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Document Information:
- Year: 2015
- Country: South Sudan
- Language: English
- Document Type: Domestic Law or Regulation
- Topic:
United Nations S /2016/963
Security Council Distr.: General
15 November 2016
Original: English
16 -18889 (E) 161116
*1618889*
Letter dated 15 November 2016 from the Panel of Experts on
South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution
2206 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council
The members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council
resolution 2206 (2015) , whose mandate was extended pursuant to Council resolution
2290 (2016) , have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 12 (d)
of resolution 2290 (2016) , the Panel’s interim report.
T he report was provided to the Security Co uncil Co mmittee established
pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) on 28 October 2016 and was considered by the
Co mmittee on 11 November.
T he Panel wo uld appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought
to th e attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of
the Council .
(Signed ) Payton Knopf
Coordinator
Panel of Experts on South Sudan
(Signed ) Andrews Atta -Asamoah
Expert
(Signed ) Andrei Kolmakov
Expert
(Signed ) Ann Oosterlinck
Expert
(Signed ) Klem Ryan
Expert
S/2016/963
16-18889 2/39
Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan
established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015)
Summary
In the wake of the de facto collapse of the Agreement on the Resolution of the
Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan after the fighting in Juba in July 2016, the
political and security situation in the country has continued to deteriorate markedly,
and t he prospects for an even more catastrophic escalation of violence at the outset of
the dry season in November and December are high. Armed actors on all sides
continue to demonstrate in word and in deed that they are preparing for just such an
escalation.
T he per manent ceasefire envisaged in the Agreement has not been respected by
the parties. Violence is surging in greater Equatoria and has included the systematic
targeting of civilians, gross violations of hu man rights and international humanitarian
law and widespread sexual violence as part of the brutal counter -insurgency
campaign undertaken by the Sudan People’s Liberation Ar my (SPLA) and militias
affiliated with the Sudan People’s Liberation Move ment/Sudan People’s Liberation
Ar my (SPLM/A) in Govern ment led by the President, Salva Kiir. In Central
Equatoria — the seat of the capital, Juba — ar med groups are increasingly targeting
vehicles carrying goods and civilians, many of who m are Dinka, in retaliation for the
government offensive and other polic ies. Co mpo unded b y the intensity of
inflammator y rhetoric b y Dinka and non -Dinka alike in recent weeks, these tactics
have the potential to provoke violent ethnic conflict on an even greater scale.
Fighting is also continuing in Western Bahr el-Ghazal, Upp er Nile and Unity, and
ar ms continue to flo w into the country.
While the flight of the leader of SPLM/A in Opposition, Riek Machar, fro m
South Sudan may give the appearance of the ascendance of Kiir and his inner circle
and may have emboldened these ele ments, deep structural weaknesses within the
regime and SPLA, in addition to an increasing lack of control over large portions of
the country, nevertheless underscore the tenuous nature of his rule. Kiir ’s co -optation
of the Agreement b y placing his proxie s in most positions reserved for SPLM/A in
Opposition members within the Transitional Government of National Unity has
foreclosed a meaningful political and reconciliation process, further dividing the
countr y along tribal lines, given that many non -Dinka co mmunities — and Dinka
alienated b y the regime — see no viable forum to express political dissent, pursue
refor m or ensure their basic security. Provocative policy initiatives, such as Kiir ’s
order of October 2015 to increase the nu mber of states fro m 10 to 28, proposed by
the Jieng Council of Elders and supported and defended b y political figures such as
the Minister of Infor mation and Broadcasting, Michael Makuei, are exacerbating
these divisions.
T his volatility is co mpound ed within Juba b y concerns a bout Kiir ’s health and
the uncertainty of presidential succession. Ru mo urs in mid -October that Kiir had
beco me gravely ill, subsequently proved to be so mewhat exaggerated, raised fears of
possible ar med conflict erupting between various factions over the f uture of the
presidency, notably between the SPLA Chief of General Staff, Paul Malong, and the
S/2016/963
3/39 16-18889
Director General of the Internal Security Bureau of the National Security Service,
Akol Koor, in addition to various other Dinka clans and political affiliates.
