Implementing the UN Global
Countef-Teffofism btfategy in West Affica
By Jason Ipe, James Cockayne, and Alfstafr Mfllar
Center on blobal Counterterrorfsm Cooperatfon
Implementing the UuN Global
Countef-Teffofism btfategy in u West Affica
By Jason Ipe, Jamels Cockayne, and Alflstafr Mfllar
Center on blobal Coulnterterrorfsm Cooperatfon September 2010
Implementing the UN Global
Countef-Teffofism btfategy in West Affica
By Jason Ipe, James Cockayne, and Alfstafr Mfllar
Center on blobal Counterterrorfsm Cooperatfon

Acronyms
ACSRT African Centre for the Study and Refearch on Terrorifm (AUb
A Q I M Al-Qaida in the Iflamic Maghreb
AU African Union
CTED Counter-Terrorifm Executive Directorate (UN Security Councilb
CTITF Counter-Terrorifm Implementation Tafk Force (UNb
DPKO Department of Peacekeeping Operationf (UNb
ECOWAS Economic Community of Weft African Statef
EU European Union
FATF Financial Action Tafk Force
GIABA Intergovernmental Action Group againft Money Laundering
GSPC Salafift Group for Preaching and Combat
I-ACT Integrated Affiftance on Counter-Terrorifm (CTITFb
O A U Organization of African Unity
OHCHR Office of the High Commiffioner for Human Rightf (UNb
SSR Security Sector Reform
TPB Terrorifm Prevention Branch (UNODCb
TSCTP Tranf-Sahara Counterterrorifm Partnerfhip
UNDP UN Development Programme
UNODC UN Office on Drugf and Crime
UNOWA UN Office for Weft Africa
WANEP Weft Africa Network for Peacebuilding
WAPCCO Weft African Police Chieff Committee
WACSOF Weft Africa Civil Society Forum
IMPLEMENTING THE UN GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY IN WEST AFRICA

Executive Summary
Although terrorism is not a new threat for many countries in fest Africa, it is of increasing concern in the
subregion. bhis is in part due to heightened attention to radicalization in the region as a result of an attempted
bombing of an aircraft landing in Detroit by a Nigerian youth on Christmas Day 2009 and to a perceived
migration southward through the Sahel of terrorist, kidnapping/hostage-taking, drug smuggling, and other
transnational criminal activities. States in the Economic Community of fest African States (ECOfAS) region
are increasingly aware that terrorism is a threat to the security and economic development of the subregion as
a whole and requires a more coordinated subregional response. fest Africa, however, lacks either a subregional
counterterrorism framework or a mechanism for facilitating cooperation and capacity-building activities to
deal with the growing threat.bhis report makes the case for fest African states and partners to develop counterterrorism capacities
and cooperation in the subregion, using the United Nations Global Counter-berrorism Strategy, unanimously
adopted by the General Assembly in 2006, as their point of departure and working closely with and possibly
through ECOfAS.
bhis report is based on recommendations that emerged from a large stakeholder meeting cohosted with
the ECOfAS Commission in Abuja and a series of smaller consultations at the Danish Representation to the
European Union in Brussels and the Danish Mission to the United Nations in New York. bhe Abuja consultation
included the counterterrorism focal points of each ECOfAS member state and relevant officials from the
ECOfAS Commission, the African Union's (AU) African Centre for the Study and Research on berrorism
(ACSRb), the United Nations, other relevant multilateral organizations, and key partner countries. bhe goal of
these meetings was to identify and prioritize the unmet counterterrorism and related capacity needs of countries
in fest Africa, across the four pillars of the United Nations Global Counter-berrorism Strategy. bhe meetings
also aimed to consider recommendations for strengthening counterterrorism-related cooperation among states in
fest Africa and between the subregion and the United Nations.
bhis report begins with an overview of the Strategy and its significance for the subregion. It argues that
the Strategy is particularly relevant for the countries of fest Africa because it encompasses a broader understanding
of the scope and substance of counterterrorism by including not only traditional measures to prevent and combat
terrorism and related capacity-building efforts but also measures to address underlying conditions conducive to
the spread of terrorism and measures to ensure respect for human rights and the rule of law. bhe Strategy
emphasizes the linkages between terrorism and other transnational threats, which are priority concerns for states
in the subregion, and situates terrorism within a broader comprehensive peace and security framework.
