GE.13 -13384
Human Rights Council
Twen ty third session
Agenda item 3
Promotion and protection of all human rights, civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights,
including the right to development
Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to
freedom of peaceful assembly and of association ,
Maina Kiai

Summary
The Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of
association presents the mandate’s second thematic report to the Human Rights Council,
pursuant to Council resolutions 15/21 and 21/16.
In chapters I and II of th e report, the Special Rapporteur provides an overview of
activities he carried out between 1 May 2012 and 28 Feb ruary 2013.
In chapters III and IV, the Special Rapporteur addresses two issues he considers to
be among the most significant ones of his mandate, namely funding of associations and
holding of peaceful assemblies.
The Special Rapporteur outlines his co nclusions and recommendations in chapter V.

United Nations A /HRC/23 /39

General Assembly Distr.: General
24 April 2013

Original: English

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Contents
Paragraphs Page
I. Introduction ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. …………. 1–3 3
II. Activities ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……………. 4–7 3
A. Communications ………………………….. ………………………….. ……………………….. 4 3
B. Country visits ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. .. 5 3
C. Participation in various events ………………………….. ………………………….. …….. 6–7 3
III. Ability of association s to access financial resources: a vital part of the right
to freedom of association ………………………….. ………………………….. …………………… 8–42 4
A. Definition of concepts ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………… 8–14 4
B. International legal framework related to the ability to access financial
resources ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ……… 15 –18 6
C. Meeting international human rights n orms and standards ………………………… 19 –42 7
IV. Ability to hold peaceful assemblies: an integral component of the right to
freedom of peaceful assembly ………………………….. ………………………….. …………….. 43 –78 13
A. Background ………………………….. ………………………….. ………………………….. ….. 43 –45 13
B. Procedural and practical measures for holding peaceful assemblies ………….. 46 –78 14
V. Conclusion and recommendations ………………………….. ………………………….. ……….. 79 –83 20

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I. Introduction
1. This second report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of peaceful
assembly and of association is submitted to the Human Rights Council pursuant to Council
resolutions 15/21 and 2 1/16. This report describes the activities carried out by the mandate
holder over the period 1 May 2012 to 28 February 2013 , and addresses two key issues
repeatedly evoked during the interactive dialogue with Council’s Member States in June
2012, namely , funding of associations and holding peaceful assemblies. In the light of
Council resolution 21/16, specific attention is also paid to the importance of freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association to the work of civil society actors, including with
respe ct to the progressive realization of economic, social and cultural rights .
2. In the preparation of this report, the Special Rapporteur convened a two -day expert
meeting on 8 and 9 December 2012 in Mombasa, Kenya. He also took into account relevant
elements of work available within the Council 1
3. As already highlighted in his first thematic report, the Special Rapporteur underlines
that the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association are interrelated and
interdependent, but they are also two sepa rate rights. The present report will therefore cover
the right to freedom of association and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly.
II. Activities
A. Communications
4. A total of 170 communications were sent by the Special Rapporteur from 1 May
2012 to 28 February 2013. Observations on communications addressed throughout the year
are contained in an addendum of the present report (A/HRC/23/39/Add.2).
B. Country visits
5. The Special Rapporteur conducted a country mission from 14 to 23 January 2013 to
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. He thanks the Government of
the United Kingdom for its exemplary collaboration prior to and throughout his visit (see
A/HRC/23/39/Add.2). He further thanks Azerbaijan, Chile, Guatemala, Honduras, the
Kyrgyz Republic, the Maldives, Rwanda and Tunisia for extending invitation s to him , and
hopes to honour these invitations in the near future.
C. Participation in various events
6. From 1 May 2012 to 28 February 2013, the Special Rapporteur participated in t he
following events organi zed by States and international and regional human rights
mechanisms:
• Seminar entitled “Human Rights Defenders and Peaceful Protest”, organi zed by the
Norwegian Ministry for Foreign Affairs (Oslo ,2 6-8 June 2012);

1 Country situations mentioned in the present report ha ve been the subject of communications sent to
Governments, as well as press releases issued by special procedures mandate holders and high -level
United Nations officials.

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• Sub-regional Eas t Africa training on “Strengthening civil society organi zations’
utilization of U nited Nations human rights mechanisms”, jointly facilitated by the
East Africa Regional Office of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner
for Human Rights (OHCHR) , the Programme on Women’s Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, CIVICUS and the International Service for Human Rights (Nairobi ,
10 September 2012);
• Development policy day on “The role and challenges of civil society organi zations
working in a disabling en vironment for civil society” , organised by Kepa ( Helsinki ,
11 October 2012);
• Organization for Security and Co -operation in Europe (O SCE ), Supplementary
Human Dimension Meeting on freedom of peaceful assembly and of association
(Vienna , 8-9 November 2012);
• In-house discussion on “The promotion and protection of human rights in the
context of peaceful protests”, organi zed by the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign
Affairs ( Bern, 21 January 2013).
7. Furthermore, the Special Rapporteur attended the following eve nts organi zed by
civil society:
• Workshop on “New technology and human rights monitoring”, organi zed by
University of Stanford (Stanford , 6-7 August 2012);
• Fifth Asian Regional Human Rights Defenders Forum (Bangkok, 3 -5 September
2012);
• Academic trip to Ma laysia (6 -8 September 2012);
• Lecture marking Human Rights Day, organi zed by Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO
Forum and Zimbabwe Lawyers for Human Rights (Harare, 10 December 2012);
• Regional consultation with civil society actors from francophone West Africa and
Central Africa countries, organi zed by World Movement for Democracy
(Ouagadougou , 15 -16 February 2013);
• Video message for Human Rights Council side -event , “Restrictions on NGO
funding”, organi zed by the Observatory for Human Rights ( Geneva, 28 February
20 13).
III. A bility of association s to access financial resources: a vital
part of the right to freedom of association
A. Definition of concepts
8. The ability to seek, secure and use resources is essential to the existence and
effective operations of any as sociation, no matter how small. The right to freedom of
association not only includes the ability of individuals or legal entities to form and join an
association but also to seek, receive and use resources – human, material and financial –
from domestic, foreign, and international sources.

2 See Joint recommendation put forward by U nited Nations and African Commission on Human and
Peoples’ Rights special procedures mandate holders, available at
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12524&LangID=E .

