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Reflections as a Citizen of Civil Society Amidst Divided Lands on Reinventing Civil Society,
Civil Liberties, and Governance in Post-Conflict Societies:

Patterns, Potentials, a nd Challenges, in the
Globalised New Millennium.

The ICNL-Cordaid Civil Liberties Prize
Honorable Mention

Shambhavi Murthy Gopalkrishna
Lecturer and Senior Academic Faculty Member,
Department of Political Science at the University of Lagos

This manuscript was submitted for consideration for the ICNL-Cordaid Civil Liberties Prize in
January 2008. More information regarding the prize and winners can be found at
https://www.icnl.org/programs/locati on/crossregional/prize/index.htm.

1

Table of Contents
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So, are civil liberties at risk?

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T
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k
k
ey elements and challenges for Developing Post-conflict
Governance Structures

Legitimacy Trust and Authority of the State

Political Will for Transparency and Accountability
Rule of Law

Social Capital and Social Cohesion

Economic Reconstruction and Service Delivery Structures

Security and Cross-border Movements

V. Overview of the Governance Gu ideposts for Post-conflict Peace and
Development

i. Leadership and Governance

ii. Public Administration
iii. Legislative Power and Rule of law

iv. Participatory Development and Social Cohesion
v. Economic Reconstruction and Development
vi. Security Sector
vii .Information and Communication Te chnologies and Knowledge Management
viii. Environment and Natural Resources Management
ix. Conflict Prevention and Pe acebuilding Infrastructure
x. Successful Policy Making/Mixing

xi. Forging Effective Partnerships

VI. The Potential of Civil Society in War-torn Societies and Conflict
Resolution
VII. Where are we going from here-Lessons Learned & the Way
forward
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3

REFLECTIONS
A
S A
CITIZEN
OF CIVIL SOCIETY
AMIDST
DIVIDED
LANDS R EFLE C TIO NS A SAC IT IZ EN OF CIV IL SO CIET YAM ID ST DIV ID ED LA N DS

ON
O
N

“RE-INVENTING
CIVIL
SOCIETY,
CIVIL
LIBERTIES
AND
GOVERNANCE
IN
“ R E-I NVEN TIN G CIV IL SO CIE TY, CIV IL LIB ER TIE S AN D GO VER N AN CE IN
POST-CONFLICT
SOCIETIES:
PATTERN,
POTENTIALS
AND
CHALLENGES
IN

P O ST-C ONFLIC T SO CIE TIE S : PA TTE R N ,P O TE N TIA LS AN D CH ALL E N GE SIN
THE
GLOBALISED
NEW
MILLENNIUM”
T
H E GL OBA LIS ED NEW MIL L E N NIU M ”

Keywords: post-conflict reconstruction cont ext, governance strategy guideposts,
governance policy pillars, civil society, civil liberty, post-conflict governance, peace
sensitivity, development, mediation and participatory processes.

I. Introduction

Those who take meat from the table teach contentment.
Those for whom the taxes are destined demand sacrifice.
Those whose bellies are full
speak to the poor / of wonderful times to come. Those who lead the nation into the abyss
call ruling too difficult / for ordinary people!
– Bertolt Brecht (German poet, 1898 – 1956)
Brecht’s satiric poem (above) aptly characterizes the world situation. The question
is how to fix it. Between individuals’ pr ivate lives and the activity of official
governments, public interest groups (a/k/a “nongovernmental organizations”)
organize to improve the quality of thei r lives. The social space where they are
active may be called “civil society.” Some scholars define civil society culturally,
that is, in terms of “social capital.” Others in the European tradition define civil
society “structurally” and “processually,” that is, in terms of conflict. Despite
differences in emphasis and perhaps like a dysfunctional family, neither of these
approaches can survive long without the ot her. Each provides essential insights.
For the past several years, I have realized my part in the world through a personal
voyeurism in civil society—NGOs, women and refugee issues. This essay which is
based on my own experiences as a citizen of civil society living amidst post-
conflict societies stems from the realization that the challenges that countries in
crises and post-conflict situations face ar e complex, multifaceted and vary due to
the variety of different historical root ca uses of conflict and the different political,
social and geographical contexts. The strategies to address these challenges and

4
effectively support a country on a path of recovery, development and durable
peace are therefore diverse. What works in one country does not necessarily work
in another. However, there are some unive rsally shared values, principles and key
elements that have been found to be sine qua non for sustainable peace that will
be described and analyzed in this essa y. These comprise: focused and committed
leadership, security, solid government stru ctures providing basic services, building
people’s trust and legitimacy, information dissemination, sound civic dialogue,
mediation and community participation. Experience from different countries
emerging from conflict has demonstrated that when a leadership sets up
appropriate, transparent and accountable management systems and tools, and
then applies them properly and equitably, the key components of sustainable
peace and development become more achievable. Government legitimacy and
trust in national institutions are created. Economic activities can flourish and
generate growth and prosperity. Difficult reconciliation can be achieved.

While the meaning of conflict has changed over the years, but, in this essay we
shall refer to conflict and post-conflict si tuations in the traditional sense of the
term.

Civic engagement and the role of social actors within the framework of the nation
state is widely accepted in both politi cs and academia. The significance of civil
society to international politics and in conflict settings is less agreed. The number
of agencies engaged in international development policy, humanitarian aid, human
rights protection and environmental polic y has increased substantially over the
last two decades. A similar development is witnessed in the field of conflict
prevention, peacemaking and post-conflict regeneration. However, assessments of
the roles and activities of civil society actors in all these areas are contradictory
and ambivalent. Controversial debates about their capacities, impacts and
legitimacy are on-going among politicians, practitioners and scholars.