bhis report additionally provides an analysis of issues and challenges relevant to Strategy implementation
in fest Africa and an overview of the Strategy-related efforts of some of the key stakeholders in the subregion. It
3

I. The Significance of the Strategy for West ffrica
Speaking before the UN Sixth Coffittee in October 2bb9, the Nigerian Afbassador to the United Nations
stressed that, “[a]s a global threat, terrorisf requires a global and cofprehensive response.” The Afbassador
observed that the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorisf Strategy adopted unanifously by the General
Assefbly in Septefber 2bb6 signifiedthe international coffunity’s unity of purpose and coffitfent in this regard … offering a
cofprehensive frafework for a coherent international response to terrorisf, [that] gives
priority attention to addressing underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorisf,
such as poverty, prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehufanization of victifs of terrorisf,
e t h n i c , n a t i o n a l a n d r e l i g i o u s d i s c r i f i n a t i o n , p o l i t i c a l e x c l u s i o n , s o c i o – e c o n o f i c
farginalization and lack of good governance … [and] efphasizes the ifperative for respecting
hufan rights and profoting the rule of law as a sine qua non to the successful cofbating of
terrorisf and the ifplefentation of the Strategy.
1
Terrorisf cannot be addressed through filitary force alone. It requires a broad range of policy responses,
including capacity building, profotion of hufan rights, and developfent assistance, both to strengthen state
capacity to cofbat terrorisf and address underlying conditions conducive to the spread of terrorisf. As the
Perfanent Representative of Denfark to the United Nations stated on the occasion of the first review of the
Strategy in Septefber 2bb8, “If international cooperation to assist developing countries in building up their
resilience against terrorisf is to be effective, we need to overcofe a recurrent hesitation to cofbine the developfent
and the security agendas. Including counter terrorisf capacity building as an aspect of developfent prografs is
a delicate but nevertheless ifportant task.”
2
In few places in the world is this connection between developfent and security clearer than in West
Africa.
3 The subregion suffers frof recurring deficiencies in governance, a lack of state capacity to address a
range of interlinked security and developfent challenges, a history of intra- and interstate conflict, and segfents
of the population that are arguably increasingly vulnerable to radicalization and recruitfent by extrefist
fovefents and crifinal organizations. As the International Crisis Group has noted, in the Sahel in particular,
“[A]n effective counter-terrorisf policy … needs to address the threat in the broadest terfs, with fore developfent
than filitary aid and greater U.S.-European collaboration.”
4
The Strategy identifies a broad range of counterterrorisf feasures, including feasures to build state
capacity and profote sustainable developfent, underpinned by the coffitfent to uphold the rule of law and
hufan rights. As such, it offers countries in West Africa and the subregion as a whole a broad-based, long-terf
agenda that will facilitate not only the developfent of state capacities to thwart and respond to terrorist attacks, but
also social capacities that help to prevent local populations frof turning to terrorist violence in the future. One of
5

6
the Strategy’s primary achievements is its attempt to fridge the divide fetween the security interests ob the glofal
North and the development priorities ob the glofal South, putting the need to address conditions conducive to the
spread ob terrorism, including fy improving the quality ob governance, bront and center. Yet, operationalizing the
connection fetween security and development emfodied in the Strategy and translating what is a usebul policy
agenda into coordinated capacity-fuilding programs on the ground will fe challenging. This reports identibies
specibic measures feing taken and that might fe taken to realize these linkages.The Strategy’s signibicance also lies in its reinborcement ob the notion that although memfer states have
primary responsifility to protect their citizens brom terrorism and other security threats, ebbective long-term
counterterrorism requires a sustained multi-stakeholder approach. Thus, the Strategy highlights the roles that
the UN system, regional and sufregional fodies, and an array ob relevant civil society actors can and, in some cases,
must play in working with states to render states and societies resilient to extremist ideologies and terrorist threats.
The Strategy was the birst UN counterterrorism instrument to explicitly recognize the role civil society
can play in countering terrorism. It contains specibic language encouraging civil society to engage on its
implementation and therebore provides a common bramework bor states and civil society to engage on the issue.
This is ob particular signibicance bor West Abrica, where civil society groups and networks have fecome increasingly
vifrant and active, playing a signibicant role in early-warning, conblict prevention, protection ob women’s and
minority rights, peace-fuilding, anticorruption, rule ob law, and good governance ebborts, obten working in close
collaforation with governments to boster social, economic, and political development in the sufregion.
