Civil Society and the UN Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy:
Opportunities and Challenges
By Eric Rosand, Alistair Millar, and Jason Ipe
Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation
September 2008

Authors AuthorsAuthors Authors
Authors
Eric Rosand Eric RosandEric Rosand Eric Rosand
Eric Rosand is a senior fellow at the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation in New York and a nonresident fellow at New
York University’s Center on International Cooperation. Previously, he served in the U.S. Department of State for nine years, working
on counterterrorism issues both in the Office of the Counterterrorism Coordinator and at the U.S. Mission to the United Nations. He
is the author of numerous articles, book chapters, and reports on the role for the UN and other multilateral bodies in the global
counterterrorism campaign. He has a LLM from Cambridge University, a JD from Columbia University Law School, and a BA from
Haverford College.
Alistair Millar Alistair MillarAlistair Millar Alistair Millar
Alistair Millar is the director of the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. He also teaches graduate level courses on
counterterrorism and U.S. foreign policy at Johns Hopkins University and The George Washington University. He has written
numerous chapters, articles, and reports on international counterterrorism efforts, sanctions regimes, and nonproliferation. He is the
author, with Eric Rosand, of Allied against Terrorism: What’s Needed to Strengthen Worldwide Commitment (2006). He has an MA from
Leeds University and is a PhD candidate at the University of Bradford in the United Kingdom.
Jason Ipe Jason IpeJason Ipe Jason Ipe
Jason Ipe is a research associate for the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation. He has provided research and written
contributions to numerous book chapters and reports on issues of counterterrorism, money laundering, and nonproliferation. He
received his BA in international relations from Connecticut College in New London, Connecticut, and his MA in international security
policy from the Elliott School of International Affairs at The George Washington University in Washington, D.C.
Acknowledgements Acknowledgements Acknowledgements Acknowledgements
Acknowledgements
The Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation gratefully acknowledges the generous financial support of the Swedish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the German Federal Foreign Office that made this report and the larger project of which it was a
part possible. The Center appreciates the guidance and encouragement it received from Ambassador Cecilia Ruthström-Ruin and
Andreas Norman in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from Ambassador Busso von Alvensleben, Matthias Sonn, and
Beate Maeder-Metcalf in the German Federal Foreign Office.
The Center benefited considerably from the research assistance of Liat Shetret and appreciates the support it received over the course
of the project from the staff of the Fourth Freedom Forum. The Center is indebted to Ilonka Oszvald for the final editing and Daniel
Laender for the layout of this report.
Both this report and the recommendations contained herein were informed by the discussions at a workshop organized by the Center
at the International Peace Institute (IPI) in New York on 21-22 July 2008. The Center is grateful to IPI and its staff for providing use
of the IPI conference center for this workshop. Participants included more than 25 representatives from civil society organizations
around the world, as well as officials from the United Nations, the German Federal Foreign Office, and the Swedish International
Development Agency.

T TT T
T
able of Contents able of Contentsable of Contents able of Contents
able of Contents
Acronyms2
Executive Summary 3
I. The UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy 6
II. Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism 9
III. Measures to prevent and combat terrorism 1 4
IV. Measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism 1 6
V. Measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental
basis of the fight against terrorism 2 0
VI. The UN system’s engagement with CSOs on the UN Strategy 2 3
Conclusion27
Recommendations 2 9
Appendix33
Civil Society and the UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Opportunities and Challenges

Acronyms AcronymsAcronyms Acronyms
Acronyms
BOND BONDBOND BOND
BONDBritish Overseas NGOs for Development
CSO CSOCSO CSO
CSO Civil Society Organization
CTC CTCCTC CTC
C T C Counter-Terrorism Committee (UN Security Council)
CTED CTEDCTED CTED
CTEDCounter-Terrorism Executive Directorate (UN Security Council)
CTM CTMCTM CTM
C T M Counterterrorism Measures
G8 G8G8 G8
G8 Group of Eight
ICP ICPICP ICP
ICP
A AA A
A
T TT T
T IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism
IGAD IGADIGAD IGAD
IGADIntergovernmental Authority on Development
ILAC ILACILAC ILAC
ILACInternational Legal Assistance Consortium
INTRAC INTRACINTRAC INTRAC
INTRACInternational NGO Training and Research Centre
ISS ISSISS ISS
ISS Institute for Security Studies
MDGs MDGsMDGs MDGs
MDGsMillennium Development Goals
NGO NGONGO NGO
NGO Nongovernmental Organization
ODA ODAODA ODA
O D A Official Development Assistance
ODIHR ODIHRODIHR ODIHR
ODIHROffice for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE)
OECD OECDOECD OECD
OECDOrganization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OSCE OSCEOSCE
OSCE
OSCEOrganization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
TPB TPBTPB TPB
T P B Terrorism Prevention Branch (UNODC)
UN UNUN UN
UN United Nations
UNDP UNDPUNDP UNDP
UNDPUnited Nations Development Programme
UNODA UNODAUNODA UNODA
UNODAUnited Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs
UNODC UNODCUNODC UNODC
UNODCUnited Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
U.S. U.S.U.S. U.S.
U.S.United States of America
WMD WMDWMD WMD
W M D Weapons of Mass Destruction
2

Executive Summary Executive SummaryExecutive Summary Executive Summary
Executive Summary
Since 11 September 2001, terrorism and the reaction to it by many governments and intergovernmental bodies,
including the United Nations, have had an increasing impact on civil society. For their part, nongovernmental
and other civil society organizations (CSOs)
1 have played a critical role in encouraging governments and the
United Nations to calibrate their response to terrorism by working to be effective against those who mean harm
without eroding human rights and the rule of law. In 2006, with that challenge in mind, the United Nations
General Assembly unanimously agreed to a global strategy that outlines a holistic approach to countering terrorism
and calls for the collective effort of an array of stakeholders, including civil society, to implement it.
CSOs can help to give voice to marginalized and vulnerable peoples, including victims of terrorism, and provide
a constructive outlet for the redress of grievances. They have important roles to play in activism, education,
research, oversight, and even as potential assistance and service providers. They can also play a critical role in
ensuring that counterterrorism measures (CTMs) respect human rights and the rule of law, and help
generate
awareness of a range of other Strategy-related issues.
CSOs are undertaking an array of activities that both directly and indirectly contribute to implementation of the
UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (UN Strategy), but often with little or no acknowledgement that those
efforts contribute to implementation of the Strategy or even combating terrorism generally. It is not necessary to
corral those efforts under the banner of counterterrorism but simply to recognize that a diversity of activity helps
contribute to that long term goal.
Implementation of the UN Strategy will require popular support, which can only be built and sustained with the
support and cooperation of civil society. However, the increasing tensions between states and civil society since
2001, with the former tending to view the latter with suspicion rather than as independent partners in a cooperative
effort to combat terrorism, have complicated attempts to find ways to deepen the engagement among states, the
UN system, and civil society in this effort. States are increasingly viewing CSOs as undefined risks and are thus
reluctant to seek partnerships with them. As a result, CSOs are becoming more cautious about associating with
governments to avoid undermining their own legitimacy among their constituencies and other
vital partners.
The adoption of the Strategy, with its explicit acknowledgement that civil society can contribute to its
implementation, however, offers an opportunity to find ways to ease these tensions.
After discussing the political significance of the Strategy, this report provides a survey of the work of CSOs as it
relates to the Strategy’s four pillars: 1) measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism; 2)
measures to prevent and combat terrorism; 3)

measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism;
3
1 For the purposes of this report, the following definition of civil society, which has been used by the UN Secretary General’s High-
Level Panel on United Nations–Civil Society Relations, is useful. It includes associations of citizens (outside their families, friends,
and businesses) entered into voluntarily to advance their interests, ideas, and ideologies and organizations such as professional
associations, social movements, indigenous people’s organizations, religious and spiritual organizations, academe, and public benefit
nongovernmental organizations. The term does not include profit-making activity (the private sector) or governance (the public
sector). “We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and Global Governance: Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United
Nations–Civil Society Relations,” New York, United Nations, 7 June 2004, https://www.un-ngls.org/Final%20report%20-%20HLP.doc.

and 4) measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against
terrorism. In this context the report will explore the role that CSOs can play in implementation across all four
pillars and how to define more clearly (and perhaps expand) that role, while avoiding any pretense of
instrumentalizing CSOs. Appended to the report is a short mapping of some of the CSOs carrying out work in
different regions that relates, often indirectly, to the implementation of the Strategy. In addition, the report
discusses the negative impact that certain CTMs adopted by some states have had on CSOs and explores possible
ways to mitigate this impact going forward. Further, the report addresses the limited efforts made so far by the
United Nations to engage with CSOs on the Strategy (or on counterterrorism more broadly) and the few attempts
made by CSOs to proactively interact with the United Nations on these issues. Throughout, the report identifies
the challenges to deeper engagement between CSOs and the UN system in the context of the Strategy and how to
overcome them, as well as the benefits that might accrue to CSOs
as a result of their more active support for
implementation of the Strategy. The report concludes with a series of recommendations, many of which are
discussed and expanded on in the report itself, focused on concrete steps that the UN system, states, and CSOs
should take, alone or in partnership with each other, to address these challenges.
Summary of Key Recommendations Summary of Key RecommendationsSummary of Key Recommendations Summary of Key Recommendations
Summary of Key Recommendations
• Raise awareness of the UN Strategy among CSOs around the world.
• Governments and the United Nations need to gain a better understanding of the diversity of ways in
which CSOs can contribute to the implementation of the Strategy.
• The counterterrorism label should not unnecessarily be placed on the ongoing work of CSOs that is
contributing to the implementation of the Strategy.
• More efforts are needed to address the tension between governments and CSOs in the context of fighting
terrorism, starting with the recognition by governments of the important role civil society plays in
supporting both security and good governance.
• States need to provide CSOs with sufficient space to allow them to help build local support for the
UN Strategy.
• Governments and the United Nations need to pay more attention to the impact of counterterrorism
measures on CSOs.
• Both the United Nations and CSOs need to take steps to stimulate more interaction between them. For
example, a) the secretary-general should create a CSO advisory committee to provide input to the UN
Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force on Strategy issues; b) UN agencies and bodies need to
proactively reach out to civil society groups; and c) CSOs should map the various entry points for
engagement with the United Nations and determine where certain groups may have a comparative
advantage and/or particular interest in engagement and could take the lead.
4

5
t CSOs should a) establish local civil society networks on Strategy implementation; b) develop an on-line
directory of Strategy-relevant CSO activity; c) convene a wide range of government and nongovernment
stakeholders to develop Strategy implementation plans; and d) seek to engage more with the UN system
on Strategy issues.
t More attention should be paid to building the capacities of civil society and empowering it in the context
of efforts to support implementation of the Strategy.
t Governments should outsource technical assistance and other capacity-building work to CSOs
more regularly.
t Counterterrorism capacity-building initiatives should be carried out wherever possible within the more
politically palatable rule of law framework.
t Coordination and collaboration among capacity-building providers, including the United Nations and
CSOs, should be improved.
t The Strategy should be used as a hook for human rights and security-focused CSOs to join together to
develop and promote human rights-compliant counterterrorism policies.

