Registration of Associations in Central and Eastern Europe and the Newly Independent States: A Survey

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REGISTRATION OF ASSOCIATIONS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
AND THE NEWLY INDEPENDENT STATES: A SURVEY 1
By Rachel L. Holmes
Part I: Introduction
This paper evaluates key features of legislation governing registration of associations in Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Newly Independent States (NIS). It is based upon a review of
English language documents.

I. International Law in the Protection of the Freedom of Association
Freedom of association has been recognized as an international right for 50 years – in Article 20
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, in Article 11 of the European Convention
on Human Rights (“ECHR”), which entered into force in 1953, and in Article 22 of the
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”), which entered into force in 1976.
Until recently, however, it was one of the least developed of fundamental freedoms.

In a landmark decision, the European Court of Human Rights unanimously held in July 1998 that
the refusal by Greek courts to register a Macedonian cultural association wa s an interference with
the applicants’ exercise of their right to freedom of association. The Court stated unequivocally
that “the right to form an association is an inherent part” of the right to freedom of association.
“That citizens should be able to form a legal entity in order to act collectively in a field of mutual
interest is one of the most important aspects of the right to freedom of association, without which
the right would be
deprived of any meaning.” (Sidiropoulos & Others v. Greece )
Of nearly equal importance is the January 1998 de cision of the European Court of Human Rights
holding that the action by the Government of Tu rkey to dissolve the United Communist Party of
Turkey was a violation of Article 11 of the ECHR. The Court stated that “the Convention was
designed to maintain and promote the ideals and val ues of a democratic society.” Since “political
parties make an irreplaceable contribution to polit ical debate, which is at the very core of the
concept of a democratic society,” they can be shut down only for “convincing and compelling
reasons.” Furthermore, political parties are essent ial to the protection of the freedom of speech
guaranteed in Article 10 of the ECHR (
United Communist Party of Turkey v. Turkey ) Similar
reasoning would seem to apply to non-governmental organizations.

These decisions under the ECHR are of global signi ficance, for Article 11 of the ECHR, protecting
freedom of association, is essentially the same as Article 22 of the ICCPR. Thus, decisions of the
European Court for Human Rights, which are final an d not subject to review, are directly relevant
to interpreting and applying Article 22 of the ICCPR, a convention that has been ratified by 140
nations.

Under both the ECHR and the ICCPR, the freedom of association can be restricted only (i) in the
interests of national security or public safety, (ii) fo r the prevention of disorder or crime, (iii) for the
protection of health or morals, or (iv) for the protection of the rights or freedoms of others. Any
restrictions must be “prescribed by law,” and they must be “necessary in a democracy” to achieve
one of the four listed objectives.
In both the Sidiropoulos and Communist Party cases, the Court
emphasized that exceptions must be “construed stri ctly,” that only “clear and compelling” reasons
can justify restrictions, that any restrictions must be “proportional to the legitimate end pursued,”
and that there must be “relevant and sufficient” evidence with “decisions based on an acceptable
assessment of the relevant facts” bef ore a restriction can be justified.
2

Finally, the Court in the Communist Party case held that the freedom of association would be
largely theoretical and illusory if it were limited to the founding of an association, for a government
might otherwise immediately disband it. “It follows that the protection afforded by Article 11 lasts
for an association’s entire life and that dissoluti on of an organization by a country’s authorities
must accordingly satisfy the requirements” of Article 11 of the ECHR.

Although many questions remain, the Sidiropoulos and Communist Party cases provide strong
international law protection for the freedom of as sociation and the right to form legal entities to
pursue that freedom
.3 They also articulate very tough standards that must be satisfied before the
freedom of association can be interfered with or restricted.

II. Concept of an NGO
The term “NGO” (Non-Governmental Organizations) refers to the myriad of organizations, some
of them formally constituted and some of them informal, that are independent of government and
that are characterized primarily by humanita rian or cooperative, rather than commercial,
objectives, and that generally seek to promote human rights, relieve suffering, promote the
interests of the poor, protect the environmen t, provide basic social services, undertake
community development, and other organizati ons working in the human dimension.
4 These
NGOs, which include associations, societies, foundations, charitable trusts, nonprofit
corporations, or other legal entities, do not operate for profit—viz., if any profits are earned, they
are not and cannot be distributed as such. NGOs do not include trade unions, political parties,
churches, or profit-distributing cooperatives.