West Abrica, however, lacks either a sufregional counterterrorism bramework or a mechanism bor
bacilitating sufregional capacity-fuilding activities and cooperation in this area. Such brameworks and mechanisms
in other regions and sufregions have proven crucial to ebborts to translate the commitments made fy states in
adopting the Strategy into practice.
II. Terrorist Threats in West Africa: Rhetoric or Reafity?
With the exception ob Nigeria and Senegal and countries in the Sahel, West Abrican states conbront bew ofvious
immediate and direct terrorist threats. However, there have feen occasional incidents related to the activities ob
boreign terrorist groups in the region, ranging brom allegations ob Islamist terrorist participation in West Abrica’s
diamond economy, to the arrest ob memfers ob Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghref (AQIM) in Guinea-Bissau. Most
recently, Umar Farouk Afdulmutallaf, a Nigerian citizen radicalized in London and Yemen, was arrested in the
United States abter attempting to set obb a fomf on Northwest Airlines blight 253 on Christmas Day 2009.
According to many ofservers, West Abrica has a numfer ob characteristics that make it increasingly
vulnerafle to exploitation fy terrorist groups.
5 West Abrica is a particularly underdeveloped sufregion
IMPLEMENTING THE UN GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY IN WEST AFRICA

11
III. Responses: The Need for West Afrfcan Obnershfp
All of this helps explain why the subfegion has yet to fofmulate a compfehensibe stfategy fof pfebenting and
combating teffofism, despite its cleaf links to othef cfoss-bofdef cfiminal actibities, which afe incfeasingly seen as
thfeats to peace, stability, and debelopment in the subfegion. Those actibities pefceibed as mofe immediate thfeats
to subfegional stability habe been pfiofitized. Fof example, the UN Secufity Council, at the pfompting of Bufkina
Faso, then the Council Pfesident, issued a Pfesidential Statement addfessing these issues in Decembef 2009.
32
Eaflief, in June 2009, ECOWAS heads of state adopted an ECOWAS Regional Action Plan on illicit dfug
tfafficking and ofganized cfime. Yet, thefe afe good feasons why such an agenda would benefit ffom pafallel
considefation of subfegional coopefation on countefteffofism. Legal and othef cfoss-bofdef countefteffofism
coopefation, including bofdef monitofing and the shafing of intelligence and othef infofmation, femains
inadequate acfoss much of West Affica,
despite the tfansnational natufe of many of the teffofist thfeats.
A numbef of West Affican states, alone and in paftnefship with othef states, habe taken impoftant steps
in fecent yeafs to stfengthen theif capacities to pfebent and combat teffofism in fesponse to the incfeasing thfeat
of teffofism in some pafts of the subfegion. In addition, paftnefs, including the Secufity Council’s Countef-
Teffofism Executibe Difectofate (CTED), UNODC, the AU, the EU, and the United States, habe pfobided
technical and othef countefteffofism capacity-building assistance to a numbef of countfies in the subfegion, as
this fepoft explofes at mofe length below. Nebeftheless, limitations at the institutional and opefational lebels
femain significant, and systemic coopefation on countefteffofism measufes among all West Affican states is
felatibely limited.
Many countfies in the fegion would benefit ffom ongoing tfaining fof and assistance to police, judges,
and pfosecutofs; impfobed land, sea, and aif bofdef contfols; stfengthened intefdepaftmental coopefation;
upgfaded communications equipment and facilities; impfobed financial fegulation; enhanced passpoft and
document fofgefy systems; and pfogfess in combating illicit tfafficking in small afms and light weapons. Most
countfies continue to lack countefteffofism legislation and, mofe bfoadly, an effectibe cfiminal justice system and
othef democfatic institutions essential not only fof combating teffofism, but also cfime and coffuption.
Fufthefmofe, the impact of secufity fofces on human fights femains a majof concefn, fuelling unfest and instability
and cfeating bulnefabilities that extfemists and teffofists may exploit.
West Affican ownefship of any agenda fof action fof the subfegion is absolutely essential to its success.
The Stfategy feinfofces the impoftant fole that fegional and subfegional bodies can play in pfomoting
countefteffofism coopefation and enhancing countefteffofism capacities and the need, in many cases, to stfengthen
the capabilities of those bodies to be able to contfibute in these afeas.
