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Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2206

United Nations S /2016/963

Security Council Distr.: General
15 November 2016

Original: English

16 -18889 (E) 161116
*1618889*
Letter dated 15 November 2016 from the Panel of Experts on
South Sudan established pursuant to Security Council resolution
2206 (2015) addressed to the President of the Security Council
The members of the Panel of Experts established pursuant to Security Council
resolution 2206 (2015) , whose mandate was extended pursuant to Council resolution
2290 (2016) , have the honour to transmit herewith, in accordance with paragraph 12 (d)
of resolution 2290 (2016) , the Panel’s interim report.
T he report was provided to the Security Co uncil Co mmittee established
pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) on 28 October 2016 and was considered by the
Co mmittee on 11 November.
T he Panel wo uld appreciate it if the present letter and the report were brought
to th e attention of the members of the Security Council and issued as a document of
the Council .

(Signed ) Payton Knopf
Coordinator
Panel of Experts on South Sudan
(Signed ) Andrews Atta -Asamoah
Expert
(Signed ) Andrei Kolmakov
Expert
(Signed ) Ann Oosterlinck
Expert
(Signed ) Klem Ryan
Expert

S/2016/963
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Interim report of the Panel of Experts on South Sudan
established pursuant to Security Council resolution 2206 (2015)
Summary
In the wake of the de facto collapse of the Agreement on the Resolution of the
Conflict in the Republic of South Sudan after the fighting in Juba in July 2016, the
political and security situation in the country has continued to deteriorate markedly,
and t he prospects for an even more catastrophic escalation of violence at the outset of
the dry season in November and December are high. Armed actors on all sides
continue to demonstrate in word and in deed that they are preparing for just such an
escalation.
T he per manent ceasefire envisaged in the Agreement has not been respected by
the parties. Violence is surging in greater Equatoria and has included the systematic
targeting of civilians, gross violations of hu man rights and international humanitarian
law and widespread sexual violence as part of the brutal counter -insurgency
campaign undertaken by the Sudan People’s Liberation Ar my (SPLA) and militias
affiliated with the Sudan People’s Liberation Move ment/Sudan People’s Liberation
Ar my (SPLM/A) in Govern ment led by the President, Salva Kiir. In Central
Equatoria — the seat of the capital, Juba — ar med groups are increasingly targeting
vehicles carrying goods and civilians, many of who m are Dinka, in retaliation for the
government offensive and other polic ies. Co mpo unded b y the intensity of
inflammator y rhetoric b y Dinka and non -Dinka alike in recent weeks, these tactics
have the potential to provoke violent ethnic conflict on an even greater scale.
Fighting is also continuing in Western Bahr el-Ghazal, Upp er Nile and Unity, and
ar ms continue to flo w into the country.
While the flight of the leader of SPLM/A in Opposition, Riek Machar, fro m
South Sudan may give the appearance of the ascendance of Kiir and his inner circle
and may have emboldened these ele ments, deep structural weaknesses within the
regime and SPLA, in addition to an increasing lack of control over large portions of
the country, nevertheless underscore the tenuous nature of his rule. Kiir ’s co -optation
of the Agreement b y placing his proxie s in most positions reserved for SPLM/A in
Opposition members within the Transitional Government of National Unity has
foreclosed a meaningful political and reconciliation process, further dividing the
countr y along tribal lines, given that many non -Dinka co mmunities — and Dinka
alienated b y the regime — see no viable forum to express political dissent, pursue
refor m or ensure their basic security. Provocative policy initiatives, such as Kiir ’s
order of October 2015 to increase the nu mber of states fro m 10 to 28, proposed by
the Jieng Council of Elders and supported and defended b y political figures such as
the Minister of Infor mation and Broadcasting, Michael Makuei, are exacerbating
these divisions.
T his volatility is co mpound ed within Juba b y concerns a bout Kiir ’s health and
the uncertainty of presidential succession. Ru mo urs in mid -October that Kiir had
beco me gravely ill, subsequently proved to be so mewhat exaggerated, raised fears of
possible ar med conflict erupting between various factions over the f uture of the
presidency, notably between the SPLA Chief of General Staff, Paul Malong, and the

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Director General of the Internal Security Bureau of the National Security Service,
Akol Koor, in addition to various other Dinka clans and political affiliates.
T he ar med opposition to Kiir ’s regime is an increasingly multifaceted amalga m
of forces enco mpassing dissident groups with diverse grievances, aims and
approaches to the war. Many of these groups are either not under the direct control of
SPLM/A in Oppo sition led by Machar, which was a party to the Agreement, or are
only loosely affiliated with it. Nevertheless, Machar ’s resilience, notwithstanding the
government attempts to assassinate him in greater Equatoria, has seemingly provided
more motivation for Equatorian ar med elements to associate for mally with SPLM/A
in Opposition. T he perception that the belligerence of Kiir ’s Dinka -do minated
regime is leading the country inexorably to wards a devastating tribal war, coupled
with a sense that the internationa l co mmunity is failing to take the steps necessar y to
avoid a further escalation of the conflict, are providing impetus amo ng non -Dinka
opposition political and militar y forces to wards greater coordination, if not co mplete
organizational unity.
Mass displacements, both internally and across borders, have accelerated in
recent months, with more than 1 million South Sudanese now having sought refuge in
neighbouring countries — 200,000 from greater Equatoria alone between July and
October. a Severe food i nsecurity, approaching famine levels in some areas, affects at
least 4.8 million people, a over one third of the population. Peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations continue to be relentlessly obstructed, principally by civilian
and armed actors affiliated with SPLM/A in Government. Notwithstanding the
purported acceptance by Kiir ’s regime of the regional protection force envisaged under
Security Council resolution 2304 (2016) , his spokesperson publicly rej ected the
proposed troop -contributing countries on 24 October. While Kiir established a
committee on 14 October to facilitate an improvement in humanitarian access within
two weeks, b there had been no evidence of improved access as at the time of
submissio n of the present report on 28 October. In fact, the government has
consistently failed to demonstrate any willingness to alleviate what is by every
empirical measure among the worst country -wide humanitarian emergencies in the
world.
T he extension of th e war also continues to pose an increasingly grave threat to
the country’s neighbours. For example, on 13 August, so me 800 to 900 troops fro m
SPLA Division VI launched an incursion into the Demo cratic Republic of the Congo,
crossing the border and engaging in a battle with SPLM/A in Opposition. On
17 August, two MI -24 helicopters also crossed the border, travelling nearly 6 km into
Congolese territory and again attacking SPLM/A in Opposition positions.

a Data as at 20 October 2016. See “OCHA huma nitarian bulletin South Sudan”, No. 16, 20 October
2016 , a vailable from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefw eb.int/files/resources/ 1601020 _O CHA_
SouthSudan_huma nitarian_bulletin16.pdf.
b See “President Kiir for ms joint huma nitarian aid deli ver y comm itt ee”, Sudan Tribune , 17 October
2016. Available from w w w.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article60555.

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Contents
Pa g e
I. Background ………………………….. ………………………….. … 5
A. Mandate and appointment ………………………….. ………………. 5
B. Methodology ………………………….. ………………………… 5
II. Extension, expansion and evolution of the war ………………………….. ……. 6
A. Intensification of tribal conflict and incitement ………………………….. .. 7
B. War in greater Equatoria ………………………….. ………………… 11
C. I mplementation of the Agreement ………………………….. …………. 15
D. T hreats to civil society ………………………….. …………………. 16
III. Procurement of ar ms ………………………….. ………………………. 18
IV. Obstruction of and attacks against United Nations and humanitarian missions …………. 20
A. Obstruction of and attacks against the United Nations ………………………. 20
B. Obstruction of and attacks against hu manitarian missions ……………………. 22
V. Collapse of the econo my ………………………….. ……………………. 22
A. Macroecono mic conditions ………………………….. ……………… 22
B. Qatar National Bank case ………………………….. ……………….. 23
C. Oil -swap deals ………………………….. ……………………….. 24
VI. I mplementation of the travel ban and asset freeze ………………………….. …. 24
VII. Reco mmendations ………………………….. ………………………… 24
Annexes*

* The annexes are being circulated in the language of submission only and without formal editing.

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I. Background
A. Mandate and appointment
1. By its resolution 2206 (2015) , the Security Council imposed a sanctions
regime targeting individuals and entities contributing to the conflict in South Sudan
and established a sanctions co mmittee (Security Council Co mmittee e stablished
pursuant to resolution 2206 (2015) concerning South Sudan). T he Co mmittee
designated six individuals for targeted sanctions on 1 July 2015. T he sanctions
regime was renewed until 31 May 2017 with the adoption by the Council of
resolution 2290 (2016) on 31 May 2016.
2. In establishing the sanctions regime, the Security Council decided that the
sanctions measures, consisting of a travel ban and an asset freeze, wo uld apply to
individuals and/or entities designated by the Co mm ittee as respons ible for, or
co mplicit in, or having engaged in, directly or indirectly, actions or policies
threatening the peace, security or stability of South Sudan.
3. T he Security Council also established a panel of experts (Panel of Experts on
South Sudan) to prov ide infor mation and analysis regarding the implementation of
the resolution. T his includes infor mation relevant to potential designations and
infor mation regarding the supply, sale or transfer of arms and related materiel and
related military or other assi stance, including through illicit trafficking networks, to
individuals and entities under mining political processes or violating international
hu man rights law or international hu manitarian law.
4. On 22 June 2016, follo wing the extension of the Panel’s m andate under
resolution 2290 (2016) , the Secretar y -General, in consultation with the Co mmittee,
appointed the five me mbers of the Panel (see S/2016/563 ): a regi onal affairs expert
(Andrews Atta -Asamoah), an ar med groups expert (Payton Knopf), a natural
resources and finance expert (Andrei Kolmakov), a humanitarian affairs expert
(Anna Oosterlinck) and an ar ms expert (Klem Ryan).

B. Methodology
5. While established by the Security Council, the Panel is an independent bod y
that operates in an objective, fact -based manner and safeguards its work against any
effort to under mine its imp artiality or create a perception of bias. T he full Panel
approved th e text, conclusions and reco mmendations contained herein on the basis
of consensus.
6. T he Panel has been fully committed to ensuring co mpliance with the standards
reco mmended by the Informal Working Group of the Security Council on General
Issues of Sanc tions in its report of December 2006 ( S/2006/997 ). T hose standards
call for reliance on verified, genuine documents, concrete evidence and on -site
observations b y experts, including photographs wherever possible . T he Panel has
corroborated all infor mation contained in the present report using multiple,
independent sources to appropriately meet the highest evidentiar y standard, placing
a higher value on statements by principal actors and first -hand witnesses to ev ents.