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9. Legal frameworks and policies related to resources have a significant impact on the
freedom of association ; they can strengthen the effectiveness and facilitate the sustainability
of associations or, alternatively , subju gate associations to a dependent and weak position.
Moreover, for associations promoting human rights, including economic, social and cultural
rights, or those involved in service delivery (such as disaster relief, health -care provision or
environmental pr otection), access to resources is important , not only to the existence of the
association itself , but also to the enjoyment of other human rights by those benefitting from
the work of the association. Hence, undue restrictions on resources available to ass ociations
impact the enjoyment of the right to freedom of association and also undermine civil,
cultural, economic, political and social rights as a whole.
10. The term “resources” encompasses a broad concept that includes financial transfers
(e.g., donations, grants, contracts, sponsorships, social investments, etc.); loan guarantees
and other forms of financial assistance from natural and legal persons; in-kind donations
(e.g., contributions of goods, services, software and other forms of intellectual propert y,
real property, etc.); material resources (e.g. office supplies, IT equipment, etc.); human
resources (e.g. paid staff, volunteers, etc.); access to international assistance, solidarity;
ability to travel and communicate without undue interference and th e right to benefit from
the protection of the State.
11. Due to word limit constraint s, th is section will primarily deal with the issue of
financial resources, including monetary transfers, in -kind donations and other forms of
financial assistance (hereinafte r “ funding ”). The report covers financial resources provided
by natural and legal persons, whether domestic, foreign or international , including
individuals; associations , whether registered or unregistered ; foundations ; governments;
corporations and inter national organizations (including United Nations funds and
programmes).
12. In recent years, civil society actors have been facing increased control and undue
restrictions in relation to funding they received, or allegedly received. Combined with the
global fi nancial crisis that has compelled some donors to reduce funding, this situation has,
in many instances, led to a decline in the number of associations and a decrease in or
readjustment of the activities of existing ones, or in worst cases , to the extinctio n of some
associations. This problem is not isolated and exists in all parts of the world , usually as a
result of undue restrictions occurring when an association: (a) seeks; (b) secures; or (c) uses
financial resources; and these measures aim, in many cas es, to silence the voices of dissent
and critics.
13. This does not mean that associations do not have any obligations. Associations have
to ensure that funds are used for the purposes intended and that they are transparent and
accountable to their donors , according to the terms of their funding agreements. It is crucial
that associations – like other sectors in society – work with integrity and ethic ally as a way
of generating trust within the sector. In this regard, the Special Rapporteur refers to a
number of civil society -led initiatives, such as the International Non -Governmental
Organisations ( INGO ) Accountability Charter, which are valuable examples of the sense of
responsibility shown by civil society actors.
14. The Special Rapporteur believes domestic, fo reign and international donors also
have responsibilities. Donors should pay due attention to the local political, social and
economic context in which associations operate, particularly associations working with
grassroots communities, marginalized and vu lnerable peoples, and on “unpopular” or
cutting -edge issues. Donors should also respect the autonomy of civil society organi zations
so that associations can address the needs and concerns of the population. The Special
Rapporteur deeply regrets that some d omestic public donors exclusively fund associations
which support Government policies, despite the fact that the right to freedom of association,
which is an essential component of democracy, underlies a pluralism of views. The Special

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Rapporteur also invi tes donors to diversify funding beneficiaries , and when applicable, take
appropriate action to support associations facing undue restrictions.
B. International legal framework related to the ability to access financial
resources
15. Article 22 of the Interna tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (hereafter the
Covenant) affirms that “everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others,
including the right to form and join trade unions for the protection of his interests .” Article
6 (f) of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief (General Assembly resolution 36/55) explicitly
refers to the freedom to access funding , stating that t he right to freedom of thought,
consci ence, religion or belief shall include, inter alia, the freedom “to solicit and receive
voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals and institutions.” On 21 March
2013, the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 22/6, in which it called u pon States to
ensure that reporting requirements “do not inhibit functional autonomy [of associations]”
and “do not discriminatorily impose restrictions on potential sources of funding.”
16. In communication No. 1274/2004, the Human Rights Committee observed t hat “the
right to freedom of association relates not only to the right to form an association, but also
guarantees the right of such an association freely to carry out its statutory activities. The
protection afforded by article 22 extends to all activitie s of an association […].”3
Accordingly, fundraising activities are protected under article 22 of the Covenant , and
funding restrictions that impede the ability of associations to pursue their statutory activities
constitute an interference with article 22. Other United Nations treaty bodies have
emphasi zed the obligation of States to allow civil society to seek, secure, and utilize
resources, including from foreign sources. The Committee on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights highlighted this issue when i t expressed “deep concern” with Egypt’s Law
No. 153 of 1999, which “gives the Government control over the right of NGOs to manage
their own activities, including seeking external funding.” 4
17. The Declaration on Human Rights Defenders 5 constitutes another rel evant frame of
reference : article 13 states that “everyone has the right, individually and in association with
others , to solicit, receive and utilize resources for the express purpose of promoting and
protecting human rights and fundamental freedoms throu gh peaceful means, in accordance
with article 3 of the present Declaration” (emphasis added). This provision is important
because it makes no distinction between the sources of funding, be it from domestic,
foreign or international sources. It is also esse ntial because it makes clear that not only
legally registered associations, but also individuals – and therefore associations which have
no legal status, such as unregistered associations – are eligible to access funding. Although
the Declaration is not a binding instrument, it must be recalled that it was adopted by
consensus by the General Assembly and contains a series of principles and rights that are
based on human rights standards enshrined in other international instruments which are
legally binding. It is clear from this standpoint that the guiding principles it sets forth
notably emanate from the provisions of article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights and can therefore be applied to other forms of associations, regardles s

3 Human Rights Committee, communication No. 1274/2004, Korneenko et al. v. Belarus , Views
adopted on 31 October 2006, para. 7.2.
4 See also CAT/C/BLR/CO/4, para . 25; CERD/C/IRL/CO/2, para. 12; A/55/38, para. 155;
CRC/C/MWI/CO/2, para. 25.
5 General Assembly resolution 53/144, annex.

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of the goals they pursue. In the light of this reasoning, and taking due consideration of the
provisions of the Covenant, which make no distinction between registered and unregistered
associations, the Special Rapporteur underlines that legislation limit ing foreign funding to
registered associations only, as is the case in existing and draft legislation in Bangladesh,
violate international human rights norms and standards pertaining to freedom of
association. Furthermore, he recalls that the formation of associations should not be subject
to a prior authorization procedure , but rather regulated by a system of notification that is
simple, easily accessible, non -discriminatory and non -onerous or free of charge. 6
18. Despite these clear legal obligations that no t only call upon States to avoid placing
restrictions , but also to facilitate access to funding, civil society actors are in too many
instances subject to regulations put in place to control , rather than enable access to funding.
The Special Rapporteur und erlines that freedom of association may be subject to certain
restrictions only, which need to meet the provisions of a rticle 22 , paragraph 2, of the
Covenant . He underscores again that freedom should be the rule , and restrictions the
exception. 7 He also u nderlines that one of the key principles of freedom of association is the
presumption that the activities of associations are lawful.
C. Meeting international human rights norms and standards
19. The Special Rapporteur notes with concern laws and practices t hat constrain civil
society organizations from seeking, receiving or utilizing foreign funding. As will be
detailed in the following section of the report, most of the justifications put forward by
States to restrict forei gn funding do not comply with article 22 , paragraph 2 , of the
Covenant , which states that “ no restrictions may be placed on the exercise of [the right to
freedom of association] other than those which are prescribed by law and which are
necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public safety,
public order (ordre public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the
rights and freedoms of others.” As will be repeatedly emphasi zed in this section, the
conditions for any restriction are cu mulative , that is, motivated by one of the above limited
interests, have a legal basis and “necessary in a democratic society”.
20. Under international law, problematic constraints include, inter alia, outright
prohibitions to access funding; requiring CSOs to obtain Government approval prior to
receiving funding; requiring the transfer of funds to a centrali zed Government fund;
banning or restricting foreign -funded CSOs from engaging in human rights or advocacy
activities; stigmatizing or delegitimizing the wo rk of foreign -funded CSOs by requiring
them to be labeled as “foreign agents” or other pejorative terms; initiating audit or
inspection campaigns to harass CSOs; and imposing criminal penalties on CSOs for failure
to comply with the foregoing constraints o n funding. The ability of CSOs to access funding
and other resources from domestic, foreign and international sources is an integral part of
the right to freedom of association, and these constraints violate article 22 of the
International Covenant on Civi l and Political Rights and other human rights instruments,
including the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
21. The Special Rapporteur also warns that the political environment, where for instance
patriarchy, sexism and authoritari an regimes are structural challenges, can also unduly
undermine access to funding to civil society. 8 Furthermore, criminalization in certain
countries of peaceful activities, such as protection of human rights, non -discrimination and