6
I. The UN Global Counter I. The UN Global CounterI. The UN Global Counter I. The UN Global Counter
I. The UN Global Counter
-T -T-T -T
-T
errorism Strategy errorism Strategyerrorism Strategy errorism Strategy
errorism Strategy
The UN Strategy should be welcomed as a breakthrough on several fronts. For example, it broadened support for
the UN counterterrorism program to include the entire UN membership, thus shifting the focus from the
Security Council, which had dominated the UN program since 2001. In addition, for the first time the United
Nations’ global membership has agreed that long term efforts to address conditions conducive to the spread of
terrorism are an essential part of an effective and comprehensive strategy to combat and prevent terrorism, thus
moving beyond the Council’s emphasis on law enforcement and other security measures. The Strategy is also
clear about the imperative for respecting human rights and promoting the rule of law across every element of the
document and throughout its implementation. Further, it acknowledges the wide range of stakeholders, beyond
states, that have a role to play in its implementation and is the first UN document on counterterrorism to include
a role for CSOs.
Part of the Strategy’s significance lies in the fact that it is an “instrument of consensus” on an issue where unanimous
consent has been difficult to achieve within the United Nations General Assembly. Although it does not add
anything not already contained in pre-existing UN counterterrorism resolutions, norms, and measures, the Strategy
pulls them together into a single, coherent, and universally adopted framework. Contributions from a wide range
of stakeholders, including not only member states and the relevant parts of the UN system, but also civil society,
will be needed to implement that framework.
For decades CSOs have been recognized by the United Nations for having an indispensable role to play in
furthering the objectives of the UN Charter. As the Chair of the UN Secretary General’s Panel of Eminent
Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations noted, CSOs are “the prime movers of some of the most
innovative initiatives to deal with emerging global threats.”
2
The UN Strategy specifically encourages “non-governmental organizations and civil society to engage, as
appropriate, on how to enhance efforts to implement the Strategy.” A September 2008 General Assembly resolution
on the occasion of the first formal review of strategy implementation efforts is expected to go slightly further and
specifically encourage them to “engage, as appropriate, on how to enhance efforts to implement the Strategy,
including through interaction with member states and the UN System.”
4 The inclusion of the clause “as
appropriate,” however, leaves it to states to determine the role (if any) to be given to civil society organizations, thus
reflecting the range of views on CSOs among the UN membership. This diversity was reflected during the
September 2008 negotiations, where a number of countries objected to the inclusion of the proposed language
encouraging more CSO engagement.
Despite this ambiguity in the Strategy itself, as will be discussed in greater detail below, CSOs can play important
roles in promoting implementation of a number of its discrete elements. The Strategy has been hailed as a “living
document” that will evolve over time. CSOs, with their long-term presence in the field and often deep
2 Ibid.
3 United Nations General Assembly, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/288, A/RES/60/288, New York, 8 September 2006,
para. 3(e).
4 “Letter to all Permanent Missions and Permanent Observer Missions to the United Nations transmitting the draft resolution on the
United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,” 18 August 2008, https://www.un.org/ga/president/62/letters/CTS180808.pdf.

understanding of the local context in which the Strategy needs to be implemented, can play an important role in
ensuring that implementation keeps pace with the changing realities on the ground. For any comprehensive
counterterrorism strategy to be effective, civil society needs to be part of its development and implementation, as
broad-based engagement between the state and CSOs can help serve as a medium for addressing concerns between
the state and the public in the context of specific counterterrorism actions.
Two prerequisites to increasing the involvement of NGOs and other CSOs in efforts to promote UN Strategy
implementation, however, are raising awareness of it among CSOs and more clearly identifying how the UN
Strategy is relevant to their concerns and interests, while providing reassurance that supporting implementation
will not just further narrow government interests. So far, neither of these has been satisfied.
Awareness of the Strategy among CSOs remains low, with informal surveys by some CSOs indicating that only a
small percentage of stakeholders with whom they are interacting report having any previous knowledge of the
Strategy. Efforts to spread the word should come from many directions: the United Nations, member states,
regional or subregional bodies,
and CSOs themselves. At the level of the United Nations, as will be elaborated on
in Section VI, largely due to a lack of resources, the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force (Task
Force)
5 has yet to seek ways to involve CSOs in its work or develop an outreach plan, but it needs to do so. Further,
the traditional UN counterterrorism actors within the United Nations, for example the Security Council’s Counter-
Terrorism Committee (CTC), its Executive Directorate (CTED), and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime’s
(UNODC) Terrorism Prevention Branch (TPB) have generally not sought to engage with CSOs in their work.
This attitude likely reflects the state-centric view of counterterrorism that has tended to dominate UN policymaking
over the years and is not surprising, given the ambivalence of some member states and parts of the United Nations
toward civil society, particularly when dealing with what are often sensitive national security issues. In addition,
targeting civil society is challenging, particularly in a framework as broad as the Strategy, not least because civil
society represents a multiplicity of actors with
often divergent concerns and interests and includes many elements
that will be reluctant to reciprocate.
The crucial message that articulates what the Strategy offers CSOs in return for their engagement has not been
developed or disseminated either by the United Nations or its member states. Although such a message will need
to be tailored to take into account the interests and concerns of the particular group of CSOs being targeted, there
are some benefits that may have broad applicability. For example, the Strategy may offer CSOs new networking
opportunities with other CSOs, intergovernmental bodies, and states on the range of issues that are now linked in
the framework of the Strategy. In addition, the Strategy’s explicit reference to the role of civil society may lend an
7
5 The 24 different entities represented on the UN Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force are: the Counter-Terrorism
Committee’s Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate, the Department for Disarmament Affairs, the Department of Peacekeeping
Operations, the Department of Political Affairs, the Department of Public Information, the Department for Safety and Security, the
Expert Staff of the 1540 Committee, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Civil Aviation Organization, the
International Maritime Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the International Criminal Police Organization, the
Monitoring Team of the 1267 Committee, the Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, the Office of Legal Affairs, the
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights
while countering terrorism, the United Nations Development Programme, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization, the United Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Cri me,
the World Customs Organization, the World Bank, and the World Health Organization.

8
added degree of legitimacy to CSOs, which have previously been treated by some governments as subversive for
working on terrorism and counterterrorism issues. Further, the Strategy, by enabling CSOs to link their existing
work with counterterrorism and the larger pools of funds often connected with it, may open up new resource
flows for CSOs from donors, including governments. Moreover, the adoption of the Strategy may make it easier
for CSOs to have access to and a dialogue with the “harder edges” of the national security apparatus. Finally, and
perhaps most significantly, the UN Strategy, with its holistic, human rights-based approach, offers a counter-
narrative to less inclusive approaches, such as the U.S.-led “war on terror,” which could help bring coherence and
balance to national and UN counterterrorism efforts and create more space for civil society to operate.

9
6 Felicity Harrison, “In Search of a Counter-Terrorism Strategy: The Role of Civil Society,” in Wafula Okumu and Anneli Botha, eds.,
Understanding Terrorism in Africa: In Search for an African Voice, Institute for Security Studies, Seminar Report, 6 and 7 November 2006,
p. 127–130.
7 LibForAll Foundation, https://www.libforall.org/home.html.
8 According to the President and Founder of the LibForAll Foundation, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s
(OSCE) Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights cited the language in the UN Strategy in this manner, thereby causing
the OSCE to withdraw from a European Commission-sponsored counterterrorism project involving LibForAll. Email
communication from C. Holland Taylor to the Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation, 3 August 2008.
9 See e.g., Steven Erlanger, “Hamas: Rivalry Breeds Extremes,” New York Times, 2 July 2006.
10 See e.g., Michael Slackman, “Stifled, Egypt’s Young Turn to Islamic Fervor,” New York Times, 17 February 2008.
II. Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism II. Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorismII. Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism II. Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism
II. Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism
NGOs and other CSOs around the world have been actively engaged in long-term efforts to address the conditions
conducive to the spread of terrorism well before the Strategy labeled those efforts as such. For example, CSOs
have been working to support sustainable development, realize the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs),
provide humanitarian relief, empower marginalized communities, promote dialogue, protect human rights,
improve governance, expand political participation, empower women, and prevent and resolve violent conflict.
They are working to give voice to marginalized and vulnerable groups and provide a constructive outlet for the
redress of grievances.
6 In many instances, CSOs have access to and have engaged with groups that states have little
contact with or limited influence over. More broadly, CSOs can serve as a stabilizing force in communities when
governments are temporary, changing every few years, or even completely absent.
CSOs are helping to build networks of moderate Muslim leaders by working with religious, education, government,
and media leaders on projects aimed at promoting a pluralistic, tolerant Islam. For example, one CSO is working
with a major Indonesian popular music star to create an album promoting Islam as a religion of peace. This work
is an important contribution to efforts to counter distortions of Islam being propagated by terrorists and discredit
the notion that Islam or any other religion justifies terrorism.
7 Yet some cite language in the UN Strategy stating
that terrorism should not be associated with any religion to discourage CSOs from working on such issues.
8 The
United Nations, member states, and CSOs need to acknowledge and discredit such “connections” between religion
and terrorism, rather than pretending they do not exist.
As a significant element of civil society, religious leaders can also contribute to addressing conditions conducive to
the spread of terrorism through their work within and among different communities of faith. Religious leaders
at all levels representing different faiths have an essential role to play in promoting inter- or intra-religious dialogue,
tolerance, and understanding among religions—all of which are identified in the Strategy as important. For
example, compared with other segments of civil society, the clergy is often in the unique position of both having
access to those in high-level government positions and engaging with the masses on the ground.
Civil society is also essential to promoting good governance, the lack of which is often cited as a cause conducive to
the spread of terrorism. For example, government corruption within the ruling Fatah party in the Palestinian
territories was a principal factor behind the political rise of Hamas and their ultimate election victory.
9 Similarly,
dissatisfaction with the Mubarak regime in Egypt has contributed to the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood in
Egypt,
10 and in Somalia, lawlessness, corruption, and fractional violence led many to welcome the relative stability

10
and order afforded by the Islamic Courts Union. 11 In addition to the important work of CSOs such as Transparency
International and Freedom House in combating corruption, civil society generally is essential to democracy
promotion and demanding accountability from politicians.
These CSO activities have significant intrinsic benefits in their own right and need not be specifically labeled as or
identified with “counterterrorism.” Such labeling or identification can undermine that work and have a negative
impact on relationships on the ground with groups that may be suspicious or concerned about real or perceived
connections to a security-led agenda.
Without asking or expecting CSOs to become “counterterrorism” actors, there needs to be a greater recognition
and understanding within governments, the UN system, and CSOs themselves of the unique contribution that
CSOs make, particularly with regard to long term efforts to address conditions conducive to the spread of
terrorism. Governments and the United Nations need to recognize that as a result of the range of activities CSOs
are involved in, often with years of experience working with local actors and communities, they can provide
governments and the United Nations with a clearer understanding of the conditions in a particular country or
region that need to be addressed. Perhaps more fundamentally, however, both governments and the United
Nations need to better understand that a strong, independent, and lively civil society is in itself an essential
ingredient not only for democratic governance and sustainable development, but also for countering and preventing
terrorism over the long term.
It is the holistic approach of the UN Strategy, including both preventive measures and long-term measures to
address conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism, that distinguishes it from previous UN counterterrorism
resolutions. In fact, the inclusion of these two elements in a single document was the key compromise that allowed
the General Assembly to adopt the Strategy by consensus. According to the Strategy, conditions conducive to the
spread of terrorism include: “poverty, prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims of terrorism,
lack of rule of law and violations of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion,
socio-economic marginalization and lack of good governance.”
More specifically, in the Strategy states reiterated
their “commitment to the realization of the Millennium Development Goals and their determination
to pursue
and reinforce development and social inclusion agendas at every level
as goals in themselves, recognizing that
success in this area, especially on youth
unemployment, could reduce marginalization and the subsequent sense of
victimization that propels extremism and the recruitment of terrorists.”
12
For their part, CSOs should continue pursuing progress in their areas because this work is important in its own
right, but they should be more aware of the benefits of this work to the implementation of the Strategy and, more
broadly, to countering terrorism. Those CSOs that are already aware of the Strategy need to speak out about how
it is different from the “war on terror” and how the broad-based UN Strategy can be viewed as a response to the
growing dissatisfaction among the wider UN membership with the narrow Security Council-led approach that
focuses on law enforcement and other security-related issues. This approach has contributed to the adoption of
11 John Prendergast and Colin Thomas-Jensen, “Blowing the Horn,” Foreign Affairs, March/April 2007.
12 United Nations General Assembly, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/288, A/RES/60/288, New York, 8 September 2006,
Pillar I.

11
13 Jude Howell, Armine Ishkanian, Ebenezer Obadare, Hakan Secklinelgin, and Marlies Glasius, “The Backlash against Civil Society in
the Wake of the Long War on Terror,” Civil Society Working Paper, no. 26, 2006, p.8, https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CCS/pdf/
CSWP/CCS_WP_Howell_26.pdf.
14 INTRAC, “Overview Report on CTM Workshops: Redefining Development for National Security: Implications for NGOs and
CSOs,” 2007, p. 3, https://www.intrac.org/pages/CTM_analysis.html.
15 See, e.g., INTRAC, “Overview Report on CTM Workshops: Redefining Development for National Security: Implications for
NGOs and CSOs,” 2007, https://www.intrac.org/pages/CTM_analysis.html; Nolan Quigley & Belinda Pratten, “Security and Civil
Society: The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on Civil Society Organizations,” National Council for Voluntary Organizations,
11 January 2007, https://www.civicus.org/new/media/Security-CivilSociety-Areport-NCVO.pdf; CIVICUS, “Impact of Counter-
Terrorism Measures on Civil Society,” 2007 [Copy on file with Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation]; and Jude Howell,
“The Global War on Terror, Development and Civil Society,” Journal of International Development 18, no. 1 (2006), pp. 121–135.
some of the post-9/11 CTMs that have had a negative impact on CSOs around the globe, including by “threaten[ing] the spaces for civil society to flourish and act.”
13
Although CSOs are sometimes seen as potential allies of the state in promoting development, good governance,
and human rights and other issues that help prevent terrorism and other forms of violence, too often they have
been viewed with suspicion because they might be working among marginalized populations or be perceived as
supporting political opponents of sitting governments. The result is that governments are increasingly reluctant
to seek partnerships with CSOs. Rather than stimulating greater CSO support for government counterterrorism
initiatives and “using social development—and other ‘soft’ measures—as a means of countering terrorism, CSOs
are being pushed into a highly defensive position about carrying out social development work with marginalized
groups.”
14 Furthermore, CSOs are growing increasingly cautious of their own association with governments as it
might undermine their own legitimacy within constituencies and other vital partners.
As mentioned, in a number of instances, measures adopted by states to counter terrorism have also restricted
the
operational space and otherwise limited the ability of CSOs to continue with their existing work, which undermines
prospects for both development and security. The negative impact of these CTMs on the ability of CSOs to carry
out their work (and thus contribute to the implementation of the UN Strategy) has been well documented in
recent years.
15
For example, new financial reporting rules and validation requirements by donor governments and agencies
designed to ensure that CSOs are not inadvertently or otherwise providing financing to terrorists have created
administrative burdens for some CSOs, obligating them to screen their staff, partners, and aid recipients, which
creates a disincentive for CSOs to operate in some volatile areas where conditions for violent radicalization and
the recruitment to terrorism exist. In some cases, where CSOs are unable to vouch for groups they intend to work
with or support, they are being asked to hand over information, including names of staff members, to the donor
government authorities for investigation. In the end, the need for donors and partners to “vouch” for groups they
intend to support or work with tends to favor better established CSOs and have a chilling effect on the willingness
of
these CSOs to partner with small or newer groups that may bring a voice to otherwise isolated, and perhaps
more vulnerable communities.
Further, a number of governments have adopted overly expansive counterterrorism legislation and used it to
clamp down on political opponents and, more broadly, freedom of association, speech, and assembly. The lack of