S/2016/963
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7. T he Panel has conducted its work with the greatest transparency possible
while maintaining, when requested or when significant safety concerns exist, the
confidentiality of its sources. When a source is described as “confidential” or is not
named herein, the Panel has deter mined that disclosing the source’s identity wo uld
present a credible threat to his or her safety. When a confidential military source is
referred to herein as a “senior” officer or commander in the Sudan People’s Liberation
Ar my (SPLA) or Sudan People’s Liberation Move ment/Sudan People’s Liberation
Ar my (SPLM/A) in Opposition, the source holds a rank between lieutenant colonel
and brigadier general. When a confidential militar y source is referred to as a “high –
ranking” officer or co mmander in SPLA or SPLM/A in Opposition, the source holds
a rank of major general or above. A document is described as confidential when its
disclosure could co mpro mise the safety of the source.
8. To gather, examine and analyse infor mation regarding t he supply, sale or
transfer of ar ms and related materiel, as mandated in resolution 2290 (2016) , the
Panel has used a co mbination of first -hand inspections of ar ms and equip ment,
photographs, other visual evidence, assessments of documentation and numerous
stakeholder interviews. In the absence of an ar ms embargo, for mal inspections of
stockpiles were not possible.
9. T he Panel is co mmitted to the highest degree of fairness and has given
relevant parties t he opportunity, where appropriate and possible, to review and
respond to any infor mation in its report citing those parties.

II. Extension, expansion and evolution of the war
10 . As described both in the Panel’s report of January 2016 ( S/2016/70 ) and its
120 -day report of September 2016 ( S/2016/793 ), the continued belligerence of
SPLM/A in Government, led b y the President, Salva Kiir, and SPLM/A in
Opposition, led b y Riek Machar, remains the principal factor driving the extension
and expansion of the war in South Sudan. Kiir ’s public threat on 19 October to
assume personal co mmand in the field of the campaign against Equatorian militias
and the statement of 23 Sept ember fro m the political bureau of SPLM/A in
Opposition calling for “popular ar med struggle”, which Machar signed, are so me of
the most recent — although far fro m the only — examples of this persistent fact.
11 . T he SPLA Chief of General Staff, Paul Malon g, remains a central figure in the
perpetuation and expansion of the war, including the conflict in greater Equatoria,
described in detail belo w. After the fighting in Juba in July, he oversaw the operation
to hunt down Machar and the SPLM/A in Opposition forces in Central Equatoria. 1
7 KH ,QWHUQDO 6HFXULW %XUHDX RI WKH 1DWLRQDO 6HFXULW 6HUYLFH XQGHU WKH FR PPDQG
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12 . T he extension of the war continues to pose an increasingly grave threat to the
countries that neighbour South Sudan. For example, after a long series of skir mishes
__________________
1 Confidential interviews with tw o high -ranking SPLA officers conducted in September and
October 2016.

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between SP LA and SPLM/A in Opposition in Central and Western Equatoria after
Machar fled fro m Juba in July, Machar and so me 750 soldiers and civilians entered
the Democratic Republic of the Congo. T he Panel has confir med that, on 13 August,
SPLA then launched an incursion into the Democratic Republic of the Congo. An
estimated 800 to 900 SPLA troops fro m Division VI crossed the border and engaged
in a battle with SPLM/A in Opposition. On 17 August, two MI -24 helicopters also
crossed the border, travelling nearly 6 km into Congolese territor y and again
attacking SPLM/A in Opposition positions. As the Panel noted in its report of
September 2016 ( S/2016/793 ), whi le the helicopters are under Malong’s direct
co mmand, it is implausible that they are deployed without Kiir ’s full kno wledge and
approval, in particular given the gravity of an operation that encroached into the
territory and airspace of another Member Sta te.

A. Intensification of tribal conflict and incitement
13 . As previously documented by the Panel, the war is increasingly characterized
by the targeting of civilians on a tribal basis, given that it has evolved into what is
widely perceived to be a zero -sum confrontation between the Dinka and non -Dinka
tribes in many areas. T his dynamic has beco me even more pronounced since SPLA
pursued Machar through Equatoria in July and August and the emergence of greater
Equatoria as the new epicentre of the war .
14 . Kiir ’s order to increase the nu mber of states fro m 10 to 28, thereby unilaterally
redrawing many well -established co mmunity boundaries, negative perceptions
associated with the activities of the Jieng (Dinka) Council of Elders 2DQG WKH
EUXWDOLW RI IRUFHV OR DO WR .LLU ?V UHJLPH DUH WKH PDMRU GULYHUV RI DQWL -Dinka
sentiment in the country. 3)RU H[DPSOH PDQ QRQ -Dinka co mmunities perceive the
28 -states order as an initiative of the Jieng Council of Elders to grant more land to
the Dinka. 4,Q KLV  2FW REHU UHVLJQDWLRQ OHWWHU DV D GHSXW FKLHI RI JHQHUDO VWDII RI
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T he government of Salva Kiir is no w only concerned with one thing and that
one this is 28 states which is the only concern of Jieng Council of Elders and
they are ready to shed blood with all those who want the order reversed in
order for them to get back their annex lands.
15 . He concluded: “I have decided to join my co mmunity in their agony and will
decide together with them whether our lands should be allo wed to be taken by
Dinka simply because the president hails fro m Dinka.”
__________________
2 For more detail on the Jieng Council of Elders, see S/2016/793 .
3 In mid -Septemb er, a Cabinet minister told the Panel that Kiir and the First Vice -President, Taba n
Deng Gai, were planning to announce a further increase in the number of states in late October,
from 28 to 36.
4 Confidential interviews with a N uer academic, an SPLA general, a civil society acti vist and an
Equatorian academic, August 2016.