6 A/HRC/20/27, paras. 58 -59, 95.
7 Ibid., para. 16.
8 A/66/2 03, para. 73 .

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equality or promotion of gender equality, can also make it difficult, if not impossible, for
associations working on these issues to raise funds. 9
1. Financing terrorism
22. One of the most common reasons used by governments to limit access to funding
relate to security measures , including protection against terrorism and prevention of money –
laundering. The crime of terrorism, which aims at the “destruction of human rights,
fundamental freedoms and democracy, threaten[s] territorial integrity and security of States
and destabiliz [es] legitimately constituted Governments ”,10 has devastating consequences
and has caused tragic human suffering. The Special Rapporteur is aware that States have an
interest in protecting “national security or public safety”, which are legitimate grounds f or
restricting freedom of association, but he underscores that there is also need for States to
comply with international human rights law while countering terrorism.
23. Under the Covenant , any limitation must not only pursue a legitimate interest but
also be “necessary in a democratic society.” It is only when groups engage in the
aforementioned confined activities that they can be labelled as a terrorist group. It is
therefore a violation of international law for counter -terrorism or “anti -extremism”
meas ures to be used as a pretext to constrain dissenting views or independent civil society.
As highlighted by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights
while countering terrorism, “[s]tates shall not invoke national security as a justification for
measures aimed at suppressing opposition or to justify repressive practices against its
population. The onus is on the Government to prove that a threat to one of the grounds for
limitation exists and that the measures are taken to deal with the threat.” 11 In order to meet
the proportionality and necessity test, restrictive measures must be the least intrusive mean s
to achieve the desired objective and be limited to the associations falling within the clearly
identified aspects characteri zing terrorism only . They must not target all civil society
associations , as is regrettably the case in a new law against organi zed crime in Venezuela.
Laws drafted in general terms limiting, or even banning funding under the justification of
counter -terror ism do not comply with the requisites of “proportionality” and “necessity”.
24. The Special Rapporteur also calls for sectoral equity, noting that commercial
companies and other entities have been abused for terrorist purposes . H e calls on States to
avoid mea sures that disproportionately target or burden civil society organizations, such as
imposing onerous vetting rules, procedures or other CSO -specific requirements not applied
to the corporate sector writ large.
25. The Special Rapporteur notes a set of standard s developed by the Financial Action
Task Force (FATF), an intergovernmental body established in 1989, which specifically
address es the issue of money -laundering and terrorist financing. FATF Recommendation 8
(formerly Special Recommendation VIII ) on non -profit organi zations recommends that
“countries review the adequacy of laws and regulations [to ensure] entities are not abused
for the financing of terrorism.” The Special Rapporteur underlines –as does an instructive
World Bank w orking paper analysing FATF ’s response towards financing terrorism –, that
very few, if any, instances of terrorism financing have been detected as a result of CSO –
specific supervisory measures; “rather it is financial intelligence that is essential.” 12

9 See for instance , the opinion adopted by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention on
communication No. 39/2012 addressed to Belarus (A/HRC/WGAD/2012/39 ), para. 47.
10 Commission on Human Rights resolution 2005/80 , preambular para. 11.
11 See A/61/267, para. 20.
12 Emile van der Does de Willebois, Nonprofit Organizations and the Combatting of Terrorism
Financing: A Proportionate Response , World Bank Work ing Paper No. 208 (Washington D.C.,

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Recommendation 8 does not adeq uately take into account that States already have other
means, such as financial surveillance and police cooperation, to effectively address the
terrorism financing threat. Moreover, FATF fails to provide for specific measures to protect
the civil society sector from undue restrictions to their right to freedom of association by
States asserting that their measures are in compliance with FATF Recommendation 8. The
Special Rapporteur insists on the need to combat terrorism, but he warns against the
implement ation of restrictive measures – such as FATF Recommendation 8 – which have
been misused by States to violate international law.
26. Fundamentally, the Special Rapporteur believes civil society organi zations play a
significant role in combatting terrorism. By t heir direct connections with the population and
their prodigious work in , inter alia , poverty reduction, peacebuilding, humanitarian
assistance, human rights and social justice, including in politically complex environments,
civil society plays a crucial r ole against the threat of terrorism. Unduly restrictive measures,
which can lead donors to withdraw support from associations operating in difficult
environments, can in fact undermine invaluable CSO initiatives in the struggle against
terrorism and extrem ism, and ultimately have adverse consequences on peace and security.
2. State sovereignty against foreign interference
27. In recent years, the protection of State sovereignty or of the S tate’s traditional values
against external interference has also been i ncreasingly invoked to restrict foreign funding
or to launch slander offensives against those receiving foreign funding. Foreign funding to
civil society has been deliberately depicted as a new form of imperialism or neo –
colonialism and recipients have bee n subject to defamation, stigmatization and acts of
harassment. This tendency has a serious impact on the work of civil society actors, not to
mention their ability to access funding as it deters them from seeking foreign funding. This
situation is particu larly alarming for associations promoting human rights and democratic
reforms who have been accused of “treason” or of “promoting regime change”.
28. For instance, in the Russian Federation, a new law adopted in July 2012 requires
foreign -funded non -commercia l organi zations engaging in “political activities ” – which is
broadly defined as attempts to influence official decision -making or to shape public opinion
for this objective – to register as organi zations “performing the functions of foreign
agents”, which in Russian is synonymous with “foreign spy”. The adoption of this law has
been followed up by a series of audits of organizations, including prominent human rights
organizations. In Egypt, the State -owned press has campaigned against civil society
organi zations , branding them as foreign agents due to foreign funding that some of them
allegedly received. In Ethiopia, legislation not only prohibits associations working in rights –
based areas from receiving more than 10 per cent of their funding from foreign s ources, but
also requires associations to allocate at least 70 per cent of their budget to program me
activities and no more than 30 per cent to administrative costs, which are broadly defined.
The enforcement of these provisions has a devastating impact on individuals’ ability to
form and operate association s effectively, and has been the subject of serious alarm
expressed by several U nited Nations treaty bodies. 13 In the same vein, a law on
associations, adopted in January 2012 in Algeria , prohibits associa tions from receiving
funding from legations and foreign non -governmental organi zations, unless a “cooperative
relation duly established with the foreign entity” – subject to prior authori zation from the
relevant authorities – is in place. Serious concerns about this legislation were notably

2010) , p. 13.
13 CAT/C/ETH/CO/1, para. 34; CCPR/C/ETH/CO/1, para. 25.