Therefore, some of the central questions addressed in this essay are: What types
of activities do international and transnational NGOs undertake in order to
influence international politics in a way that contributes to stable peace and coping
with global challenges? What potential do actors from civil society offer for war-to-
peace transitions? What problems and dilemmas are faced in the development of
civil society in war-torn societies? What are the limitations of civil society’s

5
contributions and how does it relate to state-building? Finally, how does any of
this impact on theoretical conceptualisations of the term “civil society”? By way of
elaborating these questions, the second section of this article discusses various
terms and definitions linked to debates about civil society.

In particular, this essay focuses on the potential contributions of civil society
actors for peace- building and conflict tran sformation. This includes post-conflict
peace-building, early warning, prevention , external interventions and initiatives
taken by local actors. It also may includ e economic development, social justice,
reconciliation, empowerment of disadv antaged or strategic groups and
humanitarian support. This essay points out that post-conflict reconstruction
issues are linked to the specific challenges each country has to overcome. Despite
the specificity of each country, lessons hi ghlighted in the essay show that a sound
mix of policies based on universally sh ared values and the proper use of
management systems and tools are crucial for every country emerging from
conflict. The paper shows the need for taking into consideration effective public
policies, and appropriate governance institutions that mediate relations between
governmental actors, civil society, the private sector and other regional and
international partners. This essay which is based on my personal voyeurism over
the years, as an active citizen of the glob al civil society will provide examples from
case studies and lessons learned.
Lets now begin with defining the Characteristics of Civil Society and go
onto examining the history and possibilities of global civil society…
Civil society” has become a central theme in contemporary thought
about philanthropy and civic activity, yet it is difficult to define,
inherently complex, and resistant to being categorized or interpreted
through a singular theoretical lens. The term is increasingly used to
suggest how public life should function within and between societies; at
the same time, it provides a way of describing the social action that
occurs within the context of voluntary associations or intermediary
bodies.
Nonprofit organizations, like other groups and institutions in modern societies,
operate within and are conditioned by three types of systems: economic, political,
and social. Nonprofits themselves, in turn, give group members the opportunity to
exercise three fundamental civic principles: participatory engagement,
constitutional authority, and moral resp onsibility. These characteristics can be

6
useful to nonprofit organizations in identifying the presence of civil society and
gauging its strength within a particular social context, and helpful in matching
organizational goals to specific civic actions that will encourage positive social
change. Widespread and legitimate citizen involvement in this civic context
remains a foundation for nurturing and sustaining healthy and productive
societies, especially in urban settings.

The formation of civil society usually part ners with an identifiable system of
political governance, characterized by open, public decision-making for all
community members through governmental structures that (1) permit legitimate
access to and use of civic space and resources, and (2) maintain fairness within
the existing political and judicial systems by promoting and protecting the welfare
of the people, with particular concern for the disenfranchised.

The literature reviewed suggests that the three principles enumerated below–
participatory engagement, constitutional authority, and moral responsibility–are
found in all civil societies regardless of cultural context.

Participatory engagement indicates that members of the society (1) enjoy access
to and governance of resources used for the common good, (2) are free to be
involved in civic action and social change , and (3) are free to participate in group
affiliations that provide a sense of belonging on a community level.

Constitutional authority protects the rights and privileges of citizens in a civil
society. Under the rule of law, citizens and social groups are constitutionally
legitimized and empowered to hold economic and political actors accountable for
their work as community servants and tr ustees. Local and national decision-
makers, motivated by the common good rather than self-interest, are expected to
design and implement public policies that strengthen the vitality and welfare of
the community.

Within this social context, all community members have moral responsibility to
use their civil liberties in ways that do not violate the human rights of others. The
practice of equity, justice, and reciproc ity produces social order and stability.
As the forces of empire reconstituted themselves to re-affirm their global
dominion in the guise of development, the forces of community found parallel
expression through a series of popular movements that drew inspiration from

7
earlier national liberation movements. These included the civil rights, women’s,
peace, human rights, environment, and gay rights movements — among others —
and most recently the resistance against corporate globalization. Each sought to
transform the relationships of power from the dominator model of empire to the
partnership model of community. These movements emerged in rapid success
ion
in response to an awakening consciousn ess of the possibility of creating truly
democratic societies that honor life and recognize the worth and contribution of
every person. Each sought deep change through non-violent means in the
tradition of Mahatma Gandhi and Martin Luther King. They challenged the
legitimacy of dominator cultures and institutions, withdraw cooperation and
support, and sought to live a new reality into being through individual and
collective action. Each contributed its piece to an emerging mosaic that is
converging into what we now know as global civil society.
The reality and significance of the emergi ng mosaic began to come into focus at
the International NGO Forum at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. This gathering
engaged some 18,000 citizens of every nationality, class, religion and race in
crafting citizen treaties articulating positive agendas for cooperative voluntary
action to create a world that works for all. This was an initial step in forming the
complex web of alliances committed to creating a just, sustainable, and
compassionate world we now know as global civil society.
In the late 1990s global civil society gained public visibility primarily as a popular
resistance movement challenging the institutions and policies of corporate
globalization. Less visible was the on goin g work of articulating and demonstrating
positive alternatives. This more positive and proactive face of the movement came
to the fore in 2001 at the World Social Forum in Porto Alegre Brazil nine years
after Rio. It was the first major convocation of global civil society in the third
millennium and it reflected a new stage in the movement’s self-confidence and
sense of its historic role in light of th e failing legitimacy and increasing public
awareness of the failures of the institutions of empire.
The foundation of the change ahead is the awakening of a cultural, social,
scientific, and spiritual consciousness of the interconnections that bonds the whole
of life — including the human species — into the living web of an Earth
community. A word on globalization at this juncture would be in order—Most
spheres of human activity are becoming progressively altered by globalization.

