter-terrorism Measures

The Law on Preventing Financing of Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction No. 7262 entered into force on December 31, 2020. The law, justified by the need to conform Turkish law with international standards in the fight against terrorist financing and money laundering, allows the Minister of Interior to suspend association board or staff members if they are being prosecuted for crimes related to terrorist financing, money laundering, or drug trafficking crimes. The Minister of Interior also can immediately apply to civil courts to ask for a temporary suspension of the association’s activities. The Constitutional Court annulled several key provisions of Law No. 7262 on April 3, 2024, including rules granting the Minister of Interior broad powers to suspend association organs, appoint trustees, and halt activities. As a result, some of these powers are no longer in force. However, this law has still triggered widespread concern, and CSOs working in human rights or receiving foreign funds have reported repetitive, vague, and burdensome inspections.

Despite adopting Law No. 7262 to avoid sanctions by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), Türkiye was gray-listed in 2021. It was then removed from the list in June 2024 following reforms.

On May 28, 2025, Türkiye’s Council of State annulled several provisions of a 2021 amendment to the Regulation on Associations that introduced procedures to assess and mitigate the risk of associations’ assets being linked to money laundering or terrorist financing. The ruling followed a lawsuit by the Freedom of Expression Association (İfade Özgürlüğü Derneği – İFÖD) challenging Article 16 of the amendment. The annulled provisions empowered the Ministry of Interior’s Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society to establish risk-assessment procedures, classify associations into risk groups, and assign audit frequencies and officials accordingly. The Court held that these procedures lacked a clear legal basis in the Law on Associations and violated the principles of legal certainty and foreseeability. It also annulled Article 3, which required associations to participate trainings and workshops based on risk levels. However, the Court upheld the general principle that audits may be based on risk analysis. Legislative efforts to adopt a new law on this matter are ongoing.

Human Rights Violations 

According to a December 2025 fact sheet by the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRFT) and Human Rights Association (HRA), between January 1 and November 30, 2025 at least 131 CSO members or executives were detained. Of these, 60 were arrested, and 42 were released under judicial control. At least 404 faced prosecution in 92 previously filed cases. While 49 people were acquitted, 84 were sentenced to prison for varying durations. In addition, according to the HRA’s 2025 Human Rights Violations Report, pressure on CSOs included the closure of Genç LGBTİ+ Association, the sealing of five buildings belonging to two associations, attacks on at least two association premises, and police raids on at least two association/foundation offices. The report also documented continued judicial harassment of NGO members and executives, including arrests, prosecutions, convictions, and other judicial measures in connection with their civil society activities.

According to another report the HRFT published in January 2026, between March 1 and December 1, 2025, at least 81 human rights defenders (HRDs) were detained, at least 33 HRDs were subjected to criminal investigations for their human rights activities, and at least 173 HRDs were subjected to criminal proceedings. In five different cases, a total of 55 HRDs were acquitted, and in two cases, HRDs were sentenced to imprisonment of four years and seven years. According to the report, at least seven CSOs were directly or indirectly affected by the baseless judicial proceedings.

The report “Reprisals Against Human Rights Defenders in Türkiye Following Engagement with United Nations Mechanisms”, submitted by Kaos GL, in April 2026 as input to the UN Secretary-General’s report on reprisals, highlighted that administrative and judicial measures against LGBTI+ human rights defenders in Türkiye have intensified following international advocacy efforts. It documented a pattern in which monitoring activities and reporting to UN mechanisms are followed by increased state scrutiny, including inspections, investigations, and legal proceedings targeting LGBTI+ organizations and individual activists, such as those involved in the Genç LGBTİ+ and 17 Mayıs Associations.

Osman Kavala, a businessman and civil society leader, has remained imprisoned since 2017 in connection with the Gezi Park protests. On August 25, 2026, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, in Kavala v. Türkiye (no. 2), found multiple violations of the European Convention on Human Rights and concluded that his continued detention was unlawful and that the proceedings leading to his conviction amounted to a “flagrant denial of justice.” The Court also found that the measures against Kavala pursued the ulterior purpose of silencing him and preventing his human rights work and required Türkiye to release him as soon as possible and eliminate the consequences of his conviction. Kavala nevertheless remained in detention following the judgment.

The Istanbul Anatolia Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office ruled that there was “no grounds for prosecution” following an investigation into insulting and threatening social media posts targeting human rights lawyer and Co-Chair of the Human Rights Association Eren Keskin.

The Constitutional Court announced its reasoning in the decision in a trial known as the “Gezi Park Case” in November 2025, stating that the “right to a fair trial” of urban planner Tayfun Kahraman had been violated. The Court ruled that there was no concrete link between the actions attributed to the defendant and the evidence used to justify the conviction, and therefore the conviction was not sufficiently substantiated. This, therefore, violated Kahraman’s right to a fair trial guaranteed by Article 36 of the Constitution. However, the Istanbul 13th Heavy Penal Court rejected Kahraman’s request for a retrial in line with the Constitutional Court’s decision. Following the court’s non-compliance, the Constitutional Court issued a second consecutive violation ruling regarding the case on April 2, 2026. This time a unanimous decision affirmed the breach of Kahraman’s rights and demanded his release. Despite this and additional public pressure from political figures for immediate release, the Istanbul 13th Heavy Penal Court has refused to implement the higher court’s mandate.

Selçuk Kozağaçlı, Honorary President of the Progressive Lawyers Association, has been imprisoned in Silivri for 10 years. The Marmara Closed Penal Institution’s Administrative and Observation Board denied his conditional release on grounds that he is “not in a position to reintegrate into society.” He had previously been briefly released on April 16, 2025, but was re-arrested following a prosecutor’s objection.

Legal Harassment of Marginalized Groups

Marginalized communities and the organizations that support them continue to face legal harassment. A notable example is the Association for Supporting Tarlabasi Community (Tarlabaşı Toplumunu Destekleme Merkezi Derneği or TTM), which works to empower the people living in Tarlabasi facing exclusion, poverty, and inequality, while raising awareness of their rights.

In 2022, two lawsuits were filed against TTM. One sought the termination of the association on the grounds that achieving its objectives was “impossible,” while the other sought its dissolution on the basis that the association was acting against law and morality. The first case was rejected by a lower court in May 2024, but on July 6, 2026, the Istanbul Regional Court of Appeal overturned that ruling and declared TTM legally non-existent. TTM appealed the decision before the Court of Cassation. The second case remains pending, with its next hearing scheduled for September 16, 2026. Criminal proceedings against two members of the association’s executive board also remain ongoing. TTM’s office has remained sealed since October 8, 2024 on the grounds that it was operating without a license.

Restrictions on CSO Operations

In an open letter dated May 16, 2025, Human Rights Watch and 57 other groups urged EU leaders to prioritize the protection of civil society and democratic freedoms in their engagement with Türkiye. The letter expressed concern over the Turkish government’s escalating repression of political opposition, independent media outlets, and CSOs through the misuse of criminal laws, arbitrary administrative obstacles, and growing limitations on freedom of association. The letter emphasizes that the wide-ranging crackdown has had a pervasive chilling effect on human rights and civil society and further eroded the right to political participation.

The EU Commission Türkiye Report also highlighted that CSOs operate in a difficult and increasingly restrictive environment due to sustained judicial and administrative pressures from the authorities. CSOs dealing with women’s rights, LGBTI+ issues, environmental protection and human rights especially continued to face growing pressure.

