For optimal readability, we highly recommend downloading the document PDF, which you can do below.
Document Information:
- Year: 2005
- Country: Transnational
- Language: English
- Document Type: Publication
- Topic: CSO Framework Legislation,Regional/Global Overviews
This document has been provided by the
International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL).
ICNL is the leading source for information on th e legal environment for civil society and public
participation. Since 1992, ICNL has served as a resource to civil society leaders, government
officials, and the donor community in over 90 countries.
Visit ICNL’s Online Library at
https://www.icnl.org/knowledge/library/index.php
for further resources and research from countries all over the world.
Disclaimers Content. The information provided herein is for general informational and educational purposes only. It is not intended and should not be
construed to constitute legal advice. The information contai ned herein may not be applicable in all situations and may not, after the date of
its presentation, even reflect the most current authority. Noth ing contained herein should be relied or acted upon without the benefit of legal
advice based upon the particular facts and circumstances pres ented, and nothing herein should be construed otherwise.
Translations. Translations by ICNL of any materials into other languages are intended solely as a convenience. Translation accuracy is not
guaranteed nor implied. If any questions arise related to the accuracy of a translation, please refer to the original language official version of
the document. Any discrepancies or differences created in the tr anslation are not binding and have no legal effect for compliance or
enforcement purposes.
Warranty and Limitation of Liability. Although ICNL uses reasonable efforts to include ac curate and up-to-date information herein, ICNL
makes no warranties or representations of any kind as to its a ccuracy, currency or completeness. You agree that access to and u se of this
document and the content thereof is at your own risk. ICNL discl aims all warranties of any kind, express or implied. Neither ICNL nor any
party involved in creating, producing or delivering this document shall be liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of access to, use of
or inability to use this document, or any e rrors or omissions in the content thereof.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 3
SPECIAL SECTION: THE MIDDLE EAST
NGO Laws in Selected Arab States
By Kareem Elbayar 1
I. Civil Society Organizations in the Arab World
In the last two decades, much has been written about the emergence of civil soci-
ety organizations and the importa nt role that they can play in a country’s economic and
political development. Broadly speaking, civi l society organizations are the charitable
foundations, civic associations, non-government al organizations, volunteer groups, trade
unions, professional organizations, and soci al movements—everything from medical
charities, sports clubs, and environmenta l groups to women’s and human rights groups—
that make up the “third sector” of modern li fe, separate from both the government and the
marketplace.
2 Civil society organizations work on an array of causes and issues and a
p-
pear in many different forms, but they all share the attributes of being private, non-profit,
self-governing organizations that individuals are free to join or support voluntarily.
3
Civil Society in the Arab World
Although a great deal of work has analyzed the impact and nature of civil society
in Eastern Europe and Latin America, compar able analysis covering the Middle East has
been lacking. In the West we often tend to think of the Middle East as a monolithic block
of ruthless, repressive, a nd authoritarian governments. But though the modern Middle
East has been cursed by awful governance an d hereditary autocrats, this “Orientalist”
point of view obscures both the Arab-Islami c past and the many recent reforms and de-
velopments that give reason to feel optimis tic about the future. The Middle East is not
monolithic: there are a wide variety of laws and practices throughout the region, and
there is an enormous difference between a country such as Egypt, with 16,000 registered
NGOs, and a country such as Saudi Arabia, whic h bans almost all forms of private asso-
ciation.
4
1 International Center for Not-for-Profit Law Fello w; J.D. / M.A., International Affairs Candidate,
2008, The George Washington University, Washington, D.C. (kelbayar@law.gwu.edu). This study is made
possible by the generous support of the International Center for Not-for-Profit Law (ICNL). The opinions
expressed herein are those of the author and do no t necessarily reflect the views of ICNL. The author
wishes to thank Douglas Rutzen at ICNL for providing invaluable help, guidance, and knowledge; Profes-
sor Nathan Brown at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace for his comments and advice; Dr.
Amani Kandil at the Arab Network for NGOs for her expertise and encouragement; and finally Stephen
Bates for his incomparable and essential editing work.
2 For more information on civil society organiza tions and civil society generally, see Lester M.
Salamon, S. Wojciech Sokolowski, et. al., Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector (Vol.
2), 2004: Kumarian Press, NY.
3 Lester M. Salamon, S. Wojciech Sokolowski, et. al., Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the
Nonprofit Sector (Vol. 2), 2004: Kumarian Press, NY, pp. xxi – xxii
4 “Saudi Reformers: S eeking Rights, Paying a Price,” Neil MacFarquhar, The New York Times,
June 9, 2005.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 4
This article briefly introduces the cont ours of civil society organizations and the
laws that affect them in the Middle East. It profiles ten major Middle Eastern countries,
whose laws span the gamut from extremely re pressive to excessively liberal. Though the
term “civil society organization” ordinarily includes professional organizations, trade un-
ions, and religious trusts, in the Middle East these groups are by and large controlled by
the government or subject to substantial govern mental interference. Because of their deep
association with the government , these groups cannot be considered part of the private,
non-governmental “third sector.” This article will therefore be limited to an examination
of secular non-governmental organizations, associations, and foundations. For simplicity,
these are referred to throughout the article as “NGOs.”
Each country profile briefly examines the st ate of the domestic civil society sector
and then identifies the applicable NGO legal structure and analyzes it in terms of global
“best practices.”
5 Particular attention th roughout has been paid to licensing and registra-
tion requirements, legal rights and obligati ons, and government supervision and enforce-
ment; other important or oppressive clauses have been highlighted as well. It is my hope
that this survey provides an introductory resource for those studying civil society in the
Middle East, those working on the task of Middle Eastern legal reform, and donors and
international NGOs interested in expanding their activities in or to the region.
II. Country Profiles
Algeria
Algeria has only recently emerged from a long history of occupation, military dic-
tatorship, and bloody ci vil war. Although first elected in April 1999 amidst widespread
electoral fraud, President Abdelaziz Boutef lika has embarked on a somewhat successful
program of national reconcilia tion and political modernization. Parliamentary elections
held in 2002 were judged “free of systemic fraud and vote rigging,” but they were none-
theless criticized by Freedom House because of the governme nt’s refusal to allow candi-
dates from Islamist parties to seek offices.
6 In 2004, President Bouteflika was reelected
with almost 85 percent of the vote, in what the U.S. State Department said was Algeria’s
first presidential race since i ndependence that “was democr atically contested to the
end.”
7 Since then, Bouteflika’s government has continued a program of modernization
and liberalization.
Algeria today enjoys a print media th at Freedom House judges “among the most
vibrant in the Arab world” 8 and a reenergized and increasingly active civil society sector.
Unfortunately, the main law governing NGOs in Algeria is the Associations Act of 1990
5 Many of the laws referred to in this survey are available in Arabic and English in the Online Li-
brary section of the International Center for Not-fo r-Profit Law’s website (https://www.icnl.org). For a more
comprehensive treatment of NGO law “best practices,” see Guidelines for Laws Affecting Civic Organiza-
tions (Open Society Institute, 2004).
6 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2003 (Algeria Country Report),
https://freedomhouse.org/research/freewor ld/2003/countryratings/algeria.htm.
7 U.S. State Dept. Background Note: Algeria. https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/8005.htm
8 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2003 (Algeria Country Report),
https://freedomhouse.org/research/freewor ld/2003/countryratings/algeria.htm.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 5
(Act 90-31), a highly restrictive law adopted shor tly before the military coup and Alge-
ria’s long decade of violence and terrorism. Although the Bouteflika government has not
indicated any intention to in clude the Associations Act in its campaign of legislative
modernization, Act 90-31 is a prime ca ndidate for reform and liberalization.
Licensing
Act 90-31 defines associations as “indivi duals or legal entities” that “form a group
on a contractual basis for non-pr ofit purposes,” and requires them to obtain a license from
the government prior to formation.
9 This type of mandatory licensing is an unnecessary
and discouraging burden for NGOs, the vast majo rity of which are informal organizations
with no need for legal personality or govern ment supervision. Mandatory licensing is
common in the Middle East, t ypically justified by government fear of Islamic fundamen-
talist and terrorist groups. However, such groups will operate underground with or with-
out mandatory licensing requirements, so the practic al effect of such laws is to discourage
the establishment of peaceful and moderate or ganizations while doing little to prevent the
spread of more radical groups.
Fortunately, Algeria’s actual process of licensing is not overly burdensome or ex-
pensive, at least in comparison to regional standards. NGOs need only file a “Declaration
of Incorporation” that includes the names, professions, and addresses of each founding
member; two certified copies of the NGO’s statutes; and the minutes from the NGO’s
founding meeting. This “declaration” must be filed with the governor of the province in
which the NGO is headquartered (the “ wali” of the “wilaya”), and in the case of associa-
tions that operate in more than one wilaya, with the Ministry of the Interior as well.