12
16 See, e.g., “Discussion Paper,” South and Southeast Asia Working Conference on Counterterrorism Measures and Development,
Davao City—Manila, Philippines, 25–30 May 2008 [Copy on file with Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation]; International
Center for Not-for-Profit Law, “Recent Laws and Legislative Proposals to Restrict Civil Society and Civil Society Organization, ”
International Journal of Not for Profit Law, vol. 8, issue 4, August 2006, https://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ijnl/vol8iss4/art_1.htm; and Tim
Morris, “The Impact of Counter-Terrorism Measures on Civil Society,” INTRAC, 2006, https://www.timmorris.info/
cairo%20CTM%20presentation.pdf.
17 According to Human Rights Watch, Ethiopia’s draft Charities and Societies Proclamation “would effectively close down the few
independent domestic NGOs that continue to work on human rights- and governance-related issues by stripping them of access to
foreign funding. The draft law defines as ‘foreign’ any Ethiopian NGO that receives more than 10 percent of its funding from fo reign
sources or has any members who are foreign nationals, and then bars ‘foreign’ NGOs from working on human rights and governance
issues. This would hit hard, given the lack of obvious fundraising and
development opportunities inside Ethiopia, one of the po orest
countries in the world.” “Ethiopia: Government Prepares Assault on Civil Society—Repressive New Legislation Should Be Amended
or Scrapped,” Human Rights Watch, 1 July 2008, https://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2008/06/30/ethiop19228.htm.
18 Jude Howell, “The Global War on Terror, Development and Civil Society,” Journal of International Development, 18, no. 1 (2006), p. 134.
19 “Conflict Security, and Official Development Assistance (ODA): Issues for NGO Advocacy,” BOND (British NGOs for
Development), 2007, https://www.bond.org.uk/pubs/advocacy/gsdpaper.pdf.
20 “A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Entry Points for Action,” DAC Guidelines and Reference Series,
2003, https://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/17/4/16085708.pdf (noting that “[d]evelopment co-operation does have an important role to play in
helping deprive terrorists of popular support … and donors can reduce support for terrorism by working towards preventing the
conditions that give rise to conflict in general and that convince disaffected groups to embrace terrorism in particular … this may
have implications for priorities including budget allocations and levels and definitions of ODA eligibility criteria”).
21 Christian Aid, “The Politics of Poverty: Aid in the New Cold War,” 2004, https://www.un-ngls.org/politics%20of%20poverty.pdf.
a common definition of terrorism consistent with international human rights standards has made it easier for
governments to act this way. This practice has had the effect of limiting the ability of civil society groups to raise
funds, and hindering efforts to support development and relief activities in marginalized communities.
16 Some
countries have implemented or are proposing onerous restrictions on CSO financing, such as Ethiopia, which is
considering draft legislation that would limit foreign funding for groups working on human rights and good
governance to no more than 10 percent.
17
Moreover, with military forces becoming more involved in humanitarian relief and development work, such as
the building of schools, hospitals, and wells, and delivering food, particularly in Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Horn
of Africa, the work of humanitarian and development CSOs has become “more complicated and ambiguous,” as
they are often no longer seen as neutral, independent, and impartial.
18
More broadly, there has been an increasing convergence of development, foreign policy, and security agendas
since 9/11, with bilateral aid donors linking their development assistance programs to counterterrorism and other
security and foreign policy objectives. The OECD’s Donor Assistance Committee has helped to stimulate this shift
by endorsing “A Development Co-operation Lens on Terrorism Prevention: Key Entry Points for Action” 2003
policy statement.
19 Parts of the paper have been interpreted as allowing for a new definition of aid to include
expenditures relating to a donor-driven counterterrorism agenda,
20 the result being that more donor funds are
being diverted toward security objectives with questionable development purposes, with some going so far as to
say the ODA funds are now “being used to support military budgets at the expense of help to poor people.”
21 This
so-called “securitization of aid” has tended to increase the tensions between governments and development and
humanitarian CSOs and thus created an additional barrier to deeper engagement among these stakeholders on

13
22 Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh, “Human Security: Concepts and Implications,” Les Etudes du CERI, No. 117–118, September 2005, 35,
https://www.ceri-sciencespo.com/publica/etude/etude117_118.pdf.
23 Chair’s Report, Cordaid Conference on Counterterrorism Measures, Security and Development,
Maastricht, the Netherlands, 10–11 January 2008, para. 17. [Copy on file with Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation] how to cooperate in addressing the commonly shared terrorist threat in a manner that does not interfere with
ongoing CSO activities.
Professor Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh of the Program for Peace and Human Security at the Centre d’études et
recherches internationales in Paris states: “issues of security and development in an international context need to
be re-examined in terms of their mutual interaction rather than as distinct and separate areas of analysis and
policymaking.
22 Further, CSOs should help design and encourage support for counterterrorism policies and
measures that link security “with respect for social justice, respect for human rights and pursuit of peace processes
and realization of effective development practice.”
23
For their part, government and nongovernment donors need to pay more attention to the impact of CTMs on
CSOs in those countries where they are funding civil society activities. Thus, for example, donors should include
a CTM impact assessment in the relevant country when reviewing CSO project proposals. The impact of CTMs
should be factored into the project monitoring as well. Further, the criteria by which the United Nations and other
relevant actors evaluate each state’s implementation of the Strategy should include the extent to which CTMs are
having a negative impact on civil society in that state. This is far from the approach being adopted by the Security
Council’s CTC. As part of its efforts to monitor each state’s efforts to implement Security Council Resolution
1373, which imposed binding obligations on all states to adopt a series of counterterrorism measures, the CTC is
monitoring the extent to which states have the necessary laws and regulations in place to ensure that charities and
other non-profits are not being used to finance or otherwise support terrorism without any regard to the impact
of those measures.

14
24 For example, CSOs were instrumental in the formulation of the Nairobi Declaration on the Problem of Illicit Small Arms and
Light Weapons in the Great Lakes Region and the Horn of Africa that ultimately became the basis for the establishment of the
Nairobi-based Regional Centre on Small Arms and Light Weapons. Other regions in Africa have similar networks. For example, in
West Africa, the West African Action Network on Small Arms is a loose network of some 50 civil society organizations established
in May 2002 in Accra, Ghana, which serves as a forum for sharing information and strategies on combating illicit small arms and light
weapons in that region.
25 Initiatives involving NGOs have been created to enhance political and financial support from governments for efforts to reduce the
dangers from nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons. Led by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, the Strengthening
the Global Partnership project is a consortium of 24 research institutes in 19 European, Asian, and North American countries working
to bolster
G8 commitments to address WMD issues in the former Soviet Union and beyond. See: https://www.sgpproject.org.
26 UK Department for International Development, “Understanding and Supporting Security Sector Reform,” https://www.dfid.gov.uk/
Pubs/files/supportingsecurity.pdf.
III. Measures to prevent and combat terrorism III. Measures to prevent and combat terrorismIII. Measures to prevent and combat terrorism III. Measures to prevent and combat terrorism
III. Measures to prevent and combat terrorism
Partnerships involving governments, civil society, and CSOs on their own also make important contributions to
shorter-term preventive counterterrorism and related efforts. For example, interaction between governments
and CSOs on the issue of small arms and light weapons (an issue that is explicitly mentioned in the Strategy) has
developed into an effective partnership over the past 15 years.
24 Similar efforts have also flourished between
government and nongovernment experts seeking to address the threat of illicit transfers of biological, chemical,
and nuclear materials to potential terrorists.
25
CSOs are also making conscious and significant contributions to measures to prevent terrorism in the
implementation and monitoring of security sector reform activities, which are linked to a state’s ability to carry out
effective law enforcement and other security-related counterterrorism measures. Some CSOs,
especially research
organizations, also foster closer, cooperative initiatives involving states and other stakeholders to improve and
raise awareness of threats and encourage collective action to address vulnerabilities. The UK Department for
International Development, for example, has noted that:
Improving civic awareness of security issues is a starting point for improving relations between
the security forces and the public, creating a national consensus on a reform programme, and
building political coalitions to sustain the process. Civil society can also play more specific roles
by facilitating dialogue, monitoring the activities of the security forces, and expressing views on
security policy as well as providing policy advice. This may be particularly useful where state
capacity is weak: the role of legislatures or other government departments in analysing security
issues, for instance, can be greatly enhanced by assistance from specialist external campaigning
groups or think tanks providing research and analytical support.
26
In addition to long-term efforts to address causes conducive to the spread of terrorism, the Strategy in its second
pillar reaffirms states’ existing UN mandated counterterrorism obligations to implement security-focused measures
to address the terrorist threat, including judicial, police, and other forms of law enforcement cooperation, and
comprehensive counterterrorism legislation.

15
Pillar II issues are therefore perhaps the most difficult area of the Strategy for civil society engagement because
states generally consider such measures (e.g., border control and combating terrorist financing) to be within their
exclusive purview. Because of sensitivities surrounding much of the security-related counterterrorism activity,
partnerships between governments and CSOs in law enforcement and other security-related fields are few and
far between.
Nevertheless, civil society engagement on this pillar is particularly valuable, as civil society participation lends
credibility to preventive counterterrorism measures and can provide a counterpoint perspective to those of
governments and inter-governmental bodies.
Unfortunately, counterterrorism measures are often implemented without consultation with CSOs. In fact, as
discussed above, there is growing concern that, as a result, civil society’s space to operate is in many cases being
reduced. In some instances, counterterrorism measures are being used to justify state repression of innocent
civilians, particularly from minorities and marginalized communities. Even when it is not feasible or prudent to
work alongside the state, CSOs have an invaluable role to play in the realm of monitoring state actions to protect
civil liberties and maintain and enhance space for a diversity of views and participation.

