SUDAN’S COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT:
THE LONG ROAD AHEAD
Africa Report N°106 – 31 March 2006

TABLE OF CONTENTS
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS …………………………………………. i
I.
INTRODUCTION ……………………………………………………………………………………………. 1
II. THE STATUS OF IMPLEMENTATION: A PATTERN EMERGES……………….. 2
A. CHALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTATION AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL : LOSING THE M OMENTUM OF
NAIVASHA …………………………………………………………………………………………………………….3
1. Abyei: A direct threat to peace ……………………………………………………………………….4
2. A monopoly on legal processes ………………………………………………………………………6
3. Oil problems persist ………………………………………………………………………………………7
4. Obstacles in the security sector……………………………………………………………………….9
B. THE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTHERN SUDAN : A NEW SET OF CHALLENGES ……………………..10
1. Fixing the SPLA: A top priority for the South ………………………………………………….10
2. The Juba Declaration: One Step Forward… …………………………………………………….12
3. The LRA: Exploiting an opportunity in the South …………………………………………..14
III. ASSESSING THE PARTIES: A ROUGH ROAD AHEAD……………………………… 18
A. THE NCP: OUT OF OPTIONS ? ………………………………………………………………………………….18
B. THE SPLM: A PARTY UNDER SIEGE ………………………………………………………………………..20
1. Coping with the loss of Garang …………………………………………………………………….20
2. Overcoming contradictions, divisions and capacity issues………………………………..21
3. Rebuilding the party: A prerequisite for peace …………………………………………………..23
C. THE NORTHERN OPPOSITION …………………………………………………………………………………..24
IV. THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY: EYES WIDE SHUT ……………………… 25
V. CONCLUSION ………………………………………………………………………………………………. 29
APPENDICES
A.
M AP OF SUDAN …………………………………………………………………………………………………….30
B. ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP ……………………………………………………………..31
C. CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA …………………………………………………..32
D. CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES ………………………………………………………………………..34

Africa Report N°106 31 March 2006
SUDAN’S COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT:
THE LONG ROAD AHEAD
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
More than a year after it was signed, Sudan’s
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) is showing
signs of strain. While the agreement ended one of Africa’s
longest and bloodiest civil wars, it was an agreement
between only two parties, the Sudan People’s Liberation
Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and the ruling National
Congress Party (NCP), and continues to lack broader
support throughout the country, particularly in the North.
The current equation for peace in Sudan is a worrying
one: the NCP has the capacity to implement but lacks the
political will, whereas the SPLM has the commitment but
is weak and disorganised. There is a real risk of renewed
conflict down the road unless the NCP begins to
implement the CPA in good faith, and the SPLM becomes
a stronger and more effective implementing partner. The
international community, which has largely abandoned
the political engagement and commitment that was so
crucial to achieving the peace agreement in the first place,
must forcefully reengage with the process to ensure
the agreement’s successful implementation.
The implementation process has been an uphill battle,
with the NCP exploiting the gaps within the CPA and the
weaknesses of its junior partner, the SPLM, to delay and
frustrate the process. Following the death of SPLM
Chairman Dr. John Garang in July 2005, the SPLM
vision has blurred, and the NCP has abandoned its
strategy for a political partnership with the SPLM. It
is increasingly clear that if this does not change
soon, then all peaceful paths forward in Sudan – full
implementation of the CPA, comprehensive political
solutions to the conflicts in Darfur and the East – will
likely lead to eventual regime change and an ousting
of the NCP either via free and fair elections, or by
simply whittling away its control of the structures of
government to a minority stake.
Under growing pressure, the NCP is attempting to manage
all these challenges to ensure its own political survival.
It has largely succeeded in keeping the international
community at bay over Darfur by facilitating increased
chaos on the ground and promoting divisions within
the rebels. It is achieving a similar containment of the international community on the CPA by selectively
implementing elements of the agreement without allowing
for any weakening of its grip on power or fundamental
change in the way the country is governed. Yet these
strategies are not sustainable, and will ultimately lead
to renewed or increased conflict. The NCP must begin to
implement the agreement in good faith to help assure
its political future in a peaceful Sudan by making
partnership an attractive option to the SPLM, and unity
an attractive option to southern Sudanese.
The SPLM is facing enormous challenges which are
severely undermining its ability to function as an effective
partner in government. The SPLM faces two simultaneous
tasks: as the lead party in the new autonomous
Government of Southern Sudan (GoSS), and the minority
partner in the new Government of National Unity (GNU).
1
Wracked by internal divisions and contradictions, and with
no functional party structures or party decision-making
mechanisms from mid-July 2005 through late February
2006, the SPLM has been completely overwhelmed thus
far, unable to successfully or consistently challenge the
NCP on most issues relating to implementation. This is
most apparent in Khartoum, where the minority SPLM
controls only a handful of Ministerial or State Ministerial
positions, as well as the 1
st Vice-President position, but
does not yet have any members integrated into the national
civil service or other national institutions. As a result, it has
been losing an uphill battle to implement the CPA and

1 According to the CPA, the SPLM controls 70 per cent of
the appointed positions in the GoSS until elections, the NCP
10 per cent, and other southern parties the remaining 20 per
cent. At the level of the GNU, the NCP maintains 52 per cent
of the appointed positions, the SPLM 28 per cent, other
northern parties 14 per cent, and other southern parties 6 per
cent. The SPLM must also establish 10 new state governments
in the South (where it will maintain its 70 per cent control,
with 20 per cent going to the NCP and 10 per cent to other
parties), and fill 45 per cent of the positions in the state
governments of Blue Nile and Southern Kordofan, and 20
per cent in all other northern state governments.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page ii

begin to change the policies of a government that still
faces active civil wars in the East and West.
The SPLM is faring better in the South, as the GoSS
slowly inches forward in the face of enormous physical
and structural challenges. The 8 January Juba Declaration
to integrate the bulk of the government-aligned southern
armed groups operating within the umbrella South Sudan
Defence Forces (SSDF) into the SPLA will help
consolidate peace in the South, though implementation of
the agreement will be difficult. Yet the GoSS is also
facing some acute threats, most noticeably from the lack
of progress on reorganising the SPLA into a professional
army, and the extended delays in paying its troops and
civil servants. These delays are creating an environment
exploited by the Ugandan rebel Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA), which is allegedly still receiving support from the
Sudan Armed Forces and has significantly expanded its
activities in Western Equatoria, threatening to become a
home-grown Sudanese problem.
However, there are early signs that the SPLM is beginning
to overcome some of its internal challenges and refocus
its efforts on implementation of the CPA. Without a
functioning and effective SPLM, there is little chance that
the CPA will hold.
In the face of all of this, the international community has
remained largely silent. Heavy on monitoring but
weak on follow-through, the international community –
particularly the key countries involved in the negotiation
of the CPA – has not yet embraced its role as a guarantor
of the CPA, and continues to lack a consistent, coordinated
approach to dealing with the parties, particularly the NCP,
let alone holding them to their respective commitments.
More consistent, proactive and forceful engagement by the
international community is another required ingredient
to see this agreement peacefully through the pitfalls that
lie ahead.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
ON THE DELAYS IN IMPLEMENTATION
To the National Congress Party and the Sudan
People’s Liberation Movement:
1.
Immediately reconstitute the National
Constitutional Review Commission with the proper
mandate to retroactively review all new bodies
and legal acts related to the implementation of
the CPA and ensure that they comply with the
CPA and the Interim National Constitution.
To the UN, World Bank, U.S., UK, Norway, Italy,
other Donor Countries and IGAD Member States:
2.
Work to improve international coordination and
strategies around the implementation process
by forming a Technical Secretariat attached to
the Assessment and Evaluation Commission,
preferably headed by General Sumbeiywo, to track
implementation and act as a central information
clearinghouse for the international community
on information relating to the CPA.
3. Link donor funding, both bilateral and through the
Multi-Donor Trust Fund, to the implementation
records of the parties, as determined by the
Assessment and Evaluation Commission, and
develop clear benchmarks tied to future funding
for the parties to achieve in Khartoum and Juba.
4. Channel financial support and technical expertise
in the short-term to combat the greatest immediate
threats to the CPA, by funding and helping to
operationalise key commissions such as the Ad
Hoc North-South Boundary Commission, the
National Petroleum Commission, and the National
Civil Service Commission; and neutralise potential
spoilers by supporting the implementation of the
Juba Declaration.
ON ABYEI
To the National Congress Party:
5.
Immediately cease all inflammatory rhetoric
designed to mobilise the Misseriya people against
the Ngok Dinka and the Abyei Boundary
Commission Report, and cease efforts to
unconstitutionally administer Abyei from Southern
Kordofan State.
6. President Bashir should immediately appoint the
Local Executive Council for Abyei, in consultation
with 1
st Vice-President Kiir and Vice-President
Taha, in accordance with the CPA.
To the UN Mission in Sudan:
7.
If the stalemate on Abyei continues and the
formation of an administration is not forthcoming,
UNMIS should seek to set up a temporary
administration in Abyei, while facilitating
discussions between the SPLM and NCP, and
between the Ngok Dink and Misseriya peoples, on
the following:
(a) definition of citizenship and residency
in Abyei, based on the CPA, the Abyei
Boundary Commission Report, and the
situation on the ground;

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page iii

(b) implementation of the Abyei Boundary
Commission report in light of demographic
changes on the ground;
(c) developing guarantees for nomadic grazing
rights in and through Abyei; and
(d) scenario planning should Abyei vote to join
an independent South, including:
i. discussions on provisions for dual
citizenship for residents of the area;
ii. protection of traditional grazing rights
for non-residents of Abyei; and
iii. discussions between the SPLM and
NCP on the longer-term sharing of
oil revenue from Abyei between
North and South.
ON PROBLEMS IN THE OIL SECTOR
To the NCP:
8.
Immediately provide the SPLM with access to
existing oil contracts and full oil production and
revenue information, as required by the CPA.
9. Cease blocking the establishment of an effective
National Petroleum Commission with the mandate
agreed upon in the CPA.
To the SPLM and Government of Southern Sudan:
10.
Immediately cancel all oil agreements in the South
signed in violation of the CPA.
11. Take steps to ensure that the rights of citizens in
oil producing areas are being protected.
To the International Community:
12.
Provide the SPLM with the technical expertise and
information, as required, to help it attain its fair
share of oil revenue, and develop the capacity to
manage the oil sector in the South.
TO ADDRESS SPLM AND SPLA
CONSTRAINTS
To the SPLM:
13.
Work to resolve internal divisions and
contradictions, and immediately move to begin
rebuilding party structures, working towards an
SPLM national convention, in order to be a more
effective partner in the implementation process.
To the SPLA:
14.
Take immediate steps to develop a common
internal approach on the reorganisation of the
SPLA. Prioritise the reorganisation of the army,
together with a transparent and accountable salary
structure, in order to help improve security in the
South and combat the growing threat posed by the
LRA.
To the U.S., UK, Norway, Italy, other Donor
Countries and IGAD Member States:
15.
Provide the SPLM with financial and technical
support, as needed, for it to help re-establish
functioning party structures and be a positive force
for peace in Sudan.
16. Provide the SPLA with technical and financial
support to help it reorganise its forces, integrate the
SSDF troops who have joined the SPLA, and
develop a professional standing army, capable of
combating security threats in the South such as the
LRA. In the case of the U.S., consider legislative
exemption for the GoSS from anti-terrorist
sanctions, on a year-by-year basis.
17. Support the implementation of the Juba Declaration
by providing food aid and transport, as necessary,
to help counter the efforts by the NCP’s military
intelligence to rebuild its southern militias as
spoilers in the South.
ON THE LRA
To the SPLM/A:
18.
Urgently reorganise the SPLA and develop a
targeted military strategy to counter the LRA’s
growing presence in Equatoria, including through
necessary support from the international
community.
19. Cease to pursue its own mediation efforts, and
instead coordinate with and support the existing
initiative led by Ugandan mediator Betty
Bigombe.
To the NCP and the Sudan Armed Forces:
20.
Cease all support to the LRA in southern Sudan.
To the UN Security Council:
21.
Without prejudice to the responsibilities of the
Sudanese authorities, direct UNMIS to use all
necessary means to fulfil its mandate to protect
civilians under imminent threat of physical violence
and require UNMIS to act proactively and robustly

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page iv

against the LRA, including in a preemptive
manner.
22. Appoint a panel of independent experts to
investigate the membership, funding of, and support
for the LRA. The panel should consult with
relevant governments, UN missions, and other
UN-appointed expert bodies. It should advise
the Security Council on further measures to be
taken by the Council in relation to the LRA.
To the UN Mission in Sudan:
23.
Establish a verification unit, to be negotiated directly
with the SPLA and the Sudan Armed Forces, to
verify continued SPLA claims of Sudan Armed
Forces’ support to the LRA.
Nairobi/Brussels, 31 March 2006

Africa Report N°106 31 March 2006
SUDAN’S COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT:
THE LONG ROAD AHEAD
I. INTRODUCTION
The 9 January 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) was the culmination of more than two and a half
years of negotiation between the insurgent Sudan People’s
Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)
2 and the ruling
National Congress Party (NCP). 3 It provides for a six
year interim period with democratic elections by 2009,
and an autonomous southern government, followed by a
self-determination referendum for the South. In the interim,
it mandates power and wealth sharing arrangements
aimed at ending decades of political and economic
marginalisation of the South and guaranteeing its
representation in Sudan federal government’s branches
proportional to its population.
However, 15 months in there is little reason for optimism,
as the NCP systematically delays and undermines the
implementation process. The NCP’s obstruction should

2 Following signature of the peace agreement, the SPLM and
SPLA exist as formally separate entities for the first time. This
paper uses both terms, depending on whether the military or
political entity is meant.
3 Crisis Group has published considerable reporting and analysis
on the CPA and the peace process that led to it. See Africa Report
N°102, Sudan: Saving Peace in the East, 5 January 2006;
Africa Briefing N°30, Garang’s Death: Implications for Peace
in Sudan, 9 August 2005; Africa Report N°96, The Khartoum-
SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace, 25 July 2005;
Africa Briefing N°24, A New Sudan Action Plan, 26 April 2005;
Africa Briefing N°19, Sudan’s Dual Crises: Refocusing on
IGAD, 5 October 2004; Africa Report N°73, Sudan: Towards
an Incomplete Peace, 11 December 2003; Africa Report N°65,
Sudan Endgame, 7 July 2003; Africa Briefing N°14, Sudan’s
Other Wars, 25 June 2003; Africa Briefing N°13, Sudan’s
Oilfields Burn Again: Brinkmanship Endangers the Peace
Process, 10 February 2003; Africa Report N°55, Power and
Wealth Sharing: Make or Break Time in Sudan’s Peace Process,
18 December 2002; Africa Report N°54, Ending Starvation as a
Weapon of War in Sudan, 14 November 2002; Africa Report
N°51, Sudan’s Best Chance for Peace: How Not to Lose It, 17
September 2002; Africa Report N°48, Dialogue or Destruction?
Organising for Peace as the War in Sudan Escalates, 27 June
2002; and Africa Report N°42, Capturing the Moment: Sudan’s
Peace Process in the Balance, 3 April 2002.
not come as a surprise. Though the peace agreement
catered for the NCP’s continued political dominance in
northern Sudan until elections, it also provided for a
significant opening of political space, and the sharing of
previously NCP-controlled state power and wealth. Many
within the NCP have been openly critical of the CPA for
giving away too much to the SPLM, viewing these
changes as a threat to the regime’s survival. The threat of
democratic elections to the broadly unpopular NCP, and
the expected southern vote for independence, appear to
leave the NCP with little hope of a peaceful political
survival unless it changes its political strategy.
These barriers were foreseen during the negotiation
process in Naivasha, Kenya, and different strategies were
developed to try to overcome them. The strategy of the
IGAD
4 mediation team and its international partners was
to balance the NCP’s expected reluctance to implement
by having a strong SPLM minority partner in the national
government, and by using the continued engagement of
the international community to guarantee the agreement.
Whereas the strategy pushed by the NCP aimed at
establishing a strong political partnership with the more
popular SPLM by drawing it away from its historic allies
in the opposition, so as to allow the NCP a peaceful path
to continued power and completion of its rebirth from a
pariah state to an accepted member of the international
community.
Neither strategy is working. The SPLM is in disarray, still
coping with its transition from a rebel movement to
a government and from the untimely death of its late
Chairman Dr. John Garang on 30 July 2005, just three
weeks after he had been sworn in as the 1
st Vice-President.
It currently lacks the strategic vision to consolidate its
place in the national scene as the natural umbrella for all
the marginalised and the oppressed and as the guardian of
the democratisation project that the CPA envisions.
Former SPLM security chief Edward Lino painted a grim
picture of the situation in a recent interview, noting “one
year after the signing of the CPA, the NCP continues to

4 The Intergovernmental Authority on Development, a seven
country regional body for the Horn of Africa, composed of
Kenya, Sudan, Uganda, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Somalia and Djibouti.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 2

have a firm grip on all the details of the state, institutions
are impregnated with it, a ihadist army, a security
apparatus that believes it is the NCP; and full 20 per cent
of the executive branch throughout Sudan is allocated to
us, but we haven’t filled these positions yet because of
technical and political reasons and due to the opposition
of some of our partners; we have signed an agreement,
but the implementation schedule is tight; we admit there
are shortcomings, in some ministries there is a Cold War
environment, such as the Ministry of Energy…”.
5
The international community has an enormous physical
presence in Sudan today, led by a 10,000-strong UN
mission (UNMIS) devoted to monitoring the CPA, but it
has failed to live up to its envisioned role as a guarantor,
and seems unwilling to seriously engage with the parties
politically on their numerous unmet commitments or the
direction of the CPA.
The ongoing conflict in Darfur has played into this
dynamic, distracting international attention and the parties
from the CPA. Though international efforts have been
depressingly ineffective at improving the situation in
Darfur, the international outcry has been noted by
the NCP, much of whose senior leadership is being
investigated by the International Criminal Court (ICC) for
the atrocity crimes carried out by the government forces
in Darfur since 2003.
6 Put off after Garang’s death, and
perhaps by suspicions of the SPLM’s intentions or its lack
of capacity, the NCP’s actions around implementation
have damaged the envisioned partnership.

5 “Southern leader: Sudanese Military Intelligence is behind all
the disasters. Edward Lino tells al-Sharq al-Awsat the Sudanese
army still supports the LRA”, al-Sharq al-Awsat, 15 March
2006 (in Arabic).
6 Crisis Group uses the term “atrocity crimes” advisedly. The
extensive debate over whether genocide has occurred or “only”
crimes against humanity or war crimes is misplaced. Whether
or not any party to the conflict acted with the intent “to destroy, in
whole or in part, a national ethnic or religious group, as
such” can only be properly determined through a credible
investigative and judicial process. What matters now is that
terrible crimes are continuing and will continue until the
international community acts forcefully. The perpetrators of
atrocity crimes must be brought to justice as a matter or
principle and as a step towards ending impunity in the region.
The court can determine into which legal category the crimes
fall. See, Gareth Evans, “Genocide or crime? Actions speak
louder than words in Darfur”, European Voice, 18 February
2005; also David Scheffer, “How to bring atrocity criminals to
justice”, Financial Times, 2 February 2005.
II. THE STATUS OF
IMPLEMENTATION: A PATTERN
EMERGES
The CPA is a long and complex agreement, and hence
difficult to monitor effectively. With more than 50 national
bodies and commissions to be formed, multiple systems
and levels of governments (with the GoSS and southern
state governments to be formed almost from scratch),
the parties, partners and observers are understandably
overwhelmed. Without universally accepted criteria for
assessing implementation, there is an active debate
amongst both the parties and observers on the
interpretation of the implementation process – for while
much has happened little has changed. Though the
President has issued dozens of new Presidential decrees
forming new commissions and committees, only a handful
are operational, and only the Ceasefire Joint Military
Committee (CJMC) and the Assessment and Evaluation
Committee (AEC) have met regularly.
7 Most exist only
on paper, or remain paralysed as the parties’ battle over
the terms of reference or functions for the commissions.
Though optimists point to the progress made, the
pessimists appear to be closer to the truth, for the picture
that emerges is of a pattern of NCP attempts to
systematically undermine, delay or simply ignore the
elements called for in the CPA that would fundamentally
alter the status quo and its grip on power.
With the exception of Abyei,
8 where the NCP is in blatant
violation of the terms of the CPA, its tactics are technical
and nuanced, taking advantage of either gaps in the
agreement, or the weakness and disorganisation of the
SPLM. The bulk of the agreement was directly negotiated
by then 1
st Vice-President Ali Osman Taha and SPLM
Chairman Dr. John Garang, aided by a small group of
trusted aides, and the two leaders counted on their positive
personal relationship to overcome areas of disagreement
during the implementation process. An enormous amount
of the power and decision making responsibility within
the CPA lies with the institution of the Presidency.
9 While
this seemed an effective way at the time of moving the
negotiations forward, it left a large number of gaps to be
resolved over the course of the interim period. The success
of this approach was dependent on Garang’s personal
relationship with Taha, and their joint commitment as an
executive to find a way to implement the agreement.