A fundamental distinction between types of NGOs that is relevant to the legal benefits and
burdens placed upon them is whether an NGO is or ganized and operated primarily for the mutual
benefit of a defined group of individuals (often t he members of a membership organization) or
primarily for the benefit of the public.

This paper will focus exclusively on legally established associations (i.e. membership
associations). This is not to diminish other ty pes of NGOs nor to diminish the legal problems
confronting them. These problems may be studied in a future paper.

III. Possible Areas of State Regulation
There are three areas in which the State may be in volved in the formation of associations: 1) in
the creation of an association without legal entit y status; 2) in the creation of an association
wishing to attain legal entity status; and 3) in the entitlement of tax benefits.

First, the freedom of association includes the ri ght to associate informally and the guarantee that
no one can be required to join an association. Just as international law requires that the right to
establish a legal entity be reasonably available to all, so to it would prohibit a State from requiring
the formation of a legal entity to exercise the freedom of association. In some countries, the
advantages for attaining legal entity status are not great and the burdens (e.g. annual reports)
may make formal establishment undesirable. (See, for example, Italy.) As a consequence, many
small associations choose not to be formally established. Other organizations, however, may
choose to register as private companies, foundations, political parties, trade unions, or other legal
entities if they believe this serves their purpos e. There are distinct advantages and disadvantages
of each form of organization, and the laws of each country must be examined in detail to
determine which form of entity is most appropriate.

Second, the State must not unduly restrict the legal establishment of associations. According to
the Court in the
Sidiropoulos case, the State may only restrict the freedom of association under
any of the four exceptions list ed above in Section II. These exceptions are to be strictly construed

by the registration authorities. This means that when an association applies for legal entity status,
the registration authority must not only determin e whether the association followed the procedure
outlined by law (e.g. the founders must have an orga nizational meeting, and a board of directors
must be chosen before an application for registra tion can be filed) but also whether the
association’s purposes are appropriate, within the limits outlined in the
Sidiropoulos case (see
Part I, Section II above ).
Once the application for registration has been approved and, in many countries, when the name
of the organization is formally enrolled on a regi ster of NGOs, the association acquires existence
as a legal entity. Acquisition of legal entity status generally means that it is the legal entity that is
liable for the debts, contracts, leases and obli gations that are entered into, not the individual
founders or members themselves.

Some civil law systems permit the formation of a le gal entity without a formal filing with any court
or government agency. In France, for example, an association can obtain legal entity status
simply by filing a declaration with the respec tive regional department and publishing it in the
Journal Officiel .
In the Netherlands no government agencies are in volved in the establishment of associations.
Rather, its laws merely stipulate the steps an orga nization must follow in order to acquire legal
entity status. Thus, for example, an “informal as sociation” can be formed without formal action
and its constitutive and governing rules need not be laid down in a notarial deed. An adequate
expression of the will to work together is suffici ent. “Formal associations,” on the other hand, are
established by an execution of a notarial deed and registration in the Public Trade Register held
by the Chambers of Commerce and Industry.

In Sweden establishment of an association requir es no official registration. Instead, the
association need only have two founders and an or al or written charter. If these minimum
conditions are met, the association automatically becomes a legal entity without any further
registration or other acts of state.

Many common law systems permit the establishment of associations without a formal filing with
any court or government agency. For example, in the United States, an association can simply
adopt a charter without seeking formal incorpor ation. For such unincorporated associations,
however, personal liability is not limited.
5 Should the association wish to incorporate formally, it
merely files its charter with the Secretary of State.

Third, a principal motivation for seeking legal entit y status is to become eligible for tax benefits.
There are basically two ways in which the State c an confer tax benefits. One is through an initial
registration process in which the registration autho rity deems that the association is entitled to tax
benefits in addition to legal entity status. In ot her words, the registration authority determines
whether the association has public benefit status (within the limitations articulated in the
Sidiropoulos case).
Once it makes that determination and grants legal entity status, the association is entitled to the
tax benefits conferred on public benefit associations. The Czech Republic employs this method,
leading to a more careful scrutiny in their registration process.