Notable examples of government harassment of CSOs in 2025 and 2026 include:

• Genç LGBTİ Derneği, an LGBTI+ youth association in İzmir being ordered to be dissolved by the İzmir 3rd Civil Court of First Instance on grounds of alleged “obscenity” related to its social media content. The decision followed inspections of the association’s online posts from 2024 that authorities categorized as obscene and contrary to public morality and constitutional provisions on family and child protection. The Prosecutor office also claimed the group engaged in activities outside its charter, though an earlier criminal investigation resulted in a non-prosecution decision. The association argued that the images in question were not obscene and that using them as grounds for closure represented a disproportionate infringement on freedom of expression. However, the court concluded the association’s activities were incompatible with law and morality and ruled for its closure. In addition to the closure order, the judicial pressure continued into the criminal prosecution against the association’s board. On April 8, 2026, the first hearing of a criminal trial targeting 11 human rights defenders and board members from the dissolved Genç LGBTİ+ Association commenced at the İzmir 6th Heavy Penal Court. While the eight defendants present completed their statements and demanded an immediate acquittal, the court ruled to exempt all defendants from attending future hearings and adjourned the trial until October 14, 2026.
• On February 18, 2025, 53 individuals, including journalists and CSO members, were detained in a raid targeting the People’s Democratic Congress (HDK), a civil-political alliance. As of September 2026, none remained in pre-trial detention within the scope of these proceedings, and the judicial proceedings were ongoing. Multiple proceedings based on similar allegations have been pursued against individuals before various courts. In the case against journalist Yıldız Tar and writer İbrahim Elçi, the most recent hearing was held on June 24, 2026. Tar was unable to attend the hearing because they had been detained in a police operation ahead of the NATO summit. The court ordered the continuation of the judicial measures and postponed the next hearing until November 24, 2026.
• On July 12, 2026, Haluk Levent, chairman of the humanitarian organization AHBAP, was detained with association members and staff in a financial-crimes investigation concerning alleged misuse of donations. By August, 28 people had reportedly been arrested in the investigation; AHBAP’s assets were seized, its activities were suspended, and a trustee was appointed pending a dissolution case.
• On July 29, 2025 the Human Rights Association was notified of a court order requiring removal of two of its reports on women’s rights.
• On August 23, 2026, authorities also detained Alparslan Kuytul and other members of the Furkan Foundation in raids across six cities, arrested 35 people, appointed trustees to companies linked to the foundation, and blocked access to hundreds of social media accounts associated with the movement.

Foreign Funding

There are no legal restrictions on CSOs’ ability to access foreign funding, although notification requirements apply. Foundations must notify public authorities within one month of receiving foreign funds, while associations must notify the government before using or sending the funds.

Following a July 9, 2020, amendment to the Regulation on Associations, foreign foundations and associations must now also notify authorities upon receiving any donations—whether cash or in-kind—from abroad, including from their own headquarters. Previously, funds originating from headquarters were exempt from this requirement.

CSOs receiving foreign funding have frequently been the target of smear campaigns by media outlets and politicians. In 2024, the government proposed the “agents of influence” bill, which would criminalize activities deemed to be in line with foreign states’ or organizations’ interests that are perceived as detrimental to Turkey’s security or political interests. The bill’s vague language could have exposed CSOs receiving foreign funding to criminal investigations. The bill was shelved at the end of the year.

Domestic Funding

CSOs face serious barriers to domestic fundraising. The highly restrictive and overly bureaucratic Law on Collection of Aid (No 2860, 23/6/1983) requires CSOs to obtain prior government approval for each fundraising activity it undertakes. To obtain approval, a CSO must submit an application including detailed information on the amounts to be raised, its intended use, the timeframe, and location. The local state authority decides whether to grant or deny permission. Associations and foundations must obtain such approval to collect donations in open public spaces and via the internet. In May 2022, the accounts of Nesin Foundation were blocked for breaching the Law of Aid Collection by conducting a fundraising campaign without a permit.

While voluntary donations and the publication of bank account details on websites are exempt, most other online donation tools—including SMS campaigns and direct online fundraising—require permits. This creates a repressive environment for CSOs seeking to collect donations or generate income online.

Some CSOs can receive exemptions from the Law on Collection of Aid, but as of September 2026, only 51 CSOs held this status, many of which were founded by law and are administered by the state.

A general lack of coordination and strategy among ministries complicates CSOs’ access to public funding. Türkiye lacks a permanent public funding mechanism to supports CSOs’ institutional infrastructure and activities, and no standardized legal framework, approach, or code of conduct exists to govern public funding for CSOs. There is also a lack of data on the total amount of annual public funding available, as each ministry determines its own budget, funding methods, and criteria.

CSOs are only permitted to engage in economic activities if they are conducted through separate corporate subsidiaries, which must be registered with the trade registry and are subject to corporate taxation. This imposes additional burdens on CSOs seeking to generate income for social benefit.

In January 2026, TÜSEV clarified administrative uncertainty regarding the documentation of donations received by CSOs through banks. Based on written responses obtained from the Revenue Administration and the General Directorate of Foundations, foundations and associations are not required to issue separate donation receipts for contributions transferred via bank accounts or credit cards, as bank records such as transfer receipts or account statements constitute sufficient documentation. Donation receipts remain mandatory for cash contributions, while organizations may issue receipts for bank transfers upon a donor’s request.

The Constitution of Türkiye provides for freedom of thought and expression. Article 25 guarantees that “Everyone has the freedom of thought and opinion” and protects individuals from being compelled to disclose or be punished for their thoughts. Article 26 recognizes freedom of expression but allows for restrictions on grounds including national security, public order, public safety, and the protection of state secrets, among others.

However, since 2013, freedom of expression in Türkiye has faced mounting restrictions, including restrictive interpretations of legislation and pressure, dismissals, and prosecutions targeting journalists, writers, activists, and social media users. Prosecutions under provisions concerning offenses against state sovereignty and state institutions remain particularly common. According to Ministry of Justice statistics, in 2025 a total of 26,974 cases were filed by chief public prosecutors concerning offenses including “insulting the president,” “degrading the symbols of state sovereignty,” and “degrading the Turkish Nation, the Republic of Türkiye, and the institutions and organs of the State.”

Türkiye’s Constitutional Court ruled that disciplinary penalties imposed on members of the Academics for Peace—who were dismissed after signing a 2016 petition calling for peace in the Kurdish-Turkish conflict—violated their freedom of speech and expression. This ruling, which was the second such decision by the Court, ordered the government to pay non-pecuniary damages to the academics. However, the trajectory of individual proceedings concerning the Academics for Peace remains inconsistent. For example, on March 5, 2026, the Council of State held that violation judgments delivered by the Constitutional Court in individual application cases do not possess the same degree of finality and binding force as annulment decisions. Adopted by a 3–2 majority, the ruling also referred to the stance taken by the Court of Cassation of Turkey in the Can Atalay case, thereby reigniting the ongoing debate within the higher judiciary over the binding nature of the Constitutional Court’s judgments.

Despite this, the space for freedom of speech and advocacy continues to deteriorate. Human rights defenders, journalists, academics, and LGBTI+ rights advocates are targets of threats, stigmatization, judicial harassment, prolonged arbitrary detention, and travel bans. This ongoing pressure has resulted in widespread self-censorship by activists and discouraged others from participating in CSOs and advocacy initiatives focused on human rights.

According to 2025 statistics from the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), Türkiye accounted for 34.5 percent of all pending applications among the 46 Council of Europe member states, with 18,450 cases. In 2025, the ECtHR delivered 74 judgments concerning Türkiye, finding at least one violation of the Convention in 66 cases. The most frequently violated rights included the right to liberty and security under Article 5 and the right to a fair trial under Article 6.