7 “Report of the Secretary-General on Sudan”, 14 March
2006, S/2006/160, p. 1.
8 Discussed further below in II.A.1. 9 The Presidency includes the President (President Bashir),
the 1 st Vice-President (Salva Kiir Mayardiit), and the Vice-
President (Ali Osman Taha).

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 3

Garang’s death last July has damaged, if not killed, this
partnership and the requisite commitment from the NCP
leadership. Garang’s successor, Salva Kiir Mayardiit,
has not yet found willing partners in the Presidency to
implement the agreement in accordance with the terms
and spirit of the Naivasha process. The result is that the
President, rather than the Presidency, has controlled the
implementation schedule and agenda.
A. C HALLENGES OF IMPLEMENTATION AT
THE
NATIONAL LEVEL : LOSING THE
M OMENTUM OF NAIVASHA
Nearly 15 months after the peace agreement was signed,
implementation in Khartoum in national government
institutions is slow and uneven. The GNU, originally
expected to be formed on 9 August 2005, was officially
announced on 20 September, and sworn in two days later.
Initial delays were due to Garang’s unforeseen death, but
subsequent extended delays in establishing key bodies
and commissions under the CPA illustrates the fragile
state of the agreement. The key to peace holding will be
the consolidation of the agreement, through consistent
implementation by both parties, to the point where the
momentum for peace becomes difficult to reverse and
undo. This is not yet the case.
As discussed below, the strategy of the NCP appears to
have shifted following Garang’s death, and now seems
more intent on delaying or undermining implementation
than proceeding in good faith. The distribution of
ministries in the GNU and the subsequent failure to
integrate the broader civil service provide several good
examples. The parties had categorised the various
ministries in Naivasha, and divided them between
sovereignty, economic and service ministry clusters. The
distribution of ministerial and state ministerial
10 positions
was to follow the power sharing ratio set out in the peace
agreement. The parties agreed to pair ministries in each
cluster. When the distribution finally took place, the
procedure should have been straightforward – within the
identified paired ministries, the NCP would choose one
and the SPLM would take the other.
The most controversial was the debate over the Ministry
of Energy. The Ministry of Energy had been paired with
the Ministry of Finance, but when the parties first began
discussions in the Joint National Transition Team (JNTT)
11

10 The state minister is the same as a deputy minister. Each
ministry has one minister and one or two state ministers.
11 The JNTT is a 14 person SPLM/NCP body formed last
spring to help implement the World Bank-led Joint Assessment
Mission. Once formed, the JNTT gave itself the mandate to
oversee the implementation of the CPA.
last spring, the NCP insisted on taking both. 12 The
discussion was put on hold, to be revisited by Garang and
Taha ahead of the formation of the GNU. But Garang
died before it could be resolved, leaving Salva in the
unenviable position of dealing with something that had
apparently been partially negotiated already through
private discussions between Taha and Garang. When
Salva and the SPLM began to push for the Energy
Ministry, Taha reportedly said that Garang had agreed in
private that the NCP could keep the ministry.
13 The
SPLM did not pursue the Finance Ministry because, as
with the defence arrangements, finance is effectively split
between North (at the level of the GNU, by default) and
South (at the level of the GoSS), thus making SPLM
control of GNU level ministry somewhat redundant.
14
Energy, however, would be key to monitoring and
engaging in the petroleum sector – one of the core pillars
upon which the entire CPA rests – and ensuring
compliance. When Salva made a final plea to Bashir for
the Energy Ministry, arguing that it would be an important
step towards making unity attractive, Bashir reportedly
replied that southerners were going to vote for separation
irrespective of whether they had the Energy Ministry.
15
While not a violation of the text of the CPA, this certainly
went against the spirit of Naivasha and failed to show
either good faith or goodwill on the part of the NCP.
Salva and the SPLM ultimately backed down from their
demand for the Energy Ministry, anticipating that the
National Petroleum Commission would still provide the
SPLM with a direct role in overseeing the petroleum
sector. However, the decision caused disappointment
amongst southerners, many of whom blamed Salva for
giving up where Garang would have succeeded. Hence
NCP tactics not only assured continued control of the
Energy Ministry, but also dealt a sharp blow to the support
and confidence of the SPLM leader, less than two months
into his new job. Surprisingly, UNMIS and the broader
international community remained quiet during this

12 Crisis Group interview, Khartoum, 14 October 2005. 13 Crisis Group interviews, 25 October 2005 and 7 March 2006. 14 According to the CPA, southern Sudan is to have its own
conventional banking system, in parallel to the Islamic banking
system operating in the North. The Central Bank of Sudan will
have two equal sub-systems, one for the North and one for the
South. Because the GoSS Ministry of Finance will serve as the
de facto Ministry of Finance for the conventional banking
system in the South, the national Ministry of Finance is likely
to become the de facto Ministry for the North. Crisis Group
interview, 7 March 2006.
15 Crisis Group interview, Khartoum, 14 October 2005. Salva
also stated this publicly in a speech at the Woodrow Wilson
International Center in Washington DC, on 4 November 2005,
as reported in “The Impact of the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement and the New Government of National Unity on
Southern Sudan”, Human Rights Watch, March 2006, fn.6.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 4

episode, watching in silence as the NCP openly
undermined the spirit of the CPA, with potentially dire
consequences.
The SPLM also alleges that prior to its taking over the
leadership of agreed upon ministries in October, the NCP
deliberately weakened some of the core functions of those
ministries. Some SPLM members have complained that
International Cooperation was sliced out of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and made into a separate ministry prior
to SPLM appointee Lam Akol taking over as Minister.
However, the NCP has been subdividing ministries for
years to accommodate breakaway factions from opposition
groups, southern clients, and other Islamist factions while
still retaining key ministries. The creation of the Ministry
of International Cooperation was one such move, and it
was allocated to the Umma Party-Reform and Renovation
of Mubarak al-Fadl. The arrival of the SPLM complicated
matters further as the NCP had to share power with a
principal partner, while keeping its earlier allies happy
with their piece of the cake. The NCP strategy was to give
the SPLM ministries that were voided of their essential
powers through earlier structural reshaping of the
ministries.
16
After the eventual formation of the GNU, progress became
bogged down in the establishment of the various
commissions, committees, and other bodies relating to the
implementation of the CPA. While many of these bodies
have been created by presidential decree, the legality of
many of them is questionable, as discussed below. Several
key commissions have not yet been established, including
the Human Rights Commission, the Land Commission,
the National Electoral Commission, the Commission on
the Rights of non-Muslims in the National Capital,
17 and
the National Civil Service Commission. 18 The delays in
establishing the Civil Service Commission means that
there has not yet been any SPLM integration into the
national institutions or civil service, beyond those
appointed to Ministerial or State Ministerial positions.
Hence more than 15 months after the signing of the CPA,

16 Crisis Group interview, 22 February 2006. 17 Problems remain across the board in setting up the new
administration for Khartoum. The SPLM delegation in the
Khartoum state Legislative Council recently withdrew from
the committee drafting the constitution for the national capital
citing contradictions with the Interim National Constitution.
“Sudan’s SPLM pull out of team drafting Khartoum
Constitution”, Khartoum Monitor/Sudan Tribune, 23 March
2006. Available at https://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3
?id_article=14685.
18 The most comprehensive overview of the detailed status of
implementation available is in the CPA Monitor, a monthly
report put out by UNMIS and available at https://www.unmis.
org/english/cpaMonitor.htm. See also: “Report of the Secretary-
General on Sudan”, 14 March 2006, S/2006/160.
the SPLM’s presence in the GNU, including in the
commissions and other bodies, likely amounts to no more
40 people.
19
Of the bodies that have been legally established, most are
not yet functioning. Either the parties have not yet agreed
upon the rules of procedure, or they have yet to meet. The
NCP and members of the international community
correctly blame some of the delays on the SPLM’s lack of
capacity and disorganisation. However, there is also
a more sinister pattern discernible, whereby the NCP, via
the Presidency, is delaying and manipulating the legal
establishment of some key commissions and other
institutions
20 called for in the CPA. This is discussed in
greater detail below.
1. Abyei: A direct threat to peace
While most of the obstruction by the NCP has been
quite nuanced, the NCP’s actions regarding Abyei are a
blatant violation of the CPA, creating perhaps the most
volatile element of the entire agreement right now.
21 The
CPA includes a separate agreement on Abyei, allowing
the disputed territory to hold special administrative status
under the Presidency, to be followed by a referendum
simultaneous with the southern referendum, with the
option of remaining in the North or joining the South
(including an independent South, pending the outcome
of the southern referendum.) Abyei is the traditional home
of the Ngok Dinka, a tribe of the populous Dinka to the
South, and is also dear to the neighbouring Misseriya,
Arab pastoralists who pass through Abyei every year
to graze at the river Kiir (Bahr el-Arab), and further
southwards. The Ngok Dinka have been massively

19 The CPA stipulated that the National Civil Service
Commission would be tasked with forming policies to train and
recruit southern Sudanese, to fill between 20-30 per cent of the
civil service, including at least 20 per cent of the middle and
upper-level positions. These figures would be reviewed pending
the outcome of the national census. This was one area in the
negotiations where the SPLM chose to negotiate on behalf of
the South rather than the party. This assumes that the bulk of the
southerners integrated into the civil service, including many of
those already operating in the national civil service, are supporters
of the SPLM. See: Section 2.6.2 in the Power Sharing Protocol
of the CPA, signed 9 January 2006.
20 This includes the commissions listed above. It also explains
the long and unnecessary delays in establishing the Joint
Defence Board and the Ceasefire Political Commission.
21 For more on the background to the Abyei conflict and its role
in the negotiation process, see see Crisis Group Briefing,
Garang’s Death: Implications for Peace in Sudan, op. cit. See
also Crisis Group Report, The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement, op.
cit.; Crisis Group Briefing, Sudan’s Other Wars, 23 op. cit.;
Crisis Group Report, Sudan Endgame, op. cit.; and Crisis Group
Report, Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace, op. cit.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 5

displaced over the course of the second civil war, and a
main intention of the agreement was to allow them to
return to their homes and villages, some of which have
since been settled by the Misseriya. The CPA defined
Abyei as the traditional nine Ngok Dinka Chiefdoms that
were transferred from Bahr el-Ghazal to Kordofan by
the British in 1905, and established a special boundary
commission made up equally of the SPLM, the NCP,
and international experts appointed by the U.S., UK and
IGAD, to determine these boundaries as of 1905. When
the SPLM and NCP delegations failed to reach an
agreement, the final decision was put in the hands of
the international experts. Irrespective of the territorial
definition, the agreement guaranteed the traditional
grazing rights and rights of passage through Abyei for
the Misseriya and other nomads. It was agreed that the
decision of the Abyei Boundary Commission (ABC)
would be final and binding, and the CPA sets out a number
of subsequent steps to be taken by the Presidency, such
as the appointment of a local Executive Council until
local elections can be held.
The ABC delivered its report to the Presidency on 14 July,
but there has been no progress since that time. The report
defined the territory as a broad area stretching from the
borders of Bahr el-Ghazal, east to the border with Upper
Nile, and north to the villages of Umm Sakina, Turda and
Edd Dibekir – including large oil producing areas that the
NCP had counted on remaining in the North.
22
President Bashir and Vice-President Taha have been vocal
in their rejection of the ABC report, but the NCP has also
been working to politicise the issue and mobilise the
Misseriya against the ABC. While refusing to implement
the terms of the agreement to establish an administration
in Abyei, the NCP deputy governor Southern Kordofan,
23

22 The NCP was adamantly against granting Abyei a referendum
during the negotiation process. At one point, Energy Minister
Awad al-Gaz was reported to have told the NCP delegation in
Naivasha that 80 per cent of the oil in the North lay in Abyei.
Interestingly, the SPLM reported that in private discussions
between Taha and Garant in 2003, Taha suggested two options
on Abyei: either a referendum, or a presidential decree that
would shift Abyei directly to Bahr el-Ghazal. However, this
was never raised again by the NCP in any of its subsequent
proposals on Abyei. Crisis Group Africa Report, Sudan:
Towards an Incomplete Peace, op. cit. Crisis Group interview,
Naivasha, 13 January 2004.
23 The CPA also took away the Misseriya-dominated state of
Western Kordofan. The agreement on Southern Kordofan and
Blue Nile states dissolved Western Kordofan and merged it with
Southern Kordofan, a demand put forward at the last minute by
the NCP to dilute the strength of the Nuba peoples – traditional
supporters of the SPLM – in the new state. As a result, many
Misseriya have expressed outrage and feelings of abandonment
by the NCP, as evidenced by Misseriya involvement alongside
Mr. Eisa Bashari, recently travelled to Abyei town
carrying the message that “Abyei shall remain part of
Southern Kordofan until the end of time”.
24 This type of
incendiary behaviour from NCP cadres and its security
services has been reported regularly over the past nine
months, and appears to be aimed at inciting populations
against each other and undermining implementation.
The danger of Abyei is that both sides continue to see the
referendum as a zero-sum game. For the Ngok Dinka and
the SPLM, anything short of a referendum, and a likely
vote to return to the South, is an unacceptable outcome.
For the Misseriya, their fears that their traditional
grazing rights will be sacrificed or compromised are
understandable, but these are in fact protected in the
agreement. However, the NCP’s politicisation of the issue
and its misinformation campaign appear to be exacerbating
these fears. For the NCP, its primary motivation appears
to be economic, driven by a fear of losing the huge
reserves of oil in Abyei should it vote to join an
independent South. Having built up the issue, the NCP
will now also suffer political fallout with the Misseriya
and others if it backs down. Since all groups see the
referendum as the key target, each step along the way is
being contested. For example, the NCP have suggested
setting up an interim administration made up of Ngok
Dinka and Misseriya, ahead of the Executive Council.
The SPLM have rejected this, demanding that the
Executive Council be formed instead, as per the
agreement.
25 The NCP are seeking Misseriya participation
because participation in the administration implies
residency, and residency implies a right to vote in
the referendum. Thus the first step is seen by the parties
as influencing the outcome of the last step.
26
The SPLM leadership has been pushing Bashir to allow
the experts who participated on the ABC to come back
and defend their findings in order to help break the

the rebels in Darfur and the emergence of the anti-government
armed movement Al-Shahamah (though this group has
reportedly since reached an agreement with the NCP).
24 See: Njahari Gathara, “Trouble in Abyei”, Sudan Mirror, 27
February 2006. Reprinted at https://www.southsudannation.com
/featurearticle3.htm.
25 Crisis Group interview, 8 March 2006. 26 A referendum for Abyei was originally included in the 1972
Addis Ababa Peace Agreement, which defined southern
Sudan according to the North-South borders at the time of
independence, “and any other areas that were culturally and
geographically a part of the Southern Complex as may be
decided by a referendum.” The criteria covered the Ngok Dinka
of Abyei, but obviously not the Misseriya. The referendum
was never implemented. See: Article 3.iii, The Addis Ababa
Agreement on the Problem of South Sudan, March 1972.
Reprinted in: Abel Alier, Too Many Agreements Dishonoured:
Southern Sudan, Second Reprint, Khartoum, 2003, p. 348.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 6

impasse. Bashir reportedly agreed to this in early March,
but this alone may not be enough. 27 The establishment of
an administration in Abyei is crucial to begin to stabilise
the situation and provide some much needed development
to the area. The international community should continue
to pressure the NCP to implement its commitments under
the CPA and form the Executive Council immediately.
Given the key role of the personnel appointed to the
Executive, one option would be to have the UN oversee a
temporary administration in the area while the parties,
including both the SPLM-NCP and the Ngok Dinka-
Misseriya, open discussions on the range of issues facing
them. One such issue is the definition of residency and
citizenship in Abyei, as per the agreement in the CPA,
the ABC report, and taking into account the situation
on the ground. A second discussion should focus on the
implementation of the ABC report, taking into account
the dramatic demographic changes on the ground since
1905. A third discussion should centre around potential
scenarios should Abyei vote to join an independent South.
All efforts must be undertaken to avoid an outbreak of
conflict in this case, and much can be done towards that
end. For example, the feasibility of providing dual
citizenship to Dinka and Misseriya in the area could be
investigated, and there could be preliminary discussions
between the Misseriya and Ngok Dinka on the types of
guarantees the Misseriya would require with regard to
grazing rights. Such a discussion could provide a useful
model for other pastoralist communities living elsewhere
along the North-South border, such as the Rizeigat,
Selim Baggar, Rufa’a and Fellata, should the South vote
for independence.
28 Finally, the oil factor cannot be
ignored as a driving motivation for the NCP. As proposed
by Crisis Group during the negotiations, one way to
lesson the “winner take all” approach to this issue would
be to negotiate a separate oil sharing agreement for
Abyei between North and South. Should Abyei vote to
join an independent South, that would allow for continued
oil and revenue sharing between Juba and Khartoum for
at least eight or ten years, and provide substantial benefits
to the “loser” of the referendum.
29
More focus is also needed on the other transitional areas
of Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Aligned to
the SPLM since the mid-1980’s, negotiations on these

27 Crisis Group interview, 8 March 2006. 28 Crisis Group correspondence, 31 March 2006. 29 The CPA stipulates that oil revenue from Abyei will be split
as follows: 50 per cent to the national government, 42 per cent
to the GoSS, and two per cent to each of the following: Bahr el-
Ghazal region; Western Kordofan (though this no longer exists);
the Ngok Dinka; and locally with the Misseriya people. See:
Crisis Group Report, Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace, op.
cit.
two areas were paired together with Abyei during much
of the negotiation process. However, the agreements on
these areas in the CPA granted them less than Abyei,
such as the right to a “popular consultation” rather than
a self-determination referendum. Implementation is
moving very slowly in both states, and frustration is
growing quickly amongst the SPLM. “We fought for
20 years, and now have seven paid positions in the state
government”, complained a senior SPLM official from
Blue Nile State. “Is that what we fought for? With no
change and no peace dividends, people will go back to
war.” The international community must also focus
greater attention on the implementation of the agreements
in these areas.
2. A monopoly on legal processes
The safeguards built into the CPA to provide a check on
the Presidency’s power and actions have been curtailed
by the NCP, with most key institutions related to the
CPA being formed by presidential decree. The National
Constitutional Review Commission (NCRC) was
empowered in the CPA to do two things. The first was to
draft the new Interim National Constitution, a task which
it successfully carried out. The 60-person body
30 “shall
also be required to prepare such other legal instruments as
is required to give effect to the Peace Agreement. It shall
provide in such draft statutes or in the Constitutional Text
for the appointment and other mechanisms to ensure the
independence of such National Institutions as are referred
to in section 2.10”.
31
Yet the NCRC, which is based on the power sharing
percentages laid out in the CPA, ceased to function after
the constitution was drafted. In its place, two NCP
strategies emerged. The first was a series of six provisional
orders issued by the President during the time of the NCP
caretaker government, ahead of the formation of the GNU.
These six decrees
32 included some outrageous proposed
changes to the law, such as strengthening the powers of

30 The NCRC was expanded to 180 persons during the
constitutional drafting process in order to provide greater
representation for other political parties.
31 See section. 2.12.0 of the Power Sharing Protocol of the
CPA, signed 9 January 2005. Section 2.10 of the CPA calls
for the establishment of a National Electoral Commission, a
Human Rights Commission, a National Judicial Service
Commission, a National Civil Service Commission, an ad hoc
Commission to monitor the southern self-determination
referendum, and a Fiscal and Financial Allocation and
Monitoring Commission.
32 The six decrees were the Criminal Procedure Amendment
Act, the Armed Forces Amendment Act, the Red Cross Act, the
Higher Education Amendment Act, the Wages and Salaries
Amendment Act, and the Voluntary and Humanitarian Work
Act.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 7

the police and armed forces to shoot to kill while at the
same time providing them with greater impunity from the
legal system, and gave the NCP-dominated Humanitarian
Aid Commission (HAC) near total power to monitor
and control all foreign-funded humanitarian, voluntary
and human rights-related operations. Provisional orders
must go to the National Assembly, where they can be
accepted or rejected, but not amended. If the next session
of the Assembly does not act on an order before it goes
to recess, the order lapses and is annulled. It can then
be redrafted as a bill, where it will go through the regular
process of debate and amendment.
33
The SPLM did not let these proposed laws pass without a
fight, however, and scored a political victory. In a press
conference in one of the SPLM’s first public challenges
of the NCP policies Yasir Arman, head of the SPLM in
the national assembly, publicly criticised the provisional
orders as “violating the constitution and the peace
agreement” and threatened to take the matter to the
constitutional court.
34 The Voluntary and Humanitarian
Work Act (known as the NGO Act) also sparked a serious
reaction from the humanitarian community and some of
the international partners. Facing such resistance, the NCP
withdrew the provisional orders. The NGO Act was then
re-submitted as a bill and passed by 52 per cent, despite
still containing some very worrisome clauses, such as
requiring all NGOs seeking foreign funding for projects
to be approved by the HAC.
35 Nonetheless, according to
one high-ranking SPLM representative, “We are satisfied
with the NGO Act. We managed to insert eighty per cent
of the amendments. In politics you never get one hundred
percent of what you want. The most important thing is the
NCP did not use its bare majority to pass the original law.
It is a significant procedural victory”.
36
Following agreed-upon procedures when adopting new
laws is an important step in the right direction in changing
Sudan’s old political system. Yet, the construction of new
bills based on a consensus of the NCP and SPLM, as
envisaged by the CPA, has broken down, leading to bill-
making by Presidential Decree. With the cordial working
relationship within the Presidency having faded after
Garang’s death, presidential decrees have been
increasingly controlled by the President, rather than
consensual decisions of the Presidency.
37 Several of
the decrees forming institutions have been in direct

