Pushback Against NGOs in Egypt

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Pushback Against NGOs in Egypt
James G. McGann 1
This article discusses the current political conditions within Egypt, and how its position in the world
community impedes the development and operation of domestic NGOs. Understanding the resistance
that NGOs and democracy activists face helps illuminate t he dilemmas involved in democracy
promotion under present conditions. Awareness about the inconsistencies in NGO policy within Egypt
will hopefully induce sympathy and pressure from the international community for Egypt to revise its
behavior towards NGOs.
Introduction
In recent years, various political and social indicators have surfaced that highlight a mounting
backlash in developing and transitional nations against the rise of civil society as well as the think
tanks and other non -governmental organizat ions (NGOs) that are active within it. As part of a global
trend against democratic avenues of participation, increasing state suppression of NGOs has appeared
in nations ranging from Belarus to Tunisia. The rising prominence of domestic NGOs and their gro wing
success at engaging the public has increasingly been met with threats from governments that seek to
constrain their operations and, in extreme cases, to orchestrate their collapse. Historically, public
policy think tanks in developing and transitionin g countries have been key civil society actors: they
often bring attention to critical policy issues and help create legislation and regulations that provide all
NGOs the space to operate freely. Since think tanks are often in the vanguard of civil society
movements, they are frequently the primary targets of legal and extralegal restraints designed to limit
their number, role, and influence. It is for this reason that we are giving them special consideration.
The Egypt case study was one of five countries selected for a comparative study designed to
document and analyze this alarming transnational trend. Among the study’s key findings is a detailed
picture of the rising and systematic use of both legal and extralegal means in restraining domestic
NGOs. Comm on legal measures of governmental pushback include the following:
 Registration Limitations
 Funding Restrictions
 Government Oversight/Monitoring
 Explicit Legal Restrictions on NGO Activities
Governments have also increased the range and penetration of extralegal measures targeted at the
same domestic NGOs:
 State Control of Media Outlets
 Suppression of Key Leaders
 Threats of Armed Force
 Underdeveloped Legal/Operating Environment
Each of the five nations highlighted in the la rger study have applied most if not all of these legal and
extralegal approaches to their particular domestic situations. The similarity of these tactics and those

evidenced in Egypt should be cause for increased international awareness and action by NGOs,
donors, and intergovernmental organizations.
Regime Type and State of Civil Society
The Egyptian government emerges in liberal discourse as a perennial violator of human rights and a
staunch opponent of authentic liberal democracy in the Middle East. Howe ver, Egypt consistently
receives praise from the American government as well as some European governments for being a
“moderate” Arab state —a description referring to both its position vis -à-vis Israel and its stance
against the operation of many Islamist movements in the region. 2 This dichotomous characterization
is the simplest way to point out the inherent contradiction facing democracy activists in Egypt, who
often f ace a battle within their state as well as on the international field in order to gain positions as
brokers of social and political power.
After Egypt gained independence from Britain in 1922 and the Western -backed King Farouk I was
ousted in 1952, Gamal A bdel Nasser led the state in consolidating political, economic, and social
power under a central government. Nicola Pratt states that in the postcolonial period, “[Egypt] has
exercised hegemony through a combination of a nationalist -patriarchal discourse, the institutional
framework of corporatism, and the economic structures of the public sector.” By hegemony, she
means “the ‘ensemble’ of discursive, economic, and institutional structures through which rulers
exercise their power.” 3 As a result, public paths to political and socioeconomic power have been
traditionally limited in the name of protecting the interests of the state as a corporate entity. However,
recent deve lopments have altered the state’s preeminent role as domestic power broker in these
areas.
Since 1981, after the assassination of Anwar Sadat, President Hosni Mubarak has overseen a gradual
opening up of the economy and turned towards privatization as a me thod of generating wealth and
modernizing Egyptian business and institutions. However, he has maintained the status quo in politics,
taking little or no initiative to reform the political system. 4 Since his inauguration as president,
“emergency laws” have been in place to suppress political dissent and allow the government to break
up any public gatherings or demonstrations deemed oppositional to the regime’s interest. 5 During this
period of slow reform, NGOs and think tanks have emerged to influence the debate about political and
social power —namely, to advocate a reorientation of sociopolitical power away from the state and
towards private citizens.
Yet Mubarak has consistently blocked significant opportunities for civil society by employing legal and
extralegal means to ensure that liberalization proceeds only at a rate that is desirable to the Egyptian
establishment. This establishment, which is cen tered on the National Democratic Party (NDP), has
vested interests in the economy developed over years of nepotism and patronage -entrenching deals
between the political and business communities. 6 However, the so -called “New Guard of the NDP,” led
by the president’s son Gamal Mubarak, a likely inheritor of the presidency, appears to be more
engaged with economic modernization; he has equipped Egypt for “global economic co mpetitiveness”
by, for example, removing state subsidies. the removal of the old -guard elements from his father’s
generation seems to be moving as slowly as economic reform. 7 The current conflict between political
reformers and the state is an example of how the state continues to embrace its role as patron,
strong -arming opponents into supporting a particularly slow type of reform that “entrenches a system
in which NGOs are treated as the children of a paternalistic government.” 8 It is currently unclear as to
whether a new Mubarak presidency would be more receptive to NGO involvement in domestic politics.