10 The
local agency (and, if a pplicable, the Interior Ministry) ha s 60 days to approve or deny the
application, and if no answer is received within that time period, the application is con-
sidered approved.
11 Upon approval, the NGO must publish a notice of its incorporation in
a nationally distributed daily newspaper at its own expense. 12
If the government agency rejects the app lication, the matter is automatically re-
ferred to an Administrative Court, which must affirm or reverse the agency’s decision
within 30 days of referral.
13 In theory, automatic referral to court offers protection against
unjust or arbitrary decisions, but in Algeria th e agency enjoys so much discretion that the
judicial role is limited. The la w gives government agencies th e right to deny a license if
any founder has “demonstrated conduct contrary to the interests of the fight for national
liberation,” or if the associ ation was “founded for a purpose c ontrary to the established
institutional system,” “public order,” or “public decency.”
14 These terms, further unde-
fined in the law, are so vague that in practice the courts are unlikely to reverse an agency
decision. The government has not hesitated to use its broad powers to deny licenses to
NGOs that it finds embarrassing or otherwise irritating, most recently the Association of
9 Act 90-31 (Algeria): Art. 1.
10 Id ., Art. 45.
11 Id ., Arts. 7-8.
12 Id ., Art. 8.
13 Id ., Art. 8.
14 Id ., Arts. 4-5.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 6
Families of the Disappeared of the Wilaya of Constantine, a group focusing on human
rights abuses committed by Algerian security forces. 15
Foreign NGOs that wish to establish offices in Algeria are not subject to any ex-
plicit extra requirements, but their licenses mu st be approved by the Ministry of the Inte-
rior regardless of the geogra phic scope of their operation.
16
Legal Rights and Obligations
Once an Algerian NGO obtains a license, it acquires judicial personality and legal
capacity, meaning the right to br ing suit as a plaintiff, enter into contracts, and acquire
real property.
17 No practical restraints are placed on the NGO’s ability to raise funds do-
mestically, but any foreign donations must be pre-approved by the Ministry of the Inte-
rior.
18 The criteria under which the Interior Mi nistry can deny approval are not specified,
and an NGO that wishes to appeal an advers e decision has no recourse to the courts. This
clause essentially allo ws the Interior Ministry to star ve NGOs of a major source of fund-
ing (in some cases the only source) at will. Similarly restrictive is the law’s requirement
that the Interior Ministry gi ve approval before any NGO can join an intern ational associa-
tion or federation, a provisi on that does nothing but prev ent NGOs from meeting with
their peers in the internati onal community to compare idea s and learn from groups with
more expertise and experience.
19
In contrast to the laws of most Middle Eastern states, Algerian law does not im-
pose a specific governing structure on NGOs, though it does require compliance with cer-
tain minimum guidelines.
20 However, NGOs must report basic information regarding
their workforce, source of funds, a nd financial position to their local wali on a regular ba-
sis.
21 NGOs are also prohibited from having a ny “institutional or structural relations”
with political associations, but the rights of NGOs to partic ipate in public policy debates,
comment on political developments, and endorse candidates are not abridged.
22
Notably, the law does not encourage the formation of NGOs by providing any di-
rect or indirect financial bene fits, such as tax exemptions or public utility discounts. Even
in the Middle East, most states now recognize the importance of civil society and seek to
expand NGO operations by providing such incentives – but not Algeria.
Supervision and Enforcement
Act 90-31 allows the government to disso lve or suspend any NGO, but in order to
do so the Interior Ministry must first obtai n a court order stating that the NGO has vio-
15 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2003 (Algeria Country Report),
https://freedomhouse.org/research/freewor ld/2003/countryratings/algeria.htm.
16 Act 90-31 (Algeria): Arts. 39-44.
17 Id ., Art. 16.
18 Id ., Art. 28.
19 Id ., Art. 21.
20 Id ., Art. 23.
21 Id ., Art. 18.
22 Id ., Art. 11.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 7
lated a major provision of the law. 23 The fact that the Interior Ministry cannot simply dis-
solve an NGO on its own may appear positive, bu t again the law is so broad that the Inte-
rior Ministry can ordinarily obtain the necessa ry court order with ease. In any case, the
Algerian judiciary is not quite an independe nt branch of government; it is largely de-
pendent on the Ministry of Justice, which can remove judges at any time.
24 Algerian
judges are thus unlikely to challenge the asse rtions of the executive branch. Even worse,
Act 90-31 provides for between three months’ a nd two years’ imprisonment and a fine for
any individual who “directs, administers, or promotes” or “encourage[s] the meeting of
members” in “a non-accredited, susp ended, or dissolved association.”
25 Rather than en-
courage the formation of NGOs, provisions such as these seem specifically designed to
discourage NGOs and the civil so ciety sector in general.
A Continuing Process
Although Algeria has made progress since th e end of its civil war, there is still
much to be done. NGOs can play an important role in the continuing modernization and
development of the country, but they cannot do so without a regulatory and legal envi-
ronment that encourages their formation.
Egypt
Egypt is the most populous country in the Middle East, a major United States ally,
and regional power whose laws, courts, and social norms often serve as models for emu-
lation by other Arab states. Cairo’s decisions influence those taken in capitals throughout
the Arab region, and it is no coincidence that the Arab League is headquartered in
Egypt’s capital city. Although several other Ar ab states provide a more liberal environ-
ment for the operation of civil society groups, Egypt’s influence and status as a trendset-
ter for the Arab mainstream suggests the particular importance of its civil society sector,
laws and practices.
Civil society in Egypt is gove rned by the provisions of the Law on Non-
Governmental Societies and Organizations (No. 84 of 2002) and the Executive Stat-
ute on Law 84 of 2002 (Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs Decree No. 178 of
2002) , which implements and clarifies the provis ions of the parliamentary law. Despite
the highly restrictive nature of its civil society laws, Egypt has one of the largest and
most vibrant civil society sectors in the entire developing world. A 1999 survey under-
taken by the Arab NGO Network for Developmen t found that Egypt’s civil society sector
employed the equivalent of 629,223 full-time wo rkers, accounting for $1.5 billion in ex-
penditures (approximately 2 percent of Egypt’s GDP)—and this survey did not take into
23 Id ., Arts. 32-38.
24 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2003 (Algeria Country Report),
https://freedomhouse.org/research/freewor ld/2003/countryratings/algeria.htm.
25 Act 90-31 (Algeria): Art. 45.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 8
account the substantial impact of religious-based groups. 26 Al-Ahram , Egypt’s official
newspaper of record, estimated that in 2003 more than 16,000 NGOs were registered. 27
It may seem incongruous that so many NGOs and civil society groups can exist in
a country whose NGO law has been called “one of the most restrictive in the world,” 28
but Law 84 / 2002 is not so much restrictiv e as it is discretionary. Law 84 / 2002 gives
enormous discretionary powers to the Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs (MOSA).
In practice, however, the full we ight of this authority is brought to bear only against or-
ganizations and individuals that cross the government’s “red lines” in pushing for social
reform and political liberal ization. The vast majority of Egyptian NGOs, consciously
apolitical and primarily concer ned with issues such as the environment, education, and
welfare, are generally left to operate w ithout substantial government interference.
Licensing
As with most Middle Eastern states, licensing of NGOs in Egypt is mandatory.
Law 84 / 2002 requires any “group whose purpose includes or that carries out any of the
activities of associations and institutions, even if it assumes a legal form other than that of
associations and institutions” to operate with a permit from MOSA.
29 This provision ef-
fectively precludes informal, unlicensed groups. Its emphasis on activities rather than le-
gal forms similarly precludes NGOs from inco rporating as civil companies or law firms
(as many did before the law’s enactment) in an attempt to avoid the more onerous provi-
sions of the NGO law. The licensing process it self is time-consuming and tedious, requir-
ing NGOs to submit to MOSA two copies of the society’s bylaws; two copies of a list of
the founders, including their names, ages, nationalities, professions, and addresses; a dec-
laration from each founding member that no criminal judgment has ever been made
against him or her; a document listing the founding member who will represent the foun-
ders in any administrative or legal matter; an occupancy deed demonstrating that the
NGO has a physical headquarters; and finally a £E 100 deposit into the account of the
government-run “Fund for Support of Non-Govern mental Societies and Associations.”
The mandatory deposit and occupancy deed requirements can pose major obstacles to li-
censing new NGOs, many of which start out in a founder’s home and lack the resources
to obtain real estate for separate headquarters.