33 Crisis Group interviews, February and March 2006. 34 Opheera McDoom, “Sudan’s SPLM, NCP Clash over
Security Laws”, Reuters, 2 February 2006.
35 See: “The CPA Monitor: Monthly report on the
implementation of the CPA”, February 2006, at:
https://www.unmis.org/english/cpaMonitor.htm.
36 Crisis Group interview, Khartoum, March 2006. 37 Crisis Group interview, SPLM official, 15 March 2006.
contradiction of the CPA. For example, the National
Judicial Service Commission Act was allegedly drafted
by the Ministry of Justice rather than the NCRC, and
although it passed through the National Assembly, it
contains provisions that are contradictory to both the CPA
and the Interim National Constitution.
38 For example, the
act provides for three additional positions for experts to be
appointed directly by the President, though the CPA
already provides for the exact membership of the
Commission, with equal representation from North and
South.
39 It also states that the President is responsible for
the appointment of all the judges of Sudan, whereas the
CPA states that the President of the GoSS shall appoint
the judges in the South.
40
“Presidential Decrees were expected to end with the
CPA” noted a leading southern legal expert. “They should
all be drafted as laws by the NCRC, not the Ministry of
Justice, then go to the Presidency”.
41 Questions have also
been raised about the legality of the Constitutional Court
Act, the Bank of Sudan Amendment Act, and the statutes
establishing the National Petroleum Commission and the
Assessment and Evaluation Commission.
42 The NCRC
was finally reestablished by Presidential Decree on 7
January 2006, but the new mandate of the Commission
makes no reference to ensuring the independence of CPA
Commissions and institutions and their compatibility with
the CPA and the Interim National Constitution. Instead, it
lists the function of the NCRC as being responsible for
reviewing the Constitution during the interim period.
43
3. Oil problems persist
The oil sector continues to be a high-risk area for the
implementation of the agreement. Under the terms of the
CPA, the GoSS is to receive 50 per cent of all revenue
from oil produced in southern Sudan, after 2 per cent is
set aside for the relevant oil producing state government.
However, the parties do not yet agree on the parameters
for calculating the oil wealth, or which oil fields lie in the
South. There has not yet been any progress on ascertaining
the North-South borders which will determine the division
of the oilfields, the SPLM does not yet have access to any
of the information to which it is entitled relating to oil

38 Crisis Group interview, 9 March 2006. “The CPA Monitor:
Monthly report on the implementation of the CPA”, February
2006.
39 See Article 38.b, Implementation Modalities and Global
Implementation Matrix, CPA, signed 9 January 2005.
40 See Article 53, Implementation Modalities and Global
Implementation Matrix, CPA, signed 9 January 2005.
41 Crisis Group interview, 9 March 2006. 42 Crisis Group interviews, February and March 2006. 43 “The CPA Monitor: Monthly report on the implementation
of the CPA”, Article 34 and Annex 19, February 2006.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 8

production figures and existing contracts, and the National
Petroleum Commission – the executive body created in
the CPA to help regulate the petroleum sector – remains
stuck on procedural differences. Progress must be achieved
on all three of these issues for smooth relations and
implementation in the petroleum sector.
Though the CPA granted a small SPLM technical team
the right to see and review existing oil contracts, this
has not yet happened. The SPLM blames this on NCP
intransigence – when senior SPLM official Pagan Amum
pursued Energy Minister Awad al-Jaz over the summer
to gain access to the contracts, he was told that he had
to wait until the return of the Secretary-General of the
Ministry. The Secretary-General only contacted the SPLM
in December, and the contracts remain unavailable to this
day.
44 The SPLM also shares some of the blame, as it
lacks trained personnel, was slow to establish the technical
committee, and has reportedly failed to follow up since
Pagan’s failed efforts over the summer.
45 Promises of
technical support to the SPLM have been extremely slow
in coming. Despite having a State Minister in the Ministry
of Energy, the SPLM still does not have access to any
of the key data regarding oil production, such as daily
production figures.
46
The parties have not yet made any progress on defining
the North-South boundaries, and the Ad Hoc North-South
Boundary Commission tasked with this has yet to meet.
Though the GoSS received nearly $800 million in oil
revenue from the GNU by the end of February 2006, and
is having difficulty in absorbing and disbursing this
amount, the GoSS has no way of knowing how much it is
in fact entitled to. When the NCP refused to give the
Energy Ministry to the SPLM, the decision was ultimately
accepted by Salva because it was expected that the
National Petroleum Commission would act as the new
executive body for the petroleum sector, as per the terms
laid out in the CPA – thereby giving the SPLM an
opportunity to oversee and regulate all aspects of the
sector. However, the National Petroleum Commission
remains deadlocked and ineffective, as the NCP Energy
Minister Awad al-Jaz seeks to maintain the ministry’s
total control of the oil sector, and pushes the Commission
to be little more than a ceremonial body. Little has been
achieved in the two National Petroleum Commission
meetings to date, and al-Jaz has resisted requests from the
SPLM to give the Commission a technical mandate to
deal with the negotiation of new contracts, for example,
as is provided for in the CPA. Combined with the fact that
the SPLM State Minister in the Ministry, Angelina Teny,

44 Crisis Group interviews, 14 January 2006 and 8 March 2006. 45 See “The CPA Monitor: Monthly report on the
implementation of the CPA”, Articles 79-82, February 2006.
46 Crisis Group interviews, February and March 2006.
remains shut out of the internal discussions and decision-
making processes, the SPLM have little choice but to
accept the word of the NCP.
Without having determined the borders, the NCP claims
that the South is entitled to roughly 73 per cent of oil
produced in Blocks 1, 2 and 4. The numbers that the
NCP-dominated Ministry of Energy provides to the
SPLM have little backing – hence the main revenue
stream of the GoSS remains at the mercy of the NCP.
For 2005, the NCP claim that the share for the South was
$798.4 million, of which Khartoum spent $194.5 million
on administrative costs for the now defunct South Sudan
Coordinating Council from 9 January – 9 July 2005,
and the GoSS received $523.3 of the remaining $603.9
million.
47 In late January, Salva Kiir publicly complained
that the GoSS was not receiving its rightful share of the
oil revenue.
48 In the days immediately following that
press conference, SPLM claim that the Ministry of
Finance transferred the remainder for 2005, as well as
revenue for January 2006 and the GoSS share from the
Oil Revenue Stabilisation Account, bringing the total
paid to the GoSS by early February to $773.15 million.
49
Following a meeting between the Presidency and the
GNU and GoSS Ministers of Finance, both parties agreed
that the amount transferred by the national Ministry of
Finance equalled the amount received by the GoSS. This
was the message the parties brought to the donor meeting
in Paris in mid-March. However, this consensus should
not be confused with a functioning petroleum sector.
Problems also exist in the petroleum sector in the South,
where the GoSS continues to recognise oil agreements
that a small group of SPLM officials signed after the CPA
was completed. As pointed out in a previous Crisis Group
report, these agreements, signed with White Nile (which
is 50 per cent owned by the SPLM) for Block Ba in
January 2005, and with the Moldovan company Ascom
for Block 5b in June 2005, are a clear violation of the CPA
and will likely cause problems for the GoSS in the longer-
term.
50 Not only were both signed after the CPA had been
signed – a right the GoSS did not have under the CPA,
as all new agreements must go through the National
Petroleum Commission – but both agreements were signed
in concession areas already sold to other companies. Block

47 Crisis Group interviews, 17 February and 8 March 2006. 48 Opheera McDoom, “Sudan’s Kiir slams slow peace deal
process”, Reuters, 28 January 2006.
49 Crisis Group interviews, 17 February, 7 March and 8 March
2006. Confusion reigned immediately after the press conference,
with the GNU ministry of finance alleging that the GoSS had
received its proper share. See: “South Sudan received its proper
share – official”, Sudan Tribune, 1 February 2006.
50 See Crisis Group Report, The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement,
op. cit.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 9

B (of which the White Nile concession is a sub-block)
is leased to a Total-led consortium, and has been under
lease to Total since 1980,
51 and block 5b is leased to a
consortium led by Petronas. The wealth sharing agreement
in the CPA stated that all existing oil agreements would
remain valid, thereby further undermining the right of the
SPLM to have signed these agreements. Nonetheless, the
GoSS has yet to take any action on this issue. To the
contrary, both White Nile and Ascom have set up bases in
Juba, and White Nile is operating around Bor and hopes
to begin drilling before the end of the year.
52
Oil development also continues in Unity and Upper Nile
State, with the civilian population continuing to be
displaced as a result. In Unity State, development is
displacing villages and villagers – through coercion and
unmet promises rather than violence – and is allegedly
being supported by SPLM Governor Taban Deng Gai.
For example, villagers in Thar Jath were moved in
February to a new village called Rier, where they were
promised a clinic, school and clean water, in addition to
financial compensation. The villagers reportedly refused
when they realised the proposed site was swampy and the
promised development was not forthcoming, only to be
ordered to move by the Governor.
53 Similar displacement
is reportedly also continuing in the Chinese run Ader Yel
oilfield in Upper Nile.
54 Though the CPA promised that
the views of citizens would be taken into consideration in
planning oil development, this does not yet appear to
be the case.
4. Obstacles in the security sector
The security sector provisions of the CPA are perhaps the
most critical to the sustainability of the agreement. If they
are not implemented and monitored carefully, a return to
war is possible. The disengagement of forces, disarmament
and demobilisation processes, redeployment of the Sudan
Armed Forces (SAF) from the South and the SPLA from
the North are far behind schedule. However, the UN-led
Ceasefire Joint Military Committee (CJMC) is also
the most effective CPA body formed to date, meeting
regularly and developing credibility with the parties. The
CJMC answers to another UN facilitated body, the
Ceasefire Political Committee (CPC), which finally met
in late February 2006 for the first time and is scheduled to

51 White Nile and some in the SPLM claim that Total’s
concession expired in 2000 and was renewed in December
2004, just prior to the signing of the CPA.
52 “White Nile says fully operational in Southern Sudan”,
AFX, 29 March 2006; “White Nile to start Sudan drilling by
last quarter of 2006”, Reuters, 14 March 2006; and Crisis
Group interview, 23 February 2006.
53 Crisis Group correspondence, 26 March 2006. 54 Ibid.
hold monthly meetings. The CPC is designed to deal with
political issues that could have implications on the security
situation and the ceasefire, such as Abyei or eastern Sudan,
for example. Nonetheless, there is cause for concern.
The delays in withdrawals must be addressed carefully.
Though SAF claims to be on target with the timeline
established in the CPA for withdrawals – purporting to
have already removed 13,334 of its 66,525 troops in the
South (a 31 per cent reduction) – the SPLA argues that
SAF is far behind schedule, and is in fact reinforcing its
positions in Renk and Melut.
55 UNMIS is meant to verify
these re-deployments from the South, but to date can only
confirm that 1,891 SAF troops have been redeployed to
the North.
56 “SAF is telling us they withdrew most of
their troops from January-March 2005, before we were
operational on the ground”, explained an UNMIS officer.
“We have no choice but to take their word for it until we
can inspect and confirm”.
57 A SAF withdrawal from the
South is critical to consolidating the peace, given its
continued policy of supporting South Sudan Defence
Forces (SSDF) militias, and SPLM allegations that it
continues to support the LRA.
The problems facing the SPLA are numerous, and are
discussed in the following section in greater detail. One
difficult issue relates to the SPLA withdrawal from eastern
Sudan, which should have been completed by 9 January
2006. Fortunately the SPLA were behind schedule, for
SAF invaded the SPLA and Eastern Front-held town of
Hamashkoreb on 11 January, leading to limited fighting
with the Eastern Front. The SPLA are now scheduled
to withdraw from the East in May, but this is likely to
lead to a new war in the East until and unless a credible
negotiation process is established between the NCP
and the Eastern Front.
58 The SPLA should delay its
withdrawal from the East until negotiations have begun.

55 See “The CPA Monitor: Monthly report on the
implementation of the CPA”, February 2006; and Crisis
Group interview, 7 March 2006.
56 “The CPA Monitor: Monthly report on the implementation
of the CPA”, February 2006.
57 Crisis Group interview, 22 February 2006. 58 For more on the crisis in the East, see Crisis Group Report,
Sudan: Saving Peace in the East, op. cit.. The potential
for conflict in the East is tied into the NCP’s antagonistic
relationship with Eritrea, which supports the Eastern Front and
the Darfur rebel groups, and historically supported the SPLM
against the NCP. In February 2006, Salva led a joint
SPLM/NCP delegation to Asmara to discuss the prospects
for negotiations on the East. It achieved little progress,
however, as Eritrean President Issaias Afeworki refused to
meet with the NCP members of the delegation, including the
head of national security, Salah Abdallah “Gosh”. Crisis Group
interviews, March 2006.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 10

B. T HE GOVERNMENT OF SOUTHERN
SUDAN : A NEW SET OF CHALLENGES
Establishing a functioning government in southern Sudan
will be a long and difficult process. During the war there
was a minimal level of administration in the government-
controlled garrison towns, and even less in most of the
SPLA-controlled South, leaving little in the way of
structures upon which to build the new government. The
SPLM-dominated GoSS was established on 22 October
2005, and is slowly inching forward: the South Sudan
Assembly was inaugurated on 29 September 2005, the
South Sudan Interim Constitution was adopted on 5
December 2005, and governments in the ten southern
states have been established. However, the GoSS is
literally starting from scratch. Juba, the capital of the
South, is perhaps the most developed city in all of southern
Sudan, but does not yet have electricity or running water.
The ministries are housed in a handful of run-down
buildings, but there is not yet a civil service to carry out
the work of the ministries. The combination of the lack of
infrastructure and the limited capacity of the SPLM and
other southern parties are making for slow going in South.
Though the challenges are enormous and the slow pace of
progress understandable, the GoSS is running up against
increasing frustration and unmet expectations throughout
the South, and is experiencing a rise in insecurity. The
CPA brought a welcome end to the war in the South, but
also raised expectations throughout the general population
and within the SPLM of tangible “peace dividends” as
a result of the agreement. These “peace dividends” in the
form of health care services and education or infrastructure
projects have not yet arrived, though the main road arteries
throughout the South are in the process of being de-mined
and renovated.
Little was achieved prior to the establishment of the
GoSS because there was no mandated body in charge of
governance in the South, and the SPLM was poorly
organised and lacked the resources to begin any
significant projects. Money has finally arrived – nearly
$800 million in oil revenues so far – but the GoSS does
not yet have to capacity to spend most of it, still lacking
the necessary banking, treasury and payroll structures.
59
This has led to delays in the payment of salaries to both
the civil service and the SPLA. There is far too little
accountability and transparency within the GoSS, and
rumours of missing or misspent millions from the first
transfers of oil revenue last spring have begun to circulate
in both Juba and Khartoum. Combined with the

59 Crisis Group interview with UN official, Juba, 28 February
2006.
unexplained (though not inexplicable) delays in payments
of salaries, despite sufficient money being received by the
Bank of Southern Sudan and the GoSS approving payment
for civil service and SPLA salaries in December 2005,
donor confidence in the GoSS is beginning to waver.
60
Despite the delays and the difficult road ahead, the GoSS
has several things working in its favour. First, the CPA is
a very good agreement for the South, broadly accepted
across the southern political spectrum, and the self-
determination referendum is seen as an historic opportunity
which should not be squandered. Second, the South is
arguably more unified now than it was prior to Garang’s
death, following the 8 January signing of the Juba
Declaration, pursuant to which the majority of
government-aligned southern militias agreed to be
integrated into the SPLA. However, the security
situation in the South remains tenuous, and the lack of
progress in reorganising the SPLA and delays in the
payment of troops are creating an increasingly unstable
environment in the South.
1. Fixing the SPLA: A top priority for the South
The SPLM’s main strategy for ensuring the
implementation of the CPA was to maintain a strong and
credible military threat against an NCP abrogation of the
agreement. This was cemented in the CPA by allowing
the SPLA to remain a separate army alongside the SAF.
The parties agreed to establish SPLA/SAF Joint Integrated
Units (JIU’s) in the South, the three areas of Abyei,
Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states, and Khartoum,
with the understanding that the SAF would withdraw the
remainder of its troops from the South, and the SPLA
would withdraw its additional troops from the North.
Throughout the 21-year civil war, the SPLA functioned
mostly as an unpaid army of volunteers and conscripts. Its
size varied based on the time of year and the threat, with
troops supported by the local population through voluntary
donations and taxation. Transforming the SPLA into a
professional army remains a top priority for the movement,
but one that has seen limited progress, and this is causing
a new set of problems in the South. Little was achieved
on this front during the pre-interim period,
61 due to a lack
of resources and a lack of trust between Garang and then
SPLA Chief of Staff Salva Kiir. Garang appointed a new
SPLA command just prior to his death, selecting Salva to
act as the Vice-President for the GoSS, headed by new
Chief of Staff Oyai Deng Ajak. Though the revenue
problem has since largely been solved, with the SPLM

60 Crisis Group interviews, February-March 2006. 61 The Peace Agreement established a six-month pre-interim
period, followed by a six-year interim period leading to the
southern referendum.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 11

cum GoSS receiving a steady flow of oil revenue from
the central government since May 2005, the army remains
a mess.
The plan for the reorganisation was to assemble troops
within the seven regional areas of operation for the SPLA,
and conduct a headcount of all available troops.
62 Garang
proposed a number of more than 360,000 last spring
to participate in the UN-led DDR (disarmament,
demobilisation and reintegration) process, but the target
for the standing professional army is between 80,000-
120,000 troops.
63 The head counts would also provide an
opportunity to assess the skill set of each soldier, and
reassign them as necessary – to the army, the JIUs, the
wildlife or prison services, the civil service, those to be
demobilised and those to be retired. The strategy was then
to form a national army, based on the mixed regional
forces. The head count process has proven difficult because
the SPLA, as a volunteer army, included many part-time
fighters who have since gone back to civilian life.
Assembling troops has been one major challenge. In some
locations where troops have been assembled, the lack of
food and delays in the payment of salaries has led to people
leaving the assembly areas before the headcount was
completed.
64 One area where the SPLA has made progress
is in appointing its members to serve on the JIUs. It has
also been supporting these JIU troops with housing and
food, because although the GNU is to pay for the JIUs out
of the national budget, the Joint Defence Board (the
executive body for the JIUs) did not become operational
until February 2006.
65
Though $80 million was approved by the GoSS parliament
for SPLA expenditure in the first quarter of 2006, there
have been extensive delays in paying the soldiers due to
the lack of progress on the reorganisation of the forces.
66
The continued delays, which went unexplained to the
public, combined with the knowledge that sufficient
resources had been received by the GoSS and approved
for expenditure, created a dangerous situation in the South.