The history of the Egyptian state’s repressive control of NGOs shows parallels to obstacles that NGOs
have faced in the other countries. However, one distinguishing characteristic of the regime is its
position as a confidant of the cu rrent U.S. administration —and all other U.S. administrations since the
1970s. Mubarak inherited the Egypt of Sadat, boasting the second largest amount of annual military
aid from the United States (behind Israel). For helping the U.S. with the Israel -Pales tine conflict and
accepting its regional presence in the Gulf, Egypt has received much economic assistance while
tempering American criticism of its human rights abuses and restrictions on civil society. This situation
does not mean that American administr ations resist calling for democratic change in Egypt, only that

the United States has vested interests in maintaining a strong alliance with the Mubarak
regime. 9 Democr acy activists cite this close relationship as one of the major impediments to building
a more equitable and free Egyptian society. For allowing Egypt a free hand in restraining groups like
the Muslim Brotherhood and other civil society actors calling for g reater reform, American policy
“cements the perception among Egyptians that Washington blesses autocratic regimes.” 10
NGO Climate
In its annual report, Freedom House I nternational gave Egypt a “downward trend arrow” for 2007,
with a political rights score of 6, a civil liberties score of 5, and an overall rating of “not free.” 11 The
current NGO climate reflects this trend, and although Egyptian society shows many cultural indicators
of philanthropy and is demonstrably committed to the founding of NGOs, official registration, long –
term development, and the growth of NGOs is significan tly limited under current political conditions.
The Egyptian NGO scene began to take off in the years after the October (1973) War between Egypt
and Israel. By the mid -1990s, Egypt boasted the largest NGO community in the southern global
community, includi ng the rest of the Arab world. 12 However, at the same point in time,
approximately a quarter of the NGOs then registered with the Ministry of Social Affairs were in fa ct
inactive. 13
LaTowsky groups most of Egypt’s NGOs under five categories: (1) community development
organizations, (2) religious welfare associations, (3) private -mem ber associations, (4) non -religious
welfare organizations, and (5) scientific/public cultural organizations. 14 Religious support bases from
both the Muslim and Coptic Christian communities can extend into the community development
organizations, with many as well extending into the private -member associations. In fact, the Muslim
Brotherhood in the 1980s became very powerful in lawyers’ and writers’ syndicates, effectiv ely turning
these groups into “religious -friendly” institutions. 15
Despite the large number of NGOs in the country, a fifth of Egypt’s population lives in poverty;
the refore, its citizens cannot be expected to donate as much money to charitable organizations as do
the citizens of Western Europe or the United States. 16 However, Egypt is a mostly Muslim country, so
the religious obligation of zakat contributes significantly to the strength and operation of many
charitable organizations with religious association. 17 International religious charities associated with
both the Coptic Christian and Muslim communities are also active in promoting social welfare in terms
of education, orphanages, hospitals, and agricultural development. Other organizations require
assistance in the form of grants, with much assistance traditionally coming from abroad in the form of
foreign grants or international aid. Yet the debate surrounding the funding of NGOs from abroad has
piqued interest in government a nd non -government groups in recent years.
The so -called “foreign funding debate” revolves around the fact that it is illegal under certain
circumstances for NGOs in Egypt to accept funds from foreign organizations or governments (this is
elaborated upon in the section on legal restrictions, below). Essentially, officials in the government
view the foreign funding of domestic NGOs as a potential method for achieving political reorientation
of social groups away from state control. The debate can be seen as r eplicating an oppositional binary
inherited from the colonial period in which “domestic mechanisms of authoritarianism” mediate a
power struggle between the ruling establishment and those out of power. 18 Critics accuse NGOs of
representing a “homogeneous bloc of Western interests seeking to dominate Egypt.” This perspective
in turn “creates a ‘siege mentality’” among actors who believe they are acting in the government and
state’s national interests, who are then able to justify abusing the rights of those who oppose them in
the name of national security, state unity, preservation, etc. Nicola Pratt makes three assertions to
undermine the common argument put forth by the anti -NGO side in the debate: (1) “the West is not a
homogenous bloc of interests,” (2) “Egypt is not a homogenous bloc of interests,” and (3) “the
process of globalization provides new challenges, such as multi -national corporations, environmental
degrada tion, and human trafficking, that do not subscribe to the paradigm of Western domination over
Third World or periphery countries.” 19 She found through interviewing man y NGO activists that the
strength of the anti -foreign funding argument lies not in any flaw in the pro -foreign funding side, but
in the “anti” side’s monopoly of nationalism. By placing the world against Egypt in an “us vs. them”

dichotomy, those critical of the work of NGOs can undermine any nationalist or patriotic reason put
forth by NGO activists for justifying the work that they do for Egyptian society. 20
Even the NGOs lucky enough to obtain registration from the Ministry of Cultural Affairs must maintain
a close relationship with the Ministry and appease bureaucrats who are capable of obstructing their
operation. In such an environment, though, the Egyptian governm ent can permit the free operation of
NGOs that closely serve the interests of the regime, and thus appear to be NGO -friendly. One obvious
example of such an NGO is that run by Gamal Mubarak, the son of the President. He is the chairman
of the Future Genera tion Foundation (FGF), an NPO “with the aim of bolstering Egypt’s bold strategy
for achieving sustainable economic growth through global competition by helping to create a tech –
oriented and skilled workforce that could confront the needs of the new century .”21 The organization’s
website shows that board members of FGF include the Minister of Trade and Industry, the minister of
Housing, Utilities, and Urban Development, and several prominent bankers and industrialists. 22 That
three members of the board of this NGO have direct connections to the government leaves little doubt
that the FGF qualifies as an “ersatz NGO.”