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expressed by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression further to his mission to Algeria .14
29. It is paradoxical that some of the States stigmatizing foreign -fun ded associations in
their own countr ies are receiving foreign funding themselves (in the form of loans,
financing or development assistance), often in substantially greater amounts than that
flowing to CSOs in their country. Others are the very same States providing funding to
associations abroad, while rejecting foreign funding for association s in their own countries.
But what is clear is that these new trends have a dramatic effect on civil society as they
have not only resulted in restrictions to the enj oyment of freedom of association, but also
led to further human rights violations.
30. In order to analyse whether the limitation motivated by the protection of State
sovereignty complies with international human rights law, it must first be explored whether
it falls within one of the limited legitimate grounds for restrictions. The protection of State
sovereignty is not listed as a legitimate interest in the Covenant . The Special Rapporteur
emphasi zes that States cannot refer to additional grounds, even those provided by domestic
legislation, and cannot loosely interpret international obligations to restrict the right to
freedom of association. In his view, such justification cannot reasonably be included under
“the interests of national security or public saf ety” or even “public order”. Affirming that
national security is threatened when an association receives funding from foreign source is
not only spurious and distorted, but also in contradiction with international human rights
law.
31. Human Rights Council re solution 22/6 calls upon States to ensure that “that no law
should criminalize or delegitimize activities in defence of human rights on account of the
origin of funding thereto.” Article 2 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Righ ts requires States to “take steps, individually or through international
assistance and co -operation […] to the maximum of their available resources , with a view
to achiev ing progressive ly the full realization of the rights recognized in the present
Covena nt”. Coupled with article 11 of the same Covenant , which provides for States to
“take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect the
essential importance of international co -operation based on free consent ” ( empha sis added ),
this means that States have the obligation to mobilize resources that are available within the
society as a whole, but also to gather those that are available from the international
community. 15 Hence , restrictions on foreign funding under the g uise of preservation of
State sovereignty arguably constitute a violation of States ’ obligation to respect, protect and
fulfil these rights, as it amounts to failure on the part of the State to maximize resources
through international assistance and cooper ation. This is also the sense of the Maastricht
Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, which stipulate that
violations of these rights notably include: “the adoption of legislation or policies which are
manifestly incompatible wi th pre -existing legal obligations relating to these rights […] ; the
adoption of any deliberately retrogressive measure that reduces the extent to which any
such right is guaranteed.” 16
32. Protection of S tate sovereignty is n ot just an illegitimate excuse, but a fallacious
pretext which does not meet the requirement of a “democratic society”. The expression

14 A/HRC/20/17 Add. 1 paras. 83 -86; see also CEDAW/C/DZA/CO/3 -4, para. 19.
15 See Audrey Chapman and Sage Russell (eds .), Core Obligations: Building a Framework for
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Antwerp , Intersentia, 2002).
16 Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Maastricht, 22 -26
January 1997 ), para. 14 (d) and (e); s ee also the Limburg Principles on the Implementation of the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1986), para. 72.

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“democratic society” places the burden on States imposing restrictions to demonstrate that
the limitations do not harm the principles of “pluralism, toleran ce and broadmindedness”. 17
Associations, whether domestic – or foreign -funded, should therefore be free to promote
their views – even minority and dissenting views , challenge governments about their human
rights record or campaign for democratic reforms, wit hout being accused of treason and
other defamatory terms. Dissenting views should be seen by the authorities as an
opportunity for dialogue and mutual understanding. The European Court of Human Rights
in affirming this principle ruled that “an organisation may campaign for a change in the
legal and constitutional structures of the State if the means used to that end are in every
respect legal and democratic and if the change proposed is itself compatible with
fundamental democratic principles.” 18
33. In additio n to the fact that justification on the grounds of S tate sovereignty violates
international norms and standards related to freedom of association, the Special Rapporteur
is extremely concerned about increased denigration and unfounded accusations against
individuals and organizations receiving foreign funding. Special procedures mechanisms
have expressed their particular dismay about cases of vicious verbal attacks, intimidation,
property damage, physical assaults and even criminali zation against activists accused of
having ties to a foreign entity , on the sole ground that they had allegedly received foreign
funding ( e.g. Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan). Allowing or inciting public discredit on individuals’
or organizations’ honour and reputation or inciting nationa list and xenophobic sentiment is
likely to cause associations to engage in self -censorship and , more gravely , to incite hatred
and fuel further human rights violations.
34. Finally, the Special Rapporteur is concerned that in most cases , States which restrict
or stigmatize foreign funding under the guise of preservation of sovereignty are also those
which limit access to domestic funding or which subject associations to discriminatory
treatment due to the thematic area they focus on. Where domestic funding is scarce or
unduly restricted, it is critical for associations to be free to rely on foreign assistance in
order to carry out their activities. The Special Rapporteur recalls again that “governments
must allow access by NGOs to foreign funding as a part of i nternational cooperation to
which civil society is entitled , to the same extent as Governments”. 19 He believes that States
must demonstrate a change in mentality by highlighting that funding associations contribute
to the development of a flourishing, diver sified and independent civil society, which is
characteristic of a dynamic democracy.
3. Transparency and accountability
35. Restrictions to funding are also regularly justified by the need to ensure greater
transparency and accountability within the civil s ociety sector. Combatting fraud,
embezzlement, corruption, money -laundering and other modes of trafficking is legitimate,
and may qualify as being in the “interests of national security, public safety, or public
order”. Nevertheless, it is not sufficient t o simply pursue a legitimate interest, limitation s
need also to be prescribed by law and “be necessary ” in a democratic society. In this regard,
limitations must be proportionate to the interest to be protected and must be the least
intrusive means to ach ieve the desired objective. In this respect, several legislations or
practices unduly restrict the ability of associations to access funding since other less
intrusive measures exist to mitigate the risk.

17 European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) , Handyside v. the United Kingdom , application No.
5493/72, judgement of 7 December 1976, para. 49.
18 ECtHR, Zhechev v. Bulgaria , application No. 57045/00, judgement of 21 June 2007, para. 47.
19 A/59/401, para. 82.