Foreign NGOs are not allowed to operate in Egypt without securing the permis-
sion of the Ministry of Forei gn Affairs. The Ministry’s de cision is based on unspecified
factors and not subject to any court appeal.
30
Once all of the necessary paperwork has been submitted, MOSA is required to ac-
cept or reject the application within 60 days; otherwise, the application is considered ac-
26 Lester M. Salamon, S. Wojciech Sokolowski, et. al., Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the
Nonprofit Sector (Vol. 2), 2004: Kumarian Press, NY, p. 217.
27 “Judges rule out compliance,” Mariz Tadros, Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 12-18 June 2003 (Issue
No. 642), https://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/642/eg12.htm.
28 “The Impact of NGOs on the State & Non-State Relations in the Middle East,” Peter Gubser,
Middle East Policy , March. 2002, Volume 9, Issue 1, p. 141.
29 Law 84 / 2002 (Egypt): Preamble, Art. 4
30 Id ., Art. 1
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 9
cepted. This is a substantial improvement ove r the previous associations and foundations
law (Law 32 of 1964), which set no limit on how long MOSA could take in considering
an application, thus enabling MOSA to “process” an application for years. If MOSA re-
jects an application, it must do so in writing and provide substantiated reasons for its de-
cision. Associations have the right to appeal a rejection in court.
All of these positive aspects of Law 84 / 2002, unfortunately, do not herald a new
attitude on the part of the Egyptian govern ment toward civil society groups. Although
Law 84 requires MOSA to respond to an appl ication for a license within 60 days, even
the state-run press has reporte d both MOSA’s tendency to re turn applications as incom-
plete rather than accept them and be bound by the 60-day time limit; and instances of
groups having to wait “more than three m onths” without receiving an acknowledgment
that an application has been filed, in cont ravention of Law 84’s clear instructions other-
wise.
31 In any case, Law 84 / 2002 gives MOSA so much discretionary leeway that it can
reject applications arbitrarily while techni cally complying with the law. MOSA has the
right to refuse the ap plication of an NGO that is threat ening to “national unity” or might
violate “public order or morals.”
32 Nowhere are these vague te rms clarified, and so, as
with the Algerian case, Egyptian courts are unlikely to reverse Ministry decisions. MOSA
thus effectively has th e authority to prevent the licensi ng of any group it perceives as a
threat to the government, simply by grounding its decision in the language of morality or
security.
Legal Rights and Obligations
If an NGO does obtain a license under Law 84 / 2002—and at least 10,000 groups
have done so 33—its legal rights remain constraine d. Law 84 / 2002 repeatedly takes the
sort of narrow, focused restrictions most count ries put in place to prevent fraud or corrup-
tion and converts them into standards that are broad, vague, and sometimes virtually in-
comprehensible. For example, the law prohibits “unionist activity,” which seems sensible
given that unions are regulated by a separate law. But the actual language of the prohibi-
tion – NGOs are banned from “claiming specific professionals’ rights vis-à-vis employ-
ers”
34 – is difficult to parse. Nasser Amin of the Arab Centre for Independence of the Ju-
diciary and the Legal Professi on puts it succinctly: “Our cen ter concerns itself with
violations committed against lawyers and judges. [What happens when] a low-level civil
servant interprets that as taking the side of the legal profession, causing obstacles to our
registration?”
35 Similarly, the Egyptian law prohibits NGOs from engaging in any “po-
litical activity,” including “advocating the prog ram of one of the parties,” contributing
money to support an electoral campaign, spendi ng money in support of party activity or a
31 See “Matters of permission,” Mariz Tadros, Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 5-11 June 2003 (Issue
No. 641), https://weekly.ahram .org.eg/2003/641/fr2.htm.
32 Law 84 / 2002 (Egypt): Art. 11(2), Art. 6, Art. 42.
33 See “Matters of permission,” Mariz Tadros, Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 5-11 June 2003 (Issue
No. 641), https://weekly.ahram .org.eg/2003/641/fr2.htm.
34 Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs Decree 178 / 2002 (Egypt): Art. 25.
35 “Regulating or restraining?” Mariz Tadros, Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 7-13 November 2002 (Is-
sue No. 611), https://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/611/eg4.htm.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 10
candidate, or endorsing or “putting forward candidates in the name of the society.” 36
NGOs have an important role to play in public policy debates, and they should not be so
thoroughly silenced.
In addition to these restrictions on th e outside activities of NGOs, Law 84 / 2002
prohibits NGOs from making many internal de cisions without first obtaining government
approval. The law mandates the organizationa l structure of each NGO to a high degree of
specificity, and requires all of them to join regional, state-level, and national umbrella or-
ganizations.
37 NGOs are not allowed to expand their work into any new “project areas”
that were not a part of their original charter, and they are prohibited from collecting funds
from abroad or affiliating with foreign or domestic groups or unions without MOSA
permission.
38
Law 84 / 2002 does, however, confer many benefits on the NGOs that manage to
obtain a license and comply w ith its regulations, including a reduction in telephone, wa-
ter, electricity, and gas charges; a 25 percen t discount on railway shipments; and an ex-
emption from stamp taxes, customs dutie s, and contract registration fees.
Supervision and Enforcement
As with much of Law 84 / 2002, the provi sions dealing with supervision of NGOs
and enforcement of the law are vague, arbi trary, and unnecessarily severe. MOSA has the
authority to dissolve any NGO at any time if finds that the organization is “threatening
national unity” or “violating public order or morals.”
39 And although any MOSA dissolu-
tion order is appealable to the administrative courts, an appeal can take several years in
Egypt’s backlogged court system. As an exam ple, the Egyptian Organization for Human
Rights fought MOSA in court for more than ten years.
40 Although it ultimately prevailed,
the well-respected human rights group wasted enormous amounts of time and money in
its decade-long fight for legal recognition.
More worrisome, from the standpoint of encouraging ci vil society, Law 84 / 2002
imposes severe individual penalties for non-compliance with the law. 41 These penalties
include up to one year in prison and a fine of up to 10,000 Egyptian pounds for establish-
ing an association that threaten s “national unity” or violates “public order or morals”; up
to six months in prison and a fine of up to £E 2,000 for conducting NGO activity “with-
out following the provisions prescribed” by the law, conducting activity despite a court
ruling dissolving or suspending an association, or collecting or sending funds abroad
without MOSA permission; and up to three mont hs in prison and a fine of up to £E 1,000
for conducting NGO activity without a license from MOSA, affiliating with a foreign
36 Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs Decree 178 / 2002 (Egypt): Art. 25.
37 Id ., Chapter 9.
38 Ministry of Insurance and Social Affairs Decree 178 / 2002 (Egypt): Art. 48; Law 84 / 2002
(Egypt): Arts. 16-17.
39 Law 84 / 2002 (Egypt): Art. 11(2), Art. 6, Art. 42.
40 “Braced for new challenges,” Gihan Shahine, Al-Ahram Weekly Online, 10-16 July 2003 (Issue
No. 646), https://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2003/646/eg2.htm.
41 Law 84 / 2002 (Egypt): Art. 76.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 11
NGO network or association without MOSA permission, or merging with another asso-
ciation without MOSA approval.
Restrictions such as these throw cold water on the entire concept of civil society.
Laws should, of course, be enforced, but violat ions of civil society laws are best punished
with fines and administrative penalties. Criminal sanctions should be used only in the
most exceptional cases. Making prison terms th e standard punishment discourages indi-
viduals from forming NGOs, lest they risk their personal freedom and livelihood—in
marked contrast to the Egyptian government’s self-proclaimed “commitment to support-
ing voluntary civic work.”
42
The Role of the Judiciary
Egypt’s judiciary is admired and well-re spected as one of the most independent
and fair institutions in the entire Middle East. Although the Egyptian executive branch
exerts an inordinate amount of influence over the judiciar y, the judiciary has nonetheless
protected the rights of NGOs in a noteworthy manner (and more importantly, the execu-
tive branch has complied with its rulings). Perhaps with this history in mind, Law 84 /
2002 gives MOSA the power to di ssolve civil society groups, refuse their applications,
and imprison their members, all without first making a case in court. Only after MOSA
has acted and the damage has been done can an NGO lodge an appeal—and, as discussed
above, appeals can take months or even years. But unless and until Law 84 / 2002 is re-
vised, the Egyptian judiciary, overwhelmed as it is, will remain the only protection for
NGOs against the abuses of the Ministry of Social Affairs.
