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Document Information:
- Year: 2004
 - Country: Italy
 - Language: English
 - Document Type: International Court Case
 - Topic:
 
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CASE OF MAESTRI v. 	ITALY
(Application no. 	39748	/98	)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
17 	February 2004	
In the case of Maestri v. Italy,
The European Court of Human Rights, sitting as 	a Grand Chamber composed of:
Mr 	L.	 WILDHABER	, President	,
 Mr 	C.L.	 ROZAKIS	,
 Mr 	J.-P.	 COSTA	,
 Mr 	G.	 RESS	,
 Sir Nicolas 	BRATZA	,
 Mr 	G.	 BONELLO,
 Mr 	L. LOUCAIDES	,
Mrs 	V.	 STRÁŽNICKÁ,
 Mr 	C.	 BÎRSAN,
 Mr 	K.	 JUNGWIERT,
 Mr 	V.	 BUTKEVYCH,
Mr B. 	ZUPANČIČ	,
 Mr 	J. HEDIGAN,
 Mrs 	S. BOTOUCHAROVA,
 Mrs 	E.	 STEINER,
 Mr 	S. PAVLOVSCHI	, judges	,
 Mrs 	M.	 DEL 	TUFO	, ad hoc 	judge	,
and Mr 	P.J.	 MAHONEY	, Registrar	,
Having deliberated in private on 25 June and 	3 December 2003 and on 28 January 2004,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted 	on the last-mentioned date:
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PROCEDURE
1.    The  case  originated  in  an  application  (no. 	39748	/98	)  against  the  Italian  Republic  lodged  with  the
European Commission 	of  Human  Rights  (“the  Commission”)  under  former  Article  25  of  the 	Convention  for
the  Protection  of  Human  Rights  and  Fundamental  Freedoms 	(“the  Convention”)  by  an  Italian  national,  Mr
Angelo Massimo Maestri 	(“the applicant”), on 14 June 1997.
2.    The  applicant  was  represented  before  the  Court 	by  Mr  A.  Fusillo,  of  the  Rome  Bar.  The  Italian
Government  (“the  Government”) 	were  represented  successively  by  their  Agents,  Mr  U.  Leanza  and
Mr I.M. Braguglia, 	assisted by Mr V. Esposito and Mr F. Crisafulli, co-Agents.
3.    The  applicant,  a  judge,  alleged  that  the  imposition 	of  a  sanction  on  him  for  being  a  Freemason
amounted to a violation of 	Articles 9, 10 and 11 of the Convention.
4.    The  application  was  transmitted  to  the  Court 	on  1  November  1998,  when  Protocol  No.  11  to  the
Convention came into 	force (Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11).
5.    The  application  was  allocated  to  the  Second 	Section  of  the  Court  (Rule  52  §  1  of  the  Rules  of  Court).
Within  that 	Section,  the  Chamber  that  would  consider  the  case  (Article  27  §  1  of 	the  Convention)  was
constituted  as  provided  in  Rule  26  §  1.  On  30  March 	1999  the  Chamber  decided  to  communicate  the
application to the respondent 	Government (Rule 54 § 2 (b)).
6.    On  1  November  2001  the  Court  changed  the  composition 	of  its  Sections  (Rule  25  §  1).  This  case  was
assigned  to  the  newly 	composed  First  Section  (Rule  52  §  1).  On  4  July  2002  the  application 	was  declared
admissible  by  a  Chamber  of  that  Section,  composed  of  Mr 	C.L.  Rozakis,  President,  Mr  G.  Bonello,  Mr  P.
Lorenzen,  Mrs  N.  Vajić, 	Mrs  S.  Botoucharova,  Mrs  E.  Steiner,  judges,  Mrs  M.  del  Tufo, 	ad  hoc	  judge,  and
Mr E. Fribergh, Section Registrar.
7.  On 10 October 2002 the Chamber relinquished 	jurisdiction in favour of the Grand Chamber, neither of
the parties 	having objected to relinquishment (Article 30 of the Convention and 	Rule 72).
8.  The composition of the Grand Chamber was determined 	according to the provisions of Article 27 §§ 2
and  3  of  the  Convention 	and  Rule  24.  Mrs  del  Tufo  continued  to  sit  as  an 	ad  hoc	  judge  appointed  by  the
respondent Government in place 	of the judge elected in respect of the respondent State (Rule 29 § 	1).
9.  The applicant and the Government each filed 	a memorial on the merits.
10.  A hearing took place in public in the Human 	Rights Building, Strasbourg, on 25 June 2003 (Rule 59 §
3).
There appeared before 	the Court:
(a)  	for the Government
Mr 	F. CRISAFULLI	,  	Co-Agent	,
(b)  	for the applicant
Mr 	A. FUSILLO	, avvocato	, Counsel	.
The Court heard addresses by them and also their 	replies to questions from its members.
THE FACTS
I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
11.  The applicant was born in 1944 and lives in 	Viareggio (in the province of Lucca). He is a judge.
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12.  At the time he lodged the application, he 	was acting president of the La Spezia District Court. On 23
November 	1993, following an inquiry by the General Inspectorate for the Ministry 	of Justice, the Minister of
Justice  instituted  disciplinary  proceedings 	against  the  applicant  on  account  of  his  membership  of  a  Masonic
lodge 	affiliated  to  the  Grande  Oriente  d’Italia  di  Palazzo  Giustiniani.  The 	Minister  accused  him  of  having
been  a  Freemason  from  1981  until  March 	1993  and  of  having  thereby  breached  Article  18  of  Royal
Legislative 	Decree no. 511 of 31 May 1946 (see paragraph 18 below).
13.    In  a  decision  of  10  October  1995,  the  disciplinary 	section  of  the  National  Council  of  the  Judiciary
(Consiglio  Superiore  della  Magistratura	)  found  that  the  applicant 	had  committed  the  offences  of  which  he
was  accused  and  gave  him  a  reprimand 	(censura	). 	It  stated  that  from  1982  onwards  it  should  have  been
possible to “have 	a clear idea of the loss of integrity resulting from membership of the 	Freemasons … because
of the degeneration brought about when a number 	of people came together within the P2 lodge with plans to
take  control 	of  the  public  authorities  and  subvert  democratic  institutions,  and  because 	of  the  collusion  of
certain  Masonic  lodges  with  the  Mafia  and  organised 	crime”.  The  disciplinary  section  added  that  the
directives  issued 	by  the  National  Council  of  the  Judiciary  on  22  March  1990  and  14  July 	1993  (see
paragraphs  21  and  22  below),  which  emphasised  –  the  second 	one  in  particular  –  the  substantial  conflict
between  membership  of 	the  Freemasons  and  membership  of  the  judiciary,  were  to  be  seen  in  the 	context  of
such  developments.  The  decision  also  stated  that  it  was  contrary 	to  disciplinary  rules  for  a  judge  to  be  a
Freemason,  for  the  following 	reasons:  the  incompatibility  between  the  Masonic  and  judicial  oaths, 	the
hierarchical  relationship  between  Freemasons,  the  “rejection” 	of  State  justice  in  favour  of  Masonic  “justice”
and,  lastly,  the 	indissoluble  nature  of  the  bond  between  Freemasons,  even  in  the  case 	of  a  member  who
wished to leave the organisation.
The disciplinary section of the National Council 	of  the  Judiciary  stated,  lastly,  that  the  applicant’s  alleged
ignorance 	of  the  institutional  debate  on  Freemasonry  merely  served  to  confirm 	the  existence  of  conduct
punishable under Article 18 of the 1946 Legislative 	Decree. In its opinion, such conduct was characterised by
a lack of 	diligence, caution and wisdom in dealing with a situation that posed 	a threat to the values protected
by that Article.
14.    On  5  January  1996  the  applicant  appealed  on 	points  of  law  to  the  Court  of  Cassation.  In  the  three
grounds of his 	appeal he alleged a breach of Article 18 of the Constitution, challenged 	the arguments used in
support  of  the  finding  that  judicial  office  was 	incompatible  with  membership  of  the  Freemasons,  and
complained that 	no reasons had been given for the conclusion that a judge would be discredited 	by  belonging
to the Freemasons.
15.  On 2 February 1996 the Ministry of Justice 	lodged a cross-appeal. The Court of Cassation, sitting as a
full court, 	examined the case on 19 September 1996 and, in a judgment of 20 December 	1996, dismissed the
applicant’s appeal.
It  held,  firstly,  that  the  application  of  Article 	18  of  the  Constitution  was  limited  by  the  constitutional
principles 	of  the  impartiality  and  independence  of  the  judiciary,  principles  which 	should  be  taken  to  prevail
over  the  right  to  freedom  of  association. 	The  Court  of  Cassation  further  held  that  the  disciplinary  section  of
the National Council of the Judiciary had based its decision mainly 	on the directive of 14 July 1993 in which
the Council had emphasised 	that judicial office was incompatible with membership of the Freemasons.
16.  The applicant maintains that his career has 	been at a standstill since the disciplinary section’s decision:
he was 	declared unsuitable for a post as judge of the Court of Cassation; furthermore, 	the judicial council for
his district stated that, because of the reprimand, 	it was unable to give an opinion on his suitability for a post
as president 	of a district court.
Lastly,  the  applicant  states  that  he  has  been 	transferred  to  Sicily;  however,  he  has  not  produced  any
evidence that 	that decision was linked to the sanction imposed on him.
II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
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A.  The Italian Constitution
17.  The relevant provisions of the Constitution 	are the following:
Article 18
“Citizens may form associations freely, without 	authorisation, for purposes not prohibited for individuals by the criminal 	law.
Secret associations and associations pursuing, 	even indirectly, a political aim through organisations of a military 	nature shall be
prohibited.”
Article 25
“No one shall be removed from the jurisdiction 	of a lawfully established court.
No one shall be punished save in accordance with 	a law in force at the time when the offence was committed.
No one shall be subjected to security measures 	except in cases provided for by law.”
Article 54
“All citizens shall have the duty to be loyal 	to the Republic and to comply with the Constitution and the laws.
Citizens  to  whom  public  offices  are  entrusted 	shall  perform  them  with  discipline  and  honour,  and  take  an  oath  where 	it  is
required by law.”
Article 98
“Public officials shall be at the exclusive 	service of the nation.
If they are members of Parliament they shall 	be promoted only by seniority.