8
Communication is increasingly global. Knowledge and the news of events in one
country are readily available to people in another. Culture is rapidly transmitted
from one country to another. Increasingly, our reference point is the world, rather
than the nation-state (ECLAC and OR EALC 1992; Marshall and Tucker 1992).
Globalization has had its most dramatic impact on economic competition. With
open economies, trade becomes a global activity, and investment and technology
become global commodities. Investment capital is actively sought, and flows of
investment capital are global, rather than national. Competition becomes global,
rather than national. As nations open up to the outside world, they identify
promising new technologies, adapt them to local conditions, attract foreign
investment, and monitor global markets for the best opportunities. The result is a
global push for higher productivity, which causes employers to seek new
technologies and workers who can apply them successfully. Remaining
competitive under these conditions depends increasingly on the skills of a nation’s
work force. On the other hand, Globalizat ion has spawned another factor fueling
change: the spread of new ideas such as the global civil society, neo-civil liberties
and the like. In an interconnected society, individuals may incur tremendous
personal losses because of the failures of others. Individuals and persons working
in small autonomous groups may do tremendous, almost apocalyptic, harm as
well as innovative good. We leave portals open to an enemy that seems like the
social studies equivalent of the HIV virus, a mechanism that feeds upon the very
facilities that make society free, open, and productive.

Expressive freedom becomes meaningless in a society that doesn’t have
reasonable stability and security—although this statement is itself subject to
elaboration later. Collective self-defense against any major enemy is a
prerequisite for freedom. So society as a whole has to learn the social, political
and especially legal equivalent of “safer sex.” by psychological analogy to the gay
male community’s challenge starting twenty years ago (and continuing today).
Of course, it is textbook social studies to say that terrorism, as a political strategy,
generally aims at forcing the government of the attacked society to repress its
own citizens and curtail civil liberties. Yet, in some sense citizens “share the
suffering” and shed their “tainted fruits” regardless of their own individual best
intentions. Terrorism is very much predicated on the idea that the world is a
zero-sum game. It denies the importance of individual self-direction and conceives
only of group or collective agendas, whethe r in terms of religion, nationality, or

9
some other cultural idea. Please understand that what follows in this essay is a
hypothetical, conjectural reflection and discussion. It is not a prediction.

Freedom and responsibility are inseparable companions, for there is no freedom
without responsibility. Among all species, we humans have the greatest freedom
of choice as to how we will live and the greatest impact on the life of the whole.
We therefore bear a special responsibility for the health and well-being of the
whole, including taking all necessary steps to avoid the use of technologies that
pose a potential threat to life.

A number of national movements suggest some of the ways in which civil society
might most effectively fulfill its democratic f unction in national political life. Of
special interest are major national movem ents in Canada, Chile, India, and the
Philippines that have forged alliances among thousands of organizations
representing millions of people in the caus e of articulating and advancing national
visions of democratic, life-centered societ ies. We have much to learn from such
initiatives as they are leading us to a new and more deeply democratic human
era.

Global civil society manifests a previously unknown human capacity to self-
organize on a planetary-scale with an unprecedented inclusiveness, respect for
diversity, shared leadership, individual initiative, and deep sense of responsibility
for the whole. It demonstrates a human capacity for democratic self-governance
beyond anything previously known in the human experience. Its rapidly expanding
capacity for mutual learning, consensus convergence, and global coherence
suggests the qualities of an emergent plan etary consciousness or global brain. It
is a social organism new to the human experience. We are only beginning to
understand its nature, let alone its full implications and potential.

So, are civil liberties at risk? ….. At the end of 2007 and the dawn of 2008,
20,000 Afghan people have been shoe-hor ned into one camp on the Pakistan
border, joining some three million more of their countrymen who have already
fled their homeland in terror of war, starvation or both. Nightly, the
images
beamed into our homes are of grave need and the horror of displacement. They
inspire that most genuine human response, the desire to help. Western
governments have pledged that aid will be forthcoming, that they will work swiftly
to bring a speedy resolution to this conf lict so that further human catastrophe can

10
be avoided. Now comes a fresh challenge to the already fragile status of asylum
seekers. Before we rush for remedies we must remember the old adage is never
more true when it comes to matters of civil liberties – legislate in haste and
repent, well, repent if you are at all outs ide of mainstream society. And, while it
may be tempting to say that, sacrificing some freedoms is a small price to pay if it
means we can all inhabit a safer society, we should remember that it is not too
long since we were freed from the stop on suspicion laws. The legacy of that
legislation was deep and dreadful wounds cut into the relationship between the
police and minority communities, wounds that still hurt to this day. It is in times
like these that the state must set the example. The global leaders have gone to
great lengths to insist that the fight against terrorism requires more t
han a
military coalition that the humanitarian coalit ion is of equal importance. This is to
be applauded, but we should start by setting our humanitarian standards
at home.
That means addressing the shambolic dispersal policy that has seen asylum
seekers shuttled around the country, housed in sub-standard accommodation
while ‘asylum barons’ rake in obscene pr ofits. It means dismantling the voucher
scheme, a discredited, ineffective and cr uel operation that has deepened the
misery of those in need while lining th e pockets of the supermarkets and black
marketeers. It means tackling the failure of the asylum administration system that
sees people go without essential services and community workers report that
babies are going without milk.

Ultimately balancing individual expre ssive liberty with general welfare and
security, even given the shocking nature of the new threats, remains a matter of
legal and moral principles. These principles apply even as we recognize that the
enemy seems determined to exploit our openness as some kind of destabilizing
evil and leverage that freedom against us with unpredictable attacks. W
hen
elucidating seemingly new legal principles that allow increased surveillance,
restrictions upon expressive association and the use of military justice
possibly
even with civilians citizens, we need some convincing and principled way to draw
a line. That boundary would involve evidence of the presence of weapons of mass
destruction or clear evidence of intention to produce mass violence or destruction
for its own sake. (This is not so far fr om how we used to view the Communist
Party, when the legal definition of Communism—with the capital “C”
and in
comparison to socialism ⎯included promotion of the use of violent conflict or
overthrow of the government.) Every decade since World War II had its

11
distinctive personality along the way to a build-up of individualism and personal
liberty. We have reached the crisis and catharsis. We know the theme of the
start of the new millennium. We really do ne ed to look in a structured way to draw
the line against weapons of mass destruction with respect to most individual rights
issues, including free speech, search and se izure, privacy, criminal due process,
immigration, and maybe even national service.