62 The seven areas are Upper Nile, Equatoria, Bahr el-Ghazal,
the Nuba Mountains, Southern Blue Nile, the Joint Integrated
Units, and the SPLA General Headquarters. Crisis Group
interview with senior SPLA official, 26 February 2006.
63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 Crisis Group interview, 27 February 2006. The Joint Defense
Board (JDB) is the executive body established to oversee the
formation and function of the JIUs. Staffed jointly by SPLA and
SAF, the formation of the JDB was delayed until the Presidential
decree of 29 December 2005. The JDB met twice in February,
but faces logistical constraints and is not yet fully operational.
Before the JIUs can be fully operational, the JDB must develop
a new military doctrine, rules and procedures for operations, and
organise six months of training for participating troops.
66 Crisis Group interviews, February 2006.
Under pressure from its own troops, as well as the general
population, the SPLA command finally began issuing
payment in late February 2006 to some its soldiers.
67
However, the lack of reorganisation has forced the SPLA
to pay troops using the old structure, in which commanders
are given the funds and expected to pay salaries
downwards to the members of their brigades.
68 Without
having completed the head counts or the reassignments
of troops, this system is both unaccountable and
unsustainable, because the actual soldiers present in each
brigade have not been assessed or reviewed prior to the
payment of salaries.
The reorganisation of the army must be made an
immediate priority for the GoSS. The delays have lowered
morale, leading to banditry and poor discipline amongst
the troops.
69 Poor performance by SPLA troops is allowing
new security threats to flourish, such as the Lord’s
Resistance Army (LRA). The reorganisation process will
also be complicated by the integration of a substantial
number of militia members formerly aligned to the NCP,
who agreed to join the SPLA through the Juba Declaration,
as described below. Substantial financial and technical
assistance to the SPLA promised by the U.S. government
during the final stages of the negotiations has not
transpired, and the $20 million promised last April
following U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick’s
visit to the South for military training and equipment has
also been slow in coming due in part to restrictions on the
types of assistance the U.S. can provide under current
sanctions laws.
70 One potential source of expertise was

67 Crisis Group interviews, February and March 2006. 68 Crisis Group interviews, 26 February and 27 March 2006. 69 Crisis Group interviews, 16 February 2006. 70 The U.S. government plans to take a holistic approach to
security sector, police, and judicial reform in southern Sudan.
The U.S. would like to work closely with the SPLA on rebuilding
its command structures and force planning with the dual goal of
reducing the army’s size and professionalising the force. The
U.S. also wants to provide training to SPLA units to enhance
their capacity on the battlefield. Improving the standard of the
SPLA will improve the morale of the force and assist in the
creation of the JIUs. However, under current sanctions, U.S.
assistance has been limited to providing civilian vehicles and
communications equipment to the SPLA, as well as some
training activities. Although $17 million of prior year funds
have been obligated to Dyncorp to carry out the assistance, actual
execution of some of the equipment grants, including secure
communications, and most of the training, has been held up
pending waivers of specific provisions of the Arms Export
Control Administration act or anti-terrorism statutes and
executive orders which make no distinction between the
Government of Sudan and the Government of Southern Sudan.
A Presidential waiver is required in relation to most military aid
and has not yet been issued. See also Carol Giacomo, “U.S.
looking to help southern Sudan’s ex-rebels”, Reuters, 15 April
2005. Crisis Group interviews, February and March 2006.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 12

the IMAT (International Military Assistance Team), a
joint operation set up by the U.S., UK, Norwegian and
Dutch governments, based out of Khartoum. However,
Sudanese security services unceremoniously shut down
the IMAT Khartoum offices in late February 2006,
confiscating equipment and deporting staff, stating that
the GNU had never granted it permission to operate in the
country.
71 Nonetheless, discussions between the parties
and the member governments are continuing around the
IMAT.
There are domestic options proposed by some senior
SPLA to help with the reorganisation, including bringing
retired southern officers back for short-term service to help
with the reorganisation, and even asking for technical
expertise from SAF, as was provided to the southern rebel
Anya-Nya by the northern army following the end of
the first civil war in 1972.
72 There is also a need for
international technical military expertise to help the new
command. One factor that may be hampering progress is
differing visions between Salva and the new Chief of Staff,
Oyai Deng Ajak. Prior to the appointments to the GoSS
last October, Salva requested Oyai to shift from Chief of
Staff to the Minister of SPLA Affairs, with the intention
of appointing Dominic Dim – a fellow Bahr el-Ghazal
Dinka – to be the new Chief of Staff. Oyai refused, and
there reportedly remains disagreement between the two
over the future vision for the army.
73 As with the political
divisions, these differences must be resolved urgently for
the CPA to move forward, and the SPLM and SPLA to
function as effective members of government at all levels.
2. The Juba Declaration: One Step Forward…
The signing of the Juba Declaration on 8 January 2006 by
Salva and Gen. Paulino Matiep, Chairman of the South
Sudan Defence Forces, the umbrella of government
aligned southern armed groups, was the culmination of
several years of negotiations, and represents a huge step
forward for southern unity. A prime example of the NCP’s
counter insurgency tactics of divide and rule, the SSDF
were supported, armed and directed by Khartoum to fight
the war in the South and weaken the SPLM/A both
politically and militarily.
The CPA stated that the SPLA and SAF would be the
only armed forces legally allowed in the country, and that
all other armed groups allied to either side must choose to
integrate into either the SPLA or SAF within one year
after the agreement was signed. Talks between the SPLA
and the SSDF began in 2003 while the negotiations were
ongoing, but were unsuccessful. Following the signing,

71 Crisis Group interview, March 2006. 72 Crisis Group interview, 5 March 2006. 73 Crisis Group interviews, November 2005-March 2006.
there was a very positive South-South dialogue in Nairobi
in April 2005 between the southern SPLM and other
southern political opposition parties, but this did not
include the armed elements of the SSDF. Separate
negotiations between the SSDF and SPLA were carried
out in Nairobi in June 2005, but failed to make substantial
progress, as hostility between the SSDF leadership and
Garang stymied progress.
74 The SSDF delegation came
with a number of core demands which Garang refused to
accept, such as changing the name of the army from the
SPLA to something more neutral, and demanding a set
number of guaranteed positions in the SPLA’s half of the
JIUs. It was the fear of many Sudan watchers, including
Crisis Group, that the NCP would continue to use its allied
southern militias throughout the interim period as a tool
to destabilise and divide the South, and undermine the
implementation process. Though the NCP’s military
apparatus continues to pursue this policy in the South, the
Juba Declaration, if implemented, greatly consolidates
peace in the South and removes one of the main strategies
from those seeking to undermine the CPA.
Relations between the two groups improved immediately
after Garang’s death, following the violence between
northerners and southerners in Khartoum, in which the
forces of SSDF Chairman Paulino Matiep played in a
critical role in protecting southern civilians and deploying
alongside SAF and SPLA forces to help control the
situation. This confirmed to many aligned with the NCP
that their future lay with the SPLM in the South.
75 The
hostile relationship that senior SSDF leaders held towards
Garang immediately softened after Salva’s appointment
as SPLM Chairman, and Riek Machar’s
76 promotion to
Vice-President of the GoSS. 77 Both men had historically
been more open to South-South dialogue than Garang.

74 For more on these negotiations, the April 2005 South-South
dialogue, and broader context and analysis of the SSDF, see
Crisis Group Africa Report N°96, The Khartoum-SPLM
Agreement, op. cit.
75 Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°30, Garang’s Death:
Implications for Peace in Sudan, 9 August 2005.
76 Dr. Riek Machar was a leading member of the SPLA, but in
1991 helped lead a split within the movement, forming the
SPLA-Nasir faction. In 1997 Riek signed the Khartoum Peace
Agreement with the NCP, along with five smaller southern
parties, and was appointed 2
nd Vice-President. Though the
agreement included a self-determination referendum for the
South, it was never implemented, and Riek eventually returned
to Nairobi. In early 2002 he reached an agreement with Garang
to return to the SPLM, and was eventually elevated to the third
position in the movement.
77 Riek is a Nuer, the second largest tribe in the South after the
Dinka, as are the bulk of the SSDF. A former ally of many in
the SSDF after he signed the 1997 Khartoum Peace Agreement,
Riek played a helpful role in bridging the gaps between the two
parties in the June 2005 negotiations.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 13

Matiep welcomed Salva to Khartoum, and informal
dialogue soon began between the two leaders. As a sign
of good faith, Salva agreed in September to give a small
number of SPLM positions in the GoSS and the relevant
state governments to the SSDF.
78 With the SSDF now
officially engaged in the political institutions of the CPA,
and the bulk of the SSDF leadership keen on reaching an
agreement with the SPLM that would ally them with the
South against the NCP, an agreement seemed possible.
However, the SSDF continued to demand guarantees
from the SPLM leadership which were not granted,
and the process dragged on, until resolved in the Juba
Declaration.
The Declaration is a remarkable development in that the
SSDF dropped all of its earlier demands for guarantees
and agreed to a loose implementation process, reliant on
the SPLM/A leadership keeping their word – exactly the
type of agreement that Garang had been promoting and
which had been rejected in earlier discussions. The
agreement established a High Political Committee to be
appointed by Salva and Matiep to oversee implementation,
and a joint Military Technical Committee to deal with the
details of the integration of forces, including head counts
of SSDF troops, issues of harmonisation of ranks, and
demobilisation.
79 Salva also helped cement the agreement
by appointing Matiep as the Deputy Commander-in-Chief
of the SPLA, and former Southern Sudan Coordinating
Council Finance Minister Gabriel Changson Chang,
a close ally of Matiep’s, as the new Minister of
Parliamentary Affairs in the GoSS. A member of the
SSDF negotiating team explained the change in SSDF
strategy and its decision to drop its demands prior to the 9
January 2006 deadline: “Circumstances changed after
Garang’s death and the CPA has come under threat. The
South has to come together to save the CPA. Salva has
also demonstrated a more open attitude than Garang and
has prioritised the issue, calling for a resumption of
dialogue between the SPLM and the other armed groups
in his eulogy at Garang’s funeral.”
80 He also cited the
SSDF participation in the GoSS political structures as an
important step to build SSDF investment in the CPA,
thereby sidelining some of the more extreme elements
within the SSDF.
81
The Juba Declaration also brought political benefits
to Salva and the SPLM by bringing in large sections
of the predominantly Nuer SSDF. There was growing

78 Crisis Group interview in Khartoum, 14 October 2005. 79 “The Juba Declaration on Unity and Integration”, 8
January 2006. See: “The CPA Monitor: Monthly report on
the implementation of the CPA”, Annex 24, February 2006,
at: https://www.unmis.org/english/cpaMonitor.htm.
80 Crisis Group interview, 20 February 2006. 81 Ibid.
disappointment within the Nuer community at their poor
representation in the GoSS cabinet (only three ministerial
positions, two from the SPLM including Vice-President
Riek Machar – who is also the Minister of Housing,
Lands and Public Utilities – and one representative of the
opposition United Democratic Salvation Front) and the
GNU (only two state ministerial positions) at the time of
the Juba Declaration.
82 The agreement and subsequent
appointments will help balance the tribal representation
amongst SPLM appointees, and help defuse one potential
area of disagreement within the GoSS.
Yet the implementation of the Juba Declaration is fraught
with difficulties. The SSDF has never been a coherent
organisation, but rather a conglomeration of independent
government aligned militias. Khartoum worked hard to
make sure that the allegiance of these groups was to the
North, rather than allowing them to coalesce into a strong
united southern armed movement. While the Juba
Declaration seems to have brought the bulk of the SSDF
commanders to the SPLA, several key commanders have
chosen to remain allied to SAF, as is their prerogative
under the CPA.
83 Those who remained with SAF include
Generals Gordon Kuong, Tom el-Nur, Thomas Mabior,
and Gabriel Tang Ginye, though elements of each of their
forces have joined the SPLA.
84 Though the SSDF should
have ceased to exist as of 9 January 2006, with all forces
integrated into either the SPLA or SAF according the CPA,
Gordon Kuong was immediately granted access to the
NCP-controlled state media outlets, deploring the Juba
Declaration and declaring the continued existence of the
SSDF.
85
At the same time, the SAF military intelligence has been
actively working to undermine the Juba Declaration and
draw factions and elements back to the North. Just prior
to the signing of the Juba Declaration, SAF Military
Intelligence brought Cdr. Peter Lorot to Khartoum from
his base in Chukudum, Eastern Equatoria, via a local
member of parliament, and convinced him to reject the
Juba Declaration.
86 While the negotiations were going on

82 Following Salva’s appointments to the GoSS and GNU, the
Nuer members of the SPLM caucus in the southern assembly
sent Salva an open letter on 26 October 2005, a copy of which
was obtained by Crisis Group, complaining about the lack of
Nuer representation in the various organs of government.
83 The UN estimates that prior to the Juba Declaration there
were 45,259 members of the other armed groups aligned to
SAF, and 2,345 aligned to the SPLA. After the Juba Declaration,
it estimates that there are 17,923 still aligned to SAF, 23,911
aligned to the SPLA, and 2,950 that have yet to declare their
allegiance. See “The CPA Monitor”, February 2006, op. cit.
84 Crisis Group interview, 25 February 2006. 85 See, for example, “Sudan SSDF militia denies merger with
the SPLA – Kong”, Sudan Tribune, 15 January 2006.
86 Crisis Group interview, 26 February 2006.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 14

in Juba, Military Intelligence reportedly travelled to
Longochok, Upper Nile, and delivered ammunition and
appointed a new head of the local militia while the former
leader, Cdr. Cheyut, was in Juba for the negotiations.
87
SAF also reportedly provided military support to Gabriel
Tang Ginye in Malakal, after he was forced out of Fangak
following the decision by most of his forces to join the
SPLA.
88 The Juba Declaration seems to have caught the
NCP off guard, and they have been frantically trying to
reverse its effects ever since.
Fighting did immediately break out in several areas of the
South following the agreement, as forces were split in two,
such as the case of Tang Ginye described above. More
serious fighting occurred in Yuai, near Waat, when
elements under the control of Gen. Simon Gatwich (who
supported the Juba Declaration), sought to forcibly disarm
the well-armed local population without explaining
the elements of the new agreement or sensitising the
population to their mission. The result was serious fighting
with reports between 70 and 200 people killed.
89 The
GoSS, with the support of UNMIS, was quick to respond
to the Yuai violence, first flying Gatwich to the area to
meet with the local combatants and defuse the situation,
and then by organising a reconciliation workshop also
attended by Riek Machar, to explain and consolidate the
agreement in the area.
90 This type of rapid response support
by UNMIS and political will by the GoSS is exactly what
is needed to help consolidate the agreement. Another round
of serious fighting occurred in early March 2006, when a
group of former SSDF soldiers were ambushed by current
SSDF troops just outside of Abyei town. The former were
travelling from Khartoum to the South to join the SPLA.
91
Yet even with goodwill, implementation will be difficult.
The SPLA’s lack of organisation and the delays in paying
salaries are a major obstacle that could delay the formal
integration of the forces. The salary issue is particularly
difficult. The SSDF troops have become accustomed to
receiving salaries and food aid from Khartoum, both
of which were cut straight away to all who opted to be
integrated into the SPLA. Though the Military Technical
Committee immediately began its work conducting SSDF
headcounts Unity and Upper Nile states, there were
immediate difficulties in sustaining the thousands of
assembled troops. Without rapid assistance and support
from the GoSS and the international community in the
form of food aid and transport, it is inevitable that many

87 Crisis Group interviews, 16 February and 26 February 2006. 88 Crisis Group interview, 26 February 2006. 89 “Sudan: Concerns over recent clashes in the South”, IRIN,
9 February 2006. Crisis Group interviews with SSDF, SPLA
and UN officials, February and March 2006.
90 Crisis Group interviews in Juba, February 2006. 91 Crisis Group interviews, March 2006.
of these troops will be lured back to SAF by material
incentives. This will increase the likelihood that they will
be used by the NCP to destabilise areas of the South and
undermine security, under the NCP’s favourite cover of
“tribal fighting”. There are also technical obstacles, such
as the fact that the SSDF has many more high ranking
officers than the SPLA – rapid and widespread promotions
were another of SAF’s tactics to obstruct integration with
the SPLA – and integrating these officers at their current
rank will cause difficulties for the traditional SPLA,
demonstrating yet again the need to reorganise the army
as soon as possible.
3. The LRA: Exploiting an opportunity in the
South
The Ugandan rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), has
been operating out of the Eastern Equatoria region of
southern Sudan since the mid-1990’s, supported by the
Government of Sudan in order to destabilise Northern
Uganda and counter Kampala’s support to the SPLA. The
LRA’s tactics are designed more to terrorise the local
population and disrupt peace and stability than to achieve
any identifiable political goals. The past several months
have shown a regrouped, highly mobile LRA operating
now in three countries: northern Uganda, southern Sudan,
and eastern DRC. Efforts by the Ugandan People’s
Defence Forces (UPDF) – who have had an agreement
with Khartoum since 2002 to operate in parts of the South
– to destroy the LRA rear-bases in Sudan have been
partially successful over the past several years, but
allegations of continued LRA support from SAF have
hampered the effectiveness of these operations. Attempts
at mediation between the LRA and the Ugandan
government have made some progress over the past two
years, but have not ended the conflict.
92
It was hoped that the CPA would finally mean the end
of the LRA in Sudan, as the link to SAF would be cut
following its withdrawal from the South (to be completed
by July 2007), and that without supplies the SPLA and
UPDF would be able to neutralise or expel the remaining
forces. The opposite has occurred. Rather than dwindling
away, the LRA has expanded its activities westward, to

92 For more on the LRA’s history, see Crisis Group Africa Report
N°77, Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the
Conflict, 14 April 2004. For more on the mediation efforts, see:
Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°22, Peace in Northern Uganda:
Decisive Weeks Ahead, 21 February 2005; Crisis Group Africa
Briefing N°23, Shock Therapy for Northern Uganda’s Peace
Process, 11 April 2005; Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°27,
Building a Comprehensive Peace Strategy for Northern
Uganda, 23 June 2005; and Crisis Group Africa Briefing N°35,
A Strategy for Ending Northern Uganda’s Crisis, 11 January
2006.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 15

DRC and the southern Sudanese states of Bahr-el Jebel
and Western Equatoria, creating massive disturbances
for the civilian population, disrupting relief, refugee
repatriation and development activities in the most
peaceful region of the South over the past ten years,
93 and
limiting road access along the sole entry point in and out
of Juba. Unlike previous operations in Eastern Equatoria,
the LRA has begun operating in urban centres, carrying
out attacks in and around Yei, Maridi and as far west
as Yambio, near the border with the Central African
Republic. The SPLM have openly accused SAF of
continuing its support to the LRA in the South, but this
alone does not explain the LRA’s rebirth inside Sudan.
94
In addition, the delays in reorganising and paying the
SPLA are leading to poor military performance in the
field and unwillingness to engage the LRA militarily. The
SPLM is also pursuing a confusing and contradictory
policy on the LRA. Both of these elements must be sorted
out for the security situation to improve in the South.
A main difficulty in dealing with the LRA at present is its
highly mobile presence across a very wide area in three
countries, each of which possesses varying military
capabilities to deal with the group. Prior to September
2005, the predominantly Acholi LRA had never before
crossed the Nile or moved into Western Equatoria, instead
concentrating its operations in the areas from Juba
and Torit southwards into northern Uganda, operating
primarily in the Acholi areas on both sides of the border.
Since September attacks attributed to the LRA have
skyrocketed west of the Nile, with the UPDF reporting
that there are four separate LRA groups operating within
southern Sudan.
95 UN daily situation reports from South
Sudan and Crisis Group interviews indicate that there
have been more than 50 attacks and robberies attributed to
the LRA since September, though the number of attacks
is likely significantly higher than that. The majority of the
attacks have been along the Yei-Maridi road and the Yei-
Juba road. Following an ambush in late October in which
two foreign de-miners were killed, the UN changed the
security clearance for much of Eastern Equatoria and
Bahr-el Jebel states to level IV, meaning that areas are
only cleared for emergency activity and that armed escorts
are required for automobiles or convoys to travel along

93 UNHCR, for example, has halted the repatriation of all
refugees to Central and Western Equatoria, following the recent
LRA attacks on the UN and NGOs in Yambio and Yei. Many
humanitarian organisations have decided to withdraw their staff
from Yambio, Yei, Kajo Keji, and Tambura. UNHCR Press
Release, 21 March 2006, available at www.unhcr.org.
94 “Salva Kiir says Sudanese Army supports Ugandan LRA”,
Sudan Tribune quoting an interview with BBC Arabic Service,
21 February 2006, available at https://www.sudantribune.com/
article.php3?id_article=14169.
95 “Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Sudan,
S/2006/160”, Available at www.reliefweb.int.
the roads. The LRA has moved steadily westward,
weaving between the DRC and southern Sudan, as
necessary. In early February 2006, there was an armed
attack on the Unicef compound in Yambio – the most
western target yet – which was later confirmed by UN
security to have been carried out by the LRA.
96 Another
attack near Yambio took place on 19 March, and included
a second assault on a UN compound. Fighting reportedly
lasted for nearly six hours, and UN troops killed three
suspected LRA soldiers, sustaining casualties in the
process.
97
The SPLM is convinced that the LRA is being supported
and resupplied by SAF, as are many in the UN in Juba.
98
A senior SPLA official provided three examples of
continued SAF support to the LRA. First, he stated that
LRA soldiers are continuing to be housed and supported
inside SAF barracks and outposts in and around Juba.
Following LRA attacks, they flee to these barracks and
outposts, effectively protecting them from SPLA or UPDF
attacks. Second, he claims that the SPLA security in Juba
arrested the key Ugandan interlocutor between SAF and
the LRA several months ago, though he has since been
freed. During interrogations, the accused admitted that he
was acting as the intermediary and working with the LRA.
Third, he said that the SPLA believed that SAF provided
the LRA with motorised rubber boats to cross the Nile.
99
The GoSS Minister of Information, Dr. Samson Kwaje,
commented that “The ruling party is using the LRA to
discredit its partner-in-peace so that it does not deliver.”
He cited fresh supplies to the LRA: “On March 3, after
attacking the village of Wonduruba in Lanya, Yei district,
villagers witnessed the LRA breaking open new boxes of
ammunition with Arabic inscriptions.”
100 The commander
of the SAF in Juba denied the charges, attributing them to
old ammunition stores: “In the past, when we fought the
SPLA, we were assisting the LRA. We stopped assisting
them in 1998, after we reached an agreement with Uganda.
The LRA hid some of the ammunition we had given to
them, which they are digging up now.”
101 All of this
despite agreements from SAF dating back to 2002 to
allow the UPDF to operate in the South to go after the
LRA, the elimination of the “Red Line” in October 2005
allowing the UPDF to conduct operations north of the
Juba-Torit road into LRA base areas, and an agreement