The  right  to  become  members  of  political  parties 	may  be  limited  by  law  in  the  case  of  members  of  the  judiciary,  professional
members of the armed forces on active duty, police officials and officers, 	and diplomatic and consular representatives abroad.”
Article 101
“Justice shall be administered in the name 	of the people. Judges shall be beholden only to the law.”
Article 	111
(version applicable in the instant case, before the entry into force
of Constitutional Law no. 2 of 23 November 1999)
“Reasons shall be stated for all judicial decisions.
An  appeal  on  points  of  law  to  the  Court  of  Cassation 	for  a  breach  of  the  law  shall  always  be  allowed  against  judgments  and
measures concerning personal freedom delivered by the ordinary or special 	courts. This provision may be waived only in the case
of sentences pronounced 	by military courts in time of war.
Appeals  to  the  Court  of  Cassation  against  decisions 	of the 	Consiglio 	di  Stato	  and  the  Court  of  Audit  shall  be  allowed  only  on
grounds 	pertaining to jurisdiction.”
B.  Article 18 of Royal Legislative Decree no. 	511 of 31 May 1946
18.    Royal  Legislative  Decree  no.  511  of  31  May 	1946  (“the  1946  decree”)  concerns  the  safeguards
afforded to members 	of the State legal service (	guarentigie della magistratura	).
Article  18  of  the  decree  provides  that  any  judge 	who  “fails  to  fulfil  his  obligations  or  behaves,  in  the
performance 	of his duties or otherwise, in a manner which makes him unworthy of 	the trust and consideration
which he must enjoy or which undermines 	the prestige of the judiciary” will incur a disciplinary sanction.
19.  The Constitutional Court, when asked to give 	a ruling as to whether Article 18 of the 1946 decree was
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compatible 	with  Article  25  §  2  of  the  Constitution,  held  that,  in  disciplinary 	proceedings  against  judges,  the
principle  of  lawfulness  applied  as  a 	fundamental  requirement  of  the  rule  of  law  and  was  a  necessary
consequence 	of  the  role  conferred  on  the  judiciary  by  the  Constitution  (judgment 	no.  100  of  8  June  1981,  §
4).
However,  with  regard  to  the  fact  that  Article 	18  did  not  specify  the  types  of  conduct  which  might  be
regarded as unlawful, 	the Constitutional Court pointed out that it was not possible to give 	examples of every
type  of  conduct  which  might  undermine  the  values  guaranteed 	by  that  provision:  the  trust  and  consideration
which  a  judge  must  enjoy 	and  the  prestige  of  the  judiciary.  It  considered  that  those  values  amounted 	to
principles of professional conduct which could not be included in 	“guidelines laid down in advance, because
it [was] not possible to 	identify and classify every example of reprehensible conduct which might 	provoke  a
negative reaction in society” (ibid., § 5). The Constitutional 	Court subsequently reiterated that the earlier laws
governing  the  same 	subject  matter  had  included  a  provision  of  general  scope  alongside  the 	provisions
penalising  specific  conduct,  that  the  proposals  for  reform 	in  this  field  had  always  been  worded  in  general
terms and that the same 	was true for other professional categories. It concluded: “The provisions 	in this area
cannot  but  be  of  general  scope  because  specific  guidelines 	would  have  the  effect  of  legitimising  types  of
conduct which were not 	expressly mentioned, but which nonetheless attracted society’s opprobrium.” 	It added
that  those  considerations  justified  the  broad  scope  of  the 	rule  and  the  wide  margin  of  appreciation  conferred
on  a  body  which, 	acting  within  the  guarantees  inherent  in  any  judicial  procedure,  was 	–  by  virtue  of  its
composition – particularly well qualified to 	assess whether the conduct considered in each case did or did not
undermine 	the protected values (ibid., § 5).
The Constitutional Court considered, lastly, 	that such an interpretation was consistent with its case-law on
the 	subject  of  lawfulness  (ibid.,  §  6).  It  stated  that,  as  it  had  previously 	held,  “the  principle  of  lawfulness
[was]  applicable  not  only  by  means 	of  a  rigorous  and  exhaustive  description  of  individual  cases,  but
sometimes 	also  through  the  use  of  expressions  that  are  sufficient  to  determine 	the  rule  with  certainty  and  to
ascertain whether a particular type of 	conduct has breached the principle”.
It  further  held:  “  ‘open-ended’  provisions  which 	penalise  unlawful  types  of  conduct  by  reference  to
concepts  based  on 	common  experience  or  objectively  understandable  ethical  and  social  values 	are  fully
compatible with the principle of lawfulness.”
The  Constitutional  Court  added  that,  with  regard 	to  the  provisions  in  issue,  such  interpretation  criteria
appeared  more 	valid  in  a  disciplinary  context  because,  in  comparison  with  criminal 	offences,  disciplinary
offences  aroused  less  of  a  reaction  in  society 	and  had  less  of  an  impact  on  the  personal  situation  of  the
individual 	concerned,  and  also  because  the  possibility  of  conduct  undermining  the 	protected  values  was
greater than in the case of criminal offences.
It further stated that the reference in Article 	18 to the trust and consideration which a judge must enjoy and
to  the 	prestige  of  the  judiciary  was  not  objectionable  as  those  concepts  could 	be  determined  according  to
general opinion.
Accordingly,  the  Constitutional  Court  held  that 	the  constitutional  provisions  in  issue  had  not  been
infringed,  since 	there  had  been  no  breach  of  the  principles  of  lawfulness  and  of  the 	independence  of  the
judiciary.
C.  Law no. 17 of 25 January 1982
20.    Law  no.  17  of  25  January  1982  contains  provisions 	on  the  implementation  of  Article  18  of  the
Constitution  (right  of  association) 	in  respect  of  secret  associations  and  on  the  dissolution  of  the  “P2” 	lodge.
Section 2 provides that membership of a secret association is 	a criminal offence.
With regard to civil servants, section 4 provides 	that disciplinary proceedings must also be brought against
them  before 	a  special  committee  constituted  according  to  very  precise  rules.  However, 	where  judges  of  the
ordinary,  administrative  and  military  courts  are 	concerned,  jurisdiction  is  vested  in  the  relevant  disciplinary
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bodies.
D.  The directives of the National Council of 	the Judiciary
1.  The directive of 22 March 1990
21.  On 22 March 1990 the National Council of the 	Judiciary  adopted  a  directive  after  holding  a  debate  –
further  to 	a  message  from  the  Head  of  State,  who  acts  as  its  president  –  on  the 	incompatibility  of  judicial
office  with  membership  of  the  Freemasons. 	The  proceedings  of  that  meeting  (the  debate  and  the  text  of  the
directive) 	were  published  in  the  Official  Bulletin  (	Verbali  consiliari	,  pp.  89-129)  under  the  heading  “Report
on  the  incompatibility  of  judicial  office  with  membership  of  the  Freemasons”. 	An  introductory  note  states
that  the  report  was  compiled  by  the  Committee 	on  Reform  of  the  Judicial  System.  A  copy  of  the  report  was
sent to the 	President of Italy and the speakers of the Senate and the Chamber of 	Deputies.
According to the directive, “judges’ membership 	of associations imposing a particularly strong hierarchical
and  mutual 	bond  through  the  establishment,  by  solemn  oaths,  of  bonds  such  as  those 	required  by  Masonic
lodges raises delicate problems as regards observance 	of the values enshrined in the Italian Constitution”.
The  National  Council  of  the  Judiciary  added  that 	it  was  “undoubtedly  [within  its]  powers  to  verify
compliance with 	the fundamental principle of Article 101 of the Constitution, according 	to which ‘judges are
beholden  only  to  the  law’  ”.  It  continued:  “this 	scrutiny  entails  …  taking  care  to  ensure  that,  in  discharging
their 	duties, all judges respect – and are seen to respect – the principle 	of being beholden to the law alone.”
The  National  Council  of  the  Judiciary  then  referred 	to  the  Constitutional  Court’s  judgment  no.  100  of  8
June 1981, in which 	judges’ freedom of thought had been weighed against their obligation 	to be impartial and
independent (see paragraph 19 above).
It added: “it has to be stressed that among 	the types of conduct of a judge to be taken into consideration for
the 	requirements  of  the  exercise  of  the  administrative  activity  peculiar 	to  the  Council,  there  is  also,  beyond
the limit laid down by Law no. 	17 of 1982 [see paragraph 20 above], the acceptance of constraints which 	(a)
are superimposed on the obligation of loyalty to the Constitution 	and of impartial and independent exercise of
judicial  activity  and  (b) 	undermine  the  confidence  of  citizens  in  the  judiciary  by  causing  it 	to  lose  its
credibility.”
Lastly, the National Council of the Judiciary 	considered it necessary “to suggest to the Minister of Justice
that 	consideration  be  given  to  the  advisability  of  proposing  restrictions 	on  judges’  freedom  of  association,  to
include  a  reference  to  all  associations 	which  –  on  account  of  their  organisation  and  ends  –  entail  for  their
members particularly strong bonds of hierarchy and solidarity”.
2.  The directive of 14 July 1993
22.  On 14 July 1993 the National Council of the 	Judiciary adopted a further directive.
It stated that the question whether membership 	of the Freemasons was compatible with judicial office had
hitherto given 	rise  solely  to  considerations  concerning  judges’  career  development 	and access to positions of
leadership. Following criticism from certain 	political figures, including the Italian President, to the effect that
such  an  approach  was  unconstitutional,  it  had  proved  necessary  to  clarify 	the  matter  from  a  legal  point  of
view.
Referring  to  judges’  duties  of  loyalty  and  obedience, 	and  having  pointed  out  that  the  freedom  of
association for the purpose 	of professing Masonic ideas was not being called into question on a 	general level,
the  National  Council  of  the  Judiciary  emphasised,  however, 	that  the  performance  of  judicial  duties  was
incompatible  with  membership 	of  the  Freemasons  in  Italy  on  account  of  the  association’s  secret  nature 	and
the means of action and aims of the country’s Masonic lodges.
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THE LAW
I.  THE APPLICANT’S COMPLAINTS
23.    Relying  on  Articles 	9,  10  and  11  of  the  Convention,  the  applicant  alleged  a  violation  of 	his  right  to
freedom  of  thought,  conscience  and  religion,  his  right 	to  freedom  of  expression  and  his  right  to  freedom  of
peaceful assembly 	and association.
24.  The Court considers 	that  the  applicant’s  complaints  fall  most  naturally  within  the  scope 	of Article 11
of the Convention. Accordingly, it will consider them 	under that provision only.