Iraq
It goes without saying that Iraq is a country in a major state of flux, struggling to
leave behind instability and in security and transform itself into what the world hopes will
be a secure, modern, and democratic state. Because of ongoing military operations and a
general lack of security, it is difficult to m easure the size and scale of NGO operations in
Iraq today. What is clear is that in the im mediate wake of the war, many international
NGOs set up operations in Iraq, bu t as security conditions continued to deteriorate, a sig-
nificant proportion of them ceased operations and left the country. Nevertheless, a sig-
nificant foreign and domestic NGO presence remains. The importance of these groups
cannot be overstated: not only are they helpi ng to alleviate the major humanitarian crisis
that looms over the country, they are also laying the groundwork for Iraq’s eventual de-
mocratic transition.
The NGO law in force in Iraq today, which supersedes the older NGO laws
of the
Ba’athist regime (No. 34 of 1962 and No. 13 of 2000), is, perhaps surprisingly, compara-
ble to the more restrictive NGO laws of the Middle East. G overnment officials justify
Coalition Provisional Authority Order Number 45 ’s restrictions as necessary to estab-
lish a safe and secure Iraq, bu t in practice the law inhibits the groups that have been
42 Statement of Minister of Social Affairs Amina El-Guindy, as quoted in “Regulating or restrain-
ing?” Mariz Tadros, Al-Ahram Weekly Online , 7-13 November 2002 (Issue No. 611),
https://weekly.ahram.org.eg/2002/611/eg4.htm.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 12
called “among the most important contributors to reconstruction” while doing little to
stop illegitimate groups, which operate underground in any case. 43
Licensing
All NGOs wishing to operate in Iraq are required to obtain a license from the
NGO Assistance Office, a subsidiary of the Ministry of Planning and Development (soon
to be the Ministry of State for Civil Society). Licensing is mandatory and informal groups
are explicitly prohibited from operating any “programs.”
44 The law is unclear on the
status of foreign NGOs, with some provision s indicating that they need only be accred-
ited by the Minister of Foreign Affairs and others indicating that they are also subject to
the requirements placed on domestic NGOs.
45 What is clear is that domestic NGOs must
provide the NGO Office with a mass of inform ation: a “complete statement of revenue
and expenses and assets and liabilities for the current year and the previous three years”
or, if the NGO has existed for less than four years, “financial data
for the current year and
projected budget for the next two years”; a list of the names and addresses of any donors
or non-bank lenders of funds to the NGO; and “a report on [the] proposed program [of
the NGO] prepared in consulta tion with the Relevant Ministry and budget for the first
year of its activities.”
46 These requirements impose a major burden on new NGOs, most
of which lack the operating experience necessary to provide this type of information.
Once all of the required documents are submitted, the NGO Office has 45 busi-
ness days to grant or deny the license. Howe ver, if the NGO Office requires more infor-
mation, the 45-day period starts anew from the date that it receives the additional infor-
mation. Unlike some other Arab countries, Ira q does not provide for automatic licensing
if the responsible office fails to respond by the deadline – so if the NGO Office takes
longer than the statutory 45-da y period, there are no practical consequences and the NGO
has little recourse. In any case, the NGO Office can deny licensing to any NGO that
would “constitute a threat to the public order, safety, stability, or security of Iraq,” a pro-
vision that, though perhaps understandable, is nonetheless open to abuse—especially
given that the law provides no opportunity to appeal a refusal to any court or higher ad-
ministrative authority.
47
Legal Rights and Benefits
The legal rights of NGOs in Iraq are not as severely limited as they are in other
Middle Eastern countries. Iraqi NGOs are free to merge, dissolve, and divide without
government approval, though they are required to notify the NGO Office of these types
of actions.
48 Although NGOs have the explicit right to raise funds within Iraq, the statute
43 “Comments on the Regulation of Non-Governmental Organizations Issued by the Coalition
Provisional Authority, Order Number 45,” Cathy Shea, ICNL, p. 1.
44 CPA Order 45 (Iraq): Section 2(3).
45 Compare CPA Order 45 (Iraq), Section 2.2 (“International Organization shall be accredited by
the Minister of Foreign Affairs, or his or her designee, and are not required to register as NGOs.”) with, for
example, Section 2.4(b)(ix) (“Foreign NGOs must provide the name of the head of mission in Iraq….”).
46 CPA Order 45 (Iraq): Section 2.
47 Id ., Sec. 3.
48 Id ., Secs. 8, 4.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 13
is silent about foreign donations. 49 Iraqi NGOs are free to establish their own governing
structures, though perhaps here CPA Order 45 falls a bit short by failing to set minimum
standards of good governance.
A major shortcoming of the law is the requirement that all NGOs be “non-
political.” 50 It is often sensible to restrict NGOs from directly funding candidates or po-
litical parties; if that is all that is meant, this clause shou ld be made more specific. As
written, the prohibition is too broad. Simila rly, though NGOs have the right to appeal
most administrative actions taken against them by the NGO Office, this appeal is not to
an independent court but the NGO Office itself, which again increases the likelihood of
abuse of government discretion.
Supervision and Enforcement
CPA Order 45 gives the government the right to “suspend or revoke a registration
of an NGO if the NGO violates any provision” of the Order. 51 If an NGO continues to
operate after suspension or re vocation of its license, the government can confiscate all of
its property.
52 In other words, the government has the authority to impose drastic sanc-
tions on NGOs regardless of how minor the violation may be. The law would be much
improved if it imposed sanctions tailored to th e severity of violations. Another shortcom-
ing is that the law does not provide for judicial supervis ion of executive actions—NGOs
cannot appeal adverse decisions made by the government, and they generally have no re-
course if they feel that a decision has been taken in error. Although the Iraqi judicial sys-
tem is not yet operating at full capacity, neither are any other Iraqi institutions, so that
fact cannot justify the failure to provide for judicial oversight. Even the most highly re-
strictive laws generally provide fo r appeal to a judicial authority.
Transition to Democracy
As Iraq continues its democratic transition, NGOs will no doubt play a m
ajor role.
NGOs help to build a pluralistic society from the ground up, and many serve as watch-
dogs of efficient, transparent government. The new Iraq should encourage the formation
of a wide variety of NGOs, rather than im posing a difficult licensing process and provid-
ing little incentive to form NGOs. Encour agingly, the new transitional Iraqi government
has indicated that review of the NGO la w is among its top legislative priorities.
Jordan
The outbreak of the Palestinian intifada in 2000 led to massive instability in Jor-
dan, where Palestinian refugees constitute th e majority of the population. Faced with a
stagnating economy and mass demonstrations pr otesting Jordan’s peace treaty with Is-
rael, King Abdullah dissolved parliament and be gan to rule by decree, reversing what had
been a positive trend toward political liberalization begun by his father, King Hussein,
almost a decade earlier. In 2003 the King allo wed parliamentary and municipal elections,
which according to Freedom House were “r easonably free and transparent, though not
49 Id ., Sec. 7.
50 Id ., Sec. 2.3(e)(iii).
51 Id ., Sec. 3.6.
52 Id ., Sect/ 1(6).
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 14
fair,” and abolished many of the restricti ons on personal liberties instituted during the
previous two years. 53 King Abdullah has since made a co ncerted public effort to guide
Jordan to a new era of poli tical and civil liberty, and Jordan today is unquestionably
among the more liberal and modern st ates of the Middle East region.
Much like Egypt, Jordan has both a very large and vibrant NGO sector made up
of hundreds of organizations a nd, counter-intuitively, a very restrictive NGO law. The
Societies and Social Bodies Law (No. 33 of 1966) is one of the oldest and most arbitrary
NGO laws in the Middle East, but the govern ment generally does not enforce the more
unreasonable provisions, choosing instead to “routinely license” NGOs, “dozens of
[which] address numerous poli tical and social issues.”
54 A 2001 survey counted at least
2,000 civil society groups working on issues ra nging from women’s rights and the envi-
ronment to health and political reform.
55 Many foreign NGOs conduct operations in Jor-
dan, including Caritas, Care International, and Save the Children. The vibrancy of the
NGO sector testifies to the rest raint of the Jordanian governme nt in generally abstaining
from exercising its extensive powers under Law 33 / 1966.
Licensing
No NGO can form or conduct operations in the Kingdom of Jordan without ex-
press written permission from th e Minster of Social Development. 56 The process of ob-
taining this permission is excessively long and complicated. First, an NGO must submit
ten copies of an application for registration to the Director of the regional Office of So-
cial Development in the district in which the NGO will be located.
57 The application it-
self must include a substantia l amount of information, including articles of association,
financial procedures, princi pal objectives, and the names, professions, ages, and ad-
dresses of the founding members (all of whom must be at least 21 years old).