Somewhere, someone is forgetting that today’s security measure could be the
seed for tomorrow’s two-tier society with entitlement cards for those with full
citizen rights while access to services is denied to asylum seekers and who knows
the seed of a new conflict which will shake the very edifice of societies. We have
to learn to determine when we are play ing fair with the way we set our own
priorities. With this we now move onto to discuss the key elements and
challenges for Developing Post-conflict Governance Structures… Post-
conflict recovery and state reconstruction are complex challenges for the state and
the society. They constitute, in fact, the major goals to be reached when a series
of specific challenges have been met. The most critical key challenges in post-
conflict realities are enumerated below:

Legitimacy Trust and Authority of the State

When the authority of the state has colla psed, and the remaining structures of
government often lose their legitimacy in post-conflict settings, thus leading to
political, societal and economic disintegration on a national and even regional
level, the main task of governments in post-conflict situations is to rebuild
economic and political governance and rega in legitimacy and the trust of their
populace. It is generally acknowledged that the critical determinant of sustainable
recovery, peace and development is a committed leadership aimed at: protecting
human rights; ensuring rule of law and security; reestablishing and strengthening
credible, transparent and accountable public administration institutions;
reconstructing an efficient, representative public service that achieves equitable
service delivery and re-generates an eq uitable post-conflict economy. These key
areas of concern constitute the basic prerequisites of peace-sensitive
reconstruction and reconciliation. At thei r inception, post-conflict governments,
especially transitional authorities, often lack legitimacy and have not yet earned
trust, as they were formed as a result of negotiations between warring parties
without the involvement of the majority of the population or they include former

12
combatants perceived by the population to be responsible for crimes. The
y also
exercise limited control over the country’s assets. The development of public
policy often has to be negotiated with ot her actors (sectarian groups or former
parties to the armed conflict) who may control parts of the territory and/or
national resources.
Political Will for Transparency and Accountability

The fragility of post-conflict situations creates multiple openings for corruption and
the lack of a common ethos of governance undermines the political will for
transparency and accountability, thus impeding the creation of robust mechanisms
to deal with it. The absence of a shared vision and ethos of governance within the
new, constituted governing group, espe cially when its members are drawn from
former warring parties, often induces factionalism that makes different groups in
government work at cross-purposes ra ther than for the national good.
Rule of Law

Absence of rule of law, accompanied by a culture of impunity, especially affects
many post-conflict situations and severely undermines the legitimacy of the State.
It is likely that weak rule of law ex isted prior to violent conflict and was
characterized by ineffective or corrupt institutions. The fall out from this
circumstance is especially evident in th e judiciary and police, where dysfunctional
institutions have over time eroded confidence in the formal mechanisms for
dispute resolution and grievance management and induces citizens to resort to
illicit means. There is a need to re-build the judicial infrastructure from the highest
to the lowest levels, with the most severe challenges being to rebuild the physical
infrastructure and capacities of the staff, and to establish and promulgate an
enforceable legal and regulatory framework that will be accepted by the populace.
Social Capital and Social Cohesion

Post-conflict public policies are particularly vulnerable to distortion by sectarian
behavior towards particular groups, sectors or communities overriding national
interests. The loss of human and social capital, a dearth of social cohesion,
continued exclusion of targeted groups in society, and absent participat
ory
mechanisms in public policy formulation, all perpetuate a lack of trust in
government and challenge the revival of legitimate local and national go
vernance
structures. Internally displaced peop le (IDPs), returning refugees, and
unsupported youth and (former) child so ldiers/ex-combatants and others are
particularly vulnerable to being co-opted into unproductive or illicit activities that

13
are counterproductive to the effective functioning of the state. The State must
organize specific, demonstrable initiatives to regenerate social cohesion through
policies and programs that promote participation, equity and inclusion. The lack of
coherence between the peace consolidation process as a medium- term action on
the one hand, short-term peacekeeping actions and long-term development
efforts on the other, may further destabilize efforts to achieve sustainable peace
and development.

Economic Reconstruction and Service Delivery Structures

Another major challenge is the need to simultaneously sustain ongoing
governance reform and economic restructuring programs at the same time
securing visible achievements in poverty alleviation efforts as dividends of peace
and stability. With regards to economic reconstruction, the short-term e
conomic
orientation of local actors which is focused mostly on private immediate gain,
often prevails in post-conflict setting s. Unless concerted action to retake
regulatory control of the State accompanies the cessation of violence, these
parallel economies deny the state access to substantial revenues and the
beneficiaries undermine and destabilize attempts to rectify the situation. Within
this arena, the exploitation and abuse of mineral and natural resources by illicit
national and/or foreign actors, coupled with worsening terms of economic
exchange, are other crucial challenges th at need to be addressed to ensure a
sustainable economic reconstruction.

Security and Cross-border Movements

Continuing insecurity and violence affe ct the provision of basic services, and
reestablishment of government authority and administration at local levels. A lack
of institutional authorities and failure in the security sector, in particular the police
forces, lead to continuing mistrust of the population in public authorities and, at
best, a State lacking legitimacy, and at worst, a breeding ground for the re-
eruption of unresolved conflicts and vi olence. Conflicts spilling across borders
represent an additional source of continued post- conflict disintegration, on both a
national and regional level. Such cross- border conflict issues include the illegal
traffic of small arms, light weapons and anti-personnel mines. The fundamental
question here is how to regulate movements across borders in order to discourage
illicit traffic while promoting legal and safe movements and advancing more
cohesion and integration among countries.