NGOs that are not supported in the mainstream opinion of the government and NGOs that appear to
have a “patron -client” relationship with international donors are likely to be closed down by the
government. 23 The next section describes in detail the legal methods with which the Egyptian
government can limit the activities of NGOs and justify their closure. Following that is a description of
the security services that the government employs to police the NGO community.
Recent Developments
Civil society in Egypt has passed through three distinct phases during which the government has
developed various legal methods to control and affect the breadth and depth of its reach into civil
society its control over the activity of NGOs. Each of these three phases has had its own set of codes
and regulations.
The first phase of civil society development, which took place up until World War II, had mos tly
private, philanthropic organizations as the mainstay of civil society. As these organizations were under
the auspices of royal family members, the government did not get involved with regulations.
During the second phase of civil society development, w hich began under the rule of President Nasser,
the government and its role in society as a whole shifted. The state became authoritarian, and as
such, began to pursue policies aimed at societal control. The Civic Association Code, Law 32/1964,
gave the gov ernment great powers over civil society, including the power to reject the formation of
organizations and to consolidate or dissolve groups at its discretion. Of great importance to current
Egyptian society is the Emergency Law, which was implemented in 19 67 during the Arab -Israeli War.
The law dramatically expanded police powers, suspended constitutional rights, and legalized
censorship. The law is pertinent to NGO pushback as it gives the government the legal right to act in
any manner which it believes i s needed for its national security. 24
The third and current phase of Egyptian civil society development began in the 1980s with the
emergence of a new role for civil s ociety: that of “participant in the processes of development and
democratic evolution.” 25 In this period, the government has increasingly focused on economic
development, which has allowed for the implementation of more liberal, market -oriented economic
reform. However, that spirit of liberalism and reform has yet to cross over to the political realm. The
legal restraints against Egyptian civil society that the government developed during this period will be
further detailed in the next section.
Legal Methods of Restraint
Egyptian civil society has evolved alongside government restrictions which have become stricter over
time. In 1999, the Egyptian government began to entertain the idea of a law that pertained
specifically to NGOs. The draft of the law that was to regulate NGOs, Law No.153, was crafted by the

government without the direct consult ation of civil society and was sent to Parliament for approval. It
was approved, but it was criticized as unconstitutional and was repealed by the Supreme
Constitutional Court in 2000 for procedural reasons. Though repealed, this law laid the groundwork fo r
the law which was to come, Law 84/2002. 26
Law 84/2002 was quickly and quietly passed, again with no consultation from the NGOs it would come
to affect. The law was v ery similar in content to Law 153 and would be used “as a tool for the
government elite to control CSOs.” 27 The law is very broad in scope and allows the government to
control almost every level of NGO operation. Law 84 allows the government to undermine efforts of
the political opposition by regulating out of existence NGOs that question state authority, through
regulations during the registration stage, the ability to deny the legal foundations of an NGO, and the
power to refuse access to procured funding. The law also allows the government to regulate not just
the formal existence of NGOs but also their goals and intentions. Article 11 of Law 84 is particularly
used t o prevent the registration of NGOs based on what their goals are perceived to be. The
government can control the composition of an NGO’s board as well as demand minutes from all its
meetings. If an NGO does not operate satisfactorily, Law 84 provides the g overnment many options: it
can impose steep fines, jail the NGO’s members, or even dissolve the organization for breaking rules,
whether clearly defined or not, established by Law 84. 28
From the beginning, NGOs face large obstacles. For an NGO to be legal, it must be registered with the
state. While some NGOs try to avoid registration, many find it nearly impossible to operate
successfully without the government -issued NGO identification number. The many who do decide to
register have to go through the Ministry of Social Affairs, which Article 2 of Law 84 established as the
government authority to approve or disapprove NGO registrations. The Office of State Security also
plays a large role in overseeing registration, but its role is extralegal and not provided for explicitly in
the law. Registration is mandatory under Law 84 for any group that has more than ten members and
exists “for a purpose other than gaining physical profit.” 29 The Ministry is able to reject applications
under Article 11 of the Law, which outlines, albeit vaguely, prohibited NGO activities. Rejections can
also be based in disapproval of an organization’s founding members or for “any provisions in an
association’s article of incorporation that it determines violate the law.” 30 When Human Rights Watch
obtained data on registrations that occurred after Law 84 was implemented, it found that of the thirty
NGOs it traced, seven had successfully registered, five were fighting Ministry rejection through
litigation, and the remaining gro ups had decided to pursue alternative legal options. 31
One major obstacle in registration for many NGOs is compliance with Article 11. This Article allows the
Ministry to reject applications on the ground that the NGO in question is “threatening national unity or