T he ar med opposition to Kiir ’s regime is an increasingly multifaceted amalga m
of forces enco mpassing dissident groups with diverse grievances, aims and
approaches to the war. Many of these groups are either not under the direct control of
SPLM/A in Oppo sition led by Machar, which was a party to the Agreement, or are
only loosely affiliated with it. Nevertheless, Machar ’s resilience, notwithstanding the
government attempts to assassinate him in greater Equatoria, has seemingly provided
more motivation for Equatorian ar med elements to associate for mally with SPLM/A
in Opposition. T he perception that the belligerence of Kiir ’s Dinka -do minated
regime is leading the country inexorably to wards a devastating tribal war, coupled
with a sense that the internationa l co mmunity is failing to take the steps necessar y to
avoid a further escalation of the conflict, are providing impetus amo ng non -Dinka
opposition political and militar y forces to wards greater coordination, if not co mplete
organizational unity.
Mass displacements, both internally and across borders, have accelerated in
recent months, with more than 1 million South Sudanese now having sought refuge in
neighbouring countries — 200,000 from greater Equatoria alone between July and
October. a Severe food i nsecurity, approaching famine levels in some areas, affects at
least 4.8 million people, a over one third of the population. Peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations continue to be relentlessly obstructed, principally by civilian
and armed actors affiliated with SPLM/A in Government. Notwithstanding the
purported acceptance by Kiir ’s regime of the regional protection force envisaged under
Security Council resolution 2304 (2016) , his spokesperson publicly rej ected the
proposed troop -contributing countries on 24 October. While Kiir established a
committee on 14 October to facilitate an improvement in humanitarian access within
two weeks, b there had been no evidence of improved access as at the time of
submissio n of the present report on 28 October. In fact, the government has
consistently failed to demonstrate any willingness to alleviate what is by every
empirical measure among the worst country -wide humanitarian emergencies in the
world.
T he extension of th e war also continues to pose an increasingly grave threat to
the country’s neighbours. For example, on 13 August, so me 800 to 900 troops fro m
SPLA Division VI launched an incursion into the Demo cratic Republic of the Congo,
crossing the border and engaging in a battle with SPLM/A in Opposition. On
17 August, two MI -24 helicopters also crossed the border, travelling nearly 6 km into
Congolese territory and again attacking SPLM/A in Opposition positions.
a Data as at 20 October 2016. See “OCHA huma nitarian bulletin South Sudan”, No. 16, 20 October
2016 , a vailable from https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefw eb.int/files/resources/ 1601020 _O CHA_
SouthSudan_huma nitarian_bulletin16.pdf.
b See “President Kiir for ms joint huma nitarian aid deli ver y comm itt ee”, Sudan Tribune , 17 October
2016. Available from w w w.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article60555.
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Contents
Pa g e
I. Background ………………………….. ………………………….. … 5
A. Mandate and appointment ………………………….. ………………. 5
B. Methodology ………………………….. ………………………… 5
II. Extension, expansion and evolution of the war ………………………….. ……. 6
A. Intensification of tribal conflict and incitement ………………………….. .. 7
B. War in greater Equatoria ………………………….. ………………… 11
C. I mplementation of the Agreement ………………………….. …………. 15
D. T hreats to civil society ………………………….. …………………. 16
III. Procurement of ar ms ………………………….. ………………………. 18
IV. Obstruction of and attacks against United Nations and humanitarian missions …………. 20
A. Obstruction of and attacks against the United Nations ………………………. 20
B. Obstruction of and attacks against hu manitarian missions ……………………. 22
V. Collapse of the econo my ………………………….. ……………………. 22
A. Macroecono mic conditions ………………………….. ……………… 22
B. Qatar National Bank case ………………………….. ……………….. 23
C. Oil -swap deals ………………………….. ……………………….. 24
VI. I mplementation of the travel ban and asset freeze ………………………….. …. 24
VII. Reco mmendations ………………………….. ………………………… 24
Annexes*
* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.
S/2016/963
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I. Background
A. Mandate and appointment
1. By its resolution 2206 (2015) , the Security Council imposed a sanctions
regime targeting individuals and entities contributing to the conflict in South Sudan
and established a sanctions co mmittee (Security Council Co mmittee e stablished
pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan). T he Co mmittee
designated six individuals for targeted sanctions on 1 July 2015. T he sanctions
regime was renewed until 31 May 2017 with the adoption by the Council of
resolution 2290 (2016) on 31 May 2016.