The second way a state can confer tax benefits is by requiring the association to first register for
legal entity status, and then, subsequently, regi ster for tax benefits. Hungary and the United
States both employ this method.

This paper will focus on the legal registration requirements for associations, regardless of
whether the motivation for registration is to become eligible for tax benefits, to shield individuals

from legal liability, to establish a more certain and stable governance structure, or any other
reason. In short, it will focus on how legal entity status is obtained, not why.
6
Part II: Analysis of Registration for Legal Entity Status
I. Organizational Requirements
Laws governing NGOs should be written and administer ed so that it is relatively quick, easy and
inexpensive to establish an association as a legal entity. Individuals, legal entities, and even
organs of the state should be entitled to establ ish associations for any legal, not-for-profit
purpose. Foreign individuals and legal entities should also be allowed to establish associations
with the same rights, powers, privileges and im munities enjoyed by domestic associations.

To acquire legal entity status, the state law can impose reasonable conditions that must be met
before the association achieves legal entity status. The most common of these are founder
requirements.

A. Founder Requirements
1. Number of Founders
A number of countries require two to five founders. Examples include Albania,
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Li thuania, Slovakia, Armenia, Russia, and
Ukraine. Others require ten founders, including Hungary, Latvia, Slovenia,
Belarus, and Kyrgyzstan. A few countries require a significantly greater number
of founders, which poses a practical obsta cle to the formation of associations,
particularly associations promoting less popular goals. For example, Bosnia
requires 30 founders; Poland, 15 for its “f ull” associations; and Romania, 20.

Any provision of a law governing NGOs may be so onerous that it impedes the
right to the freedom of association. Thus, requiring a number of founders so high
that it is very difficult to form legally registered associations would violate
international law. There is no fixed number that is the maximum allowed. Rather,
the issue must be examined on a facts and circumstances basis.

2. Foreign Founders
In many states, like Bulgaria, Estonia, Russia, Moldova, and Ukraine, foreigners
are permitted to be founders. By contrast, in places like Azerbaijan, Belarus, and
Yugoslavia, the laws explicitly state that only citizens may be founders. In
Yugoslavia, for instance, the law does not permit foreigners to establish
associations or for foreign associatio ns to operate legally in the Yugoslav
territory. As an example of an another approach, foreigners in Romania may
establish associations provided that 50% of the members of the board and
executive body are Romanian citizens. As an example of yet another approach,
foreigners in Macedonia and Bosnia may establish associations provided they
“permanently reside” in the territory.

3. Legal Entities as Founders
While all existing NGO laws in CEE and the NIS allow individuals to establish
associations, a few do not allow legal entities to establish associations.
Yugoslavia’s Law on Associations, for exam ple, explicitly forbids legal entities

from founding an association. Similarly, the recently-enacted Macedonian Law on
Associations and Foundations precludes legal entities from founding
associations, however, they may be members of associations, and furthermore,
NGOs may form umbrella groups. It is an important best practice to allow legal
entities, including agencies of the government, to establish associations. This
permits like-minded associations to form umbrella groups to pursue matters of
mutual interest. For example, environmental NGOs should be allowed, and even
encouraged, to form an association to coordinate their activities, share
knowledge and skills among themselves, and to speak as a group on important
environmental issues. Similarly, it should be permissible for city police forces or
state-owned museums to form national associations for similar purposes.

II. Document Requirements
For the most part, the application process is ve ry similar in all the CEE and NIS countries.
Successful registration depends upon adherence to the legal formalities when submitting the
documents, but the document requirements tend to be minimal.
7
One relatively minor concern with the applicatio n process is the requirement in some countries
that foreign associations submit copies in tw o different languages. For example, in Kazakhstan
and Tajikistan, foreign associations are required to produce documents in both the Republic
language and Russian. Some foreign NGOs have complained that it would be less of a burden if
they were allowed to choose one or other of the two languages.
8
III. Registration Authority
A. Registration Authority
Registration authority can be vested in the courts or in ministries. It can operate at the national
level, local level, or both. Where registration autho rity is vested in ministries, it can be assigned to
a single ministry (for example, the Ministry of the Interior) or in ministries that have responsibility
over particular functions (e.g. health, education, research).