International and Domestic Monitoring Reports

Several international and domestic organizations have documented restrictions on free expression in Türkiye:

• On May 26, 2026, the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Michael O’Flaherty, released a memorandum following his official visit to Türkiye in December 2025, calling for urgent structural reforms to protect fundamental freedoms and judicial independence. The Commissioner raised concerns over the Turkish judiciary’s broad and arbitrary interpretation of the Criminal Code and Anti-Terrorism Law to suppress peaceful political speech, human rights advocacy, and civil society organizations, particularly those defending women, minorities, and LGBTI+ people. To curb systemic state pressure, the memorandum urged authorities to halt blanket protest bans, investigate law enforcement’s excessive use of force, reform the Council of Judges and Prosecutors to eliminate executive interference, and safeguard the independent operations of lawyers and bar associations.
• The Council of Europe’s Press Freedom Report “On the Tipping Point: Press Freedom 2025” identifies Türkiye as one of the most challenging environments for independent journalism in Europe, marked by legal harassment, intimidation, and increasing censorship. The report documents intensified pressure on the media landscape in 2025, including the detention of journalists covering protests following the arrest of opposition figures, restrictions on protest coverage imposed by the broadcasting regulator Radio and Television Supreme Council, and the use of criminal charges such as terrorism, defamation, and insulting the president against journalists. It also highlights physical attacks on reporters, legal pressure on satirical media, significant financial penalties and broadcast suspensions targeting critical television channels, and restrictions on online platforms during periods of political tension, which points to a sustained deterioration of media freedom and pluralism.
• The updated findings in Amnesty International’s The State of the World’s Human Rights: April 2026 flag a severe escalation in human rights violations in Türkiye, characterized by deeply entrenched executive interference in the judiciary and systemic failures to implement binding European Court of Human Rights rulings. The report documents an intensified crackdown on political opposition and civil society, highlighted by the arbitrary detentions of high profile figures like Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and legal professionals, alongside widespread criminal prosecutions targeting journalists, human rights defenders, and bar associations. Furthermore, authorities continued to systematically suppress freedom of assembly and association through unlawful police force, blanket protest bans, and the forced closure of civil society organizations, particularly those advocating for LGBTI+ and women’s rights.
• Human Rights Watch’s World Report 2026 documented continued democratic backsliding and systemic human rights concerns in Türkiye throughout 2025. The report highlighted growing pressure on political opposition and civil society, detention of opposition figures, restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly, prosecutions against journalists, lawyers, and human rights defenders, and persistent non-compliance with binding judgments of the European Court of Human Rights. It also noted concerns over the treatment of refugees and migrants, the erosion of women’s and LGBTI+ rights, and the broader weakening of judicial independence and rule of law guarantees.
• According to the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRFT) and Human Rights Association (HRA), at least 29 journalists and media professionals were in prison in Türkiye as of December 10, 2025. Between January 1 and November 30, 2025, 101 journalists were detained, 52 were arrested, and one was prevented from entering the country. In addition, 329 people were detained and 48 arrested due to social media posts. The Radio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK) imposed penalties, including fines and program suspensions, on at least 20 media platforms including 11 TV outlets, six digital broadcast platform, two radio broadcast and one YouTube channel.
• Reporters Without Borders (RSF) ranked Türkiye 163rd out of 180 countries in its 2026 World Press Freedom Index, marking a further four-place decline from the previous year and a drastic drop from its 99th position in 2002. In its latest evaluation, RSF underscored that the baseline conditions for journalism are now “difficult” or “very serious,” driven by the regular instrumentalization of charges such as “disinformation,” “insulting the President,” and “denigrating state institutions” to repress media professionals alongside anti-terrorism laws.
• According to the Media and Law Studies Association’s July 2026 Fair Trial Monitoring Report, 141 defendants were tried in 16 monitored cases concerning freedom of expression and press freedom, including 31 journalists and media workers. The most common charges included membership in a terrorist organization, terrorist propaganda, insulting the President, insulting a public official, inciting hatred and hostility, publicly disseminating misleading information, and violations of Law No. 2911 on Meetings and Demonstrations. Of the 16 monitored cases, one ended in acquittal, two resulted in convictions, and 13 were adjourned.
• A report by the Freedom of Expression Association (İFÖD), titled Digital Lockdown: Silencing the Public in the Name of Public Order, documented the expansion of online censorship in Türkiye throughout 2025. The report found that, by the end of 2025, access to 1,505,484 websites and domain names had been blocked pursuant to 1,284,464 separate decisions issued by 875 institutions and judgeships. It also documented the use of bandwidth throttling, bulk blocking of social media accounts, and restrictions targeting journalists, student initiatives, civil society actors, campaign accounts, and information concerning public protests under Article 8/A of Law No. 5651.

Legal Framework and Legislative Challenges

Freedom of expression in Türkiye is undermined by vaguely worded provisions in legislation, which are frequently used to prosecute dissent. Problematic articles in the Turkish Penal Code include:

• Article 216: inciting people to hatred and hostility
• Article 217/A: publicly disseminating false information capable of disturbing public peace
• Article 226: obscenity
• Article 220/6: committing crimes on behalf of an organization without being a member of the organization
• Article 301: denigrating the Turkish nation and the state
• Article 299: insulting the President

Articles 6 and 7/2 of the Anti-Terror Law, on making propaganda for a terrorist organization, are also highly restrictive. Furthermore, Law No. 7418, known as the “Censorship Law,” has expanded restrictions on journalists through amendments to the Press Law.

Restrictions on Speech in 2026

Freedom of expression continued to be restricted in 2025 and 2026:

• In May 2025, as part of the government’s “Year of the Family” campaign, the Ministry of Family and Social Services issued a circular prohibiting the use of rights-based concepts like gender, gender identity, LGBTI+, and SOGIESC (sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, and sex characteristics) in public-CSO collaborations. CSOs working on women’s and LGBTI+ rights strongly opposed the circular, citing violations of international human rights obligations and risks of exclusion from state consultation mechanisms.  In early 2026, government officials announced that the campaign would be extended and reframed as the “Decade of the Family,” indicating that related policy measures and activities would continue in the coming years. Subsequently, on May 2, 2026, a presidential circular officially designated the 2026–2035 period as the “Decade of the Family and Population” and introduced a visionary document to evaluate all public policies based on their impact on family structure.
• DW Türkçe correspondent Alican Uludağ was detained in Ankara and transferred to Istanbul, where he was formally arrested on charges of “publicly insulting the president” and “publicly disseminating misleading information” based on social media posts on his X account. The indictment against Uludağ also included the charge of “publicly disparaging the government and judicial organs of the Turkish Republic.” Uludağ was formally arrested on February 19, 2026, and held at Silivri Prison pending trial. At the first hearing on May 21, 2026, the court ordered Uludağ’s release, with proceedings scheduled to September 18, 2026.
• On April 29, 2026, the Elazığ 2nd Criminal Court of Peace issued an access ban against the X account of Cumhuriyet, a prominent daily newspaper with approximately 3.5 million followers. The court cited “the preservation of national security and public order” as the formal justification for the restriction. According to the Freedom of Expression Association, the platform had not yet implemented the geo-blocking order within Turkey at the time of reporting.
• On June 30, 2025, Leman, a Turkish satirical and humor magazine, faced a legal investigation for “publicly insulting religious values” over a cartoon allegedly depicting Prophet Muhammad and Moses. The cartoonist, editorial staff, and two general managers were arrested. The indictment seeks prison sentences ranging from six months to four years for six individuals. A capture order was also issued for the magazine’s owner, who resides abroad, with all charged with “inciting hatred and enmity among the public.” Four of the five individuals detained over Leman magazine’s June 2025 cartoon were released under judicial control on September 4, 2025, while the cartoonist, Doğan Pehlivan, remained in custody. The indictment for “incitement to hatred” was accepted, with the first hearing on November 14, 2025. At that hearing, the court ordered Doğan Pehlivan’s release after five months and lifted judicial controls on the other defendants. Pehlevan will remain in custody due to a separate “insulting the president” case. At the May 5, 2026 hearing, the court ordered that the execution of the arrest warrant issued for Mehmet Tuncay Akgün be awaited, and accepted the re-quest to take his statement in the country where he is currently located. The court also lifted the “travel ban” imposed on Doğan Pehlivan, and decided that defendants whose statements had already been taken would be exempted from attending further hearings in person. The proceedings were scheduled to October 13, 2026.
• According to the 2025 Media Monitoring Reports published by Bianet, around 150 journalists faced prosecution during the year. The reports indicate that at least 29 journalists were arrested, three were placed under house arrest for extended periods, and 58 journalists were either taken into custody or compelled to give statements by police. In addition, courts convicted 28 journalists under the Turkish Penal Code and the Anti-Terror Law, while 41 journalists and cartoonists were acquitted.
• According to Bianet’s periodic Monitoring Report (April–June 2026), at least 12 journalists faced prosecutions that concluded during the period, with six journalists receiving a total of 7 years and 6 months in prison sentences, including 1 year and 6 months suspended. The report also documented at least five journalists being detained, five attacks or physical interventions against journalists, one journalist being threatened, at least 24 online news items being blocked, and 16 journalists and cartoonists facing proceedings for “insulting the President.” It further reported that at least eight journalists and media workers lost their jobs during the period.
• In October 2025, Merdan Yanardağ, General Editorial Director of TELE1 television channel, was arrested in connection with an “espionage” investigation targeting Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and his campaign director Necati Özkan. On the day Yanardağ was arrested, the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund (TMSF) appointed a trustee to ABC Radio Television and Digital Broadcasting Inc., the company that owns TELE1, placing the channel under TMSF-appointed trusteeship and transferring management control away from its editorial leadership. Many employees resigned because the appointment of a government-affiliated figure to manage the company threatened the channel’s editorial independence. Prior to his arrest, in September, Yanardağ, along with TELE 1 Managing Director İhsan Demir and program moderator Musa Özuğurlu, were detained as part of an investigation in which they were accused of “publicly insulting the president.” After giving their statements, the three journalists were released under judicial control measures of “travel ban and reporting to the police station.” In the ongoing espionage case, Yanardağ remains in detention, and the trial continues with the second hearing completed in May 2026; the court ordered the continuation of detention and scheduled the next hearing for July 6, 2026. On July 6, 2026, at the fourth hearing, the court ordered the continued detention of Yanardağ and the other defendants and rejected a request to lift the trusteeship imposed on TELE1. The court adjourned the trial until September 29, 2026.
• Comedian Deniz Göktaş was investigated over his stand-up show Ölü Deniz, which was published on YouTube, on allegations including insulting the President, “inciting or degrading the public to hatred and hostility, and publicly degrading the religious values adopted by a section of the population. He was detained at Istanbul Airport on July 2, 2026, upon returning from abroad, and was arrested on July 3. On August 28, a court ordered his re-lease in relation to the first two charges, but he was immediately rearrested on a separate charge of praising a crime and a criminal; following a prosecutor’s objection, he was subsequently rearrested on the initial charges as well. An indictment seeking up to 12 years and 2 months’ imprisonment was accepted on September 4, with the first hearing scheduled for September 28, 2026.
• The use of the Penal Code’s “obscenity” provisions also intensified later in 2026, when musician Mabel Matiz was acquitted in May 2026 in a case concerning the song “Perperişan.” However, in August prosecutors opened a new investigation concerning the lyrics and video for “Ha Leylim.” Matiz was questioned and released on August 21 subject to a travel ban. Later that month, Tolga Akış, founder and manager of the music group Manifest, was detained in an investigation involving allegations of obscenity, drug use, and laundering of criminal proceeds and was subsequently remanded in custody on an obscenity-related charge.