S/2016/963
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16 . Over the course of th e war, SPLA has beco me dominated by Dinka, in
particular Dinka fro m greater Bahr el-Ghazal. While other tribes are represented in
SPLA, they are increasingly marginalized, rendering the multi -tribal structure of the
ar my largely a façade that obscures the central role that Dinka no w play in virtually
all major theatres of the conflict. 5,Q D VSHHFK WR 63/0 SDUW PHPEHUV RQ
 October, Kiir in fact alluded to the predo minantly Dinka character of SPLA b y
asking rhetorically that, if “Nuers have left with Riek Machar and Equatorians have
refused to join the ar my, how should I get other people to join the ar my?” He also
railed against Equatorians, who m he blamed for instigating instability in an attemp t
to encourage United Nations intervention in the country and , saying “we will not
just sit in Juba, we will go out”, threatened to take personal co mmand of the
counter -insurgency campaign in Yei, Central Equatoria.
17 . Incitement to violence has also increased as part of the intensification of the
tribal conflict. Follo wing the killing of Dinka civilians in an ambush on the Juba –
Yei road in October, an attack on three buses transporting civilians, including many
Dinka, on the Juba -Nimule road and subsequent reports of the targeting of Dinka in
Western Equatoria, 6LQFLWHPHQW IUR P ERWK (TXDWRULDQ DQG ’LQND FR PPXQLWLHV
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18 . For example, an open letter dated 4 October purportedly fro m a member of the
“Jieng Youth Union” threatened that “we the youth of Jieng are tired of this act and
as per no w, we urged all Equatorians and other tribes who have declared war against
us to leave our areas before designated dateline elapses”. A subsequent letter,
apparently fro m the same source, called for atrocities against their tribespeople to
stop “o ther wise they will regret the retaliation” and that Dinka yo ung people “will
not tolerate and keep silence while their people are being killed on daily basis”. 7
$QRWKHU JURXS FDOOLQJ LWVHOI WKH ?$QJU <RXWK RI IRU PHU 1RUWKHUQ %DKU HO *KD]DO? LVVXHG D ZDUQL QJLQD OHWWHU FLUFXODWHGWR QRQ -governmental organizations in the area on 14 October, stating the follo wing: We are going to take a quick revenge attack against Equatorians anywhere and any place fro m no w on. We will find you and kill you. We will despicably and barbarically kill you. We will also humiliate you like it is never done before. We will gruesomely cut you like what your people did to our mothers and children on Equatoria roads. Retaliation attack MUST begin right now! ONE NATION, ONE PEOPLE is DE AD. T he consequences will graphically and horrifically huge. __________________ 5 Conf idential interviews with four high -ranking SP LA officers, July and August 2016, and a for mer high -ranking SPLA officer, September 2016. 6 See “ Dinka Council of Elders condemns Juba -Yei a mbush attack”, Radio Ta mazuj, 10 October 2016. Available from https ://radiota mazuj.org/en/article/dinka -council -elders -condemns -juba - yei -ambush -attack . 7 Letter written by the “Jieng Youth Union” in condemnation of the killing of ci vilians on the Juba -Yei road, 11 October 2016, signed b y Garang Madut Apiin and Sa muel M arial Dongrin. S/2016/963 9/39 16-18889 19 . Another letter circulated in Aweil, Northe rn Bahr el-Ghazal, in mid -October by the “Greater Aweil Vigilant Syndicate” stated: We are issuing a 168 hour (7 days and nights) ultimatum to all Equatorians — Wo men, Men & Her maphrodite, young & old, and any other unmentioned categor y to gather their b elongings and embark on their journey back to Equatoria in peace and piece or else risk being carried back ho me in coffins as a luggage … As of no w, we are deploying our units at strategic points as they await to launch the vengeance. 20 . A statement post ed online on 16 October claiming to be fro m a section of Equatorian young people threatened that “any Equatorian lives taken in Dinkaland or anywhere shall receive shift and deter mined response that every Dinka in the territories of Equatoria will co me to kno w”. After noting what the author describes as “injustices perpetrated by the Dinka upon the people of Equatoria, as it has been sho wn recently in the Dinka Plan against the non -Dinka, including Equatoria; master minded b y Dinka Co uncil of Elders; impleme nted b y the tribal Government, presided upon b y Kiir that sought to enshrine Dinka supremacy over other tribes”, the statement instructed that “Dinka must leave Equatoria immediately” and that “Equatoria has taken enough loses, are fed up, and enough is en ough”. 8 21 . A similar threat issued on 17 October, purportedly b y Dinka young people in Eastern Nile, gave all Equatorians seven days to leave the state and threatened that other wise “we will apply the same practices to yo u on our roads, don’t take this f or granted but wait and see”. While condemning the targeting of Dinka and seeking to draw the attention of the international co mmunity to their restraint and co mmitment to peace, another group calling itself the “Jieng Co mmu nity in East Africa” released a widely circulated press statement on 20 October in which it noted that “Dinka people are being targeted because of their ethnicity and therefore are entitled to self -defense unless the groups behind the killings stop the activities of extra -judicial killin gs with immediate effect”. A threat issued on 24 October by the “Greater Bahr El Ghazal Youth in Wau State” to Equatorians working in the area stated that the “time for retaliation has come to its mature stage, which will be effective as soon as possible”. T he letter urged “all the Equatorians to evacuate Bahr el Ghazal within 72 hours effective fro m the date of this letter”. 22 . Reacting to the ambushes of Dinka civilians in greater Equatoria, the Minister of Infor mation and Broadcasting, Michael Makuei, threatened reprisal attacks by SPLA against the Equatorian co mmunities deemed to be harbouring SPLM/A in Opposition forces, declaring in a press release fro m the Office of the Spokesperson of the Transitional Government of National Unity on 12 October that “the Government may be forced to respond b y hunting do wn those who are hiding within the co mmunities” and that “the Government may be forced to take measures that may not be favoured b y the co mmunities in order to stem these elements fro m the co mmunities” . A leading member of the Jieng Co uncil of Elders, Aldo Ajou Deng Akuey, had also claimed publicly at the end of September that Dinka were being __________________ 8 A cop y of the letter is available from w w w.southsudanliberty.com/ news/index.php/latest - news/1302 -it-is-ti me -for -dinka -to-lea ve -equatoria -and -now . S/2016/963 16-18889 10/39 physically targeted by “organized tribal terrorists in Central Equatoria” and said that “it has to stop other wi se the response would be disastrous”. 9 23 . Derogatory tribal epithets are increasingly used b y one tribe against the other, signifying the extent to which so me of the tribes are dehu manizing one another. Dinka refer to Nuer as “rebels” and “Pig Nuers” and to Equatorians as “co wards” and “nya m -nyam”, meaning, among other things, “cannibal”. 10(TXDWRULDQV UHIHU WR 'LQND DV ?ODQG JUDEEHUV? ?IRUELGGHQ JRRGV? ?XQZDQWHG JRRGV? RU ?07 1? DQ DSSURSULDWLRQ RI WKH PRELOH SKRQH FR PSDQ?V VORJDQ ?HYHU ZKHUH RX JR? 111XHU V KDYH FRUUXSWHG WKH 'LQND ZRUG ?-LHQJ? 'LQND  LQWR ?-LDQJ? D ZRUG PHDQLQJ ?VODYH?LQWKH1XHUODQJXDJH 24 . Social media has been used by partisans on all sides, including so me senior government officials, to exaggerate incidents, spread falsehood s and veiled threats or post outright messages of incitement. In a meeting in June with the Minister of Defence and Veterans’ Affairs, Kuol Manyang, and the SPLA Chief of General Staff, Paul Malong, the latter sho wed the Panel a video on his mobile phone o f what he alleged was the murder of a group of “Dinka in Central Equatoria” and claimed that he had first -hand witnesses verifying the video’s authenticity. T he Panel has been unable to deter mine the exact origin of the video. T he video has, ho wever, circu lated on social media, and investigations into its content do not support the government claims regarding the location, the timing or the ethnicity of the victims. 25 . Figure I belo w depicts screenshots fro m social media illustrating so me of the online in citement examined b y the Panel during its investigations (see annex II for additional examples). __________________ 9 See “ Dinka Council of Elders w arns disastrous war in South Sudan”, Radio Ta mazuj, 30 Septemb er 2016. Available from https://radiota mazuj.org/en/article/dinka -council -elders - warns -disastrous -war -south -sudan . 10 The word “ nya m -nya m” is used by both Nuer and Dinka and can mean both “cannibal” or, in recent usage, “food lover”. 11 These na mes were extracted from numerous social media posts by South Sudanese of var ying ethnicities. S/2016/963 11/39 16-18889 Figure I Social media screenshots B. War in greater Equatoria 26 . As described in the Panel’s report of January 2016 ( S/2016/70 ), with the exception of Juba, greater Equatoria had been largely unaffected during the first 14 mo nths of the war. Beginning in the second half of 2015, ho wever, violence in the region spiked as a result of territorial disputes between Equatorian co mmunities and Dinka pastoralists who were backed b y SPLA. T he resulting hostilities have been co mpounded by the lack of implementation of the Agreement, including the government’s initial refusal to canton oppos ition forces in greater Equatoria as part of the security arrange ments; Dinka do mination of the political and security S/2016/963 16-18889 12/39 institutions of the government coupled with Equatorian marginalization; and the disruption of Equatorian agriculture and trade o wing to the expanding conflict. 12 27 . T hese trends accelerated dramatically follo wing the violence in Juba in July. As at the beginning of October, at least 200,000 refugees had fled fro m South Sudan to Uganda since July, of who m an estimated 150,000 were fro m Equatoria — a clear indicator of the severity of the security situation in that region. Another 120,000 Equatorians were estimated to be displaced internally. 132Q WKH EDVLV R I LQWHUYLHZV ZLWK UH FHQW (TXDWRULDQ UHIXJHHV DQG QHDUO D GR]HQ 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV DQG KX PDQLWDULDQ VWDII ZRUNLQJ LQ RU YLVLWLQJ WKH DUHD WKH 3DQHO KDV FRQFOXGHG WKDW DWURFLWLHV DQG JURVV YLRODWLRQV RI KX PDQ ULJKWV DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO KXPDQLWDULDQ ODZ DUH WDNLQJ SODFH ZKLFK KDYH RQO IXUWKHU GHHSHQHG (TXDWRULDQ DQLPRVLW WR ZDUGV .LLU ?VUHJLPH 28 . So me of the most severe violence in the weeks immediately preceding the sub mission of the present report occurred in Central Equatoria, the seat of the capital, Juba. In one case in lat e August, SPLA reportedly pursued and captured 20 civilians in Katigiri Paya m, Wonduruba County, on account of their alleged support for SPLM/A in Op position. 147KH FLYLOLDQV LQFOXGLQJ WZR ERV RI  DQG  years of age and two older men of over 65 years o f age, were executed at the SPLA barracks. Another witness told the Panel ho w fo rces affiliated with SPLM/A in Government had razed the village of Lobonok on 4 September. 15$Q HOGHUO  VXUYLYRU IOHG IUR P .HQL 3DDP /DLQD &RXQW WR 8JDQGD WKDW GD DQG GHV FULEHG KLGLQJLQWKHEXVKDV63/$ VROGLHUVDWWDFNHGKLVYLOODJHDQGORRWHGDOOYDOXDEOHV+H UHSRUWHG ODWHU VHHLQJ WKHERGLHV RI IRXU PHQ DQGD ZR PDQ E WKHURDGVLGH DV KH IOHG WR8JDQGD 16 29 . Yei County and the to wn of Yei have been particularly affected b y this recent violence. T he Panel has received nu merous reports of indiscriminate targeting of civilians in Yei b y ar med forces affiliated with SPLM/A in Government, including extrajudicial killings, rapes, abductions, arbitrary arrests and detentions, t orture, beatings, harassment and intimidation, looting and destruction of civilian properties (including burning do wn ho uses) and livelihoods. 17 30 . T he deplo yment to Yei of SPLA units under Malong’s co mmand in late 2015, allegedly at the governor ’s reques t in order to address rising insecurity on the roads, was a turning point. T hose units consisted almost exclusively of Dinka fro m greater __________________ 12 Confidential interviews with a U nited Nations source, an SPLM/A official, two senior SPLM/A in Opposition officers and nearly 20 Equatorian refugees in Nai robi and Ka mpala, September and October 2016. 13 See the protection situation update on Yei and the surrounding area, dated 7 October 2016, available from w w w.humanitarianresponse.info/en/s ystem/files/documents/files/protection_ cluster -update_on_ yei_and_ surrounding_area_7_october_2016.pdf. According to UN HCR in Uganda in its emergenc y update on the South Sudanese refugee situation (No. 52, covering the period 22-24 October 2016), in October an average of 2,376 new arrivals fled from South Sudan to Uganda ever y da y. 14 Infor mation provided b y a confidential U nited Nations source. 