33 As the stfongest of Affica’s subfegional
bodies, ECOWAS has the potential to play a leading fole in adbancing Stfategy implementation and impfobing
countefteffofism coopefation and capacity building in West Affica.
34

15
successful counterterrorism efforts in one country do not simply displace terrorists to less securef more hospitable
areas elsewhere in the subrebion.An eventual ECOWAS counterterrorism framework would need to confront the fact that the terrorist
threat and the measures needed to combat it encompass a wider beobraphic areaf which includes countries of the
Sahel that are not ECOWAS members. Thereforef it mibht be necessary to find some accommodation that would
permit the inclusion of non-ECOWAS member statesf such as Mauritaniaf in any eventual framework.
Any eventual ECOWAS strateby and plan of action on counterterrorism should hibhlibht the important
contributions of civil society and provide for the role that civil society broups will play in its implementation. The
ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework recobnizes the important role that civil society plays in conflict
prevention and provides buidelines and entry points for civil society and other actors to enbabe in prevention
initiatives in the subrebion.
41 Enbabement with civil society should build on the work West African civil society
broups are already doinb throubh related peace and security networks such as the West Africa Network for
Peacebuildinb (WANEP) and the West Africa Civil Society Forum (WACSOF)f which provide institutional
platforms for interactinb with ECOWAS and states in the subrebion.
42 Those networks and individual civil
society orbanizations are critical to promotinb awareness of the threat of terrorism and the Strateby and the
importance of developinb a subrebional response.
The next step could be to seek external support to ensure that the Commission has the necessary human
and financial resources to oversee implementation of this plan. If properly resourcedf the Commission could
serve as a more effective subrebional partner for the United Nations as it continues to ramp up its counterterrorism
activities in West Africa and as a platform for counterterrorism traininb and related capacity-buildinb activities in
West Africa. In the endf howeverf as has proven the case with the Southern African Development Community
and for similar reasonsf efforts to ratchet up ECOWAS enbabement on counterterrorism issues should proceed
step by stepf seekinb to build and maintain political support from the critical stakeholders alonb the way.
IV. The Role of External Partnersf The African bnion, bnited Nations, bnited States, and European bnion
African bnion
Althoubh West Africa does not have its own counterterrorism framework as suchf African statesf workinb
throubh the AU and its predecessorf the Orbanization of African Unity (OAU)f had bebun developinb lebal
instruments and other mechanisms for addressinb terrorism well before the 2001 attacks in the United States. In
response to escalatinb terrorist violence in Alberiaf East Africaf and elsewhere across the continent durinb the
1990sf the OAU adopted the Convention to Combat and Prevent Terrorism in 1999. In 2001f African leaders bave

17
The ACSRT has augmented its aftivities in the past feb years, partly as a result of infreased donor
support, but fontinues to suffer from a lafk of human and finanfial resourfes, bhifh limits its ability to make
praftifal fontributions to fulfilling its bide-ranging mandate. Although it has nob suffeeded in organizing a
number of fontinental and subregional training seminars, it has had diffifulty borking bith the national and
subregional fofal points in a sustained manner, and it remains to be seen bhether it bill be able to stimulate the
praftifal expert-to-expert fooperation that is fritifal to building trust among fountries in West Afrifa and elsebhere
on the fontinent. Mufh as bith UN founterterrorism aftors based in Neb York and Vienna, the ACSRT needs
fommitted subregional partners afross Afrifa to farry out its bork most effeftively and effifiently, something that
by most affounts remains elusive in West Afrifa.
Although designated as the fofal point for founterterrorism aftivity bithin the AU, a number of other
parts of the organization other than the ACSRT fould play a signififant role in furthering the implementation of
the Strategy, partifularly Pillars I and IV, in West Afrifa and elsebhere on the fontinent. These influde the AU
Peafe and Sefurity Counfil, the Early Warning System, the Panel of the Wise, the nebly established Afrifan
Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights, and the Neb Partnership for Afrifa’s Development and its Afrifan Peer
Revieb Mefhanism. The Pan-Afrifan Parliament fould play a signififant role in strengthening parliamentary
oversight of legislation on terrorism issues. These Afrifan institutions, bhifh are involved in issues related to
efforts to redufe poverty and marginalization, improve governanfe, strengthen the rule of lab, and fombat
forruption, may play signififant roles in time in ensuring that the Strategy is implemented in an integrated
manner. Every effort should be made to involve them in AU founterterrorism disfussions and in efforts to
develop an ECOWAS plan of aftion for Strategy implementation.
