F
Volume
27,Issue 4 2003 Article2 The Constitution of North Korea: Its Changes
and Implications
Dae-Kyu Yoon 

Copyright c

2003 by the authors. F is produced by The Berke-
ley Electronic Press (bepress). https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/ilj

The Constitution of North Korea: Its Changes
and Implications
Dae-Kyu Yoon
Abstract
Though a departure from mainstream socialist States, a glimpse of North Korea’s Constitu-
tion can still provide observers with an understanding of how North Korea has undergone and
responded to social changes and vicissitudes. Hence, this Essay sets out to do a number of things.
First, this study succinctly examines the nature and status of law in North Korea. Second, it reviews
the country’s constitutional history in sequence, and then, provides a more in depth look into the
characteristics of the current Constitution. Conclusions are then drawn from this examination. The
goal of this Essay is not to describe the principles or contents of North Korean Constitutions per se,
but rather to look at how North Korea has responded to change from a constitutional perspective.
However, our discussion will be mostly limited to the texts of the constitutions since there is no
case known to outsiders that would afford us an understanding of its real operation in daily life. At
the same time, constitutional processes including the North Korean amendment process does not
deserve our attention either, as all constitutional processes in North Korea are, by design, endorsed
without opposition and manipulated by the country’s top leadership –an undisputable reality of the
totalitarianism housed within the country’s borders.

THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH KOREA:
ITS CHANGES AND IMPLICATIONS
Dae-Kyu Yoon*
INTRODUCTION
More often than not, a Constitution of a State acts as a
prism that affords one an understanding of that State as a whole.
This is possible since a State’s Constitution is a manifestation of
the State itself, and provides the fundamental principles of su-
preme law for State management. For the most part, this is also
true of socialist countries, despite the different implications that
law in socialist societies, governed by proletarian dictatorships,
serve a different role than in pluralist, democratic societies
which are governed by the rule of law. A Constitution derived
under socialist governance still reflects, to some extent, the real-
ity of the State and thus is still one of the best ways to understand
its government’s management of society and its responses to
changes in its internal and external environments.
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (“DPRK” or
“North Korea”) is no exception. Though a departure from
mainstream socialist States, a glimpse of North Korea’s Constitu-
tion can still provide observers with an understanding of how
North Korea has undergone and responded to social changes
and vicissitudes. Hence, this Essay sets out to do a number of
things. First, this study succinctly examines the nature and status
of law in North Korea. Second, it reviews the country’s constitu-
tional history in sequence, and then, provides a more in depth
look into the characteristics of the current Constitution. Con-
clusions are then drawn from this examination. The goal of this
Essay is not to describe the principles or contents of North Ko-
rean Constitutions per se, but rather to look at how North Korea
has responded to change from a constitutional perspective.
However, our discussion will be mostly limited to the texts of the
constitutions since there is no case known to outsiders that
would afford us an understanding of its real operation in daily
life. At the same time, constitutional processes including the
* Professor of Law and Vice-Director of the Institute for Far Eastern Studies, Ky-
ungnam University. Ph.D. and LL.M. in Law, University of Washington School of Law; B.A. in Law, Seoul National University.
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1290 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:1289
North Korean amendment process does not deserve our atten-
tion either, as all constitutional processes in North Korea are, by
design, endorsed without opposition and manipulated by the
country’s top leadership 1 – an undisputable reality of the totali-
tarianism housed within the country’s borders.
I. THE ROLE OF LAW IN NORTH KOREA
Like many aspects of North Korea, the uniqueness of its law
is derived from its political reality that is distinguished by the
one-man dictatorship which has lasted for generations. North
Korean leader Kim I1 Sung consolidated and solidified his abso-
lute power via Stalinist-style purges and eliminations of all those
who opposed and all that which threatened his leadership. Con-
frontation with South Korea also contributed to sustaining and
strengthening tensions for the sake of his domestic rule. Over-
all, much of his success in maintaining totalitarian dictatorship
can be attributed to the build-up of pervasive intelligence mech-
anisms, strong military forces, indoctrination of the people with
a cult of personality, and near inclusive isolation of the populace
from the outside world.