58 The Dis-
trict Office Director must then send the appl ication, along with his comments, to the Na-
tional Director General of So cial Development within 30 days. The Director General
must then attach his comments to the propos al before forwarding the entire package,
within 15 days, to the Minister of Social Development. Fi nally, the Minister of Social
Development has the power to “issue the deci sion which he sees proper in respect from
the application within a period not exceeding three months from the date of sending to
him.”
59 If each official takes the maximum amount of time allotted by statute, an NGO
can wait up to 135 days for a decision on its application. Worse still, the law gives the
Minister of Social Developmen t the right to reject an application for any reason the Min-
53 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2004 (Jordan Country Report),
https://freedomhouse.org/research/freewor ld/2004/countryratings/jordan.htm.
54 Id .
55 Directory of Civil Society Organizations in Jordan , Hani Hourani, Edited by Ica Wahbeh, Sin-
bad Publishing House, Amman, Jordan, 2001 (Al-Urdun Al-Jadid Research Center), p. 10.
56 Law No. 33 / 1966 (Jordan): Article 5.
57 Id ., Art. 7(1).
58 Id ., Art. 6.
59 Id ., Art. 7.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 15
ister sees fit, and there is no mechanism for j udicial review of the Minister’s decision, or
indeed appeal of any sort whatso ever against an adverse decision.
There is a default registration provision, whereby if no response is received from
the Minister of Social Development within 30 days from the date that the application has
been forwarded to that office, an NGO can “start working as if [it has] been duly regis-
tered.”
60 However, this is not quite an automatic licensing provision, because it does not
extend to NGOs a presumptive license. Instea d, it allows them to commence work until
further notice from the Minister; but if the Minister decides to deny the application six
months or six years down the line, the NGO has no recourse.
Foreign NGOs may be authorized under th e same licensing procedures, but they
face the added imposition of any “conditions and restrictions which [the Minister of So-
cial Development] imposes.”
61 Again, the Minister’s decisions in this realm are unre-
strained; he or she can “refuse to allow a ny foreign body or society to work in the King-
dom [or] impose on it any conditi ons which he sees proper.”
62
Legal Rights and Obligations
Short of a ban on “fulfilling any political objectives,” 63 the law provides no ex-
plicit list of the types of activities that a licensed NGO can engage in. This may appear to
be a positive aspect of Law 33 / 1966, but th at is not necessarily the case. The unre-
strained powers granted to th e Minister of Social Development throughout the licensing
process do not disappear once an NGO has been licensed. The Minister of Social Devel-
opment can order the dissolution of any lic ensed NGO essentially at whim—without ju-
dicial oversight and without an appeals proces s. Technically, the Minister of Social De-
velopment must first become “satisfied” that the NGO has violated any of a long list of
conditions, including “not achiev[ing] the purposes provided for in its articles of associa-
tion”; “refus[ing] to allow [ government representatives] to attend its meetings, examine
its premises, registers, or documents”; “deal[ ing] with its funds in a way other than the
way specified for it”; or “generally contrave n[ing] any of the provisions of this law.”
64
The Minister must notify the NGO in writing of his or her intention at least one month
before actually dissolving the organization.
65 But when the decision is left to the Minister
of Social Development’s personal discretio nary judgment, and when no mechanism al-
lows an NGO to appeal a dissolution order, a notification requirement provides limited
procedural protection.
Reflecting a similar disregard for the au tonomy of NGOs, the Ministry of Social
Development is free to send representatives to observe any meeting or election, and to in-
spect any and all records kept at the NGO at any time.
66 The Ministry of Social Devel-
60 Id ., Art. 12.
61 Id ., Art. 19(a).
62 Id ., Art. 19(3).
63 Id ., Art. 2.
64 Id ., Art. 16(1).
65 Id ., Art. 16(2).
66 Id ., Art. 16(1)(c).
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 16
opment also takes an active role in NGO internal governance and organization, requiring
NGOs to notify the Ministry of any election at least 15 days in advance and reserving the
right of Ministry officials to attend the election “to be certain that [it] goes on in compli-
ance with the [NGO’s] Articles of Association.”
67 If quorum is not met at the election
meeting, or if the Minister of Social Development believes th at the board of directors has
violated any provision of the law, the Minister is free to appoint a temporary board of di-
rectors to run the NGO and call a ne w board election within 60 days.
68
Licensed NGOs can merge or dissolve wit hout seeking official permission, but no
NGO can affiliate with any foreign or inte rnational body without the express permission
of the Minister of Social Development.
69 There are no explicit lim itations on the right of
NGOs to raise funds, but the ban on foreign affiliations presumably implies a ban on for-
eign funding.
Supervision and Enforcement
As discussed above, Law 33 / 1966 is a highly draconian statute that empowers
the Ministry of Social Development to li cense and de-license NGOs based on the arbi-
trary and subjective pers onal judgments of ministry offici als. Law 33 / 1966 also provides
for individual criminal punishments for any “p erson who contravenes, alone or together
with any other person or persons, any of the provisions” of the law.
The punishment is a
fine of 50 Jordanian dinars, up to three mont hs in prison, or both, for any violation of
Law 33 / 1966 – no matter how small.
Jordan’s Continuing Reform
Jordan’s process of reform has, for th e most part, been ably led, first by King
Hussein and now by his son, King Abdullah. Ho wever, the fact remains that the NGO
law, like many other laws in Jordan, gives the executive branch the power to act as it
pleases without interf erence from the legislative or judicial branches. And though the
Ministry of Social Development does not often use its powers under Law 33 / 1966, the
fact remains that it can. A reminder of this reality came recently, when, amidst strong in-
ternational criticism, the Ministry moved to shut down the Jordanian Society for Citizen’s
Rights for an alleged violation of Law 33 / 1966. It was the first NGO to be closed by the
government since 1989.
70
This unfortunate trend has continued, with the introduction in March 2005 of a
draft law that would severely restrict the ri ghts of professional associations, requiring
these groups to “obtain prior written approval from the Interior Ministry to hold a public
gathering or meeting,” and furt her “limit[ing] topics of discussion at any of their profes-
sional meetings, councils, and committee meetings exclusively to ‘professional mat-
67 Id ., Art. 17.
68 Id ., Art. 18.
69 Id ., Arts. 8, 16, 9(2).
70 See Amnesty International Press Release,
https://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/E NGMDE160202002?open&of=ENG-JOR.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 17
ters’.” 71 The Jordanian parliament has not yet vo ted on the law, but the vote will be an
excellent barometer of the Jordanian government’s commitment to continuing political
liberalization.
Lebanon
Lebanon’s early 2005 “Cedar Revolution” has provoked enormous global interest
and attention. The tens of thousands of Lebane se who took to the streets in the wake of
Rafik Hariri’s assassination have given hope to many that democratization and govern-
ment reform are possible in the Middle Ea st. But though a new parliament dominated by
reform and anti-Syrian parties has now been seated, serious obstacles remain before the
Lebanese democratic movement is consolidat ed and reinforced. Particularly problematic
are the racial, ethnic, and religious fault lines that still run through Lebanese society, and
in fact are so central to Lebanese government and politics that they are written into the
Constitution and other core governing docum ents. Lebanon’s 15-year-long civil war
ended only in 1990, and the years of relative stability that followed were due in large part
to the domination of the Syrian military and security apparatus. It is an open question to-
day whether, in the absence of Syrian control, Lebanon will be able to maintain calm,
stability, and a functioning political system.
Although exact information about the size and scope of Leba non’s NGO sector is
lacking, it is clear that Lebanon en joys one of the largest, most active, and least restrained
civil societies in the Middle East. More than 1,000 NGOs are registered in Beirut alone,
and the Ministry of Health estimates that 60 percent of all Lebanese health centers are run
by non-profit groups.
72
The strength of Lebanon’s NGO sector stem s from the major role NGOs played
during the 1975-90 civil war, as organizations fulfilled what are typically state responsi-
bilities such as education, healthcare, and em ergency relief. Reflecting the sectarian na-
ture of Lebanese society, most NGOs are organized by religious affiliation, but they often
reach across these lines to provide services for many outside their confessional communi-
ties.
NGO Law in Lebanon
Technically speaking, NGOs in Lebanon are subject to the 1909 Ottoman Law
on Associations , a statute that predates the emergence of the modern Middle East and
even Lebanon’s 1926 Constitution.
73 The law is highly anachroni stic, with repeated ref-
erences to imperial authorities and ministries that no longer exist. In reality the Lebanese
71 “Jordan: Draft Bill Would Muzzle Civil Society,” Human Rights News, Human Rights Watch,
New York, April 7, 2005, https://hrw.org/e nglish/docs/2005/04/06/jordan10430.htm.