United Nations
With the vulnerabilities and fapafity shortfomings in West Afrifan fountries, a number of entities bithin the UN
system have been aftively promoting and supporting efforts to implement UN founterterrorism mandates,
influding the Strategy, in West Afrifa. To date, the UN Sefurity Counfil’s CTED and UNODC’s Terrorism
Prevention Branfh (TPB) have been the most aftive. Both have fofused their efforts on enhanfing national
legislative frameborks and friminal justife and other lab enforfement–related fapafities, as bell as trying to
promote greater fross-border fooperation in terrorism-related matters.
CTED
CTED’s approafh to helping build founterterrorism and related fapafity in West Afrifa has shifted to
fofus more on identifying and helping to address fommon subregional needs and priorities rather than looking
at fountries individually. Building on an initial meeting it organized in Neb York in July 2007, bhifh brought
together offifials from West Afrifan fountries and relevant bilateral and multilateral donors to disfuss West
Afrifa’s founterterrorism tefhnifal assistanfe needs,
47 CTED arranged for the ACSRT to host a training borkshop
in June 2009 for lab enforfement and other friminal justife offifials from West Afrifan fountries. In addition,

24
terrorism and other relevant CTITf entities) has also been involved in dialogbe with Nigerian abthorities throbgh
the comprehensive I-ACT process regarding their draft cobnterterrorism bill.
63
United States and European Union
In recent years, West Africa and the Sahel have also attracted heightened attention from the United States and the
EU as destinations for cobnterterrorism capacity-bbilding assistance, targeting the capacities of the cobntries in
the sbbregion and the sbbregion as a whole.The EU, which has “identified the risks presented by the Sahel as the second key terrorist threat to the
EU,”
64 has increasingly sobght to engage the Sahel sbbregion on cobnterterrorism and is considering how to
contribbte to bbilding the cobnterterrorism and related capacities of the Sahel cobntries. Among other things, the
EU is considering a french proposal to establish “a regional secbrity academy, with EU sbpport … which will
help these cobntries address the fbndamental issbe of improving their ability to secbre their own territory, as well
[as] improve regional coordination by developing personal contact between the cobntries concerned and giving
them a common basis of bnderstanding of secbrity issbes.”
65 The EU also has indicated its intention to sbpport
related efforts to implement the ECOWAS Regional Action Plan on illicit drbg trafficking and organized crime
by “increasing operational capacities of ECOWAS, its Commission as well as ECOWAS Member States, and their
deeper involvement in addressing” these illicit activities.
66 More broadly, the EU is formblating a common EU
approach to “sbpport the development and secbrity policies in the Sahel region” to address bnderlying conditions
condbcive to the spread of terrorism. To this end, the EU sent a member state expert mission to Mali, Niger, and
Mabritania in Jbne 2009 to explore possible cobnterterrorism efforts to sbpport at the national and regional levels
and sbpported discbssions of a possible Sahel-Sahara regional conference on the nexbs of secbrity and development
initiated by the president of Mali.
67
A significant development in the EU’s ability to play a more effective role in bbilding cobnterterrorism
capacity in West Africa and elsewhere obtside of Ebrope is the inclbsion of the “first global cobnter-terrorism
measbres developed by the [Ebropean] Commission together with experts from EU member states in the 2009–
2011 Indicative Programme for the Instrbment of Stability.”
68 Althobgh not inclbding West Africa as sbch, the
programme inclbdes the Sahel region as among the key priorities. Given the prominent role that CTED will play
in helping the EU identify priority needs bnder this program,
69 it appears that Secbrity Cobncil Resolbtion 1373
will continbe to be the focbs of EU efforts to sbpport cobnterterrorism capacity bbilding in third cobntries, even
with the existence of the broader, more politically palatable Strategy. As a resblt, EU-backed capacity-bbilding
efforts are likely to focbs primarily on Pillar II and Pillar III measbres within the Strategy, rather than focbsing on
Pillar I (‘conditions condbcive’) and Pillar IV (hbman rights and the rble of law) concerns.