Facilitating this totalitarian dictatorship has been the pri-
macy of the Korea Workers’ Party (“KWP”). Its supremacy over
official government organizations and unlimited authority has
allowed this one-man reign to thrive. Party control is reinforced
by interlocking membership between party elites and chief gov-
ernmental and military figures. Its grip over the populace is per-
vasive and reaches into the daily lives of residents through indoc-
trination and surveillance. Thus, the KWP has stood as one pil-
lar of the leader’s power as he reigns over the State in the
uppermost position of the party, its General Secretary. In this
regard, it is not unusual that the Constitution itself provides that
“The DPRK shall conduct all activities under the leadership of
1. The authority to adopt and amend the Constitution in DPRK has belonged to the Supreme People’s Assembly since the first North Korean Constitution. See N. Ko- REA CONST. art. 104 (1948) [hereinafter 1948 CoNsT.]; N. KOREA CONST. art. 76(1) (1972) [hereinafter 1972 CONST.]; N. KOREA CONST. art. 91(1) (1992) [hereinafter 1992 CONST.]; N. KoREa CONST. art. 91(1) (1998) [hereinafter 1998 CONST.]. Predictably, Constitutions have been adopted or amended by a unanimous vote at the First Supreme People’s Assembly (“SPA”) without advance public debate. See, e.g., FUKUSHIMA MASAO, ON THE SOCIALIST CONSTITUTION OF THE DEMOCRATIC PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF KOREA 83, 90-91 (1975).

THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH KOREA
the Workers’ Party.” ‘2 It follows that the party directives, which
know no limits, stand above the law.
The second pillar of his power is the juche ideology, the
backbone of party guidance and State philosophy. Juche (or “self-reliance”) was formulated to justify Kim Il Sung’s dictator-
ship and succession of power to his son, Kim Jong I1, emphasiz-
ing peculiar aspects of the North Korean environment. Advo-
cated as a creative application of Marxist-Leninist principles, the
ideology also serves as a tool that justifies the leader’s demand
for the populace’s unquestionable loyalty. It developed into a
cult of personality surrounding Kim I1 Sung and Kim Jong I1,
officially supplanting all other philosophical and religious beliefs
in the State. Consequently, as stipulated in the Constitution,
juche ideology is the ultimate paradigm that guides State activi-
ties. 3
In the Weberian sense, 4 North Korea can be characterized
as a charismatic society where the supreme, godlike leader’s words
and directives are the principal governing norms that supersede
all else, including the law. His word is considered the quintes-
sential source of enlightenment capable of dispensing justice.
Law, on the other hand, plays but a marginal role in the adminis-
tration of justice and instead acts as a secondary instrument to
enforce and realize the leader’s directives, leaving its efficacy as a
thing of ridicule. Thus, law in North Korea is naturally mobil-
ized for political purposes; inherent justice or inviolable divine
elements – i.e., the “spirit of the law” – for all intents and pur-
poses, is sorely lacking.
The North Korean Constitution exists essentially as a politi-
cal manifesto with a bulk of programmatic provisions rather
than as a document written to ensure justice for the people. The
discrepancy between the written laws and law in action is so per-
vasive that the issue of legal ground is entirely irrelevant on
many occasions. Constitutional ground is not necessarily re-
quired to invoke State action since the State holds its legitimacy
ipso facto with no procedure to challenge it.
2. 1998 CONsT. art. 11. 3. Id. art. 3.
4. Weber’s “ideal types” make a distinction between 1) charismatic, 2) traditional,
and 3) rational-legal authority. As it is, North Korean authority tends to fall under this
first category. See MAX WEBER, Eco~oNar AND SociET 212-301 (Roth and Wittich eds.,
1978).
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1292 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:1289
II. THE FIRST CONSTITUTION OF 1948
The first Constitution of DPRK was inaugurated in 1948,
modeled after the 1936 Stalinist Constitution of the former So-
viet Union (“USSR”). Despite constitutional revisions of a dras-
tic nature both in 1972 and 1998, 5 since its 1948 original, the
basic principles and characteristics of North Korea’s Constitu-
tion largely have been preserved up to the present day. There-
fore, much of the structure that exists today has its origins in the
1948 Constitution.
Drafted in April 1948, the Constitution of the DPRK was
adopted at the First Supreme People’s Assembly (“SPA”) in Sep-
tember of that same year. 6 It consisted of ten chapters and 104
articles 7, and held provisions on basic principles, rights and du-
ties of citizens, central and local legislative and executive organs,
courts, budgets, national defense, amendment procedures, and
the State emblem, capitals, and so on. During its twenty-four
year lifespan, it was amended only a handful of times on very
minor matters (therefore, it is not worth elaborating on), all
within the first fourteen years of its existence. 8
Most significantly, the 1948 Constitution elevated the SPA as
the highest organ of State authority, essentially succeeding the
two interim bodies that previously functioned in such a capacity
(the North Korean Provisional People’s Committee of February
1946, which was dissolved a year later in February 1947 in order
to create the People’s Assembly of North Korea). The SPA be-
came the legislative body of the Nation, modeled after the
USSR’s Supreme Soviet. According to the Constitution, the SPA
5. Although the 1992 revision was not extensive, this revision still holds significant meaning. Therefore, the 1992 Constitution will also be reviewed under a separate
Chapter. 6. The 1948 Constitution is also referred to as the “People’s Democratic Constitu-
tion.” 7. The 1948 Constitution consists of ten Chapters of 104 Articles: 1948 CONST. Ch. I (Basic Principles); Ch. 2 (Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens); Ch. 3 (The Highest Organ of State Power); Ch. 3, § I (The Supreme People’s Assembly (SPA)); Ch.3, § 2 (The Presidium of the SPA); Ch. 4 (The Central Executive Organ of State Power); Ch. 4, § I (The Cabinet); §2 (The Ministries); Ch. 5 (The Local Organs of State Power); Ch. 6 (The Court and the Procurator’s Office); Ch. 7 (The State Budget);
Ch. 8 (National Defense); Ch. 9 (State Emblem, National Flag and Capital); Ch. 10 (Procedure for Constitutional Amendment).
