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Civil Society in Egypt: A Catalyst for Democratizati on?
Nadine H. Abdalla 1
Over the past decade, it has been noted that the West (mainly Europe and the United States) tends to
view civil society as a catalyst or engine f or democratization, especially in the Arab world. The role
played by civil society in some countries of Eastern Europe and Latin America leads to a hope that
other countries can make a successful transition to democracy even if they are still confronting s ome
problems of democracy consolidation. Undoubtedly, this trend also reflects the West’s will to find a
reliable partner, capable of achieving a transition to democracy in a region that is characterized, on
the one hand, by authoritarian Arab governments reluctant to implement significant reforms, and, on
the other hand, by a secular opposition unable to counterbalance the power.
Thus, strengthening civil society seems increasingly to be the watchword at meetings, seminars, and
conferences in the official and academic spheres. Recently, at the European level, the development of
civil society has appeared to be the only way to achieve democratization in the Arab world
Within this framework, Arab NGOs have been heavily funded, especially those of Egypt. Here, the
question arises: To what extent can Western aid granted to civil society in general and NGOs in
particular help to achieve a democratic transition and be considered an engine of democratization in a
country like Egypt? To answer that question, I outlin e some challenges to the idea of funding a civil
society -engine of democratization, and argue that the West’s "strategy of indirect promotion of
democracy” 2 cannot succeed in Egypt, at least in the short term.
1. Proliferation of NGOs or consolidation of authoritarianism?
The Egyptian regime cannot be called authoritarian, but rather “semi -authoritarian,” according to
Marina Ottaway 3; or “liberalized autocracy,” in Daniel Brumberg’s phrase. 4 That is to say, thi s regime
is able to consolidate its authoritarianism while putting in place measures that can be considered more
or less liberal. For such a system, the proliferation of NGOs is less likely to be a means of empowering
groups seeking to change the regime’s strategy than a part of the controlled -liberalization strategy
itself. The presence of these NGOs and their various activities, even those seen as anti -government,
can be viewed as outgrowths of a policy of controlled liberalization.
Thus, the government h as much more to do with promoting civil society than civil society has to do
with democratization. 5 This situation creates a plight for donors, who find themselves fund ing
organizations that bolster the regime’s survival strategy, rather than organizations with a realistic
chance of affecting this strategy. 6
2. A “romantic” Western vi sion for civil society?
We should be wary of romanticizing civil society. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) can play a
positive and effective role in the democratic transition process only if they have two prerequisites:
First, they must have a degree o f autonomy vis -à-vis the regime. 7 But in a country like Egypt, the
regime in place does not hesitate to co -opt NGO leaders and activists by giving them better positions
elsewhere in governmental or semi -governmental organizations while letting them retain their
positions as head of the NGOs. 8 An important example is the appointment of Hafez Abu Seada,
director of one of the largest and oldest NGOs in Egypt, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights
(EOHR), to the board of directors of the National Council for Human Rights, a governmental or semi –
governmental institution. Beyond leader s of NGOs, the regime is working to co -opt the game itself by
creating organizations that are supposedly work in the fields of advocacy and human rights. The result
of that a large proportion of external funding aids institutions that pose no threat to the government’s
plans. Examples include the Federation of Non -Governmental Organizations, the National Council of
Human Rights, and the National Council of Women. 9

For NG Os to make a difference, they also must possess the capacity to build alliances with other
sectors of civil society as well as a clear agenda for advocacy and, where appropriate,
militancy. 10 Through alliances, they can pressure the government for socioeconomic or human rights
reforms. 11 However, structural deficits afflicting Egyptian NGOs interfere with their ability to ally with
other NGOs, and hence their ability to play effective leadership and mobilizing roles. 12
These structural deficits are of two types. The first is the absence of internal democracy and
transparency. These NGOs, especially those of political nature, are most often centered around a
charismatic personality, and feature a staff w ith scant experience. 13 The situation probably promotes
authoritarian leadership of these NGOs. 14 In addition, the imbalance between the voluntary and
professional side and staff within these NGOs affects their ability and their effectiveness. Donors,
consequently, must give qualitative rather than quantitative aid if they want to e nhance the
effectiveness of these NGOs, a problem afflicting mainly the assistance offered by the European
Commission in Egypt.
3. Receiving funds versus acquiring a social base?
Certainly, without external funding, NGOs of an advocacy type or political in nature may never
emerge. The Egyptian government prohibits NGOs from receiving funds without its permission, which
is rarely granted.
Even if permission is given, the culture of the country can be a real obstacle. The public has relatively
little interest in politically active organizations, by contrast to its considerable interest in organizations
of a religious nature that provide economic and social services; these social service NGOs are much
likelier to receive local funds for their activities. 15 This creates contradictory interests between
external donors interested in democratization, on the one hand, and the community, relatively
uninterested in political activi sm, on the other. Political groups in general have little or no social base.
An additional problem is that the democratization -oriented NGOs compete for external donors.
Scarcely any cooperation between them exists, which weakens their ability to lead and mobilize
effectively. 16
4. Nongovernmental partner in the government?
The government welcomes partnerships with NGOs working in development and providing services,
esp ecially given the rising Egyptian population. 17 These organizations, unlike those in Latin America,
for example, do not possess a dual agenda combining development and democratic change, so they
do not mobilize the population to demand democratic reforms. 18 USAID in 2001 implemented an
action plan for Egypt, under which it would str ess aid to NGOs that combine their activities with
advocacy or democratic change, but this approach is still limited and relatively ineffective. 19 One
must ask, then, whether these organizations are generally reinforcing the government’s
authoritarianism rather than challenging it.
5. The Islamist dilemma
A further problem is that Islamist NGOs in Egypt tend to be more effective than secular ones, yet the
Islamist ones tend to be excluded from external funding. (The Islamist organizations do not
necessarily want external funds. 20 ) The result is two categories of organizations: secula r ones with
limited effectiveness, a weak social base, and access to outside aid; and Islamist ones with greater
efficiency, a stronger social base, and no outside aid. These two categories confront each other rather
than cooperating, and thus are unable t o act as a combined catalyst for pressuring the government for
greater democracy. Donors generally do not promote such cooperation.
6. Civil society, a catalyst for democracy?