14

V. Overview of the Governance Guideposts for Post-conflict Peace and
Development

This section suggests a range of key governance guideposts and strategies for
post-conflict and peace-sustaining recons truction within different policy areas.
These guideposts contain a mix of shared universal values integrated with first-
hand experiences in post-conflict setti ngs which illustrates the coexistence of
three different areas: the surrounding area (represented by the lines emanating
from the cultural context, external factors, and management tools), the center
area and the periphery. The three central and interrelated governance levers are:
(i) the people, (ii) the resources, and (iii) the services.

Based on the above analysis of the relevant factors pertaining to the nine
identified pillars, we will examine key guideposts that are the ingredients for the
success of post conflict reconstruction strategies.

i. Leadership and Governance

The success or failure of post-conflict reconstruction efforts is closely linked to a
solid governance infrastructure, based on well-articulated horizontal and vertical
divisions of power, which is crucial to delivering political promises along with the
needed public goods such as security, health care, education and infrastructure.
State- or nation-building is the central objective of every peace- building
operation and is dependent upon the reco nstitution of sustainable governance
structures. Post-conflict nation-building comprises, at minimum: the rule of law,
judicial, constitutional and security sector reform, the establishment of
mechanisms of political participation and inclusive policies, the effective provision
of basic services and goods, fighting corruption, fostering a democratic
culture,
free and transparent elections, and the promotion of local governance.
Thus, leadership is crucial. Most fundamentally, sustained peace requires a
visionary leadership in a trustful, transparent and participatory partnership with
civil society. ii. Public Administration

In any development context, and particularly in a post-conflict setting, the public
administration must be capable of the management and implementation of the
whole set of government activities dea ling with the implementation of law,
regulations and decisions of the government and the management related to the

15
provision of public services. At the center of credible governance and public
administration is an effective public service, whether understood as an institution,
a structure of organization, a cadre of public officials, or simply as the service
provided by a public authority. Therefor e, a capable public service, based on a
merit- and incentive based system, has a greater bearing on recovery than is
generally recognized, both in terms of delivering aid and basic services and in
rebuilding national cohesion and the credibility, legitimacy, and trust in
government. The Rwandan experience demonstrates that institution-building is
essential to ensure the promise of good governance and the achievement of
economic and social goals. In addition, the South African experience indicates that
it is impossible to transform a gove rnment and therefore a State without
transforming the public service.

iii. Legislative Power and Rule of law

The guidepost involving legislative power an d rule of law is derived from the inter-
linkages of the legislative and judiciary pillars. Parliaments have a fundamental
role to play in peace-building processes, including oversight of reconstruction,
legislating on human right issues and addressing post-conflict security concerns.
Parliamentary strengthening is critical to allow a parliament to fulfill its
constitutionally mandated role of holdin g the executive branch accountable for its
actions and performance. It also contri butes to peace- building while restoring
legitimacy and trust in the legislative powe r. Therefore in post-conflict realities,
the legal framework, judicial institutions and the penal system need to be re-
established to sustainably ensure the rule of law.

Here, it is important to mention that an accurate revision and enactment of laws
and regulations, supported by appropriate funding provisions, may be nee
ded to
promote women and vulnerable groups’ participation in leadership and decision
making positions.

iv. Participatory Development and Social Cohesion

A decisive factor in the success and effectiv eness of post-conflict reconstruction is
the prior experience of a country and society in democratic processes. Where
governance measures can rely on such tr aditions and previous experiences, the
transition from violence to a peaceful an d democratic political culture is greatly

16
facilitated. Social inclusion, political participation and social cohesion are crucial to
post-conflict reconstruction, but also represent complex processes of political and
social consultations. Enabling societies to dialogue with itself and to encourage
dialogue between governments and the civil society needs to be amongst the key
goals of post-conflict reconstruction in order to find solutions that consolidate
peace in the long run. Support to the establishment of civil society umbrella
bodies helps to create a structure through which civil society organizations can
collectively engage in lobbying, advocacy and monitoring programs that help
enhance the development of pr o-poor development polices.

Therefore, any post-conflict development in itiative must be implemented with the
participation of the affected populations. This is to ensure correct understanding of
their actual needs, including society transformation after conflict, local
participation and ownership as well as responsibility for sustaining achieved
results.
v. Economic Reconstruction and Development

In the area of socio-economic govern ance, the promotion of macroeconomic
reconstruction and stabilization is one key determining factor for sustainable long-
term reconstruction. Regulating ownership in a post-conflict society and
combating and constraining the basis of so-called ‘war economies’ and parallel
economies are priorities. In the immediat e period after the end of violence, the
creation of jobs through public works pr ograms and the stimulation of micro and
small enterprises are crucial.

Threatened livelihoods can easily lead to a new break-out of conflicts.
Reintegrating ex- combatants, refugees and internally displaced people into the
economy represent further financial challenges on fragile post-conflict states
suffering from sharply reduced revenues. In flation might be additionally increased
by further credits; declining confidence in the domestic currency leads to brain
drain and dwindling capital, thus to a sp iral of continued economic failures. New
macroeconomic policies and institutions, as well as capacity-building for people
working in these areas, are required to encourage the development of market
mechanisms that can efficiently and effectively allocate scarce economic
resources. International actors should encourage governments to promote private
sector development, creation of economic opportunities for business operation and

17
development as well as entrepreneurship training and policy frameworks for small
and medium enterprise development. They should also assist governments to
establish sustainable partnerships with the private sector, where the latter exists
(public private partnerships), and carefully balance its interactions in this area in
order to prevent polarization of interests that might undermine the benefits of the
general population, hence generating re newed or even new conflict. Economic
policies need to be closely aligned with peace-building components.