8. See DAE-SOOK SUH, KoREAkN COMMUNISM: 1945-1980, at 499 (1981); see also DAL- KON CHOI & YOUNG-HO SHIN, BUKHANBOP-IPMUM [INTRODUCTION TO NORTH KOREAN LAw] 51-52 (1998); MASAO, supra note 1, at 121-24.

THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH KOREA
was to exercise exclusive legislative power and consist of repre-
sentatives elected by the people (although this last point is some-
what misleading as SPA representatives are selected by universal,
equal, direct, and secret vote as per the Constitution, 9 yet candi-
dates are carefully screened and approved by the party).
Centralization of power onto it was made a constitutional
principle, and thus the SPA was invested with vast legislative pow-
ers: the authority to enact basic domestic and foreign policies;
create a Presidium to operate on its behalf when the Assembly
was not in session; approve the laws and statutes adopted by the
Presidium; revise and amend the Constitution; deliberate and
approve the national budget; elect and recall a Prime Minister of
the Cabinet and its members; appoint major officials such as the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court and Procurator-General of
the Central Procurator’s Office; 1 dispatch foreign service per-
sonnel; and so forth. All the constitutional organs were given
their authority from the SPA. Division of labor among other
government organs was, however, done for the purpose of gov-
erning the State; never was such a division intended to create a
system of “checks-and-balances” on State authority via a separa-
tion or diffusion of powers – as is the case in most liberal de-
mocracies.
Notwithstanding, in all reality it was the Presidium of the
SPA, comprised of a much smaller group of individuals (ranging
from fifteen to twenty of the top party personnel and the same
men who essentially dominate the KWP), which initiated action
on almost all policymaking. Thus, in reality, the SPA’s
supremacy was a mere superficiality. As a government body, the
SPA was – and still is – purely a quasi-independent agency, a
facade erected to give the appearance of democratic representa-
tion, and a puppet whose strings are pulled to legitimize State
action.
The Presidium of SPA also held the position of Head of
State and exercised associated ceremonial authority concerning
both foreign and domestic affairs. The Cabinet exercised execu-
tive authority empowered by the SPA. Kim I1 Sung had been
seated as top leader of the northern part of the Korean penin-
sula by the Soviet Union – since its occupation after liberation
9. See 1948 CONST. art. 3. 10. See id. art. 37.
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1294 FORDHAMIN TERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:1289
from Japanese rule in 1945, was now appointed as Prime Minis-
ter. In fact, the key players of government administration were
members of the Cabinet who had concurrent positions in the
Party as well as the SPA. The local sovereign organ was the Peo-
ple’s Assemblies, whose members were elected by their respec-
tive local residents. People’s Assemblies supervised the People’s
Committees, which were in charge of the administration of re-
spective local districts. 1
As far as the Constitution and North Korean citizens are
concerned, the first Constitution stipulated that fundamental
rights, similar to those in liberal democracies, be protected. For
example, Freedom of Speech (Article 13), Equal Protection (Ar-
ticle 11), Right to Vote and be Elected (Article 12), Right to Re-
ligion (Article 14), Protection of Privacy (Article 21), Protection
from Arbitrary Arrest (Article 24), Right to Petition (Article 25),
etc. were all addressed in the Constitution. However, whether or
not these rights were ever protected in practice remains highly
suspect.1 2
Although North Korea adopted constitutional principles of
the Soviet Union’s political structure, the first Constitution
could not avoid reflecting North Korea’s inherent reality. Since
North Korea was just beginning to construct a socialist system,
many legacies of its previous system still remained. In a sense, it
was inevitable that the new leadership, which had yet to establish
a stable power base, compromised with existing non-socialist ele-
ments. Such compromises were found particularly in connec-
tion with the economic sector. For example, private ownership
was broadly protected along with the freedom to. run busi-
nesses.”‘ Citizens were also required to pay taxes according to
what they were financially capable of paying. 4 In order to rid
11. See id. arts. 68-81. The 1972 Constitution additionally instituted Local Adminis- trative Committees as the administrative enforcement agencies of local affairs. See 1972
CONST. arts. 128-32. 12. For a more in depth review of human rights protection in North Korea, see KOREA INSTITUTE FOR NATIONAL UNIFICATION, WHITE PAPER ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN NORTH KOREA, (Jae Jean Suh et al. eds., 2003); Amnesty International, Starved of Rights: Human Rights and the Food Crisis in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
(North Korea), available at www.web.amnesty.org/library/print/ENGASA240032004 (Jan. 17, 2004); State U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Department of State Human Rights Reports for 2000: Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, available at https:// humanrights-usa.net/reports/dprk.html (Feb. 2001). 13. 1948 CONST. arts. 5, 8, 19.