II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 	11 OF THE CONVENTION
25.    The  applicant  complained  that  the  decision 	by  the  National  Council  of  the  Judiciary,  upheld  by  the
Court  of  Cassation, 	to  impose  a  disciplinary  sanction  on  him  in  the  form  of  a  reprimand 	for  being  a
Freemason  had  infringed  his  right  to  freedom  of  assembly 	and  association.  He  relied  on  Article  11  of  the
Convention, which provides:
“1.    Everyone  has  the  right  to  freedom  of  peaceful 	assembly  and  to  freedom  of  association  with  others,  including  the  right 	to
form and to join trade unions for the protection of his interests.
2.  No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise 	of these rights other than such as are prescribed by law and are necessary 	in a
democratic society in the interests of national security or public 	safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection
of  health  or  morals  or  for  the  protection  of  the  rights  and  freedoms 	of  others.  This  Article  shall  not  prevent  the  imposition  of
lawful  restrictions 	on  the  exercise  of  these  rights  by  members  of  the  armed  forces,  of  the 	police  or  of  the  administration  of  the
State.”
A.  Whether there was interference
26.  The Court considers that there was interference 	with the applicant’s right to freedom of association as
guaranteed by 	Article 11 of the Convention. The Government did not dispute this.
27.    In  order  to  be  compatible  with  Article  11, 	such  interference  must  satisfy  three  conditions.  It  must  be
“prescribed 	by  law”,  pursue  one  or  more  legitimate  aims  under  paragraph  2  and 	be  “necessary  in  a
democratic society” for the achievement of the 	aim or aims.
B.  Whether the interference was “prescribed 	by law”
1.  The parties’ submissions
(a)  The applicant
28.  The applicant asserted that there were no 	laws in Italy prohibiting judges from being members of the
Freemasons, 	a  political  party,  a  trade  union  or  a  Church.  He  considered  that  Article 	18  of  Royal  Legislative
Decree no. 511 of 1946 was obsolete and served 	a purely formal purpose in that it did not specify the types of
conduct 	and action that were prohibited for judges but merely conferred power 	on the National Council of the
Judiciary to determine which types of 	conduct and action were concerned.
He further submitted that the only associations 	prohibited by the Italian Constitution were secret ones and
those which 	pursued political aims by means of military organisations. He argued 	that Freemasonry was not a
secret  association,  but  rather  a  private 	association  like  other  Italian  associations  such  as  political  parties 	and
trade  unions;  however,  lists  of  such  associations’  members  were 	not  made  public,  contrary  to  the  practice
adopted by the Freemasons. 	Moreover, Freemasonry was not a paramilitary organisation and pursued 	purely
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cultural, humanitarian and philanthropic aims.
(b)  The Government
29.  Relying on 	N.F. v. Italy	 (no.	 37119/97,  §§  14-19  and  27,  ECHR  2001-IX),  the  Government 	observed
that  the  Court  had  already  found  in  a  similar  case  that  domestic 	law  provided  a  “sufficient  and  accessible
legal basis” for the interference 	complained of, namely Article 18 of the 1946 decree (ibid., § 27).
Turning  to  the  quality  of  the  law,  the  Government 	argued  that,  with  regard  to  the  condition  of
foreseeability, all the 	rules existing in Italian law, namely the relevant provisions of the 	Constitution, Article
18  of  the  1946  decree  and  the  two  directives  issued 	by  the  National  Council  of  the  Judiciary,  constituted  a
clear  legislative 	framework  with  foreseeable  effect,  particularly  on  account  of  the  “personal 	status”  of  those
to whom they were addressed and the field they covered.
2.  The Court’s assessment
30.  The Court notes that it has already had occasion 	to rule on whether the enforcement of a disciplinary
sanction imposed 	on a judge, on the basis of Article 18 of the 1946 decree, for belonging 	to the Freemasons is
compatible  with  Article  11  of  the  Convention  (see 	N.F.  v.  Italy	, cited  above).  In  that  judgment  the  Court
found  that  the  disciplinary 	sanction  had  had  a  basis  in  Italian  law  (§  27)  and  that  the  “law” 	on  which  it  was
based  had  been  accessible  (§  28).  However,  it  considered 	that  the  condition  of  foreseeability  had  not  been
satisfied (§§ 29-34).
The Court reiterates that the expressions “prescribed 	by law” and “in accordance with the law” in Articles
8  to  11  of 	the  Convention  not  only  require  that  the  impugned  measure  should  have 	some  basis  in  domestic
law, but also refer to the quality of the law 	in question. The law should be accessible to the persons concerned
and 	formulated with sufficient precision to enable them – if need be, 	with appropriate advice – to foresee, to a
degree  that  is  reasonable 	in  the  circumstances,  the  consequences  which  a  given  action  may  entail 	(see  The
Sunday  Times 	v.  the  United  Kingdom  (no.  1)	,  judgment  of  26  April  1979,  Series 	A  no.  30,  p.  31,  §  49;
Larissis and Others v. Greece	, judgment of 24 February 1998, 	Reports of Judgments 	and Decisions	 1998-I, p.
378,  §  40; 	Hashman  and  Harrup  v.  the  United  Kingdom	  [GC],  no.  25594/94, 	§  31,  ECHR  1999-VIII;  and
Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia and Others v. Moldova	, no. 	45701/99, ECHR 2001-XII).
For domestic law to meet these requirements, 	it must afford a measure of legal protection against arbitrary
interferences 	by  public  authorities  with  the  rights  guaranteed  by  the  Convention. 	In  matters  affecting
fundamental rights it would be contrary to the 	rule of law, one of the basic principles of a democratic society
enshrined 	in  the  Convention,  for  a  legal  discretion  granted  to  the  executive  to 	be  expressed  in  terms  of  an
unfettered power. Consequently, the law 	must indicate with sufficient clarity the scope of any such discretion
and the manner of its exercise (see 	Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria	 [GC], no. 30985/96, § 84, ECHR 	2000-XI,
and 	N.F. v. Italy	, cited above, § 29).
The  level  of  precision  required  of  domestic  legislation 	–  which  cannot  in  any  case  provide  for  every
eventuality  –  depends 	to  a  considerable  degree  on  the  content  of  the  instrument  in  question, 	the  field  it  is
designed  to  cover  and  the  number  and  status  of  those 	to  whom  it  is  addressed  (see 	Hashman  and  Harrup	,
cited above, § 31).
31.  In the instant case, the Court notes that 	Article 18 of the 1946 decree, construed in the light of Law no.
17 	of  1982  and  the  1990  directive,  was  the  legal  provision  used  as  the 	basis  for  the  sanction  imposed  on  the
applicant. It therefore concludes 	that the disciplinary measure had a basis in domestic law.
32.    The  Court  must  next  determine  whether,  in 	the  light  of  the  particular  circumstances  of  the  case,  the
condition 	relating to the quality of the law was also satisfied. It must therefore 	ascertain whether the law was
accessible and foreseeable as to its effects.
33.  As regards accessibility, the Court observes 	that Article 18 of the 1946 decree satisfied that condition
because 	it was public and, moreover, readily accessible to the applicant on 	account of his profession. The fact
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that  both  the  disciplinary  section 	of  the  National  Council  of  the  Judiciary  and  the  Court  of  Cassation 	also
referred  in  their  reasoning  to  the  1993  directive,  which  was  issued 	after  the  material  events,  is  irrelevant.
Article  18  and  the  first  directive 	adopted  by  the  National  Council  of  the  Judiciary  in  themselves  constituted
provisions  that  satisfied  the  condition  of  accessibility  (see, 	mutatis  mutandis	, Autronic  AG 	v.  Switzerland	,
judgment of 22 May 1990, Series A no. 178, p. 	25, § 57).
34.    As  regards  foreseeability,  the  Court  must 	determine  whether  domestic  legislation  laid  down  with
sufficient  precision 	the  conditions  in  which  a  judge  should  refrain  from  joining  the  Freemasons. 	In  this
connection, regard should also be had to the particular requirements 	of disciplinary regulations.
35.    The  Court  notes,  firstly,  that  Article  18 	of  the  1946  decree  does  not  define  whether  and  how  a  judge
can  exercise 	his  or  her  freedom  of  association.  Furthermore,  while  holding  that  Article 	18  was  compatible
with  the  Italian  Constitution,  the  Constitutional 	Court  noted  that  that  provision  was  of  general  scope  (see
paragraph 	19 above).
36.    The  Court  considers  that,  in  the  applicant’s 	case,  a  distinction  should  be  made  between  two  periods:
the period from 	1981,  when  he  joined  the  Freemasons,  to  22  March  1990,  when  the  National 	Council  of  the
Judiciary adopted its first directive, and the period 	between that date and March 1993, when the applicant left
the Freemasons. 	The  directive  adopted  by  the  National  Council  of  the  Judiciary  in  1990 	stated  that  a  judge’s
membership  of  lawful  associations  which,  like 	the  Freemasons,  were  governed  by  specific  rules  of  conduct
could be 	problematical for him or her (see paragraph 21 above).
37.    With  regard  to  the  first  period,  the  Court 	considers  that  Article  18  of  the  decree  on  its  own  did  not
contain  sufficient 	information  to  satisfy  the  condition  of  foreseeability.  The  fact  that 	Italy  passed  a  law  in
1982 on the right of association – which also 	ordered the dissolution of the secret P2 lodge (see paragraph 20
above) 	and  prohibited  membership  of  secret  associations  –  could  not  have 	enabled  the  applicant  to  foresee
that a judge’s membership of a legal 	Masonic lodge could give rise to a disciplinary issue.
38.    With  regard  to  the  second  period,  the  Court 	must  determine  whether  Article  18,  combined  with  the
1990  directive 	(see  paragraph  21  above),  supports  the  proposition  that  the  sanction 	in  question  was
foreseeable.
39.  It notes in that connection that the directive 	in question was issued in the context of an examination of
the specific 	question of judges’ membership of the Freemasons. Furthermore, the title 	of the report was clear:
“Report on the incompatibility of judicial 	office with membership of the Freemasons.”
However, although the title was unambiguous and 	the directive was primarily concerned with membership
of the Freemasons, 	the debate held on 22 March 1990 before the National Council of the 	Judiciary  sought  to
formulate, rather than solve, a problem.