15 Confidential interview with a refugee from Lobonok in Ka mpala, October 2016. 16 Confidential interview with a refugee from Kenyi Pa ya m, Lainya Count y, in Ka mpala, October 2016. 17 Confidential interviews with United Nations sources and 12 refugees from Yei Count y in Nairobi and Ka mpala, Septemb er and October 2016. S/2016/963 13/39 16-18889 Bahr el -Ghazal. 187KH VKRRWLQJ RQ  0D  E  63/$ RI D &DWKROLF QXQ ZKR  GLHG D IHZ GDV ODWHU IXUWKHU DJJUDYDWHG WHQVLRQV EHWZHHQ WKH ORFDO FR PPXQLW DQG JRYHUQPHQW -affiliated security forces. 19$IWHU WKH YLROHQFH LQ -XED LQ -XO LQWHQVH ILJKWLQJ EHWZHHQ 63/$ DQG 63/0$ LQ 2SSRVLWLRQ LQ WKH WR ZQ RI <HL DQG DUHDV VRXWK RI WKH WR ZQ LQ /DVX 3DDP WKHQ SUHFLSLWDWHG D ZDY H RI PDVV GLVSODFHPHQW WR 8JDQGDWKH'HPRFUDWLF5HSXEOLFRIWKH&RQJRDQG-XED 20 31 . In July and August, SPLA began to force people in the villages surrounding Yei into the to wn, purportedly to enable operations to drive out rebel forces. SPL A subsequent ly set up checkpoints on all main access roads into the to wn. Internally displaced persons and host co mmunities, irrespective of ethnicity, were not allo wed to leave to tend to their properties or far mland, which led to food shortages. 21 ,QGLYLGXDOV RXWVLGH WKH WR ZQ ZKR ZHUH GHHPHG E  JRYHUQPHQW VHFXULW IRUFHV WR EH DIILOLDWHG ZLWK 63/0$ LQ 2SSRVLWLRQ ZHUH DW ULVN RI EHLQJ EHDWHQ RU NLOOHG 22 $FFRUGLQJ WR VR PH RI WKH DFFRXQWV RI WKRVH ZKR PDQDJHG WR IOHH IUR P <HL 63/$ ZDV DOVR WDUJHWLQJ IRU DWWDFN DQ FLYL OLDQV LQ WKH WRZQ ZKR ZHUH VXVSHFWHG RI VXSSRUWLQJWKHRSSRVLWLRQ 23 32 . A humanitarian assessment mission undertaken by United Nations and hu manitarian agencies visited Yei fro m 6 to 8 September. T he mission reported “violent attacks — including killings of civilians using machetes and guns, abductions, sexual violence, forced recruitment and mistreatment by ar med __________________ 18 Confidential interviews with a for mer SPLM/A official in Nairobi, Septemb er 2016, and an Equatorian reli gious leader and a United Nations source in Ka mpala, October 2016. 19 See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “ Inter -agenc y rapid needs assess ment report: Yei, Central Equatoria (6 -8 September 2016), available from http://reliefweb.int/s ites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/160923_ yei_irna_report.pdf; Panel inter view with Equatorian religious leader in Ka mpala, October 2016; Fredrick Nzwili and Megan Cornw ell, “ Slovakian missionar y sister shot in South Sudan”, Tablet , 19 Ma y 2016, available from w w w.thetablet.co.uk/news/5577/0/slovakian -missionar y -sister -shot -in-south - sudan; and “ Nun dies after being shot in South Sudan”, IO L, 20 May 2016, available from ww w.iol.co.za/news/africa/nun -dies -after -being -shot -in-south -sudan -2024270 . 20 See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “ Inter -agenc y rapid needs assess ment report: Yei, Central Equatoria (6 -8 September 2016)”, a vailable from http://reliefweb.int/sites/ reliefw eb.int/files/resources/160923_ yei_irna_report.pdf . 21 UN M ISS noted in a statement of 10 October that it was “concerned at the huma nitarian crisis unfolding, with a population una ble to move freel y, tend to their far ms, or feed themsel ves, due to various restrictions on their movement, and the inabilit y of huma n itarian partners to freel y access the area and provide much needed assistance”. See https://unmiss.unmissions.org/unmiss - statement -yei -call -immediate -cessation -hostilities . A group of Yei churches launched an emergenc y huma nitarian appeal in late August ow ing to food shortages and an absence of huma nitarian ser vices, including medicine and education. See “ Yei churches fear ‘massi ve exodus’ after desperate huma nitarian situation”, Radio Ta mazuj, 24 August 2016, a vailable from https://radiota mazuj.org/en/arti cle/ yei -churches -fear -“ massi ve -exodus” -after -desperate - huma nitarian -situation . 22 See the protection situation update on Yei and the surrounding area, dated 7 October 2016, available from w w w.humanitarianresponse.info/en/s ystem/files/documents/files/prot ection_ cluster -update_on_ yei_and_surrounding_area_7_october_2016.pdf. Confir med b y multiple inter views with United Nations personnel, Equatorian refugees, an Equatorian religious leader and four for mer SPLM/A officials. 23 Confidential interviews with 1 2 refugees from Yei County in Nairobi and Ka mpala, Septemb er and October 2016. S/2016/963 16-18889 14/39 actors”. 242Q  6HSWHPEHU WKH 2IILFH RI WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV +LJK &R PPLVVLRQHU IRU 5HIXJHHV 81+&5  LVVXHG D VWDWHPHQW FLWLQJ ?KRUULILF YLROHQFH DJDLQVW FLYLOLDQV … including assault, targeted killing, mutilation, looting and burning of property”, stating that “several civilians have been hacked to death, including wo men and infants”, and that “there are reports that many young men, aged between 17 and 30, have been arrested on suspicion of siding with the opposition”. 25,W KDV IXUWKHU QRWHG LWV FRQFHUQ DERXW ?DQ HVWLPDWHG  SHRSOH UHSRUWHGO WUDSSHG LQ <HL WR ZQ LQ 6RXWK 6XGDQ DQG FRQWLQXHG UHSRUWV RI URDG EORFNV KLQGHULQJ WUDYHO WR  WKHERUGHU V? 26 33 . In September, the South Sudan protection cluster 27GHVFULEHG UHSRUWV R I XQODZIXO GHWHQWLRQ DQG LPS ULVRQPHQW LQ DUHDV DURXQG<HL 28,W QRWHG LQ 2FWREHU WKDW ?UHSRUWV RI GHWHQWLRQV DQG GLVDSSHDUDQFHV RI RXQJ PHQ FRQWLQXH WR FDXVH IHDU? 29 7 KH 3DQHO L QWHUYLHZHG WKUHH RXQJ SHRSOH IUR P <HL &RXQW ZKR GHVFULEHG KDYLQJ EHHQ WKUHDWHQHG DQG KDUDVVHG E JRYHUQPHQW DFWRUV RQ VXVSLFLRQ RI VXSSRUWLQJ WKH RSSRVLWLRQ 2QH UHIXJHH LQWHUYLHZHG E  WKH 3DQHO FODLPHG WR NQR Z DSSUR[LPDWHO PHQZKRKDGEHHQGHWDLQHG DWXQNQR ZQORFDWLRQVE63/$VLQFHPLG -July. 30 34 . T here have also been numerous reports of conflict -related sexual violence as wo men return to their ho mes seeking food. 312QH UHIXJHH IUR P /DLQD &RXQW WROG WKH 3DQHO DERXW ZLWQHVVLQJ WKH UDSH RI KLV VLVWHU DQG DQRWKHU  -year -old wo man by forces affiliated with SP LM/A in Government. Another witness described seeing a wo man being raped by unifor med men and the bodies of several children as he fled fro m Juba to Uganda through the Yei area in July. 32$FFRUGLQJ WR D FRQILGHQWLDO 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV VRXUFH RQ  6HSWHPEHU ILYH 63/$ VROGLHUV UHSRUWHGO DEGXFWHG UDSHG DQG NLOOHG D  -year -old girl and two wo men who were going to a local market in Yei County. __________________ 24 See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “ Inter -agenc y rapid needs assess ment report: Yei, Central Equatoria (6 -8 September 2016)”, a vailable from http://re liefweb.int/sites/ reliefw eb.int/files/resources/160923_ yei_irna_report.pdf . 25 Available from w w w.unhcr.org/57ee25224.ht ml. Also on 10 October, U NM ISS issued a statement in which it expressed extreme concern about the situation in Yei , noting that it ha d received “deeply disturbing reports of horrific violence perpetrated against innocent and vulnerable civilians, including women and infants”. See https://unmiss.unmi ssions.org/unmiss -statement - yei -call -immediate -cessation -hostilities . 26 See the U N HCR South Sudan regional emergenc y update, covering the period 16 -30 September 2016, a vailable from http://data.unhcr.org/SouthSudan/regional.php . 27 The South Sudan protection cluster coordinates huma nitarian protection acti vities on community protection, g ender -based violence, child protection, protection of ci vilians, rule of law, mine action and land issues across South Sudan. Based in Juba, it is coordinated by U N HCR and the Norw egian Refugee Council. See ww w.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south -sudan/ protection . 28 See the protection cluster update on the Juba crisis and the expansion of the conflict, dated 16 Septemb er 2016, available from w w w.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south -sudan/ document/south -sudan -protection -cluster -situation -update -16092016 . 29 See the protection situation update on Yei and the surrounding area, dated 7 October 2016, available from w w w.humanitarianresponse.info/en/operations/south -sudan/document/protection - cluster -update -yei -and -surrounding -area -7-october -2016 . 30 Confidential interview with a refugee from Juba in Nairobi, September 2016. 31 Confidential interview s with United Nations sources in Ka mpala and Nairobi, September and October 2016. 32 Confide ntial interview with a refugee from Juba in Nairobi, September 2016 . S/2016/963 15/39 16-18889 35 . Similar incidents of violence against civilians are all egedly occurring in Eastern Equatoria. For example, a witness interviewed b y the Panel in Kampala in October stated that he had seen seven unar med civilians being summarily executed in Torit on 30 July. T he Panel interviewed another refugee that same month who had been working in the to wn of Nimule, Mag wi County, and had witnessed eight men being attacked b y government ar med forces; allegedly only one survived. 33$ FRQILGHQWLDO 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV VRXUFH WROG WKH 3DQHO WKDW 63/$ WURRSV GHSOR HG WR 3DMRN $DFL DQ G 3DOZDU LQ 0DJ ZL &RXQW KDG ORRWHG VKRSV DQG KRXVHV RFFXSLHG VFKRROVUDSHGZR PHQDQGDUUHVWHGPHQRQ2FWREHU 36 . An assessment team of United Nations and humanitarian agencies that visited several locations in Torit County from 17 to 23 August deter mined that the population had “been significantly affected by recent violence, which has manifested in direct violations including sexual violence, harassment, use of community facilities by armed elements, and looting, and indirectly in death during fligh t, family separation, restricted movement, and widespread psychosocial stress” .34,W IXUWKHU QRWHG WKDW LQFUHDVLQJ LQVHFXULW ZDV GLVUXSWLQJ DJULFXOWXUDO DFWLYLWLHV LQ (DVWHUQ (TXDWRULD FRQVLGHUHG WKH FRXQWU ?V ?JUHHQ EHOW? DQG D PDLQ IR RG -producing region , which wo uld have a significant impact on food security nationwide. 35 C. Implementation of the Agreement 37 . T he fighting in July has derailed even the minimal progress achieved in implementing the Agreement. As noted by the Chair of the Joint Monito ring and Evaluation Co mmission, Festus Mogae, in his address at the plenar y meeting of the Co mmission on 19 October, “the fighting has disintegrated all the transitional security arrangement mechanisms, such as the [Joint Military Ceasefire Commission], the [Joint Operations Centre] and the [Strategic Defence and Security Review Board] and what little that had been acco mplished has been lost”. T he inclusivity of these institutions has been co mpro mised because SPLM/A in Opposition representatives who were ap pointed b y Machar have been replaced b y those affiliated with Taban Deng Gai. T he establishment of the Transitional National Legislative Assembly and the approval of cantonment sites in greater Equatoria and greater Bahr el -Ghazal appear to constitute the only apparent progress that the Transitional Government of National Unity has mad e to wards the implementation of the institutional requirements of the Agreement, yet both moves remain contested, with SPLM/A in Opposition and others deeming them illegitimat e. 38 . On 4 October, Malong oversaw the graduation of 5,000 new SPLA troops in Aweil in a move that contravened the security sector refor ms stipulated in the Agreement. 36+H FR PPHQGHG WKH 63/$ FR PPDQGLQJ RIILFHUV *HQHUDOV -RN 5LDN __________________ 33 Confidential interview with a refugee from Magwi Count y in Kampala, October 2016. 34 Available from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resour ces/Multi -Sector%20Rapid% 20Needs %20Assessment %20Report%20 -%20Torit%20Count y% 20201608.pdf. 35 Care, “ CARE finds dire huma nitarian situation in previousl y unaffected areas of South Sudan”, press release, 13 October 2016. Available from w w w.care -international.org/news/press -releases / care -finds -dire -huma nitarian -situation -in-previously -unaffected -areas -of-south -sudan . 36 See Agoth Abraha m, “5000 soldiers graduate in Aweil East”, G urtong, 4 October 2016 . Available from w w w.gurtong.net/ECM/Editorial/tabid/124/ctl/ArticleView /mid/519/ articleId/19905/5000 - Soldiers -Graduate -In-Aw eil -East.aspx . S/2016/963 16-18889 16/39 and Santino Wol ( who wer e both sanctioned by the Co mmittee on 1 July 2015), on their efforts to recruit these forces fro m the local co mmunity. Given the difficulties faced by the government in paying the salaries of troops (see sect. V), the additional soldiers will only add to t he financial problems. 39 . T he disproportionate recruitment of soldiers fro m Aweil — Malong’s ho me area — co mplicates any serious effort to pursue security refor ms and causes instability, given that many in SPLA view such recruitment as an effort by Malon g to change the tribal co mposition of the ar my to enhance his control and marginalize perceived rivals and other tribes. 