14. Id. art. 29.

THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH KOREA
the country of remnants of Japanese colonial rule, the Constitu-
tion provided clauses which confiscated assets and land owned
by the Japanese and their collaborators, and deprived them of
their civil rights.’ 5 Interestingly enough, however, Article 31
provided protection for ethnic minorities. This addition seems
to have been blindly adopted from the Soviet Constitution 16 be-
cause the Soviet Union consisted of many different ethnic
groups while the issue of ethnic minorities was by-and-large a
non-issue in North Korea. i7
III. THE SOCIALIST CONSTITUTION OF 1972
The second Constitution of the DPRK was inaugurated in
1972 after a profound transformation of North Korean society.
Here, two aspects in particular should be noted. First, Kim I1
Sung ultimately came out on top in the struggle for absolute
power over North Korea and consolidated his power into an un-
disputable one-man dictatorship. Kim II Sung’s unparalleled
leadership and his critical role and contribution to the develop-
ment of a socialist State were well described in the Preamble of
the 1972 Constitution. Second, private ownership was totally
eliminated, ushering in the completion of the Socialist central
economic planning system as the principle of collectivism was
broadly introduced and strongly emphasized. Thus, this new
Constitution was called the “Socialist Constitution” of the DPRK
as it epitomized North Korea’s successful transition to a socialist
system via the removal of non-socialist elements inherent in the
Constitution of 1948. The 1972 Constitution provided that “class antagonisms and all forms of exploitation and oppression
of man by man have been eliminated forever,”‘ 8 and that “the
historic task of industrialization has been accomplished success-
fully.”‘” However, these expressions did not mean that socialist
construction of the State had been completed, but would rather
continue until North Korea reached the high phase of commu-
nism where it became “not only [a] classless society but also a
highly advanced society where there is no distinction between
mental and physical labor and each member of society works ac-
15. Id. arts. 5, 6, 12.
16. See U.S.S.R. CONST. art. 123.
17. North Korea omitted this provision from the Constitution of 1972.
18. 1972 CONST. art. 6.
19. Id. art. 24.
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1296 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol.27:1289
cording to his ability and receives according to his needs. 2°
The 1972 Constitution was drastically different from its 1948
predecessor, not only in formality and contents but also in its
level of sophistication. 21 It claimed that the DPRK was an “inde-
pendent socialist State representing the interests of all the Ko-
rean people,” 22 and based on proletarian dictatorship. 23 The
juche ideology of the KWP was expressively incorporated in the
Constitution as the guiding principle of the State and regarded
as a “creative application of Marxism-Leninism to the conditions
of [North Korea] .,”4 The KWP’s status was thereby enhanced by
its constitutional recognition. Democratic centralism was the ba-
sic principle of organization and activity of State organs. 25 Ac-
cording to this principle, once citizens elect their representa-
tives, they should obey representatives’ decisions, and lower au-
thorities should obey the decisions made by higher authorities.
There is no checks and balances system among State organs, but
rather only strict hierarchical domination and submission.
This Constitution also created the presidency position and
made him Head of the State, a position that carried a four-year
term with no re-election limitations. 26 Although the SPA was still
the supreme sovereign organ and elected the country’s presi-
dent, defacto State power was the President’s to exercise. Kim I1
Sung, was of course, inaugurated as the first President and
served in that position until his death in 1994. Furthermore, the
Constitution created and renamed other specific government or-
gans. Accordingly, the Central People’s Committee (“CPC”) was
created, the Chairman of which was the President. It became
the supreme guiding agency of State sovereignty and policymak-
20. Id. art. 25.
21. The 1972 Constitution consisted of eleven Chapters and 149 Articles. The
Chapters are as follows: 1972 CONST. Ch. 1 (Politics); Ch. 2 (Economy); Ch. 3 (Cul- ture); Ch. 4 (Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens); Ch. 5 (The Supreme Peo- ple’s Assembly); Ch. 6 (The President of DPRK); Ch. 7 (The Central People’s Commit-
tee); Ch. 8 (The Administrative Council); Ch. 9 (The Local People’s Assembly, People’s Committee and Administrative Committee); Ch. 10 (The Court and the Procurator’s
Office); and Ch. 11 (Emblem, Flag and Capital).
22. 1972 CONST. art. 1. The first Constitution does not mention the term “socialist State” at all.