That  is  demonstrated  by  the  fact  that  the  directive 	was  adopted  after  the  major  debate  in  Italy  on  the
unlawfulness  of  the 	secret  P2  lodge.  Furthermore,  the  directive  merely  stated:  “Naturally, 	members  of  the
judiciary are prohibited by law from joining the associations 	proscribed by Law no. 17 of 1982.” With regard
to other associations, 	the directive contained the following passage: “the [National] Council 	[of the Judiciary]
considers  it  necessary  to  suggest  to  the  Minister 	of  Justice  that  consideration  be  given  to  the  advisability  of
proposing 	restrictions on judges’ freedom of association, to include a reference 	to all associations which – on
account  of  their  organisation  and  ends 	–  entail  for  their  members  particularly  strong  bonds  of  hierarchy 	and
solidarity” (see paragraph 21 above).
40.    Lastly,  the  Court  considers  it  important  to 	emphasise  that  the  debate  of  22  March  1990  did  not  take
place  in  the 	context  of  disciplinary  supervision  of  judges,  as  was  the  case  for  the 	directive  of  14  July  1993,
but  in  the  context  of  their  career  progression 	(see  paragraph  22  above).  It  is  therefore  clear  from  an  overall
examination 	of the debate that the National Council of the Judiciary was questioning 	whether it was advisable
for a judge to be a Freemason, but there was 	no indication in the debate that membership of the Freemasons
could 	constitute a disciplinary offence in every case.
41.    Accordingly,  the  wording  of  the  directive 	of  22  March  1990  was  not  sufficiently  clear  to  enable  the
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applicant, 	who,  being  a  judge,  was  nonetheless  informed  and  well-versed  in  the 	law,  to  realise  –  even  in  the
light  of  the  preceding  debate  and  of 	developments  since  1982  –  that  his  membership  of  a  Masonic  lodge
could 	lead to sanctions being imposed on him.
The  Court’s  assessment  is  confirmed  by  the  fact 	that  the  National  Council  of  the  Judiciary  itself  felt  the
need  to  come 	back  to  the  issue  on  14  July  1993  (see  paragraph  22  above)  and  state 	in  clear  terms  that  the
exercise of judicial functions was incompatible 	with membership of the Freemasons.
42.    That  being  so,  the  Court  concludes  that  the 	condition  of  foreseeability  was  not  satisfied  in  respect  of
the  period 	after  March  1990  either  and  that,  accordingly,  the  interference  was 	not  prescribed  by  law.  There
has therefore been a violation of Article 	11 of the Convention.
C.  Compliance with the other requirements of 	paragraph 2 of Article 11
43.    Having  reached  the  conclusion  that  the  interference 	was  not  prescribed  by  law,  the  Court  does  not
consider  it  necessary 	to  ascertain  whether  the  other  requirements  of  paragraph  2  of  Article 	11  of  the
Convention  were  complied  with  in  the  instant  case  –  namely, 	whether  the  interference  pursued  a  legitimate
aim and whether it was 	necessary in a democratic society.
III.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF 	THE CONVENTION
44.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation 	of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law 	of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation 	to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction 	to the
injured party.”
A.  Damage
45.  In his claims submitted under Rule 60 of the 	Rules of Court the applicant asked the Court to order the
respondent 	State to put an end to the violations found by taking any measures available 	at national level. On
the  basis  of  Recommendation  Rec(2000)2  of  the 	Committee  of  Ministers  to  the  member  States  on  the  re-
examination  or 	reopening  of  certain  cases  at  domestic  level  following  judgments  of 	the  European  Court  of
Human  Rights  (adopted  by  the  Committee  of  Ministers 	on  19  January  2000  at  the  694th  meeting  of  the
Ministers’  Deputies), 	the  applicant  sought  the  reopening  of  the  disciplinary  proceedings. 	He  argued  that  the
Court’s judgment was to be regarded as a “new fact” 	which, under Article 37 § 6 of the 1946 decree, entitled
him to apply 	for those proceedings to be reopened.
During  the  oral  proceedings  the  applicant  also 	sought  an  award  for  non-pecuniary  damage.  He  stated,
however, that he 	was not seeking financial gain but, rather, a moral victory which would 	dispel any doubts as
to  whether  his  membership  of  the  Freemasons  had 	been  lawful.  He  left  it  to  the  Court’s  discretion  to
determine the amount.
46.  The Government observed that the applicant’s 	claim for non-pecuniary damage had been submitted for
the first time 	at  the  hearing  on  25  June  2003.  They  considered,  however,  that  a  finding 	of  a  violation  would
constitute in itself sufficient just satisfaction 	under that head.
They further submitted that the applicant had 	not proved that he had sustained any such damage.
47.  The Court reiterates that, in the context 	of the execution of judgments in accordance with Article 46 of
the  Convention, 	a  judgment  in  which  it  finds  a  breach  imposes  on  the  respondent  State 	a  legal  obligation
under that provision to put an end to the breach 	and make reparation for its consequences in such a way as to
restore 	as far as possible the situation existing before the breach. If, on 	the other hand, national law does not
allow  –  or  allows  only  partial 	–  reparation  to  be  made  for  the  consequences  of  the  breach,  Article 	41
empowers the Court to afford the injured party such satisfaction 	as appears to it to be appropriate. It follows,
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inter alia	, that a judgment in which the Court finds a violation 	of the Convention or its Protocols imposes on
the  respondent  State  a 	legal  obligation  not  just  to  pay  those  concerned  the  sums  awarded  by 	way  of  just
satisfaction,  but  also  to  choose,  subject  to  supervision 	by  the  Committee  of  Ministers,  the  general  and/or,  if
appropriate, individual 	measures to be adopted in its domestic legal order to put an end to 	the violation found
by  the  Court  and  to  redress  so  far  as  possible  the 	effects  (see 	Scozzari  and  Giunta  v.  Italy	  [GC],
nos. 39221/98 and 41963/98, 	§ 249, ECHR 2000-VIII, and 	Pisano v. Italy 	(striking out) [GC], no. 36732/97,
§ 43, 24 	October 2002).
Furthermore,  it  follows  from  the  Convention, 	and  from  Article  1  in  particular,  that  in  ratifying  the
Convention  the 	Contracting  States  undertake  to  ensure  that  their  domestic  legislation 	is  compatible  with  it.
Consequently,  it  is  for  the  respondent  State 	to  remove  any  obstacles  in  its  domestic  legal  system  that  might
prevent 	the applicant’s situation from being adequately redressed.
In the instant case, it is for the respondent 	State to take appropriate measures to redress the effects of any
past 	or  future  damage  to  the  applicant’s  career  as  a  result  of  the  disciplinary 	sanction  against  him  which  the
Court has found to be in breach of the 	Convention.
48.  The Court notes that the applicant did not 	submit a quantified claim for non-pecuniary damage. At the
hearing  on 	25  June  2003,  however,  he  left  the  matter  to  the  Court’s  discretion. 	The  Court  considers  that  the
applicant  must  have  sustained  damage  on 	account  of  the  psychological  and  mental  suffering  caused  by  the
imposition 	and  enforcement  of  the  disciplinary  sanction  against  him.  Making  its 	assessment  on  an  equitable
basis,  as  required  by  Article  41  of  the  Convention, 	the  Court  awards  the  applicant  the  sum  of  10,000  euros
(EUR) under this 	head.	
B.  Costs and expenses
49.    The  applicant  sought  reimbursement  of  the 	costs  incurred  in  the  disciplinary  proceedings,  namely
EUR 8,500, and 	of the expenses incurred in the proceedings before the Court, which 	he put at EUR 12,000.
50.  The Government left the matter to the Court’s 	discretion.
51.    As  regards  the  proceedings  before  the  domestic 	courts,  the  Court  observes  that  they  were  instituted
with a view to 	redressing the grievance that led to its finding of a violation.
Making  its  assessment  on  an  equitable  basis, 	as  required  by  Article  41  of  the  Convention,  the  Court,
having  regard 	to  the  work  incontestably  performed  by  his  lawyer  during  the  written 	and  oral  stages  of  the
proceedings,  awards  the  applicant  EUR  4,000, 	a  similar  amount  to  that  awarded  to  the  applicant  in 	N.F.  v.
Italy	 (see paragraph 47 of that judgment).
As  regards  the  costs  incurred  in  the  proceedings 	before  it,  the  Court  notes  that  the  Chamber  to  which  the
case  was  initially 	allocated  relinquished  jurisdiction  in  favour  of  the  Grand  Chamber  (Rule 	72).  It  therefore
considers it reasonable to award the applicant the 	sum of EUR 10,000.
C.  Default interest
52.    The  Court  considers  it  appropriate  that  the 	default  interest  should  be  based  on  the  marginal  lending
rate of the 	European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1.  	Holds	 by eleven votes to six that there has been a violation 	of Article 11 of the Convention;
2.  	Holds	 by eleven votes to six
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(a)  that the respondent State is to pay 	the applicant, within three months, the following amounts:
(i)  EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros) in respect 	of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii)  EUR 14,000 (fourteen thousand euros) 	in respect of costs and expenses;
(iii)  any tax that may be chargeable on 	the above amounts;
(b)    that  from  the  expiry  of  the  above-mentioned 	three  months  until  settlement  simple  interest  shall  be
payable  on  the 	above  amounts  at  a  rate  equal  to  the  marginal  lending  rate  of  the  European 	Central  Bank
during the default period plus three percentage points;
3.  	Dismisses	 unanimously the remainder of the applicant’s claim 	for just satisfaction.
Done  in  English  and  in  French,  and  delivered 	at  a  public  hearing  in  the  Human  Rights  Building,
Strasbourg, on 17 	February 2004.
Luzius 	WILDHABER
  President
 Paul 	MAHONEY
 Registrar
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of 	the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the following
dissenting opinions are annexed to this judgment:
(a)  joint dissenting opinion of Mr Bonello, Mrs 	Strážnická, Mr Bîrsan, Mr Jungwiert and Mrs del Tufo;
(b)  dissenting opinion of Mr Loucaides joined 	by Mr Bîrsan.
L.W.
P.J.M.
JOINT DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGES BONELLO, 	STRÁŽNICKÁ, BÎRSAN,
JUNGWIERT AND DEL TUFO
1.    We  disagree  with  the  majority’s  finding  that 	the  State’s  interference  with  the  applicant’s  enjoyment  of
his  rights 	under  Article  11  was  “not  prescribed  by  law”  in  so  far  as  that  interference 	lacked  the  element  of
foreseeability	1.