96 Crisis Group interview, 24 February 2006. 97 See: “UN troops in South Sudan engage attackers, kill 3”,
Reuters, 22 March 2006; and “Uganda’s LRA attacks in
Yambio, terrorising Eqautorians”, Sudan Tribune, 20 March
2006.
98 Crisis Group interviews, February and March 2006. 99 Crisis Group interview, 7 March 2006. 100 “Sudan: LRA terrorises Sudan”, New Vision (Kampala),
19 March 2006, Available at www.newvision.co.ug.
101 Ibid.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 16

signed with the UPDF and SPLA in December 2005 to
conduct joint operations against the LRA. 102
Interviews with former LRA combatants revealed that
one way in which the LRA is sustaining itself is by
raiding cattle in Sudan, then bartering them for weapons
with Dinka and Toposa traders.
103 However, there is
considerable suspicion and speculation in Juba about
the identity of the attackers terrorising Bahr-el Jebel and
Western Equatoria. Many people suspect that there are
in fact other Sudanese groups operating under the
shadow of the LRA, with their attacks and actions being
attributed to the LRA because of a lack of information.
“The Tong-Tong [the local name given to the LRA] operating in Western Equatoria are predominantly
Sudanese”, worried a senior SPLM security official.
“There are now more Sudanese than Ugandans in the
LRA. They’re being paid and supplied by SAF. It’s not
possible for the Yambio attacks to have been carried out
by the Ugandan LRA, it’s too far from their homes.”
104
The tactics of the LRA west of the Nile are also reportedly
softer than the traditionally brutal LRA in Northern
Uganda, killing fewer people, and often releasing their
abductees unharmed after forcing them to help carry
goods or equipment.
105 This is also used as evidence
by some to support the theory that these attackers are
predominantly Sudanese, and some allege that some of
the attacks are in fact being carried out by disgruntled
SPLA soldiers seeking money by other means. A senior
UN official in Juba worried about the impact of the
continued attacks in the South. “If it’s not resolved soon it
will become a major problem. If it has become a Sudanese
movement, and it’s allowed to continue, it will either
be “talent spotted” by a backer seeking to undermine
the CPA, or it will become a rallying point for dissident
Sudanese.”
106
What is most shocking about the LRA’s resurgence west
of the Nile is that it has happened in the SPLA’s heartland,
near the home of the army headquarters in Yei, yet the
SPLA has completely failed to respond to the LRA threat.
Many attribute this to the lack of progress in reorganising
the SPLA and delays in payment of salaries, leading to
low morale and poor performance. “They haven’t been

102 “Uganda to Step up Battle Against Rebels”, Institute for
War and Peace Reporting, 21 October 2005, available at
https://iwpr.net/?p=acr&s=f&o=257705&apc_state=heniacr2
00510. See also, “Uganda, Sudan to carry out joint operations
against rebels”, Xinhua, 18 December 2005. Available at:
https://english.people.com.cn/200512/18/eng20051218_2289
30.html.
103 Crisis Group interviews, Gulu, Northern Uganda, January
2006.
104 Crisis Group interview, Juba, 20 February 2006. 105 Crisis Group interviews, February 2006. 106 Crisis Group interview, Juba, 23 February 2006.
paid in over a year, but they’re told the money is there.
They won’t do anything”, despaired a senior SPLM
security official.
107 “The SPLA still don’t have orders to
fight the LRA, and they don’t have the will to risk their
lives now that peace has come”, commented another
senior SPLA officer. “Our troops say they were brought
to fight SAF, not the LRA. There have been incidents
where we just watch them but do nothing.”
108 Reportedly
even the UPDF have begun complaining to some SPLM
officials about the poor performance of the SPLA.
109
Though the delays in reorganising and paying the SPLA
are obviously a factor in its poor response to the LRA
threat, blame can also be apportioned to the ambiguous
and confusing policy the SPLM leadership holds on the
matter. Since coming to power, Salva has repeated
Garang’s three layered approach to the LRA – first to
seek a peaceful solution to the LRA problem, second for
the LRA to leave southern Sudan, or finally to face forced
eviction.
110 In early November, GoSS Vice-President
Riek Machar offered to mediate between the LRA and the
Ugandan government, an offer that was accepted the
following day by the LRA via press release.
111 Riek’s
offer was unplanned, and undermined the existing efforts
of Ugandan negotiator Betty Bigombe to establish a
credible negotiation process. Mediation efforts stalled
over the next several months, while attacks continued in
the South. However, a letter was reportedly recently
delivered by an LRA emissary to Riek Machar,
reconfirming the LRA’s willingness to negotiate with
the Ugandan government, and promising to send a full
delegation to Juba in the near future.
112 By February, the
SPLM message had shifted again to one of war, including
Salva’s public accusation of SAF’s continued support of
the LRA.
113 During a mid-February visit to Juba, President
Bashir instructed the GoSS to expel the LRA from the
South within one month, and Salva reaffirmed this as a
joint priority for the South.
114 However, it appears that the

107 Crisis Group interview, Juba, 20 February 2006. 108 Crisis Group interview, Juba, 26 February 2006. 109 Crisis Group interview, Juba, 26 February 2006. 110 “Sudan’s FM stresses need to force out Uganda’s anti-gov
group from southern Sudan”, Sudan Tribune, 25 August 2006.
Available at https://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_
article=11272.
111 “Uganda Rebel LRA welcomes Sudan’s SPLM offer of
mediation”, Press Release, 15 November 2005. Available at
https://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=12583.
112 Crisis Group interview, 7 March 2006. 113 “Salva Kiir says Sudanese Army supports Ugandan LRA”,
Sudan Tribune quoting an interview with BBC Arabic Service,
21 February 2006, available at https://www.sudantribune.com/
article.php3?id_article=14169.
114 “LRA’s expulsion is the task of Sudan’s army and the SPLA
– Salva Kiir”, Sudan Tribune, 21 February 2006. Available at
https://www.sudantribune.com/article.php3?id_article=14198.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 17

SPLA has yet to receive orders to target the LRA. A
senior SPLA official explained the dilemma: “They don’t
yet have orders to track down the LRA, because the LRA
are staying in SAF camps. If we go after them, it will lead
us to SAF and that will cause a major security incident.
The only options are either to establish the JIUs in the
South and direct them to jointly go after the LRA, or we
have to wait until SAF withdraws from the South.”
115
The growing LRA activity is becoming a major source of
instability in southern Sudan, disrupting humanitarian and
development efforts, and threatening to deteriorate further
if not addressed. Steps are needed by all sides. On the
international side, the UN Security Council recently
renewed the UNMIS mandate in Sudan, urging it to
“make full use of its current mandate and capabilities” on
the LRA and other armed groups who are responsible
for attacks on civilians.
116 The UNMIS mandate, however,
is subject to different interpretations: high-level mission
officials and commanders in the field can read it as either
allowing for or restricting robust engagement. Therefore,
the Security Council should clarify the UNMIS mandate,
making it clear that the mission is to act proactively,
including in a pre-emptive manner, and requiring it to
use all necessary means to tackle the LRA problem.
A much better understanding is needed about the attacks
in Western Equatoria, the identity of the perpetrators,
and the LRA’s alleged links with SAF. “We need
dedicated intelligence on the LRA”, declared a senior
UNMIS official.
117 The information gap on the LRA must
be closed. The UN Security Council should appoint a
Panel of Experts to investigate the membership, funding
of, and support for the LRA. It should seek to develop
comprehensive strategies to deal with the LRA more
effectively, and should advise the Security Council
on further measures to be taken. Given the regional
dimension of the LRA, the Panel should coordinate and
work closely with UNMIS, MONUC (the UN mission
in the DRC), the SPLA, the UPDF, and other regional
actors affected by the LRA. Additionally, after
consultations with the SPLA and the SAF, UNMIS should
establish a verification body mandated to freely and rapidly
investigate allegations of SAF support to the LRA.

115 Crisis Group interview, 7 March 2006. 116 “UN extends peacekeeping mission in S. Sudan”, AFP, 24
March 2006. See UNSC Resolution 1663 (S/RES/1663 (2006))
of 24 March 2006. UNMIS currently has a Chapter VI mandate,
with a provision under Chapter VII, “in the areas of deployment
of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities,” to protect
UN personnel, equipment and operations, and “without
prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Sudan, to
protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.”,
UNSC Resolution 1590 (S/RES/1590 (2005)), 24 March 2005,
paragraph 16(i).
117 Crisis Group interview, 5 March 2006.
Political pressure should be applied on the SAF and the
NCP to allow for unhindered operations for the newly-
created body. The verification body should also track
LRA movements, patterns, and support networks. Capable
UN member states should provide necessary support,
such as satellite imagery or communications technology.
Across the border, MONUC should also up its
intelligence gathering efforts on the LRA, sharing
information and coordinating strategies with UNMIS.
118
For the SPLM, the LRA is yet another reason for it to
urgently prioritise the reorganisation of its army and the
payment of its troops. SPLM leadership must also clarify
its policy on the LRA. Instead of pursuing its own
negotiating track, the SPLM should support the existing
mediation process and coordinate more closely with lead
negotiator Betty Bigombe. At the same time, the SPLA
must begin to apply far greater military pressure on the
LRA. For this to succeed, it would require first the rapid
re-organisation of the SPLA, even within the existing
Brigade model, provided that the Brigades are confirmed
to be fully staffed, rather than the envisioned regional
reorganisation.
119 Second, the SPLA leadership must
ensure the LRA’s eviction to be a top priority, including
by providing the necessary arms and logistics to carry out
the mission. Third, the JIUs, once operational, should be
tasked by the Joint Defence Board to focus on the LRA in
the three states. Finally, SAF support must be cut off
in order to defeat or expel the LRA. The SPLM must
continue to press the NCP and SAF on this issue, with
support from the international community.
120

118 The regional implications of the LRA’s expansion and an
analysis of more effective cooperative regional approaches to
the LRA will be the subject of an upcoming Crisis Group report.
119 Crisis Group interview, 26 February 2006. 120 Crisis Group interview, 26 February 2006.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 18

III. ASSESSING THE PARTIES: A
ROUGH ROAD AHEAD
A. T HE NCP: OUT OF OPTIONS ?
Despite being the most powerful and best organised
political force in the Sudan, the ruling NCP finds itself
increasingly threatened by the direction the country is
headed. The NCP signed the CPA in January 2005 in
part to divert international attention from the crisis in
Darfur, though its commitment to the implementation of
the agreement was questionable even then. There was,
however, reason to believe that the strong working
partnership between Garang and Taha that developed
over the course of the negotiations could help ensure
implementation.
Aware of its own vulnerability and lack of popular support
in the North, the NCP foresaw the dangers that full
implementation of the CPA would bring to its political
survival, namely a more open political system and free
and fair elections after four years in which opposition
parties could challenge its record since 1989. Yet
pragmatic calculations kept it at the negotiation table,
pressured by a strong regional and international consensus
to reach an agreement, a desire to end its pariah status and
normalise its relations with the West, and, initially, a fear
of potential U.S. reprisals after September 11
th due to its
links to Islamic terrorism. After Garang and Taha began
direct negotiations in August 2003 and signed the
agreement on security arrangements a few weeks later,
the talks took on a level of seriousness that had been
lacking in previous rounds. The NCP soon developed
a new strategy for its political survival by opening
discussions with the SPLM in Naivasha on a potential
political partnership between the two parties throughout
the interim period. The discussions took place in secret
with senior members of both parties, beginning in late
2003 and running through most of 2004.
121 The NCP
sought a firm commitment from the SPLM to maintain a
political partnership throughout the six year interim
period, including elections, over and above the CPA.
122
“The SPLM can’t be the government and the leader of the
opposition at the same time” explained a senior NCP
official to the negotiations. “A political partnership will
help the implementation, and will help with unity. It’s not
a requirement for peace, but it’s a priority for smooth
implementation or there will be constant disagreement
over interpretations.”
123 While the SPLM accepted the

121 Crisis Group interviews in Naivasha, 2003 – 2004. 122 Crisis Group interview with a senior SPLM official,
Naivasha, 27 February 2004
123 Crisis Group interview, Nairobi, 6 April 2004.
need for a de facto partnership with the NCP to facilitate
implementation, it resisted a separate political partnership
that would link the parties throughout the interim period
irrespective of the CPA.
124
Calculating that the SPLM’s popular support would help
insure a joint NCP/SPLM electoral victory, the NCP
counted on the partnership to secure its peaceful survival
and its transformation to an internationally recognised
and respected government. Supported by the strong
working relationship that had developed between Taha
and Garang, the NCP signed the CPA on 9 January 2005,
obviously confident enough that it could either survive
implementation,
125 or perhaps torpedo the agreement
if necessary.
While Garang’s overwhelming reception upon his arrival
in Khartoum on 9 July 2005 likely surprised and scared
the NCP, his unexpected death may have also signalled
the end of the partnership and a change in strategy by
the ruling party. According to one member of the NCP
and participant in Naivasha, “We thought there would
be political coordination, but the shocking death of Dr.
John Garang changed the dynamics”. After Garang’s
death, he described the SPLM in “a stage of free-fall”
and incapable of maintaining a partnership with the NCP
as it struggles to build institutions in the South and deliver
services.
126
Prior to Garang’s death, it was widely expected that the
key architects of the Naivasha protocols in both the
SPLM and the NCP would be rewarded with prominent
positions in the new GNU. For the NCP, key negotiators
and interlocutors in the partnership discussions like Dr.
Mutrif Siddiq, Yahya Hussein Babiker, Idriss Mohamed
Abdel Gadir, and Mohamed Ahmed Dirdirry were
reportedly promised and were expecting promotions to
prominent positions in the new national government, as
ministers or state ministers.
127 Yet of this group, only
Idriss – who was a state minister in the last government –
was appointed to be a state minister in the ministry of the
Presidency.
128 (A similar trend, discussed below, also

124 Ibid. 125 A government strategist close to the NCP, but not involved
in Naivasha, admitted the party was comfortable making major
concessions in Kenya because it knew implementation would
be difficult and could be manipulated. Crisis Group interview,
Khartoum, February 2006.
126 Crisis Group interview, Khartoum, 20 March 2006. 127 Crisis Group interviews, February and March 2006. 128 Idriss was also appointed to sit on the Assessment and
Evaluation Commission (AEC) and the Ceasefire Political
Commission (CPC); Dr. Mutrif remains under-secretary in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs; Yahya Hussein Babiker is a co-
chair of the Joint National Transition Team (JNTT); Dirdirry is
a member of parliament. However, this is not conclusive

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 19

occurred in the SPLM, with some of the key figures from
Naivasha and participants in the partnership negotiations
being pushed to marginal positions in the GoSS and
GNU). President Bashir instead appointed several people
who had been openly critical of the CPA, such as Defence
Minister Abdel Rahim Mohamed Hussein.
129 People
involved in the Naivasha talks from both parties were
generally disappointed with appointments of both the
SPLM and NCP to the new government. “Both parties
could have come up with better lists”, worried a senior
NCP negotiator. “If there’s a silver lining, it’s that people
who have always been opponents of the CPA on the NCP
side are now sworn to uphold it”.
130
While the partnership may have suffered a blow with
Garang’s death, the NCP’s subsequent behaviour around
the implementation of the CPA has further undermined
a revival of the alliance. Instead, as described above, the
NCP’s program of systematically delaying or undermining
implementation is likely to continue to push the SPLM
farther away, and make a vote for independence a
foregone conclusion in the southern referendum of 2011,
provided the CPA holds until that point.
With the opportunity for a political partnership
evaporating, the NCP has few viable options for its
peaceful political survival. The full implementation of the
CPA, with free and fair elections, would almost certainly
sweep the NCP out of power if it is not allied with the
SPLM.
131 Peace agreements in Darfur and Eastern Sudan
must inevitably include provisions for a greater share of
representation for these regions in the central government,
and must come at least in part out of the NCP’s 52 per cent
stake, eventually whittling it down to a minority party in
government. The risk of losing political power means that

evidence of a power struggle or a shift in policy. The Islamist
Movement in Sudan has been compared to Soviet-style
Commmunist regimes in the sense that position does not
necessarily correlate to one’s actual power or decision-making
weight within the movement. For example, two of the key NCP
negotiators in Naivasha, Dr. Sayeed el-Khateeb and Amin
Hassan Omer, were not members of the government at the time.
129 Those close to Taha had Abdel Rahim fired from the pre-
CPA government over an incident involving the collapse of a
new multistory building overseen by Abdel Rahim. Bashir’s
appointment of Abdel Rahim as Minister of Defence in the
post-CPA government was seen as rewarding loyalists
regardless of suspicions of corruption and inefficiency and a
rebuff of Taha.
130 Crisis Group interview, 18 October 2005. 131 Perhaps in an implicit acknowledgement of its vulnerability
in a free and fair election in 2009, President Bashir has suggested
that early elections be held. See “President al-Bashir: National
Congress ready to contest any early elections”, SUNA, 4 March
2006. Critics suggest the NCP prefers early elections before the
holding of a proper census, establishment of independent
electoral commission and passage of electoral laws.
NCP officials could lose their wealth, entitlement and
impunity to which they have grown accustomed over
the last seventeen years. A larger fear amongst the NCP
leadership may be the looming investigation of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) into atrocity crimes
carried out in Darfur since 2003.
132 The government has
largely refused to cooperate with the ICC’s investigations
in Darfur, and President Bashir has repeatedly rejected the
prospect of any Sudanese facing trial on foreign soil. But
if there is a change in regime, it is probable that leading
NCP figures will be arrested and tried by the ICC for their
role in orchestrating the atrocity crimes in Darfur. This is
yet another disincentive to implementation of the CPA by
the NCP, in the absence of a political strategy to reduce
the risk of prosecution.
133
At the moment, the NCP appears to be trying to manage
its multiple crises, without allowing any one to spin too
far out of its control. On the CPA, it is managing
implementation without allowing for fundamental change,
exploiting the SPLM’s weakness and in the process
damaging the movement’s credentials as a national political
party and the credibility of Salva Kiir as a national leader.
On Darfur, it is again pursuing delaying tactics in Abuja
while trying to topple Chadian President Idriss Deby in
order to weaken and isolate the Darfur rebels. On Eastern
Sudan, there is no credible negotiation process to speak
of, though the NCP showed its intentions to re-capture
Hamashkoreb if and when the SPLA withdraw from the
East when it briefly invaded the town on 11 January 2006.
Exposing the agenda of the NCP and applying increased
domestic and international pressure to implement the terms
of the peace agreement may have some effect, as President
Bashir in particular seems to want to be seen as publicly
supportive of CPA implementation. Yet this alone will
not be enough; the NCP will not willingly hang itself. The
future of the Sudan may rest in the ability of the SPLM
and other political parties to somehow assuage the fears
of the NCP and provide them with a political exit strategy.
At the same time, the NCP has to begin implementing the
CPA in good faith in order to help revive its political
partnership with the SPLM. Some in the SPLM leadership
are aware of this dilemma, and are pursuing ways to revive
the idea of a partnership with the NCP, if only as a means
to safeguard the CPA.
134 However, many other leading

132 The regime’s aggressive opposition to the transition from an
Africa Union to a United Nations force in Darfur also is based
on its fear that the handover to the UN will make it easier for the
ICC to capture and try indicted war criminals.
133 Of course the ICC has the jurisdiction to issue arrest warrants
for, and try, NCP figures even if they are in government – but it
will be difficult, though perhaps not impossible, for it to effect
arrests of senior NCP leaders while they still hold power.
134 Crisis Group interview, 15 March 2006.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 20