37$ QX PEHU RI VHQLRU PLOLWDU  DQG SROLWLFDO ILJXU HV LQ 6RXWK 6XGDQERWK JRYHUQPHQWDODQG RSSRVLWLRQ KDYHLQGLFDWHGWRWKH3DQHOWKHLU FRQFHUQV DERXW SRWHQWLDO LQVWDELOLW LQ -XED UHVXOWLQJ IUR P IDFWLRQDO LQILJKWLQJ EHWZHHQ 0DORQJ DQG ULYDO 'LQND HOHPHQWV LQFOXGLQJ .RRU LQ WKH HYHQW RI D FRQWHVWHG VXFFHVVLRQ WR .LLU )RU H[DPSOH UXPR XUV DERXW .LLU ?V LOO KHDOWK ZLGHO UHSRUWHG LQ WKH S UHVV DQG RQ VRFLDO PHGLD LQ PLG -October, led to escalated tensions over a 24 -hour period that eased only after Kiir made a series of public appearances .38 D. Threats to civil society 40 . T he operating environment for South Sudanese civil society has narro wed considerably as a result of the policies and actions of SPLM/A in Government, which have involved both an increase in onerous bureaucratic restrictions and overt intimidation. The resu lt has been the obstruction of the reconciliation and political processes described in paragraph 9 of Security Council resolution 2290 (2016) . As one civil society representative noted to the Panel, the “time for dialogue has co me to an end as this government is not interested in talking”; similar sentiments have been echoed b y other civil society activists. 39 41 . T he adoption by the Transitional National Legislative Assembly, controlled b y Kiir, of the N on -Governmental Organizations Act and the Relief and Rehabilitation Co mmission Act in Februar y and the subsequent pro mulgation of the non -governmental organization regulations in March laid the foundation for mor e intrusive interference in civil society ac tivities by SPLM/A in Government. The Non -Governmental Organizations Act established a new legal frame work for non -governmental organizations, while the Relief and Rehabilitation Co mmission Act established the regulator y body that has the mandate to implem ent the Non -Governmental Organizations Act. 42 . Both acts include provisions that do not conform to international best practices, contrary to the Agreement. 40)RU H[DPSOH WKH 5HOLHI DQG 5HKDELOLWDWLRQ &RPPLVVLRQ $FW SURYLGHV WKH &R PPLVVLRQ ZLWK WKH SRZHU WR DPRQJ RWKHU WKLQJV ?GLUHFW GHSORPHQW RI QRQ -governmental organizations to areas of needs in South Sudan” __________________ 37 Confidential interviews with four high -ranking SP LA officers conducted between March and October 2016. 38 An exa mple of the media reporting on this incident can be found at http://eastafrica monitor.com/ sal va -kiir -not -dead -south -sudanese -government -insists/ . 39 Confidential interviews with South Sudanese civil societ y representati ves in Ka mpala, October 2016. 40 According to an anal ysis of the legislation carried out b y t he International Center for Not -for - Profit Law. S/2016/963 17/39 16-18889 (sect. 7 (3)), irrespective of whether the organizations have the ability, kno wledge, resources or capacity to work in those environments. The No n-Governmental Organizations Act stipulates that all non -governmental organizations are required to “agree upon” their areas of operation with the government (sect. 9 (b) (v)), denying them the ability to determine their own objectives and activities. 43. The acts and regulations have also negated the oversight role that the Ministry of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management historically exercised over the Relief and Rehabilitation Commission in advance of that ministry co ming under the management of SPLM/A in Opposition, pursuant to the Agreement. The Relief and Rehabilitation Commission regulations themselves were signed and approved by the then outgoing Minister of Humanitarian Affairs and Disaster Management, Awut Deng Acuil. Consequently, SPLM/A in Government effectively retained control of the Commission after the formation of the Transitional Government of National Unity. 44 . Civil society has co me und er even more pressure since July when the Relief and Rehabilitation Co mmission began to invite non -governmental organizations to co me for ward with their applications for renewal. 418QGHU WKH 1RQ -Governmental Organizations Act, all non -governmental organizations had to reregister with the Co mmission. 427KHVH DSSOLFDWLRQV FRXOG EH UHMHFWHG E WKH &R PPL VVLRQ 5HJLVWUDU LI WKHDSSOLFDQW?VLQWHQGHGDFWLYLWLHVFRQWUDYHQHGWKHSULQFLSOHV 43FRQWDLQHGLQVHFWLRQ RI WKH$FW ZKLFK KDYH QRW EHHQ FOHDUO GHILQHG DQG WKHUHIRUH OHDYH PXFK URR P IR U DUELWUDU DSSOLFDWLRQ RI UHVWULFWLRQV DQG LQFRQVLVWHQW IHHV DQG SURF HVVHV DV ZHOO DV IRUWKUHDWVDQGLQWLPLGDWLRQ 44 45 . T he Panel has received reports that the Relief and Rehabilitation Co mmission has threatened to withhold renewals or revoke registrations if organizations do not forfeit their assets to the Co mmission on demand, based on specific provisions in the Non -Governmental Organizations Act and the associated regulations. As at the time of the submission of the present report, at least four non -governmental organizations had had their renewal as civil society orga nizations initially rejected or threatened with rejection owing to suspicion of the “political” nature of their activities __________________ 41 Originall y, the Non -G overnment al Organizations Act had set the deadline for renewal of registration as 10 Ma y (within three months of the Act’s entry into force). This deadline was postponed indefinitel y . 42 Under section 9 (c), a non -governmental organization is prohibited from operating in South Sudan “ unless it has been dul y registered with the Com mission”. The Act violates the right to freedom of association, under the International Covenant on Ci vi l and Political Rights and the African Charter on H uma n and Peoples’ Rights, by mandating that all non -governmental organizations register. In addition, on the basis of infor mation ob tained by the Panel, the now infa mous “blacklist of 40 organizations” act ually referred to a list of all organizations that w ere required to reregister in accordance with the Act, rather than a list of non -governmental organizations being specificall y targeted on account of their activities. 43 These principles include “fairn ess in selection of geographical areas for allocation of projects”, “accountabilit y to beneficiaries, donors and relevant public institutions”, “sustainability of progra mmes”, “participation b y local communities and beneficiaries” and “respect for the sove reignt y of the Republic of South Sudan”. 44 According to the International Center for Not -for -Profit Law. Also confir med in multiple confidential interviews with national and international civil society organizations. S/2016/963 16-18889 18/39 and were subsequently advised to register as political parties, demonstrating the particular pressure faced by civil society actors e ngaged in advocacy .45 46 . Reports from numerous civil society actors, international non -governmental organizations and journalists have described the expanding involvement of the National Security Service’s Internal Security Bureau, led by Koor, in matters relating to civil society organizations. In line with the National Security Service bill of 2015, the National Security Service has unrestrained authority to detain suspects , monitor communications, conduct searches and seize property without judicial ove rsight. The Panel is continuing to investigate numerous reports that the National Communication Authority and the National Security Service have visited non -governmental organization facilities, inspected telecommunications equipment and demanded “fees” for the organizations to be able to continue to operate . 47 . Civil society activists who met the Security Council during its visit to Juba in early September have also been targeted. T he Panel has confir med that at least three people were directly threatene d by the National Security Service for having attended the meeting. T he actual nu mber may be higher. III. Procurement of arms 48 . T he Panel is continuing its investigations into ar ms transfers into South Sudan, consistent with its mandate. 49 . In a meeting with the Panel on 28 September, the First Vice -President, Taban Deng Gai, refuted the presence of L -39 jets in South Sudan, which the Panel had documented with supporting evidence, including photographs and eye witness accounts, in its report to the Security Council that mo nth ( S/2016/793 ). During the same meeting, he offered the opportunity to the Minister of Defence and Veterans’ Affairs to provide further infor mation on the jets, but the latter declined to do so. 50 . T he Panel has been provided with preliminar y infor mation on the weapons that the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo took fro m the co mbatants who acco mpanied Machar into the Democratic R epublic of the Congo in August 2016. T he sources of the weapons are consistent with those previously documented by the Panel as having been procured in South Sudan, both before and after independence, including weapons and ammunition manufactured in the Su dan, China, the United States of America, Israel and various Eastern European countries. 51 . One weapon of note amo ng the ar ms documented is a Micro Galil rifle manufactured b y Israel Weapon Industries, bearing serial number 36100549. T his is the third we apon of its type identified b y the Panel, with two others (serial numbers 36100566 and 36100588) having been documented in Upper Nile in 2015. Each of the weapons was, according to interviews with SP LM/A in Opposition me mbers, taken fro m South Sudanese gov ernment stocks either through battlefield capture or __________________ 45 For example, the Community Empo werment for Progress Organization received a government letter ordering the organization to shut down within two weeks or be considered “illegal”. See Justin Lynch, “South Sudan activists say intimidated for meeting diplomats”, Associated Press, 8 Septembe r 2016, available from http://bigstory.ap.org/article/2731beaf514a48d29dc9fe582f497748/south -sudan - activists -say -intimidated -meeting -diplomats. S/2016/963 19/39 16-18889 by defectors. According to infor mation provided to the Panel b y the manufacturer, as noted in the Panel’s report of Januar y 2016 ( S/2016/70 ), the three weapons are fro m a batch sold to the Ministr y of Defence of Uganda in 2007. T here is no provision in the end user certificate for their transfer to South Sudan. T hat the Panel has no w identified three such weapons fro m this batch supports the conclusion that they are part of a larger group of weapons transferred fro m Uganda to South Sudan. 46 52 . In September, the Panel received infor mation fro m Spain regarding weapon trafficking to South Sudan that the Spanish police had obtained as part of a continuing investigat ion into money -laundering and racketeering. T he infor mation details co mmunications between an ar ms trafficking network based in Europe and the leadership of SPLM/A in Opposition in 2014, in which the latter had requested the delivery, through an inter media r y in Senegal, of an extensive list of small ar ms, munitions and light weapons. Further investigations by the Panel suggest that this ship ment was at least partially delivered. 477KH 3DQHO LV ZRUNLQJ ZLWK WKH 6SDQLVK DXWKRULWLHV DQG RWKHU VRXUFHV WR IXUWKHU FRUURERUDWH WKH RULJLQ RI WKH ZHDSRQV DQG WUDFNWKHLUXVHLQ6RXWK6XGDQ 53 . Also in September, the Panel received infor mation and documentation fro m a confidential high -level South Sudanese source that, in July 2014, a ship ment of small ar ms ammunition and 4,000 assault rifles had been delivered by Bulgarian Industrial Engineering and Management to the Ministry of Defence of Uganda. According to the documentation, Bosasy Logistics, a co mpany registered in Kampala and described in previous reports by the Panel, including its report o f January 2016 ( S/2016/70 ), acted as an inter mediar y in the transaction. T he weapons and munitions were subsequently transferred to South Sudan. While the Panel is further investigating this transaction, it notes that recent ar ms transfers fro m Ugand a to South Sudan, as described in its report of September 2016 ( S/2016/793 ), are likely to be using the same modality as the earlier transfers fro m 2014, with Bosasy Logistics and its Chair man, Valerii Copeichin, facilitating the sales. 48 54 . T he Panel has received multiple reports fro m various sources of ar ms ship ments entering South Sudan b y road through Uganda and by airlift to Juba and Wau since May. 497KH FRQWHQW DFFRUGLQJ WR WZR KLJK -level sources with kno wledge of the operations, was small ar ms and light weapons, ammunition and ar mo ured vehicles. T he Panel is in possession of a contract signed b y SPLA in May 2015 for the provision of Panthera ar moured vehicles valued at $7,187,500. 507KH FR PSDQ  FRQWUDFWHG WR SURYLGH WKH YHKLFOHV (JSW DQG 0LGGOH (DVW IRU 'HYHORS PHQW ZDV UHSUHVHQWHG E DQ (JSWLDQ QDWLRQDO 0RKD PHG$WWD -DG7 KH FR PSDQ LV UHJLVWHUHG __________________ 46 The Panel sub mitted a for mal written request to the G overnment of Uganda in Februar y for additional infor ma tion regarding these weapons but has not received a response. 47 Confidential interview with a senior opposition militar y officer invol ved in the procurement process. 