72 United Nations Development Program – Program on Governance in the Arab Region. “State-
Civil Society Relations: Lebanon,” https://www.pogar.org/c ountries/civil.asp?cid=9; Lester M. Salamon, S.
Wojciech Sokolowski, et. al., Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the Nonprofit Sector (Vol. 2), 2004:
Kumarian Press, NY, p. 227
73 United Nations Development Program – Program on Governance in the Arab Region. “State-
Civil Society Relations: Lebanon,” https://www.pogar.org/countries/civil.asp?cid=9.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 18
government takes a laissez-faire approach to NGO regulati on and ignores most provi-
sions of the 1909 Law. 74
The 1909 Ottoman Law requires only that any “association” (defined as “a group
composed of several individuals who unite th eir information and efforts in a permanent
fashion and the goal of which is not to divide profit”) inform the Ministry of the Interior
of its existence. No permits or license s are needed to form the association.
75 Associations
for the “promotion of Arab nationalism” are illegal, but this provision, like many others,
is clearly a holdover from the imperial (Turki sh) Ottoman Empire, and it is not enforced
by any Lebanese authority.
76 Police are given the right to attend the meetings of any as-
sociation so long as they have an official order from the Ministry of Police in Istanbul;
this provision may sound problematic, but Leba nese authorities never use it and, indeed,
the imperial Ministry of Police no longer exists.
77
Lebanon’s hands-off approach is preferable to that of the vast majority of Arab
states, which interfere with and deny full ri ghts to the NGOs that operate within their
borders. Some have argued, however, that NGOs need “active state intervention in pro-
viding clear legislation and in stitutional mechanisms which provide the framework of
rights and obligations for these spheres.”
78 If so, the Lebanese approach, while an im-
provement on regional standards, is nonetheless open to improvement.
Libya
While the Libyan government has made some efforts to modernize and reform in
recent years, it is still effectively an absolute dictatorship with few civil or political rights.
The Libyan Constitution contains no guarantee of a right to association. The sole statu-
tory right of asso ciation comes from Law 71 of 1972, which grants indi viduals the right
to associate only through institutions run by the government, such as the National Trade
Unions’ Federation.
79 Any NGO or otherwise independent organization is “contrary to
the revolution” and therefore illegal; member s are subject to extreme criminal punish-
ments, including execution.
80 Libya, along with Saudi Arabia , has the dubious distinction
of having the most extreme and restrictive NGO law in the Middle East and perhaps in
the entire world.
74 Email to author from Lebanese Embassy in Washington, D.C., 3 June 2005.
75 Ottoman Law (Lebanon): Arts.1-2.
76 Id ., Art. 6.
77 Id ., Art. 18.
78 “Islam, the State, and Democracy: Contrasting Co nceptions of Society in Egypt,” Sami Zubaida,
Middle East Report , No. 179, Nov.-Dec. 1992, p. 3.
79 United Nations Development Program – Program on Governance in the Arab Region. “State-
Civil Society Relations: Libya,” https://www .pogar.org/countries/civil.asp?cid=10.
80 “Libya: Military – Opposition” GlobalSecurity.org,
https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/libya/opposition.htm; United Nations Development Program
– Program on Governance in the Arab Region , “State-Civil Society Relations: Libya,”
https://www.pogar.org/countries/civil.asp?cid=10.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 19
Morocco
King Mohammed VI came to power in Morocco in July 1999. Much like King
Abdullah of Jordan, King Mohammed took control of a country that had been led by his
father through several years of slow political and social liberalization, yet one that also
faced major economic and social problems. Mohammed has since taken many steps to
further the development of Morocco, embarking on a major anti-corruption drive and
overseeing parliamentary elections in 2002 and 2003 “that were widely considered to be
the most representative in the country’s history.”
81 Unfortunately, Morocco’s moves to-
ward wider political participation and social liberalization were interrupted by a series of
five suicide bombings in Ma y 2003, which precipitated a tight ening of laws and a major
crackdown on Islamist elements in the country.
The NGO law in Morocco is Decree No. 1-58-376, promulgated as part of the
1958 Code of Public Liberties, but subsequently amended by a 1973 decree. At the time,
the Code of Public Liberties wa s one of the most liberal statutes in the Middle East; today
the Code would be considered somewhat harsh, and the 1973 amendment was designed
to restrict NGOs even further.
Licensing
It is not clear from the language of th e statute whether registration is mandatory.
Decree No. 1-58-376 begins by proclaiming “the right to establish associations,” and
goes on to identify an association as any “agreement for achieving ongoing collaboration
between two or more persons in order to use their information and activity for a goal
other than the distribution of profits am ongst themselves”—what we would call an
NGO.
82 The law then indicates that the act of “founding associations of persons is al-
lowed with complete freedom and without pr ior permission on the condition that the re-
quirements of Section 5 are heeded.” But Section 5 states that “every association must
submit a prior declaration to the headquarter s of the local administrative authorities …
and the agent of His Majesty the King.” Sectio ns 4 and 5 thus seem to contradict each
other as to whether prior permission is requi red. Vague as the statute may be, in practice
the Moroccan government requires all NGOs to obtain government permission before
beginning their activities.
83
The licensing process itself is relatively easy: an NGO must submit, to the local
district attorney as well as th e local branch of the Interior Ministry, a declaration with the
name and goals of the association, informa tion on its founders and officers, the location
of its headquarters, and its internal operating statutes.
84 Once this paperwork has been
filed, the NGO technically assumes legal status without having to wait for any kind of re-
sponse from the Interior Ministry. However, as discussed below, Decree No. 1-58-376
81 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2004 , (Morocco Country Report),
https://freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/morocco.htm.
82 Decree No. 1-58-376 of 1958 (Morocco): Preamble, Sec. 2.
83 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2004 , (Morocco Country Report),
https://freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/morocco.htm ; CEIP
https://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/Morocco_APS.doc .
84 Decree No. 1-58-376 of 1958 (Morocco): Preamble, Sec. 5.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 20
makes it so easy for the Interior Ministry to di ssolve associations that in practical terms
the ministry can prevent any unwanted organi zation from operating as an NGO. The law
does not provide for any right of appeal to the courts, and the Interior Ministry’s decision
is not required to be made in writing. Nota bly, any NGOs that “are incompatible with the
law or good morals or which might aim to tamper with the unity of the national soil or the
royal system of government are null and void.”
85
Legal Rights and Obligations
Moroccan NGOs have somewhat limited rights. For example, while NGOs can
comment on public policy, “associations … whic h in any way pursue a political activity”
are subject to special requirements, includ ing being composed of only Moroccan citizens
and being run only with domestically earned assets.
86 There are no restrictions on the
sources of income for Moroccan NGOs, but foreign NGOs (defined as any NGO in
which half the members, or any of the officers, are non-Moroccan) ar e subject to several
additional rules and regulations, and “the government is allo wed to object to the founding
of [any] foreign association.”
87 NGOs can merge without government permission, but
must seek permission to divide.88 An adverse decision made by the Interior Ministry can-
not be appealed.
Supervision and Enforcement
Decree No. 1-58-376 is notable for the shee r number and severity of the criminal
punishments it provides. Almost every sectio n contains a criminal punishment. Any
founders, managers, or treasurers who change the NGO charter without informing the In-
terior Ministry can be imprisoned for from three months to two years and fined 10,000 to
50,000 Moroccan dirhams,
89 for example; any particip ant in an NGO that provokes
armed demonstrations in public faces from one to five years in prison and a fine of MD
20,000 to 100,000.
90 Further, the government has al most unchecked power to dissolve
any NGO at will. 91
Morocco at a Crossroads
Morocco has been in the news lately as the kingdom has made several stymied at-
tempts at reform. The regime cannot seem to make up its mind about whether to encour-
age a fully pluralistic, democratic system or to crack down on dissent and religious ele-
ments. The Moroccan government thus has been sending a mixed message, and though
85 Id ., Sec. 3.
86 Id ., Section 17.
87 Id ., Part 5 (Sections 21-28).
88 Id ., Section 14, 7.
89 Id ., Section 8.
90 Id ., Section 30.
91 Id ., Section 7.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 21
“the Moroccan civil society sector is rich and complex,” it “remains institutionally
weak.” 92
Palestine
In any comparative study of Arab govern ments and laws, Palestine represents an
exceptional case for a host of reasons. But Pale stine’s unique history has in many ways
proved conducive to the development of a vibrant and active civil society, by both re-
gional and global standards.