violating public order or morals.” 32 Human Rights Watch describes Arti cle 11 as “a tool with which to
block the registration of groups whose behavior or goals do not fit within the narrow margins the state
favors.” 33 At least five human rights NGOs had been denied registration as of June 2005 due to
“security concerns” or other Article 11 considerations: the Egyptian Center for Housing Rights, the
Egyptian Initiative for Personal Rights, the Egyptian Association Against Torture, the Civil Observatory
for Human Rights, and the World Center for Human Rights. And the label “threatening,” which is at the
center of Article 11, seems to be one that faces no real standards of scrutiny. Additionally, when NGOs
try to fight rejections based on Arti cle 11 grounds, they often receive little additional explanation for
their rejections, or face long court battles that can drain their funding. When the Egyptian Association
Against Torture attempted to challenge its rejections, the Ministry, five weeks af ter a request, vaguely
informed the group that “its objectives breached Law 84 in practice and in spirit and violated the
public order.” 34
If an NGO successfully navig ates the challenge of registration with the Ministry, it faces additional
hurdles in operation. Law 84 allows the government great freedom of interference in almost all NGO
activities, with the threat of dissolution always looming in the background. Accord ing to Article 25, the
Ministry has the right to send “representatives to an organization’s meetings and even call a meeting
of the general assembly.” 35 The Ministry a lso requires that the NGO send the Ministry a copy of the
minutes from each meeting within thirty days of it taking place. Regulation of activity is also attained
through rules regarding the composition and number of board members. The Board of Directors m ust
comprise an odd number, anywhere between five and fifteen, and a list of those nominated as board
members must be submitted for approval to the Ministry sixty days before the election. Board

nominees can be removed by the Ministry for “non -fulfillment of nomination requirements” according
to Article 34. 36 Human Rights Watch found cases in which individuals were blocked from participating
in board elections for two NG Os, one focused on human rights and the other on development. 37
Another realm in which the Ministry exercises great control is the funding of NGOs. Many NGOs have
come to rely on foreign funding to keep their organizations running, since domestic sources of funding
are often few and far between. However, according to A rticle 17, “associations may not accept foreign
funding without explicit authorization from the Ministry of Social Affairs.” 38 There are strict protocols
regarding the transfer of foreign funds, one of which stipulates that all foreign funds must be
deposited into designated bank accounts during the review period, none of which the NGO can access.
The law also states that the Ministry must give its final decision within sixty days. However, since the
NGO cannot access any of the funds during this period, the waiting period can often drive the NGO to
insolvency. This complication frustrates many NGOs, as one NGO leader said to Human Rights Watch:
“The sixty days are an is sue —of course the government will take longer, and we won’t be able to
touch it. Our operational funding is vital. It is essential we get it in time, and it’s the hardest to find.
The electricity [bill] must be paid.” 39 Many organizations that had experienced trouble with
registration find that gaining permission to use their foreign -donated funds can be equally trying.
The relationship between the government and NGOs i s often marked by distrust, as the government
perceives many NGOs to be “wealthy groups corrupted by foreign political interests.” 40 The dynamics
and difficulties in t he registration process are thus often affected by the social, economic, and political
differences between NGO activists and government officials. Additionally, corruption in the
government, confusion among officials, and lack of knowledge of the complicat ed NGO laws contribute
to the difficulties many NGOs face. Belligerence from government officials makes legitimate NGO work
in Egypt even more difficult. One NGO leader remarked that whenever he went to the Ministry he
“took a copy of the law in one hand a nd the executive regulations in another. [I] would read aloud
different provisions to them and they would say ‘but we have orders to do it this way.’” 41 Many of
these barriers to NGOs within the Ministry bureaucracy “appear to be the bureaucratic expression of
political resistance” to voices of opposition in Egypt. 42
Groups that bre ak any of the rules laid out in Article 84 may face fines, penalties, jail time, or even
dissolution. If an NGO tries to avoid registration, activities deemed “clandestine” can be punished with
up to a year in prison and hefty fines. However, the law is so vaguely defined that many NGOs are
subject to penalty without being clearly forewarned of their illegal activity. We have to remember that
any activity that threatens national unity or violates public order or morals can be punished;
furthermore, any acti vity seen as political is illegal. This ban can cause issues when an NGO is accused
of sponsoring a “campaign,” a word without non -political connotations in Egypt. When organizations
are punished, they are done so collectively, which discourages many Egypt ians from participating in
these groups. Likewise, dissolution of an NGO can take place as a result of the actions of a single
member. 43
While many groups have faced s anctions as a result of Law 84’s penalties, the Ibn Khaldun Center for
Development Studies in Egypt is a particularly poignant case. Its director, Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim,
was arrested at gunpoint in 2000 with two of his employees and was then held for fort y-five days
while receiving no formal charges. The police along with about fifteen to twenty armored cars took Dr.