The legal framework governing the right to peaceful assembly in Türkiye includes:

• The Constitution of Türkiye;
• Law No. 2911 on Meetings and Demonstrations, adopted on October 6, 1983;
• The Regulation on the Implementation of Law on Meetings and Demonstrations, adopted on August 8, 1985;
• Law No. 2559 on the Duties and Discretion of the Police;
• Law No. 3713 on the Prevention of Terrorism Acts; and
• Law No. 5326 on Misdemeanors.

Article 34 of the Constitution guarantees citizens the right to organize assemblies and demonstrations without prior authorization. However, Law No. 2911 on Meetings and Demonstrations imposes significant restrictions. Assemblies and demonstrations may be limited on broad and vaguely defined grounds such as “preservation of national security,” “public order,” “prevention of crime,” and protection of “public morality” and “public health.” Although these limitations appear compatible with Article 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, in practice they are often applied in a restrictive and arbitrary fashion, undermining the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly.

Article 10 of the Law on Meetings and Demonstrations introduces further restrictions, requiring all members of the organizing committee to submit a signed declaration to the district governor’s office during work hours at least 48 hour prior to the assembly. Failure to comply renders the assembly illegal, giving authorities the right to disperse it, including through police intervention.

The Law Amending the Law on Powers and Duties of the Police, Other Laws and Decrees, which Parliament passed in March 2015 and is widely referred to as the “Internal Security Reform Package,” further expanded police powers. This reform allows police to detain individuals during demonstrations without prior approval from the prosecutor’s office.

In a decision issued on September 28, 2017, the Constitutional Court struck down provisions of the Law on Meetings and Demonstrations requiring assemblies and demonstrations to end before sunset and a ban on demonstrations on public roads that might disrupt daily life. In response, Law No. 7145, adopted on July 25, 2018, amended the relevant provision, allowing assemblies to continue up to one hour after sunset. This change has been seen as a positive step towards aligning national law with the Court’s decision.

International and Domestic Monitoring Reports

Several international and domestic organizations have documented restrictions on the right to peaceful assembly in Türkiye:

According to the Human Rights Association’s 2025 Human Rights Violations Report, the restrictive approach to the right to peaceful assembly in Türkiye continued throughout 2025. Governorships and district governorships imposed blanket bans on assemblies and events for a total of 200 days across 13 provinces and 10 districts, affecting 40,834,555 people. At least 306 assemblies and demonstrations were prevented as a result of administrative bans and arbitrary practices by law enforcement, while law enforcement intervened in at least 268 demonstrations, detaining at least 8,477 people. In connection with assemblies and demonstrations, at least 1,112 people were arrested and 1,625 were subjected to judicial control measures.

According to a December 2025 fact sheet by the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (HRFT) and Human Rights Association (HRA), between January 1 and November 30, 2025 law enforcement intervened in at least 245 peaceful meetings and demonstrations, detaining 3,511 people, many of whom reported torture or other forms of ill treatment in custody, and at least 131 people were injured. 292 of whom were arrested, and judicial control measures were applied to at least 876 people, 75 of whom were under house arrest. Local governorships imposed blanket bans on demonstrations 29 times across 13 cities and 8 district, with the duration of bans ranging from one to 15 days.

The CIVICUS 2026 State of Civil Society Report highlights Turkey’s growing use of transnational repression, including covert attempts to target exiled dissidents and collaboration with foreign regimes to deport activists. The report also notes that politically motivated actions against opposition figures sparked massive, youth-led nationwide protests. These demonstrations were met with severe government crackdowns, characterized by widespread arbitrary detentions, physical violence, and the excessive use of force by law enforcement against peaceful protestors.

The authorities continue to impose widespread restrictions on assemblies, often citing security concerns or public order.