23. See id. art. 10.
24. See id. art. 4.
25. See id. art. 9.
26. See id. arts. 89-99.

THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH KOREA
ing. 27 In addition, the Cabinet was renamed the “Administrative
Council,” was led by the Prime Minister, and became the policy
enforcement agency under the supervision of the President and
the CPC. 28
The Constitution also made changes in terms of citizens’
rights. The collectivist principle of “one for all and all for one”
was adopted as the basis of the rights and duties of citizens. 29
Thus, “mass line” and “mass movement” were inserted as consti-
tutional principles. 3″ Collectivism became the basic orientation
of education at all levels. Private ownership for means of pro-
duction was eliminated along with individuals’ rights to run busi-
nesses; 31 private ownership of goods was limited to personal use
items only. 32 As the State was responsible for providing the daily
necessities people would need through a rationing and public
distribution system, the system of taxation was abolished. 3 Even
amid the beginning of dialogue between North and South Korea
in the early 1970s, a peaceful unification clause was also inserted
in the Constitution – although the victory of socialism was still
the ultimate goal of the State. 34 This was an expression of North
Korea’s confidence in its own made-for-Korea socialist system.
IV. THE 1992 AMENDMENT FOR POWER SUCCESSION
It was twenty years before another amendment to the 1972
document would be implemented. This revision, however, was a
result of a build-up of external events in the 1980s culminating
at the turn of the decade, which ushered in radical changes that
would alter the geopolitical world order and signal the end of
the Cold War. The Soviet Union and Eastern European States
which formed the Communist bloc fell into decline and later
27. See id. arts. 100-06. 28. See id. arts. 107-14. 29. See id. art. 49; see also id. art. 68 (providing that “[c]itizens must display a high degree of collectivist spirit… [and] cherish their collective and organization and de- velop the revolutionary trait of working interests of the homeland and the revolution”). 30. See id. arts. 12-13.
31. See id. art. 18. 32. See id. art. 22. 33. See id. art. 33 (providing that “[t]he State abolishes taxation, a hangover of the old society”); see also, 1948 CONST. art. 29 (providing that citizens should pay tax). 34. See id. art. 5. Interestingly, South Korea also amended its Constitution in 1972 to extend President Park’s rule under the pretext of legitimizing North and South dia-
logue for peaceful unification.
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1298 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:1289
collapsed. Equally important, communist China continued on
its path of transformation, incrementally enacting measures in
order to adopt a market system. This new post-Cold War period
that began in the 1990s thus drove North Korea into desperation
as the country was forced to try and find its own way to survive in
a new, radically altered foreign environment, sans reliance on its
traditional trading partners for markets and contiguous allies for
significant assistance and support. All of these external events
had a huge impact on the North Korean economy and political
survival. 5 Isolated, North Korea has for some time now been
forced to attract foreign investment and boost trade in a desper-
ate attempt to climb out of economic destitution. Dialogue with
South Korea has resumed in this regard. All of these events
came at a very bad time for North Korea, as preparation for the
succession of power from the aging Kim I1 Sung to his son Kim
Jong I1 required greater time for the latter to consolidate his
power.
With these factors in mind, an amendment to the Constitu-
tion was made in 1992. First eliminated from the document was
the expression of Marxism-Leninism in conjunction with juche
ideology and instead the philosophical principle of juche ideol-
ogy was constitutionalized by itself. 36 Second, the leading role of
the Party was emphatically stipulated.” The proletarian dicta-
torship was replaced with a dictatorship of people’s democracy, 38
although the Constitution still expressed that the DPRK was a
socialist State in Article 1. However, it is unclear why such a
change occurred when considering the socialist theory that a
proletarian dictatorship is more developed than a dictatorship in
35. For an in depth synopsis of the impacts of the collapse of the Communist bloc
on the DPRK economy, energy, and agricultural sectors, see James H. Williams et al., Fuel and Famine: Rural Energy Crisis in the DPRK, 26(1) ASIAN PERSP., Mar. 2002, at 111-
40, available at https://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/energy/pp46.html; An- drew Natsios, Special Report: The Politics of Famine in North Korea (United States Institute of Peace 1999), available at www.usip.org; Marcus Noland, Famine and Reform in North Korea (Institute for International Economics Working Paper No. 03-5 2003), available at
https://www.iie.com/publications/wp/2003/03-5.pdf; MICHAEL E. O’I-ANLON & MIKE
MOCHIZUKI, CRISIS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA (2003).
36. See 1992 CONST. art. 3 (providing that “[t]he DPRK is guided in its activities by the juche idea, a world outlook centered on people, a revolutionary ideology for achiev-
ing the independence of the masses of people”).
37. See id. art. 11 (providing that “[t] he DPRK shall conduct all activities under the leadership of the Workers’ Party of Korea”).