Ibrahim to the center where he saw his building ransacked. After three years in and out of courts and
jails, Dr. Ibrahim was acquitted after the high court of Cassation, the only independent court of Egypt,
overturned all of the charges. Upon returning to the Center’s office, he likened its appearance to the
“National Museum of Baghdad” after the looting that took place during the American inva sion in
2003. 44 The formerly thriving NGO had been deprived of all of its computers, and the office was now
unusable. Despite the government harassment, Dr. Ibrahim an d his group decided to push forward
and to continue on with their work. Dr. Ibrahim recently described his ordeal in the Washington
Post and spoke out against the repression of Egyptian NGOs: “My real crime is speaking out in defense
of the democratic gove rnance Egyptians deserve.” 45 With deteriorating health and as a target of the
Egyptian government, Dr. Ibrahim has been warned not to return to Egypt. He describes the current
situation: “My family is worried, knowing that Egypt's jails contain some 80,000 political prisoners and
that disappearances are routinely ignored or chalked up to accidents. My fear is that these abuses will

spread if Egypt’s allies and friends c ontinue to stand by silently while this regime suppresses the
country's democratic reformers.” 46
Extralegal Measures of NGO Pushback
As articulated in the section on l egal restrictions, Law No. 84/2002 does not explicitly describe a role
for the security services concerning the application and registration of NGOs. Those organizations that
continue to operate without direct approval from the Ministry of Cultural Affairs of all logistical and
financial actions run the risk of being closed down by security services. 47 Thus, in Egypt, the actions
of NGOs and the boundaries of their activism are influenced by the ever -present fear of security
services.
By and large, Egypt boasts the largest overall security sector in the Middle East. However the majority
of its spending a nd training is not devoted to the development of the armed forces, but rather to the
larger and more numerous internal security services. These agencies include the General Intelligence
and Security Service, the Military Security Service, the General Direc torate of State Security
Investigations, and the State Security Service. 48 Together, these agencies have worked to curtail
NGO operation through a variety of methods. The most publicized aspect of Egypt’s internal security
apparatuses is their record for arbitrarily arresting, beating, and torturing civil society actors.
Examples include unwarranted arrests of reporters, public beating of protestors, and the torture of
prisoners. Many asylum -seekers who have fled to other countries have been tortured upon returning
to Egypt, as have many political activists who have demonstrated to express their dissatisfaction with
the Mubarak regime. 49
Although NGOs and democracy activists frequently find themselves in the crosshairs of the Egyptian
state when making demands for greater political power, the state’s internal repression is aimed at
other social currents as well. One of these other targeted groups is the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood,
publicly outlawed since 1954. The Brotherhood has agitated for recognition by the state as a legal
political party and religious social movement for years; however, the state has demonstrated its
intransigence in a number of ways, most notably during the early 1990s when a sub -war raged
between the state security services and various militant factions within the Brotherhood. 50 The
state’s campaign to quash their activities influences NGO pushback because it serves as a pretext for
the Egyptian security services to do everything necessary to maintain social order. With this rationale,
NGO activists can be arrested and detained o n legal grounds developed in response to prosecuting
violent saboteurs and terrorists.
The toll exacted by the internal security services on Egyptian society has been well documented. Last
year, the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights confirmed that at least 500 cases of police abuse
took place since 1993, 167 of which resulted in death. 51 Also, reports have shown that Egypt’s
national budget overwhelmingly emphasize s internal security before other areas of public spending,
such as healthcare. 52 The state’s broad definition of “public order” has consistently been applied as
an att empt to legalize any action by the security services, whose extralegal harassment, torture, and
detention of NGO personnel has been exceedingly difficult to prosecute due to state anti -defamation
laws and a byzantine network of legal rules protecting secur ity personnel in the military courts. The
imprisonment of Saad Eddin Ibrahim and the closing of the Ibn Khaldoun Center for Development
Studies between 2000 and 2003, and the simultaneous rollercoaster of legal appeals that eventually
granted him freedom, demonstrate the willingness of the security services to stifle inquiry into the
problems that currently face Egyptian society and the economy in a difficult age of reform.