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12
36. For instance, the obligation for associations to r oute funding through state channels;
to report on all funds received from foreign sources and how these are allocated or used
(e.g. Kyrgyz Republic); to obtain authorization from the authorities to receive or use funds
(e.g. Jordan, Sudan) all constitute h uman rights violations . In some cases, not only does
legislation providing for an authori zation procedure not comply with international law, but
the implementation of such strict provisions is also problematic For example , in
Bangladesh, a human rights ass ociation encountered arbitrary delays greatly in excess of
the legal 45 -day period before receiving a response to an application for project approval
from the NGO Affairs Bureau; in Egypt , a women rights association was granted approval
for funding seven m onths after its request, which was far beyond the 60 days prescribed by
law. In some other cases (e.g. Azerbaijan, Uganda, Zimbabwe), activists were subject to
intimidation and sometimes physical assault aimed at forcing them to provide the names of
their funding partners.
37. Fundamentally, the Special Rapporteur believes that associations should be
accountable to their donors, and at most , subject by the authorities to a mere notification
procedure of the reception of funds and the submission of reports on t heir accounts and
activities .
38. The transparency and accountability argument has, in some other cases, been used to
exert extensive scrutiny over the internal affairs of associations , as a way of intimidation
and harassment. The Special Rapporteur warns agai nst frequent, onerous and bureaucratic
reporting requirements, which can eventually unduly obstruct the legitimate work carried
out by associations. Controls need therefore to be fair, objective and non -discriminatory ,
and not be used as a pretext to silen ce critics. Composition of the supervisory body also
needs to be independent from the executive power to ensure its decisions are not arbitrary.
The Special Rapporteur is of the view that if an association fails to comply with its
reporting obligations, su ch minor violation of the law should not lead to the closure of the
association (e.g. Belarus) or criminal prosecution of its representative (e.g. Egypt); rather,
the association should be requested to promptly rectify its situation. Only this approach
cor responds to the spirit and the letter of freedom of association.
4. Aid effectiveness and funding control
39. International development cooperation between States has greatly increased in
recent years and has allowed for advancing global development. To ensur e the quality of
aid, more collaborative approaches have now emerged. The Aid Effectiveness Agenda of
the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008) and the Busan
Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation (2011) are implementation frameworks
aimed at enhancing the effectiveness of aid. They have gradually required harmonization of
donor initiatives and accountability of development partners, but also require d partner
States to take ownership of aid initiatives. Nevertheless, in som e cases, the principles
identified within this framework ( namely, o wnership, alignment, harmonization, results and
mutual accountability) have been interpreted by some States as giving them the sole power
to determine priorities and subsequently control the plans of CSOs, thereby justifying
limitations over the activities of civil society actors, including their right to seek and use
foreign funding. While an inclusive and participatory process towards aid is to be
welcomed, a rights -based approach is neede d to ensure civil society’s access to funding is
not unduly restricted.
40. The Special Rapporteur highlights that coordination of aid is not listed as a
legitimate ground for restrictions under the I nternational Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights . Furthe rmore , he underlines that barriers in the name of aid effectiveness have little
in common with “the interests of national security or public safety, public order (ordre

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13
public), the protection of public health or morals or the protection of the rights and
freedoms of others”.
41. The Special Rapporteur stresses that e ven if the restriction were to pursue a
legitimate objective, it would not comply with the requirements of “a democratic society”.
In particular, deliberate misinterpretations by Governments of ow nership or harmonization
principles to require associations to align themselves with Governments ’ priorities
contradict one of the most important aspects of freedom of association, namely that
individuals can freely associate for any legal purpose. Hence, Governments which restrict
funding in the name of aid effectiveness violate the key democratic principles of
“pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness” and therefore unduly restrict freedom of
association.
42. The Special Rapporteur wishes to highlight that t here is an inherent contradiction in
States restricting funding to associations, while at the same time receiving increased
funding through international cooperation. He believes that instead of aiming to limit the
participation of civil society actors, ai d effectiveness rather aims to provide all relevant
stakeholders, including associations, with greater influence to contribute to, inter alia,
poverty reduction, strengthening of democratic reforms and human rights promotion. For
example, i n Busan, Republi c of Korea, assurances were made to “implement fully
respective commitments to enable CSOs to exercise their roles as independent development
actors, with a particular focus on an enabling environment, consistent with agreed
international rights , that maxi mi zes the contributions of CSOs to development” (emphasis
added) . The independence of the civil society sector, including in terms of access to
funding, should therefore be guaranteed. In the context of ongoing discussions related to the
post -2015 Millenni um Development Goals, the Special Rapporteur believes that civil
society involvement and contributions to development are paramount, and that States
should exert all efforts to support, rather than inhibit , their work .
IV. A bility to hold peaceful assemb lies: an integral component of
the right to freedom of peaceful assembly
A. Background
43. The ability to hold peaceful assemblies is a fundamental and integral component of
the multifaceted right to freedom of peaceful assembly, which shall be enjoyed by
everyone. Such ability is of utmost importance to the work of civil society actors, including
those promoting the realization of economic, social and cultural rights, as it enables them to
publicly voice their message, which ultimately benefits the realizati on of the right(s) they
strive to promote and protect, especially in the context of the ongoing dire economic crisis.
This is all the more relevant for groups most at risk of violations and discrimination, such
as women, youth, indigenous peoples, persons with disabilities, persons belonging to
minority groups , groups at risk because of their sexual orientation and gender identity and
non -nationals.
44. However, in far too many instances, the ability to hold peaceful assemblies has been
denied or restricted by authorities in violation of international human rights norms and
standards. As a consequence, the right to take part in the conduct of public affairs, as
recognized in article 25 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Affairs, has
been narro wed. In this connection, the Special Rapporteur wishes to refer once again to the
Human Rights Committee ’s g eneral comment No. 25 (1996) on participation in public
affairs and the right to vote , which considers that “citizens also take part in the conduct of
public affairs by exerting influence through public debate and dialogue with their

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representatives or through their capacity to organize themselves. This participation is
supported by ensuring freedom of expression, assembly and association”. 20
45. As repea tedly stressed by the Human Rights Council, “peaceful protests should not
be viewed as a threat, and therefore encourage[s] all States to engage in an open, inclusive
and meaningful dialogue when dealing with peaceful protests and their causes”. 21
B. Proce dural and practical measures for holding peaceful assemblies
46. Article 21 of the I nternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights recognize s the
right to freedom of peaceful assembly to be enjoyed by everyone, as provided for by article
2 of the Covenant and resolutions 15/21 and 21/16 of the Human Rights Council. Article 15
of the Convention of the Rights of the Child recognizes this right for persons below 18
years of age . Unregistered associations should equally be able to enjoy this right.
47. The Special Rapporteur re calls that the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful
assembly can be subject to certain restrictions only, “which are prescribed by law and
which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security or public
saf ety, public order ( ordre public ), the protection of public health or morals or the
protection of the rights and freedoms of others.” 22 In this connection, he stresses once again
that freedom is to be considered the rule and its restriction the exception.
48. He further reminds that whenever authorities decide to restrict an assembly, they
should provide assembly organizers, in writing, with “timely and fulsome reasons ” which
should satisfy the strict test of necessity and proportionality of the restrictions(s) imposed
on the assembly pursuant to legitimate aims. 23
1. Presumption in favour of holding peaceful assemblies
49. The Special Rapporteur has already stressed in hi s first thematic report to the Human
Rights Council (A/HRC/20/27) , that States have a positive obligation under international
human rights law not only to actively protect peaceful assemblies, but also to facilitate the
exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful assembly (para. 27) . The law only protects
assemblies that are not violent and where p articipants have peaceful intentions , and that
shall be presumed. Acts of sporadic violence or other punishable acts committed by others
do not deprive peaceful individuals of their right to freedom of peaceful assembly (para.
25) .
50. In this connection, the Special Rapporteur highlights again the existence of
“presumption in favour of holding peaceful assemblies, ” as was first stressed by the OSCE
Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights ( ODIHR ) Panel of Experts on
Freedom of Peaceful Assembly and the Council of Europe’s European Commission for
Democracy through Law (the Venice Commission) 24. This means that an assembly should
be presumed lawful and deemed as not constituting a threat to public order. Such
presumption should apply to everyone, withou t any discrimination, and should be “clearly
and explicitly established in the law, enshrined either in constitutions or in laws governing

20 Human Rights Committee, g eneral comment No. 25 (1996) on t he right to participate in public
affairs, voting rights and the right of equal acces s to public service ( art. 25), para. 8.
21 Human Rights Council resolutions 19/ 35 (preambular para. 11) and 22/10 (preambular para. 16) .
22 Human Rights Council resolution 15/21 .
23 A/HRC/20/27, para. 42.
24 See OSCE /ODIHR and the Venice Commission, Gui delines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly ,
Second edition (Warsaw/Strasbourg, 2010).