One way of framing the issue is whether we wish to foster the demand for democracy, by increasing
the capacity of civil society organizations to pressure the government and rally the citizenry; or
whether we wish to foster the supply of democracy, by enhancing the ability of state institutions to
behave consistently with dem ocratic values. In a famous article, Berman showed that civil society in
Germany in the 1930s failed to achieve greater democracy. Highly mobilized, facing state institutions
that were weak and unable to meet their demands, the organizations sided with the Nazi
party. 21 Admittedly, this situation differs from that currently in Egypt, but the point is that civil
society is not invariably a catalyst for democracy; the pol itical and cultural contexts play a crucial role.
The West knows that the dynamics of democratization, in terms of political openings or more radically
in terms of regime change, could at least in the short term lead to instability. The Muslim brotherhood,
for example, is the only viable opposition in Egypt; it could assume power. The 2005 legislative
elections confirmed this danger. For this reason, the West is seeking to promote democracy indirectly
through civil society, an approach with limited promise.
Notes
1 Nadine H. ABDALLA is a Researcher Assistant in the AL Ahram Center for Political and Strategic
Studies in Cairo and a Ph.D. candidate at the Institut d’Etud es Politique de Grenoble in France.
2 For further information about the Indirect Strategy for Democracy Promotion in the Arab World, see
CAROTHERS Thomas, Is Gradual ism Possible? Choosing a Strategy for Promoting Democracy in the
Middle East, in CAROTHERS Thomas (Editor), Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion ,
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2005, pp 243 -245.
3 OTTAWAY Marina, Democracy Challenged : The challenge of semi -authoritarianism, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, Washington DC, 2003, p3.
4 For more on “liberalized a utocracy, see : BRUMBERG Daniel, The Trap of Liberalized
Autocracy, Journal of Democracy , Vol 13, n4, October 2002, pp57 -67.
5 DENEGEUX Guilain, Promouvoir la démocratie et la gouvernance dans les pays arabes : Les options
stratégiques des bailleurs de fond (Democracy and Governance Promotion in the Arab World :
Strategic Options for Donors ), dans BEN NAFISSA Sara, ONG et Gouvernance dans le Monde Arabe
(NGOs and Governance in the Arab World) , Karthala and CEDEJ, Paris – Cairo, 2004, p87.
6 YOM Seon L, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World, Middle East Review of
International Affairs, Vol 9, n4, December 2005.
7 HAWTHORNE Amy, Middle East Democracy: Is Civil Society The Answer?, Carnegie Papers 44
(March 2004), p11.
8 On cooptation, see Policy Failure et Political Survival : The Contribution of Politi cal Institutions, The
Journal of Conflict Resolution , Vol 43, n2, April 1999.
9 YOM Seon L, Civil Society and Democratization in the Arab World, op.cit.
10 HAWTHORNE Amy, Middle East Democracy, op.cit, p11.
11 YOM Seon L, Civ il Society and Democratization, op.cit.
12 Interview with Ms Nihad Rageh, director of the USAID project for strengthing NGOs’ capacities at
the NGO Support Center, Cairo, 17 October 2007.

13 AL AGATI Mohamed, Challenges that Face Civil Society in Egypt, paper presented at the 2 nd
Subregional Conference of the EuroMeSCo at Ale xandria, April 2007.
14 Field observation.
15 Interview with Mr. Ayman Abd AL Wehab, Head of the Civil Society Unit at AL Ahram Center for
Political and Strategics Studies (ACPSS), Cairo.
16 Ibid.
17 DALACOURA Katerina, US democracy promotion in the Arab Middle East since 11 September 2001:
A critique, International Affairs, May 2005, pp976 -977.
18 HAWTHORNE Amy, Middle East Democracy, op.cit , p12.
19 Interview with Nihad Rageh, op. cit.
20 AL Sayed Kamal Mustapha, Helping Out is Hard to Do, Foreign Policy , n117, Winter 1999 – 2000,
p25. See also AL Sayed Kamal Mustapha, in NORTON Augustus Richard, Civil Society in the Middle
East , EJ Brill Leiden, New York Koln, 1995, pp282 -290.
21 DENEGEUX Guilain, op. cit , p87. See also CAROTHERS Thomas and BRANDT William, Think Again:
Civil Society, Foreign Policy, n117, Winter 1999 -2000, p 21.