SPLM figures increasingly see the NCP as the obstacle
rather than the solution. “The NCP will lead to Sudan
exploding, because elections will be their end, so
they’ll try to stop it. But you have to have democratic
transformation or the country can’t survive.”
135
The NCP is not monolithic, however. Some observers
suggest that there is a power struggle occurring inside the
NCP between Taha and the architects of Naivasha, and
Bashir and those around him who are more critical of the
CPA. The struggle centres over control of political power
and leadership of the country, including implementation
of the CPA. Having personally negotiated the Naivasha
deal with Dr. John Garang, Taha is seen as more vested in
its implementation, as his political career is tied to the
CPA. The critics feel Taha gave away too much for the
sake of securing peace. Moreover, they view Taha as a
“man of the West”, who seeks to appease the Americans
and Europeans at the expense of the party’s northern
Islamic constituency.
136 These criticisms escalated after
Taha went to Brussels in early March to discuss with EU,
U.S. and AU officials the transition to a UN force in Darfur
and then travelled to Tripoli to meet the leaders of the
Darfur rebel movements, Minni Minawi and Khalil
Ibrahim. Critics attacked him for selling out the nationalist
cause in Brussels while Sudanese rallied in the streets
against the UN deployment, and for seeking to strike
another Naivasha accord with the Darfurian rebels. Taha,
upon his return to Khartoum, adopted a harsher line
regarding the transition to a UN force in Darfur. Many
others suggest that the differences between the two groups
are overstated. NCP tactics have often been to portray
fictitious internal divisions to help neutralise external
pressures. According to one top SPLM official, “There is
a difference within the NCP, but it is not qualitative. It is
of style not of substance”.
137
B. T HE SPLM: A PARTY UNDER SIEGE
The SPLM is facing its toughest challenge ever in its
transition from rebel movement to government, and its
performance to date is cause for concern. An effective
and functioning SPLM is a basic prerequisite for
implementation of the CPA, but the party that was
expected to provide a breath of fresh air to the Sudanese

135 Crisis Group interview, 17 February 2007. Said another
senior SPLM official: “The SPLM from the beginning insisted
that the partnership is based on the implementation of the
CPA….The NCP’s general tendency is to absorb the SPLM
and preserve the old system….The struggle is on this issue:
whether we are partners of old system or new system.” Crisis
Group interview, 30 March 2006.
136 Crisis Group interviews, Khartoum, March 2006. 137 Crisis Group interview, Khartoum, March 2006.
political scene has imploded over the first year of the
agreement, crippled by Garang’s death, internal
contradictions and divisions, and poor organisation. Many
of the challenges facing the SPLM were predictable.
A rebel movement for twenty-one years with overly-
centralised decision making structures and weak
administrative capacity, the shift to government would
have been difficult under ideal circumstances. But the
untimely death of John Garang on 30 July 2005, just three
weeks after he had been sworn in as the 1
st Vice-President,
combined with the lack of support for the CPA from the
ruling NCP, have dealt the movement a blow from which
it has yet to fully recover.
1. Coping with the loss of Garang
The SPLM under Garang had its own set of strengths and
weaknesses, which would have aided some elements of
implementation and hampered others.
138 The unanimous
appointment of Salva Kiir Mayardiit by the SPLM
Leadership Council as the new SPLM Chairman (and
therefore President of the GoSS and 1
st Vice-President
of the GNU), brought a different set of qualities to the
leadership. At the time of his death, Garang had massive
support as a national political figure who transcended
the North/South divide, as evidenced by the millions of
people who greeted him in the streets upon his arrival in
Khartoum last July. Garang also had credibility in northern
Sudan as the champion of the New Sudan ideology, which
envisioned a fundamental change in the governance of
the country to allow for a united Sudan based on the equal
rights of all citizens. Salva, by contrast, is a lifetime
military man. He participated in earlier rounds of the
IGAD negotiations, as well as Nigerian led negotiations
in the early 1990s, but was not directly involved in the
Naivasha talks which led to the CPA. This was one of
many issues which drove a wedge between Salva and
Garang in the last few years, culminating in an open split
between the two in November-December 2004, just
weeks before the peace agreement was finalised. The
divisions between the leaders filtered throughout much
of the movement, and continue to exist to this day.
Little was accomplished during the pre-interim period
prior to Garang’s death, beyond the drafting of the new
interim national constitution, Garang’s swearing in as
1
st Vice-President on 9 July, and his appointment of an
interim caretaker administration in the South. Though
there are many reasons for these delays, such as the lack
of organisation and funding, one critical factor was the

138 For more on the challenges facing the SPLM prior to
Garang’s death, see Crisis Group Report, The Khartoum-SPLM
Agreement, op. cit. For analysis of the impact of Garang’s death
on the SPLM and the CPA, see Crisis Group Briefing, Garang’s
Death, op. cit.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 21

continuing divisions within the SPLM, including Garang’s
lack of trust in then SPLA Chief of Staff Salva Kiir.
Leading SPLM figures from Naivasha, such as Nhial
Deng Nhial and Pagan Amum, continued to play key
leadership roles in the first stages of implementation during
the pre-interim period, but on the whole there was an
environment of uncertainty within the movement on
how SPLM appointments to the GNU and GoSS would
be made, and around what the future held.
After the passing of the interim national constitution
by the SPLM National Liberation Council, the de facto
parliament of the SPLM, Garang dissolved all SPLM
political structures on 18 July 2005, appointing a 10-person
interim caretaker government for the South, and choosing
Salva to be the Vice-President of the GoSS.
139 The NCP
also dissolved its cabinet, and President Bashir appointed
a provisional caretaker government until the creation of
the new GNU, which was to be formed by 9 August.
Garang’s plan had been to rebuild the SPLM as a national
party from the bottom up, in conjunction with the
establishment of the GoSS and the GNU.
140 Garang’s
death came less than two weeks later, leaving the SPLM
without any functioning decision making bodies. Salva,
Garang’s successor in the SPLM hierarchy, immediately
re-constituted the Leadership Council on an emergency
basis and was unanimously elected the Chairman on 1
August.
The SPLM was facing a drastic and unprecedented
challenge, though it initially seemed to be coping
miraculously well. Within days, Riek Machar – the next
behind Salva in the SPLM hierarchy – had been approved
as the new Vice-President for the GoSS, and Garang’s
wife Rebecca emerged as a voice of strength and reason
for the country and the movement, in the face of massive
unrest in Khartoum and throughout the South, and
uncertainty over what lay ahead. Salva was sworn in as
the new 1
st Vice-President of the GNU on 11 August.
Within days, grassroots consultations were organised
throughout the South to appoint the SPLM representatives
to the national assembly, Council of States, southern
assembly, and southern state assemblies. Salva had been
critical of Garang’s exclusive decision making and overly-
centralised leadership style, and there was initially
optimism that a more democratic movement would
emerge under Salva’s watch.
Cracks soon began to appear over the appointments to
ministerial posts at the GNU and GoSS levels, and over

139 This included the National Liberation Council and the
Leadership Council, a 16-person executive body. “Garang
appoints southern states administrators, advisors”, Sudan
News Agency, 18 July 2005.
140 Crisis Group interview, 17 February 2006.
the division of ministries between the SPLM, NCP and
other political parties at the national level. As discussed
above, Bashir and the NCP refused to give the SPLM the
Ministry of Energy, despite repeated pleas by Salva. The
disagreement stalled the formation of the GNU, and when
Salva finally relented he faced an unhappy southern
public, including many who blamed him for failing where
Garang would have succeeded.
Though relations between Salva and those close to Garang
(and involved in the CPA) had been relatively smooth
up to that point, the process of political appointments to
the GNU, GOSS, and commissions re-opened the gap
between the two sides. Instead of embracing those who
negotiated the CPA and were closest to Garang, Salva
appointed many new faces to prominent positions in
government and on the various commissions. “Salva’s a
team player and listens to those around him”, noted a
senior SPLM official at the time. “The danger is the
people advising him. That’s why we need to institutionalise
the SPLM leadership and the Presidency.”
141 Salva was
reportedly heavily swayed in his appointments by a few
individuals from his own area of northern Bahr el-Ghazal,
including some non-SPLM members, who reportedly
advised him to reward those who had backed him in
the 2004 clash with Garang, and use this opportunity to
marginalise those closest to Garang.
142 Most key positions
in the GNU and on some of the key commissions were
given to individuals who had not been involved in
Naivaha, though this was in part because some of the
leading SPLM figures and Garang allies, such as Nhial
Deng Nhial, opted to serve in the South rather than
Khartoum after Garang’s death.
2. Overcoming contradictions, divisions and
capacity issues
The sudden death of Garang left the SPLM without a
clear political strategy for implementation. SPLM
membership is torn between conflicting priorities and
visions for the CPA. This gap existed before Garang’s
death, and persists to this day. For many southerners, both
inside and outside the SPLM, the CPA is ultimately about
the southern self-determination referendum. For this
group, the agreement clearly divided the country between
North and South, with the NCP the northern partner that
will deliver the referendum if it is not challenged too
often or too directly on issues related to its governance
and behaviour in the North. The strategic arena of this
group is in Juba, at the level of the GoSS. A second group
includes both northerners and southerners committed to
the New Sudan ideology, who view the CPA as a vehicle
to ultimately change the system of government in

141 Crisis Group interview, 8 September 2006. 142 Crisis Group interview, 18 September 2006.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 22

Khartoum, spread national power and wealth more evenly
throughout the country and ultimately remove the NCP
from power. They believe sufficient change can be
undertaken to convince the South to vote to remain united
with the North. For this group the strategic arena is the
GNU in Khartoum and the state governments throughout
the North. Attached to this school are some southern
secessionists who recognise the importance of engaging
fully in the central government and challenging the NCP
to implement every aspect of the CPA, as a strategy for
ultimately safeguarding the referendum and the South.
In theory, these different outlooks are not incompatible
and need not cripple the SPLM, as the referendum is
guaranteed in the agreement and the logic of the six
year interim period was for the North to make unity
attractive to the South. However, the working assumption
that the NCP is an unwilling partner that will scuttle
the agreement if threatened –an assumption that the
NCP is living up to – is pushing some secessionists to
pursue a policy of appeasement to ensure the referendum
takes place. Without functioning party structures and
party policies on many of these issues, many people
see Salva and the southern SPLM leadership focusing
increasingly on the South, at the expense of the SPLM in
the North, the New Sudan, and serious engagement in
the GNU. This is not an entirely fair assessment, as
the lack of progress is due in large part to NCP
intransigence, in addition to SPLM failures.
Northern opposition and civil society groups that were at
the receiving end of the NCPs oppression throughout the
1990s, and inhabitants of peripheral regions that continued
to be economically and politically marginalised by the
ruling Islamist elites view the SPLM as a natural ally. The
SPLM made early inroads in the three northern regions
of Abyei, Southern Kordofan, and Southern Blue Nile,
establishing an active presence there that resulted in
the three regions joining the war against the central
government under the SPLM banner. Initially a southern
movement, the SPLM quickly acquired a national
dimension following the Islamist takeover. It joined
northern opposition groups under the umbrella National
Democratic Alliance (NDA). Through its presence in this
alliance, the SPLM came in contact with representatives
of other marginalised regions in northern Sudan and
actively supported their armed struggle against the central
government. The SPLM thus came to support Beja
Congress and other groups in eastern Sudan, and the
Darfurian insurgent groups in western Sudan.
Many northerners expect the SPLM to be a fierce defender
of the democratisation agenda embedded in the CPA, and
entire populations in marginalised regions in the North
look to the SPLM to push for fair allocations of the
national wealth and political power to all the marginalised
regions of the country. While the millions that received Garang in Khartoum were a testimony to the stature of
Garang as a national leader who had transcended the
South, it also demonstrated the national appeal of the
SPLM and the depth of aspirations that northerners
hinged on it. In the weeks that followed, the SPLM had to
scramble to cope with an influx of thousands of people
who flocked to offices throughout northern Sudan to
register as SPLM members.
Nonetheless, the SPLM is in a delicate position at the
moment in Khartoum. While it still enjoys tremendous
popular support in the North, it seems to be rapidly losing
credibility, due to its failure to challenge the NCP on
national issues and its lack of organisation.
143 Though
efforts to organise the SPLM throughout the northern
states have gone remarkably well, to the point that the
party in the North is far ahead of its counterparts in the
southern states, frustration is starting to grow and the
lustre of the SPLM may soon begin to fade. The decision
of Abdel Aziz Adam al-Hilu, a senior SPLM leader who
was responsible for building the SPLM as a party in
northern Sudan, to remain indefinitely in the U.S. rather
than return to Sudan is a sign of how desperate things
have become within the party.
144
One example of the SPLM’s political impotency has been
its track record on Darfur since joining the GNU. More
than six months in, it has yet to have any visible impact,
or even a public position, on the crisis in Darfur. Numerous
senior SPLM officials contacted by Crisis Group admitted
that they support a stronger international mission in Darfur
if it will provide greater civilian protection, and support a
transition to the UN if it can provide better protection than
the current AU mission.
145 Yet the lack of a clear party
line on Darfur has left a policy vacuum that is being
exploited by the NCP. SPLM-appointed Foreign Minister
Lam Akol is one of several SPLM appointees in Khartoum
who have been openly siding with the NCP on most issues
relating to the North, irrespective of the reality on the
ground or the SPLM position, leading many of their
colleagues to accuse them of being bought off by the
NCP.
146 On Darfur, for example, Akol has been a leading
advocate of a continued AU role in Darfur rather than
a transition to the UN, despite the AU’s inability to
effectively protect civilians in Darfur
147; and he is on
record denying that there was a genocide in Darfur. 148

143 Crisis Group interview, 7 March 2006. 144 Crisis Group interviews, March 2006. 145 Crisis Group interviews, February and March 2006. 146 Crisis Group interviews, February and March 2006. 147 See, for example, “As AU debates takeover in Darfur, Sudan
FM calls to maintain African force”, Associated Press, 10 March
2006.
148 “Sudan rejects US claim of ongoing Darfur genocide”,
Reuters, 18 February 2006.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 23

Exploiting the policy vacuum in the SPLM, Akol is
pushing the NCP line on all these issues and indicating to
the world that the SPLM is in fact fully supportive of the
government policies in Darfur. This is not the case, as the
former rebel movement has not only supported the Darfur
rebels in the past, but claims to be supportive of the rights
of the “marginalised” populations throughout Sudan. Yet
the total absence of action on these issues has damaged
that claim, and made little impact in the lives of the
people the SPLM is claiming to support.
The Darfur crisis illustrates the difficulties that the SPLM
has to confront daily in its partnership with the NCP, a
party with a history and present record of involvement in
mass atrocities and war crimes that has difficult relations
with the international community. The NCP keenness on
a partnership with the SPLM is also motivated by its
desire to have the SPLM shield it from international
criticism and censor. According to a former senior official
of Sudan’s security agency, retired General Hassab Allah
Omer, “the SPLM as a partner in the GNU should have a
role – proportionate to its representation – in confronting
and dismantling the US lobbying groups that are using the
Darfur crisis against the Sudan”.
149
The lack of party structures and strategy has crippled the
SPLM, particularly in Khartoum. It has been less of a
problem at the level of the GoSS, as the SPLM dominate
the new government structures and control 70 per cent
of the appointments, allowing the GoSS cabinet to
partially fill the void and serve as a de facto decision
making body for the party in the South. At the GNU,
where the SPLM are a minority partner, the cabinet
cannot serve this purpose. The lack of clear policies,
decision making structures, internal coordination, or a
common vision, combined with NCP intransigence, has
severely challenged its ability to function effectively at
the national level. The SPLM appointees who are in
Ministerial and State Ministerial positions in the GNU
continue to be islands within their respective ministries,
without any integration of other SPLM cadres into the
national civil service as yet. The SPLM in Khartoum
only began to meet regularly in January 2006, in an
effort to try to better coordinate their efforts and stay
informed of developments.
150
After the emergency meeting of the SPLM Leadership
Council to appoint Salva following Garang’s death, there
existed no functioning party structures until 20 February
2006, when Salva finally formed a number of new political
bodies for the movement, including an Interim Political
Bureau. Though these bodies are crucial to the SPLM’s
ability to operate and to the implementation of the CPA,

149 www.sudaneseonline.com, 14 March 2006 (in Arabic). 150 Crisis Group interview, 8 March 2006.
internal divisions delayed their formation for months.
Following the appointments to the GNU and the GOSS,
relations between Salva and those close to Garang
worsened, and the discourse became increasingly
combative. The NCP fed into this, allegedly warning
Salva about the intentions of the “Garang boys”, and
urging him not to appoint them to key positions in the
GNU or on the key commissions.
151 Before his death,
Garang had appointed Pagan Amum to be in charge of
building the SPLM party in the South, and Abdel Aziz
Adam al-Hilu in the North. As internal relations soured,
Pagan repeatedly presented Salva with draft lists for the
new party structures, reportedly dominated by the “Garang
crowd” and therefore viewed as a threat by Salva and
those around him, dragging the process on for months.
152
It finally took intervention by other members to develop
a list of the Interim Political Bureau that both sides
were happy with.
153
3. Rebuilding the party: A prerequisite for peace
Recent months have seen a warming of relations between
the two groups within the SPLM, and an increased
recognition of the need to work together for the sake
of the peace agreement. The delays in establishing new
political structures have hurt the SPLM over the past six
months, but Salva’s decision to appoint Pagan Amum, a
close ally of Garang’s and key negotiator in Naivasha, as
the Secretary General of the SPLM and as the number
two in the party structure, moving him ahead of Riek
Machar, is a positive first step towards getting the
party back on track and bridging the gap between the
Garang/Naivasha crowd and Salva.
154 However, there
remains a great deal of work to be done before the SPLM
will be a fully-functioning minority partner in the GNU.
The new bodies have yet to meet, let alone begin to
establish party policies or the process of re-organising the
movement ahead of elections. “The last 14 months were
a process of burying the SPLM”, worried a senior party
official. “We’re now one month into resurrecting the
SPLM….We must organise ourselves into institutions,
with a clear vision and clear rules that will regulate out
behaviour….There’s no guarantee for success, and the
NCP is working hard to dismantle the SPLM and to ensure
it doesn’t achieve significant changes in the North.”
155

151 Crisis Group interview, 14 October 2005. 152 Crisis Group interview, 9 March 2006. 153 Crisis Group interviews, February and March 2006 154 The new Interim Political Bureau comprises 23-people and
should act as the movement’s highest decision making body.
Salva also created a 57-person Interim Executive Committee,
and technical secretariats for the national party, northern states,
and southern states. Crisis Group interviews, February and
March 2006.
155 Crisis Group interview, 17 March 2006.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 24

Since a two party agreement with only one functioning
party cannot survive for long, the CPA will likely fail
without a unified and functioning SPLM. The NCP will
continue to undermine implementation, continue to work
to divide the South, and either refuse or rig the national
elections of 2009. “Our strategy was to make the cost of
non-implementation higher to the NCP than the cost of
implementation. This is not currently the case”.
156
The SPLM is still at the beginning of the long process
of transforming itself into both a government and a
functioning political party. State congresses are planned
to elect representatives to another national convention, at
a date yet to be determined. This convention would be
only the second in the history of the movement, and will
help decide the future of the movement. Crucial to the
SPLM’s survival and transformation, the outcome of this
national convention is far from scripted. The internal
divisions and contradictions, as well as the increased
representation of new SPLM members from throughout
the North could lead the decisions in any number of
directions.
The SPLM is facing financial restrictions in its ability to
carry out effective party work, as the money that has been
paid to the South under the CPA has gone to the GoSS
rather than the SPLM as a party. Given the urgency, the
international community should support the SPLM party
work, as well as other democratic forces in the country.
However, the SPLM must do a much better job to provide
transparency and accountability for the oil revenue it has
received to date. Increasing rumours of corruption in the
South amongst SPLM officials are beginning to worry
international partners, and requests for external support
will be much more heavily scrutinised until and unless the
SPLM and GoSS are able to establish better credibility as
a financially responsible government and movement.
Scrutiny is focused most directly on the initial
advancement on oil revenue of $60 million provided to
the SPLM in May and June, ahead of the formation of the
GoSS. To help ensure guaranteed financing for all political
parties ahead of elections, the SPLM should introduce a
political parties financing act in both the southern assembly
and the national assembly.
C. T HE NORTHERN OPPOSITION
Because of their exclusion from the Naivasha negotiations,
most opposition parties and leaders feel little commitment
to the provisions of the CPA regarding wealth-sharing and
power-sharing between the NCP and SPLM. The parties
to the CPA ignored calls by the main faction of the Umma
Party and other opposition and civil society groups soon
after the signature of the peace accord for an all inclusive