The earliest Palestinian NGOs formed dur ing the British mandate and focused
generally on grassroots promoti on of the nationalist struggle. 93 After 1948, a large variety
of organizations were formed on behalf of women, students, doctors, and others. Though
formed earlier than the Palestinian Liberati on Organization (PLO), many of these organi-
zations worked with it or on its behalf in the project of building the state of Palestine. Be-
cause the PLO did not constitute a fully sovereign state, Palestinian NGOs were able to
operate with a relatively fr ee hand in seeking funding from regional and international do-
nors, such as the wealthier Arab states and the World Bank. By 1994, when the Palestin-
ian National Authority (PNA) began operati on, these NGOs had a long history of provid-
ing many essential social services and working in the absence of the kinds of restraints
typically imposed on NGOs in the Middle East.
But the PNA immediately attempted to assert the heavy-handed control over
NGOs that was common in most Arab states, especially the neighboring states of Egypt
and Jordan. Relations between the PNA and Palestinian NGOs declined precipitously.
94
When the PNA produced a draft NGO law mo deled on the highly restrictive Egyptian
law, the reaction of Palestinian NGOs was swift and well-organized. Palestinian NGOs
mounted a successful campaign domestically and, perhaps most effectively, used the in-
ternational connections made in their long hi story to get donor states and international
agencies – which provided the bulk of the P NA’s funding – to pressure the PNA. After a
protracted struggle between the PNA, which was rapidly developing a reputation for au-
thoritarian excess, and the highly organized and well-connected Palestinian civil society
sector, the NGOs won what has be en termed “a near total victory.”
95
The NGO law, finally passed in 2000, was and remains by a wide margin the
most liberal and least restrictive NGO law in the Middle East. Despite certain shortcom-
ings, the Law of Charitable Associations an d Community Organizations (No. 1 of
2000) could serve as a worthy model for other Arab states.
92 Lester M. Salamon, S. Wojciech Sokolowski, et. al., Global Civil Society: Dimensions of the
Nonprofit Sector (Vol. 2), 2004: Kumarian Press, NY, p. 233.
93 Palestinian Civil Society in Theory and In Practice , Nathan J. Brown, Paper for the Annual
Meeting of the Structure of Government Section, International Political Science Association, May 2003, p.
4.
94 Id ., p. 5.
95 Id .,, pp. 9-10.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 22
Licensing
Even the liberal Law 1 / 2000 cannot escape what appears to be a regional pro-
pensity to require the licensing of all groups, formal and informal. NGOs that operate in
Palestine, regardless of their need or desire to seek formal legal incorporation, must ob-
tain a license from the Ministry of the Inte rior (MOI) before they can “practice any of
their activities.”
96 Fortunately, the procedure for licen sing is the easiest in the Middle
East, requiring only that the applicant subm it three copies of the association’s bylaws
along with an application form provided by th e MOI. The MOI then must issue a decision
accepting or denying the application within two months. If no decision is made within
that period, the association is considered licensed by law.
97
By contrast to most Middle Eastern countries, the MOI does not have the explicit
right to reject as sociations for being contrary to vague principles such as “public morals”
or the “national interest.” Rejections of a li cense application must be made in writing and
must specify the reasons. However, the statut e does not stipulate the grounds on which an
application can be rejected, which is a shortc oming. An applicant has the right to contest
a rejection before a court, but it is unclear under what grounds a court would reverse a re-
jection on the part of the MOI.
98 Nonetheless, because the law requires the MOI to keep a
public log of rejected applica tions, including the reasons fo r their rejection, it appears
unlikely that the MOI would act in a totall y arbitrary manner without eliciting a major
outcry from the ever-vigilan t Palestinian NGO sector.
Legal Rights and Obligations
Unlike the rest of the Middle East, Pa lestine’s NGO law places virtually no limi-
tations on the rights of an NGO. NGOs are free to engage in public policy debates, raise
funds from foreign and domestic sources, and merge and dissolve without government
interference. NGOs can affiliate with forei gn or domestic organizations without seeking
MOI permission, and foreign NGOs are free to es tablish branches in Palestine so long as
approval is given by both the MOI and the Mi nistry of Planning and International Coop-
eration.
99 The law also encourages the forma tion of NGOs by providing several eco-
nomic incentives, including an exem ption from tax and customs duties. 100 Finally, any
actions taken against an association by the MOI can be appealed in court. 101
Supervision and Enforcement
In keeping with the liberal nature of th e Palestinian law, the MOI is prohibited
from unilaterally dissolving an association or seizing its assets. Instead, the MOI must
first secure a court order before taking action against an NGO.
102
96 Law 1 / 2000 (Palestine): Art. 7.
97 Id ., Art. 4.
98 Id ., Art. 4.
99 Id ., Ch. 7, Ch. 6, Ch. 8, Art. 28.
100 Id ., Art. 14.
101 Id ., Art. 38.
102 Id ., Art. 41, Art. 38(2).
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 23
Law 1 / 2000 provides no individual criminal sanctions – the norm in most states,
of course, but not in the Middle East. In Pa lestine, violations of the NGO law are pun-
ished through administrative mech anisms, as they should be.
Palestine in Perspective
In many ways, Law 1 / 2000 is an ideal NGO law. But as Nathan Brown of the
Carnegie Endowment for Interna tional Peace puts it, “Palestine is, in short, a model de-
mocracy. Its most significant flaw is that it does not exist.”
103 The tragedy of Palestine is
that on paper it has many of the institutions and procedures of a democratic sovereign
state, but in reality it rema ins caught between the intifida, crippling unemployment and
insecurity, and Israeli occupation. Palestine is almost a phot ographic negative of its Arab
neighbors: whereas most Arab states have ove rwhelmingly dominant state institutions but
no democracy, Palestinians are well-versed in the methods and procedures of democracy,
but their institutions have not been able to take root “in the midst of one of the world’s
most intractable conflicts.”
104 Thus, as with many Palestinia n laws, the civil society stat-
ute is on paper very close to a model of good gov ernance; but the practical realities of life
in the highly unstable, occupied country make it difficult to ascertain just how relevant
the law actually is.
Encouragingly, the evidence indicates that both the PNA and most Palestinian
NGOs comply with Law 1 / 2000. The Palestinian NGO Network, one of the oldest and
most well-respected NGOs in Palestine, is li censed and complies with the law, and re-
quires each of its 92 aff iliated NGOs to do the same.
105
A Major Setback
In May 2005, the Palestinian Legislative Council introduced a bill to amend Law
No. 1 / 2000. Passage of this amendment would represent a major blow to the Palestinian
NGO movement by converting the Middle East’s most liberal NGO law into one of its
most restrictive. The amendment would inse rt a new article into Law 1 / 2000, banning
NGOs from “engaging in any po litical activity.” Most Arab NGO laws contain similar
provisions, which have been criticized several times throughout this article as both un-
necessarily vague and susceptible to major abuse by enforcement authorities. Further-
more, in the context of the Palestinian-Israe li conflict, it is difficult to envision an NGO
whose work would not constitute some kind of political activity or statement. Nonethe-
less, the amended law would impose severe cr iminal punishments on any violation of the
ban on political activity. The proposed am endment would also create a government
“Commission for Non-Governmental Organiza tions and Human Rights” with the power
to supervise, monitor, and direct all NGO activity, which could entail increased govern-
ment interference in the daily affairs of NGOs.
Needless to say, this amendment has been greeted by vociferous condemnation
and resistance from the Palestinian NGO commun ity. Thanks to the work of groups such
103 Nathan Brown, Evaluating Palestinian Reform , Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Democracy and Rule of Law Project, Number 59, June 2005, p. 3,
https://www.carnegieendowment.org /files/CP59.brown.FINAL.pdf.
104 Id .
105 Email to author from Palestinian NGO Network, 26 May 2005. See also www.pngo.net.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 24
as the Palestinian NGO Network, the amendmen t has currently been placed on hold, but
not, as of this writing, totally rejected by the Palestinian Legi slative Council. Just as it did
when the PNA first attempted to impose a restrictive NGO law in 1994, the international
community should work with domestic Pa lestinian NGOs to oppose this amendment.
106
Saudi Arabia
As a result of international (to a large degree, American) pressure, Saudi Arabia
has lately begun to enact a series of political and social reforms. Modified provincial
elections were held in 2005, but women were not allowed to vote, and at least half the
seats on each provincial council were to be appointed by the royal court
. Many analysts,
both inside and outside the Midd le East, have criticized these reforms as superficial at
best. The king, though nominally required by Shari’a law to seek the consensus of senior
princes and religious officials on decisions, nonetheless remains the sole and absolute
source of authority in Saudi Arabia. Saudi Ar abia remains at the bottom of the Freedom
House survey of Political Rights and Civil Liberties for the eleventh consecutive year.