38. Compare id. art. 12 with 1972 CONsT. art. 10.

THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH KOREA
a people’s democracy in the process of socialist revolution. It
might have happened from the defensive sense of vulnerability
which emerged after the collapse of the European socialist
States. Third, North Korea’s policy towards South Korea was
also changed from an aggressive stance to a more receptive one
for coexistence. 39 At least from the viewpoint of constitutional
expression, North Korea seems to have renounced a North Ko-
rea-initiated revolutionary unification since 1992 as the 1992
Constitution supports the principle of peaceful unification.
Thus, it was natural that the new revision removed the foreign
policy clause of international cooperation with socialist States
based on Marxist-Leninism and proletarianism by adopting inde-
pendence, peace, and solidarity as the basic principles of foreign
policy. 0
The most important point of this 1992 revision was the en-
hancement of the National Defense Commission (“NDC”) as a
separate constitutional organ. Before this, the NDC was merely
a subcommittee of the CPC. 41 However, the 1992 Constitution
created a new Chapter for this commission with six Articles. 42
Before this revision, the President, as the Chief Commander of
the State, held the Chairmanship of the Commission as ex officio,
leading State military affairs. 43 The 1992 amendment separated
the highest military leadership from the authority of the presi-
dent and conferred it on the Chairman of the NDC. Now, the
Chairman of the NDC became the Chief Commander of the
State and exercised the highest military authority. As Kim Jong
I1 was elected as its Chairman, he solidified his status as the de
jure and de facto successor.
In the economic realm, several provisions were also supple-
mented to emphasize an independent national economy and
the development of science and technology. 44 The most notable
change in this area was that constitutional ground was laid for
the support of an “open-door” policy, something that could be
inferred from the inclusion of Article 37 which established that
“[t]he State shall encourage institutions, enterprises or associa-
39. Compare 1992 CONST. art. 9 with 1972 CONST. art. 5. 40. Compare 1992 CONST. art. 17 with 1972 CONST. art. 16. 41. See 1972 CONST. art. 105.
42. See 1992 CONST. arts. 111-16.
43. See 1972 CONST. art. 93. 44. See id. arts. 19, 26, 27, 28.
20041 1299

1300 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:1289
tions of the DPRK to establish and operate equity and contrac-
tual joint venture enterprises with corporations or individuals of
foreign countries.” Although the Joint Venture Act had come
into being in 1984, it lacked constitutional grounding at that
time. The inclusion of Article 37 suggested a more positive atti-
tude and active policy toward attracting foreign investment. In-
vestment of this nature was possibly seen – as it is today – as a
means to assist the country in surmounting its economic hard-
ships. Prior to this amendment, North Korea’s top leadership
had already decided in 1991 to create the Rajin-Sonbong Free
Economic Trade Zone. Soon after this 1992 amendment, Py-
ongyang promulgated a series of laws concerning foreign invest-
ment in North Korea. 45
Two years after this revision, North Korean leader Kim I1
Sung passed away. His death in 1994 heralded imminent change
in the power structure of North Korea. However, in spite of his
death, the presidency remained vacant for four years until the
new 1998 Constitution finally abolished the position. The fact
that there had been no political instability during the four-year
absence of the presidency is proof that Kim Jong Il’s control had
already dug deep, unshakable roots. All that was needed was
constitutional change fitted for his direct rule.
V. THE NEW 1998 CONSTITUTION OF KIM JONG IL ERA
The current Constitution, which was built upon the old ver-
sion but refashioned in 1998,46 was tailor-made by Kim Jong I1
and designed to suit his personality and method of rule. First,
although the junior Kim established and enjoyed formidable
and unquestionable authority in his fiefdom, his authority was
inherited, and thus his legitimacy bound to his father’s legacy.
To capitalize on his father’s sacred reputation and superior char-
ismatic leadership, Kim Jong I1 ceremoniously credited the es-
45. See, e.g., Foreign Investment Act (1992), Foreign Enterprise Act (1992), Con- tractual Joint Venture Act (1992), Foreign Economic Trade Zone Act (1993). 46. The 1998 Constitution has ten Chapters consisting of 166 Articles. The ten
Chapters are as follows: 1998 CONST. Ch. 1 (Politics); Ch. 2 (Economy); Ch. 3 (Cul- ture); Ch. 4 (National Defense); Ch. 5 (Fundamental Rights and Duties of Citizens); Ch. 6 (The Structure of the State) Ch. 6, § 1 (The Supreme People’s Assembly), Ch. 6,
§ 2 (The National Defense Commission), Ch. 6, § 3 (The SPA Presidium), Ch. 6, § 4 (Cabinet) Ch. 6, § 5 (Local People’s Assembly), Ch. 6, § 6 (Local People’s Committee), Ch. 6, § 7 (Public Procurators’ Office and Court); Ch. 7 (National Emblem, Flag, Na-
tional Anthem and Capital).

THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH KOREA
tablishment of North Korea to his father by elevating him to the
position of Eternal President, where Kim I1 Sung continues to
reign posthumously. Rules based on Kim 11 Sung’s teaching
have been professed in order to recruit public support and jus-
tify Kim Jong Il’s rule. Nevertheless, overcoming the economic
difficulty that the country has faced also became an urgent prob-
lem that threatened Kim Jong II’s legitimacy, and thus a prob-
lem for his regime to solve. Hence, existing principles in the
economic sector required alterations to ensure a more prag-
matic direction. If one looks closely, elements addressing these
two concerns are reflected in the new Constitution.
In its preamble, the 1998 Constitution named itself the
“Kim I1 Sung Constitution,” which legally embodies Comrade
Kim I1 Sung’s juche State construction ideology and achievement.
Kim I1 Sung was idolized as “the founder of the DPRK and origi-
nator of the Socialist North Korea,” and now the DPRK and its
citizens have Kim I1 Sung as “the Eternal President of the Repub-
lic.” Essentially, this means that only Kim I1 Sung was, is, and
shall ever be worthy of the role of President of the DPRK, a posi-
tion stipulated in the preface of the new Constitution. This lead-
ership-affirmed truth thus justified the abolishment of the presi-
dency. This rhetorical and structural change was, of course, a
reflection of Kim Jong Il’s character and motivations. The pow-
ers that seemingly went to the grave with the senior Kim were
instead creatively transferred to the son. Kim Jong I1 herein
strengthened the authority of the NDC by adding “an organ for
general control over national defense” to the existing “highest
military leading organ of State power.” 4 This thereby empow-
ered the Chairman of the NDC to direct and command all of the
armed forces and guide “defense affairs as a whole.” 4 The NDC
Chairmanship was elevated to the highest position of the State
when Kim Jong I1 was re-elected as the Chairman via the new
Constitution. This amounts to delegation of State sovereignty to
the Chairman of the NDC, since this phrase is interpreted com-
prehensively. 49 This also suggests that military force is the back-
47. 1998 CONST. art. 100.
48. Id. art. 102. 49. The office of the Chairman of the NDC was exalted as a sacred position. Ac- cording to the speech proposing to reelect Kim Jong II as Chairman of the NDC at the first session of the Tenth SPA, the chairmanship was described as follows:
The NDC chairmanship is the highest post of the State with which to organise
2004] 1301

1302 FORDHAM1NTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:1289
bone of Kim’s leadership, its means for both regime survival and
overcoming the State crisis. Regarding the latter issue, Kim Jong
I1 himself even suggested the construction of a “prosperous and
powerful [N]ation” as the goal of his new era. In sum,
supremacy of military forces is the principle by which Kim Jong
Il intends to rule, a principle that has aptly been coined “mili-
tary-first politics.” 5°
Accompanying change in tandem with the abolishment of
the presidency was also made to vest more authority to the Pre-
sidium of the SPA and the Cabinet. The President of the SPA
Presidium represents the Nation as the Head of State. 5′ The au-
thority of the President and the CPC, which was also abolished in
the current Constitution, was distributed to the SPA Presidium
and the Cabinet respectively.
Presidential authority concerning foreign and external af-
fairs as the Head of State and the Chairman of the CPA was
transferred to the Presidium of SPA, while his authority concern-
ing government management as the head of the executive and
the CPA was given to the Cabinet. Thus, the Cabinet is not only
the highest executive enforcement organ but was also expanded
to become the general State management organ. 52 Although
the Constitution delegated many authorities – with the excep-
tion of military affairs – to other State organs, these designa-
tions have not undermined Kim Jong II’s invincible authority as
top leader of the State. He is the General Secretary of the KWP,
the Chairman of the NDC and the Chief Commander of the Ko-
rean People’s Army.
The other component of constitutional changes is con-
cerned with overcoming North Korea’s grave economic diffi-
culty. For example, social organizations were added to subjects
and lead the work of defending the State system of the socialist country and the destinies of the people and strengthening and increasing the defence ca- pabilities of the country and the State power as a whole through command over all the political, military and economic forces of the country. It is also a sacred, important post which symbolizes and represents the honor of our country and the dignity of the [N]ation.
Kim Jong II’s Election as NDC Chairman Proposed, RODONG SHINMUN [KoREA WORKERS’
PAR’f DAiLY], Sept. 6, 1998, at 1.
50. For a more complete discussion of “military-first politics,” see Dae-Sook Suh, Military First Politics of Kim Jong ll, 26(3) ASIAN PERSP., Sept. 2002, at 145-67.