156 Ibid.
conference to be held in Sudan to endorse and build
consensus around it.
A decade of severe repression in the 1990s, followed
by aggressive NCP efforts aimed at discrediting party
leadership through cooption left opposition parties
ineffectual and highly factionalised. At least three
smaller factions splintered away from the Umma Party,
and the Democratic Unionist party witnessed similar
splits. These divisions are both a result of the weakness
of the opposition and a direct consequence of the NCP’s
active divide-and-rule politics. As a result, the GNU is
based on a broad coalition that, in addition to the two
CPA partners, includes eight NCP satellite political
entities.
Shortly after the establishment of the GNU, three main
opposition parties took the lead in assembling a “Loyal
Opposition” to it, namely the Umma Party, Hassan al-
Turabi’s Popular Congress Party and the Communist
Party of Sudan. Al-Turabi is adept at making controversial
and sensational media statements that create serious
trouble for his former followers in the NCP. For instance,
shortly before the meeting of the Arab League Summit
in Khartoum in late March 2006, Turabi reiterated
his accusation of high level involvement by Sudan
government officials in the failed 1995 assassination
attempt of Egyptian Husni Mubarak. The recycled claim
put the NCP on the defensive, and is believed to have
been behind Mubarak’s decision to skip the meeting.
With the many divisions that have undermined its various
constituencies, the opposition is failing to serve as a
credible political force or play a role in resolving impasses
between the NCP and the SPLM. Moreover, the weakness
of the opposition places more pressure on the SPLM
as it means that the latter has little support in trying to
reverse the onslaught of obstructive NCP policies. As
a result, the SPLM often finds itself playing the role
of opposition party, which increases the strain on its
partnership with the NCP.
The opposition parties are particularly keen to see the
opening of the political system and to ensure that free
and fair elections will be held in 2009. They see this as
their opportunity to gain a share of political power. They
were quick to criticise Bashir’s calls for early elections,
especially when almost no progress has been made
on conducting the census and instituting the electoral
commission.
There have recently been increasing efforts to bring
Sudan’s many marginalised groups under one broader
political umbrella to press for fairer allocation of wealth
and power in the country. These attempts build on a
long history of regional and ethnically-based political
formations from Sudan’s most disenfranchised regions,

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 25

such as the Beja Congress, the General Union of the Nuba
Mountain, and similar formations in the Southern Blue Nile
and Darfur regions that have contested elections in the
past and won seats in Parliament. IV. THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY: EYES WIDE SHUT
The CPA would not have been possible without the
sustained high-level engagement of the international
community – particularly IGAD and the quartet of the
U.S., UK, Norway and Italy – during the Naivasha
talks. Targeted international pressure on the parties helped
thwart multiple attempts to derail the process, but the
spoilers did not fade away on 9 January, 2005. The
agreement foresaw a continued and critical role for the
international community to keep the spoilers at bay
during the interim period and maintain forward momentum
for implementation.
Specifically, the CPA called for the deployment of a
10,000 strong UN Mission to support and monitor
implementation of the agreement.
157 The agreement also
created an Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC)
consisting of representatives from the parties, IGAD, and
the quartet.
158 In addition to rigorous monitoring of the
parties’ progress, donors were expected to open their
check books and provide a “peace dividend.” In Oslo,
Norway on 11 and 12 April, 2005, donors met, and
pledged $4.5 billion to fund ongoing humanitarian and
development needs, and to support the GNU and the
nascent GoSS.
159
Rapid dispersal of the peace dividend is subject to its own
set of challenges. The humanitarian catastrophe in Darfur
is draining funding away that might have gone towards
projects to support implementation of the CPA, and
distracts political attention from the still fragile peace
agreement.
160 Illustratively, the U.S. Agency for

157 The United Nations Mission in Sudan, formally approved by
the UN Security Council on 24 March 2005 in Resolution 1590.
It includes a 10,000-strong military component, up to 715
civilian police, and a sizeable civilian component. Its primary
task is to support and monitor implementation of the CPA
158 Paragraph 2.4 of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. The
parties also agreed that the UN and EU would act as observers
to the AEC.
159 At Oslo, the GNU-led Joint National Transitional Team
(JNTT) presented a six-year development plan to correspond
with the six-year interim period. The JNTT was established
under the wealth sharing agreement to monitor distribution of
government revenues throughout the interim period. For a full
readout of the Oslo Donors Conference, see https://www.dep.no
/ud/norsk/tema/sudan/konferanse/alle/032041-990007/dok-
bn.html.
160 Crisis Group interviews with U.S. government officials,
Washington, 28-30 March 2006. For recent analysis of the
conflict in Darfur, see Crisis Group Africa Report N°105, To
Save Darfur, 17 March 2005. For an analysis of the crisis in

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 26

International Development, the largest donor to Sudan,
provided more than $855 million in fiscal year 2005, but
55 per cent of that funding was directed towards the
humanitarian response in Darfur. Southern Sudan and
opposition held areas in Eastern Sudan have significant
humanitarian needs as well; more than half of the
USAID’s non-Darfur funding went towards emergency
food and other humanitarian assistance.
161
Funding challenges run much deeper than the difficulty of
responding to rapidly changing humanitarian needs.
As the driving force behind the peace agreement, the
U.S. was expected to contribute the most money towards
implementation. At Oslo, the U.S. pledged $1.7 billion for
fiscal years 2005 and 2006, but some U.S. officials told
Crisis Group that the complexities of various bilateral
sanctions against Sudan (for its sponsorship of terrorist
activity and abysmal human rights record) have restricted
the U.S. ability to support the CPA.
162 The critical issue is
how to apply sanctions against the “Government of Sudan”
when there is now a Government of National Unity
and a Government of Southern Sudan. While Congress is
amending Congressionally-legislated sanctions such that
they will only apply to the central government and not the
GOSS,
163 the multiple layers of sanctions enacted by the
executive branch are restricting the U.S. government’s
ability to support the GOSS and the SPLA.
164 A U.S.
official told Crisis Group that the current sanctions
are “highly restrictive” and the Bush administration is
determined to do things “by the book.”
165 U.S. officials

Eastern Sudan see Crisis Group Africa Report, Sudan: Saving
Peace in the East, op. cit.
161 USAID Sudan Monthly Update, March 2006. Available
online at https://www.usaid.gov/locations/sub-saharan_africa/
countries/sudan/docs/sudan_monthly3_06.pdf. USAID is
finalising a funding strategy for Sudan that will change USAID’s
focus from meeting sector-specific strategic objectives to
objectives closely tied to CPA implementation. Crisis Group
interviews with U.S. government officials, Washington, 28-30
March 2006.
162 For a list of U.S. sanctions visit https://www.treasury.gov/
offices/enforcement/ofac/legal/sudan.shtml.
163 The language of the Senate version of the Darfur Peace and
Accountability Act (DPAA) reads: “The term ‘Government of
Sudan’ means the National Congress Party, formerly known as
the National Islamic Front, government in Khartoum, Sudan,
or any successor government formed on or after the date of the
enactment of this Act (including the coalition National Unity
Government agreed upon in the Comprehensive Peace
Agreement for Sudan), except that such term does not include
the regional Government of Southern Sudan.” Legislators have
not yet passed the DPAA.
164 The U.S. is also looking into providing direct assistance
to SPLM-led ministries in the GNU, but this is illegal under
current law. Crisis Group interviews with U.S. government
officials, Washington, 22 March 2006.
165 Crisis Group interview, U.S. State Department official,
told Crisis Group that they are able to accomplish their
goals by using existing waivers, but that this bureaucratic
process requires multiple lawyers from multiple
government agencies to reach agreement.
166
U.S. sanctions are also slowing the dispersal of $421.9
million pledged for 2006 and 2007 by donors to Multi
Donor Trust Funds (MTDFs) managed by the World
Bank.
167 The World Bank has approved projects worth
approximately $150 million, but project implementation
has been slowed because the Bank needs a license from
the U.S. Office of Foreign Assets Control to conduct
some transactions related to MTDF projects.
168 State
Department officials believe that the situation will be
remedied, but ambiguities within U.S. regulations have
created bureaucratic delays that further hinder the
international community’s ability to deliver on its
promises.
On 9-10 March 2006, the World Bank hosted in Paris the
first meeting of the Sudan Consortium, a group consisting
of the GNU, the GOSS, and various international institutions
and bilateral partners working to help implement the
agreement. No new funding was announced formally at
the meeting, and some attendees were shocked by the

Washington, 23 March 2006. Several U.S. officials told Crisis
Group that the U.S. has “no intention” of lifting sanctions against
the National Congress Party (NCP), and pending legislation
on Capitol Hill would actually tighten existing congressional
sanctions against human rights violators in Darfur. However,
other U.S. sources indicated to Crisis Group that some within
the administration are pushing for legislated sanctions to be
lifted, leaving the executive branch with flexibility.
166 Crisis Group interview, U.S. State Department official,
Washington, 27 March 2006. Lawyers from the State
Department, USAID, the Department of Commerce, and
Treasury Department and the White House are wading through
this legal morass to reach agreement on each waiver.
167 The CPA established one MTDF for southern Sudan and
another for the Government of National Unity.
168 The U.S. Government maintains sanctions against several
countries, with each country having its own set of regulations.
For example, there is a difference between the regulations
for sanctions against Sudan and those against Burma. The
Burma regulations exempt the World Bank from sanctions
that restrict certain transactions between the US and Burma,
while the Sudan regulations do not exempt the World Bank.
U.S. Government lawyers have interpreted this discrepancy
to mean that the Bank needs a license for these types of
transactions. Additionally, the Bank is not exempt from
additional sets of sanctions and therefore requires additional
licenses. To fix the situation, the U.S. is working to grant
the Bank a general license. In the meantime, the Bank has
established alternative mechanisms for some of these
transactions (such as working through banks in a third
country). Crisis Group interviews, U.S. government and World
Bank officials in Washington, 20-23 March 2006

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 27

Sudanese delegation’s lack of preparation. 169 Nonetheless,
the meeting was significant in bringing all the key players
together to begin to develop consensus on priorities and
next steps for CPA implementation. Members of the
Consortium shared many concerns, including the negative
implications of the crisis in Darfur, limited progress in
assisting the Three Areas and the failure of the GoSS to
establish budgetary systems.
170 More broadly, they agreed
that development assistance should not be conditional on
a resolution of the crisis in Darfur, and that medium and
long term development assistance should be channelled
through the World Bank and the Multi-Donor Trust Funds.
The Paris meeting is a useful first step in enhancing
coordination between the key players, but donors,
UNMIS, the World Bank, the GNU, and the GOSS
must work with a greater sense of urgency to establish
mechanisms to monitor compliance with the terms of
the agreement, punish violations, and create tangible
benefits of peace for those communities most affected
by the civil war.
Beyond the financial support the international community
is trying to provide, the most worrying trend is the lack of
political engagement around the implementation of the
CPA. The international role was critical to the success of
Naivasha, in the form strong working partnership between
the IGAD mediation and the quartet, with the broader
IGAD Partners Forum working behind the scenes to
support the process as needed. This partnership monitored
every aspect of the negotiations, and was there to
help break deadlocks, hold the parties to their earlier
commitments, and pressure and cajole the parties through
some of the toughest areas of talks. That level of
engagement and interest has completely disappeared
since the signing of the CPA. But it is crucially needed
given the current equation around the CPA: a strong NCP
with the capacity but lacking the political will to
implement, and a weak SPLM with the will but lacking
the capacity.

169 Crisis Group interviews with U.S. government officials,
Washington, 28-30 March, 2006. Salva Kiir led the Sudanese
delegation.
170 The World Bank has released a presidential statement
summarising the meeting, available online at https://web.world
bank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/AFRICAEX
T/SUDANEXTN/0,,menuPK:375428~pagePK:141159~piP
K:141110~theSitePK:375422,00.html. Informal assessments
indicated that the planned financing was likely to exceed
initial pledges coming out of Oslo for Sudan as a whole for the
first two years, with the 2005-2006 estimates showing some
76 per cent of pledges thus far met and some six countries
including the Netherlands, EC, US, Canada, Japan and Finland
exceeding 80% of their pledges.
The Assessment and Evaluation Commission (AEC) was
formally established on 30 October 2005 and held its first
meeting on 20 November, but early meetings saw little
progress in establishing basic operational guidelines. One
of the reasons for the delay in forming the AEC was a
concerted effort by Pronk to convince the parties to
appoint him to be the Chairman of the AEC, rather than
Norwegian Ambassador Tom Vraalson, as had been
agreed upon in Naivasha.
171 The AEC finally got down
to business in February 2006 and created working
groups for each protocol of the agreement. However,
the commission has so far failed to establish a clear
plan for how to monitor compliance and hold the parties
accountable to their obligations. Most pressing is the need
to set up a reliable, up-to-the-minute source of consolidated
updates on implementation.
172 While some donors are
establishing their own monitoring mechanism for internal
purposes, information sharing among the key players is
lacking, and political engagement on the CPA is dismal.
173
The disengagement of the international community can
be explained by a number of factors. First, the world has
understandably been distracted by the crisis in Darfur,
and many seem to have mistakenly assumed that the
agreement, once signed, was self-implementing. With
only limited resources and manpower, the international
community has focused most of its political efforts on
improving the situation in Darfur, albeit ineffectively so
far.
Second, Garang’s death has had a negative impact on the
interest and involvement of some Western and African
countries, in following the implementation process. Garang
was an expert at engaging with the international community,
using his allies in the U.S., Europe and Africa as “force
multipliers” to increase pressure on the NCP during the
negotiation process. He had the contacts and ability
to mobilise partners around an issue or a problem. Within
the continent, Garang had strong allies within the AU and
IGAD, as well as throughout the region. Support within
IGAD for the SPLM from the mid-1990s until the signing
of the CPA was in large part due to Garang’s diplomacy.
The relatively easy ride that Bashir received at the mid-
March IGAD summit in Nairobi is seen by some as

171 Crisis Group interviews, Khartoum, October 2004. 172 According to USAID, a significant problem in establishing
a public information body through the AEC is that the GNU
would need to approve the release of these reports and attempt
to edit out indications that implementation is not on track.
However, this would presumably not be an issue if the
information produced were exclusively for the use of AEC
members and not for public consumption. Crisis Group
interviews, U.S. government officials, Washington, 28-30
March 2006
173 Crisis Group interviews, U.S. government officials,
Washington, 28-30 March 2006.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 28

testament to the drop-off in effective SPLM diplomacy. 174
The SPLM undoubtedly miss his leadership in this crucial
area, and Salva has been slow to re-engage with the
international community, lacking the networks and
expertise. Without functioning party structures or
strategies, as described above, the SPLM have not
been able to sustain a diplomatic offensive to help
raise international attention and support to the challenges
facing them at home. The impact of Garang’s death was
also felt in international circles, where some appear to
have concluded that the agreement had died with him. It
is important that the SPLM maintain effective working
relationships with the regional IGAD countries, and work
to keep the regional body engaged and invested in the
implementation process.
Third, there is no clear role for the international community
within the CPA itself, beyond limited roles in the AEC
and a handful of the commissions. Although the SPLM
have flirted with a more intrusive international role in
implementing the CPA, they have not yet publicly called
for such a step to be taken.
Fourth, there has been infighting and a lack of coordination
within the international community. SRSG Jan Pronk
has actively sought to position UNMIS as the lead
international actor on Darfur and Eastern Sudan as well as
the CPA, alienating and clashing with other bilateral
or regional actors. He has done a poor job on all three
fronts. Though UNMIS has the mandate to monitor the
implementation of the CPA, Pronk has spent very little
time in the South – no more than a few weeks – since the
agreement was signed. “Pronk has messed it up. He was
appointed for the South, but he believes he’s the Secretary
General of the Sudan,” complained a member of the
mediation team from Naivasha.
175 UNMIS has a sub-
mission in the South run out of Juba, but Pronk’s perceived
lack of interest has sent a negative signal to southerners
and to many in the SPLM leadership, souring relations
that may be necessary if the situation takes a turn for
the worse. The problem is also institutional. In general,
Khartoum is providing the institutional base for most
bilateral missions and international organisations, as well
the UNMIS headquarters. Much of the leadership and
personnel tend to get bogged down in Khartoum, and
decisions regarding the South (and other areas of the
country) are often made from Khartoum and based on a
view from the capital, rather than a view from the field.
A practical implication of this Khartoum-centric approach
is that members of the GoSS have to spend additional time
away from the South in order to have effective interaction
with international decision making processes.
176

174 Crisis Group correspondence, 30 March 2006. 175 Crisis Group interview, March 2006. 176 Crisis Group correspondence, 30 March 2006.
UNMIS’ efforts on the CPA have been heavy on
reporting, but light on follow-up. Though UNMIS is
now producing the monthly CPA Monitor, an excellent
publication which updates the status of implementation,
and Pronk presents a quarterly report to the Security
Council on the status of implementation, UNMIS is not
yet backing these efforts with political muscle to push
the parties to implement their commitments. UNMIS’
establishment and Pronk’s efforts to be the lead actor on
all fronts have alienated some of the traditionally more
active countries in Sudan, including those involved in
supporting the Naivasha process, from maintaining a
more central role.
Several things are required for more effective international
support to the CPA. The first is better coordination
amongst the international actors on monitoring key
elements of the implementation process, and more directed
pressure on the parties to counter violations. “The
international community consistently underestimates the
diplomatic savvy of the NCP” said a Western diplomat
based in Khartoum. “They’re running circles around
us, and many of us don’t see it. We’re not working
together because of divisions within the international
community.”
177 A central “clearinghouse” should be
established to systematically monitor and track the
implementation of the agreement. There is no body tasked
with this purpose in the CPA, and though the parties
empowered themselves to do this through the JNTT last
spring, it has not been functioning. IGAD is ideally suited
to play this role, particularly if Gen. Sumbeiywo, the leader
of the Naivasha talks, can be convinced to return to play
this role and the Kenyan government can be persuaded to
allow him to resume his duties on Sudan. He is an ideal
candidate: well versed on the terms of the CPA and well
respected by both parties and the international community.
The IGAD cell could be attached as a technical secretariat
to either the AEC or the JNTT. Once operational, it could
help coordinate the international community’s actions,
based on documented gaps in the implementation process,
or by identifying areas where political pressure could be
helpful, much as Gen. Sumbeiywo did successfully during
the negotiation process. If IGAD does not prove to be
politically possible, another umbrella should be sought for
Gen. Sumbeiywo’s involvement, perhaps by engaging the
Moi Africa Institute, Gen. Sumbeiywo’s current place of
work, to help provide this technical capacity. “The parties
don’t trust each other, and they won’t trust a third party
unless they have a proven track record and the trust of the
parties,” said a long time regional Sudan watcher.
178
UNMIS is the other body that is meticulously tracking
implementation, but it does not seem keen to take on the
role of coordinator, and Pronk’s strained relations with

177 Crisis Group interview, 8 March 2006. 178 Crisis Group interview, 28 March 2006.

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 29

many of the key bilateral actors and both lead parties will
make this difficult.
Equally important, the quartet of the U.S., UK, Norway
and Italy, together with the IGAD member states,
need to urgently refocus their efforts on bolstering
the implementation process and holding the parties
accountable to the agreement they worked so hard to
achieve, particularly the NCP. The lack of a clear political
strategy guiding the financial support for implementation
of the CPA is counter-productive. In the short term, donor
funding should be directed at countering the main threats
to the CPA. This can be done, for example, by supporting
the implementation of the Juba Declaration, and by
supporting the establishment, required technical expertise,
and operations of key commissions such as the Ad Hoc
North-South Boundary Commission, the AEC, and the
National Petroleum Commission. At the same time, donors
should begin to place conditionalities on their financial
support to the CPA, and a formal link should be
established between the MDTF and the AEC. Clear
benchmarks for implementation should be established in
Khartoum and Juba, and the donors must begin to flex
their financial muscle and coordinate their actions to help
push the parties towards those benchmarks and punish
consistent obstruction or violation. The current approach
is unlikely to yield much success given the obstacles to
implementation. V. CONCLUSION
Sudan’s peace agreement remains on shaky ground. The
unstable partnership between a strong but unwilling
NCP and a weak but committed SPLM is making the
implementation process highly volatile. With conflicts
still raging in Darfur and simmering in the East, the CPA
does not yet appear to be the comprehensive answer to
Sudan’s problems that many had hoped for. Steps can
be taken to help reverse this trend. A strengthened and
better organised SPLM and SPLA should help push
implementation forward and hold the NCP to its core
commitments. The international community must also
play a much more supportive role if the CPA is to hold.
Beyond financial support, which has been promised
but not yet delivered, concerned world actors must
begin to flex their collective political muscle to get
the implementation process back on track. The CPA
represents an historic opportunity to end Sudan’s recurring
conflicts. It cannot be allowed to fall apart during the
implementation process, or the suffering that has plagued
Sudan for 50 years will continue indefinitely.
Nairobi/Brussels, 31 March 2006