• On May 31, 2026, on the anniversary of the 2013 Gezi Park protest, Taksim and its surrounding areas in Istanbul were placed under heavy police restriction. Access to central locations, including Taksim Square and nearby streets, was controlled by security forces, with commemorative gatherings held under police blockade conditions. During the Gezi remembrance gathering in Beyoğlu, multiple people were detained, and 83 of those detained were later released, according to reports from the Contemporary Lawyers Association.
• The 2025 Istanbul Pride marches were again met with bans, heavy police presence, and human rights violations. At least 95 people were arbitrarily detained, some of whom were subjected to ill-treatment and discriminatory insults. For the first time, three participants were arrested solely for taking part in a Pride march.  The trial of 53 participants continued, and at the hearing held on June 5 2026, 51 participants were heard and then exempted from appearing at subsequent hearings. The next hearing is scheduled for December 4, 2026.
• Large-scale demonstrations were held across several cities in Türkiye on March 8, 2026, to mark International Women’s Day, with thousands of women and LGBTI+ people participating in Feminist Night Marches. In Istanbul, tens of thousands gathered for the 24th Feminist Night March in the Taksim area, calling for gender equality and an end to violence against women. Similar marches and demonstrations took place in cities including Ankara, Izmir, Adana, Mersin, Antalya, and Kocaeli. While the events drew significant participation, police interventions were reported in several locations, including attempts to block marches and incidents linked to the display of LGBTI+ flags. Several participants were briefly detained in different cities, though those taken into custody were later released.
• Workers of Doruk Mining launched a protest march from Eskişehir to Ankara on April 13 2026 over unpaid wages, severance payments, overtime compensation, and forced unpaid leave. After reaching Ankara on April 20, workers continued their protest, including a nine-day hunger strike. On April 21, police detained 110 workers during a sit-in and hunger strike in front of the Ministry; all were released the same day. Following negotiations mediated by public authorities, the protest ended on April 28 after an agreement was reached. However, when promised payments were not made by the agreed deadline, workers resumed their mobilization and returned to Ankara in early June. The dispute concluded on June 4 2026, when the union announced that outstanding payments and entitlements had been transferred to workers’ accounts.
• On May 1, 2026, International Workers’ and Labour Day, authorities in Istanbul imposed restrictions banning all rallies, marches, press statements, and similar events between 00:01 and 23:59 in the districts of Beyoğlu, Şişli, Fatih, and Beşiktaş, while two other districts were exempt from the ban. According to the ÇHD (Contemporary Lawyers Association), 576 people detained during 1 May events in Istanbul were later released. It was also reported that 28 April saw a prior police operation in which 47 people were detained; 14 of them were arrested, while others were placed under house arrest or released without referral to court.
• During protests against the expropriation decisions affecting villages around the Akbelen Forest area in Muğla’s Milas district, environmental defender Esra Işık was detained and subsequently arrested on March 31, 2026 on charges of “resisting a public officer.” After spending 41 days in pre-trial detention, she was released on 11 May under a travel ban. At the second hearing held on 1 June, the court lifted the travel restriction and adjourned the proceedings until 22 June 2026. In a related development, the Council of State suspended the execution of the emergency expropriation decision covering agricultural lands around Akbelen, finding that the legal conditions required for such an exceptional measure had not been demonstrated.
• Following the suspicious death of university student İlayda Zorlu on April 17, 2026, from a gunshot wound tied to her police officer father’s service weapon in Hatay, widespread protests erupted across Ankara, İstanbul, and İzmir. Student organizations and human rights groups alleged that Zorlu had been systematically criminalized and targeted by police, who pressured her family regarding her previous participation in women’s rights demonstrations. Law enforcement violently intervened in the protests, detaining a total of 88 individuals.

Restrictions on peaceful assembly continued during the summer of 2026. Ahead of the NATO Summit, 225 people were detained in police and gendarmerie raids across Ankara on June 23. Of those detained, 178 were remanded in custody, including journalists, academics, civil society representatives, trade unionists, and lawyers. Several were subsequently released in July and August. Authorities also detained participants in anti-NATO demonstrations in Ankara and Istanbul, most of whom were later released.

Authorities also imposed extensive restrictions on Pride Month activities in June 2026. According to the Human Rights Foundation of Türkiye, at least 143 people were arbitrarily detained and subjected to treatment amounting to torture or other ill-treatment during at least seven police interventions in four cities. At least six journalists were also detained. Authorities imposed at least six bans on Pride events, including city-wide and district-wide restrictions lasting between one and 15 days, and investigations were initiated against lawyers who acted as observers during Pride marches.

Labor and environmental demonstrations also faced restrictions during the reporting period. Doruk Mining and Eti Gümüş workers carried out an 18-day joint protest campaign in Ankara in August following disputes over unpaid wages and other employment entitlements; workers were detained on multiple occasions during the campaign. Separately, on July 6, environmental human rights defender Esra Işık was convicted in connection with her participation in protests opposing expropriation around Akbelen Forest and sentenced to two years and one month in prison for resisting a public official, while remaining free pending appeal.

Turkish Parliament passes landmark law to advance PKK peace process (August 2026)
On August 10, 2026, the Turkish Parliament adopted legislation establishing a legal framework for the disbandment and reintegration of PKK members. The law provides protections for former PKK militants who have not committed specified offenses and permits the suspension of certain prison sentences for people convicted of PKK membership. The legislation followed the parliamentary commission’s roadmap for legal reforms and the PKK disarmament process. Kurdish political actors have continued to call for broader democratic and legal reforms, including measures concerning political and cultural rights.

Türkiye detains another opposition district mayor as crackdown expands (July 2026)
On July 29, 2026, authorities detained Üsküdar Mayor Sinem Dedetaş and five others in an investigation concerning alleged irregularities in building and occupancy permits. The detention occurred amid a broader series of investigations involving municipalities controlled by the opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP). The opposition described the investigations as politically motivated, while the government maintained that the judiciary was acting independently.

Opposition leader forms new political party to challenge Erdogan (July 2026)
On July 24, 2026, former Republican People’s Party (CHP) leader Özgür Özel and 90 other lawmakers formally resigned from the CHP and registered a new political party, named the “New Party,” with the Interior Ministry. The move followed a May court ruling that annulled the CHP’s 2023 party congress and reinstated former chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, prompting Özel and his supporters to establish a separate political organization. With 91 lawmakers, the New Party became the largest opposition group in Parliament, while the CHP was reduced to 44 seats. The development followed a broader series of legal proceedings and detentions targeting CHP officials and opposition figures, including Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, who has remained imprisoned since March 2025.

Turkish police storm offices of the main opposition CHP party, firing tear gas and rubber bullets (May 2026)

On May 24, 2026, Turkish riot police stormed the headquarters of the main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) in Ankara, firing tear gas and rubber bullets at party supporters and officials who had refused to vacate the building for three days. The operation brought a violent end to a standoff between the Özel-aligned CHP membership and the court-appointed leadership backed by reinstated former chairman Kılıçdaroğlu. The Ankara Governor’s office authorized the police intervention following a formal request from Kılıçdaroğlu’s legal team, ordering the transfer of party headquarters to court-appointed officials. Özel, who was among those inside the building, announced he would continue to govern the CHP from his parliamentary Office.

Turkish court rules to remove head of the main opposition party in latest blow (May 2026)

On May 21, 2026, an appeals court annulled the Republican People’s Party’s (CHP) 2023 national congress, at which Özgür Özel had been elected party leader, citing procedural irregularities. The ruling reinstated former chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who had lost the presidential election to President Erdoğan earlier that year. The CHP condemned the decision as a “judicial coup,” with Özel vowing to challenge it through legal appeals and pledging to remain at the party’s Ankara headquarters.

LGBTI+ activist Enes Hocaoğulları acquitted (February 2026)
A court in Ankara has acquitted LGBTI+ rights defender and Council of Europe youth delegate Enes Hocaoğlulları, who faced charges of “inciting the public to hatred and enmity.” The charges stammed from Hocaoğlulları’s statements during the protests against the detention İstanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and his subsequent suspension from office in March last year. The activist remained arrested for three days in September.

Lawmakers back PKK peace reforms but tie steps to disarmament (February 2026)
A Turkish parliamentary committee recommended a series of reforms to advance a new peace initiative with the militant Kurdistan Workers’ Party, or PKK, while stressing that legal steps should be tied to state security institutions verifying that the group has surrendered its weapons. The recommendations, which were overwhelmingly approved by the National Solidarity, Brotherhood and Democracy Commission, call for a temporary legal measure to reintegrate PKK members who renounce violence, according to the final draft of a report made available to journalists. The commission also calls for measures to expand freedom of expression, release older or sick prisoners and ensure that nonviolent acts are not prosecuted under anti‑terror laws.

The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights visits Türkiye (December 2025)
The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights, Michael O’Flaherty, visited Türkiye from December 1–5, 2025 and urged Turkish authorities to fully implement human rights standards on freedom of expression, peaceful assembly and association, noting that although these rights are guaranteed in law, their practical application—especially regarding restrictions on protests, broad criminal provisions affecting speech, and pressures on civil society—falls short of European human rights norms. He called on Türkiye to align counter-terrorism and other legislation with international standards and to reinforce protections for civic space.

Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office announce Istanbul Municipalit indictment (November 2025)
On November 1, 2025, 237 days after Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and his colleagues were arrested, the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office announced that the Istanbul Municipality (IBB) indictment was completed.  İmamoğlu is charged with “organizing a criminal syndicate for the purpose of obtaining financial profit” and faces a prison sentence ranging from 828 to 2,352 years. 3,741-page indictment names 402 suspects: 105 in custody, 170 under judicial control, seven wanted on arrest warrants, and five listed as complainants. In total, 407 individuals are charged with 142 separate acts.