vi. Security Sector

Governance of the security sector is a pr econdition for stability – to provide safety
and security for the populace, assure th e return of the Internally Displaced
Persons (IDPs)/refugees and resettlement, and ensure good management of
disarmament, demobilization and reintegrat ion (DDR) processes. A well-governed
security sector is a key public service an d a prerequisite for stability, recovery and
development. Thus, security sector reform s need to be initiated and implemented
within a wider and long-term peace-building perspective. Downsizing or reforming
the security sector on the basis of in ternational standards is not a sufficient
starting point. The primary emphasis shou ld be on determining, on the basis of
dialogue among relevant stakeholders, th e genuine internal and external overall
security needs of a post-conflict society, and then ensuring the allocation of
resources to meet these needs. The security sector has the potential to generate
tremendous political good will and protect economic growth within a post-conflict
country. Thus, governing authorities need to ensure security as a precondition for
any further post-conflict development

vii. Information and Communication Te chnologies and Knowledge Management

Access to reliable and objective information is a vital element of democratic
process and settings. Countries’ experience shows that the manipulation of
information can be a trigger of rising misunderstanding and tensions that can lead
to devastating conflicts. Therefore, the promotion of exchange and dissemination
of information is an important element of re -construction efforts. It is therefore in
the interest of governments to set up mechanisms allowing them to manage
information and knowledge assets. In particular information and communication
technology (ICT) “can play an important ro le as a powerful tool for both economic
and social development, allowing governme nts to improve efficiency and to deliver
more transparent, high-quality services to citizens” .

18

viii. Environment and Natural Resources Management

The consequences of violent conflicts on the physical environment and
irreplaceable natural resources are obvious. In the aftermath of violence, leaders
and decision makers must pay a careful attention to environmental stewardship
toward the ultimate goal of peace and sustainable development. This requires
balance between reconstituting the ecosystem, the optimal management of
natural resources and equitable resource distribution to benefit all citizens.

The main strategic areas to be developed further in both a conflict situation
analysis and for policy development are as follows:

o Protecting biodiversity for the global environmental balance as a key element of
re-construction efforts. Governments ne ed to implement specific policies and
actions for preventing natural disasters and planning for problems such as climate
change, desertification, etc. .

o Enhancing socio-economic activities that reduce poverty, generate growth, and
manage natural resources sustainable without further damaging the environment.

o Participation and commitment of local communities in the management of
natural resources.

o Fostering an optimal resources management process based on transparency and
accountability within three focal points: a) mapping of natural resource areas –
e.g. “Tele-detection”, b) exploitation norms including performance requirements
and obligations and c) control, monitoring and evaluation.

viii. Conflict Prevention and Peace-building Infrastructure

Both international and regional actors play a crucial role in peace-building as part
of post-conflict reconstruction efforts. Ho wever, it is essential that they also
support actions aimed at strengthening national capacities for conflict prevention.
As part of these efforts, it is important to build skills and capabilities of civic and
political leadership for understanding the nexus between peace and development
and for enacting mechanisms for in-depth conflict analysis and prevention. Within
this context, public sector managers need to be aware of the existence of
mechanisms which can be accessed to support post-conflict peace building
activities as well as for conflict preventi on. Among the former mechanisms it is
worth mentioning the Peace-building Comm ission, an intergovernmental advisory
body established to enact a recommendation made by world leaders at the 2005
World Summit. The need for consolidating peace-building and development efforts

19
has been institutionalized with the establishment of this body. The role of the
Commission is to marshal resources at the disposal of the international community
to advise and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict recovery, focusing
attention on reconstruction, institution-building and sustainable development, in
countries emerging from conflict.

ix. Successful Policy Making/Mixing

Any post-conflict reconstruction strategy to be successful starts from the
beginning by determining the right entry point(s). The assessment of the context
will then point out the key pillars around which the strategy(ies) should be built.
Based on the sectors or pillars identifi ed as crucial, sectoral policies and
appropriate management arrangements will be made with a main purpose: create
coherence among different policies and make them converge towards the co
mmon
goal of sustained development, prosperity and peace.

x. Forging Effective Partnerships

The political and managerial leadership will learn that nothing could be made in
isolation due to the amount of challenges to overcome. Some effective
partnerships will be strongly tied between national institutions and international
community agencies, for example, the public donor agencies and NGOs, or
between institutions of public and privat e sectors including the civil society and
the common citizen at national and local level. With this, we systematically
investigate the links between civil society and conflict resolution, we can achieve
better understanding of violence in general as well as of its local a regional
variation.

VI. The Potential of Civil Society in War-torn Societies and Conflict
Resolution

Civil society interface at the point wher e conflict turns into violence. In NGO
discourses, civil society is seen as “one of the crucial underpinnings for
strengthening the capacity of societies to manage conflict peacefully. This is
particularly true when individuals are members of multiple groups, each of which
addresses different aspects of their Issues such as their communal identity,
vocational interests and hobbies, social and political values, and neigh
bourhood
environment.

20
Experiences from post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina“Strengthening Civil Society” is
established as a key element of some external interventions and missions in post-
conflict situations. It is applied both by international organisations and
international NGOs based on the expectation that civil society will contribute both
to democratisation processes and conflict transformation. Since the mid 1990s,
the importance of civil society initiatives is increasingly acknowledged in
peacebuilding discourses, especially given the failures of international intervention
efforts in Somalia, Rwanda or the Balkans..