More recently, Egyptian bloggers who have written critically of the government have been targeted in
much the same manner as Ibrahim — tried under anti -state defamation laws and imprisoned with
minimal resources for legal defense. “Sandmonkey,” also known as Abdel Kareem Nabil, was arrested
and jailed for four years for “insulting Islam an d Egyptian president, Hosni Mubarak, on his
blog.” 53 As in other countries like Syria, China, and Russia, the Internet is increasingly subject to
censorship by the Min istry of Information and the various security networks in Egypt. 54 Yet the
community of bloggers has shown that it can effectively aid opposition leaders and democracy
activists in orchestrating anti -government protests, and also influence the dialogue about how best to

express their dissatisfaction with the current political climate. 55 In the 2005 election cycle, members
of the blogging community demonstrated, through new technologies such as text -messaging and the
Internet how to mobilize support for political movements like the Muslim Brotherhood and
the Kefaya movement (a group o f anti -government civil society actors agitating for greater civic
inclusion and freedom, whose name means “enough” in Arabic). 56
Ultimately, the Egyptian government w astes valuable time, resources, and human energy by
harassing NGO personnel and detaining their members. Not only is the Egyptian government under –
concerned with the structural problems facing the country, but the active campaigns carried out by the
securi ty services indicate government willingness to see the country suffer an intellectual stagnation.
By employing extralegal measures to limit the activity of civil society actors, the Mubarak regime
ensures that its top -down reforms can be carried out with a s little internal criticism as possible.
Without the advantage of other voices in the domestic dialogues over what to reform and how to
reform, the government is unable to construct many meaningful relationships within Egyptian society
that favor public ac countability and efficiency in its development goals.
Regional Implications
When examining the role and repression of civil society in Egypt, it is illuminating to compare the
Egyptian situation to that in other countries of the Middle East. Augustus Richa rd Norton, in the
introduction to his compilation on civil society in the Middle East, describes the regional situation:
“Intolerant of peaceful political opposition and suspicious of independent political activities, the
region’s governments have persiste ntly moved to squash those political voices resistant to co -optation
or intimidation.” 57 In terms of repression of civil society and political dissent, Egypt is on par with its
peers and acting in a manner that seems to be normal in the region. Civil society in the Middle East as
a whole “enjoys less autonomy than civil society in the West, an d is therefore likely to be less vigorous
and less efficacious in interaction with government institutions.” 58 Of potential interest is the fact that
a human rights mo vement has emerged in the Middle East, a movement that has also been observed
in Egypt.
As the hobbling of civil society has left a gap in the realm of popular expression in the Middle East,
many countries, Egypt included, have seen the rise of a new ideol ogy to fill that void — Islamism.
While the government in Egypt may not like the fact that that this movement has taken hold through
such groups as the Muslim Brotherhood, Norton argues that “even when the governments have not
purposely assisted the Islamis ts, the governments have aided the Islamists indirectly through
limitations and restraints on associational life.” 59 Growth in popularity of Islamist parties and
movem ents has been noted in all Middle Eastern countries. However, Egypt has tried to work through
the use of its Emergency Law and its NGO Law, Law 84/2002, to prevent Islamic activists from rising
to political power. 60 The role of Islamism in Egypt in the future will be of great importance, however,
as more Islamist movements seek expression of their aims through civil society.
Although Egypt seems to follow the Middle East ern trend with regard to limitations on civil society, it
has a few features that make it a unique case. Egypt is an authoritarian state (like many in the region)
that has seen a growth of the popularity of Islamism. However, Maha Abdel Rahman argues that a
backlash against the Islamist movement and the repression of religious groups are increasingly
emerging not just from direct orders from the government, but from secular civil society groups
themselves. Competition within the civil society sphere for muc h-needed domestic funding that is not
subject to Law 84 pits some civil society actors against one another, often in a conflict between
secular and religious groups. This phenomenon has been termed “the privatization of
repression.” 61 Exacerbating the tensions are the non -secular intellectuals who hope to take power
entirely away from secular groups by allying themselves with the government. While the motivations
of the secular intellectuals may be diverse, one common reason for their repression of the Islamists is
rooted in their fear that “if the Islamists come to power, there is no guarantee that they would abide
by the rules of democracy.” 62 And like other states in the region that have recently held elections —
notably Palestine, Lebanon, and Iraq —there is a common precedent to limit the participation of
religious actors in the p olitical process.

Policy Recommendations
While the Egyptian government often boasts of the growth and number of NGOs that populate its civil
society, that growth has been tempered with repression. The freedoms of speech and press that are
necessary for a f lourishing and productive civil society have largely been replaced in Egypt with
administrative hurdles and harassment from the security services. The government is able legally to
prevent the registration of NGOs that have aims or goals which it believes to be compromising to
Egyptian “security.” Article 11 of Law 84 is so broadly and vaguely worded as to allow the Ministry of
Social Affairs near -ultimate authority in rejecting any NGO application that may be construed as
“threatening” to the regime. The t hreat of penalties, fines, and even dissolution puts NGOs in the
position of trying to follow rules which they are bound to break, or trying to fly under the radar with
their activity. Those who are caught face an uphill legal battle, as did Dr. Ibrahim of the Ibn Khaldun
Center of Cairo. Additionally, the extralegal role of the security services guarantees that those who are
caught breaking the laws will meet the heavy hand of punishment and harassment.