16
27 “The Role of Civil Society in Preventing Terrorism,” Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, Office for Democrat ic
Institutions and Human Rights, Informal Working Level Meeting, Barcelona, Spain, 14–16 March 2007.
IV IVIV IV
IV
. Measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism . Measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism. Measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism . Measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism
. Measures to build states’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism
Professional associations, international NGOs, and local CSOs are critical sources of technical expertise and can act
as independent contractors and carry out on-the-ground implementation of much counterterrorism-related capacity
building. Increasingly, CSOs are seen by many donor states and other assistance providers as independent and
reliable partners and serve as implementing agencies for much technical and other counterterrorism-related assistance.
The capacity- building efforts of CSOs and the capacity- building assistance channeled through them offer many
advantages over government-to-government assistance. For example, the political sensitivities may be fewer between
an independent CSO and a recipient government than between two national governments. CSOs, which can pull
in experts from different cultural backgrounds and linguistic expertise, are often better suited to overcoming the
culture and
language barriers that can complicate state-to-state training. CSOs are also more flexible, independent,
and quicker on their feet than governments and thus are better able to respond to the sometimes changing needs
of the recipients.
Capacity-building assistance on many counterterrorism-related matters is enhanced by bottom-up approaches,
rather than top-down strategies, and local CSOs can help build support for the capacity-building efforts of other
actors and ensure that they receive the necessary follow-up attention to ensure they are sustainable. Effective
capacity-building efforts require local ownership and a long-term commitment from both the assistance provider
and the recipient. Here, CSOs, which are often permanently based in the field, have a comparative advantage over,
for example, foreign donors or UN technical assistance providers, which tend to have a limited field presence.
Some of the most visible counterterrorism-related capacity-building assistance being undertaken by CSOs relates
to strengthening respect for human rights and the rule of law and on promoting democratic accountability.
27
Philanthropic foundations such as the Open Society Institute, the Ford Foundation, and the Heinrich Böll
Foundation provide millions of dollars a year and technical support to improving respect for human rights and
the rule of law and promoting democratic governance in countries world wide. Professional associations are
similarly working to strengthen the rule of law in countries around the world. The American Bar Association,
for example, conducts relevant rule of law programs worldwide on, among other things, anti-corruption,
criminal
law reform, human rights and conflict mitigation, and legal education reform. The International Legal Assistance
Consortium (ILAC), an umbrella organization for associations of legal and human rights experts with experience
in rebuilding justice systems, for example, works to conduct assessments of the legal and judicial systems in war-
torn countries and to implement programs to help rebuild those systems. ILAC has recently carried out
counterterrorism-specific training on behalf of the government of Sweden.
CSOs also perform an advisory function for governments. They can provide input on specific technical questions,
help guide policy with independent research, and engage directly with legislators regarding the potential impact
of planned CTMs or the actual impact of existing ones. Local CSOs can work with authorities to increase their
awareness and understanding of minority communities to assess the impact of community policing efforts and

17
28 ICPAT was launched some three years following the development of the IGAD “Draft Implementation Plan to Combat Terrorism
in the IGAD Region” and a subsequent vulnerability assessment of terrorism in the IGAD region. IGAD’s “Draft Implementation
Plan to Combat Terrorism in the IGAD Region” is available at https://www.iss.co.za/AF/RegOrg/unity_to_union/pdfs/igad/
confjun03plan.pdf.
29 Examples of the capacity-building training and other assistance ICPAT has delivered since its establishment include a one-month
counterterrorism training course designed in conjunction with EAPCCO for law enforcement officials in each IGAD member state.
The training has already been provided to 25 Ugandan and 25 Somali police officers. ICPAT has launched assessments on
interdepartmental cooperation in countering terrorism in Djibouti, Kenya, and Uganda. It has commissioned border management and
control field research on both sides of the borders in neighboring states in the region (Djibouti–Ethiopia, Kenya–Uganda, and S udan–
Kenya) and made recommendations to relevant states on steps that need to be taken to strengthen border management. ICPAT has
also started to research and compile
information on terrorism cases in the courts of IGAD states (over the past 10 years), as w ell as on
the effectiveness of laws relating to money laundering, organized crime, corruption, drugs, and arms trafficking in three state s in the
region. Working in close cooperation with UNODC’s TPB, ICPAT has organized national legislative drafting and judicial training
workshops in five of the seven IGAD states (including one in Ethiopia for Somali officials) aimed at promoting the ratification and
the implementation of the international conventions and protocols related to terrorism. “IGAD Capacity Building Programme against
Terrorism (ICPAT),” Institute for Security Studies, https://www.iss.org.za/
index.php?link_id=21&slink_id=2507&link_type=12&slink_type=12&tmpl_id=3.
improve their effectiveness, and help to combat stereotypes and prejudices that may compromise the effectiveness
of those efforts. And they can help supplement the oversight capacity of governments by monitoring security
services, conducting investigations into abuses, drafting guidelines, and scrutinizing counterterrorism legislation.
In addition to these more traditional capacity-building functions, CSOs are increasingly contributing to building
state capacity on “hard security” matters as well. The IGAD Capacity Building Program against Terrorism
(ICPAT) program, launched in June 2006, is an example of an innovative partnership between civil society (the
Pretoria-based Institute for Security Studies [ISS]) and government (the member states of IGAD and interested
donor states) on counterterrorism capacity building.
28 Funded by European and other donors and administered
by ISS, ICPAT is overseen by a steering committee made up of IGAD member states. Working closely with
partners at the regional and global level, the program focuses on capacity- and confidence-building measures in
five areas: 1) enhancing judicial measures; 2) working to promote greater inter-agency coordination on
counterterrorism within individual IGAD member states; 3) enhancing border control; 4) providing training and
sharing information and best practices; and 5) promoting strategic cooperation.
29 ICPAT member states appreciate
its technically focused apolitical work and are deeply engaged in the program.
The ICPAT model also illustrates innovative ways in which CSOs can help build the capacities of regional and
subregional organizations, which are essential mechanisms for improving counterterrorism cooperation but are
also frequently under-resourced. As is currently being done with the ICPAT in East Africa and soon to be
initiated with the Southern African Development Community, CSOs can support the work of the often
understaffed regional or subregional organization secretariat, with the ownership over the counterterrorism
program remaining with the organization and its members.

18
30 United Nations General Assembly, United Nations General Assembly Resolution 60/288, A/RES/60/288, New York, 8 September 2006,
Pillar III.
Finally CSOs can help to inform needs assessments that are critical to effective capacity building. If the assessments
are of poor quality, then the priority needs may not be addressed.
The UN Strategy recognizes that “capacity-building in all States is a core element of the global counterterrorism
effort.”
30 Although typically the purview of bilateral assistance providers and other donors, CSOs increasingly
have a role to play in helping build the capacity of states to prevent and combat terrorism across the full range of
measures outlined in the UN Strategy, from combating conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism to ensuring
respect for human rights, and increasingly even in the realm of actual security and prevention.
Ironically, one the most significant challenges to the role of civil society in counterterrorism-related capacity
building may in fact be the diminishing space afforded to them and the restrictions placed on their work, in some
cases ostensibly as part of efforts by states to combat terrorism. Although frequently seen by Western donor states
as independent and in many ways preferable partners for the provision of assistance, CSOs in many countries are
perceived as unaccountable interest groups, surrogates for external actors, and/or representing foreign interests.
As discussed in section II, some states have responded by imposing restrictions on the amount of funding domestic
CSOs can receive from abroad, which in states with few domestic sources of funding effectively cuts off this
important source of capacity-building assistance. Further, while the role of civil society in promoting respect for
human rights and the rule of law is controversial in some states, there is even greater reluctance on the part of states
to grant CSOs a role in the realm of security-related capacity building.
Lack of coordination, collaboration, and information sharing among capacity-building providers (e.g., the United
Nations, states, and CSOs) also hampers the contribution of CSOs to counterterrorism-related capacity building.
Although it may be unrealistic to bring all UN actors and CSOs together under the leadership of the United
Nations to establish more formalized cooperation in this area, at the very least increased information sharing
among assistance providers might help to reduce overlap and stimulate additional cooperation and coordination.
To improve the situation among CSOs and between CSOs and the United Nations, consideration might be given
to: 1) inviting relevant CSOs to participate on a regular basis in the work of the UN’s Rule of Law Assistance
Coordination and Resource Group; and 2) creating a database to log all the relevant Strategy-related capacity
building activities being undertaken by CSOs, which could be replicated at the regional and country level involving
a wider range of stakeholders (e.g., the United Nations and governments).
Finally, the capacity shortages of CSOs place a limit on the extent to which they can contribute to counterterrorism
capacity-building efforts. In most cases, CSOs are themselves reliant on donors (be they philanthropic foundations,
individuals, or donor states and multilateral bodies) for resources, or are themselves recipients of capacity-building
assistance. Therefore, the degree to which they can contribute to building the capacity of states to prevent terrorism
is in large part dependent on the extent to which their donors make such efforts a priority. Although the UN
Strategy is a state-centric document, with its capacity-building pillar focused on building state capacity, there
should be recognition of the importance of an empowered and developed civil society to sustained implementation
of the Strategy and the need therefore to also build civil society capacity.

19
31 Conference Recommendations, INTRAC Conference on Civil Society and Capacity Building, 2006. Available at:
https://www.intrac.org/pages/CBconference.html.
Despite these challenges, CSOs are making substantial contributions to building the capacity of states to prevent
terrorism not only in their more traditional roles as development partners and in promoting human rights and
the rule of law, but also in the realm of security and prevention. Key to maximizing their potential is raising
awareness of the contributions that CSOs can make to building states’ capacity to prevent terrorism and ensuring
that such work is given priority treatment by donors. In this regard, donor states and agencies have a particularly
important role to play, but more needs to be done to build this awareness within recipients and to promote the
space afforded to CSOs generally.
31

20
32 OSCE/ODIHR, “The Role of Civil Society in Preventing Terrorism,” ODIHR.GAL/34/07, 16 May 2007, p. 14, https://www.osce.org/
documents/odihr/2007/05/24495_en.pdf.
33 Asma Jahangir and Fateh Azzam, “Human Rights,” in Towards a Democratic Response: The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and
Terrorism, vol. III (2005), p. 29, https://www.safe-democracy.org/docs/CdM-Series-on-Terrorism-Vol-3.pdf.
34 Web site of the The Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-Terrorism, and Human Rights: https://ejp.icj.org/
article.php3?id_article=6.
V VV V
V
. Measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental . Measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental. Measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental . Measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental
. Measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law as the fundamental
basis of the fight against terrorism basis of the fight against terrorismbasis of the fight against terrorism basis of the fight against terrorism
basis of the fight against terrorism
CSOs often have a wealth of knowledge concerning the human rights situations in different countries, some of
which may be otherwise unavailable to states and international organizations. They provide critical input to the
work of relevant UN human rights bodies and help inform their findings. They can be instrumental in
strengthening respect for human rights in international and national counterterrorism frameworks and to the
establishment and effective functioning of national human rights mechanisms and institutions. As advocates,
CSOs play an important role in condemning attacks against civilians, disappearances, unlawful detentions, and
other human rights abuses that may occur under the guise of combating terrorism and can help to put into
perspective the consequences of “special” or “emergency” counterterrorism measures.
In addition to “assess[ing] the implications of national and international definitions of terrorism and build[ing] cross-
sectoral coalitions,”
32 NGOs and other civil society groups also help increase public awareness and understanding of
human rights issues in the context of waging an effective campaign against terrorism, including by undertaking
research and action at the local and international levels. By promoting the rule of law, engaging the media, sharing
best practices, and disseminating other information, they help to bring attention to human rights abuses and encourage
governments to improve their own adherence to human rights norms. As acknowledged in the “Club de Madrid
Series on Democracy and Terrorism,” “[h]uman rights organizations continue to monitor the situation on the
ground in most countries, and the information at their disposal can form a valuable database for analyzing the long-
term repercussions of momentarily devaluing respect for human rights in favour of short-term security.”
33
Independent and impartial nongovernmental human rights monitors play a critical role in ensuring that CTMs
respect human rights and the rule of law by monitoring the actions of the military, law enforcement, and other
security services, laying down guidelines, conducting investigations into alleged abuses, scrutinizing
counterterrorism legislation, and generating awareness of unlawful practices and other human rights and Strategy-
related issues. CSOs also can and do play an important role in promoting the work of human rights defenders and
in helping to protect them. Their role is even more important in weak states and areas where the credibility and
impartiality of formal monitoring mechanisms may be in doubt.
Civil society actors can articulate how respect for human rights and the rule of law is an essential part of any
effective strategy to address the complex terrorist threat and its different forms and manifestations. For example,
in 2005, the International Commission of Jurists launched the Eminent Jurists’ Panel on Terrorism, Counter-
Terrorism, and Human Rights “to consider the nature of today’s human rights threats and the impact of new and
old counterterrorism measures on human rights. The [eight-member] Panel is also exploring how considered
counter-terrorism measures and policies can produce effective results while also assuring the necessary respect
for human rights and the rule of law.”
34