Across CEE, the prevailing pattern is to register with the local district courts. The presumption by
many in the region is often that registration with court-based systems are more open and less
subject to political interference than registration with a ministry which may be more restrictive or
subject to political influence. In addition, many countries have moved away from registration with
the Ministry of Interior, which in former ti mes had associations with the secret police.

Typically, each district court maintains its own re gister, but all registration decisions are compiled
and collected into a national register at the Suprem e Court or another central registration locus.
Almost all of the CEE countries have a central register; Croatia and Romania do not. There are
some CEE countries which vest registration authori ty in a ministry. For example, in Bosnia, an
association must register with the Ministry of Justice or one of its local branches;
9 in Croatia, with
the Ministry of Public Administration or one of the local administration; and in the Czech Republic,
with the Department of Civic Affair s at the Ministry of Interior, but not at a district or local level.

In every country in the NIS except Georgia, regist ration is currently vested with the Ministry of
Justice and/or its local administrative bodies. In Ge orgia, registration is vested in the courts. Of
the several draft NGO laws being considered in t he NIS, only the Azerbaijani draft has proposed
vesting the registration authority in the courts.

In many of the countries of CEE and the NIS, registration is carried out through registration
authorities located throughout the country, thus making registration accessible for associations

outside the capital cities. In Azerbaijan, however, registration is carried out only through the
Ministry of Justice central office in Baku, the capital city. That restraint makes it difficult to register
associations in regions outside of Baku.

B. Degree of Discretion
The degree of discretion vested in court registrati on authorities and ministries varies. Typically,
the registration authority vested in the courts simply verifies that the claimed purposes are
consistent with those stipulated in law and that the association complies with the minimum
requirements as to legal form. While there are some ministries with clearly limited responsibilities
(for example, the Czech Republic), more often ministerial level authorities also have the power to
determine whether a particular organization is need ed in a particular field, regardless of whether
its purposes are consistent with those that are le gally permissible. Sometimes this is because the
legal provisions on establishment are not clear about the kinds of organizations that may be
established.

For instance, in many NIS countries, including Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and
Uzbekistan, registration authorities might require associations to change or modify their purpose
in order to comply with written and unwritten laws inherited, in part, from the past and encouraged
by lack of clarity in the legislation. In other words, the laws of public associations explicitly or
implicitly give these registration authorities broad discretion in interpreting which organizations
may be established. Nonetheless, it should be permissible to establish an association to engage
in any legally permitted activity that is not prim arily intended to make profits. Any derogation from
that standard raises the possibility of inconsiste ncy with emerging international law standards for
the freedom of association.

Prior control is another good example of a regi stration authority’s extreme discretionary power.
Prior control means the direct involvement of the government prior to registration. Prior control
continues to be a problem in Romania, Bulgaria, Poland, and Uzbekistan. Prior to registration, in
Romania, the founders of an association must request an opinion from the ministry or other
central public administrative body having jurisdic tion over the activities proposed by the
association. This opinion serves only an advis ory purpose because the court has ultimate
authority over registration decision s, but it can be quite influential. In addition, the founders must
prove that the association has a legal right to use the premises where its headquarters will be
located. When an application is submitted for re view, the prosecutor and the ministry or the
central public administrative body that issued t he advisory opinion are required to participate in
the hearings, which are open to the public.

Similarly, in Bulgaria registration of associations is decided after an open hearing with the
participation of the public prosecutor. Although ma ny associations have succeeded in registering
in recent years, this is a remnant of the communist period and should be changed.

In Poland the court informs the local administrative bodies about the application and the
administration may then within 14 days express its opinion before the court or enter the
proceedings as an interested party. If the adminis tration or public prosecutor intervenes and
opposes registration, the registration court may forbid the establishment of the association,
particularly for “associations simple.”

In Uzbekistan founders are required to convene an organizational meeting to adopt a charter and
elect officers. Such conferences officially r equire local government approval, which, since mid-
1992, has been virtually impossible for groups ind ependent of the government to obtain. Only
after the conference has been conducted are founde rs permitted to file all of the organizational
documents with the Ministry of Justice.