48 The Panel has received reports that Copeichin holds M oldova n citizenship. 49 These ship ments have been reported to the Panel in confidential inter views with several high - ranking SP LA officers, diplomatic representati ves of a neighb ouring country, a security official from a neighbouring countr y and the personnel of an international organization operating in South Sudan. 50 The contract does not specif y the quantity of vehicles purchased nor outline detailed technical specifications. S/2016/963 16-18889 20/39 in Cairo. 517KH 3DQHO LV LQYHVW LJDWLQJ WKH SRVVLEOH FRQQHFWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKLV FRQWUDFW DQGWKHUHFHQWDLUOLIWVWR6RXWK6XGDQ IV. Obstruction of and attacks against United Nations and humanitarian missions A. Obstruction of and attacks against the United Nations 55 . As described in the Panel’s report of September 2016 ( S/2016/793 ), the most senior me mbers of SPLM/A in Government consistently demonize the United Nations. For example, on 13 September, Kiir delivered a lengthy public indi ctment of the United Nations for having evacuated Machar fro m the eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo, saying “so it is clear that the United Nations itself is not part of the solution” and “so the people who are no w saying we are in a situation where the UN is seen as not neutral have genuine concerns”. 52 56 . On 18 September, the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) issued a statement in reaction to accusations made b y SPLM/A in Government that the Mission was fostering criminal activity and harbouring ar med elements in the United Nations protection of civilian sites in Juba. 53,Q PLG -October, it issued another statement to reiterate the civilian nature of the sites. 54&RQWUDU  WR WKH JRYHUQPHQWDFFXVDWLRQVWKHELR PHWULFUHJLVWUDWLRQEWKH,Q WHUQDWLRQDO2UJDQL]DWLRQ IRU 0LJUDWLRQ RI LQWHUQDOO GLVSODFHG SHUVRQV OLYLQJ LQ SURWHFWLRQ RI FLYLOLDQ VLWHV  DQG  LQ -XED ² DV DW 2FWREHU  ² FOHDUO GHPR QVWUDWHV WKDW WKH VLWHV SUHGR PLQDQWO FR PSULVH ZR PHQ DQG FKLOGUHQ QRW PHQ RI ILJKWLQJ DJH 2I  LQGLYLGXDOV  VR PH  SHU FHQW  DUH PHQ EHWZHHQ  DQG  HDUV RI DJH 7 KH UHPDLQLQJ QHDUO  SHU FHQW RI WKH SRSXODWLRQ DUH ZR PHQ DQG DW OHDVW  FKLOGUHQQHDUOKDOIRIZKR PDUHXQGHUHDUVRIDJH 55 57 . Pro -government elements also consistently use social media to agitate against the international presence in South Sudan, in particular the United Nations. A diplo mat based at the South Sudanese embassy in Washington, D.C., Gordon Buay, and a South Sudanese journalist, Mading Ngor Ake c Kuai, are amo ng the most pro minent figures who consistently use their social media accounts to propagate inflammator y statements against the United Nations presence, including the examples sho wn in figure II belo w (see annex II for additional examples): __________________ 51 Letter to the Panel from the Perma nent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations, 14 October 2016. 52 See “President Kiir accuses U N of taking Machar ’s side for regi me change”, Sudan Tribune , 14 Septemb er 2016. Available from w w w.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article60221 . 53 Available from http://reliefweb.int/report/south -sudan/united -nations -mission -south -sudan - unmiss -responds -sudan -peoples -liberation -army . 54 Available from http://reliefweb.int/report/south -sudan/unmiss -remi nds -all-parties -respect - civilian -nature -poc -sites . 55 See http://reliefweb.int/report/south -sudan/dtm -south -sudan -juba -un-house -poc -sites -biometric - registration -update -october . S/2016/963 21/39 16-18889 Figure II Screenshots of inflammatory statements using social media 58 . Sustained, systematic violations of the status -of-forces agreement have continued, with 19 violations recorded in September alone. T he vast majority were mo vement restrictions imposed against the United Nations, and all but one were directed b y civilian and ar med actors affiliated with SPLM/A in Government. SPLM/A in Government regularl y prohibits UNMISS fro m patrolling in areas in which conflict has flared and hu man rights violations are being reported, impeding the Mission fro m implementing its mandate. For example, SPLA did not allo w UNMISS to have access to the Yei area between April and October, notwithstanding the multiple attempts and public requests for access to verify the drastic deterioration of the security situation, coupled with nu merous reports of human rights violations. 56 __________________ 56 See the U N MISS statements dated 10 and 12 October 2016 on denial of access, available from https://unmiss.unmissions.org/unmiss -statement -yei -call -immediate -cessation -hostilities and http://unmiss.unmissions.org/unmiss -statement -increased -incidents -violence -south -sudan. S/2016/963 16-18889 22/39 59 . While on 14 October Kiir announced a co mmittee to facilitate an improvement in mo vement and access for the United Nations and for humanitarian operations, as well as for the deployment of the regional protection force mandated in resolution 2304 (2016 ) within two weeks, as at the time of submission of the present report (28 October 2016), there had been no evidence to suggest any progress on these issues. On 19 October, the Minister of Cabinet Affairs, Martin Elia Lo muro, transmitted a letter to the Pr esident of the Security Council confirming the acceptance of Rwanda, Kenya and Ethiopia as the troop -contributing countries for the force. On 24 October, however, Kiir ’s spokesperson, Ateny Wek Ateny, publicly rejected those countr ies. 57 B. Obstruction of and attacks against humanitarian missions 60 . Since the conflict began in December 2013, at least 67 aid workers have been killed, 8 since the Panel submitted its report in September alone. The majority of those killed were South Sudanese. Most recent ly, three aid workers were killed in the space of seven days at the beginning of October. One was shot and killed in an ambush on a clearly marked non -governmental organization vehicle in Eastern Equatoria on 14 October, when a team from ZOA was travelling from Torit to a project site. The deceased was a 41 -year -old agricultural officer. A second national staff member from a humanitarian organization in Akobo was killed on 8 October in unclear circumstances, and a national staff member of another non -govern mental organization was killed in the same period during fighting in Budi, Eastern Equatoria .58 61. In the first nine months of 2016, more than 640 humanitarian access incidents were reported, including 81 in September alone. Of the 81 incidents, 59 involv ed violence against humanitarian personnel and assets, including a substantial increase in assaults, ambushes and armed attacks, with 11 incidents reported in September compared with 5 in August. Armed ambushes and attacks were mainly reported in Eastern E quatoria, Central Equatoria, Western Equatoria, Lakes and Western Bahr el-Ghazal .59 V. Collapse of the economy A. Macroeconomic conditions 62 . As at the end of October, the government had yet to demo nstrate a co mmitment to sound econo mic governance, which, as described in the Panel’s __________________ 57 See “ South Sudan again rejects neighb ouring countries participation in RPF ”, Radio Ta mazuj, 24 October 2016. Available from https://radiota mazuj.org/en/article/south -sudan -again -rejects - neighb oring -counties -participation -rpf. 58 See “ OCH A humanitarian bulletin South Sudan”, No. 16, 20 October 2016. Available from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/1601020 _OCH A_SouthSudan_ huma nitarian_bulletin16.pdf. 59 See Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, “ South Sudan: humanitarian access situation snapshot – Septemb er 2016”. Available from http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/ files/resources/sep tember_access_snapshot_20161011.pdf . S/2016/963 23/39 16-18889 report of September 2016 ( S/2016/793 ), had further destabilized the security situation. The South Sudanese pound had continued to lose value, and the slumping curre ncy rates had consequently boosted inflation to 682.1 per cent. 606LQFH -DQXDU WKH FRQVXPHU SULFH LQGH[ KDV LQFUHDVHG E  PRUH WKDQ  SHU FHQW SHDNLQJ DW  SRLQWVLQ6HSWHPEHU 61 63 . T he Panel obtained data indicating that projected State budget exp enditure for the 2016/17 fiscal year wo uld exceed revenue b y 149 per cent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he draft budget for the fiscal year 2016/17 is estimated to be 22.3 billion South Sudanese pounds, half of which is allocated to the security sector. 647 KHUHLV D ULVNWKDWSURMHFWHGDXVWHULW PHDVXUHVLQQRQ -security sectors may fo ment instabil ity, given that the urban part of the population will be hit by payroll cuts. Owing to the lack of financial transparency, the World Bank has denied the Ministr y of Finance and Econo mic Planning any new project funding. 65 65 . Revenue for the 2016/17 budget was calculated on the basis of oil production of 120,000 barrels per day, which is the lo west rate of extraction since December 2013. T here is no indication that Deng Gai’s efforts in August to renegotiate the pipeline and transfer fees with Khartoum were successful, meaning that South Sudan will continue to pay $24.1 per barrel in fees to the Sudan, undercutting the revenue of the budget o wing to volatile oil prices. T he oil industr y also sho ws no signs of recovery to the pre -war levels; the Unity fields were disabled in the early mo nths of the war, and the continuing conflict will make it difficult to launch the long and technologically complicated process of restarting oil production. 66 B. Qatar National Bank case 66 . During its investigations into the sources of external financing in the light of the fact that most government expenditure is devoted to prosecuting the war, the __________________ 60 See ww w.tradingeconomics.com/south -sudan/inflation -cpi. 61 See ww w.tradingeconomics.com/south -sudan/consumer -price -index -cpi. 62 Transitional Government of National Unit y budget speech, October 2016. 63 See Denis Dumo, “ South Sudan seeks $300 million in external support for budget”, Reuters, 29 August 2016. Available from www.reuters.com/article/us -southsudan -budget -idUSKCN1141CO . 64 See “ South Sudan budgets billions for ar my, militar y operations in 2016/2017”, R adio Tamazuj, 18 October 2016. Available from https://radiota mazuj.org/en/article/south -sudan -budgets - billions -army -militar y -operations -20162017. 65 Inter view with World Bank representati ves, 22 September 2016, Nairobi. 66 See “ South Sudan plans to resum e oil production in U nit y region”, Sudan Tribune , 20 August 2016. Available from w w w.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article59981. S/2016/963 16-18889 24/39 Panel acquired infor mation indicating that, until February, the Qatar National Bank had provided two letters of credit to the government, totalling so me $632 million. T he mo ney was used b y the Bank of South Sudan to buy local currency at the fixed exchange rate of 2.96 South Sudanese pounds to the dollar. After the fall of oil revenue, the government was unable to meet the payment schedule, which was amended. 67)ROOR ZLQJ WKH GUDPDWLF VKULQNLQJ RI WKH IRUHLJQ UHVHUYHV DQG WKH FRQWLQXHG GHFOLQH RI RLO UHYHQXH LQ  LW LV WKHUHIRUH XQOLNHO WKDW WKH 4DWDU 1DWLRQDO%DQNZLOOSURYLGHWKHJRYHUQPHQW ZLWKIXUW KHUILQDQFLQJ C. Oil -swap deals 67 . Oil advances remain one of the few mechanisms available to the government to raise short -ter m funds. Under contracts with international oil co mpanies, fund s are advanced in for ward oil -swap deals, which the governm ent repays over a certain period at a negotiated interest rate. 68 . Two co mpanies, Trafigura Pte Ltd. and Addax Energy SA, have been at the forefront of these arrangements. T hrough its investigations, the Panel has obtained infor mation that, between Novem ber 2015 and April 2016, Trafigura Pte Ltd. purchased 7 million barrels of Dar Blend crude oil. 687KH WRWDO UHYHQXH REWDLQHG E  WKH JRYHUQPHQW WKURXJK WKHVH WUDQVDFWLRQV ZDV UHSRUWHG WR EH  PLOOLRQ 7 KH 3DQHO DOVR REWDLQHG GDWD IURP WKH 0LQLVWU  RI 3HWU ROHXP GHVFULELQJ SXUFKDVHV IURP )HEUXDU  WR$SULO  RI  PLOOLRQ EDUUHOV RI 'DU %OHQG RLO E $GGD[ (QHUJ 6$ IUR P WKH JRYHUQPHQW 7 KH WRWDO UHYHQXH UHFHLYHG IUR P WKHVH WUDQVDFWLRQV ZDV UHSRUWHGWREHPLOOLRQ VI. Implementation of the travel ba n and asset freeze 69 . T he Panel has confir med that a sanctioned individual, Peter Gadet, travelled fro m Khartoum to Nairobi in September, and remained in Kenya as at the time of sub mission of the present report. VII. Recommendations 70 . T he Panel makes the follo wing reco mmendations: (a) T hat, to achieve the objectives of the Security Co uncil stated in its resolution 2290 (2016) , namely an inclusive and sustainable peace in South Sudan, the Co mmittee designate high -level decision makers responsible for the actions and policies that threaten the peace, security and stability of the country, as defined in paragraphs 9 and 10 of the resolution, including those who are responsible for serious crimes under international humanitarian and international hu man rights law and who have the po wer and influence either to perpetuate or end the war. T he Panel provided a confidential annex to the Co mmittee with the names of such individuals in Januar y 201 6; __________________ 67 IM F official response to the Panel, 21 Jul y 2016. 