Legal reforms are needed in Egypt to in order produce a productive and flourishing civil society in
which NGOs can operate. NGOs and other civil society members need to be thoughtfully and
legitimately incorporated into the lawmaking process to produce a new NGO law which will make many
of the administrative hurdles less daunting. The registration process needs to be streamlined with the
rules for rejection or acceptance of the application of an NGO more clearly defined. There also needs
to be a simplified appeals process in which the Ministry replies within allotted deadlines and gives
concrete reasons for rejecting the application of an NGO. The process for obtaining funding should be
made simpler as well. Many NGOs need more readily available funds in order to keep their
organizations afloat. The government should decide whether to allow foreign funding in a timely
manner so that NGOs can assess their financial needs more quickly.
Changes also need to be made within the government bureaucratic apparatus itself. The role of the
Ministry versus the role of the security services needs to be clearly defined. As it stands, the security
services have no legal role with respect to NGO registration and operation. However, the security
services often decline NGO registrations. The two organizations need to be disentan gled, and the NGO
registration process de -politicized. Additionally, government bureaucrats need to be educated about
the laws under which they operate. Some have even enforced the old NGO law from 1974. Ministry
employees need to know thoroughly the laws that they are enforcing and carry them out across all the
regions of Egypt equally. Most importantly, efficiency and transparency should be increased in all
actions in order to make the regulation of Egyptian civil society more legitimate. NGOs are often a t the
mercy of the Ministry in terms of registration, funding, and appeals. The rules need to be adhered to
in all processes, and time frames should be enforced and respected.
Finally, changes need to occur within the Egyptian community itself. NGOs will c ontinue to face an
uphill battle if they are perceived by the government and by the community at large as rich affiliates
of foreign governments. Within the realm of the law, NGOs face the challenge of changing their
perception. While their options are lim ited given the ban on political campaigns, through their
persistence in their work and through good governance practices they should be able to help the
community slowly see that they can be a force for good and for change. Additionally, if the laws are
ad justed to shift punishments away from the collective and toward the individual, Egyptians may feel
inclined to get involved with the work of NGOs and help build a more inclusive and democratic civil
society.
Notes
1 James G. McGann is assistant director of the International Relations Program at the University of
Pennsylvania and the president of McGann Associates. His books include Think Tanks and Policy Advice
in the U.S.: Academics, Advisors and Advocates and Comparative Think Tanks, Politics and Public
Policy.

2 On many occasions, Egypt has condemned the actions of Hezbollah, al-Qaida, Hamas, and other
Islamist groups that have used violence to articulate grievances against Israel, the United States, and
other Western governments.
3 “Hegemony and Counter -Hegemony in Egypt: Advocacy NGOs, Civil Society, and the State.” NGOs
and Governance in the Arab World. Ed. Ben Nafissa, Sarah, Nabil Abd al -Fatah, Sari Hanafi, and Carlos
Milani. New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2005 . 126.
4 2005 was the first election cycle that permitted a multi -party presidential election; however, the
validity of the election was fundamentally undermined by the imprisonment and restriction of
Mubarak’s opponents. See Lavin, Abigail. “Democracy on the Nile: The Story of Ayman Nour and
Egypt's Problematic Attempt at Free Elections.” The Daily Standard . 27 Mar 2006. Accessed March
2008

.
5 Freedom Ho use. “Freedom in the World – Egypt.” Freedom House, 2007. Accessed 8 Mar 2008
.
These la ws were actually renewed in 2006 for two more years. See Williams, Daniel. “Egypt Extends
25 -Year -Old Emergency Law.” Washington Post 1 May 2006. A13.
6 And in the re form period, many businessmen held elected office. Owen, Roger. State, Power and
Politics in the Making of the Modern Middle East . New York: Routledge Press, 2003.131.
7 Dunne, Michele. “Egypt’s National Democratic Party: The Search for Legitimacy.” Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 16 Nov 2007. Accessed March 2008
.
8 Human Rights Watch. “Egypt: Margins of Repression: State Limits on Nongovernmental Organization
Activism .”Human Rights Watch 17.8 (July 2005): p.1.
9 See Kessler, Gl enn. “Rice Criticizes Allies In Call for Democracy.” Washington Post 21 Jun 2005.
A01.
10 Hamzawy, Amr and Dina Bishara. “Burying Democracy Further in Egypt.” The D aily Star , Beirut,
Lebanon. 16 Mar 2007.
11 A rating of 1 represents “most free,” while a rating of 7 is “least free.” Report is available online at
.
12 In 1997, Egy pt had 14,000 -15,000 private non -profit organizations, in addition to many more
youth clubs, professional syndicates, and trade unions. See LaTowsky, Robert J. “Egypt’s NGO Sector,
A Briefing Paper.” Education for Development 1.4 (1997): 1.