2. In establishing the sanctions regime, the Security Council decided that the
sanctions measures, consisting of a travel ban and an asset freeze, wo uld apply to
individuals and/or entities designated by the Co mm ittee as respons ible for, or
co mplicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies
threatening the peace, security or stability of South Sudan.
3. T he Security Council also established a panel of experts (Panel of Experts on
South Sudan) to prov ide infor mation and analysis regarding the implementation of
the resolution. T his includes infor mation relevant to potential designations and
infor mation regarding the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel and
related military or other assi stance, including through illicit trafficking networks, to
individuals and entities under mining political processes or violating international
hu man rights law or international hu manitarian law.
4. On 22 June 2016, follo wing the extension of the Panel’s m andate under
resolution 2290 (2016) , the Secretar y -General, in consultation with the Co mmittee,
appointed the five me mbers of the Panel (see S/2016/563 ): a regi onal affairs expert
(Andrews Atta -Asamoah), an ar med groups expert (Payton Knopf), a natural
resources and finance expert (Andrei Kolmakov), a humanitarian affairs expert
(Anna Oosterlinck) and an ar ms expert (Klem Ryan).
B. Methodology
5. While established by the Security Council, the Panel is an independent bod y
that operates in an objective, fact -based manner and safeguards its work against any
effort to under mine its imp artiality or create a perception of bias. T he full Panel
approved th e text, conclusions and reco mmendations contained herein on the basis
of consensus.
6. T he Panel has been fully committed to ensuring co mpliance with the standards
reco mmended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General
Issues of Sanc tions in its report of December 2006 ( S/2006/997 ). T hose standards
call for reliance on verified, genuine documents, concrete evidence and on -site
observations b y experts, including photographs wherever possible . T he Panel has
corroborated all infor mation contained in the present report using multiple,
independent sources to appropriately meet the highest evidentiar y standard, placing
a higher value on statements by principal actors and first -hand witnesses to ev ents.
S/2016/963
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7. T he Panel has conducted its work with the greatest transparency possible
while maintaining, when requested or when significant safety concerns exist, the
confidentiality of its sources. When a source is described as “confidential” or is not
named herein, the Panel has deter mined that disclosing the source’s identity wo uld
present a credible threat to his or her safety. When a confidential military source is
referred to herein as a “senior” officer or commander in the Sudan People’s Liberation
Ar my (SPLA) or Sudan People’s Liberation Move ment/Sudan People’s Liberation
Ar my (SPLM/A) in Opposition, the source holds a rank between lieutenant colonel
and brigadier general. When a confidential militar y source is referred to as a “high –
ranking” officer or co mmander in SPLA or SPLM/A in Opposition, the source holds
a rank of major general or above. A document is described as confidential when its
disclosure could co mpro mise the safety of the source.
8. To gather, examine and analyse infor mation regarding t he supply, sale or
transfer of ar ms and related materiel, as mandated in resolution 2290 (2016) , the
Panel has used a co mbination of first -hand inspections of ar ms and equip ment,
photographs, other visual evidence, assessments of documentation and numerous
stakeholder interviews. In the absence of an ar ms embargo, for mal inspections of
stockpiles were not possible.
9. T he Panel is co mmitted to the highest degree of fairness and has given
relevant parties t he opportunity, where appropriate and possible, to review and
respond to any infor mation in its report citing those parties.
II. Extension, expansion and evolution of the war
10 . As described both in the Panel’s report of January 2016 ( S/2016/70 ) and its
120 -day report of September 2016 ( S/2016/793 ), the continued belligerence of
SPLM/A in Government, led b y the President, Salva Kiir, and SPLM/A in
Opposition, led b y Riek Machar, remains the principal factor driving the extension
and expansion of the war in South Sudan. Kiir ’s public threat on 19 October to
assume personal co mmand in the field of the campaign against Equatorian militias
and the statement of 23 Sept ember fro m the political bureau of SPLM/A in
Opposition calling for “popular ar med struggle”, which Machar signed, are so me of
the most recent — although far fro m the only — examples of this persistent fact.
11 . T he SPLA Chief of General Staff, Paul Malon g, remains a central figure in the
perpetuation and expansion of the war, including the conflict in greater Equatoria,
described in detail belo w. After the fighting in Juba in July, he oversaw the operation
to hunt down Machar and the SPLM/A in Opposition forces in Central Equatoria. 1
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