68 The actual purchase price differed for each deliver y, ranging from $18.30 to $32.60 per barrel. S/2016/963 25/39 16-18889 (b) T hat, to prevent the further destabilization of the security situation in South Sudan and in particular the continuing large -scale hu man rights violations that the Panel has deter mined are directly related to the supply of ar ms and ammunition to no n-State actors and groups b y all sides, as well as to prevent the further transfer or use of heavy equip ment, the Security Council impose an embargo on the supply, sale or transfer to South Sudan, fro m or through the territories or b y the nationals of all Member States, or using their flag vessels or aircraft, of ar ms and related materiel of all types, including weapons and ammunition, military vehicles and equip ment, paramilitar y equip ment and spare parts for the aforementioned, and technical assistance, t raining, financial or other assistance relating to military activities or the provision, maintenance or use of any ar ms and related materiel, including the provision of any for m of training b y foreign forces or ar med mercenar y personnel whether or not orig inating in their territories. T he Panel further maintains its reco mmendations for the modalities for the implementation of such an embargo as outlined in paragraphs 84 (d), (e) and (g) of its interim report for 2015 ( S/2015/656 ); (c) That, to further compliance with the existing designations, 69WKH &RPPLWWHH  ZULWH WR WKH EDQNLQJ UHJXODWRU  DXWKRULWLHV RI .HQD DQG 8JDQGD UHLWHUDWLQJ WKH REOLJDWLRQV XQGHU$UWLFOH  RI &KDSWHU 9,, RI WKH &KDUWHU RI WKH 8QLWHG 1D WLRQV WR FR PSO ZLWK WKH DVVHW IUHH]H HVWDEOLVKHG XQGHUUHVROXWLRQ   DQG H[WHQGHG XQGHU UHVROXWLRQ    DQG LVVXH D SUHVV UHOHDVH HQFRXU DJLQJ 6WDWH DQG FR PPHUFLDOEDQNVLQ.HQDDQG8JDQGDWRLPSOHPHQWWKHIUHH]H __________________ 69 See https://scsanctions.un.org/fop/fop? xml=htdocs/resources/xml /en/consolidated.xml & xslt= htdocs/resources/xsl/en/southsudan.xsl. S/2016/963 16-18889 26/39 Annex I: Letters from Tribal Communities An open letter to the Equatorian Community: Why are you turning your region into the Greater Upper Nile? Posted: October 4, 2016 by PaanLuel Wël in Commentary , Contributing Writers , Opinion Articles , Opinion Writers By Bior Raad, Juba, South Sudan 8-members -of-bor -dinka -community -killed -along -juba -yei -road October 4, 2016 (SSB) — It is absolutely indisputable that Equatorians are delighted in or feeling pleasure fro m inhu mane slaying of Dinka. It is unclear whether these sporadic killings came out of the meeting as a resolution to wipe Dinka out of South Sudan or could it be deliberately done to provoke Dinka to horrifically retaliate. Our silence all this long was to maintain a good relationship in order to live in a society where we are never strangers to our fello w brothers and to each other. We may have differences and quarrels, but t hese are brotherly quarrels that cannot divide us and destro y our togetherness. What do you think if Dinka take part in flashing out sons and daughters of Equatoria working in their areas? Not only that, also organise the ar med youth groups to be stationed on various roads, charged with duties to kill other non -Dinka tribesmen. By the way, Dinka has the capacity to turn this country into anarchy and cleanse elements that support terrorism. It is sad to receive hourly report that the dear ones have been murd ered on their way to Uganda, Kenya and even within territories of Equatoria. Dinka are always nervous when travelling on road simply because of those people who set up barricades on trunk roads instructed b y their chiefs and politicians to search for ‘MT N’ as they referred to Dinka. No one in this ruthless time can risk to sleep in the car. Everyone is alert keeping a close watch at next seated Equatorian passenger. Most of them are the ones setting up cars to fall into ambush. Seeing this happen evokes ang uish and anger in so meo ne like me who lost relatives and friends few days ago in Kajo -Keji road amb ush that claimed the life of eleven innocent civilians. Sudan by then has been in a long devastating civil war aimed at secession but such barbaric actions h ave never been reported. Khartoum, our great enemy b y then did not devised such inhumane killing to war captives. I have S/2016/963 27/39 16-18889 never heard Equatoria elders and leaders co ming out publicly to denounce these ethnics’ targeted killings as well as urging their co mmu nities to cease this behaviour. It means that they are in support of it. It troubles my mind to und erstand what we have done to Equatorians and the rest of South Sudanese who hate Dinka for no reason. T here is no where in Equatoria or elsewhere that you wil l never spot bones of Dinka’ son who sacrificed his life for the sake of this country. Where were those who today say they don’t want Dinka in their areas? Matter of fact, We the youth of Jieng are tired of this act and as per no w, we urged all Equatorians and other tribes who have declared war against us to leave our areas before designated dateline elapses because we will not fold our hands, seat back and watch our relatives being slaughtered ever y day. T his is just to infor m ever yone that Dinka has a cul ture of war where people confront themselves in the broad daylight. Co me out and declare it as a war against Dinka. We have refused to lend our ears to this matter for long and it has been used against us as our co wardice. Enough is enough. T his time, we w ill not tolerate nonsense. If we can take vengeance amo ng ourselves, ho w hard is it to let innocent Equatorians pay for the action of their brothers. T he rest of the co mmunities who are happy with this tribal killings will also test the bitterness of their actions. Whoever is found will be consu me by the wrath of angr y avengers the day it will start though still remain concealed. T his is the time for eye for an eye. If the state of social disorder is what you want, we have declared it and we shall see who w ill desert this country to who? Most of you who have never conducted funerals of gunshot deceased, will this time conduct multiples of them. It is absolutely a fool of ourselves to treat enemies of peace with white teeth exposed and subsequently, they turn out to be the pain in ass. Why wo uld yo u scapegoat your grievances that need government attention to the innocent travellers? Your co mplaint of Dinka cattle destroying your far ms was exceptional and government acted immediately to drive back cattle to the ir original places. What happened again that you are killing Dinka travellers? Are they also trespassing your far ms? Jieng youth is totally disappointed with this inhu mane behaviour. To be honest, we have co me up with the resolution that we have to embark on such inhumane killings. We will also target enemies of peace in and beyond our areas. We kno w so me tribes in Equatoria who have involved in these killings and we are not going to spare them, our action will be enor mous. Innocent civilians who fled their ho mes to refugees’ camps because of food insecurity narrates senseless and false stories that Dinka want to kill us. A story that implicate Dinka and the UNHCR get interested in these fabricated life stories. Isn’t this selling out? If we don’t learn to b e honest to ourselves, this countr y will not acco mmodate us. Change your negative attitudes to wards Dinka otherwise we will not wait to be kill in the same way. The write is the Senior Member of Jieng Youth Union in Juba and can be reached on biorraad@gmai l.com Posted Online: https://paanluelwel.com/2016/10/04/an -open -letter -to-the -equatorian -community -you -are - turning -your -region -into -the -greater -upper -nile/ S/2016/963 16-18889 28/39 S/2016/963 29/39 16-18889 S/2016/963 16-18889 30/39 EQUATORIAN YOUTH WAR NING: “IT IS TIME FOR DINK A TO LEAVE EQUATORIA AND NOW” FROM Equatorian Youth TO All Dinka in Equatoria Date: 16 th October 2016 Oct 17, 2016(Nyamilepedia) — – The Equatoria Youth makes this co mmunique in response to Dinka government threats, which were broadcaste d on the SSB C, and preached by the Dinka politicians on the internet and social. Please read carefully:  T he Equatoria Youth takes seriously the threat by Dinka “Angry Youth” to co mmence immediate killing of Equatorians living and serving in Dinka land, acc ording to their letter dated 14 th October 2016;  T he Equatoria Youth Condemns the killings of all and taking the lives of any innocent civilians in our nation, the South Sudan;  Notes the injustices perpetrated b y the Dinka upon the people of Equatoria, as it has been sho wn recently in the Dinka Plan against the non -Dinka, including Equatoria; master minded by Dinka Council of Elders; implemented b y the tribal Government, presided upon by Kiir that sought to enshrine Dinka supremacy over other tribes;  Notes t hat “One Nation, One People” is not only dead, but also it never existed; for this has always been a government that preferentially treated Dinka and shamefully a Dinka centric government. But more importantly adversely affects all the other 63 ethnic grou ps for the benefit of the Dinkas.  Deter mines that the unwelco med presence of Dinka in Equatoria must end, until such a time when a for mula of equal citizenship and co -existence has been agreed;  Reminds the Dinka that the “gun equations” has no w changed, we have the means and the willingness to respond and decisively. T hat there are more Dinkas in our lands than our people in their lands, thus there is no lack of Targets should the Dinka choose to continue in the same path their Dinka Centric government has taken even before Kiir unleashed death on the Nuer and ever since, murdering our wo men and children in pretense of killing rebels.  Sternly warns that any Eqautorian lives taken in Dinkaland or anywhere shall receive shift and deter mined response that ever y Dinka in the territories of Equatoria will co me to kno w, fro m us the youth, in ever y inch of this great Equatorian land.  DE CIDES T HAT DINKA MUST LE AVE EQUATORI A IMME DIAT ELY.  Equatoria has taken enough loses, are fed up and enough is enough. The Press rele ase was submitted to Nyamilepedia on behave of Equator ia Youth by Justin S Kwaje. For more information give a shout at j.kwaje@aol.com Online http://www.nyamile.com/2016/10/16/equatorian -youth -warning -it-is-time -for -dinka -to-leave - equatoria -and -now/ , accessed 22 October 2016. S/2016/963 31/39 16-18889 S/2016/963 16-18889 32/39 MTN: Who’s behind the picking and killing of Dinka MTN? Oct. 18 Press Releases 8 comments PRESS RELEASE FROM THE OFFICE OF JIENG UNION (DINKA) IN EAST AFRICA T his press release co mes from the office of Jieng Union in East Africa. Jieng Union was for med in 2014 to represent the interest of Dinka people and act as their voice where there is a threat to their existence wherever they are. T hus, acting on behave of the Dinka people, we, the leaders of Jie ng Union in East Africa have noted with great and grave concern as it has co me to our attention based on concrete evidence that the war in South Sudan is no longer against the government but against Dinka people because of their ethnicity. As a matter of f act, which is supported b y the evidence of the eye -witnesses and survivors, Dinka people are being targeted by certain organized groups whose intention is to eliminate them in South Sudan. T he clear intention of these groups is sho wn b y the use of the word “MT N”. MT N is a well kno wn South African Telephone Network that stands for Mobile Telephone Network, whose slogan is “Ever ywhere You Go” because it is found almost in all countries in Africa. T herefore, the organized groups mentioned in the third paragrap h above are using the slogan of the MT N, “Ever ywhere You Go” to refer to the Dinka people since they are also found ever ywhere in South Sudan, hence, derogatorily referring to them as “MT N.” It is not a surprise that since the adoption of the word “MT N” wh ich has no w become syno nymo us with the word “Dinka people”, the killings of Dinka people has increased to disproportionate level. Dinka people are being targeted ever ywhere, and in particular, on major roads in South Sudan. T hese major roads include: Juba -Yei Road, Juba -Mundari Road, Juba -Terekeka Road, Juba -Bor Road, Juba -Torit Road, Juba -Nimule Road, Juba -Kecji -Kecji Road and Yei -Kaya Road. T he Vehicles travelling on these major roads are frequently stopped b y these groups as already mentioned above, who then search those vehicles to find out whether Dinka people are on them. Once a Dinka person or Dinka people are found on board, they are ordered to go do wn from the buses or taxis and then killed without