13 Ibid., 4.
14 Ibid., 5 -7.
15 Owen, 184 -185.
16 2005 estimate. The Central Intelligence Agency. The 2008 World Factbook. Accessed 7 Jun 2008
.

17 Zakat is considered one of the five pillars of Islam, and it requires those who are financially
capable of meeting their immediate needs to donate 2.5% of their income to those in need withi n their
communities.
18 Pratt, Nicola. “NGOs and the ‘Foreign Funding Debate’ in Egypt.” Human Rights in the Arab World:
Independent Voices . Ed. Anthony Chase and Amr Hamzawy. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2006. 124.
19 Ibid., 124 -125.
20 Ibid., 125 -126.
21 Future Generation Foundation. “About us | Background.” Future Generation Foundation. Accessed
on 10 Mar 2008 < https://www.fgf.org.eg/About.aspx?pageID=156 >
22 Future Generation Foundation. “About us | Members.” Futu re Generation Foundation. Accessed on
10 Mar 2008 < https://www.fgf.org.eg/About.aspx?pageID=160 >.
23 For a discussion on the issues facing international NGO relations between the global North and
South, see Milani, Carlos. “Non -Governmental Organizations in Global Governance.” NGOs and
Governance in the Arab World . Eds. Sarah Ben Nefissa, Nabil Abd al -Fatah, Sari Hanafi, and Carlos
Milani. New York: The American University in Cairo Press, 2005. 19 -37.
24 Agati, Mohamed. “Undermining Standards of Good Governance: Egypt ’ s NGO Law and Its Impact
on the Transparency and Accountability of CSOs.” International Center for Non -for -Profit Law, Apr
2002. Accessed Mar 2008 < https://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl /vol9iss2/special_4.htm >.
25 Agati.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Margins of Repression.”
32 Ibid.
33 Human Ri ghts Watch, “Egypt: Margins of Repression.”
34 Ibid.
35 Agati.
36 Ibid.
37 Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Margins of Repression.”

38 Agati.
39 Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Margins of Repression.”
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid.
43 Agati.
44 Open Society Institute’s Central Eurasia Project. “Freed Reformist Sees Hopes for Islamist
Democracies.” Open Society Institute , 5 May 2003. Accessed 18 Mar 2008.
.
45 Ibrahim, Saad Eddin. “Egypt’s Unchecked Repression.” Washington Post 21 Aug 2007: A15.
Accessed 18 Ma r 2008 < https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp - dyn/content/article/2007/08/20/AR2007082001500.html?referrer=emailarticle >.
46 Ibid.
47 Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Margins of Repression.”
48 See Federation of American Scientists. “Egypt: Intelligence Agencies.” Federation of American
Scientists, last updated 10 Jun 2008. < https://www.fas.org/irp/world/egypt/index.html >.
49 See Human Rights Watch. “US: Halt Deportation to Torture in Egypt.” Human Rights Watch, 1 Jun
2007. Ac cessed March 2008
. See also Physicians
for Human Rights.“Egypt: Torture of Anti -War Demonstrators Continues; Urgent Independent
Investigation Needed.” Physicians for Human Rights, 26 Mar 2003. Accessed March 2008
.
50 Owen, 185.
51 Paraphrased in Ibrahim.
52 Ibid.
53 Levinson, C harles. “Egypt’s Blog Rebels Silenced by Jail.” Sunday Telegraph 7 May 2007. Accessed
March 2008
.
54 For the first instance of Russia charging blogger with “inciting hatred and enmity,” see “Russian
Blogger Heads to Court After Fiery Comment.” The O ther Russia 13 Mar 2008. Accessed March 2008
. For Syr ian instance, see “Civil Society News from Around the Region: Syria.” Civil Society
and Democratization in the Arab World (Aug 2007): 2.
55 See Levinson, Chris. “Egypt’s Growing Blogger Community Pushes Limits of Dissent.” Christian
Science Monitor 24 Aug 2005. < https://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0824/p07s01 -wome.html >.

56 See Stack, Liam. “Democratic Reforms Missing from Egypt’s Political Debate.” The Daily Star .
Beirut, Lebanon. 13 Oct 2006.
57 Norton, Augustus Richard. Civil Society in the Middle East , Volume 2. New York: Die Deutsche
Bibliothek, 1996.
58 Ibid ., 1 -16.
59 Ibid.
60 Yet these modes of repression do not guarantee tota l control of the political situation. In the 2005
elections, Muslim Brotherhood members registered as independents captured roughly 20% of
parliamentary seats. See Otterman, Sharon. “Muslim Brotherhood and Egypt’s Parliamentary
Elections.” Council on Forei gn Relations, 1 Dec 2005. Accessed March 2008
.
61 Rahman, Maha Abdel. “The Politics of unCivil Society in Egypt.” Review of African Political
Economy 29.91 (2002): 21 -36. Accessed 18 Mar 2008 < https://www.roape.org/cgi - bin/roape/show/0091.html >.
62 Ibid.