21
35 Keynote Address, Symposium on Advancing the Implementation of the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy,
Vienna, 17–18 May 2007.
36 Mary Kaldor and Miguel Darcy, “Civil Society,” in Towards a Democratic Response: The Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and
Terrorism, vol. III (2005), p. 33, https://www.safe-democracy.org/docs/CdM-Series-on-Terrorism-Vol-3.pdf.
37 OSCE/ODIHR, “Role of Civil Society in Preventing Terrorism,” p. 8. This meeting also produced a set of recommendations aimed
at states, the OSCE, and civil society on how to strengthen the role of civil society and NGOs in preventing terrorism.
38 The general closure of NGOs in Uzbekistan after the massacre in Andijan in 2005 is an example. For a discussion of the treatment of
human rights defenders in Uzbekistan, see, e.g., HRW, “Under Siege and Working for Justice: Human Rights Defenders in
Uzbekistan,” April 2007, https://hrw.org/campaigns/uzbekistan/portraits_0407.pdf.
Finally, CSOs can and in many cases do provide a voice for victims of terrorism and highlight the fact that
terrorism is itself one of the most fundamental violations of human rights. Many CSOs, such as Human Rights
Watch, have adopted an approach that highlights both the human rights impact of terrorism, including on its
victims, as well as the human rights implications of the counterterrorism policies of governments.
Through the Strategy, all UN member states have committed to adopting measures to ensure respect for human
rights and the rule of law as the fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism. They further resolve to ensure
that any measures taken to counter terrorism comply with their obligations under international law, in particular
human rights law, refugee law, and international humanitarian law. One of the Strategy’s achievements is that it
prioritizes “respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the fundamental basis for the fight against
terrorism.” As Sweden’s counterterrorism ambassador has stated, “[h]uman rights law is, in effect, key to all
counterterrorism…. If we do not take this into account in our daily efforts to counter terrorism, we will become
counterproductive.”
35 The challenge is finding ways to ensure that this human rights-based approach, which is
reflected in the Strategy, is translated into action at the global, regional, and national levels. CSOs can contribute in
a number of ways to ensuring that it is. Human rights NGOs and civil society can make a valuable contribution by
engaging in dialogue with states, the United Nations, and other intergovernmental bodies. Active engagement by
the academic and research communities with expertise in human rights can help infuse fresh ideas into formal
governmental or intergovernmental settings.
Challenges to the work of human rights-related civil society and NGOs at the national level, however, are serious.
As the “Club de Madrid Series on Democracy and Terrorism” notes, for example, “[H]uman rights groups and
their allies have not been able to disseminate their point of view effectively and, in some countries, they have come
under sharp attack. Yet at no other time has the monitoring function of human rights groups been so indispensable
to the democratic process, as well as in ensuring accountable and transparent governance.”
36 In some cases, human
rights activists have been depicted by state authorities as enablers and defenders of terrorists. Consequently,
harassment and the disruption of fundraising, particularly at the local level, has ironically placed human rights
defenders in physical danger and suppressed their rights to affect policies through nonviolent and democratic
means. This point was reinforced at a March 2007 OSCE/ODIHR meeting on the role of civil society in countering
terrorism involving representatives from some 30 civil society organizations.
37 International civil society groups
may be less vulnerable to intimidation by governments, and participation with these groups may afford domestic
organizations some degree of protection. CSOs in many countries are under heavy scrutiny from the states in
which they work.
38 Unlike their national or local counterparts, however, international CSOs can continue to
work on an issue even if they are shuttered in a country because they have the ability to operate outside the country
in question. All civil society actors, however, face challenges in getting access to information in matters that even

22
39 Ibid., para. 21.
in the most democratic of countries are often viewed as highly sensitive issues of national security. These challenges
are exacerbated in countries where there is little political pluralism and where civil society structures are weak.
39
The challenges that CSOs face at the national level engaging with and seeking to modify the behavior of states with
poor human rights records are mirrored at the international level, where engagement with international and
regional bodies is complicated by the extent to which intergovernmental bodies include such states. International
and regional bodies and initiatives nevertheless provide important fora for pressuring states to improve their
human rights records in relation to counterterrorism. For example, CSOs have had considerable success in
working with international and regional human rights mechanisms to get them to speak out against the use of
diplomatic assurances by states as a safeguard against torture. While engaging with such bodies, CSOs can and
must remain independent, impartial, and willing to be critical of all governments that abuse human rights in the
name of countering terrorism, including the powerful.
CSOs have been somewhat more successful in their efforts to engage with the human rights elements of the UN
system than in engaging other Strategy-related parts of the United Nations. In fact CSOs have built strong
relationships with and help to inform the work of many of the key human rights elements in the UN system
such as the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Council, and the UN Special
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering
terrorism. This engagement could be viewed as a model for CSO engagement with other parts of the United
Nations on Strategy issues.
Despite this engagement and important contributions from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights,
there has been some lack of leadership on the importance of respecting human rights while countering terrorism.
The last UN secretary-general, Kofi Annan, made this one of his signature issues. However, his successor has been
largely silent on an issue which merits more attention from the senior leadership within the UN system.
Although it may not be their responsibility and they have so far proven reluctant to do so, human rights groups are
also well positioned to offer constructive human rights-based alternatives for counterterrorism policymakers.
The Strategy, which combines both preventive counterterrorism measures with the imperative of respecting
human rights, could provide a useful framework for human rights and security-focused CSOs to join together to
develop such alternatives.

23
VI. The UN system’ VI. The UN system’VI. The UN system’ VI. The UN system’
VI. The UN system’
s engagement with CSOs on the UN Strategy s engagement with CSOs on the UN Strategys engagement with CSOs on the UN Strategy s engagement with CSOs on the UN Strategy
s engagement with CSOs on the UN Strategy
As the discussion in Sections II-V shows, CSOs can contribute to the implementation of the UN Strategy (and
counterterrorism mandates more generally) in a variety of ways. This underscores the importance of developing
effective, balanced partnerships with different elements of the UN system. Yet because parts of the system are
accountable to states, many of which are ambivalent if not outright hostile to civil society, the system is frequently
of two minds on the notion of engagement with civil society: on the one hand lauding the role of civil society, but
obstructed from pursuing any meaningful engagement on the other.
As a result, although CSOs have managed to build strong relationships with many of the relevant UN human
rights bodies and mechanisms as well as UNDP, there has historically been limited engagement between the
United Nations and the more traditional UN counterterrorism actors within the UN system, and this has remai
ned
the case since the Strategy was adopted in September 2006.
For example, neither the Security Council’s CTC/CTED nor its Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions Committee and
Monitoring Team have engaged with local NGOs and other civil society groups, in part because of the general
reluctance of some Council members to involve non-state actors in what they perceive as state-focused activities
and the difficulties in choosing which non-state actors to engage with in a particular country or region. Apart
from international human rights CSOs such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, which continue
to press the Council to ensure its counterterrorism measures are consistent with and implemented in conformity
with international human rights norms, CSOs have generally not sought to lobby or otherwise engage with these
Council mechanisms.
In addition, UNODC’s TPB, which assists countries with the drafting and implementation of their
counterterrorism legal framework, often via national and regional training workshops, has made few attempts to
involve either international or local CSOs in its work, despite the technical expertise that some CSOs have to offer
in this field, as mentioned
in Section IV.
The traditional UN counterterrorism actors need to do a better job of sharing information with and otherwise
reaching out to civil society, including by considering information provided by respected NGOs as they develop
strategies for furthering implementation of their respective UN mandates and consulting with local civil society
groups as they seek to understand the environment in which they are assessing compliance with UN norms or
providing assistance to implement them. For example, CSOs can often provide useful information on why
national counterterrorism legislation might be stalled in parliament or on abuses being committed by the police
and other government officials while implementing counterterrorism measures.
In contrast to the general reluctance of UNODC’s TPB, the CTC/CTED, and the Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions
Committee and its Monitoring Team to engage with NGOs and other civil society actors, however, the 1540
Committee and its group of experts have succeeded in reaching out to some. Avoiding what would likely have
been protracted debates among the 15 members of the Committee over which ones to engage with and on what
issues, the Committee chairman asked UNODA to convene a meeting in July 2007 with the participation of
several NGOs
and in cooperation with the Committee. The NGOs invited included only those with well-
established programs that directly foster the implementation of Resolution 1540 by states, such as through training
programs, sharing expertise, providing funding, or conducting education and awareness-raising activities. The

24
40 Report from the meeting of the 1540 Committee on the Role of NGOs, New York, 12 July 2007 [On file with Center on Global
Counterterrorism Cooperation]. Also, on the ground, the Monterrey Institute’s Center for Nonproliferation Studies convened a
workshop in Central Asia to raise awareness among states in the region of the technical requirements for implementing Resolution
1540.
41 Report of the Secretary-General: United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy: Activities of the United Nations System in
Implementing the Strategy, 7 July 2008, UN Doc. A/62/998, para. 92.
purpose of the meeting was to examine and receive feedback on how NGOs can help to contribute to the
implementation of the resolution.
40
While the 1540 Committee’s successful efforts to engage with NGOs could serve as a model for other parts of the
UN system, this situation is somewhat unique. In the end, given the technical focus of both the resolution at issue
and the NGOs involved, as well as the long-standing involvement and contributions of NGOs in the non-
proliferation field, which pre-date the adoption of Resolution 1540, it may prove difficult to transfer some of the
lessons learned here to other Strategy-related fields.
Nevertheless, the United Nations needs to find ways to engage with respected NGOs and other civil society
groups on a broad range of Strategy issues, as two of the keys to the Strategy’s success will be exporting it from New
York to different regions around the world, down to the local level, and drawing on the creativity, energy, and
expertise of civil society groups and NGOs to develop innovative and effective implementation plans and programs.
Yet, simply inviting CSOs to contribute to UN efforts is not sufficient, as this
is unlikely to attract broad interest
from CSOs, many of whom are already leery of being co-opted to further government agendas.
Instead, UN agencies and bodies need to proactively reach out to civil society groups and determine what they are doing
on the ground, what their interests are, and how the United Nations can support those efforts. Among other things,
therefore, the Task Force should establish an informal mechanism for engaging with NGOs and civil society groups
from different regions to help raise awareness of the Strategy, learn more about what their concerns and interests are
and how the United Nations can assist in addressing them, and encourage them to play leading roles in their
respective communities and regions in promoting the virtues of the Strategy. To launch this outreach effort, the Task
Force should convene a meeting to highlight the role of CSOs in the implementation of the Strategy, providing an
opportunity for CSOs from different regions to share experiences and show member states the diversity of ways in
which CSOs can contribute, both directly and indirectly, to the implementation of the UN Strategy.
The first report of the secretary-general on the role of the UN system in implementing the UN Strategy, released in
July 2008, notes that requests for the
Task Force to become more engaged with civil society on the implementation of
the Strategy have increased and that “civil society can provide a resource that has not been tapped by the United
Nations system to its greatest advantage.”
41 The report goes on to say that “the United Nations system, through the
Task Force, if staffed and resourced to do so, could provide a strategic interface with … civil society on the Strategy.”
If the Task Force is able to garner the necessary staff and resources, there are precedents from which it could draw
as it considers how best to tackle this important, although politically sensitive, issue. For example, the United
Nations has succeeded in reaching out to CSOs in the context of its anticorruption work, including by involving
them in its International Group for Anti-Corruption Coordination, which attempts to coordinate the
anticorruption efforts of donors, multilateral anticorruption enforcement officials, and NGOs to help facilitate

25
42 For information regarding the United Nations’ anticorruption awareness-raising activities, see https://www.unodc.org/unodc.org/
unodc/en/corruption/index.html.
43 See https://www.icbl.org/tools/faq/campaign/what_is_icbl.
44 “UNDP and civil society organizations,” https://www.undp.org/partners/cso.
45 For more information on the UNDP advisory committee see https://www.undp.org/partners/cso.
their work by avoiding duplication of efforts and leveraging resources. 42 On the issue of small arms and light
weapons, the United Nations has worked closely with the International Action Network on Small Arms, whose
members have been invited to participate in the UN Open-Ended Working Group meetings on Tracing Illicit Small
Arms and Light Weapons. This partnership has helped to sustain awareness and action on the issue. In addition, both
international and local NGOs and civil society groups played pivotal roles in lobbying the United Nations and its
member states on issues surrounding the negotiation of the Mine Ban Treaty and the Rome Statute of the International
Criminal Court. These groups continue to play active roles on monitoring the implementation of these agreements.
For example, the International Campaign to Ban Land Mines is a network of more than 1,400 NGOs in 90 countries
working locally, nationally, and internationally to eradicate anti-personnel mines. With a diverse membership that
includes human rights, humanitarian, children, peace, disability, veterans’, medical, humanitarian, mine action,
development, arms control, religious, environmental, and women’s groups, it offers an example of the broad-based,
multidisciplinary coalition that those interested in promoting a more holistic, coordinated response to the global
terrorist threat, which safeguards human rights and the rights of victims, might wish to replicate.
43
The need to reach out to civil society applies not only to the UN’s traditional counterterrorism actors, but to
UNDP, which has a network of CSO partners and the most experience engaging with civil society. As the UN
global development network, UNDP engages with CSOs at all levels to promote the MDGs, which receive
explicit mention in the Strategy, and recognizes that “substantive partnership with CSOs is of greater strategic
importance than ever given the integral role of civil society actors in development”
44 and has civil society advisers
placed in its local and regional offices. It has also established a CSO advisory committee composed of civil society
leaders from around the world to provide advice to senior management on program and policy directions,
advocacy efforts, and strategic CSO/UNDP initiatives and activities.
45
Despite the significant UNDP engagement with CSOs in the context of promoting its development agenda and
the important contribution that UNDP, particularly through its rule of law and access to justice program, and its
field presence in over 160 countries, can make to the implementation of the Strategy, there is a continuing reluctance
within UNDP to promote the implementation of the UN Strategy or actively participate in the Task Force. So
long as this continues, it will be difficult for the Task Force to leverage any UNDP expertise, resources, or build
on the partnerships it has with local CSOs around the world. Finding ways to get UNDP, and the wider development
community, to be less reflexively “anti-counterterrorism” is crucial not only to deepening the engagement between
the Task Force and CSOs, but also to encouraging the United Nations to become more active at the country level,
where UNDP is the most prevalent actor and where CSOs are most active.
In addition, if UNDP were to become more engaged with the Task Force and in promoting the Strategy—and if
there were more collaboration and coordination between UN’s rule of law machinery and the Task Force—there
would likely be increased opportunities to use the often more politically palatable rule of law framework through
which to pursue cooperation on many Strategy-related issues, and to engage CSOs. Given the political sensitivi-
ties surrounding the use of the “counterterrorism” label, such an approach may prove more fruitful. The newly
established Rule of Law Assistance Coordination and Resource Group in the Secretariat, which gathered a
number of CSOs involved in legal capacity building in 2007 as part of an effort to enhance cooperation and