Turkey sets up parliamentary commission to oversee PKK disarmament (August 2025)
Turkey’s parliament has set up a commission to oversee the disarmament of the PKK, following the group’s decision to end its armed insurgency. The commission will manage the disarmament process and prepare the legal framework to support lasting peace.

Kurdish PKK militants burn weapons in Iraq to launch disarmament (July 2025)
Thirty PKK militants publicly burned their weapons in northern Iraq on July 11, marking the launch of a long-awaited disarmament process following imprisoned leader Abdullah Ocalan’s call for the group to disband. The symbolic ceremony is seen as a potential turning point in ending the decades-long insurgency that has killed more than 40,000 people. Ankara welcomed the move as a step toward strengthening security and regional stability, while Kurdish leaders urged Turkey’s government and parliament to address demands for greater rights as part of the peace process.

European Court of Human Rights finds Selahattin Demirtaş’s 2019 detention arbitrary (July 2025)
On July 8, 2025, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Selahattin Demirtaş’s 2019 detention was arbitrary, politically motivated, and violated multiple rights under the European Convention on Human Rights, including Articles 5 and 18. The Court highlighted failures of judicial oversight and the prolonged, unjustified pretrial detention of the politician, since November 2016.

 Turkey’s main pro-Kurdish party prepares to again meet with Öcalan for peace efforts (June 2025)
Turkey’s pro-Kurdish People’s Equality and Democracy Party (DEM Party) is preparing for a visit to İmralı Island to meet with Abdullah Öcalan, the imprisoned leader of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), as part of ongoing efforts for peace between Ankara and the Kurdish militants. DEM Party spokesperson Ayşegül Doğan announced that the visit would include members of the party’s leadership but did not specify the date. Öcalan, who has been imprisoned since 1999, has long been a central figure in the conflict between the Turkish state and the PKK, which has fought for Kurdish rights since the 1980s.

Turkish police scuffle with May Day protesters in Istanbul (May 2025)
Turkish police charged May Day protesters in Istanbul, detaining hundreds of people and dragging some away in buses after they tried to defy a ban on public gatherings and march towards Taksim Square. Unions and NGOs had called for protests and marches across Istanbul, which has seen a wave of mass demonstrations in recent weeks over the detention of its mayor and President Tayyip Erdogan’s main political rival, Ekrem Imamoglu.

Large crowds rally in Istanbul over jailing of Erdogan’s main rival (March 2025)
Hundreds of thousands of Turks protested in Istanbul against the jailing of Mayor Ekrem Imamoglu, President Tayyip Erdogan’s main rival, sustaining the largest demonstrations Turkey has seen in more than a decade. A letter from Imamoglu was read out at the rally to cheers from the crowd. The main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP), other opposition parties, rights groups and some Western powers have all said the case against Imamoglu is a politicised effort to eliminate a potential electoral threat to Erdogan.

IBAHRI’s concern for Istanbul lawyers’ body (January 2025)
The International Bar Association’s Human Rights Institute (IBAHRI) has expressed “deep concern” about a recent criminal investigation and lawsuit against the Istanbul Bar Association, its President İbrahim Kaboğlu, and the executive board. It has co-signed a statement calling on Turkish authorities to immediately cease legal proceedings against the Istanbul Bar Association. The statement from several legal and human-rights organisations also calls on Türkiye to respect its obligations under international law to ensure the independence of the profession and the right to freedom of expression.

İstanbul bans November 25 women’s rights demonstrations (November 2024)
Authorities in İstanbul have imposed restrictions on public transportation in Taksim ahead of planned November 25 demonstrations marking the International Day for the Elimination of Violence Against Women. The İstanbul Governor’s Office banned all events in the Beyoğlu district, citing security concerns.

Enlargement reports 2024: Commission outlines progress and priorities for candidate countries (October 2024)
The Commission has adopted the 2024 enlargement reports, which offer a detailed assessment of the state of play and the progress made by countries seeking to join the European Union. The reports also provide guidance on key reform priorities for each country.

Instagram reopened in Turkey following 8-day ban (August 2024)
Access to Instagram was reopened in Turkey on August 10 following an eight-day ban that had begun on August 2. On the morning of August 2, Turkish authorities blocked access to the platform, citing failure to remove unlawful posts as justification for the ban. Although not explicitly stated, censoring of posts related to the recent assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran was strongly implied as the impetus for the ban.

Turkey blocks Instagram amid ‘censorship’ row (August 2024)
Turkey has blocked access to Instagram, the national communications authority said, after a top government official slammed the social media platform for “censoring” Hamas-related content. The communications authority BTK announced the block on Friday, without giving an explanation for the decision or stating the duration of the ban. The move follows comments by the Turkish presidency’s communications director, Fahrettin Altun, criticizing the Meta-owned platform for what he called its decision to block condolence posts on the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh.

Turkey approves ‘massacre law’ to remove millions of stray dogs (July 2024)
Turkish legislators have approved a law aimed at removing millions of stray dogs from the country’s streets that animal lovers fear will lead to many of the dogs being killed or ending up in neglected, overcrowded shelters. Some critics also say the law will be used to target the opposition, which made huge gains in the latest local elections. The legislation includes penalties for mayors who fail to carry out its provisions and the main opposition party has promised not to implement it.

Unlawful ban on May Day celebrations in Istanbul must be lifted (May 2024)
The Turkish authorities must urgently lift a ban on a planned May Day solidarity demonstration in Istanbul’s Taksim Square and allow people to gather in accordance with a recent ruling by Türkiye’s Constitutional Court, Amnesty International said. Trade unions, opposition parties and other civil society organizations have pledged to gather in Taksim Square despite a ban announced by the governor on April 23 and by the Minister of Interior on April 29.

Kurdish politicians convicted in unjust mass trial (May 2024)
A Turkish court’s conviction of 24 Kurdish politicians on bogus charges of crimes against the state follows a manifestly political and unjust trial, Human Rights Watch and the Turkey Human Rights Litigation Support Project said. The court sentenced the 24 politicians to prison terms ranging from 9 to 42 years, while acquitting 12 other politicians who had been on trial with them.

RSF decries draft amendment on “agents of influence” that threatens independent journalism (May 2024)
Reporters Without Borders (RSF) urges the Turkish government to abandon proposed amendment on “agents of influence” under which journalists working for internationally funded media could potentially be jailed. Such legislation would endanger independent journalism.

Turkey’s ‘Foreign Influence Agent Law’ alarms media and civil society (March 2024)
The planned “foreign influence agent law” of the Turkish government would be a major blow to rights and freedoms and take a toll on press and civil society. “Those who work on behalf of another state and create public opinion against Turkey will be put under the spotlight. Influence spying will be included in the Turkish Penal Code as a crime,” Yeni Safak wrote. This news alarmed rights groups and the opposition, since everyone critical of the government can fall under this definition.

Turkish parliament strips jailed opposition lawmaker of status (January 2024)
Turkey’s parliament stripped a jailed opposition lawmaker of his status following a judicial ruling, further complicating an unprecedented clash between two of the country’s top courts. Can Atalay, 47, was elected to parliament representing the Workers’ Party of Turkey (TIP) – an ally of the large pro-Kurdish DEM party – while serving an 18-year prison sentence. Atalay was sentenced in April 2022 after being convicted of trying to overthrow the government by allegedly organizing the nationwide Gezi Park protests in 2013 with Turkish philanthropist Osman Kavala, also now jailed, and six others. The chair of Atalay’s party, Erkan Bas, branded the Court of Cassation move as “unconstitutional” and said parliament had also violated the constitution by stripping the jailed lawmaker of his status.

Türkiye elections marked by unlevel playing field yet still competitive (May 2023)
Characterized by a high turnout, Türkiye’s general elections were well-managed and offered voters a choice between genuine political alternatives, but the current president and the ruling parties enjoyed an unjustified advantage. Continued restrictions on fundamental freedoms of assembly, association and expression hindered the participation of some opposition politicians and parties, as well as civil society and independent media, international observers said in a statement.

Thousands dead, millions displaced: earthquake fallout in Turkey and Syria (February 2023)
Turkey’s death toll has climbed above 41,000, the country’s disaster authority has said. In Syria, already devastated by years of war, authorities have said more than 5,800 people died. According to Hans Kluge, the World Health Organization’s Europe director, relief workers were facing “the worst natural disaster in the region for a century”, adding that 26 million people need assistance across both countries.”