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peaceful assemblies ” (A/HRC/20/27, para. 26). The Special Rapporteur believes that
unclear legal provisions should be clarified, and that in the absence of clarity, such
provisions should be interpreted in favour of those wishing to exercise their right to
freedom of peaceful assembly.
2. Notification procedure and decision -making
51. The aforementioned presumption further means that, in a free and democratic
society, no authorization should be required to assemble peacefully. In this regard, the
Special Rapporteur stresses again that the exercise of the right to freedom of peaceful
assembly, should be “governed at most by a regime of prior notification whose rationale is
to allow State authorities to facilitate this exercise and to take measures to protect public
safety and order and the rights and freedoms of others” (A/HRC/20/27, para. 28) . The
notable exception to this p rinciple is that of spontaneous peaceful assemblies where
organizers are unable to comply with the requisite notification requirements or where there
is no existing or identifiable organizer. Fundamentally, the Special Rapporteur reiterates
that “should th e organizers fail to notify the authorities, the assembly should not be
dissolved automatically and the organizers should not be subject to criminal sanctions, or
administrative sanctions resulting in fines or imprisonment” (para. 29) .
52. Furthermore, the Spe cial Rapporteur is of the opinion that notification should be
required only for large assemblies or for assemblies where a certain degree of disruption is
anticipated .25 In his view, such notification should be submitted a maximum of, for
example, 48 hours prior to the day the assembly is planned to take place. The organizers
should send a single notification to a designated primary authority, and not to multiple
authorities ( e.g one or several municipal authorities , as is sometimes done in the case of
parad es, and/or law enforcement agencies). 26 Th e primary authority should communicate
the details of the notification to all relevant bodies. 27
53. In this regard the Special Rapporteur believes that the organizers should be able to
notify the designated primary auth ority of the holding of a peaceful assembly in the
simplest and fastest way, by filling, for instance, a clear and concise form, available in the
main local language(s) spoken in the country, preferably online to avoid uncertainties and
possible delays in postage. The notification should merely contain information regarding
the date, time, duration and location or itinerary of the assembly, and the name, address and
contact details of the organizer.
54. By contrast , as in the view of the OSCE/ODIHR Panel of Exp erts, 28 a notification
should be considered as unduly bureaucratic if any of the following requirements is
imposed on the organizers: that there be more than one named organi zer; that only
registered organi zations are considered as legitimate organizers; that formal identity
documents, such as passports or identity cards , be produced ; that identification details of
others involved in the event, such as stewards be provided ; that reasons for holding an
assembly, bearing in mind the principle of non -discrimina tion , be given ; and that the exact
number of participants, which is difficult to predict , be given . In this connection, the
authorities should not punish organizers if the number of participants does not match the
anticipated number, as stipulated by domes tic legislation (as has occurred in the Russian
Federation ).

25 OSCE /ODIHR and the Venice Commission , Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly , para. 115.
26 Based on consultation with members of the OSCE /ODIHR Panel of Experts.
27 OSCE /ODIHR and the Venice Commission, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly , para. 117.
28 Based on consultation with members of the OSCE /ODIHR Panel of Experts.

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55. The Special Rapporteur further echoes the views of the Panel of Experts that the
authorities should be flexible in case s of (a) late notification , if there is a good reason; (b)
incorrect comple tion of form; or (c) failure to provide all necessary information. The
notification timeline should not restart from the beginning and there should be some
flexible means of correcting minor omissions or errors. 29
56. Another inappropriate requirement attached to the notification process is informally
or formally impos ing on the organizers the expectation to negotiate the time and place of
the assembly with the authorities . Such requirement would be tant amount to restrictin g the
planned assembly and would need to pass the strict test of necessity and proportionality, as
defined in article 21 of the Covenant, which is applicable to restrictions. The Special
Rapporteur also warns against authorities proposing an alternative time and place for an
assembly, when pro cessing a notification , as this would also be imposing restrictions on the
right to freedom of peaceful assembly and should satisfy the aforementioned test.
57. The Special Rapporteur is also of the opinion that the notification procedure should
at all times b e free of charge so as not to financially deter organizers from exercising their
right to freedom of peaceful assembly. Similarly, the cost of protecting and facilitating the
assembly (such as deploying security barriers, medical services or temporary sani tary
facilities) should not be borne by the organizers.
58. Once the organizers have notified the designated primary authority of the ir intention
to hold an assembly , a receipt acknowledging that timely notification has been submitted
should be provided in an expeditious manner. Should the organizers not hear from the
authority prior to the designated time for holding the assembly, it should be assumed that
said assembly does not present any problem. The Special Rapporteur warns against any
possible abuse of th e receipt system. 30
59. The Special Rapporteur is mindful of States ’ obligation to guarantee law and order ,
but restrictions on peaceful assembl y in relation to its “time, place and manner ”31 should be
limited to the extent that such restrictions meet the aforem entioned strict test of necessity
and proportionality. Any restriction imposed on the nature or content of the message the
organizers and participants want to convey, especially in relation to criticism of
Government policies, should be proscribed, unless the message constitutes “incitement to
discrimination, hostility or violence”, in conformity with article 20 of the Covenant . In this
connection, he stresses the recommendation that he has already put forward to States to
“provide individuals exercising th eir rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of
association with the protection offered by the right to freedom of expression”. 32
60. Should the assembly be restricted in compliance with international human rights
norms and standards, the authorities should p rovide reasonable alternatives to the
organizers to hold peaceful assemblies, which fundamentally should always be facilitated
within “sight and sound” of the target audience so that the message th ey ( organizers and
participants ) want to convey reaches thi s target audience. 33
61. In far too many instances, authorities in many countries fail to apply the
aforementioned strict test of necessity and proportionality when reviewing the imposition of
a possible restriction to the right to freedom of peaceful assembly . Peaceful assemblies

29 Based on consultation with members of the OSCE /ODIHR Panel of Experts.
30 See CCPR /CO/82/MAR, para. 24.
31 OSCE /ODIHR and the Venice Commission, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly , para. 99.
32 A/HRC/20/27, para. 84 (g).
33 OSCE /ODIHR and the Venice Commission, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly , para. 99
and 101.