51. See 1998 CONST. art. 111.
52. Compare 1992 CONST. art. 124 with 1998 CONST. art. 117.

THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH KOREA
that can own the means of production, in addition to the State
and cooperative organizations. 55 On the other hand, the objects
of State ownership were reduced, while those of private owner-
ship as well as those of social and cooperative organizations were
expanded. 54 Citizens can now earn income from legal eco-
nomic activities, in addition to the products of individual side-
line activities, including those from the gardens of cooperative
farmers. 55 This means that citizens can make money through
commercial activities, which has been tolerated after the collapse
of the public rationing system and now legalized by the Constitu-
tion. This amounts to the initial reception of a primitive market
economy. In this regard, creation of citizens’ freedom to travel
should be noticed. 56 Individuals can travel for business as long
as constitutional expression is concerned, although residents still
need licenses to travel. 57 Protection of patent rights, in addition
to existing inventor’s rights and copyrights, was newly included
in consideration of the expanded protection of intellectual
property rights. 58
The new Constitution also strengthens the autonomy of in-
dividual economic entities. “The State shall introduce …[an] independent cost accounting system in the economic manage-
ment system …[and] utilize such economic levers as prime
costs, prices, and profits.” 9 Expansion of an independent enter-
prises method will hopefully bring about expanded autonomy in
the economic management of individual entities. The introduc-
tion of the concepts of costs, prices, and profits is concerned
with the introduction of market economy, although constitution-
alization of these concepts will not bring about a market econ-
omy automatically.
Under the previous Constitution, foreign trade activities
were monopolized by the State. But the current Constitution al-
53. See 1998 CONST. art. 20.
54. See id. arts. 21, 22, 24.
55. Compare 1998 CONST. art. 24 with 1992 CONST. art. 24.
56. 1998 CONST. art. 75. 57. This provision seems to be included to legalize residents’ travel to seek food
during the rampant food crisis since 1994, and the State could not but accept such travel because the crisis was out of control to those who were starving to death. There-
fore, creation of the freedom to travel is the acceptance offait accompli, but does not signify the automatic improvement in citizens’ fundamental rights.
58. See 1998 CONST. art. 74.
59. See id. art. 33.
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1304 FORDHAMINTERNATIONALLAWJOURNAL [Vol. 27:1289
lows social and cooperative organizations to engage in them. 6″
The Constitution also provides constitutional ground for creat-
ing a special economic zone, 61 where foreign investors can enjoy
broader freedom of economic activities. 62 Although the new
Constitution adopted some initial steps needed to begin the first
stage of creating a market economy, retention of the general so-
cialist principle of autarky, as well as the regime’s seemingly
ongoing political inflexibility, still inhibits the rapid growth to-
ward a market economy. These changes were made within toler-
able limits for the regime’s survival without undermining the
current status quo. The current Constitution manifests a di-
lemma which North Korean leaders still face.
CONCLUSION
The Constitution of North Korea is no more than a charac-
ter of the law of North Korea. In North Korea, where the rule of
law does not govern, but the directives and words of leaders and
administrative directives do, legal grounds for State actions are
not sought for their justification. Although the Constitution is
the highest law in form, it functions merely as a tool of propa-
ganda. In other words, the Constitution in North Korea exists
not for the protection of citizens’ rights and interests, but merely
as a tool to showcase the superiority of the State’s system to its
citizens and outside observers alike. In this regard, the mere ex-
istence of a provision for a fundamental right does not guaran-
tee that right. The lack of constitutional ground also does not
indicate the impossibility of action by the State either: the Joint
Venture Act of 1984,63 and widespread travel of residents – in
search of food – before legal provisions were created for such
actions in 1998 are cases-in-point. These situations allow the
State a great deal of discretion in the exercise of its authority. In
addition, the State neither finds any restraint to check its limit-
less exercise of public authority, nor do any such legal mecha-
nisms exist.
However, North Korean leadership has tried to adjust itself
60. See id. art. 36. 61. See id. art. 37. 62. On the basis of this provision, the special laws to create the Mt. Geumgang Tourist Zone, Gaeseong Industrial Complex, and Sinuiju Special Administrative Region
were promulgated in 2002. 63. See 1992 CONsT. art. 37 (providing constitutional ground for such law).

THE CONSTITUTION OF NORTH KOREA
to the new environment via constitutional changes. They have
tried to lessen the gap between law in the book and law in ac-
tion. If an open-door policy is the inevitable option that must be
chosen to overcome the country’s current economic difficulty,
law will be one of the most important vehicles to win over for-
eigners’ trust in the North Korea’s system. Relevance of law in
managing a society should be enhanced in North Korea to draw
foreign attention and entice economic cooperation. Therefore,
the importance of examining the law in North Korea, including
its Constitution, is a rising necessity for all North Korea observ-
ers.
The constitutional history of North Korea suggests that revi-
sions are possible at anytime the country’s leadership decides to
change the direction of State management or keep in step with
environments in flux. The wishes of citizens have not been at
issue and are unlikely to be for some time. This is unfortunate,
but in the perspective of Kim Jong Il’s regime, this makes consti-
tutional revision in North Korea straightforward once the top
leadership makes up its mind.
2004] 1305