‘Disinformation’ tactics silence journalism (October 2022)
According to the BİA Media Monitoring Report of the July-August 2022 period, 126 media representatives faced trials. In the previous three months, at least five media representatives, including three women and one LGBTI+, were detained. The most important agenda of the three months was the “Disinformation Law.”

Turkey detains medical group head on ‘terrorist propaganda’ charge (October 2022)
Turkish police detained the head of the Turkish Medical Association (TTB), Sebnem Korur Fincanci, for allegedly “spreading terrorist group propaganda.” The state-owned Anadolu news agency said an investigation was launched over statements Fincanci made to Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) militant group-linked media last week on alleged chemical weapons use by the Turkish armed forces. The TTB described her arrest as a “political lynching” and said it was the final stage of pressure exerted by authorities on the medical group and its leaders. It demanded that she be released immediately after her statement is taken.

Turkey: Court upholds exit from treaty on violence against women (July 2022)

Turkey’s top appeals court upholds jail term for prominent opposition figure (May 2022)

Top appeals court upholds jail term for prominent opposition figure (May 2022)

Philanthropist sentenced to life in Turkey in ‘travesty’ trial over Gezi Park protests (April 2022)

Council of Europe Congress highlights “generally degrading situation” of local democracy in Turkey (March 2022)

Osman Kavala case: Council of Europe launches proceedings against Turkey (February 2022)

Erdogan tightens grip on media with circular on family values (January 2022)

Boğaziçi University students protesting: 14 detained (October 2021)

Turkish government increases pressure on social media (September 2021)

Istanbul police attack peace rally, detain several (September 2021)

Turkey to further ease coronavirus restrictions from July (June 2021)

Committee of Ministers of CoE gives warning to Turkey (June 2021)

Büyükada trial: Constitutional Court rules that rights advocate Eser’s arrest was unlawful (June 2021)

Exiled Turkish journalist attacked in Germany (July 2021)

İstanbul Pride March: Several people detained (June 2021)

Erdoğan reveals stricter COVID-19 measures during Ramadan (April 2021)

Diyarbakır police detain dozens of women in early morning raid (April 2021)

Hrant Dink murder: people sentenced to life in prison (March 2021)

Boğaziçi protests: police detain 12 students for carrying rainbow flags (March 2021)

Turkey sentences journalist to 27 years in jail (December 2020)

Constitutional Court forwards Kavala’s application to General Assembly (December 2020)

Torture in Turkish prisons under scrutiny again following inmate’s death (October 2020)

New Turkish indictment prolongs ‘torture’ for philanthropist Kavala (October 2020)

PACE Rapporteurs Call for Release of Kavala (June 2020)

Six HDP co-mayors removed from duty (May 2020)

Turkey Amends Criminal Procedure And Execution Provisions (May 2020)

Coronavirus stokes tensions between Erdogan and mayor (April 2020)

Turkish activist re-arrested hours after his Gezi Park acquittal (April 2020)

Turkish Law on Social Media Delayed by Pandemic (April 2020)

Yiğit Aksakoğlu to be Released on Probation, Arrest of Osman Kavala to Continue (June 2019)

Civil Society Organizations from Germany: ‘Kavala and Aksakoğlu Should be Released’ (June 2019)

CHP members say ruling party fears losing billions in grants to charities tied to government (May 2019)

Turkish police use tear gas to break up Women’s Day march (March 2019)

Minister Kasapoğlu launched 2019 Year of Volunteering (March 2019)

Turkish police use tear gas to break up Women’s Day march (March 2019)

Minister Kasapoğlu launched 2019 Year of Volunteering (March 2019)

Turkey academic jailed after raids on professors and activists (November 2018)

Ministry of Interior to collect information of association members (October 2018)

Turkey issues first decree for new executive presidential system (July 2018)

The Start of a New Era in Turkey: Presidential System of Government (July 2018)

Understanding The “Turkish Model” Of Presidential System (July 2018)

Turkey ends state of emergency after two years (July 2018)

Turkey election: Erdogan win ushers in new presidential era (July 2018)

Turkey ends state of emergency, but eyes tough terror bill (July 2018)

Turkey’s Erdogan says state of emergency may be lifted after June 24 elections (June 2018)

Ministry of Interior: 624 Social Media Accounts Investigated in One Week (June 2018)

Q & A: Turkey’s Elections (June 2018)

Turkey’s Data Protection Board Announces Exemptions from Registering with the Data Controller Registry (May 2018)

The Commission of Inquiry for State of Emergency Practices (May 2018)

Turkish government to extend state emergency for seventh time (April 2018)

Ban on access to website violates freedom of expression: Constitutional Court (December 2017)

Turkey worst in world for jailed journalists for second year (December 2017)

Court arrests Turkish activist Osman Kavala over failed coup attempt (November 2017)

Turkish LGBTI activists condemn ‘illegal’ ban on events in Ankara (November 2017)

EU cuts Turkey funding after ‘democratic deterioration (November 2017)

‘Massive anxiety’ as Turkey cracks down on international NGOs (October 2017)

Arrest of rights activists ‘chills’ Turkey’s civil society (July 2017)

Turkey arrests two opposition journalists over alleged coup links (May 2017)

Turkey Blocks Wikipedia (May 2017)

As Turkey’s Democracy Takes a Hit, Civil Society Must Take Center Stage (April 2017)

State of emergency review body paves way for justice (January 2017)

Turkish PM cools down demands to reinstate death penalty (August 2016)

Turkey arrests novelist Aslı Erdoğan over ‘terror’ charges (August 2016)

Tayyip Erdogan hints at return of death penalty in Turkey (August 2016)

Turkey shuts down telecommunication body amid post-coup attempt measures (August 2016)

Europe and US urge Turkey to respect rule of law after failed coup (July 2016)

Turkey issues arrest warrants for 42 journalists after failed coup (July 2016)

In latest escalation, 102 media outlets closed by decree (July 2016)

Turkey’s Erdogan shuts schools, charities in first state of emergency decree (July 2016)

Turkey dismisses military, shuts media outlets in crackdown (July 2016)

President Erdogan texts 68 million people in fresh call for protests (July 2016)

Turkey coup attempt: State of emergency announced (July 2016)

Turkey to temporarily suspend European Convention on Human Rights after coup attempt (July 2016)

Turkey: Istanbul gay pride march banned over ‘security’ concern (June 2016)

Turkey jails Cumhuriyet journalists Can Dundar and Erdem Gul (May 2016)

Turkish LGBT group releases annual monitoring report on hate crimes (May 2016)

Erdoğan’s latest target is CSOs (April 2016) (Turkish)

How Turkey uses terrorism to justify its crackdown on the press (March 2016)

Turkey Seizes Newspaper, Zaman, as Press Crackdown Continuing (March 2016)

Ruling AKP creating its own NGOs (March 2016)

Two journalists arrested for story on trucks bound for Syria (November 2015)

Pro-Kurdish lawyer Tahir Elci shot dead in Turkey (November 2015)

Turkey Dominates Global Twitter Censorship (October 2015)

Political parties suspend election rallies over Ankara bombing (October 2015)

Journalists, legal experts decry Turkey’s media blackout (October 2015)

Water cannon used to disperse Istanbul gay pride parade (June 2015)

Turkey Lifts Ban on Access to Twitter, Facebook and YouTube (March 2015)

Turkey Passes Tough New Security Law (March 2015)

Security Bill Undermines Rights (October 2014)

Turkish Parliament to Consider New Protest Laws (October 2014)

Withdrawal of the Bill on the Right to Collect Aid by the Cabinet (September 2014) (Turkish)

Circular Issued after the Mining Incident (July 2014) (Turkish)

Action Plan of Right to Peaceful Freedom of Assembly (June 2014)

Turkish Parliament Approves Internet Crackdown (February 2014)

Listen to, Don’t Attack Protestors (June 2013)

Turkey spared from FATF Blacklist (February 2013)

Article on Turkey’s Expanding Role in Development Aid (February 2013)

Reconsider appointment to key rights body (December 2012)

Police fire tear gas at Republic Day protesters (October 2012)

Journalists targeted by smear campaign (September 2012)

Confirmed pre-trial detention of defender Osman Isci and 27 trade union members: Joint press release (July 2012)

NGO report slams Turkish government (May 2012)

European Union critical of human rights in Turkey (October 2011)

Activists prosecuted for criticising the judges (February 2011)

Human Rights Watch slams journalists’ arrests in Turkey (March 2010)

FIDH supports joint declaration of its member organizations in Turkey and Armenia (April 2010)

Turkey: Summary of Amnesty International’s Concerns in Turkey, July to December 2009 (March 2010)

Until 2004, when a new Associations Law was enacted, the autonomy of civil society in Türkiye remained heavily restricted. The new law was widely welcomed by both civil society actors and the European Union as a positive step toward expanding civic space. Further progress came in 2008 with the adoption of the Law on Foundations.