any strong reasons but because they are Dinkas. As a result, many Dinka people have been killed because of their identity and ethnicity. What makes us to conclude that they are being targeted is the fact that once these groups stop the vehicles, they ask passengers to sho w their identity cards and when it is found out that the holder of the identity card is a Dinka or they are Dinkas, they are ordered to go do wn fro m the buses or taxis and immediately executed and dumped on roadsides. For instance, on 30th of September 2016, 11 Dinka stud ents who were under taking training in nursing course at Kecji -Kecji in South Sudan were killed on the road from Kecji -Kecji to Juba because of their identity. As the evidence suggested and through the use of the “MT N,” they were singled out among other passengers and mercile ssly murdered because they were Dinkas. Again, on the 2nd of October, 2016, three (3) traffic Dinka police officers were killed in cold blood at Aruu Junction because of their identity. On October 8, 2016, about 200 Dinka people, mostly wo men, children and elderly who were travelling fro m Yei to Juba were massacred in cold blood simply because they were Dinka me mbers. On the same day as the killing was going on, on Juba -Yei Road, Dinka people who were staying at Ro m Village at Meluth County in Eastern Nile State of South Sudan were killed and their houses burned do wn because they were Dinka people. S/2016/963 33/39 16-18889 What makes the killings mentioned in the above paragraph even worse and heartbreaking was the way they wer e killed. T hey were killed and after that the dead bodie s were mutilated and finally burned beyond recognition. It was horrific and grueso me killing and at the same time inhuman. T here are a lot of evidence substantial the existence of these horrible killings has alread y taken away hundreds of lives of Dinka pe ople who are killed through target killings since the beginning of 2016 because of their identity and ethnicity. Apart fro m killings, there are also evidences which show that the abovementioned groups are organized with the sole mission to use all means to eliminate Dinka people. For instance, these groups have no w resorted into checking the names of Dinka people in the telephones of non -Dinka people and if the Dinka names are found in mobile telephones of non -Dinka, then the person whose telephone contain the name of the Dinka is detained and beaten because he has the name of Dinka people in his or her telephone. In addition, these groups also check the logbook of the vehicle if the logbook is registered in name of the Dinka, then, the car, taxi or the bus is burned. T his explains why Eco bus registration nu mb er SSB 154 A which was burnt to ashes. According to the report, the attackers identified themselves as enemies of the Dinka people, fighting to take over government in South Sudan. T hey accused the Dinka and Ugandans of supporting the government of President Salva Kiir. So their rationale of killing Dinkas is to eliminate of all of them because they are supporting the government, thus indiscriminately killing all children, wo men and elderly contrary to th e international humanitarian law as we shall explain latter in this work. We have, therefore, co me to the conclusion that killing of Dinka people which include children, wo men and elder is not because of their support to the government but because of their ethnicity and identity. T hus, the purpose of this press release is threefold: first of all, to condemn these barbaric killings in the strongest ter m possible, secondly, to bring to the attention of the international co mmunity that Dinka people are being targeted because of their ethnicity and therefore are entitled to self -defense unless the groups behind the killings stop the activities of extra -judicial killings with immediate effect, and finally, to warn these groups to unconditionally stop killings our people. Condemnation of targeting killings against Dinka people We, the leaders of Jieng Union in East Africa have cond emned these barbaric killings of our people in the strongest ter ms possible. We wo uld like to bring to the attention of these groups beh ind the killings of our people to the fact that the international human rights law, regional human rights law and South Sudan national law give the Dinka people the rights to life, security, integrity of persons and the rights to self -defense. T hus, killin gs Dinka people due to their ethnicity violates the prohibition on the arbitrary deprivation of the right to life, which they enjo y under the law. In addition, these groups must kno w that during a non -international ar med conflict, directing attacks against civilians not directly participating in hostilities, including extra -judicial killings is the violation of Additional Protocol II and Commo n Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, which prohibits all violence directed against them including murder, mutilati on, cruel treatment and torture. We condemn these groups of people who target our Dinka people because of their ethnicity. T heir actions of killing Dinka people who are innocent civilians based on their ethnicity amo unt to discriminatory diverse treatment, which is a violation of the international human rights law that prohibits discrimination. In addition, it also amounts to the violation of co mmo n Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and fundamental guarantees set forth in Article 4 of the Additional Proto col II. We further strongly condemn the deliberate, ethnicity -based attacks on our people, which are widespread and systematic. T he violence being directed against Dinka people is clearly defined by its scale and method, which indicates that they are being targeted because of their ethnicity. For instance, killings of our people is not random, S/2016/963 16-18889 34/39 accidental or isolated acts of violence, but rather it invo lves a high level of preparation that we believe it follo ws a certain pattern as indicated b y the use of th e word “MT N” to refer to Dinka people for easy identification and targeting. We must stress that target killings and other acts of violence against Dinka people can constitute serious violations of international humanitarian law. Moreover, depending on the circumstances, which are met in this case, if established before the Court of law, such acts also amo unt to the violation of Article 13 (2) of Additional Protocol II. We condemn and tell whoever is behind the killing of Dinka people that what they are doi ng is collective punishment, which is a reprisal directed against them due to their perceived support to the government, which is contrary to the international human rights law. T he attacks on Dinka people who are accused of supporting the government of So uth Sudan can constitute a collective punishment which is in contravention of Article 4 (2) (b) of the Additional Protocol II. T herefore, we condemn the killings of our people unreservedly and we would like to bring to the attention of all the Internationa l Co mmunity members that the war in South Sudan is no longer civil war between the government and the oppositions but it is no w being directed against Dinka people because of their ethnicity since they are Dinka people were the President is co ming from. Ou r Infor mation or warning to the International Co mmu nity As leaders of Jieng Co mmu nity in East Africa, we have found it imperative to bring to the attention of the International Co mmunity that we are extremely disappointed and dismayed by the impotent respo nse fro m the International Co mmunity to condemn these barbaric and inhuman acts which is in contravention of the international human rights and hu manitarian law. We would like also to inform the International Co mmunity that we, the Dinka people kno w ho w to fight and we can do it to the required standard but in this case, we have not chosen to adopt the violent means resolving the problems despite the fact that many of our people have been killed in cold blood. T he reason we have been keeping quiet and just watched helplessly though our people are being murdered ever yday is because we need peace and unity in South Sudan. In other words, our interest is to save lives of innocent people and also to ensure that dispute is solved peacefully in South Sudan. Ho weve r, the way things have reached no w as our people are being murdered mercilessly, we are likely to rethink our approach unless the groups behind the killings of our people stop with immediate effect. T hus, our infor mation or warning is going to the internat ional Community or whoever are in the contact with the rebels or these criminals who are killings our people to tell them to stop immediately and unconditionally. If they don’t stop these terrorist activities of targeting our people, we shall be forced to take the law into our hands to defend our people and since we have alread y warned the whole world in this press release, no one will again raise an accusing finger to wards us because we are entitled to self -defense if we are being killed. Warning to the pe ople behind the killings of Dinka People We would like to reiterate our call on these groups to stop killings innocent Dinka people and if they do not give heed to our appeal to stop inhu man activities, then this serves as a warning that unless the killing s of our people stop with immediate effect, we shall be forced to take the law into our hands to defend ourselves. At that point, there will be no co mpro mise as we shall begin with those who are working in Dinka areas and who co me fro m the areas fro m which we suspect the people killings Dinka people to be co ming from. Inclusion, this press release is not intended to incite Dinka youth as we would like to emp hasize that, we, the Dinka people need peace in South Sudan but we would also like to stress that tho ugh we need peace, the peace should not be maintained at our expenses because we are also citizens of South Sudan and we should be given equal treatment. We cannot be killed without defending ourselves on the ground that there is a need for peace in S/2016/963 35/39 16-18889 South Sudan. T he role of peace keeping is for every citizen in South Sudan irrespective of their ethnical backgrounds. T herefore, we again call upon the people killing our people to stop killing them and if they do not, then we shall be forced to fight in self -defense if these subversive and barbaric activities of killings our people due to their ethnicity do not stop. By the office of Jieng Union in Diaspora (East Africa) and undersigned b y the people listed belo w: Signed b y Name Title Signature 1. Peter Maniel Kuc Chairperson of Jieng Union (+ 256774343608 ) 2. Mabior Ikau Chairperson of Greater Bahr el Ghazal made up of ten states 3. Koul Monytong Chairperson of Jieng Padang 4. Ngor Mayor Chairperson of Greater Lakes State made up of three States 5. Akot Garang C hairperson of Aweil States 6. Machar Chol Chairperson of Greater Warrap States Note the Copies have been given to all the embassies, the UN High Co mmission for Human Rights office in Uganda and other civil societies. T he photos sho wn belo w are for those wh o have been killed on the road because they are members of Dinka ethnic group. T he article entitled: Who is behind the picking and killing of MT N? A nickname for Dinkas in South Sudan. MT N is a network with logo of “ever ywhere you go”, the business co mpany ’s logo beco mes nickname for Dinka in South Sudan. T hey ask people in vehicles, is there MT N? T hey said yes if available or no if not! By David Matiop Gai, Juba South Sudan Source: Paanluelwel.co m T he author is a co -founder of National Mental Health Care O rganization; He holds Bachelor degree in Social work and social Ad ministration fro m SSCUST, Bachelor degree in T heology fro m CLT in Kalispell, Montana USA, and a fello w researcher. He can be reach at tonggaid 551 @yahoo.co m/david matiopgai@gmail.co m. Source: Paanluelwel.co m T he above photo is of the nurse students who were training at Kecji -Kecji in South Sudan because he was a Dinka. T he person being carried in the above photo was one of the victims in Juba -Yei Road Massacre on 8/10/2016 Source: Paanluelwel.co m T he people who are lying dead in the above photo were so me of the victims in Juba -Yei Road Massacre where over 200 people mostly wo men and children were killed on 8/10/2016 Source: radiotamazuj.org T he vehicle above is carr ying people kille d on target killing because they are Dinka Source: newsweek.co m T he above photo is one of the massacres of Dinka people in target killings Online: http://www.southsudannation.co m/condemnation -of-target -killings -of-dinka -and -warning -to-do - orchestrating -it/, accessed 18 October 201 6. S/2016/963 16-18889 36/39 S/2016/963 37/39 16-18889 Annex II: Examples of Incitement on Social Media S/2016/963 16-18889 38/39 Sample of anti -UN social media posts by Mading Ngor Akec Kuai S/2016/963 39/39 16-18889

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