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 30

APPENDIX A

MAP OF SUDAN

BuramDongolaHalaib
Kapoeta KarimaMuhammad
Qol
Nagishot RadomSelima Oasis
Salala
Suakin
YeiHaiya Kerma
Maridi Sodiri Laqiya Arba‘in
Muglad Nukheila
El‘Atrun
MiskiKarora
Shendi
Abu ‘Uruq
Kafia KingiTullusAbu Zabad
Kologi
Talodi En Nahud Umm Badr
Renk
Kigille
Raga
Li
YubuFathai
Akobo
Ukwaa
Towot FamakaGonder Omdurman
Halfa al
GadidaGadamai AtbaraTokar Abu Hamed
Paloich Ed Da‘ein
AbyeiWadi Halfa
AmadiMerowe
Kosti
Nyala
Torit YambioJuba Bentiu Al Fasher
Geneina
WauEl Obeid
Malakal Al FulaSinnar
RumbekEd Damer
Wad Medani
Port Sudan
GedarefKassala
Aweil
Kadugli
BorEd Damazin
Adis Abeba
(Addis Ababa)
Khartoum
Asmara
JebelAbyadPlateau
JebelNagashush
QozAbuDulu
Administrative
boundary
DarHamid
N u b i a n
Desert
Administrative
boundary
Semna West
Kumma
Meroë Old Dongola
Libyan
D
esert
Nuba Mts.
S
u
d
d
Abay
Pibor
Pongo
VictoriaNile
WadielMilk
Bahrel'Arab
Lol
Jur
AlbertNile
Omo
Dinder
Sobat
RED
SEA
WadiHowar
JongleiCanal
WadiOdib
Nile
Abay(BlueNile)
Lotagipi
Swamp
Lake
Nubia
Lake
Nasser
L. Albert L. Salisbury
L. Turkana(L. Rudolf)
Ch'ew Bahir
L. Kyoga
Kenamuke
Swamp
T'ana
Hayk'
Kobowen
Swamp
Tekeze
WhiteNile
BahrezZaraf
WhiteNile
Atbara
NORTHERN
DARFUR
WESTERN
DARFUR
SOUTHERN DARFUR
UPPER
NILE
BLUE
NILE
WHITE
NILE
RIVER
NILE
JONGLI
EASTERN
EQUATORIA
WESTERN
EQUATORIA
WESTERN
BAHR
AL GHAZAL
NORTHERN
BAHR
AL GHAZAL
KHARTOUM
RED SEA NORTHERN
STATE
NORTHERN
KORDOFAN
SOUTHERN
KORDOFAN WESTERN
KORDOFAN
UNITY
STATE
WARAB
BAHR AL
JEBELKASSALA
GEDAREF
SINNAR
GEZIRA
BUHEYRAT
KENYA UGANDA EGYPT
CHAD
CENTRAL
AFRICAN
REPUBLIC
SAUDIARABIA
ETHIOPIAERITREA
DEMOCRATIC
REPUBLIC OF
THE CONGO
SUDAN
National capital
State (wilayah) capital
To w n
Major airport
International boundary
State (wilayah) boundary
Main road
Track
Railroad
100 0 200 300 km
0 100 200 mi
The boundaries and names shown and the designations used
on this map do not imply official endorsement or acceptance
by the United Nations.
Map No. 3707 Rev. 7 UNITED NATIONS
May 2004Department of Peacekeeping Operations
Cartographic Section
SUDAN

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 31

APPENDIX B

ABOUT THE INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an
independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation,
with over 110 staff members on five continents, working
through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy
to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.
Crisis Group’s approach is grounded in field research.
Teams of political analysts are located within or close by
countries at risk of outbreak, escalation or recurrence of
violent conflict. Based on information and assessments
from the field, it produces analytical reports containing
practical recommendations targeted at key international
decision-takers. Crisis Group also publishes CrisisWatch,
a twelve-page monthly bulletin, providing a succinct
regular update on the state of play in all the most significant
situations of conflict or potential conflict around the world.
Crisis Group’s reports and briefing papers are distributed
widely by email and printed copy to officials in
foreign ministries and international organisations and
made available simultaneously on the website,
www.crisisgroup.org. Crisis Group works closely with
governments and those who influence them, including
the media, to highlight its crisis analyses and to generate
support for its policy prescriptions.
The Crisis Group Board – which includes prominent
figures from the fields of politics, diplomacy, business
and the media – is directly involved in helping to bring
the reports and recommendations to the attention of senior
policy-makers around the world. Crisis Group is chaired
by Lord Patten of Barnes, former European Commissioner
for External Relations. President and Chief Executive
since January 2000 is former Australian Foreign Minister
Gareth Evans.
Crisis Group’s international headquarters are in Brussels,
with advocacy offices in Washington DC (where it is
based as a legal entity), New York, London and Moscow.
The organisation currently operates fifteen field offices
(in Amman, Belgrade, Bishkek, Bogotá, Cairo, Dakar,
Dushanbe, Islamabad, Jakarta, Kabul, Nairobi, Pretoria,
Pristina, Seoul and Tbilisi), with analysts working in over
50 crisis-affected countries and territories across four
continents. In Africa, this includes Angola, Burundi, Côte
d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Eritrea,
Ethiopia, Guinea, Liberia, Rwanda, the Sahel region,
Sierra Leone, Somalia, Sudan, Uganda and Zimbabwe;
in Asia, Afghanistan, Indonesia, Kashmir, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Myanmar/Burma, Nepal, North Korea,
Pakistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan; in
Europe, Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and
Herzegovina, Georgia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Moldova,
Montenegro and Serbia; in the Middle East, the whole
region from North Africa to Iran; and in Latin America,
Colombia, the Andean region and Haiti.
Crisis Group raises funds from governments, charitable
foundations, companies and individual donors. The
following governmental departments and agencies
currently provide funding: Australian Agency for
International Development, Austrian Federal Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Belgian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and International
Trade, Canadian International Development Agency,
Canadian International Development Research Centre,
Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dutch Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, European Union (European Commission),
Finnish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, French Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, German Foreign Office, Irish Department
of Foreign Affairs, Japanese International Cooperation
Agency, Principality of Liechtenstein Ministry of Foreign
Affairs, Luxembourg Ministry of Foreign Affairs, New
Zealand Agency for International Development, Republic
of China (Taiwan) Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal
Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Royal Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swedish Ministry for Foreign
Affairs, Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs,
United Kingdom Foreign and Commonwealth Office,
United Kingdom Department for International
Development, U.S. Agency for International Development.
Foundation and private sector donors include Carnegie
Corporation of New York, Compton Foundation, Flora
Family Foundation, Ford Foundation, Fundación DARA
Internacional, Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, William
& Flora Hewlett Foundation, Hunt Alternatives Fund,
Korea Foundation, John D. & Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation, Moriah Fund, Charles Stewart Mott
Foundation, Open Society Institute, Pierre and Pamela
Omidyar Fund, David and Lucile Packard Foundation,
Ploughshares Fund, Sigrid Rausing Trust, Rockefeller
Foundation, Rockefeller Philanthropy Advisors, Sarlo
Foundation of the Jewish Community Endowment Fund
and Viva Trust.
March 2006
Further information about Crisis Group can be obtained from our website: www.crisisgroup.org

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 32

APPENDIX C

CRISIS GROUP REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS ON AFRICA SINCE 2003

CENTRAL AFRICA
The Kivus: The Forgotten Crucible of the Congo Conflict,
Africa Report N°56, 24 January 2003
A Framework for Responsible Aid to Burundi, Africa Report
N°57, 21 February 2003
Rwandan Hutu Rebels in the Congo: a New Approach to
Disarmament and Reintegration, Africa Report N°63, 23
May 2003 (also available in French)
Congo Crisis: Military Intervention in Ituri, Africa Report N°64,
13 June 2003
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: Time for
Pragmatism, Africa Report N°69, 26 September 2003 (only
available in French)
Refugees and Displaced Persons in Burundi – Defusing the
Land Time-Bomb, Africa Report N°70, 7 October 2003 (only
available in French)
Refugees and Internally Displaced in Burundi: The Urgent
Need for a Consensus on Their Repatriation and Reintegration,
Africa Briefing Nº17, 2 December 2003 (only available in French)
Northern Uganda: Understanding and Solving the Conflict,
Africa Report N°77, 14 April 2004
HIV/AIDS as a Security Issue in Africa: Lessons from Uganda,
Issues Report N°3, 16 April 2004
End of Transition in Burundi: The Home Stretch, Africa
Report Nº81, 5 July 2004 (also available in French)
Pulling Back from the Brink in the Congo, Africa Briefing
Nº18, 7 July 2004 (also available in French)
Maintaining Momentum in the Congo: The Ituri Problem,
Africa Report N°84, 26 August 2004
Elections in Burundi: The Peace Wager, Africa Briefing
Nº20, 9 December 2004 (also available in French)
Back to the Brink in the Congo, Africa Briefing Nº21, 17
December 2004
Peace in Northern Uganda: Decisive Weeks Ahead, Africa
Briefing N°22, 21 February 2005
The Congo’s Peace is Failing: Crisis in the Kivus, Africa Report
N°91, 30 March 2005
Shock Therapy for Northern Uganda’s Peace Process, Africa
Briefing N°23, 11 April 2005
The Congo: Solving the FDLR Problem Once and for All,
Africa Briefing N°25, 12 May 2005
Building a Comprehensive Peace Strategy for Northern
Uganda, Africa Briefing Nº27, 23 June 2005
Élections au Burundi: Reconfiguration radicale du paysage
politique, Africa Briefing N°31, 25 August 2005 (only available
in French)
A Congo Action Plan, Africa Briefing N°34, 19 October 2005
Katanga: The Congo’s Forgotten Crisis, Africa Report N°103,
9 January 2006 (also available in French)
A Strategy for Ending Northern Uganda’s Crisis, Africa Briefing
N°35, 11 January 2006 Security Sector Reform in the Congo, Africa Report N°104,
13 February 2006
HORN OF AFRICA
Sudan’s Oilfields Burn Again: Brinkmanship Endangers The
Peace Process, Africa Briefing Nº13, 10 February 2003
Negotiating a Blueprint for Peace in Somalia, Africa Report
N°59, 6 March 2003
Sudan’s Other Wars, Africa Briefing Nº14, 25 June 2003
Sudan Endgame, Africa Report N°65, 7 July 2003
Somaliland: Democratisation and Its Discontents, Africa
Report N°66, 28 July 2003
Ethiopia and Eritrea: War or Peace?, Africa Report N°68, 24
September 2003
Sudan: Towards an Incomplete Peace, Africa Report N°73,
11 December 2003
Darfur Rising: Sudan’s New Crisis, Africa Report N°76, 25
March 2004 (also available in Arabic)
Biting the Somali Bullet, Africa Report N°79, 4 May 2004
Sudan: Now or Never in Darfur, Africa Report N°80, 23 May
2004 (also available in Arabic)
Darfur Deadline: A New International Action Plan, Africa
Report N°83, 23 August 2004 (also available in Arabic and in
French)
Sudan’s Dual Crises: Refocusing on IGAD, Africa Briefing
Nº19, 5 October 2004
Somalia: Continuation of War by Other Means?, Africa Report
N°88, 21 December 2004
Darfur: The Failure to Protect, Africa Report N°89, 8 March
2005 (also available in Arabic)
A New Sudan Action Plan, Africa Briefing N°24, 26 April 2005
Do Americans Care About Darfur?, Africa Briefing N°26, 1
June 2005
The AU’s Mission in Darfur: Bridging the Gaps, Africa
Briefing Nº28, 6 July 2005
Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?,
Africa Report Nº95, 11 July 2005
The Khartoum-SPLM Agreement: Sudan’s Uncertain Peace,
Africa Report N°96, 25 July 2005
Garang’s Death: Implications for Peace in Sudan, Africa
Briefing N°30, 9 August 2005 (also available in Arabic)
Unifying Darfur’s Rebels: A Prerequisite for Peace, Africa
Briefing N°32, 6 October 2005 (also available in Arabic)
The EU/AU Partnership in Darfur: Not Yet a Winning
Combination, Africa Report N°99, 25 October 2005
Somalia’s Islamists, Africa Report N°100, 12 December 2005
Ethiopia and Eritrea: Preventing War, Africa Report N°101,
22 December 2005
Sudan: Saving Peace in the East, Africa Report N°102, 5
January 2006
To Save Darfur, Africa Report N°105, 17 March 2006

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 33

SOUTHERN AFRICA
Dealing with Savimbi’s Ghost: The Security and Humanitarian
Challenges in Angola, Africa Report N°58, 26 February 2003
Zimbabwe: Danger and Opportunity, Africa Report N°60, 10
March 2003
Angola’s Choice: Reform Or Regress, Africa Report N°61, 7
April 2003
Decision Time in Zimbabwe, Africa Briefing Nº15, 8 July
2003
Zimbabwe: In Search of a New Strategy, Africa Report N°78,
19 April 2004
Blood and Soil: Land, Politics and Conflict Prevention in
Zimbabwe and South Africa, Africa Report Nº85, 17 September
2004
Zimbabwe: Another Election Chance, Africa Report N°86, 30
November 2004
Post-Election Zimbabwe: What Next?, Africa Report N°93, 7
June 2005
Swaziland: The Clock is Ticking, Africa Briefing Nº29, 14
July 2005.
Zimbabwe’s Operation Murambatsvina: The Tipping Point?,
Africa Report N°97, 17 August 2005
WEST AFRICA
Tackling Liberia: The Eye of the Regional Storm, Africa
Report N°62, 30 April 2003
The Special Court for Sierra Leone: Promises and Pitfalls of
a “New Model”, Africa Briefing Nº16, 4 August 2003
Sierra Leone: The State of Security and Governance, Africa
Report N°67, 2 September 2003
Liberia: Security Challenges, Africa Report N°71, 3 November
2003 Côte d’Ivoire: “The War Is Not Yet Over”, Africa Report
N°72, 28 November 2003
Guinée: Incertitudes autour d’une fin de règne, Africa Report
N°74, 19 December 2003 (only available in French)
Rebuilding Liberia: Prospects and Perils, Africa Report N°75,
30 January 2004
Côte d’Ivoire: No Peace in Sight, Africa Report N°82, 12 July
2004 (also available in French)
Liberia and Sierra Leone: Rebuilding Failed States, Africa
Report N°87, 8 December 2004
Côte d’Ivoire: Le pire est peut-être à venir, Africa Report
N°90, 24 March 2005 (currently only available in French)
Islamist Terrorism in the Sahel: Fact or Fiction?, Africa
Report N°92, 31 March 2005
Stopping Guinea’s Slide, Africa Report N°94, 13 June 2005
(also available in French)
Liberia’s Elections: Necessary But Not Sufficient, Africa
Report, 7 September 2005
Côte d’Ivoire: Les demi-mesures ne suffiront pas, Africa Briefing
N°33, 12 October 2005 (currently only available in French)
Liberia: Staying Focused, Africa Briefing N°36, 13 January 2006

OTHER REPORTS AND BRIEFINGS
For Crisis Group reports and briefing papers on:
• Asia
• Europe
• Latin America and Caribbean
• Middle East and North Africa
• Thematic Issues
• CrisisWatch
please visit our website www.crisisgroup.org

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 34

APPENDIX D

CRISIS GROUP BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Chair
Lord Patten of Barnes
Former European Commissioner for External Relations, UK

President & CEO
Gareth Evans
Former Foreign Minister of Australia

Executive Committee
Morton Abramowitz
Former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State and Ambassador to Turkey
Emma Bonino
Member of European Parliament; former European Commissioner
Cheryl Carolus
Former South African High Commissioner to the UK; former Secretary
General of the ANC
Maria Livanos Cattaui*
Former Secretary-General, International Chamber of Commerce
Yoichi Funabashi
Chief Diplomatic Correspondent & Columnist, The Asahi Shimbun,
Japan
William Shawcross
Journalist and author, UK
Stephen Solarz*
Former U.S. Congressman
George Soros
Chairman, Open Society Institute
William O. Taylor
Chairman Emeritus, The Boston Globe, U.S.
*Vice-Chair

Adnan Abu-Odeh
Former Political Adviser to King Abdullah II and to King Hussein;
former Jordan Permanent Representative to UN
Kenneth Adelman
Former U.S. Ambassador and Director of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency
Ersin Arioglu
Member of Parliament, Turkey; Chairman Emeritus, Yapi Merkezi
Group
Diego Arria
Former Ambassador of Venezuela to the UN
Zbigniew Brzezinski
Former U.S. National Security Advisor to the President
Kim Campbell
Secretary General, Club of Madrid; former Prime Minister of Canada
Victor Chu
Chairman, First Eastern Investment Group, Hong Kong
Wesley Clark
Former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Europe
Pat Cox
Former President of European Parliament
Ruth Dreifuss
Former President, Switzerland
Uffe Ellemann-Jensen
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Denmark
Mark Eyskens
Former Prime Minister of Belgium
Leslie H. Gelb
President Emeritus of Council on Foreign Relations, U.S.
Bronislaw Geremek
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Poland
Frank Giustra
Chairman, Endeavour Financial, Canada
I.K. Gujral
Former Prime Minister of India
Carla Hills
Former U.S. Secretary of Housing; former U.S. Trade Representative
Lena Hjelm-Wallén
Former Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Affairs Minister, Sweden
Swanee Hunt
Chair of Inclusive Security: Women Waging Peace; former U.S.
Ambassador to Austria
Asma Jahangir
UN Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial, Summary or Arbitrary
Executions; former Chair Human Rights Commission of Pakistan
Shiv Vikram Khemka
Founder and Executive Director (Russia) of SUN Group, India
James V. Kimsey
Founder and Chairman Emeritus of America Online, Inc. (AOL)
Bethuel Kiplagat
Former Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Kenya
Trifun Kostovski
Member of Parliament, Macedonia; founder of Kometal Trade Gmbh
Wim Kok
Former Prime Minister, Netherlands
Elliott F. Kulick
Chairman, Pegasus International, U.S.
Joanne Leedom-Ackerman
Novelist and journalist, U.S.
Todung Mulya Lubis
Human rights lawyer and author, Indonesia
Ayo Obe
Chair of Steering Committee of World Movement for Democracy,
Nigeria

Sudan’s Comprehensive Peace Agreement: The Long Road Ahead
Crisis Group Africa Report N°106, 31 March 2006 Page 35

Christine Ockrent
Journalist and author, France
Friedbert Pflüger
Parliamentary State Secretary, Federal Ministry of Defence;
member of the German Bundestag
Victor M. Pinchuk
Member of Parliament, Ukraine; founder of Interpipe Scientific and
Industrial Production Group
Surin Pitsuwan
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Thailand
Itamar Rabinovich
President of Tel Aviv University; former Israeli Ambassador to the
U.S. and Chief Negotiator with Syria
Fidel V. Ramos
Former President of the Philippines
Lord Robertson of Port Ellen
Former Secretary General of NATO; former Defence Secretary, UK
Mohamed Sahnoun
Special Adviser to the United Nations Secretary-General on Africa
Ghassan Salamé
Former Minister Lebanon, Professor of International Relations, Paris
Salim A. Salim
Former Prime Minister of Tanzania; former Secretary General of
the Organisation of African Unity
Douglas Schoen
Founding Partner of Penn, Schoen & Berland Associates, U.S.
Pär Stenbäck
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Finland
Thorvald Stoltenberg
Former Minister of Foreign Affairs, Norway
Grigory Yavlinsky
Chairman of Yabloko Party and its Duma faction, Russia
Uta Zapf
Chairperson of the German Bundestag Subcommittee on
Disarmament, Arms Control and Non-proliferation
Ernesto Zedillo
Former President of Mexico; Director, Yale Center for the Study
of Globalization

INTERNATIONAL ADVISORY COUNCIL
Crisis Group’s International Advisory Council comprises major individual and corporate donors who contribute their advice and
experience to Crisis Group on a regular basis.
Rita E. Hauser (Chair)
Marc Abramowitz
Anglo American PLC
APCO Worldwide Inc.
Patrick E. Benzie
BHP Billiton
Harry Bookey and Pamela
Bass-Bookey
John Chapman Chester
Chevron
Companhia Vale do Rio Doce
Peter Corcoran
Credit Suisse John Ehara
Equinox Partners
Konrad Fischer
Iara Lee & George Gund III
Foundation
Jewish World Watch
JP Morgan Global Foreign
Exchange and Commodities
George Kellner
George Loening
Douglas Makepeace
Anna Luisa Ponti Michael L. Riordan
Sarlo Foundation of the Jewish
Community Endowment Fund
Tilleke & Gibbins
Baron Guy Ullens de Schooten
Stanley Weiss
Westfield Group
Woodside Energy, Ltd.
Don Xia
Yasuyo Yamazaki
Sunny Yoon

SENIOR ADVISERS
Crisis Group’s Senior Advisers are former Board Members (not presently holding executive office) who maintain an association
with Crisis Group, and whose advice and support are called on from time to time.
Oscar Arias
Zainab Bangura
Christoph Bertram
Jorge Castañeda
Eugene Chien
Gianfranco Dell’AlbaAlain Destexhe
Marika Fahlen
Stanley Fischer
Malcolm Fraser
Max Jakobson
Mong Joon ChungAllan J. MacEachen
Barbara McDougall
Matt McHugh
George J. Mitchell
Cyril Ramaphosa
Michel RocardVolker Ruehe
Simone Veil
Michael Sohlman
Leo Tindemans
Ed van Thijn
Shirley Williams
As at March 2006