2.    It  is  our  view  that  the  applicant,  a  magistrate 	presumed  to  be  versed  in  the  law,  knew,  or  reasonably
ought  to  have 	known,  that  joining  an  Italian  Masonic  lodge  would  have  attracted  disciplinary 	sanctions.
There  were  compelling  and  inescapable  pointers  scattered 	throughout  the  Italian  legal  system  that  should
have  left  no  doubt  in 	his  mind  as  to  the  incompatibility  of  membership  of  the  Italian  Freemasons 	with  the
exercise of judicial functions.
3.  The majority concluded that none of the measures 	current in Italy before 1993, including the directive
approved  by  the 	National  Council  of  the  Judiciary  on  22  March  1990,  were  “sufficiently 	clear”  to  forewarn
the applicant of disciplinary sanctions in the 	event of his joining a Masonic lodge. To reach this inference the
majority 	were  repeatedly  compelled  to  disregard  the  Court’s  (and  the  Commission’s) 	long-standing  case-law
and the abundant harvest of factual findings 	on record.
The interference
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4.  It is important to emphasise at the outset 	that the applicant himself 	never	 claimed in his defence before
the  Italian  courts  that 	he  could  not  have  foreseen  that  membership  of  a  Masonic  lodge  was  incompatible,
under Italian norms, with the exercise of his judicial functions. 	It was only 	as a last resort before this	 Court
that  he  discovered  the  non-foreseeability  of  the  prohibition	. In  the  Italian  courts  he  relied  exclusively  on  a
defence that, as a 	matter of fact, he was unaware of the prohibition on judges joining 	the Freemasons and, in
law,  that  the  ban  was  in  breach  of  his  freedom 	of  association  guaranteed  by  the  Constitution,  and  also  that
insufficient 	reasons had been given for the penalty imposed on him	2.
5.    In  other  words,  the  applicant  always 	accepted	 that  the  Italian  system  contained  norms  prohibiting
judges from joining 	the Freemasons, but claimed that these norms were in violation of his 	fundamental  right
of freedom of association and that insufficient reasons 	had been given for the sanction against him. He never
asserted in the 	domestic fora that he could not have foreseen from the existing norms 	that membership of the
Freemasons could lead to disciplinary sanctions.
Who is the best 	interpreter of domestic law?
6.    The  various  national  adjudicating  authorities 	which  were  called  upon  to  determine  the  issue,  or  to  try
the applicant, 	had absolutely no misgivings in finding in the 1990 directive to the 	judiciary on Freemasonry,
and in the norms which preceded it, a sufficiently 	clear and foreseeable legal basis on which to establish that
by joining 	the Freemasons he had infringed his judicial duties.
Thus, relying on a 1981 judgment of the Constitutional 	Court	3, the  National  Council  of  the  Judiciary  (the
highest body that regulates 	the conduct of the judiciary), in its decision of 10 October 1995 in 	the  applicant’s
case,  found  that  the  Italian  legal  system  contained 	a  sufficient  and  clear  legal  basis  for  the  ban  on  judges
joining  the 	Freemasons	4. 	Similarly,  on  20  December  1996  the  Court  of  Cassation,  on  an  appeal 	by  the
applicant, confirmed the existence of a clear legal basis for 	the ban	5.
7.    According  to  the  Court’s  case-law,  the  national 	adjudicating  authorities  are  the  natural  interpreters  of
domestic  law. 	“The  Court  reiterates  that  it  is  primarily  for  the  national  authorities, 	notably  the  courts,  to
resolve  problems  of  interpretation  of  domestic 	legislation,  the  Court’s  role  being  confined  to  determining
whether 	the  effects  of  that  interpretation  are  compatible  with  the  Convention.”	6 On  norms  which  could  be
deemed  to  have  been  drafted  with  insufficient 	precision,  the  Court  has  stressed  that  “it  is  primarily  for  the
national 	authorities to interpret and apply domestic law”	7 when a question arises whether a particular norm is
sufficiently clear 	and foreseeable.
The  Court  has  also  underlined  that  it  regards 	the  courts  of  first  instance  and  appeal  as  being  the  most
qualified 	for the task of construing and applying domestic law	8.
It  is  thus  clear  that,  at  least  to  date,  the 	Court  has  declined  to  interpret  domestic  law  and  has  taken  the
domestic 	courts’  interpretation  to  be  correct  and  binding.  The  Court  only  exceptionally 	interferes,  but  not  in
reinterpreting  domestic  law;  its  intervention 	is  limited  to  enquiring  whether  domestic  law, 	as  established  by
the	 national authorities	, is compatible with the Convention.
8.    In  view  of  this  well-established  case-law, 	it  is  a  matter  of  notable  concern  that  the  majority  elected  to
disregard 	the  unanimous  interpretation  of  Italian  law  repeatedly  made  by  the  highest 	Italian  adjudicating
authorities  as  to  the  sufficiency  of  the  legal 	basis  in  this  particular  case,  and  found  it  expedient  to  second-
guess 	the consistent and unanimous legal assessment made by the Italian courts.
9.  In our view, the judgment of the majority 	has totally pushed aside the principle of subsidiarity (and also
those 	of  the  “fourth-instance”  doctrine  and  the  margin  of  appreciation), 	so  fundamental  to  the  proper
application of the Convention.
The specific historical and social context 	in Italy
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10.  In our view it is important from the outset 	to recall very briefly some facts that deeply affected Italian
Freemasonry 	from  the  1970s  onwards:  the  detection  of  “P2”,  a  secret  and  deviant 	Masonic  lodge;  the  Licio
Gelli	 affair; the suspicion that some Masonic lodges were implicated 	in subversive plots to overthrow Italian
democracy; the Gladio	 affair; and indications that part of Italian Freemasonry had 	close links with the Mafia,
terrorism  and  organised  crime.  The  report 	by  the  parliamentary  commission  of  inquiry  on  the  P2  lodge,
submitted 	by President Tina Anselmi in 1984, should be kept in mind too, as should, 	inter alia,	 the fact that a
Grand  Master  of  the  Grande  Oriente  of  Italy  left  the 	association  and  founded  a  new  observance  in
consequence of the disreputable 	situation Italian Freemasonry was in, and the fact that, for the same 	reasons,
British  Freemasonry  formally  decided  to  withhold  recognition 	of  the  Grande  Oriente  (the  official  Masonic
association) of Italy and 	banned its affiliates from having connections with their Italian brothers.
It is against this social and historical background 	that the events in issue took place, and that the applicant
remained 	affiliated to the Freemasons.
The legal basis for the interference
11.    Concerning  the  legal  context  in  the  light 	of  which  the  facts  should  be  evaluated,  we  observe  the
following.
(a)  The Italian Constitution
As the Court’s judgment points out, the Constitution 	of the Italian Republic enshrines:
(i)    the  principle  of  free  association  for  individuals, 	for  purposes  not  prohibited  by  the  criminal  law
(Article 18);
(ii)  the principle of legality (Article 25);
(iii)  the duty for all citizens to be loyal to 	the Republic and its laws (Article 54 § 1);
(iv)  the duty for persons to whom public offices 	are entrusted to perform them with discipline and honour,
taking an 	oath where this is required by law (Article 54 § 2);
(v)  the duty for public officials to be at the 	exclusive service of the nation (Article 98 § 1);
(vi)  the possibility of limiting by law the right 	to become members of political parties in the case of, 	inter
alia	, members of the judiciary (Article 98 § 3); and
(vii)  the duty for judges to be beholden only 	to the law (Article 101 § 2).
Article 104 § 1, which asserts the autonomy 	of the judiciary and its independence from any other power, is
also 	to be borne in mind.
(b)  Article 18 of Royal Legislative Decree 	no. 511 of 31 May 1946
Article 18 of Royal Legislative Decree no. 511 	of 31 May 1946 (	Guarentigie della magistratura	)  provides
that any judge who 	“fails to fulfil his obligations or behaves, in the performance of 	his duties or otherwise, in
a  manner  which  makes  him  unworthy  of  the 	trust  and  consideration  which  he  must  enjoy  or  which
undermines the 	prestige of the judiciary” will incur disciplinary sanctions.
(c)  Law no. 17 of 25 January 1982
Law  no.  17  of  25  January  1982  laid  down  restrictions 	on  the  right  of  association  (Article  18  of  the
Constitution) in respect 	of secret associations and provided for the dissolution of the P2 lodge.
This  law  is  not  relevant  in  this  case.  It  merely 	implements  the  provisions  of  Article  18  §  2  of  the
Constitution  (prohibition 	of  secret  associations  and  associations  pursuing,  even  indirectly,  political 	aims
through organisations of a military nature) in the very particular 	context of Italian history during this period.
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(d)  Judgments of the Constitutional Court
Two  judgments  of  the  Constitutional  Court  (on 	penalising  certain  types  of  conduct  by  members  of  the
judiciary) are 	relevant.
Judgments  nos.  145/1976  and  100/1981  state  that 	judges  enjoy  the  rights  granted  to  all  citizens.
Nevertheless,  their 	function  and  the  role  they  are  called  upon  to  play  legitimise  certain 	restrictions  on  their
enjoyment of such rights, on two conditions: the 	restrictions must be provided for by law and their legal basis
must 	be of a constitutional nature.
The  impartiality  and  independence  of  judges 	are  enshrined  in  Article  101  §  2  and  Article  104  §  1  of  the
Constitution. 	These  principles  are  aimed  both  at  protecting  the  trust  and  consideration 	which  a  judge  must
enjoy in public opinion and ensuring the dignity 	of the judiciary.
Impartiality  and  independence  are  constitutional 	principles  which  must  have  priority  over  the  rights  and
liberties granted 	by the Constitution when judges exercise “atypically” such rights 	and such liberties.
As  the  Court  noted,  these  judgments  of  the  Constitutional 	Court  also  recognised  the  compatibility  of
Article  18  of  the  1946  decree 	with  Article  25  §  2  of  the  Constitution.  The  Constitutional  Court  pointed 	out
that an enumeration by Article 18 of all the types of conduct which 	might  be  regarded  as  unlawful  would  be
impossible,  while  the  use  of 	a  wider  and  more  flexible  wording  allows  a  better  balance  between  the 	two
different  interests:  trust,  consideration  and  prestige  of  the  judiciary, 	on  the  one  hand,  and  the  rights  of
individuals  on  the  other.  In  penal 	matters,  too,  where  the  rule  of  legality  should  receive  stronger  protection,
the  principle  of  legality  is  respected,  even  when  the  provision  is  not 	very  detailed,  where  it  is  possible  to
identify  the  proscribed  conduct 	by  making  reference  to  parameters  which  are  objective  or  capable  of 	being
inferred.