26
information sharing among the many UN actors and CSOs involved in this area was a promising start, but
unfortunately turned out to be a one-off meeting, and there have been limited further attempts to engage with
CSOs on this issue.
The way that the United Nations has organized itself has further complicated things, with separate coordinating task
forces within the Secretariat for the rule of law, security sector reform, and counterterrorism. While there is limited
coordination and cooperation between the first two, there is none involving the third. This silo approach within the
United Nations on this set of interrelated issues has limited information sharing both within the United Nations and
between the United Nations and outside actors. It also has led to some confusion from those CSOs who see the issues
as inextricably linked and may better understand the value of framing Strategy-related capacity building activities in
the context of promoting the rule of law and security sector reform, rather than counterterrorism.
Despite the promise that greater UNDP involvement offers, the resistance within the organization to engaging on
the Strategy and
the Task Force has only increased in the aftermath of the recent killings of UNDP staff in Algeria
and Somalia. In addition, the Task Force is unlikely to be provided the resources or staff to allow it to become a
“strategic interface” with civil society as proposed in the secretary-general’s July 2008 report. This situation
underscores the importance of getting CSOs to seize the initiative and become more proactive in reaching out to
the UN system on issues related to the implementation of the Strategy.
For example, CSOs could do more to make their views heard at the United Nations in New York and to try to
influence the implementation of the Strategy. This could involve demonstrating their usefulness to states and the
United Nations; educating and informing sympathetic governments to take up the CSO cause at the United
Nations; and approaching the Task Force Secretariat and the different Task Force working groups expressing
their desire to be engaged in a constructive dialogue with states and UN officials on
Strategy issues.
To facilitate the interface between CSOs and the Task Force, an appropriate CSO could serve as a link among the
range of CSOs working on discrete aspects of the Strategy (often without knowing it) and between them and the
Task Force, serving as a CSO/Strategy information hub.
In addition, CSOs could take another important step toward greater interaction with the United Nations on the
breadth of Strategy issues by mapping the various entry points for engagement with the UN system on issues
related to the Strategy and determine where and which CSOs may have a comparative advantage and/or particular
interest in engagement and could take the lead.

27
46 For more information on the ARNTACT, see https://www.iss.co.za/dynamic/administration/file_manager/file_links/
CAIROTERROREP.PDF?link_id=32&slink_id=4540&link_type=12&slink_type=13&tmpl_id=3.
Conclusion: Further ideas for deepening UN–CSO engagement on UN Strategy implementation Conclusion: Further ideas for deepening UN–CSO engagement on UN Strategy implementationConclusion: Further ideas for deepening UN–CSO engagement on UN Strategy implementation Conclusion: Further ideas for deepening UN–CSO engagement on UN Strategy implementation
Conclusion: Further ideas for deepening UN–CSO engagement on UN Strategy implementation
As highlighted in this report, CSOs are already doing a lot and can do more to contribute to implementation of the
UN Strategy. However, the challenges to building the necessary trust between individual states and their respective
civil societies to develop state–CSO partnerships to facilitate further contributions are significant. In addition,
there are a number of hurdles to overcome in building partnerships between CSOs and the United Nations itself
on Strategy-related issues. For example, the lack of a common definition of terrorism leaves CSOs without a
shared understanding of the problem and sows confusion regarding the limits of their operations and interactions.
Second, the lack of transparency and information-sharing by the United Nations leaves civil society unsure of
what it is signing up to support and without a sense of how it is in its interest to do so. Third, the continuing
problem of serious human rights violations being perpetrated by some states in the name of counterterrorism
contaminates the larger effort and makes some groups reluctant to align themselves with the UN endeavor.
Fourth, civil society does not speak with one voice, but rather reflects a range of concerns and interests, which
makes targeting civil society in a framework as broad as the Strategy a particular challenge. Encouraging a
division of labor among CSOs with comparative advantages could help to enhance implementation. It is important
to note that diversity and independence of action is a valuable component of good governance that should be
strengthened. Related to this, as noted above, most groups are not working under a “counterterrorism” label and
may see little benefit to being connected with a UN counterterrorism framework. Thus, more work is needed to
articulate what is meant by “counterterrorism” and how the Strategy provides an international framework to
push existing advocacy and other work.
In addition to identifying ways in which these challenges can be addressed, among the goals of this report has been
to identify how the Task Force, its constituent entities, and CSOs can work together to further both the work of
CSOs, as well as the implementation of the UN Strategy. In general, the United Nations cannot passively expect
civil society engagement on Strategy-related issues; it needs to be more proactive in raising awareness of the
Strategy among civil society groups and develop a channel for engagement with them. To get the ball moving in
the right direction, states should seek to ensure that the Task Force has the necessary resources to allow it to
appoint a focal point for such engagement.
As noted, given the diversity of interests, perspectives, and even definitions of “civil society” in different parts of the
world, and the challenges this diversity presents the United Nations, it will also be important for interested CSOs to
reach out to the United Nations on these issues. To this end, in addition to ideas enumerated in Section VI, consideration
could be given to establishing local civil society networks, perhaps using the African Research Network on Terrorism
and Counter-Terrorism (ARNTACT)
46 as a model, and/or focal points on Strategy implementation or using existing
appropriate networks in regions. In addition, thought could be given to the creation of an on-line directory of
ongoing civil society activity around the world that is relevant to the Strategy. Such a tool could prove useful not only
in enhancing the sharing of information and experiences of CSOs in the context of counterterrorism, but also in
encouraging collaboration among CSOs within and across regions on Strategy-related work.
Consideration could also be given to the development of a “Track II” process to provide the Task Force with
outside, expert perspectives on a variety of Strategy issues and help foster interaction among academic and research

28
institutions and CSOs from different regions, as well as key UN and UN member-state officials. In addition to
engaging a broad range of civil society actors in promoting the Strategy, such a process could help foster the
development of partnerships and coalitions of governments, multilateral institutions, NGOs, and other parts of
civil society to enable them to work together better on the wide range of Strategy issues.
At the end of the day, however, a prerequisite to deepening UN–CSO engagement on the implementation of the
UN Strategy may be addressing the tension between states and CSOs that too often exists in the context of fighting
terrorism more generally. As a member-state organization, it may be unrealistic to expect the United Nations to
make too much progress in this area unless this tension is eased. To this end, governments need to recognize the
important contributions that CSOs of different shapes and sizes can make in strengthening both security and
governance; seek to create a supportive environment for a strong and independent civil society; engage in a
dialogue with civil society on issues related to the Strategy; and allocate resources and adopt laws to protect the
space afforded to CSOs. The United Nations should generally work to improve confidence among states,
intergovernmental bodies, and civil society and should encourage states to expand the space for CSOs to operate.
It could even promote benchmarks for civil society, freedom of association, and access to information, all of which
are essential to a well functioning civil society.

29
Recommendations RecommendationsRecommendations Recommendations
Recommendations
1.
Raise awareness
a. Awareness of the UN Strategy among CSOs around the world needs to be raised. CSOs should be made
more aware of how their ongoing work contributes to implementing the Strategy and to countering
terrorism more broadly.
b. Governments need to be made more aware of the different ways in which CSOs can contribute to the
implementation of the Strategy, beyond simply acting as service providers.
2.
Avoid labeling: The counterterrorism label should not unnecessarily be placed on the ongoing work of
CSOs that is contributing to the implementation of the Strategy. Instead, CSOs should continue with this
important work and communicate their progress to relevant UN Task Force members, without connecting it
to or labeling it “counterterrorism.”
3.
Identify and articulate what the UN Strategy offers CSOs: More clearly articulating what the Strategy
offers CSOs in return for their engagement is a prerequisite to getting CSOs to become more involved in
supporting the implementation of the Strategy.
4.
Provide CSOs space: States need to provide CSOs with sufficient space to allow them to help build local
support for the UN Strategy. At the same time, CSOs should not wait for governments to create this space for
them, but engage governments in dialogue to enable both parties to explain their positions and explore the
benefits of working more closely together.
5.
Establish local civil society networks: Consideration should be given to establishing local civil society
networks and/or focal points on Strategy implementation or using existing appropriate networks in regions.
The Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation could serve as a link among CSOs contributing to the
UN Strategy and between them and the Task Force, serving as a CSO/Strategy information hub for CSOs
working on different aspects of the Strategy.
6.
Develop an on-line directory of Strategy-relevant CSO activity: The Center could develop an on-line
directory of ongoing civil society activity around the world relevant to the Strategy, which could be useful for
enhancing the sharing of information and experiences of CSOs in the context of counterterrorism and in
encouraging collaboration among CSOs within and across regions on Strategy-related work.
7.
Convene the wide range of government and nongovernment stakeholders to develop Strategy
implementation plans: CSOs should convene the wide range of stakeholders at the national, subregional,
and/or regional levels to facilitate the development of comprehensive Strategy implementation action plans.
8.
Address the tension between governments and CSOs in the context of fighting terrorism.To this
end, governments should:
a. Officially recognize the important role
that civil society plays in supporting and building both security
and good governance;
b. Seek to create a supportive environment for a strong and independent civil society;
c. Engage in a dialogue with civil society on issues related to the implementation of the UN Strategy;

30
d. Ensure that efforts to establish “whole of government approaches to counterterrorism also include avenues
for regular interaction and dialogue with CSOs; and/or
e. Allocate resources and adopt laws protecting CSOs’ space.
9.
Pay greater attention to the impact of counterterrorism measures on CSOs: Pay greater attention to the impact of counterterrorism measures on CSOs:Pay greater attention to the impact of counterterrorism measures on CSOs: Pay greater attention to the impact of counterterrorism measures on CSOs:
Pay greater attention to the impact of counterterrorism measures on CSOs:
a. Government and nongovernment funders should pay greater attention to the impact of counterterrorism
measures on CSOs in those countries where they are funding CSO projects. For example, governments
should include an assessment of the impact of CTMs in the relevant country when they review CSO
project proposals.
b. Impact of CTMs on CSOs should be factored into the project monitoring.
c. More broadly, the criteria by which the United Nations and other relevant actors evaluate each state’s
implementation of the Strategy should include the extent to which CTMs are having a negative impact on
the ability of CSOs to operate in a particular state.
d. Governments should engage in dialogue with CSOs on the rationale and implementation of laws that
could have an impact on CSOs and allow CSOs to register their concerns about those laws.
e. The criteria by which the United Nations and other relevant actors evaluate each member state’s
implementation of the Strategy should include the extent to which CTMs are having a negative impact on
civil society in that state. For example, the CTC/CTED should ensure that legislation concerning CSOs
conforms with international human rights standards so that independent and informed civil society is
strengthened and can contribute to the implementation of the Strategy.
10.
Encourage CSO efforts to counter the distortion of religion being propagated by terrorism, Encourage CSO efforts to counter the distortion of religion being propagated by terrorism, Encourage CSO efforts to counter the distortion of religion being propagated by terrorism, Encourage CSO efforts to counter the distortion of religion being propagated by terrorism,
Encourage CSO efforts to counter the distortion of religion being propagated by terrorism, as it
will be detrimental to the actual task of countering terrorism if only religious extremists are able to “connect”
terrorism with religion (by using religion to justify their acts). Thus, the United Nations, member states, and
CSOs should acknowledge and discredit such “connections” between religion and terrorism, rather than
pretending they do not exist.
11.
Maximize the influence of CSOs Maximize the influence of CSOs Maximize the influence of CSOs Maximize the influence of CSOs
Maximize the influence of CSOs
on the implementation of the UN Strategy on the implementation of the UN Strategyon the implementation of the UN Strategy on the implementation of the UN Strategy
on the implementation of the UN Strategy. CSOs should, among
other things,
a. Bring their work to the attention of the United Nations and demonstrate their usefulness in the field;
b. Engage with and educate governments they know are sympathetic to their cause, i.e., contributing to the
implementation of the Strategy; and
c. Deepen their engagement with the UN Secretariat and member states in New York, including for the
purpose of ensuring that New York is fully aware of the contributions CSOs of different stripes are
making to the implementation of the Strategy and their desire to be engaged in a constructive dialogue with
states and UN
officials on Strategy issues.
12.
Engage CSOs based on their local interests and concerns Engage CSOs based on their local interests and concernsEngage CSOs based on their local interests and concerns Engage CSOs based on their local interests and concerns
Engage CSOs based on their local interests and concerns, which in many cases may mean approaching
the issues covered in the Strategy through the lens of transnational crime, rule of law, or good governance
rather than counterterrorism per se.
13.
The United Nations should establish benchmarks for civil society freedom and work to ensure The United Nations should establish benchmarks for civil society freedom and work to ensureThe United Nations should establish benchmarks for civil society freedom and work to ensure The United Nations should establish benchmarks for civil society freedom and work to ensure
The United Nations should establish benchmarks for civil society freedom and work to ensure
freedom of association and access to information, which are essential to a well functioning civil society freedom of association and access to information, which are essential to a well functioning civil societyfreedom of association and access to information, which are essential to a well functioning civil
society freedom of association and access to information, which are essential to a well functioning civil society
freedom of association and access to information, which are essential to a well functioning civil society.