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have been prohibited or repressed because the message conveyed do not please the
authorities, as has been done in Algeria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Belarus, China, Cuba, Egypt,
the Iran ( Islamic Republic of ), Indonesia, Russian Federation , Syrian Arab Republic and
Zimbabwe. Organizers and participants have been charged with, inter alia, “sedition ” and
“rioting ”.
62. This has also been the case for peaceful protestors advocating economic, social and
cultural rights, such as indigenous peoples protesting the exploitation of a coal mine
(Bangladesh ), local residents denouncing the health impact of nuclear power plants (India ),
students protesting university reforms (Chile ), employees protesting the closure of a mine
(Myanmar ), activists criticizi ng the increase in fuel prices (Sri Lanka ) or students
supporting an ethnic group forcibly displaced by the construction of a dam (Sudan ).
63. The Special Rapporteur is particularly troubled by the imposition of blanket bans in
many States, such as Azerbaijan and Bahrain, typically in the interests of national security,
public safety or public order. He firmly believes that such blanket bans, are intrinsically
disproportionate and discriminatory measures as they impact on all citizens willing to
exercise their right to freedom of peacefully assembly. States have also resorted to pre –
emptive measures to quash peaceful assemblies, including by preventing participants from
reaching assembly points, as in Sri Lanka and Myanmar.
64. Finally , organizers should be given t he possibility of an expedited appeal procedure,
with a view to obtaining a judicial decision by an independent and impartial court prior to
the notified date of the assembly. The decision of the regulatory authority and of the appeal
court should be publi shed for the purposes of transparency and fairness, possibly on a
specific website. 34
3. Access to public space
65. A key measure with regard to facilitating the holding of peaceful assemblies is to
make public space available for organizers and participants. The Special Rapporteur deems
it useful to refer again to an important decision of the Spanish Constitutional Court which
stated that “in a democratic society, the urban space is not only an area for circulation, but
also for participation”. The Inter -Ameri can Commission on Human Rights (IACHR) also
stressed that although the exercise of the right of assembly can sometimes be disruptive to
the normal routine of daily life, or may even cause problems or affect the exercise of other
rights that the State has a n obligation to protect and ensure , such as freedom of movement,
“such disruptions are part of the mechanics of a pluralistic society in which diverse and
sometimes conflicting interest s coexist and find the forums and channel s in which to
express themselv es”. 35 Furthermore, the Human Rights Council in its resolution 22/10
urged States to facilitate peaceful protests by providing protestors with access to public
space and protecting them, where necessary, against any forms of threats, and underline d
the role of local authorities in this regard. 36 The issue of access to public space is all the
more important in light of the increased privatization of public space in many States, where
peaceful assemblies have been curtailed through the use by private bodies, bo th companies
and individuals, of civil injunctions, which can be difficult to challenge, coupled with the
issue of aggravated trespass, as in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, for example .

34 Based on consultation with members of the OSCE /ODIHR Panel of Experts.
35 Organization of American States (OAS), IACHR , Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights , 31
December 2009 (OEA/Ser.L/V/II), par a. 198. Available at:
https://www.cidh.oas.org/countryrep/Seguridad.eng/CitizenSecurity.Toc.htm
36 Human Rights Council resolution 22/ 10, para. 4.

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66. Access to public space means concretely tha t organizers and participants should be
able to use public streets, roads and squares to conduct (static or moving) peaceful
assemblies. The Special Rapporteur believes that space s in the vicinity of iconic buildings
such as presidential palaces, parliamen ts or memorials should also be considered public
space, and peaceful assemblies should be allowed to take place in those locations. In this
regard, the imposition of restrictions on “time , place and manner ” should meet the
aforementioned strict test of nec essity and proportionality. In Kenya, protesters have been
temporarily prohibited from gathering around the Supreme Court as they await ed a
decision, as well as from other public places.
67. In this connection, the I ACHR stressed that “the competent institut ions of the State
have a duty to design operating plans and procedures that will facilitate the exercise of the
right of assembly ,.[including] rerouting pedestrian and vehicular traffic in a certain area”. 37
An assembly causes only a temporary obstruction t o traffic, that is, a temporary interference
with the rights and activities of others. The Special Rapporteur finds it troubling that in
some States , street protests are forbidden under domestic legislation (Malaysia) ; it is
prohibited for street marches t o impede the movement of traffic and pedestrians (Belarus );
mass gatherings are prohibited and subject to a heavy fine as they may, inter alia, disrupt
traffic and transportation (Russian Federation); application to hold a peaceful assembly to
celebrate I nternational Peace Day was rejected by the authorities , allegedly because it
would have, inter alia, disrupted traffic (Myanmar); women human rights defenders have
repeatedly been arrested and detained for disrupting traffic during peaceful street marches
(Zimbabwe) .
4. Pre -event planning
68. The Special Rapporteur considers pre -event planning, including risk assessment, by
law enforcement officials , together with organizers of peaceful assemblies and , if possible,
local authorities, as a good practice which m ay contribute to the success of the assembly.
However, participation of organizers in such planning should never be made compulsory.
69. Possible issues for discussion include an estimate of the number of participants
expected ; itinerary of the assembly , if it is not static; specific needs of persons with
disabilities and groups at risk , such as women, indigenous peoples and groups who , due to
their sexual orientation and /or gender identity may be in need of greater protection by the
authorities; need to deploy properly trained and clearly identified stewards whose role is to
provide assistance to organizers by, inter alia, informing and orienting the public during the
event, but who should n ot be used to palliate deficiencies in the security apparatus.
Importan tly, when organizers cannot be identified due to the nature of certain assemblies
(such as those convened through the Internet), the authorities must undertake such planning
and be prepared to the same extent.
70. Law enforcement authorities should be prepared and properly trained to handle the
presence of agents provocateurs and counter -demonstrators aim ing to disrupt or dispers e
the assembly, and to extract them from the assembly or contain them effectively . The
authorities should also be prepared to handle s imultaneous demonstrations, which should be
facilitated and protected when possible.
71. Fundamentally, law enforcement authorities should always be forthcoming and
genuinely cooperate with organizers, bearing in mind their duty to facilitate and protect
pea ceful assemblies.

