Published May 2026

This briefer examines recent state laws authorizing the designation of domestic organizations as “terrorist” entities. It explains how these laws may affect U.S. nonprofits and their supporters and discusses constitutional concerns these laws raise.

In 2026, lawmakers in several states introduced—and in Florida and Indiana enacted—new laws authorizing state officials to designate domestic organizations as “terrorist” entities or “affiliates” of terrorist groups. The legislation follows executive actions by the Governors of Texas and Florida to designate the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), a leading U.S. Muslim civil rights nonprofit, as a “terrorist organization.”¹

These developments raise significant constitutional concerns. By combining severe legal consequences with broad and often discretionary standards, state terrorism designation laws may chill lawful speech, association, and other protected First Amendment activity.

The new laws in Florida and Indiana also represent a significant shift. While 32 states and Washington, D.C. have domestic terrorism laws on the books—many already criticized as overbroad—those laws generally criminalize individual conduct.² The new state designation laws go further by authorizing state officials to label entire domestic organizations as terrorist entities and impose sweeping civil and criminal consequences, often with limited procedural safeguards. The laws also mark a departure from the traditional federal framework for terrorism designations, allowing state officials to make designation determinations long reserved to federal authorities.³

Enacted and Proposed Legislation

Proposed and enacted terrorism designation laws vary in their provisions. Some link a designation to allegations of engaging in “terrorism” as defined (often broadly) by state law, while others base the designation on alleged links to a federally-designated entity.⁴ A majority of the proposed bills would penalize designated organizations by depriving them of public contracts, grants, employment, or other state benefits. Some go further, creating new criminal penalties tied to membership, management, support for, or affiliation with a designated group.

Enacted laws

FLORIDA

Enacted in April 2026, Florida House Bill 1471 authorizes Florida’s Chief of Domestic Security, together with the Governor and Cabinet, to designate an organization a “domestic terrorist organization” if the official finds that the group is “engaging in terrorist activity” that is an ongoing security threat.

Preexisting Florida law defines “terrorist activity” broadly to include violent unlawful acts that are intended to “intimidate” a civilian population or “influence the policy of a government by intimidation.” The breadth of this definition may create a risk of officials trying to apply it to conduct occurring in the context of protests and demonstrations, including conduct involving isolated unlawful acts.

The law allows for designation of groups based or operating in Florida “or the United States,” raising questions about what degree of ties to Florida may be required before officials can lawfully attempt to designate organizations operating outside the state. Moreover, because the law does not limit “organizations” to incorporated entities, officials could seemingly seek to designate loosely affiliated groups of individuals or social movements.

The consequences are severe. Under the law, knowingly providing or conspiring to provide “material support” to a designated group is a felony punishable by up to thirty years in prison, regardless of whether the support was intended to further unlawful activity. Florida law defines “material support” broadly as “any property… or service,” including “expert advice or assistance.”

Because the law’s material support provision prohibits “work[ing] under the direction and control” of a designated organization, as well as “manag[ing], supervis[ing], or otherwise direct[ing]” such an organization, the staff and management of a designated organization could face felony charges if they continued to operate.

The law also prohibits state and local agencies from spending public funds “to support a domestic terrorist organization, or a member of such organization.” This could affect public grants, contracts, and even employment for individual “members” of a designated group regardless of their role in any illegal activity.

A designated group has thirty days to challenge the designation in Florida state court. Once legal challenges have been exhausted, the state can move to dissolve the organization.⁵

Under the law, a designated “domestic terrorist organization” also qualifies as a “criminal gang” under Section 874 of Florida Statutes. Among other implications, anyone who “knowingly initiates, organizes, plans, finances, directs, manages, or supervises” any activity “committed with the intent to benefit, promote, or further the interests of” a designated group commits a first-degree felony.

The law imposes specific restrictions on students and educational institutions, including by prohibiting public schools from funding programming that “promotes” a designated organization. The law also requires public colleges to expel students who “promote” designated groups in a way that is deemed to support violence and interfere with the rights of others. Private schools that receive state funds are barred from hiring or contracting with individuals “affiliated with” designated organizations—without defining what might constitute “affiliation.”

INDIANA

Enacted in March 2026, Indiana’s Senate Bill 256 authorizes the designation of domestic groups and individuals as “affiliates” of a federally-designated foreign terrorist organization (FTO).

The law defines “affiliate” broadly to include someone who “acts or acted in any capacity at the order or request” of an FTO. As such, someone engaged in purely expressive activity deemed to be at the “request” of an FTO could seemingly fit the definition of an FTO “affiliate.”

Indiana’s new law also creates a risk of targeted investigations. Under the law, the State Attorney General can issue civil investigative demands and use “all existing civil investigative powers” to surveil and investigate a potential designee. Based on those findings, the Governor may formalize the designation if he or she determines that it is “more likely than not” a group or individual is an FTO “affiliate.”