107
The 1992 Basic Law ( Nizam) serves as an informal constitution, but it fails to
guarantee any basic human right s; it makes no mention of freedom of expression, relig-
ion, or association. The very few NGOs that do exist were established by separate royal
decrees; otherwise, no legal framework ex ists for establishing new NGOs. The govern-
ment also allows some professional associations to form, but they too are subject to abso-
lute government control.
108 The recent death of King Fahd has given hope to many that
his successor, King Abdullah, will embark upon more ambitious political liberalization,
but the pace of reform in Saudi Arab ia is likely to remain slow.
Yemen
Since the reunification of North and South Yemen in 1990, the Republic of
Yemen has made many strides toward modern ization and liberalization. But even though
the situation of most Yemenis has continued to improve, Yemen remains among the least
developed and most re pressive nations.
Since 1998 Yemen has closely cooperated with the Internati onal Monetary Fund
and the World Bank to implement economic and political reforms, and as of 2004 the
World Bank operated more than 22 active pr ojects ranging from water purification to
education and civil service reform.
109 As part of its ongoing c ooperation with the World
Bank, the Yemeni government recently passed a new NGO law, the Law Concerning
Associations and Foundations (No. 1 of 2001) . The law is a definite improvement over
106 Palestinian NGO Network, “Letter by Palestinia n civil society organizations to Palestinian Leg-
islative Council members,” 28 May 2005, https://w ww.pngo.net/NGOlaw_en_Letter_PLC_28_05_05.htm;
“Memorandum to the Palestinian Legislative Council Members from Palestinian Non-Governmental Or-
ganizations,” 9 June 2005, https://www.p ngo.net/NGOlaw_en_memorandum.htm.
107 Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2004 (Saudi Arabia Country Report)
https://freedomhouse.org/research/freeworld/2004/countryratings/saudi-arabia.htm.
108 Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Arab Political Systems: Baseline Information
and Reforms: Saudi Arabia,”
https://www.carnegieendowment.org/publi cations/index.cfm?fa=view&id=16918.
109 U.S. State Dept. Background Note: Yemen, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35836.htm.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 25
its predecessor; indeed, in many ways, it is among the most progressive in the Middle
East. The Yemeni NGO sector has flourished since its passage: according the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs and Labor, 2,941 NGOs were licensed under the law by mid-2004.
110
Licensing
In a refreshing departure from the nor m among Middle Eastern states, Law 1 /
2001 does not require NGOs to obtain mandatory licenses. Associations and foundations
are free to decide whether they wish to receive the legal benefits and protections that
come with formal registration, or whether they prefer to remain an informal, unlicensed
group.
111 The registration process is quick and easy, requiring only that the NGO submit
to the Ministry of Pensions and Social A ffairs (MPSA) a written application, including
copies of the artic les of association and organi zational regulations of the NGO.
112 MPSA
then has one month to rule on the applicati on. If no action is taken by the end of the
month, the application is considered accepted.
113 Rejections must be made in writing,
and all rejections must be poste d by MPSA on a public bulletin board. 114 Rejected NGOs
are entitled to appeal the decision to an independent court within 60 days.115
Legal Rights and Obligations
Yemeni NGOs are prohibited from engaging in “any partisan activity,” including
taking part “in any election ca mpaign or [allocating] any … funds for such purposes di-
rectly or indirectly.”
116 This restriction is not as proble matic as the restrictions on “politi-
cal activity” found in many other Middle East ern NGO laws; “partisan activity” suggests
a narrower prohibition, one that permits discus sion of public policies and political topics.
However, adding a list of rest ricted acts to the law would represent an improvement over
the current ban on “partisan activity.”
Other than this restriction, Yemeni NGOs are generally allowed to operate freely.
They can merge, dissolve, and divide without government approval. 117 NGOs can accept
money and assistance from foreign sources without government permission, though they
are required to inform the government that such assistance has been given. However, be-
fore undertaking an activity “based on a reques t or assignment from an external [foreign]
entity,” an NGO must obt ain approval of MPSA.
118 Internal governance of NGOs is sub-
110 Mohammed bin Sallam, “The Future of NGOs in Yemen – More NGO Accountability
Needed,” Yemeni Times , Vol. 784, Issue 13, 25-27 October 2004,
https://www.yementimes.com/article.shtml?i=784&p=community&a=2.
111 Law 1 / 2001 (Yemen): Art. 2.
112 Id ., Art. 8.
113 Id ., Art. 9.
114 Id ., Art. 10.
115 Id ., Art. 11.
116 Id ., Art. 19.
117 Id ., Art. 47, Art. 44(4), Art. 48.
118 Id ., Art. 23.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 26
ject to many requirements, but these seem intended to ensure good governance and lack
of corruption. They do not impose overly onerous conditions on NGOs. 119
Foreign NGOs can be formed so long as th ey do not violate “Islamic values” or
the Yemeni Constitution. 120 What, exactly, constitutes “Islamic values” is left unspeci-
fied.
In recognition of the important role that NGOs play in development, the Yemeni
government extends substantial benefits to NGOs, including exemption from all taxes on
income and imported goods and supplies, exemption from customs duties on overseas
gifts and grants, and a 50 percent reduc tion on electricity and water utility fees.
121
Supervision and Enforcement
In keeping with the protections against government interference built into Law 1 /
2001, no NGO can be terminated by MPSA without a court order. MPSA has only the
right to “sue for the dissolution” of an NGO in court, and then only if the NGO has com-
mitted “a serious breach of the provisions of this Law.”
122 In addition, MPSA cannot file
suit unless it has given the NGO notice at leas t “three times within six months to remedy
the violation” and the NGO has still not complied.
123
Even so, Law 1 / 2001 does contain a ha ndful of draconian punishments, which
seem out of place given the law’s overall libe ral thrust. For example, individuals who are
not members of an NGO but participate in th e management or discussions of an NGO’s
General Assembly without express approval of the NGO’s Board of Directors are subject
to up to six months in prison a nd a fine of 50,000 Yemeni rials.
124 Further, any violation
of Law 1 / 2001, no matter how small, can be punished by three months in prison and a
fine of YR 30,000.
125 Such severe penalties can do nothing but discourage the formation
of NGOs and the participation of individuals in NGO activities.
Aside from its overly severe criminal sanctions, Yemen’s NGO law is basically a
well-written example for other Middle Eastern states, one that bot h complies with most
international standards and exhibits an admi rable level of liberality. Yemeni NGOs are
lucky to operate within one of the most pe rmissive environments in the Middle East.
III. The Importance of Continuing Reform
While there is much variation among the ten countries surveyed in this article,
several underlying themes emerge. Most im portant, Middle Eastern NGO laws tend to
suffer from over-breadth. The laws are often vague and unclear, especially the sections
specifying the circumstances under which th e government can dissolve or ban an NGO.
Many of the laws surveyed are very old and do not reflect a modern understanding of the
119 Id ., Arts. 24-43.
120 Id ., Art. 79.
121 Id ., Art. 40.
122 Id ., Art. 44.
123 Id ., Art. 44.
124 Id ., Art. 69(1).
125 Id ., Art. 70.
International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law / vol. 7, no. 4 / September 2005 / 27
importance of NGOs as partners for the de velopment of society. And generally speaking,
the NGO laws surveyed here tend to reflect government’s desire to control rather than
regulate the NGO sector. But as Middle East ern governments liberalize and modernize,
there is reason to believe that the NGO laws will be among the first to change.
It is noteworthy that the two most lib eral and generally admirable NGO laws,
those of Yemen and Palestine, are among th e most recently enacted NGO statutes. Both
Yemen and Palestine wrote their NGO laws amidst substantial intern ational pressure for
reform (the former from the World Bank, the latter from most of the international com-
munity). Such pressure can often backfire in the Middle East, where sensitivity to per-
ceived interference from former colonial pow ers is always high, even more so in the
wake of the Iraq war. In other words, alt hough the international community can play an
important role in strengthening civil society in the Middle East, any actions must be taken
with a keen awareness of regional sens itivities, strengths, and weaknesses.
Most encouraging is the sheer number of NGOs currently operating in the Middle
East, in all but a small minority of especially authoritarian states. The incredible prolif-
eration and endurance of NGOs, in countries with liberal NGO laws and even in coun-
tries with very repressive laws, is a testam ent to the strength and power of the domestic
“third sector.” The Middle East is not so different from other areas of the world that have
undergone recent major change, and if histor y is any guide, we should not underestimate
the power of the domestic civil society sector to help produce positive and lasting change
in the region.