In  the  present  case,  the  applicant  should  reasonably 	have  foreseen  that  his  conduct  could  incur  a
disciplinary sanction in 	the light of Article 18 of the decree.
He  had  joined  the  judiciary  in  1972  and  should 	have  known  of  the  decisions  of  the  Italian  Constitutional
Court,  delivered 	some  years  before  his  affiliation  to  the  Freemasons  in  1982.  He  should 	have  known,  in
particular,  that  the  right  of  association  can  be  restricted 	on  the  basis  of  the  constitutional  principles  of
impartiality and independence, 	where  those  principles  require,  respectively,  the  appearance  of  independence
and the absence of any appearance of bias.
Also,  in  the  light  of  the  specific  social,  historical 	and  legal  context  of  the  Italian  system,  it  was  already
inevitable that 	the applicant’s conduct would be deemed to be in violation of Article 	18 of the 1946 decree.
(e)  The directive of 22 March 1990 by 	the National Council of the Judiciary
Over  and  above  this,  on  22  March  1990,  the  National 	Council  of  the  Judiciary  adopted  a  directive  to  the
effect  that  “judges’ 	membership  of  associations  imposing  a  particularly  strong  hierarchical 	and  mutual  bond
through  the  establishment,  by  solemn  oaths,  of  bonds 	such  as  those  required  by  Masonic  lodges  raises
delicate problems as 	regards observance of the values enshrined in the Italian Constitution”.
12.  That directive was adopted on the initiative 	of the President of the Italian Republic, the titular head of
the  National 	Council  of  the  Judiciary.  The  Official  Bulletin  (	Verbali  consiliari	)  formally  published  the
directive under 	the following heading: “Extract of the minutes of the sitting held 	in the morning of 22 March
1990, concerning 	the incompatibility of judicial office with membership of the Freemasons.	”9
13.    The  President  of  the  Council  opened  the  sitting 	by  reminding  members  of  the  Italian  President’s
message “	concerning the incompatibility of judicial office with membership 	of the Freemasons	”10	.
14.    The  rapporteur  on  the  directive  (Dr  Racheli), 	tabling  the  motion,  resorted  to  language  that  could
hardly  have  been 	more  explicit  and  forceful.  He  referred  repeatedly,  and  with  approval, 	to  the  distressing
findings  of  the  report  by  the  parliamentary  commission 	of  inquiry  (the  Tina  Anselmi  Report)  into  the
scandals rocking Italy 	at and prior to that time as a result of the infiltration of degenerate 	Freemasonry into all
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spheres of power, an infiltration which had resulted 	in a stranglehold of all democratic institutions, including
the judiciary, 	and had compromised every sector of Italian public life and Italian 	Freemasonry as a whole.
The  rapporteur  left  positively  no  room  for  equivocation 	that  the  directive	 was  exclusively  aimed  at
asserting  the  functional  incompatibility 	between  the  holding  of  judicial  office  and  membership  of  Italian
Masonic 	lodges. “Applying the above standpoint of the Constitutional Court, 	it  is  to  be  excluded  that  judges
can  be  members  of  associations  that, 	through  the  bonds  of  hierarchy  and  professed  and  practised  ideologies,
may  induce  citizens  to  believe  that  the  exercise  of  judicial  power  can 	be  distorted  to  the  advantage  of  the
association or its individual members. 	As far as Freemasonry is concerned, there is no doubt that it is widely
agreed that the image of the judiciary is greatly blackened.”	11
15.    The  basis  in  Italian  law  on  which  the  directive 	rested  was  explained  in  detail  by  the  rapporteur  and
various  other  members 	of  the  Council  who  intervened  in  the  debate.  Very  briefly,  the  incompatibility 	of  the
exercise  of  judicial  power  with  Italian  Freemasonry  derives  from 	the  violation  of  the  constitutional  precept
that	 judges are beholden only to the law, whereas a Freemason is 	bound  solemnly  to  “swear  to  obey  without
hesitation or dissent such 	orders as are given to me by the Sovereign Tribunal of the 31st Degree 	and  by  the
Council  of  the  33rd  Degree  of  the  Ancient  and  Accepted  Scottish 	Rite”	12	. Moreover,  the  bond  of  solidarity
between  Italian  Freemasons  –  confirmed 	on  oath  –  is  incompatible  with  the  independence  and  impartiality
indispensable 	in  the  judiciary.  The  regulations  of  the  Loggia  Montecarlo,  as  one  example, 	further impose on
members  a  duty  “to  study  and  analyse  power  with 	the  aim  of  gaining  it,  exercising  it,  retaining  it  and
rendering it 	ever more solid”.
16.  The debate and the directive of the National 	Council of the Judiciary were not generated in a vacuum
(see paragraph 	10 of this opinion). The applicant knew, or manifestly had the duty 	to know (though he claims
he  did  not),  that  the  highly  publicised  official 	report  of  the  parliamentary  commission  of  inquiry  into
Freemasonry in 	Italy had laid bare the colossal damage which the image, credibility 	and authority of official
institutions, including the judiciary, had 	suffered through their infiltration by degenerate Italian Freemasonry.
That  report  should  have  left  absolutely  no  doubt  in  the 	bona  fide	  conscience  of  any  Italian  judge  about  the
irreversible 	conflict  arising  between  the  exercise  of  judicial  power  and  membership 	of  Masonic  lodges.  The
widely  distributed  report,  as  the  rapporteur 	remarked,  did  not  record  the  feelings  of  individuals,  but
“registered 	the  beliefs  of  the  Italian  people”  about  the  noxious  infestation  of 	degenerate  Freemasonry
throughout  the  vital  organs  of  the  State.  The 	applicant  showed  scant  regard  for  the  “beliefs  of  the  Italian
people”, 	so publicly and alarmingly expressed by the legislature of the Republic 	which he had undertaken to
serve.
The rapporteur’s analysis, 	published officially	 together with the	 directive	, stressed that “membership of the
Freemasons – 	as of any association with a strong hierarchical structure and an iron 	bond of solidarity – brings
about, as such, a falling-off, not only 	in appearances, but also and primarily, in substance … Belonging to 	the
Freemasons appears, then, as an obligation that objectively superimposes 	itself on the oath of loyalty required
by Article 54 of the Constitution, 	and on the primary obligation that every judge must be beholden only 	to  the
law”	13	.
17.  The directive, put to the vote in the context 	of the aforementioned preparatory work, was approved by
the National 	Council of the Judiciary, with twenty-four votes in favour and five 	abstentions.
18.  These extensively broadcast, precise and 	unequivocal forewarnings, disseminated officially alongside
the directive 	itself, could have left the applicant with no residue of doubt that 	membership of a Masonic lodge
constituted an actionable disciplinary 	offence. It is frivolous, in our view, for him to hold (very belatedly, 	in
an  extreme  line  of  defence)  that  he  could  have  believed,  in  good 	faith,  that  an  Italian  judge  could  embrace
Freemasonry  with  the  blessing 	of  the  law  –  a  claim  so  far-fetched  that  he  never  saw  fit  to  raise 	it  in  the
disciplinary proceedings against him in Italy.
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The case-law of the Court and the Commission on accessibility and 	foreseeability
19.  We cannot accept that the Italian norms on 	the compatibility between the exercise of judicial functions
and  Freemasonry 	in  Italy  can  in  any  way  be  deemed  vague,  inaccessible  or  unforeseeable 	as  to  their
consequences.  On  the  contrary,  they  are  as  positive  and 	forceful  as  can  be.  However,  if,  for  the  sake  of
argument,  they  could 	be  deemed  to  suffer  from  a  margin  of  ambiguity,  we  find  it  useful  to 	recapitulate  the
Court’s stand, at least to date, on this issue.
20.  The Court has repeatedly held that any interference 	with the enjoyment of certain fundamental rights
must  be  “prescribed 	by  law”  and  that  the  restrictive  law  in  question  must  be  accessible 	and  foreseeable.  To
that  we  subscribe  without  reservation.  But  the  Court, 	in  its  case-law,  has  been  attentive  to  the  necessity  of
tempering  this 	general  recital  with  the  inescapable  exigencies  of  practical  reason. 	It  has  acknowledged  (	and
this should be	 particularly  obvious  where  disciplinary  measures  are  concerned	) 	that  (as  in  the  present  case)
“it may be difficult to frame laws with 	absolute precision and that a certain degree of flexibility may even 	be
desirable to enable the national courts to develop the law in the 	light of their assessment of what measures are
necessary in the interests 	of justice”	14	.
21.  Concerning the requirement of foreseeability, 	the Court has recognised the need for flexibility. Legal
certainty can 	be established taking account not only of the wording of the relevant 	provisions, but also of the
national  courts’  interpretation  of  them, 	and  of  other  readily  available  forms  of  guidance  as  to  their  meaning
and application.
22.    The  Commission  has  stressed  that  different 	criteria  of  foreseeability  should  apply  in  the  case  of
disciplinary 	offences.  In  a  case  concerning  the  dismissal  of  a  government  employee, 	in  which  the  issue  of
foreseeability was raised, it found that the disciplinary 	proceedings against him were “prescribed by law” (the
regulations 	are not quoted), emphasising that “	disciplinary law is necessarily drafted	 in general terms	”15	.
23.    The  level  of  precision  required  of  domestic 	legislation,  the  Court  has  found,  “depends  to  a
considerable  degree 	on  the  content  of  the  instrument  considered,  the  field  it  is  designed 	to  cover, 	and  the
number and status	 of those to whom it is addressed	”16	. In other words, a law aimed at experts need not be as
explicit  as  one 	addressed  to  laymen.  In  the  specific  field  of  (military)  discipline 	the  Court  has  observed  that
“it would scarcely be possible to draw 	up rules describing different types of conduct in detail”	17	.
24.    On  the  requirement  of  clarity  and  foreseeability 	of  the  law,  the  Court  has  also  found  that  “the  mere
fact  that  a  legal 	provision  is  capable  of  more  than  one  construction  does  not  mean  that 	it  does  not  meet  the
requirement implied in the notion ‘prescribed by 	law’ ”	18	.