All of the above-mentioned illustrations of prior control are obstacles in forming associations and
may be of debatable legitimacy in light of the principles set for in the
Sidiropoulos and Communist
Party cases (see Part I, Section II ).
C. Requirement to Register
In many CEE and NIS countries (e.g. Russia), oper ations of unregistered public associations are
permitted (that is, not expressly prohibited). In ot her countries, the lack of registration simply
means that any group that is unr egistered does not receive the benefits that are conferred upon
public associations such as legal entity status or preferential tax treatment. (See, for example,
western European countries such as Sweden or Germany.) But, in several countries like Bosnia,
Moldova, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, a different obstacle is created by the
requirement that associations
must register as legal entities, or they will not be allowed to operate
in the country.

As an example, Article 12 in Tajikistan’s Public Associations Law explicitly states that public
associations are allowed to carry out their activities only after they are registered with the Ministry
of Justice or its local agencies. It is a violation of the law, therefore, to exist as an unregistered
public association. However, there appear to be no provisions on sanctions for failure to register.
(See also Yugoslavia.)

In Kazakhstan public associations not registered according to the order prescribed in the Law on
Public Associations are not allowed to work in the Republic. Moreover, in 1995, the Decree of the
President established administrative responsibilit y for punishment of unregistered associations.
These provisions do not correspond with the nor ms of the Kazakhstan Constitution and Civil
Code.

Similarly, Uzbekistan’s Law on Public Associations forbids operations of public associations with
unregistered by-laws. These appar ent limitations on the right of individuals to come together and
operate freely in informal associations is clearly inconsistent with the right to freedom of
association protected by the European Conven tion on Human Rights and the International
Covenant of Civil and Political Rights.

Generally, the founders can file an application for registration with the appropriate registration
authority in the area where the association is located immediately after the founding of an
association. For the most part, there are no time limits on when to file an application for
registration. But in countries where registrati on is mandatory, founders must file an application
and submit all the required documents within 15 to 30 days after the founding of an association in
order to become a legal entity. For example, in Yugoslavia and Turkmenistan, associations are
required to register with the registration court within 30 days of being founded. In Bosnia the Law
on Association of Citizens explic itly states that an application for registration must be submitted
within 15 days of holding a founding assembly. This requirement, combined with the law’s
stipulation that associations which are not regist ered are not permitted to operate in the territory
of the Federation of Bosnia (s ee Section III, C above), appears to be an infringement on the right
to freedom of association.

D. Registration Fees
Finally, associations are typically required to pay a registration fee upon submission of their
applications, although no payment is required in Hu ngary. Registration fees vary from $1 US in
Croatia and Turkmenistan, to $45 US in Bulgaria and $180 US in Tajikistan. In much of the NIS,
international public associations must pay an av erage of 20 minimum monthly salaries plus $100-
$200 US. This fee is usually feasible for well-funded foreign associations, but for other public
associations the payment of a fee of 10-20 mini mum monthly salaries might not be manageable.

For example, individuals have complained that the registration fee in Tajikistan has posed a
severe obstacle to registration. A receipt shoul d be provided by the registration authorities upon
payment of the fee.

IV. Registration Process
Once the application is filed, the registration aut horities typically have 30 to 120 days to make a
decision. As soon as the registration authoritie s make a decision, they have approximately 10
days to inform the association of its approval or rejection. Most countries in CEE and NIS follow
this procedure. In addition, several countries have provisions in their laws offering default
registration should the registration authority fail to act upon the application within the stated time.
For those that provide default registration, the st ipulated time is generally 30 to 40 days. (See, for
example, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Croatia.
10)
Under the old law in Macedonia, default registra tion was available after 30 days but it was not
possible to prove when the documents were submi tted (i.e. it was difficult to get a receipt
indicating submission of documents), so this default period was often exceeded. Providing for
default registration when no action is taken within a reasonable period of time precludes officials
who are overseeing establishment procedures from using delay as a means of effectively denying
establishment to an organization they do not favor. (Countries that do not provide default
registration include Hungary, Ro mania, and the NIS countries.)

V. Grounds for Refusal to Register
Generally speaking, registration may be rejected if the court or Ministry determines that the
purpose of the association is not permitted, the association is a political party or religious society,
or the association’s purpose is otherwise prohibi ted by law. Registration may also be rejected if
the application contains deficiencies and the applicant fails to correct the deficiencies identified by
the registering authority in the statute or other document. Registration may also typically be
denied if the name chosen by the new association is already in use by another. Usually, as is the
case in most CEE and NIS countries, the registering authority must identify the faults within five to
10 days of submission so that the problem can be corrected. Again, in a country with default
registration, registration becomes automatically valid if the court or Ministry does not inform the
association of its decision within 30 days or more.