37 OAS/ IACHR , Report on Citizen Security and Human Rights , 31 December 200 9 (OEA/Ser.L/V/II) ,
para. 193.

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5. New communication technologies
72. The Special Rapporteur stresses again the utmost importance of new communication
technologies, including the Internet and mobile phones, in organizing peaceful assemblies.
Such technologies allow organ izers to mobilize a large group of people in a prompt and
effective manner , and at little cost. This importance was highlighted by both panelists a nd
delegations during the Human Rights Council panel discussion on the promotion and
protection of human righ ts in the context of peaceful protests. 38 It should be noted that
individuals who post on social media organizers’ call s for assemblies should not be
considered as organizers, as has regrettably been the case in Malaysia , for instance.
73. The Special Rapporteu r is of the opinion that organizers and participants of peaceful
assembl ies should be allowed access to the Internet and other new technologies at all times,
as made clear by the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to
freedom of opinion and expression, who also stated that “any determination on what
[website] content should be blocked must be undertaken by a competent judicial authority
or a body which is independent of any political, commercial, or other unwarranted
influences”. 39 In this connection, the OSCE /ODIHR Panel of Experts recommended that
“States should ensure that efforts to disseminate information to publicize forthcoming
assemblies are not impeded in any way”. 40 Finally, the Human Rights Council, in its
resolution 20/8 , recognized the global and open nature of the Internet as a driving force in
accelerating progress towards development in its various forms (para. 2) and “called upon
all States to promote and facilitate access to the Internet and international cooperatio n
aimed at the development of media and information and communications facilities in all
countries ” (para. 3) .
74. Likewise, new communications technologies, in particular the Internet, should be
seen by the authorities as an excellent opportunity to interact with a large and diversified
audience prior to and during peaceful assemblies, with a view to sensitizing them on their
role and functions, and ultimately building or reinforcing trust among the population.
75. The Special Rapporteur is concerned that access t o new communications
technologies, in particular the Internet, or to specific websites, has allegedly been
temporarily blocked prior to , during or after peaceful assemblies (e.g. , in Algeria , China
and Egypt ).
76. The Special Rapporteur also warns against pos sible abusive use of laws governing
the prevention and fight against offences linked to information and communications
technologies, which “should be applied only as an exception to the general norm of
permitting the open and free use of the Internet, like all other forms of communication; only
very few qualified and clearly legislated exceptions should be permitted”. 41
6. Responsibility of organizers
77. Whenever organizers have deliberately not respected a legitimate restriction
imposed on the right to freedo m of peaceful assembly, sanctions should be proportionate to
the offence with a view to not dissuading the holding of future assemblies. In many
countries where a regime of authorization is in place, exorbitant fines are often in place in
case organizers d o not request authorization to demonstrate or do not respect the content of
the authorization. Such fines are in many cases disproportionate, and have a chilling effect

38 A/HRC/19/40, para s. 8, 16 and 52.
39 A/HRC/17/27, para s. 70 and 7 9.
40 OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice Commission, Guidelines on Freedom of Peaceful Assembly , p. 35.
41 A/HRC/20/17/Add.1, para. 105.

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on the enjoyment of the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of expression, as in the
legislations of Azerbaijan, Russian Federation and (Canton of Geneva ) Switzerland.
78. Furthermore, as stated previously, organizers of peaceful assemblies should never be
held liable for the unlawful behaviour of others. 42 The principle of individual lia bility of
participants should be upheld, notably due to the presumption of peacefulness of the
assembly. The Special Rapporteur is concerned that organizers have sometimes been
brought to court for the violent behaviour of others, as in Malaysia. He is sim ilarly
concerned about legal provisions criminalizing organizers for the violent conduct of others,
as in the Canton of Geneva , Switzerland .43
V. Conclusion and recommendations
79. The Special Rapporteur considers the two issues discussed in the present rep ort
to be critical for the enjoyment of the rights to freedom of peaceful assembly and of
association. He expresses serious concern that undue barriers to funding are put in
place, especially in a climate of harassment and exclusion of civil society actors on one
hand, and in the context of a global financial crisis on the other. It is crucial that civil
society not bear any more restrictions and obligations than private corporate bodies,
for instance, in these areas. In a framework of ongoing democratic re forms in several
countries across the world and of discussions related to the post -2015 Millennium
Development Goals Agenda, he believes States have the obligation to facilitate , not
restrict , access for associations to funding, including from foreign sour ces, so that they
can effectively take part in the democratic process and enrich post -Millennium
Development Goals talks, and ultimately contribute to development.
80. Moreover, the Special Rapporteur believes that the “Arab Spring ”, and the
“o ccupy movement ” which subsequently flourished in many parts of the world, have
opened a door which will never be closed. They provide a non -violent alternative for
change as well as giv e authorities a chance to understand the views and feelings of
citizens. These events indelibly confirmed that holding peaceful assemblies is a
legitimate and powerful means to make calls for democratic change; greater respect
for human rights, including economic, social and cultural ones; and accountability for
human rights violations and abuses. The ability to hold such assemblies has proven
particularly crucial for groups most at risk of violations and discrimination enabling
them to address their often desperate plight in a meaningful manner.
81. As general recommendations, the Special Rappo rteur calls upon States:
(a) To create and maintain, in law and in practice, an enabling environment
for the enjoyment of the rights to freedom of association and of peaceful assembly;
(b) To ensure that any restriction complies with international human r ights
norms and standards, in particular in line with the strict test of necessity and
proportionality in a democratic society, bearing in mind the principle of non –
discrimination;
(c) To ensure that a detailed and timely written explanation for the
imposi tion of any restriction is provided, and that said restriction can be subject to an
independent, impartial and prompt judicial review;

42 A/HRC/20/27, para. 31.
43 As of April 2013, the law is still the subject of an appeal before the Swiss Federal Tribunal.

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(d) To ensure that sanctions for the non -respect of restrictions complying
with international human rights norms and stan dards are proportionate and not set at
a level that would deter individuals from exercising their right to freedom of
association and/or of peaceful assembly;
(e) To ensure that those who violate and/or abuse the rights of individuals to
freedom of associa tion and of peaceful assembly are held fully accountable by an
independent and democratic oversight body and by the courts of law.
82. In relation to freedom of association, the Special Rapporteur calls upon States:
(a) To adopt a regime of notification for t he formation of associations , and
to allow for the existence of unregistered associations;
(b) To ensure that associations – registered and unregistered – can seek,
receive and use funding and other resources from natural and legal persons, whether
domesti c, foreign or international, without prior authorization or other undue
impediments, including from individuals; associations, foundations or other civil
society organizations; foreign Governments and aid agencies; the private sector; the
United Nations an d other entities;
(c) To recognize that undue restrictions to funding, including percentage
limits, is a violation of the right to freedom of association and of other human rights
instruments, including the I nternational Covenant on Economic, Social and Cu ltural
Rights ;
(d) To recognize that regulatory measures which compel recipients of
foreign funding to adopt negative labels constitute undue impediments on the right to
seek, receive and use funding;
(e) To adopt measures to protect individuals and associ ations against
defamation, disparagement, undue audits and other attacks in relation to funding they
allegedly received.
83. In relation to freedom of peaceful assembly, the Special Rapporteur calls upon
States:
(a) To establish in law, in a clear and explici t manner, a presumption in
favour of holding peaceful assemblies, and to facilitate and protect peaceful
assemblies;
(b) To ensure that peaceful assemblies are governed at most by a regime of
notification regarding the holding of peaceful assemblies, in l ieu of a regime of
authorization. The notification procedure, where introduced, should be as simple and
expeditious as possible;
(c) To provide organizers, whenever an assembly is restricted in compliance
with international human rights norms and standards , with reasonable alternatives to
hold their peaceful assemblies, which should be facilitated within “sight and sound ” of
the target audience;
(d) To ensure access to public space, including public streets, roads and
squares, for the holding of peaceful as semblies, with the consequence of rerouting
pedestrian and vehicular traffic when necessary;
(e) To ensure and facilitate at all times access to the Internet and other new
communications technologies, and to further ensure that any restriction on such
acc ess or on the content of websites is reviewed by a competent judicial court;

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(f) To guarantee that assembly organizers are never held responsible and
liable for the unlawful behaviour of others.