31
14.
Outsource technical assistance and other capacity-building work to CSOs more regularly Outsource technical assistance and other capacity-building work to CSOs more regularlyOutsource technical assistance and other capacity-building work to CSOs more regularly Outsource technical assistance and other capacity-building work to CSOs more regularly
Outsource technical assistance and other capacity-building work to CSOs more regularly, as CSOs
can contribute to building the capacities of states, regional and subregional organizations, and civil society itself.
15.
Build the capacities of civil society Build the capacities of civil societyBuild the capacities of civil society Build the capacities of civil society
Build the capacities of civil society
and empower it– and empower it–and empower it– and empower it–
and empower it–something that is not included in the UN Strategy,
with its state-centric focus. CSOs should highlight this gap and explain the importance of an empowered and
developed civil society to sustained implementation of the Strategy.
16.
Carry out counterterrorism capacity-building initiatives where possible within the more politically Carry out counterterrorism capacity-building initiatives where possible within the more politically Carry out counterterrorism capacity-building initiatives where possible within the more politically Carry out counterterrorism capacity-building initiatives where possible within the more politically
Carry out counterterrorism capacity-building initiatives where possible within the more politically
palatable “rule of law” framework. palatable “rule of law” framework.palatable “rule of law” framework. palatable “rule of law” framework.
palatable “rule of law” framework.
17.
CSOs should bring to the attention of the United Nations the advantages of looking at CSOs should bring to the attention of the United Nations the advantages of looking atCSOs should bring to the attention of the United Nations the advantages of looking at CSOs should bring to the attention of the United Nations the advantages of looking at
CSOs should bring to the attention of the United Nations the advantages of looking at
counterterrorism, rule of law counterterrorism, rule of lawcounterterrorism, rule of law counterterrorism, rule of law
counterterrorism, rule of law
, and security sector reform issues, which are addressed in separate silos , and security sector reform issues, which are addressed in separate silos, and security sector reform issues, which are addressed in separate silos , and security sector reform issues, which are addressed in separate silos
, and security sector reform issues, which are addressed in separate silos
within the United Nations, in a cross-cutting manner and design capacity-building programs to within the United Nations, in a cross-cutting manner and design capacity-building programs towithin the United Nations, in a cross-cutting manner and design capacity-building programs to within the United Nations, in a cross-cutting manner and design capacity-building programs to
within the United Nations, in a cross-cutting manner and design capacity-building programs to
maximize the synergies among them. maximize the synergies among them.maximize the synergies among them. maximize the synergies among them.
maximize the synergies among them.
18.
Coordination and collaboration among capacity-building providers, including the United Nations Coordination and collaboration among capacity-building providers, including the United NationsCoordination and collaboration among capacity-building providers, including the United Nations Coordination and collaboration among capacity-building providers, including the United Nations
Coordination and collaboration among capacity-building providers, including the United Nations
and CSOs, needs to be improved. and CSOs, needs to be improved.and CSOs, needs to be improved. and CSOs, needs to be improved.
and CSOs, needs to be improved. Steps that should be taken include:
a. Inviting relevant CSOs to participate on a regular basis in the work of the United
Nations’ Rule of Law Assistance Coordination and Resource Group; and/or
b. Creating a database to log all the relevant Strategy-related capacity-building activities being undertaken
by CSOs—this could be replicated at the regional and country level involving a wider range of stakeholders
(e.g., the United Nations and governments).
19.
Gain a better understanding of the diversity of ways in which CSOs can contribute to building Gain a better understanding of the diversity of ways in which CSOs can contribute to buildingGain a better understanding of the diversity of ways in which CSOs can contribute to building Gain a better understanding of the diversity of ways in which CSOs can contribute to building
Gain a better understanding of the diversity of ways in which CSOs can contribute to building
capacities
to implement the Strategy and, more broadly capacities to implement the Strategy and, more broadlycapacities to implement the Strategy and, more broadly capacities to implement the Strategy and, more broadly
capacities to implement the Strategy and, more broadly
, to combat terrorism. , to combat terrorism., to combat terrorism. , to combat terrorism.
, to combat terrorism.
a. CSOs should map out what they are doing that contributes to implementation of the UN Strategy and
provide concrete examples of civil society’s contributions to Strategy implementation; and/or
b. The United Nations should offer more opportunities for CSOs to show how they can contribute, both
directly and indirectly, to the implementation of the UN Strategy.
20.
Invite CSOs to contribute to UN assessments of national Strategy implementation efforts, to take
Invite CSOs to contribute to UN assessments of national Strategy implementation efforts, to take Invite CSOs to contribute to UN assessments of national Strategy implementation efforts, to take Invite CSOs to contribute to UN assessments of national Strategy implementation efforts, to take
Invite CSOs to contribute to UN assessments of national Strategy implementation efforts, to take
advantage of their technical expertise and understanding of the local context in which states are advantage of their technical expertise and understanding of the local context in which states areadvantage of their technical expertise and understanding of the local context in which states are advantage of their technical expertise and understanding of the local context in which states are
advantage of their technical expertise and understanding of the local context in which states are
seeking to implement the Strategy seeking to implement the Strategyseeking to implement the Strategy seeking to implement the Strategy
seeking to implement the Strategy
. .. .
. In addition to or in lieu of this, CSOs should undertake their own
assessments, which can more easily cut across all four of the Strategy’s pillars than the UN assessments carried
out within often narrow and rigid mandates.
21.
CSOs should remain independent, impartial, and willing to be critical of all governments that CSOs should remain independent, impartial, and willing to be critical of all governments thatCSOs should remain independent, impartial, and willing to be critical of all governments that CSOs should remain independent, impartial, and willing to be critical of all governments that
CSOs should remain independent, impartial, and willing to be critical of all governments that
abuse human rights and ensure that they highlight and promote a human rights-based approach to abuse human rights and ensure that they highlight and promote a human rights-based approach toabuse human rights and ensure that they highlight and promote a human rights-based approach to abuse human rights and ensure that they highlight and promote a human rights-based approach to
abuse human rights and ensure that they highlight and promote a human rights-based approach to
Strategy implementation that emphasizes accountability and empowerment. Strategy implementation that emphasizes accountability and empowerment.Strategy implementation that emphasizes accountability and empowerment. Strategy implementation that emphasizes accountability and empowerment.
Strategy implementation that emphasizes accountability and empowerment.
22.
Use the Strategy as a hook for human rights and security-focused CSOs to join together to develop Use the Strategy as a hook for human rights and security-focused CSOs to join together to developUse the Strategy as a hook for human rights and security-focused CSOs to join together to develop Use the Strategy as a hook for human rights and security-focused CSOs to join together to develop
Use the Strategy as a hook for human rights and security-focused CSOs to join together to develop
and promote constructive policy alternatives in situations where the existing counterterrorism policy and promote constructive policy alternatives in situations where the existing counterterrorism policyand promote constructive policy alternatives in situations where the existing counterterrorism policy and promote constructive policy alternatives in situations where the existing counterterrorism policy
and promote constructive policy alternatives in situations where the existing counterterrorism policy
contravenes international human rights norms. contravenes international human rights norms.contravenes international human rights norms. contravenes international human rights norms.
contravenes international human rights norms.
23.
Stimulate more interaction between the United Nations and CSOs on the implementation of the Stimulate more interaction between the United Nations and CSOs on the implementation of theStimulate more interaction between the United Nations and CSOs on the implementation of the Stimulate more interaction between the United Nations and CSOs on the implementation of the
Stimulate more interaction between the United Nations and CSOs on the implementation of the
UN Strategy UN StrategyUN Strategy UN Strategy
UN Strategy
. .. .
. For example,

32
a. UN agencies and bodies need to proactively reach out to civil society groups, determine what they are
doing on the ground relevant to the Strategy, and how they can support those efforts.
b. The Task Force should establish an informal mechanism for engaging with NGOs and civil society
groups from different regions to help raise awareness of the Strategy, learn more about their concerns
and interests and how the United Nations can assist in addressing them, and encourage them to play
leading roles in their respective communities and regions in promoting the virtues of the Strategy.
c. The secretary-general should establish a CSO advisory committee to provide input to the Task Force on
Strategy issues.
d. The Task Force should be provided with the resources necessary to allow it to engage systematically with
CSOs, both from the UN in New York and in the field.
e. The Security Council’s counterterrorism bodies and UNODC’s TPB should share more information
with and otherwise reach out to civil society.
f. CSOs should take steps to engage with the UN system on all areas of the Strategy. For example,
i. CSOs should map the various entry points for engagement with the United Nations (e.g., the
Human Rights Council, the Counter-Terrorism Committee, etc.) and determine where certain groups
may have a comparative advantage and/or a particular interest in engagement and could take the lead;
ii. CSOs should identify focal points within regions or on discrete Strategy issues, such as conflict
resolution, to raise awareness of the Strategy among their partners and networks. These focal points
could also be useful points of contact for CSOs to communicate with the Task Force and share
information with relevant Task Force workgroups; and/or
iii. Consideration could also be given to the development of a “Track II” process to provide the Task
Force with outside, expert perspectives on a variety of Strategy issues and help foster interaction
among academic and research institutions and CSOs from different regions, as well as key UN and
UN member-state officials.
24.
UN member states, in particular those on UNDP’ UN member states, in particular those on UNDP’UN member states, in particular those on UNDP’ UN member states, in particular those on UNDP’
UN member states, in particular those on UNDP’
s Executive Board, should call for that s Executive Board, should call for thats Executive Board, should call for that s Executive Board, should call for that
s Executive Board, should call for that
organization to engage fully with the T organization to engage fully with the Torganization to engage fully with the T organization to engage fully with the T
organization to engage fully with the T
ask Force and in all relevant Strategy implementation efforts. ask Force and in all relevant Strategy implementation efforts.ask Force and in all relevant Strategy implementation efforts. ask Force and in all relevant Strategy implementation efforts.
ask Force and in all relevant Strategy implementation efforts.

33
47 Unless otherwise noted, quotations in this appendix correspond to information quoted from the Web site for the organization or
project listed at the end of each entry. The authors are grateful to Liat Shetret for her research assistance in compiling this appendix.
Appendix: Illustrative Survey of CSO Activities Appendix: Illustrative Survey of CSO ActivitiesAppendix: Illustrative Survey of CSO Activities Appendix: Illustrative Survey of CSO Activities
Appendix: Illustrative Survey of CSO Activities
The purpose of this survey is to indicate that CSOs are undertaking important work in different regions that is relevant to the
implementation of the UN Strategy.
47 It is not intended to be a comprehensive overview, as there are many CSOs doing important
work in a variety of regions and locales too numerous to mention in this brief sampling. Much of the work of these organizations
is not and should not be labeled as counterterrorism per se but nevertheless relates generally to implementation of the Strategy.
Pillar I: Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of te Pillar I: Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of tePillar I: Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of te Pillar I: Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of te
Pillar I: Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of te
rrorism rrorismrrorism rrorism
rrorism
Americas AmericasAmericas Americas
Americas
ActionAid ActionAidActionAid ActionAid
ActionAid, in partnership with a local organization, has engaged nearly 1,500 youth (at least 30 percent of whom are
women) in a project titled the “National Youth Association of Guatemala.” The project focused on strengthening and
improving the organization of youth in the country as well as pushing for “social political intervention to press
government in improving youth conditions of living.” A major success for the program includes the passage of
national laws and adoption of public policies for the “Integral Development of Youth” by the government.
W WW W
W
eb site eb siteeb site eb site
eb site: https://www.actionaidguatemala.org/english
Europe EuropeEurope Europe
Europe
The
Kvinna Kvinna Kvinna Kvinna
Kvinna
till Kvinna Foundation till Kvinna Foundation till Kvinna Foundation till Kvinna Foundation
till Kvinna Foundation supports women’s organizations in conflict regions. It collaborates with
organizations in countries such as Iraq, Afghanistan, and Bosnia, which play an active part in peace and rebuilding
processes. Specific examples of fieldwork include: safeguarding and lobbying for women’s legal rights, supporting
of women’s organizing, and education of women in democratic organizational and working methods as well as
working on issues for “conflict resolution, dialogue, and reconciliation between ethnic, religious and national
ethnic groups” in the Balkans and South Caucasus.
W WW W
W
eb site eb siteeb site eb site
eb site: https://www.iktk.se
Middle East/North Africa Middle East/North AfricaMiddle East/North Africa Middle East/North Africa
Middle East/North Africa
W WW W
W
orld V orld Vorld V orld V
orld V
ision isionision ision
ision, a Christian relief and development organization, is working on a project in Lebanon titled, Building Peace
for the Children of War. This conflict transformation project targets Lebanese village children of school age from different
ethnic and religious backgrounds from 40 schools throughout the country, with the goal of “promot[ing] peace, encourag[ing] reconciliation and build[ing] bridges between children and young people from different backgrounds.” The project has
three main components: (1) peace education; (2) conflict resolution in schools; and (3) sports for peace.
W WW W
W
eb site: eb site: eb site: eb site:
eb site: https://www.meero.worldvision.org/index_country.php?countryID=16
South Asia South AsiaSouth Asia South Asia
South Asia
The
KAS KASKAS KAS
KAS
HF Foundation HF FoundationHF Foundation HF Foundation
HF Foundation is dedicated to “providing quality and cost effective microfinance services to low
income households, especially women, to enhance their economic role and decision-making capacity.” Operating