As a matter of international law, registration may be only be rejected if the application falls within
the one of the four grounds for refusal set for by the Court in the
Sidiropoulos case (see Part I,
Section I above).

In the NIS if founders fail to make the require d changes in their applications regarding their
purpose or other important provisions in thei r statutes, as requested by the registration
authorities, then the registration authorities will deny their registration. Again, the laws on public
associations are usually so ambiguous that they provide broad discretion in interpreting the
reasons for denying an application. This probl em, in particular, affects human rights
organizations. Insufficient legislation, and other barriers such as corruption, discourages new
associations from being created in most of the NIS countries.

VI. Right to Appeal
In case of rejection, an association almost unive rsally has the right to appeal. Typically, in both
CEE and the NIS, associations have the right to appeal to the Supreme Court anywhere from 10
to 30 to 60 days after the rejection has occurred. This right of appeal is variously stipulated in the
public associations laws, in the adminis trative laws, or in the civil codes.

While most countries request that the appeals process be handled by the courts, some countries
request that the appeals be handled administrati vely. For instance, Article 30 of the Law on
Association of Citizens in Bosnia provides that appeals can be initiated through an administrative
proceeding in court. The court reviews the legality of the decision, i.e. whether the law was
adequately applied to a particular set of facts, and it has the power to overturn the ministry’s
decision.

This can become a problem because deciding appeals based on an administrative record where
the issues are purely legal is less burdensom e and quicker than an administrative proceeding
where there is a
de novo review of the facts as well as the law. (See also Croatia where there is
no particular provision in the law regarding app eals, hence, administrative appeals presumably
takes place.)

In Azerbaijan, as another example, the appeals proc ess is difficult. Associations have to apply to
appeal to the Supreme Court and present to the court, a written response from the registration
authority. This becomes an expensive and time-cons uming process. Similarly, in Kyrgyzstan, if
registration of an association is denied or del ayed, the association may appeal to the Supreme
Court. However, if the court decides that the decis ion of the Ministry of Justice was improper, the
law is unclear as to who is responsible for taking corrective action.

VII. Time When an Association Becomes a Legal Entity
Generally, the moment that a registration aut hority approves the application and renders its
decision is the moment that an association becomes a legal entity. This is usually formalized by
entering the association into the register. Th is appears to be the norm for CEE and the NIS.

Hungary, in an interesting approach, requests that the court send a copy of its decision over to
the public prosecutor’s office, which, from the moment of registration, has powers of general
supervision over associations. The public pros ecutor, upon receiving notice of an association’s
registration, then has the obligation to see that the association complies with the law. For
instance, the prosecutor is empowered to notify t he association if he or she finds any wrongdoing,
such as evidence of illegal acti vities or neglect of duties. The prosecutor may also warn the
association against conducting future illegal activi ties. When the association receives a notice or
warning from the public prosecutor, the associ ation has approximately 30 days to rectify the
situation. This example aptly illustrates the role t hat a government official can play in scrutinizing
the activities of an association as soon as registration has occurred.

VIII. Grounds for Dissolution
Generally, the legislation in CEE and the NIS provides for involuntary dissolution by the courts for
the following reasons: 1) an association can be in voluntarily dissolved if it remains inactive for
more than a year; 2) if it has fewer than the re quired number of members; 3) if it commits a
criminal offense or encourages others to commit a criminal offense; or 4) if its conduct infringes
onto the rights and freedoms of others. Decisions regarding involuntary dissolution are
appealable.

In Croatia, for example, the law is too broad with respects to suspension of activities. It lists no
specific criteria setting forth when the association is deemed to have ceased to exist, thus
creating broad discretionary room for shutting down associations. In other countries, especially in
the NIS, the term “impossibility” of purpose pr esents problems. Mainly, it gives registration
authorities broad discretion in determining whether an association’s purpose is feasible. This is
contrary to the international legal principal t hat registration authorities have no right to say
whether an association’s activity or purpose is “impossible.”