Designated entities are barred from receiving state funds, state employment, and any “other form of a state benefit,” including state tax exemption. The law bars public schools and universities from knowingly providing any grant, contract, or other financial benefit to a designated entity. Intentional violations of the law are punishable by up to $10,000 per violation.

Proposed legislation

Several additional bills introduced in 2026 remain pending or may serve as models for future legislation:

• Arizona House Bill 2808:  Would authorize the Attorney General to investigate and designate organizations as “terrorist” based on vaguely-defined links to federally-designated groups and other foreign entities. These include if a group’s “ideological alignment demonstrates documented ideological, operational or advocacy alignment” with a federally-designated entity or “foreign extremist movement.” Designated groups would be barred from operating or recruiting in Arizona and denied public grants and contracts. 
• Louisiana Senate Bill 388: Would authorize the Governor to designate U.S.-based “foreign terrorist organizations” based on alleged ties to federally-designated groups or conduct deemed to threaten public safety and security. Under the bill, the Governor may designate a group based on certain findings, including that the group is “substantially affiliated with” a federally-designated entity, or that it has engaged in or “facilitated” activities that threaten public safety, state security, or critical infrastructure. Designated groups would be barred from receiving state contracts.   
• Oklahoma Senate Bill 1784: Would allow the Governor to label a “designated terrorist organization” based on evidence that the organization “commits, plans, assists” or “provides material support” for “terrorism.” Oklahoma law defines “terrorism” to include any act or threat of violence resulting in property damage or injury, if it “appears to be intended” to influence government policy by intimidation or coercion. Designated groups would be barred from receiving state contracts and grants, as well as owning real estate in Oklahoma. 
• Oklahoma Senate Bill 1536: Would authorize the state Attorney General to investigate and designate domestic groups as “designated terrorist support entities,” based on a finding linking them to a federally-designated FTO. Bases for designation would include findings that a group was “misrepresenting the nature of its relationship with or support for” an FTO’s unlawful activities. Designated groups would be subject to civil injunction and penalties, and barred from state funds, including through public schools and universities. 

Constitutional Concerns

State laws authorizing officials to designate U.S. organizations as “terrorist” raise significant constitutional issues, including:

Overbreadth: The Supreme Court has invalidated laws as overbroad where they prohibit a substantial amount of protected First Amendment activity.⁶ State terrorism designation laws can raise similar concerns where broadly drafted “material support,” “promotion,” or “affiliation” provisions reach protected speech, advocacy, or associational conduct.

These concerns are heightened where legal consequences attach to an individual’s relationship with a designated organization, rather than to their own unlawful conduct. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the First Amendment limits the government’s ability to impose criminal or civil liability on someone based solely on their association with others.⁷ In particular, the Court has held that individuals must know about and specifically intend to further a group’s unlawful goals or activities in order to face liability. Constitutional concerns arise where a law extends beyond such conduct and imposes penalties based on group membership or loosely defined forms of “affiliation.”

The Court’s treatment of the federal “material support” statute underscores these concerns. While the Court upheld that statute as applied to support for federally-designated foreign terrorist organizations (FTOs), it grounded its analysis in the context of foreign terrorism and the government’s foreign affairs and national security interests. The Court expressly did “not suggest that Congress could extend the same prohibition on material support at issue here to domestic organizations.”

Vagueness: Laws imposing criminal or civil consequences must give ordinary people a reasonable opportunity to understand what conduct is prohibited, so that they can act accordingly.⁸ Vague laws can enable arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement and risk chilling lawful conduct.

Yet some state designation laws give state officials broad discretion to investigate and designate organizations based on vague criteria, such as if an organization is “affiliated” with a foreign terrorist organization. Under such laws, individuals and organizations may be unable to determine what relationships or conduct can trigger liability, increasing the chance that they will refrain from protected activity.

Due Process: Government action that deprives an entity or individual of significant property interests generally must be accompanied by adequate notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard, including the chance to respond to evidence on which the government relies.⁹

State designation laws may raise due process concerns where they allow officials to designate organizations based on undisclosed evidence, or where groups lack a meaningful opportunity to challenge the designation. For example, Florida’s law does not require officials to share the evidentiary basis for a designation; further, a companion law creates an exemption to the state’s public records statute, limiting designated organizations’ access to evidence underlying a designation determination and undermining their ability to effectively challenge allegations against them.

Preemption: Federal law may preempt state laws and actions in areas where federal regulation has “occupied the field.”¹⁰ State laws may also be preempted if they pose an obstacle to federal objectives, including by interfering with the executive branch’s sole decision-making authority in certain areas.¹¹ Because federal law provides for a uniform national scheme for terrorism designations, controlled by federal officials, state terrorism designation laws that provide for designation of domestic groups may also be vulnerable to federal preemption challenges.

For more information contact Elly Page (epage@icnl.org).