Cross-cutting memberships among civil society actors are expected to create
“bridging social capital”: networks that are a powerful force in integrating society
and minimizing the potential for polarisation along any specific divide. Civil society
often is understood as a solution to social, economic and political problems, not
only by grassroots practitioners but also by international organisations. But there
is a risk that this view overestimates the scope of social actors and neglects the
complexity of needs in war-to-peace tran sition, especially in situations where
different processes of transformation over lap. This became obvious in the Balkans
where post-conflict regeneration challenges coincided with transformation of the
economic and political system. Based on experiences from post-war Bosnia-
Herzegovina, some dilemmas of strengthening civil society in relation to
peacebuilding efforts can be elaborated. After the Dayton Peace Agreement that
ended the war in 1995, Bosnia has become a kind of “pilot project for international
governance” in the context of a “global domestic policy” which views the
establishment of democracy and market economy as a prerequisite for conflict
resolution and the prevention of violence.

What is crucial to the nation of civil society is that families and individuals connect
with others beyond these homes and talk about matter of public relevance without
the interference or sponsorship of the state. Whether such engagement takes
place in association or in the traditional sites of social get-togetherness depends
on the degree of the state urbanization an d economic development. Cities tend to
have formal associations, but villages make do with informal sites and meetings.

When villages become towns, towns turn into cities, and cities are transformed
into metropolises and meglapolises, people begin to travel long distances for
work, face to face contact is typically not possible beyond neighbourhoods, and
associations become necessary not only for civil peace but also for many

21
economic, social and political aims and interactions. We should not look for
associations, where the end for them is not pressing or where access to them is
difficult for some groups. We should, instead, look at the alternative civil sites that
perform the same role as the more stan dard civil organisations do. One more
observation is that interethnic or inte r-communal engagement makes for peace,
not interethnic or intracommunal. Intracommunal engagement leads to the
formation of what might be called institutionalised peace system. Engagement, if
all intracommunal, is often associated with institutionalised riot system.

One the whole, two links can be specified between civic life and conflict. First prior
and sustained contact between members of different communities allows
communication between them to moderate tensions and preempt violence, when
tensions arise owing to an exogenous shock, say a riot in the nearby city, distant
violence repeated in press or shown on T.V., rumours planted by politicians or a
group in the city, a provocative act of communal mischief by police or some
youths. In cities of thick interactio n between different communities, peace
committees at the time of tensions emerge from bellow in various neighborhoods
and the local administration does not have to impose such committees on the
entire city. The former is better peace prot ector than the latter. Secondly, in cities
that have associational integration as well as everyday integration, the
foundations of peace becomes stronger without a nexus between politicians and
criminals, big riots and killings are highly improbable.

Civil links across communities have a remarkable local and regional variation.
They differ from place to place depending on how different communities are
distributed in local business, middle-class occupations, parties, and labour
markets. The result is, when the same orga nisation is able to create tensions and
violence in one city or region, it is unable to do so in another city and region,
when civil engagement crosses communal lines. In the late 1990s, for example,
UN organisations, research institutions and NGOs (International Alert, UK, the
American Council on Foreign Relations, York University, Canada, and swisspeace)
founded a Forum for Early Warning and Early Response (FEWER). Through its
FAST programme, the Swiss research institute, swisspeace, has been a standard-
setter in developing early warning methodology, monitoring programmes in the
Americas, Africa and Asia. The International Crisis Group delivers regular
background reports and briefings on conflict zones. CARE International has
launched several community-based early warn ing systems in high-risk areas of El

22
Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. In Africa, the West African Network for
Peacebuilding (WANEP) is setting the stage for a civil society-based initiative
called Warning and Response Network (WAR N) that will operate in 12 of the 15
member countries of the Economic Community of West African States
(ECOWAS).The Institute for Security Studie s (ISS) in South Africa is also a key
organisation in early warning analysis and crisis reporting in Africa.

Other Civil Society Organisations are active in preventive diplomacy (multi-track
diplomacy, and in particular Track 1,5 interventions), as for instance
International
Alert (UK), the Carter Center (US) and its International Negotiation
Network
(developed by the Carter Center), and the church-related Community of Sant’
Egidio. Some also have participated in peacemaking processes. In the cases of
Northern Ireland, Guatemala and South Afri ca, civil society actors have effectively
facilitated broader public participation in peace agreement negotiations, thus
influencing such processes. Cooperatio n between governments and Civil Society
Organisations has been practised in vari ous conflict zones. Perhaps the most well
known is the cooperation between the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affai
rs and
the Institute for Applied Social Science to form the ‘Norwegian Channel’ that led to
the Oslo Accord of 1994.

The international literature offers various taxonomies of a range of NGO functions
in this context:
• Establishing alternative media, war and peace reporting

• Monitoring of elections and state institutions and activities related to
democratization

• Youth work (community-based social policy, income generation, education and
empowerment)

• Support for education sector reforms and initiatives for peace education

• Establishing peace cultures: incentives for overcoming cultures of war via arts,
music, films and cultural events

• Strengthening local “peace constituencies”

• Initiatives for inter-religious dialogue

• Empowerment of women, campaigns for women’s rights and against h
uman
trafficking

• Initiatives for demobilisation, disarmament and demilitarisation

23

• Protection of endangered individuals, and providing security for minority groups
or refugees and returnees

• Re-integration of returnees and community building

• Human rights monitoring

• Documentation of war crimes, fact-finding and support to identify missing people

• Dealing with trauma and psycho-social support for war victims, refugees and
returnees
• Initiatives for dealing constructively with the past (fact-finding, story-telling,
reconciliation initiatives
Civil society cannot, however, replace the state. Civil society typically depends on
the security and predictability provided by an effective democratic state controlled
by a government that ensures the rule of law and creates policies that respond to
the needs of the population. Thus civil society and democratic states are highly
complementary, even interdependent.

VII. Where are we going from here……Lessons Learned & the Way
forward… This essay which is more in the nature of a reflective journey has
attempted to provide an overview of peace-sensitive considerations and insights
to policy and practice in the main areas of concern to post-conflict reconstruction
engaging discussions on civil liberties, the role of civil society and governance in
these processes-both overtly and covertly.