IX. International Organizations
UNHCR has been interested in NGO law reform throughout the Newly Independent States,
largely because its work with displaced persons increasingly demands interaction with indigenous
NGOs. UNHCR believes that, in order for the sector to become more dependable and effective,
the legal framework governing its activities must be strengthened: increasing the security,
independence, and sustainability of the sector, and its public accountability and transparency. For
example, UNHCR has taken the lead in seeking to improve the legal framework in Azerbaijan,
working with the Soros Foundation and ICNL in assisting in the drafting of new laws.

Together with the Council of Europe, UNHCR has sponsored high-level regional conferences
throughout the NIS, highlighting the importance of the sector and the need for a fair and effective
legal foundation for its operations. The Council’s interest in seeing that European standards are
adopted in western NIS and the Caucasus countries has precipitated its participation in this effort.

Likewise, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has supported NGO
law reform throughout Central and Eastern Europe as well as Central Asia. It has supported ICNL
in its mission to assist in developing and drafting NGO laws in 14 countries in CEE and eight
countries in the NIS.

X. Recommendations
• That the governments work with the NG O sector and other interested parties in
developing a supportive legal and regulatory framework for NGO law reform.

• That the process of establishing an asso ciation be quick, simple, and inexpensive.
• That foreigners and legal entities be allowed to establish associations on terms
comparable to those for individual citizens.

• That the minimum number of founders be 10 or less.
• That the laws on public associations be made clear and specific so as to avoid ambiguity,
which can lead to arbitrary abuses of the law by registration authorities.

• That discriminatory or arbitrary delays be avoided by providing for default registration, so
that registration is automatic afte r the expiration of a stated deadline.

• That relief be provided for associations paying high registration fees—e.g. excuse the fee
for associations that prove that they are unable to pay t he fee due to lack of funds.

• That the registration fees be lowered to reasonable amounts, possibly taking into
consideration monthly minimum salaries and national economic conditions.

• That de novo administrative appeals be limited and simple, legal appeals to independent
courts be encouraged.

• That unregistered associations be allowed to participate in public life by eliminating any
requirement that they must be registered.

• That the role of the public prosecutor in participating in and holding hearings during the
registration process be eliminated.

• That any undue discretionary power of registration authorities be abolished.
• That ample and sufficient time for associations to apply for registration be allowed and/or
to appeal rejection decisions.

• That the time for registration authoritie s to process registration applications be
reasonably short.

• That associations be given fair and timely notice to correct any deficiencies in their
applications before an ultimate decision to reject registration is given.

• That the number of documents necessary to s ubmit to the registration authorities be kept
to a minimum.

FOOTNOTES (HINT: Use the back button on your browser to return to the text after
reading the footnote)

1. This paper was originally written for the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) and presented at the OSCE Implementation Meeting in Warsaw, Poland, October 26-
November 2, 1998. The original text has been sli ghtly altered to accommodate the International
Journal of Not-for-Profit Law.
2. The full decision of the European Court of Human Rights in Sidiropoulos and Communist Party
can be found on the website of the Internat ional Center for Not-for-Profit Law at
https://www.icnl.org.
3. This section only deals with international law protection for the freedom of associations. Many
countries also protect the freedom of associations in their constitutions.
4. See Handbook on Good Practices for Laws Relating to Non-Governmental Organizations ,
prepared for the World Bank by the Internat ional Center for Not-for-Profit Law, p. 20.
5. In the United Kingdom, “friendly societies” have been granted some attributes of legal entities
while still remaining unincorporated organizations.
6. For more information on public benefit organizations, see ICNL’s paper on Public Benefit
Status and Not-for-Profit Organizations .
7. Generally, the associations s ubmit for registration an applicat ion, and copies of their statute
and founding act.
8. Also, in Bosnia, the name of the association mu st be in Bosnian or Croat in Latin alphabet.
9. In the Republika Srpska, the courts retain jurisdiction over the registration of associations.
10. Organizations that were registered by default in Croatia have encountered problems in getting
documentation of their registration so that they can open bank accounts, sign leases and so forth.

INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR NOT-FOR-PROFIT LAW
Copyright © 1999 ICNL. All rights reserved.
Revised: .