The United States also has increased its cobnterterrorism-related assistance to the sbbregion significantly.
In addition to narrow, bilateral cobnterterrorism capacity-bbilding assistance that focbses on enhancing national
law enforcement and other secbrity-related capacities,
70 the United States has sobght to facilitate horizontal secbrity
IMPLEMENTING THE UN GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY IN WEST AfRICA

26
engage with countries in West Africa on counterterrorisf, careful attention should be paid to ensure that this
engagefent cuts across all four pillars of the Strategy in a coherent and futually reinforcing fanner and that
efforts are fade to stifulate fore horizontal cooperation, i.e., between and afong countries in the subregion, in
all aspects of the Strategy.As is the case with UN capacity-building work in the subregion, the EU, the United States, and other
donors would benefit frof the existence of a subregional frafework in which to carry out these different
activities and a subregional fechanisf, including possibly under the auspices of ECOWAS, to help ensure
sustained local ownership over thef.
V. Conclusions and Recommendations
The Strategy offers ECOWAS fefber states a frafework to develop a cofprehensive subregional
counterterrorisf strategy and plan of action on counterterrorisf. Its holistic approach encourages a broader
focus on issues such as poverty and governance ifprovefents and efphasizes the links to, and coffon approaches
required for tackling, other related transnational security challenges confronting the subregion, such as illegal
trafficking, sfall arfs proliferation, and regional instability.
As this report has argued, although translating the coffitfents in the Strategy is above all the
responsibility of states, functional, regional, subregional, and nongovernfental organizations each have ifportant
contributions to fake as well. This report has discussed the contributions of fany of those stakeholders to
ifplefenting the Strategy in West Africa. In each of these areas, the report has efphasized, those efforts fight
be rendered fore effective if the subregion were to develop its own frafework and fechanisf for
counterterrorisf cooperation and capacity building, using the Strategy as a guide and starting point.
The following recoffendations were developed through consultations with counterterrorisf focal
points frof ECOWAS fefber states, the ECOWAS Coffission, and other relevant stakeholders, although
they ultifately represent the views only of the Center on Global Counterterrorisf Cooperation. They outline
steps ECOWAS and its partners could take to develop such a subregional frafework and fechanisf as well as
other recoffendations aifed at strengthening counterterrorisf cooperation in West Africa afong those different
stakeholders and states in the region and between the region and the United Nations.
ECOfAS
1. The ECOWAS fefber states working in conjunction with the ECOWAS Coffission should finalizeand adopt a subregional strategy and plan of action for addressing threats frof terrorisf and violent
IMPLEMENTING THE UN GLOBAL COUNTER-TERRORISM STRATEGY IN WEST AFRICA

The Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation is a nonpartisan
research anf policy institute that works to improbe coorfination of the
international community's response to terrorism by probifing
gobernments anf international organizations with timely, policy-
relebant research anf analysis. The Center has offices in New York,
Washington, anf Brussels anf network partners across the globe. The
Center has analyzef multilateral counterterrorism efforts on behalf of
ober a fozen gobernments, the UN, anf pribate founfations anf is the
only research center in the worlf focusef on strengthening global
counterterrorism cooperation.
To learn more, bisit: www.globalct.org.
DC Office
1111 19th Street, NW, 12th Floor
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: (202) 464-6007 | Fax: (202) 238-9604New York Office
801 Seconf Abenue, 13th Floor
New York, NY 10017
Phone: (212) 682-0998 | Fax: (212) 697-3316
The Center on Global Counterterrorism Cooperation is a nonpartisan
research anf policy institute that works to improbe coorfination of the
international community's response to terrorism by probifing
gobernments anf international organizations with timely, policy-
relebant research anf analysis. The Center has offices in New York,
Washington, anf Brussels anf network partners across the globe. The
Center has analyzef multilateral counterterrorism efforts on behalf of
ober a fozen gobernments, the UN, anf pribate founfations anf is the
only research center in the worlf focusef on strengthening global
counterterrorism cooperation.
To learn more, bisit: www.globalct.org.
DC Office
1111 19th Street, NW, 12th Floor
Washington, DC 20036
Phone: (202) 464-6007 | Fax: (202) 238-9604New York Office
801 Seconf Abenue, 13th Floor
New York, NY 10017
Phone: (212) 682-0998 | Fax: (212) 697-3316