The operating environment for civil society began to deteriorate following the Gezi Park protests in 2013, which were triggered by the government’s urban development plans but evolved into broader anti-government demonstrations. Civil society has since faced mounting pressure linked to the conflict in the Kurdish-majority southeast, instability related to the Syrian conflict, and the failed coup attempt in 2016, following which the government adopted measures curbing the freedoms of association, assembly, and expression.

Türkiye officially transitioned to a presidential system of government on July 9, 2018, when Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was inaugurated for a new term. The new system has been widely criticized for concentrating excessive power in the president. Nevertheless, on October 10, 2018, a regulation on the organization and duties of the Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society came into force, introducing targets to improve the civil society environment.

On April 22, 2022, Parliament adopted the Law on Sport Clubs and Sport Federations (No. 7405), allowing sports clubs and federations to convert their legal status from associations to corporations. Since then, approximately 20,000 sports clubs and federations have made this transition, contributing to the decline in the overall number of registered associations in Türkiye.

In late 2022, the Specialized Committee on Civil Society Organizations in the Development Period was established to contribute to the preparation of the 12th National Development Plan (2024–2028). The committee’s main objective was to increase CSO participation in public policy planning, development, monitoring, and supervision, though the diversity of CSOs represented in the committee remained limited.

According to BirGün, by the end of 2024, prosecutors had opened 4,379 investigation files under the Law on Meetings and Demonstrations, accusing 11,041 people of a total of 14,016 offenses. In 2023, 4,097 such files were opened, targeting 12,571 individuals with 17,120 alleged offenses. This trend is also reflected in Constitutional Court rulings on violations of the right to assembly, which rose from 602 in 2022 to 1,403 in 2023.

In line with the 12th National Development Plan, the 2025 Annual Presidential Program highlighted the increasing number and diversity of CSOs; recognized the importance of ensuring their effective participation in decision-making processes; and stressed the need to strengthen cooperation between CSOs, public institutions, and the private sector.

Although the Directorate General of Relations with Civil Society published the Draft Civil Society Strategy Document and Action Plan (2023–2027) for public consultation on its website at the end of 2022, by the end of February 2025, the document had still not entered into force. Moreover, CSOs that provided feedback had not been informed about how their feedback was evaluated. At the end of 2024, the Directorate also published draft amendments to the Law on Associations and Law on Aid Collections, inviting input from CSOs and relevant experts. The Directorate General of Foundations has been working on draft amendments to the Law on Foundations to comply with recommendations from the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) to counter money laundering and the financing of terrorism. However, no legislative proposals had been submitted to Parliament as of mid-2025.

European Commission Report Highlights Challenges to Civic Space

According to the 2024 Türkiye Report by the European Commission, Türkiye has seen continued democratic backsliding, particularly in the areas of rule of law, fundamental rights, and judicial independence. Structural deficiencies in the presidential system remain unaddressed, with a centralized concentration of power undermining checks and balances. The report highlighted significant challenges for CSOs, including increased administrative and judicial pressure, restrictive regulations, and shrinking civic space. Freedom of assembly and association is hindered through bans, intimidation, and bureaucratic hurdles. Human rights defenders, activists, and independent CSOs face targeted pressure, limiting their ability to operate freely. Media outlets critical of the government continue to face harassment, fines, and judicial proceedings. The European Commission also notes insufficient efforts to improve human rights protections and address systemic concerns about democratic accountability and pluralism. Civil society remains resilient but faces a hostile operating environment, exacerbating restrictions on civic engagement and advocacy.

Judicial Operations Targeting Opposition Officials in Istanbul and Elsewhere

Since March 19, 2025, a series of large-scale judicial operations targeted the Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality, culminating in the arrest of Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and dozens of municipal officials and affiliates. The multi-phase investigation was based on serious allegations including forming and leading a criminal organization, bribery, bid rigging, aggravated fraud, unlawful acquisition of personal data, and aiding a terrorist organization, also linked with the above mentioned ‘urban consensus’ investigation. The first wave began on March 19 with the detention of 106 individuals. İmamoğlu was arrested four days later on March 23, along with 30 others, in a move that drew strong national attention. Subsequent waves of the operation expanded the scope significantly. The second wave, on April 26, led to the detention of 52 individuals, including senior municipal officials and executives. Eighteen people were arrested, 26 were released under judicial control, and four were placed under house arrest. The third wave on May 20 focused on the municipality’s media and public relations departments, detaining 22 people, several of whom cooperated with authorities under the “effective remorse” provision. Some people who were initially arrested in this phase were later released to house arrest. The fourth wave, on May 23, targeted high-ranking bureaucrats and executives of municipal subsidiaries. Forty-nine people were detained in this round, though judicial outcomes had not been finalized at the time of reporting. As part of the broader investigation, two district mayors—Şişli Mayor Resul Emrah Şahan and Beylikdüzü Mayor Mehmet Murat Çalık—were also arrested on charges of aiding an armed terrorist organization. Şişli Deputy Mayor Ebru Özdemir was likewise arrested under the same charges.

Following these arrests, the Ministry of Interior suspended all three from their duties. The Şişli District Governor, was appointed as a trustee in place of Şahan. İmamoğlu and Çalık were also formally suspended from office. The investigation, widely referred to as the “city consensus” probe, centers on allegations that İmamoğlu and his administration forged an electoral alliance during the Istanbul municipal elections with the People’s Democratic Congress, a coalition accused of links to terrorist organizations. This alleged political coordination forms the basis of the terrorism-related charges. In this context, IMM Deputy Secretary General Mahir Polat and Reform Institute Director Mehmet Ali Çalışkan were also arrested; Polat was later placed under house arrest due to health issues.

Overall, the operations have led to the detention of at least 229 people, with at least 49 formally arrested, several placed under judicial supervision or house arrest, and multiple high-profile suspensions and trustee appointments. The scale and political sensitivity of the investigation have triggered widespread controversy regarding judicial impartiality, political interference, and the broader implications for democracy in Türkiye. Since March 19, 2025, the political climate in Türkiye has become increasingly tense. The detentions have sparked widespread national and international concern over the state of democracy and rule of law. Protests have erupted in major cities, with opposition parties and civil society condemning the detentions as politically motivated. The government, however, claims that these measures were part of a legal investigation. This development has also deepened societal polarization and intensified debates over judicial independence and democratic backsliding in Türkiye. Police have responded to the protests with disproportionate force in many cities. Human rights organizations have also raised alarm about the government violations, including the mistreatment of detainees and restrictions on freedom of expression and assembly. Within the scope of the investigation, arrests targeting numerous politicians and municipal officials from Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality and other CHP-run district municipalities continue as of the end of May.

On November 1, 2025, 237 days after Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu and his colleagues were arrested, the Istanbul Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office announced that the Istanbul Municipality (IBB) indictment was completed.  İmamoğlu is charged with “organizing a criminal syndicate for the purpose of obtaining financial profit” and faces a prison sentence ranging from 828 to 2,352 years. 3,741-page indictment names 402 suspects: 105 in custody, 170 under judicial control, seven wanted on arrest warrants, and five listed as complainants. In total, 407 individuals are charged with 142 separate acts.