Notes

1. Although the governors’ actions did not at the time create new criminal penalties for CAIR’s members, they triggered serious legal consequences for the organization under state law. CAIR challenged both the Texas and Florida orders, in both cases alleging violations of the First Amendment. In Florida, a federal court preliminarily enjoined the Governor’s order, citing ways in which the terrorism designation had chilled third parties’ willingness to associate with CAIR. For example, the court pointed to the withdrawal of a production company from an agreement with CAIR to record a podcast, and the disassociation of a federation of Muslim groups from CAIR’s Florida chapter ahead of a planned conference—in both cases, citing the designation. As of this writing, the court in the Texas case has not ruled on CAIR’s motion for a preliminary injunction.  ↩
2. At least two states—Indiana and New Jersey—criminalize conduct by individuals involving “terrorist organizations,” and define “terrorist organization” broadly to cover more than just federally-designated entities. But these statutes target individual conduct and require the state to prove all elements beyond a reasonable doubt. Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Chapter 125, meanwhile, provides for potential injunction of “foreign terrorist organizations,” which it defines broadly. However these provisions target organizations that operate at least in part outside the U.S. Further, injunction requires a plaintiff to prove in court that an entity satisfies the definition of “foreign terrorist organization” and that the entity “continuously or regularly” engages in certain specified crimes. ↩
3. Federal law provides, for example, for the designation of “Specially Designated Global Terrorists” and “Foreign Terrorist Organizations” (FTOs), and makes it a crime to provide “material support” to FTOs. See ICNL, Federal Terrorism Law and U.S. Civil Society: An Explainer. ↩
4. The law in a number of states already criminalizes providing support to federally-designated terrorist organizations, such as FTOs. New terrorism designation bills would go further by creating a state-level administrative process to label and penalize domestic groups based on an executive branch determination that they were associated with federally-designated entities in often vaguely-defined ways. For instance, Arizona HB 2808 would authorize the Attorney General to investigate and designate organizations as “terrorist” if a group’s “ideological alignment demonstrates documented ideological, operational or advocacy alignment” with a federally-designated entity. ↩
5. Florida’s Department of State cannot dissolve nonprofit corporations that are incorporated in a state other than Florida. The law cites provisions of Florida Statutes related to the administrative dissolution of Florida nonprofit corporations. See Florida Statutes s. 617.1420.↩
6. For example, in United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010), the Court applied the overbreadth doctrine to strike down a federal statute barring creation, sale, or possession of a “depiction of animal cruelty,” because it reached substantial protected applications, such as depictions of lawful hunting.   ↩
7. In United States v. Robel, 89 U.S. 258 (1967), for instance, the Court invalidated part of a federal law that barred members of federally-registered Communist organizations from employment at certain federal facilities. Because the prohibition “sweeps indiscriminately across all types of association” with a registered group, the Court found it was impermissibly overbroad. Similarly, in NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982) the Court rejected the imposition of civil liability on nonviolent participants in a boycott movement, where some individuals in the same movement engaged in unlawful acts. In Claiborne, the Court noted that “guilt by association is a philosophy alien to the traditions of a free society… and the First Amendment itself.” ↩
8. In Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), the Court explained that “[v]ague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them… Third, but related, where a vague statute ‘abut[s] upon sensitive areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,’ it ‘operates to inhibit the exercise of [those] freedoms.’” For instance, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971), the Court struck down an ordinance banning any assembly of three or more people who “annoy” passersby as unconstitutionally vague because it had no ascertainable standards. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), the Court held as unconstitutionally vague a “breach of the peace” statute the terms of which would allow individuals to be “punished merely for peacefully expressing unpopular views.”  ↩
9. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, government actors must take certain steps before they may deprive an individual of a protected property interest, which includes tax exemptions and other government-provided benefits. In Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), the Court found that before a state may terminate a welfare recipient’s benefits, the state must provide timely and adequate notice and a full hearing. Under Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), the Court applies a balancing test to determine what process is due, taking into account the government’s chosen process, the risk of erroneous deprivation of a private interest, and the government’s interest. ↩
10. The Supreme Court has found state laws to be preempted by federal law where there is a scheme of federal regulation “so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for States to supplement it,” or where federal law concerns “a field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on the same subject.” Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947). For example, in Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387 (2012), the Court struck provisions of an Arizona law that criminalized failure to comply with a federal law requirement that noncitizens carry proof of their status. The Court found the field of alien registration to be “a field in which Congress has left no room for States to regulate.” ↩
11. In Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000), the Court held that federal law preempted a Massachusetts law restricting state agencies’ ability to buy goods or services from companies doing business with Burma. The Court pointed to a federal statute imposing sanctions on Burma, and reasoned that the Massachusetts law interfered with Congress’s choice to give the President full discretion to augment or waive the sanctions. The Court also found that the law interfered with Congress’s intent to impose a “specific range” of economic pressure on the Burmese government, “by penalizing individuals and conduct that Congress has explicitly exempted or excluded from sanctions.” ↩

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