As the range of examples in this essay demonstrate, the performance of countries
varied greatly, depending on factors such as the degree of governmental
commitment, institutional capacity, the exte nt of corruption, and the strength of
civil society. The sobering realities of our new millennium are that as the
worldwide push for greater personal and political freedom grows stronger, it is
being met with increasing resistance from those who feel threatened by political
and societal change. The question before us is- How far is this attack on civil
liberties going to go?

Based on experience and analysis of the various case studies and examples from
all over the world, the following conclusions may be drawn.

Civil society groups can be a factor in war as well as a force for peace. They can
contribute to the mobilization and escalation of war. Intellectuals, research
institutes and religious leaders may provide the moral justification for violence.

24
Authorities from the educational sector and the media can shape simplistic
perceptions of reality, foster stereotypes and advocate war as an answer
to a
complex reality. This was obvious before, during and after the wars that brought
about the dissolution of former Yugoslavia, where hardliners in governments and
parliaments could rely on support from civil society actors (i.e., religious leaders,
universities and journalists) to fuel conflicts, promoting segregation and division.
Civil society actors can also strive for democratic values, positive social change
and reconciliation. But in many countries undergoing transitions from violence to
peace, civil society per se does not necessarily contain an emancipatory potential.
This is further undermined when the civil society itself must be democratised.

Moreover, development projects have created a wide range of community-based
organizations (CBOs). In areas with less NGO presence, mass party organizations
and religious groups are the main organiza tional structures. Citizens in Guinea
Bissau are compensating for a perpetually weak state by creating CBOs in
response to specific problems. A number of NGOs, mostly national, support these
CBOs on a project-by project basis, but lack necessary resources and capacity to
ensure institutional development and sustainability. Poor governance has reduced
donor investments but has also shifted resources from the state to Civil Society
Organisations (CSOs). Nevertheless, CS Os also have important governance
functions. First, they improve govern ance from the bottom-up by creating
partnerships between CBOs and local go vernments. Second, CSOs introduce more
participatory approaches to community-lev el decision-making. Third, CSOs can
play a stabilizing and mediating role in reducing conflict.

CSO dynamics change in the transition ou t of conflict. The transition poses new
challenges, both in terms of CSO-govern ment relations, and the new skills and
capacities that CSOs need to function in a changing environment.

First, as conflicts end and public institutions gradually recover, the dynamics
between citizens, CSOs, and government institutions change and new sourc
es of
friction may emerge. While CSOs are likely to continue to play a major
development role, especially in social service delivery, the redefinition of roles and
responsibilities may be subject to tension between CSOs and government,
especially where rules are not cl ear or applied arbitrarily.

25
Second, as countries transition out of conflict and as the state is strengthened, the
type of activities carried out by CSOs needs to shift from relief to development.
This requires new skills and business models among CSOs, which are difficult to
acquire when donor funding is tied to sm all, discrete projects, and CSOs have few
sources for longer-term assistance in capacity building and institutional
development.

Third, as public institutions gradually resume responsibilities in basic service
delivery, opportunities may arise for CSOs to be more active in advocacy and
policy influence, but this is an area where CSO experience and capacity is
generally limited. In two of the country cases, weak democratic traditio
ns
constrain such activities. The paucity of institutionalized communication between
government and CSOs, with reliance on ad-hoc or personal contacts, further
exacerbates misunderstandings and suspicions. Legal frameworks in all th
ree
countries are unclear and rarely enforced. CSOs are subject to arbitrary
restrictions not sanctioned by law. This is particularly true for advocacy
organizations.

Some preliminary recommendations emerge in this essay. The recommendations
target a broad specter of development partners including donors, CSOs, and
governments. They can be summarized as follows:

First , more rigorous and systematic analysis of CSOs could help inform more
effective engagement. This is particular ly important in post-conflict settings,
where there is likely to be little systematic information on CSOs, and their role will
likely change as the country moves throug h the relief-to-development transition.

Second , longer-term financial support to CSOs would create better incentives for
capacity and institutional development, strategic planning and specialization. As
CSOs transition out of the emergency phas e, with its less stringent requirements,
they need sustained support to meet the more demanding conditions required by
donors in the development phase.

Third, long-term partnerships between international and national CSOs could
ensure transfer of capacities and improve sustainability.

26
Fourth, financial support to networks and umbrella organizations could promote
more effective use of resources, cross-learning, and accountability.

Fifth, strengthened forums for CSO-government communication may contribute to
better coordination and effectiveness, an d underpin more systematic government
engagement with CSOs in policy formulation, as well as more clear and
transparent rules of engagement. Sixth, analysis of CSOs could be a useful
precursor to Poverty Reduction Strategy Pa per (PRSP) processes. More systematic
and contextualized analysis of CSO dynamics and capabilities could assist
governments and donors identify additional sources of quantitative and qualitative
information on poverty and social conditions (which is often a severe constrain in
conflict- affected and LICUS settings), an d potential partners in developing and
monitoring PRSPs.

It is critical for countries emerging from conflict to have engaged leadership
committed to adopting effective and efficient strategies that establish effective
,
trustworthy, transparent, participatory and efficient governance institutions
capable of ensuring the delivery of basic services to the population. Institutions
are therefore expected to be responsive to the critical needs of human wellbeing
(water, energy, healthcare and sanitation, shelter and education). Eff
ective post-
conflict leadership also requires commitment to address inequalities, social
exclusion, manage diversity, foster social dialogue, consensus, peace,
reconciliation and development.

Thus we can sum up by saying that, civil society organizations (CSOs), play and
will continue to play a prominent role in conflict-affected and fragile states in the
new millennium. The challenge is provide them with effective political and legal
environments to further strengthen them and this is exactly what as a citizen of
global civil society in century twenty-one looks forward to….My Journ
ey in the
Unfolding New Millennium has just begun….

***

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