25.    In  another  leading  judgment,  the  Court  analysed 	the  element  of  foreseeability  essential  in  any  law
relied on as the 	legal basis for limiting a fundamental right. It observed: “The Swedish 	legislation  applied  in
the present case is admittedly rather general 	in terms and confers a wide measure of discretion … On the other
hand, 	the circumstances … in which a care decision may fall to be implemented 	are so	 variable  that 	it  would
scarcely  be  possible  to  formulate  a  law  to  cover  every	 eventuality 	…  Moreover,  in  interpreting  and  applying
the  legislation, 	the  relevant  preparatory  work  …  provides  guidance	 as  to  the  exercise  of  the  discretion  it
confers	 … The Court 	thus concludes that the interferences in question were ‘in accordance 	with the law.’ ”	19
26.  The latest pronouncement of the Court on 	the accessibility and foreseeability of norms restricting the
enjoyment 	of  fundamental  rights  was  handed  down  today  in 	Gorzelik  and  Others  v.  Poland	.  The  findings
there,  and  in  previous 	pronouncements,  are  in  direct  contradiction  to  what  has  been  held  by 	the  majority  in
the present case: “it is a logical consequence of 	the principle that laws must be of general application that the
wording 	of  statutes  is  not  always  precise.  The  need  to  avoid  excessive  rigidity 	and  to  keep  pace  with
changing  circumstances  means  that  many  laws  are 	inevitably  couched  in  terms  which,  to  a  greater  or  lesser
extent, are 	vague. The interpretation and application of such enactments depend 	on practice.”	20
The Court added: “It must also be borne in 	mind that, however clearly drafted a legal provision may be, its
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application 	involves  an  inevitable  element  of  judicial  interpretation,  since  there 	will  always  be  a  need  for
clarification  of	 doubtful  points  and  for  adaptation  to  particular  circumstances. 	A  margin  of  doubt  in  relation
to  borderline  facts  does  not  by  itself 	make  a  legal  provision  unforeseeable  in  its  application.  Nor  does  the
mere fact that a provision is capable of more than one construction 	mean that it fails to meet the requirement
of ‘foreseeability’ for the 	purposes of the Convention. The role of adjudication vested in the [domestic] 	courts
is  precisely  to  dissipate  such  interpretational  doubts  as  remain, 	taking  into  account  the  changes  in  everyday
practice.”	21
27.    The  restriction  on  the  enjoyment  of  a  fundamental 	right,  that  judgment  insisted,  must  be  formulated
with sufficient precision 	to enable the citizen to regulate his conduct. The applicant must have 	been  able  “to
foresee,  to  a  degree  that  is  reasonable  in  the  circumstances, 	the  consequences  which  a  given  action  may
entail”.  However,	 “those  consequences  need  not  be  foreseeable  with  absolute  certainty: 	experience  shows
this to be unattainable	”22	.
28.  The Commission was the organ charged by the 	Convention with deciding matters of admissibility, and
had many occasions 	to evaluate the issue of foreseeability 	in disciplinary	 law.	 It held that the dismissal of an
employee in the Netherlands 	on disciplinary grounds was “prescribed by law” in the light of 	Article 1639w of
the  Civil  Code,  which  states  only  that  “contracts 	[of  employment]  may  be  terminated  when  new
circumstances make it necessary 	to do so”	23	.
29.    Similarly,  the  Commission  upheld  the  legality 	of  a  disciplinary  sanction  (compulsory  relief  of  the
applicant  from 	her  job  duties)  on  the  strength  of  staff  regulations  that  stated  that 	“members  of  staff  must
behave  in  all  circumstances  in  a  dignified 	and  correct  manner  and  perform  no  act  likely  to  set  a  bad
example”. 	This norm was sufficient for the sanction applied to be foreseeable 	and “prescribed by law”	24	.
30.  In another case in 1995 the Commission approved 	as sufficiently foreseeable and thus “prescribed by
law”  a  disciplinary 	regulation  governing  the  legal  profession,  by  which  any  “breach  of 	integrity,  honour  or
discretion … shall render the 	avocat	 responsible liable to … sanctions …”	25	.
31.  The Court has also found that judicial interpretation 	taking account of social changes is in conformity
with Article 7	26	.
32.    The  majority,  in  assessing  the  1990  directive 	on  the  Italian  judiciary  and  Freemasonry,  and  the  other
measures which 	preceded it, failed to take into consideration any of the many criteria 	required by the Court’s
and  the  Commission’s  case-law  to  determine  whether 	the  interference  with  the  applicant’s  rights  had  a
sufficient  legal 	basis.  They  ignored  the  fact  that  general  norms  are  sufficient  (and 	indispensable)  in
disciplinary law, and did not give adequate weight 	to “the status of those to whom the norm is addressed” (in
the  present 	case  a  person  presumed  to  be  immersed  in  legal  expertise).  More  lamentably, 	nor  was  due
consideration  given  to  the  “relevant  preparatory  work” 	concomitant  with  the  enactment  of  that  norm.  In  the
present instance, 	the relevant preparatory work, published in official form, leaves not 	the flimsiest penumbra
of  doubt  that  the  norms  in  question  prohibited 	Italian  judges,  in  totally  unequivocal  terms,  from  being
members of 	Italian Masonic lodges.
Different  requirements  of  foreseeability  between  criminal  laws  and 	norms  which  interfere  with  the
enjoyment of fundamental rights
33.    The  Convention  stresses  the  requirement  of 	“clarity”  of  the  law  in 	two	  circumstances:  firstly,  in
defining  proscribed  criminal 	behaviour  in  penal  statutes  (the  “void  for  vagueness”  doctrine  enshrined 	in
Article 7)	27	 and secondly, in the norms that interfere with the enjoyment of certain 	fundamental  rights  (such
as  those  enshrined  in  Articles  8  to  11).  The 	requirement  of  clarity  obviously  appears  necessary  to  a  higher
degree 	in the “criminal” context of Article 7.
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34.    And  yet  the  Court  quite  recently  accepted 	as  sufficiently  precise,  in  an  Article  7  case,  a  criminal
statute which 	states: “Any person who is a public officer and abuses his office 	in any manner other than that
defined  in  this  Code  shall  be  sentenced 	to  imprisonment  of  not  less  than  six  months  but  not  more  than  three
years,  depending  on  the  gravity  of  the  offence”  (Article  240  of  the 	Turkish Criminal Code)	28	. The  applicant
in  that  case  was  sentenced  on  the  strength  of 	this  provision	  of  the  law  to  one  year’s  imprisonment,  a  heavy
fine and disqualification from holding public office. No violation of 	Article 7 was found by the Court; in fact
the application was rejected 	as inadmissible.
35.    It  is  bewildering  that  this  vague  and  equivocal 	criminal  non-law  passed  the  stringent  test  of  clarity
required  under 	Article  7,  while  the  emphatic,  public  and  reiterated  proscription  of 	Freemasonry  for  Italian
judges now fails the less stringent test of 	clarity required by Article 11.
36.    This  opinion  is  solely  concerned  with  establishing 	whether  there  existed  in  Italian  legislation  a
“sufficient legal basis” 	on which to discipline the applicant for being a member of a Masonic 	lodge. We have
not analysed the necessity, in a democratic society, 	of the restriction in question.
DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE LOUCAIDES
JOINED BY JUDGE BÎRSAN
I disagree with the majority. Although I could 	agree with the substance of the dissenting opinion of Judge
Bonello, 	I prefer to base my dissent more specifically on the following reasoning.
As rightly observed by the Court in 	Chorherr v. Austria	 (judgment of 25 August 1993, Series A no. 	266-B,
pp. 35-36, § 25), the level of precision required of domestic 	legislation “depends to a considerable degree on
the contents of the 	instrument considered, 	the field it is designed to cover	 and the number and status 	of those
to  whom  it  is  addressed”  (emphasis  added).  Therefore,  the 	requirement  for  law  to  be  clear  and  foreseeable
depends  on  the  subject 	matter  it  is  intended  to  cover  and  the  degree  to  which  it  is  possible 	to  make  such
subject matter clear and foreseeable.
The  point  I  wish  to  stress  in  this  respect  is 	that  achieving  the  requisite  level  of  clarity  and  foreseeability
may 	in  some  areas  simply  be  impossible.  And  the  law  does  not  compel  the 	impossible  (	lex  non  cogit  ad
impossibilia	).
In the present case, we are in the field of 	disciplinary offences and it is an elementary rule of disciplinary
law 	of  universal  recognition  that  it  is  impossible  to  cover  exhaustively 	or  specify  all  the  different  acts  or
omissions which may constitute 	disciplinary offences.
This  in  fact  has  been  recognised  to  a  certain 	extent  by  the  Court  in  dealing  with  disciplinary  law  in
Vereinigung  demokratischer  Soldaten  Österreichs  and  Gubi  v.  Austria	 (judgment  of  19  December  1994,
Series A no. 302, pp. 15-16, § 31), 	where the Court stated:
“As far as military discipline is concerned, 	it would scarcely be possible to draw up rules describing different 	types of conduct
in  detail.  It  may  therefore  be  necessary  for  the  authorities 	to  formulate  such  rules  more  broadly.  The  relevant  provisions  must,
however, afford sufficient protection against arbitrariness and make 	it possible to foresee the consequences of their application.”
The requirement that “the relevant provisions 	must … make it possible to foresee the consequences of their
application” 	in the third sentence of that quotation is formulated in more absolute 	terms than the principle in
the  preceding  sentence  logically  allows. 	For,  if  it  is  accepted  that  there  are  many  types  of  conduct  which
cannot 	be  described  in  detail,  the  possibility  that  it  may  not  prove  possible 	to  foresee  the  consequences  of
such conduct in some cases cannot be 	excluded.
The fact remains 	that in disciplinary law there may be certain types of conduct which 	cannot be specified
expressly and these are usually covered by a general 	prohibition formulated in broad terms, the interpretation
and application 	of which depends on the social and moral attitudes of society as understood 	by the competent
disciplinary  body  at  the  specific  time  the  prohibition 	is  applied.  This  point  is  aptly  made  by  the  Italian
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Constitutional Court 	(see paragraph 19 of the judgment). And it is not difficult to accept, 	because disciplinary
law does not seek to bar specific acts or omissions 	but rather to condemn general conduct or behaviour which
in  most  disciplinary 	codes  is  referred  to  in  broad  terms  such  as  “conduct  incompatible 	with  the  duties  or
status” of the public officer or other person to 	whom the disciplinary code applies.