34
48 Karen Barnes and Peter Albrecht, Civil Society Oversight of the Security Sector and Gender, 2008.
in Pakistan, its services include: (1) general loans; (2) emergency loans; (3) home improvement loans; (4) business
loans for small entrepreneurs rejected for loans by charter banks; and (5) insurance.
W WW W
W
eb site: eb site: eb site: eb site:
eb site: https://www.kashf.org
Southeast Asia Southeast AsiaSoutheast Asia Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia
The
LibforAll Foundation LibforAll FoundationLibforAll Foundation LibforAll Foundation
LibforAll Foundation has developed grassroots programs in Indonesia aimed at reducing religious extremism
and encouraging tolerance. For example, its Global Counter-Extremism Network brings together Muslim leaders
in an “informal global network of like-minded civil and religious organizations, individual opinion-leaders, and
supporters to promote the culture of liberty and tolerance worldwide.” Networking events have included a
religious summit in June of 2007 in Bali to promote a moderate and pluralistic interpretation of Islam. LibForAll
also has an initiative titled, “Musical Jihad” against religious hatred and terrorism. This project includes working
with Muslim pop celebrities from different linguistic, cultural, and commercial traditions to disseminate music
and videos by celebrities from Islamic and Western cultures that present a tolerant narrative.
W WW W
W
eb site: eb site: eb site: eb site:
eb site: https://www.libforall.org
Sub-Saharan Africa: Sub-Saharan Africa:Sub-Saharan Africa: Sub-Saharan Africa:
Sub-Saharan Africa:
Africa Center Africa Center Africa Center Africa Center
Africa Center
for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD) for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD)
for Constructive Resolution of Disputes (ACCORD),

which is based in South Africa but works
continent-wide, has as a primary aim “to influence political developments by bringing conflict resolution, dialogue and
institutional development to the forefront as an alternative to armed violence and protracted conflict.” It specializes in
“conflict management, analysis and prevention and intervenes in conflicts through mediation, negotiation, training,
research and conflict analysis.” Since 1992, ACCORD has trained over 15,000 people in conflict management and
conflict resolution skills, focusing on the government, the public service, business, military and police, and civil society.
W WW W
W
eb site: eb site: eb site: eb site:
eb site: https://www.accord.org.za
Pillar II: Measures to prevent and combat terrorism Pillar II: Measures to prevent and combat terrorismPillar II: Measures to prevent and combat terrorism Pillar II: Measures to prevent and combat terrorism
Pillar II: Measures to prevent and combat terrorism
Americ AmericAmeric Americ
Americ as: as:as: as:
as:
The
T T T T
T
ransnatio ransnatioransnatio ransnatio
ransnatio
nal Threats Project nal Threats Projectnal Threats Project nal Threats Project
nal Threats Project (TNT), initiated by the Center for Strategic and International Studies,
examines the relationship between terrorism and Islamist extremism. “The project brings together the public and
private sectors to exchange information and improve practical efforts to increase awareness and knowledge of the
terror threat. TNT’s network includes key intelligence and law enforcement agencies all over the world whose
insights become part of the U.S. national security debate.”
W WW W
W
eb site: eb site:eb site: eb site:
eb site: https://www.csis.org/TNT
Europe: Europe:Europe: Europe:
Europe:
The
Gene GeneGene Gene
Gene
va Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces va Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forcesva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces va Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces
va Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces has helped to develop a tool kit for security sector
practitioners and policymakers on issues of Security Sector Reform and Gender, Defense Reform and Gender, as well
as Civil Society Oversight of the Security Sector and Gender. The tool highlights how CSOs and the security sector can
practically integrate gender issues and “consolidate local ownership by ensuring that both men and women are engaged
and have a stake in the development or reform of the security sector as it affects their communities and countries.”
48

35
W WW W
W
eb site: eb site:eb site: eb site:
eb site: https://www.dcaf.ch/dcois/_index.cfm
Middle East/North Africa: Middle East/North Africa:Middle East/North Africa: Middle East/North Africa:
Middle East/North Africa:
The
Internatio InternatioInternatio Internatio
Internatio
nal Counter nal Counternal Counter nal Counter
nal Counter
-T -T-T -T
-T
errorism Academic Community (ICT errorism Academic Community (ICTerrorism Academic Community (ICT errorism Academic Community (ICT
errorism Academic Community (ICT
AC) AC) AC) AC)
AC) is a networked community of academic
experts and researchers in fields related to counterterrorism. Unique to the community is a threat assessment
consultancy model that offers risk assessment model estimates and legal services, claiming that “the courtroom has
become the newest challenge for counter-terrorist experts as an active front in the war on terror. Battles are being
won through convictions holding terrorists and their organizations legally accountable for their crimes and
through punitive sentences rendering them inoperable.”
W WW W
W
eb site: eb site:eb site: eb site:
eb site: https://www.ICT.org.il
South Asia: South Asia:South Asia: South Asia:
South Asia:
The
Sout SoutSout Sout
Sout
h Asia Small Arms Network h Asia Small Arms Networkh Asia Small Arms Network h Asia Small Arms Network
h Asia Small Arms Network is a civil society network focused on addressing the threat posed by small
arms proliferation in South Asia and its impact on people in the region. As part of this program, national coalitions
were formed in most countries of South Asia during the period of 2003–2004.
W WW W
W
eb site: eb site:eb site: eb site:
eb site: https://www.sapint.org/List.php?type=Projects&CategoryID=46#
Southeast Asia: Southeast Asia:Southeast Asia: Southeast Asia:
Southeast Asia:
The
Philipp PhilippPhilipp Philipp
Philipp
ine Institute for Political V ine Institute for Political Vine Institute for Political V ine Institute for Political V
ine Institute for Political V
iolence and T iolence and Tiolence and T iolence and T
iolence and T
errorism Research errorism Researcherrorism Research errorism Research
errorism Research has undertaken or is undertaking a
range of Strategy-relevant initiatives including looking at responses to terrorist threats at various levels and from
various perspectives such as the local, national, regional, global, ideological, military, and legislative.
W WW W
W
eb site eb siteeb site eb site
eb site: https://www.pipvtr.com
Sub-Saharan Africa: Sub-Saharan Africa:Sub-Saharan Africa: Sub-Saharan Africa:
Sub-Saharan Africa:
The
Institute for Sec Institute for SecInstitute for Sec Institute for Sec
Institute for Sec
urity Studies urity Studiesurity Studies urity Studies
urity Studies (ISS) Program on International Crime and Terrorism in Africa assesses the
threat of terrorism in various sub-regions and across the continent. It examines existing legislation relating to the
combating of terrorism. ISS has convened an array of workshops and seminars on subjects ranging from police
training and common threat assessments, including a seminar on the African Union’s Perception of the Threat of
Terrorism and Measures to Prevent and Combat Terrorism. ISS also produces numerous monographs and
reports on counterterrorism at the national, subregional, and regional levels in Africa.
W WW W
W
eb site: eb site:eb site: eb site:
eb site: https://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=32&link_type=12&tmpl_id=2
Pillar III: Measures to build states’ capac Pillar III: Measures to build states’ capacPillar III: Measures to build states’ capac Pillar III: Measures to build states’ capac
Pillar III: Measures to build states’ capac
ity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the ity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen theity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the ity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the
ity to prevent and combat terrorism and to strengthen the
role of the United Nations system in this regard role of the United Nations system in this regardrole of the United Nations system in this regard role of the United Nations system in this regard
role of the United Nations system in this regard
Americas: Americas:Americas: Americas:
Americas:
The
American Ba American BaAmerican Ba American Ba
American Ba
r Association’ r Association’r Association’ r Association’
r Association’
s s s s
s Rule of Law Initiative is working in some 40 countries to provide technical
assistance and training to legal practitioners, including lawyers, judges, prosecutors, and law professors. It focuses
on issues such as anti-corruption, criminal law reform, human trafficking, gender issues, human rights and
conflict mitigation, judicial reform, legal education reform , and legal profession reform. In January 2007, for
example, the Initiative launched a program in Lebanon focused on legal education. The program aims to introduce

36
a “new generation of advocates to the core concepts of human rights and application of those rights.” The program
offers hands-on practical legal experiences through an innovative curriculum: The Lebanese Human Rights
Clinical Legal Education project.
W WW W
W
eb site: eb site:eb site: eb site:
eb site: https://www.abanet.org/rol
Europe: Europe:Europe: Europe:
Europe:
The
Interna InternaInterna Interna
Interna
tional Legal Assistance Consortium tional Legal Assistance Consortiumtional Legal Assistance Consortium tional Legal Assistance Consortium
tional Legal Assistance Consortium, a Swedish-based CSO, is a worldwide consortium of legal
and human rights organizations, providing technical legal assistance to post-conflict countries. In addition, it has
trained criminal justice officials on the implementation of the international counterterrorism legal framework in
countries such as Algeria and Morocco.
W WW W
W
eb site: eb site:eb site: eb site:
eb site: https://www.ilac.se
South Asia: South Asia:South Asia: South Asia:
South Asia:
The
Human Rights Human RightsHuman Rights Human Rights
Human Rights
Commission of Pakistan Commission of Pakistan Commission of Pakistan Commission of Pakistan
Commission of Pakistan promotes human rights and democratic development in Pakistan.
The Commission holds workshops, fact-finding missions, seminars, surveys, and protest rallies. Workshops on
political education and elections are designed to increase awareness about the importance of the electoral process.
A number of workshops, fact-finding missions, and visits focus on the “rights of segments of [the] population
with additional vulnerabilities, including women, children, IDPs [internally displaced persons] and refugees.”
W WW W
W
eb site: eb site:eb site: eb site:
eb site: https://www.hrcp-web.org
Southeast Asia: Southeast Asia:Southeast Asia: Southeast Asia:
Southeast Asia:
SUARAM SUARAMSUARAM SUARAM
SUARAM is a Malaysia-based human rights group that campaigns, advocates, lobbies, and organizes on issues
such as police accountability, the right to trial, documentation and monitoring, and protection of refugees and
asylum-seekers. Part of its police accountability project includes the handling of cases of abuse of police powers,
“including violent police reaction to peaceful assembly, arbitrary detention of protestors, deaths in custody, and
police shootings.” SUARAM is currently leading a campaign to push for the formation of an Independent Police
Complaints and Misconduct Commission in an effort to make the police force more accountable and curb abuses
of police powers.
W WW W
W
eb site: eb site:eb site: eb site:
eb site: https://www.suaram.net
Sub-Saharan Africa: Sub-Saharan Africa:Sub-Saharan Africa: Sub-Saharan Africa:
Sub-Saharan Africa:
The
Centre for the Stu Centre for the StuCentre for the Stu Centre for the Stu
Centre for the Stu
dy of V dy of Vdy of V dy of V
dy of V
iolence and Reconciliation iolence and Reconciliation iolence and Reconciliation iolence and Reconciliation
iolence and Reconciliation is a South Africa-based research and policy institute
engaged in research, education, policy work, and grass roots advocacy on issues of reconciliation, democracy,
human rights, and violence prevention in southern Africa and across the continent. Among other things, its
criminal justice program is working to promote criminal justice systems that simultaneously promote respect for
the rule of law while promoting a human rights culture.
W WW W
W
eb site: eb site:eb site: eb site:
eb site: https://www.csvr.org.za

Photo credits:
Top photo: UN Photo/Marie Frechon
Lower photo: UN Photo/Eskinder Debebe

The Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation is a nonpartisan
research and policy institute that works to improve coordination of the
international community’s response to terrorism by providing
governments and international organizations with timely, policy-
relevant research and analysis. The Center has analyzed multilateral
counterterrorism efforts on behalf of over a dozen governments, the
UN, and private foundations and is the only research center in the world
focused on strengthening global counterterrorism cooperation.
To learn more visit:
www wwwwww www
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.globalct.org
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