Take for example the “	obligation de réserve	” applicable in French law to members 	of the public service. It
is impossible to enumerate the specific cases 	in which a breach of this obligation will occur.
We can even borrow an example from the Convention 	itself regarding the dismissal of a judge from office
on the ground 	“that he has ceased to fulfil the required conditions” (Article 	24), one of which is that “he shall
be of high moral character” 	(Article 21 § 1). One cannot seriously deny the fact that it is impossible 	to  define
or describe in detail or exhaustively the different types 	of conduct that may be considered incompatible with
“a high moral 	character”.
Therefore,  it  is  inevitable  in  the  field  of 	disciplinary  law  that  only  a  general  indication  (accompanied
perhaps 	by certain specific prohibitions) as to the kind of behaviour that may 	be considered as amounting to a
disciplinary offence will be possible 	and that the degree of foreseeability will often be less than in other 	cases
where a higher level of clarity and foreseeability of the law 	is in fact possible.
The result is that there may be disciplinary 	offences which cannot be foreseen with the requisite degree of
certainty 	in  all  cases,  though  it  is  necessary,  in  my  view,  to  afford  the  best 	possible  protection  against
arbitrariness.  This  can  be  achieved  firstly 	by  ensuring  that  the  description  of  the  prohibited  conduct,  though
broad, 	is capable of indicating the type of conduct for which there is a 	reasonable 	risk	 of its being considered
to  constitute  prohibited  conduct. 	And,  secondly,  by  providing  the  possibility  of  independent  judicial 	review
of the relevant decision by the competent disciplinary body.
In  the  present  case,  Article  18  of  the  1946 	decree  provides  that  any  judge  who  “fails  to  fulfil  his
obligations 	or  behaves,  in  the  performance  of  his  duties  or  otherwise,  in  a  manner 	which  makes  him
unworthy  of  the  trust  and  consideration  which  he  must 	enjoy  or  which  undermines  the  prestige  of  the
judiciary”  will  incur 	a  disciplinary  sanction.  This  provision  is  in  line  with  the  general 	prohibition  found  in
disciplinary law as explained above. As in other 	legal systems, it is left to the competent disciplinary body to
decide 	whether  any  particular  conduct  in  an  individual  case  amounts  to  behaviour 	that  is  incompatible  with
the  general  prohibition  concerned.  The  question 	is  whether,  in  the  case  under  consideration,  the  conduct
found  to  be 	incompatible  with  that  prohibition  (membership  of  a  Masonic  lodge)  in 	the  light  of  the
disciplinary  body’s  factual  findings  was  behaviour 	which  it  was  reasonably  possible  would  be  considered  as
falling within 	the scope of the prohibited conduct. In this connection, it should be 	noted that the record shows
that  the  disciplinary  body  took  the  following 	elements  into  account  in  reaching  the  conclusion  that  the
applicant 	had engaged in prohibited conduct.
(a)    “Loss  of  integrity  resulting  from  membership 	of  the  Freemasons  …  because  of  the  degeneration
brought about when 	a  number  of  people  came  together  within  the  P2  lodge  with  plans  to  take 	control  of  the
public authorities and subvert democratic institutions, 	and because of the collusion of certain Masonic lodges
with the Mafia 	and organised crime” (see paragraph 13 of the judgment).
(b)    Incompatibility  between  the  Masonic  and  judicial 	oaths,  the  hierarchical  relationship  between
Freemasons, the “rejection” 	of State justice in favour of Masonic “justice” and the indissoluble 	nature  of  the
bond between Freemasons, even in the case of a member 	who wished to leave the organisation (ibid.).
All these elements existed before 1982.
It is true that reference was also made to the 	directive of 14 July 1993, which was issued after the applicant
had 	left  the  Freemasons  and  which,  for  this  reason,  the  Court  in  this  case 	rightly  disregarded.  However,  this
directive  simply  expressed  formally 	what  was  already  known  to  be  the  position  in  practice,  for  example  the
fact  that  the  association  was  secretive.  The  fact  that  Masonic  lodges 	kept  their  functions,  ceremonies  and
procedures secret is a matter of 	public knowledge and should have been known to the applicant. The directive
of  14  July  1993  did  not  make  that  fact  known  for  the  first  time  but 	simply  confirmed  it  formally.  The  other
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elements  also  relied  on  by  the 	disciplinary  body,  as  mentioned  above,  should  also  have  been  known  to 	any
person  in  the  applicant’s  position  and  by  themselves  justify  the 	conclusion  that  it  would  not  have  been
difficult  for  him  in  the  circumstances 	to  foresee  at  least  that  there  was  a  risk  that  his  membership  of  a
Masonic 	lodge  might  reasonably  be  considered  a  disciplinary  offence.  That  is 	so  even  if  we  act  on  the
premiss  that  the  directive  of  22  March  1990 	did  not  clearly  state  in  so  many  words  that  membership  of  the
Freemasons 	constituted a disciplinary offence for a judge.
Even if nothing was said on this subject in 	a directive, there was, in my opinion, sufficient indication in the
circumstances of the case that a judge ran a reasonably foreseeable 	risk of committing a disciplinary offence
by joining the Freemasons.
I do not agree with the Court’s statement that 	the fact that the National Council of the Judiciary issued the
directive 	of  14  July  1993  stating  in  clear  terms  that  the  exercise  of  judicial 	functions  was  incompatible  with
membership of the Freemasons confirms 	the view that until then such membership could not be considered a
disciplinary 	offence.  As  I  have  already  said,  the  directive  in  question  simply  expressed 	formally  the  existing
position  regarding  conduct  which  any  person  in 	the  applicant’s  position  would  regard  as  being  reasonably
likely  to 	constitute  a  disciplinary  offence.  The  directive  did  not  purport  to 	introduce  for  the  first  time  a  new
principle. It merely clarified an 	already existing principle, thus removing any doubts. In any event, 	the  other
facts  on  which  the  disciplinary  decision  was  based  did  exist 	and  were  undisputed  at  the  material  time  and
could,  as  I  have  already 	explained,  reasonably  support  a  finding  that  a  disciplinary  offence 	had  been
committed.
For all the above reasons, I find that there 	has been no violation of the Convention in this case.
1.  See paragraph 42 of the 	judgment.
2.  See paragraph 14.
1.  No. 100 of 8 June 1981.
2.  See paragraph 13 of the 	judgment.
3.  See paragraph 15.
4.    See 	Waite  and  Kennedy  v.  Germany	  [GC],  no.  26083/94,  §  54,  ECHR 	1999-I,  and 	Gorzelik  and  Others  v.  Poland	  [GC],  no.
44158/98, § 100, also 	published in this volume.
5.  See 	Vogt v. Germany	, judgment of 26 September 1995, Series A no. 	323, p. 24, § 48.
6.  See 	Gitonas and Others v. Greece	, judgment of 1 July 1997, 	Reports 	of Judgments and Decisions	 1997-IV, p. 1235, § 44.
1.  Emphasis added.
2.  Emphasis added.
3.  	Verbali consiliari	, p. 103.
4.  Ibid.
1.  Ibid., p. 104.
1.  See 	Goodwin v. the United Kingdom	, judgment of 27 March 1996, 	Reports 	1996-II, pp. 497-98, § 33.
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2.  See 	Haseldine v. the United Kingdom	, no. 18957/91, Commission decision 	of 13 May 1992, Decisions and Reports (DR) 73, p. 231
(emphasis added).
3.  See 	Chorherr v. Austria	, judgment of 25 August 1993, Series A no. 	266-B, pp. 35-36, § 25 (emphasis added).
4.  See 	Vereinigung demokratischer Soldaten Österreichs and Gubi v. Austria	, judgment  of  19  December  1994,  Series  A  no.  302,  pp.
15-16, § 31.
5.  See 	Vogt	, cited above, p. 24, § 48.
1.  See 	Olsson v. Sweden (no. 1)	, judgment of 24 March 1988, Series 	A no. 130, pp. 30-31, §§ 62-63 (emphasis added).
2.    See 	Gorzelik and Others	,  cited  above,  §  64,  and  also  the  following 	judgments: 	Kokkinakis  v.  Greece	,  25  May  1993,  Series  A  no.
260-A,  p.  19, 	§  40;  The  Sunday  Times 	v.  the  United  Kingdom  (no.  1)	,  26  April  1979,  Series  A  no. 	30,  p.  31,  §  49;  and 	Rekvényi  v.
Hungary	 [GC], no. 25390/94, § 34, ECHR 1999-III.
3.  See 	Gorzelik and Others	, cited above, § 65; see also 	Cantoni v. France	, judgment of 15 November 1996, 	Reports 	1996-V,  p.  1628,
§ 32.
1.  See 	Rekvényi	, cited above, § 34 (emphasis added).
2.  See 	Van der Heijden v. the Netherlands	, no. 11002/84, Commission 	decision of 8 March 1985, DR 41, p. 270.
3.  See 	Morissens v. Belgium	, no. 11389/85, Commission decision of 	3 May 1988, DR 56, p. 135.
4.  See 	Zihlmann v. Switzerland	, no. 21861/93, Commission decision 	of 28 June 1995, DR 82-B, p. 18.
5.  See 	S.W. v. the United Kingdom	, judgment of 22 November 1995, Series 	A no. 335-B.
1.  See 	Kokkinakis	, cited above, p. 22, §§ 51-53.
2.  See 	Ugur v. Turkey	 (dec.), no. 30006/96, 8 December 1998.
MAESTRI v. ITALY 	JUDGMENT
MAESTRI v. ITALY 	JUDGMENT
MAESTRI v. ITALY JUDGMENT
MAESTRI v. ITALY JUDGMENT
MAESTRI v. ITALY JUDGMENT – JOINT DISSENTING 	OPINION
OF JUDGES BONELLO, STRÁŽNICKÁ, BÎRSAN, JUNGWIERT 	AND DEL TUFO
MAESTRI v. ITALY JUDGMENT – JOINT DISSENTING 	OPINION
OF JUDGES BONELLO, STRÁŽNICKÁ, BÎRSAN, JUNGWIERT 	AND DEL TUFO
MAESTRI v. ITALY JUDGMENT
MAESTRI v. ITALY JUDGMENT –
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DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE LOUCAIDES JOINED BY 	JUDGE BÎRSAN
MAESTRI v. ITALY JUDGMENT –
DISSENTING OPINION 	OF 	JUDGE LOUCAIDES JOINED BY JUDGE BÎRSAN