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Ashughyan v. Armenia, Application No. 33268/03

THIRD SECTION

CASE OF ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA

(Application no. 33268/03 )

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

17 July 2008

FINAL

01/12/2008

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the
Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision. C O N SEIL
D E L’EU R O PE
C O U N C IL
O F EU R O PE
C O U R EU R O PÉEN N E D ES D RO ITS D E L’H O M M E
EU R O PEA N CO U RT O F H U M A N R IG H TS

ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT 1
In the case of Ashughyan v. Armenia ,
The European Court of Human Rights ( Third Section ), sitting as a
Chamber composed of:
Josep Casadevall , President,
Elisabet Fura -Sandström ,
Boštjan M. Zupančič ,
Alvina Gyulumyan ,
Ineta Ziemele ,
Luis López Guerra ,
Ann Power , judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Deputy Section Registrar ,
Having deliberated in private on 24 June 2008 ,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 33268/03) against the
Republic of Armenia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“the Convention”) by an Armenian national, Mr s Gayane Ashughyan (“the
applicant”), on 26 September 2003 .
2. The applicant was represented by Mr N. Yegh iazaryan . The Armenian
Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent,
Mr G. Kostanyan , Representative of the Republic of Armenia at the
European Court of Human Rights .
3. On 20 May 2005 the Court decided to give not ice of the application to
the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the Convention,
it decided to examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4. The applicant was born in 1965 and lives in Yerevan . She works as a
cook.
5. In February -March 2003 a presidential election took place in
Armenia. Following the election, the applicant participated in a series of
rallies of protest organised in Yerevan by the opposition parties.

2 ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT
A. The demonstration of 7 April 2003
6. On 7 April 2003 at 5 p.m. a demonstration was held in the centre of
Yerevan on the occasion of Mother ’s Day. The demonstration took place on
the Mashtots Avenue next to the Research Institute of Ancient Manuscripts
(Մատենադարան ). It appears that the demonstration was of a political
nature and criticism of the Government and of the conduct of the
presidenti al election was voiced.
7. The applicant alleged, and the Government did not dispute, that traffic
was suspended by the traffic police on the relevant stretch of the Avenue
prior to the commencement of the demonstration in order to facilitate its
conduct. The applicant took part in the demonstration and the following
march .
8. According to the applicant, at around 6 p.m. she went to work. After
work a t around 9 p.m. the applicant went home. On her way home, she was
approached by three men in civilian clothes who, without presenting
themselves, started dragging her to a nearby car. The applicant screamed
and tried to resist. The men twisted her arms, punched her and pushed her
into the car. The applicant was t aken to the Central District Police Station of
Yerevan ( ՀՀ ոստիկանության Երևան քաղաքի կենտրոնական
բաժին ), where she found out that she had been arrested for having
participated in the demonstration.
9. At the Police Station, the ar resting police officers drew up a record of
the applicant ’s arrest ( արձանագրություն բերման ենթարկելու մասին )
in which it was stated that the applicant had been “arrested at 7.30 p.m. at
12 Khorhurdneri Street for violating public order”. The applicant alle ged
that the time of her apprehension was not correctly recorded. In reality she
was arrested at 9 p.m .
10 . One of the arresting police officers reported to the Head of the Police
Station ( ՀՀ ոստիկանության Երևան քաղաքի կենտրոնական բաժնի
պետ ) that:
“… [the applicant] was brought to the Central Police Station for having participated
on 7 April 2003 in an unauthorised march headed from the [Research Institute] to the
Constitutional Court and violated public order …”
11 . The applicant was subjected to a search during which no illegal
items were found. A relevant record was drawn up.
12 . The police officers questioned the applicant. She made a written
statement ( արձանագրություն բացատրու թյուն վերցնելու մասին ) in
which she gave details of her participation in the demonstration and the
following march . She stated, inter alia , that the street traffic was obstructed
when the march headed towards the building of the Constitutional Court.
She w as in the front line holding the Armenian flag and screaming “justice”.
The applicant alleged that this statement was made under pressure and was

ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT 3
dictated to her by the police officers . While most of this statement was true,
its part concerning the obstruc tion of traffic did not correspond to the reality
since the traffic had been beforehand suspended by the traffic police.
13 . The police officers drew up a record of an administrative offence
(վարչական իրավախախտման արձանագրություն ) in which it was
stated that the applicant had “participated in a march and violated public
order”. The applicant ’s actions were qualified under Article 172 of the Code
of Administrative Offences (Վարչական իրավախախտումների
վերաբերյալ ՀՀ օրենսգիրք – “the C AO” ) as minor hooliganism. This
record was signed by the applicant. She also put her signature in the section
certifying that she had been made aware of her rights under Article 267 of
the CAO. In the section marked as “other information relevant for the
determination of the case”, the applicant also added “I do not wish to have a
lawyer”.
14 . The applicant alleged that she was forced to sign this and other
documents prepared by the police officers under threat of violence.
Furtherm ore, they persuaded her to refuse a lawyer by insisting that a
lawyer ’s involvement would not help and would only be detrimental to her
case. The same day at around 12 midnight she was taken to Judge M. of the
Kentron and Nork -Marash District Court of Yere van ( Երևան քաղաքի
Կենտրոն և Նորք -Մարաշ համայնքների առաջին ատյանի
դատարան ), who examined the case.
15 . The Government contested this allegation. According to them, the
applicant was kept at the Police Station for two hours and taken to Judge M.
at 9.30 p.m . During this period, the police officers explained to the applicant
her right to have a lawyer and advised her to avail h erself of this right,
which she did not wish to do. The record of an administrative offence was
signed by the applicant voluntarily and without any objections.
Furthermore, the applicant failed to initiate any act ions aimed at the def ence
of her rights, such as lodging motions or availing h erself of other procedural
rights guaranteed by Article 267 of the CAO, despite having been made
aware of them.
16 . The materials of the applicant ’s administrative case, whic h wer e
transmitted by the police to J udge M. for examination, contained the
following documents: (1) the record of an administrative offence; (2) the
police report; (3) the record of the applica nt’s arrest; (4) the record of the
search of the applicant ; an d (5) the applicant ’s written statement. All these
documents were signed by the applicant except the police report.
17 . Judge M., after a brief hearing, sentenced the applicant under Article
172 of the CAO to an administrative fine of 1500 Armenian drams
(approximately EUR 2.4 a t the material time). The judge ’s entire finding
amounted to the following sentence:

4 ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT
“On 7 April 2003 between 4 p.m. and 6 p.m. … on the Mashtots Avenue [the
applicant], together with a group of people, obstructed street traffic, violated public
order by making a loud noise, and incited other participants of the demonstration to do
the same …”
18 . According to the record o f the court hearing – drawn up in a
calligraphic handwriting – the hearing was held in public with the
participation of the judge, a clerk and the applicant. The judge explained the
applicant ’s rights to her and informed her of the possibility to challenge the
judge and the clerk. The applicant did not wish to lodge any challenges. She
stated that she was aware of her rights and did not wish to have a lawyer.
The judge read out the motion submi tted by the police, seeking to impose
administrative liability on the applicant. The applicant submitted that at
4.30 p.m. she had participated in a march which had taken place in the
Central District of Yerevan, during which they had obstructed the traffi c and
invited other people to join them. No questions were put to the applicant.
Thereafter, the judge read out and examined the materials prepared by the
police. Having familiarised herself with these materials, the applicant
accepted that she had signed the record of an administrative offence. The
judge departed to the deliberation room, after which he returned and
announced the decision.
19 . The applicant alleged, and the Government did not explicitly
dispute, that the above reco rd was a fake and was drafted at some point after
the hearing in order to create an appearance of lawfulness. In reality there
was no clerk and the hearing was not being recorded. The hearing lasted not
more than five minutes and was conducted in Judge M. ’s office . The
applicant further alleged that, contrary to what the record stated, only the
judge, the applicant and the accompanying police officer were present at the
hearing. The latter did not as such participate in the hearing and his
functions were li mited only to bringing the applicant before the judge. The
judge neither explained her rights, nor asked whether she wanted to have a
lawyer. The materials of the case file were not read out and she was not
allowed to make any oral submissions. No evidence was taken or examined.
The judge simply prepared the above decision, solely on the basis of the
materials prepared by the police, and only in the end broke the silence to
threaten the applicant with imminent detention if she did not refrain from
further p articipation in demonstrations.
20 . On 8 April 2003 the applicant complained to the K entron and Nork –
Marash District Prosecutor ( Կենտրոն և Նորք -Մարաշ համայնքների
դատախազ ) about the above -mentioned events . In particular, she
submitt ed that she had been arrested on false accusations. The police
officers had drafted a document and forced her to sign it without reading it.
At about 12.30 a.m. she had been brought before a judge who had sentenced
her to a fine without any examination of the case. She further submitted that
she had sustained an injury to her wrist in the course of the arrest. She

ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT 5
sought to undergo an official medical examination and to have criminal
proceedings instituted against the police officers.
21 . The applicant alleged that in reply she was asked to appe ar in two
days. It appears that she did not pursue her application any further .
B. The demonstration of 9 April 2003
22 . On 9 April 2003 at 12 noon another demonstration was organised in
the same area by the opposition parties. The demonstration was followed by
a march towards the Government building where the inauguration ceremony
of the elected President was taking place. The applicant was in the front line
of the march , holding the Armenian flag.
23 . According to the applicant, the march was blocked at the very
beginning of the Mashtots Avenue by special forces. Since the
demonstrators insis ted on continuing their march , the special forces started
to disperse the demonstration with rubber clubs. She submits that she was
ordered by a police officer to hand over the flag. She refused to do so, after
which she was beaten and taken to a police ca r.
24 . At around 2.30 p.m. the applicant was brought to the Central Police
Station. The arresting police officers drew up a record of her arrest in which
it was stated that she had been “arrested for having violated public order
du ring the march of 9 April 2003”.
25 . One of the arresting police officers reported to the Head of the Police
Station that:
“… during the march which took place on 9 April 2003 after the demonstration next
to the [Research Institute] I noticed one citizen who was violating public order:
waving a flag while walking on the driveway, obstructing the regular traffic of public
transport, creating an e mergency situation, randomly hitting passers -by who were not
taking part in the demonstration with the long flagpole, and inciting others to follow
her example …”
26 . The applicant was subjected to a search during which no illegal
items were found. A relevant record was drawn up.
27 . The police officers questioned the applicant. A statement was taken
from her , al though this time it was not written by the applicant herself.
According to the statement, when t he special forces blocked the march , the
applicant who was in the frontline started to demand to pass through. They
ignored her demands and ordered her to leave. T he applicant started to shout
and hit the people standing behind her with the flagpole so tha t they would
pay attention and also start to demand to pass through , after which she got
arrested . She also admitted in the statement that the Mashtots Avenue was
blocked because of the march .
28 . The police officers drew up a reco rd of an administrative offence in
which it was stated that the applicant had “made a loud noise with a group
of people, and randomly insulted and hit passers -by in the Central District”.

6 ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT
Her actions were qualified under Article 172 of the CAO as minor
hoo liganism.
29 . All the above documents, including the record of an administrative
offence, were signed by the applicant with the exception of the police
report. She also put her signature in the section of the record certifying that
she had been made aware of her rights under Article 267 of the CAO. In the
section marked as “other information relevant for the determination of the
case”, the applicant also added “I do not wish to have a lawyer in
administrative proceedings”.
30 . The applicant initially submitted that she had refused to sign any
documents during her arrest of 9 April 2003. In a later submission, she
claimed that due to the injuries and stress suffered during the apprehension
she could hardly stand and was in a difficult physical and psychological
condition. As a result, she signed the record of an administrative offence
unconsciously and without first familiarising herself with it. Later she did
not even remember that she had signed any documents. She refused a
lawyer for the same reasons as on 7 April 2003. At 11 p.m. she was taken to
the same J udge M. of the Kentron and Nork -Marash District Court of
Yerevan, who examined the case.
31 . The Government contested this allegation. According to them, the
applicant was kept at the Police Stat ion for two hours and taken to J udge M.
at around 5 p.m . The circumstances of her stay at the police station were
similar to the ones of 7 April 2003 (see paragraph 15 above).
32 . The materials of the applicant ’s administrative case, which were
transmitted by the police to Judge M. for examination, contained the
following documents: (1) the record of an administrative offence; (2) the
police repor t; (3) the record of the applicant ’s arrest; (4) the record of the
search of the applicant; and (5) the applicant ’s written statement. All these
documents were signed by the applicant except the police report.
33 . Judge M. sentence d the applicant under Article 172 of the CAO to
five days of administrative detention . The judge ’s entire finding amounted
to the following:
“On 9 April 2003 between 11 a.m. and 1 p.m. in the Central District of Yerevan [the
applicant], swearing loudly and hitting passers -by, obstructed street traffic and
violated public order.
In deciding on the administrative penalty, [the court] takes into account as an
aggravating circumstance the repetition of the anti -social behaviour of 7 April 2003,
i.e. re -commissi on of a similar offence within one year, and the offence being
committed by a group of people.”
34 . This decision also indicated that the applicant had no depend ants.
35 . The record of this hearing is almost identical in wording to the
record of the hearing of 7 April 2003 (see paragraph 18 above) , with the
exception that the applicant added in her submissions that she and other

ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT 7
demonstrators had incited passers -by to participate in the demonstration.
They had arguments with a few of them and there were also some swear
words used, since some of the passers -by tried to mock her. She touched the
passers -by with the flagpole accidentally.
36 . The applicant alleged, and the Governmen t did not explicitly
dispute, that this hearing was in reality conducted in the same manner as the
one of 7 April 2003. In addition , the judge asked the applicant “if you
promise in writing that from now on you will not participate in
demonstrations and ma rche s any more, I will fine you and let you go home,
otherwise I will detain you”. The applicant replied that she had participated
and would continue to participate, because she had not violated any laws
and nobody had the right to prohibit her from enjoy ing her constitutional
rights. The judge pronounced the sentence , after which she was taken to a
detention centre where she served her sentence.
37 . On 15 April 2003 the applicant applied to a local human rights NGO
February 22nd ( «Փետրվարի 22 » իրավապաշտպան
կազմակերպություն ), complaining about the events of 7 and 9 April 2003
and seeking its assistance. Sh e submitte d, inter alia , that on 7 April 2003
the police officers had prepared some documents and forced her to sign
them without even familiarising herself with them first .
38 . On 18 April 2003 the NGO complained to the K entron and Nork –
Marash District Prosecutor ( Կենտրոն և Նորք -Մարաշ համայնքների
դատախազ ) on behalf of the applicant .
39 . By a letter of 12 May 2003 the K entron and Nork -Marash District
Prosecutor ( Կենտրոն և Նորք -Մարաշ համայնքների դատախազ )
informed the NGO that the decisions of 7 and 9 April 2003 had been well –
founded and there were no grounds for appeal.
II. RE LEVANT DO MESTIC LAW AND INTERNATIONAL
DOCUMENTS
40 . For a summary of the relevant domestic provisions and international
documents and reports see the judgment in the case of Galstyan v. Armenia
(no. 269 86/03, § § 25-32 , 15 November 2007 ).

8 ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT
THE LAW
I. THE GOVERNMENT ’S PRELIMINARY OBJECTION
41 . The Government claimed that the applicant had failed to exhaust the
domestic remedies in respect of the decision s of 7 and 9 April 2003, by not
lodging appeals under Article 29 4 of the CAO with the Chairman of the
Criminal and Military Court of Appeal.
42 . The applicant contested the Government ’s objection , arguing that the
wording of Article 294 was unclear and allowed multiple interpretations. It
did n ot prescribe a right of the convicted person to lodge an appeal against
the court ’s decision imposing an administrative penalty, but rather conferred
powers on the chairman of the superior court to review such decisions of his
own motion.
43 . The Court notes that it has already examined this issue and found
that the review possibility provided by Article 294 of the CAO was not an
effective remedy for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention (see
Galstyan v. Armenia , no. 26986/03, § 42, 15 November 2007). The
Government ’s preliminary objection must therefore be rejected.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 OF THE CONVENTION
ON ACCOUNT OF THE APPLICANT ’S ADMINISTRATIVE
DETENTION
44 . The applic ant complained that Article 5 § 1 did not envisage, as one
of the grounds for deprivation of liberty, the detention of a person as an
administrative penalty . Sh e further complained under Articl e 5 § 4 of the
Convention that s he was not entitled to contest the lawfulness of the
detention imposed on her by the decision of 9 April 2003. The relevant
provisions of Article 5 read as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be
deprived of his liberty save in the followi ng cases and in accordance with a procedure
prescribed by law:
(a) the lawful detention of a person after conviction by a competent court;
(b) the lawful arrest or detention of a person for non -compliance with the lawful
order of a court or in order to s ecure the fulfilment of any obligation prescribed by
law;
(c) the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing
him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having
committed an offence or when it is rea sonably considered necessary to prevent his
committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;

ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT 9
(d) the detention of a minor by lawful order for the purpose of educational
supervision or his lawful detention for the purpose of bringing him before the
competent legal authority;
(e) the lawful detention of persons for the prevention of the spreading of infectious
diseases, of persons of unsound mind, alcoholics or drug addicts or vagrants;
(f) the lawful arrest or detention of a person to prevent his ef fecting an unauthorised
entry into the country or of a person against whom action is being taken with a view
to deportation or extradition.

4. Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to
take proceedings by whic h the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily
by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”
Admissibility
45 . The Government submitted that the applicant ’s “administrative
detention” was permissi ble under Article 5 § 1 (a), since she was convicted
by a competent court of committing an administrative offence. As to Article
5 § 4, the Government claimed that the applicant was entitled to contest the
lawfulness of her detention under Article 294 of t he CAO.
46 . The applicant submitted that administrative detention, as a form of
penalty, could not be included among the grounds for detention permissible
under Article 5 § 1 . As to Article 5 § 4, the applicant claimed, in addition to
the reasons contained in her arguments concerning the issue of the allege d
non -exhaustion (see paragraph 42 above), that she was un able to contest the
decision of 9 April 2003 because a copy of this decision was given to her
only at a later date, following her release from detention.
47 . The Court recalls that identical complaints were raised by the
applicant in the above -mentioned case of Galstyan and were found to be
manifestly ill -founded ( see Gals tyan , cited above , §§ 43 -53). It sees no
reasons to be depart from those findings in the present case.
48 . This part of the application is therefore manifestly ill -founded and
must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION
49 . The applicant made several complaints under Article 6 §§ 1 and
3 (b) and (c) of the Convention. In particular, she submitted that (1) the
tribunal examining her cases was not independent, since there were no
independent courts in Armenia because judges were appointed by the
Council of Justice presided over by the Presid ent of Armenia and the

10 ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT
Minister of Justice; (2) the trials were not fair and the tribunal was not
impartial: there was basically no examination of the cases and both t rials
lasted about five minutes; the judge ignored all her arguments without even
trying to rebut them and based his decision solely on the record of an
administrative offence, a document fabricated by the police; (3) the trials
were not public since they were held in camera in the judge ’s office at
12 midnight and 11 p.m. respectively; (4) sh e was not made aware of her
rights and was therefore not able to prepare her defence and to engage a
lawyer; and (5) the decisions taken as a result of this procedure contained
distorted and false facts.
The relevant part of Article 6 of the Convention pro vides:
“1. In the determination … of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled
to a fair and public hearing … by an independent and impartial tribunal…

3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the following minimum rights:

(b) to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of his defence;
(c) to defend himself in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing…”
A. Admissibility
1. Applicability of Article 6
50 . Although th e applicability of Article 6 to the administrative
proceedings in question is not in dispute, the Court considers it necessary to
address this issue of its own motion.
51 . The Court notes that the applicant was convicted on both oc casions
of an offence envisaged under the same article of the CAO as in the above –
mentioned case of Galstyan , where Article 6 of the Convention was found
to be applicable under its criminal limb (ibid., §§ 55 -60) . The Court
therefore considers Article 6 also to be applicable to both sets of
proceedings examined in the present case.
2. Independence of the tribunal
52 . The applicant complained about the independence of the tribunal,
expressing a general dissatisfaction with the syste m of appointment of
judges in Armenia . The Court recalls that an identical complaint was
examined in the case of Galstyan and found to be manifestly ill -founded

ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT 11
(ibid. , §§ 61 -63). It sees no reasons to be depart from that finding in the
present case.
53 . The Court concludes that this part of the application is manifestly ill –
founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of
the Convention.
3. Other fair trial guarantees
54 . The Government submitted that, in respect of h er complaint s about
the lack of sufficient time and facilities to prepare h er defence, the applicant
had failed to exhaust the domestic remedies since in both sets of
proceedings she had not requested the court to adjourn the examination of
the case.
55 . The applicant did not comment on this point.
56 . The Court notes that a similar objection has been already examined
in the case of Galstyan where the Court concluded that the applicant did not
unequivocally enjoy, both in law and in practice, the right to have the
examination of his case adjourned ( ibid., § 85). The Court notes that the
circumstances of the present case are practically identical to those examined
in t he case of Galstyan . There is therefore nothing in the materials of the
present case that would prompt the Court to depart from that finding.
57 . The Court further notes that these complaints are not manifestly ill –
founded within t he meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties ’ submissions
(a) The Government
58 . The Government argued that the applicant had had sufficient time to
prepare h er defence. Referring to the case of Albert and Le Compte v.
Belgium (judgment of 10 February 1983, Series A no. 58, pp. 20 -21, § 41),
they argued that “sufficient time” was to be assessed in view of the
circumstances of the case, including the complexity of the case and the
stage of the trial. On 7 April 2003 t he applicant was brought to the police
station at 7.30 p.m. , while the court hearing took place at about 9.30 p.m .
On 9 April 2003 the respective hours were 2.30 p.m. and 5 p.m . During both
periods she failed to avail h erself of h er procedural rights, despite all the
efforts of the police officers. The applicant was familiarised with the
materials of the case s against h er and informed about h er right to lodge
motions and challenges, which she failed to do. On both occasions t he

12 ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT
applicant signed the record of an administrative offence voluntarily and, by
doing so, she agreed with its content and in essence admitted her guilt .
Taking into account that the applicant signed the record s, refused to have a
lawyer, did not lodge any motions and did not avail herself of other
procedural rights, the police officers considered these periods to be
sufficient for t he preparation of the applicant ’s defence. Furthermore, the
applicant had the right to request an adjournment of the examination of h er
case s, which she also failed to do. By failing to request such an
adjournment, the applicant admitted that she had had ample time to prepare
her defence. Finally, by immediately presenting the case s to the court, the
police officers ensured that the trial s took place within a reasonable time.
59 . The Government fu rther argued that the applicant ’s case s were
examined publ icly. According to Article 8 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
for a case to be examined in camera the court has to take a specific decision
on that. No such deci sion s were taken in the applicant ’s case s, which
indicates that the hearing s were public. Nor di d the record s of the court
hearing s indicate that the y were not public. The presiding judge did not take
any actions preventing the public from being present at th ese hearing s.
60 . The Government finally submitted that on both occa sions the
applicant h erself did not wish to have a lawyer, despite the fact that the
police officers explained to her her right to have a lawyer and advised her to
avail herself of this right. Moreover, the applicant did not wish to have a
lawyer during the entire procedure, including the court hearing s. In sum, the
appl icant ’s trial s as a whole complied with the guarantees of Article 6 of the
Convention.
(b) The applicant
61 . The applicant submitted that the trial s were not fair. A fair trial
presupposed an impartial, objective and thorough examination of the
circumstances of a case, whereas all the materials indicate d that there was
no such examination in her case. Sh e further submitted that, in the period
following the 2003 presidential election, both the police and the courts were
acting upon the instructions of the authorities and doing all that was
possible to punish the opposition activists in condi tions lacking
transparency. The police as a rule were looking for their “victims” not at a
demonstration but at a later hour and at a different location. Often the public
and close relatives became aware of the conviction only after the court
decision had been taken and the convicted person had already been placed
in the detention facility. The accused were normally not ill -treated at police
stations but were, nevertheless, subjected to various methods of
psychological pressure aimed at forcing them to sign documents containing
false accusations. In order to conceal the fact that these cases were
fabricated, the authorities were not allowing lawyers to participate and were

ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT 13
holding hearings at late hours, thus effectively excluding the possibility for
them to be public.
62 . The applicant further referred to h er previous submissions, according
to which the court hearing s, contrary to what the Government claim, took
place at 12 midnight and 11 p.m. respectively and no one else was presen t
besides the judge and the accompanying police officer. Both trial s lasted
about five minutes and there w ere no examination s as such. She was not
made aware of her rights and was not asked whether she wanted to have a
lawyer. The materials of the cases were not read out and she was not
allowed to make any submissions. No evidence was taken or examined and
the resulting court decisions were based solely on the records of an
administrative offence, which were fabricated by the police .
63 . The applicant further submitted that she did not have sufficient time
and facilities to prepare her defence. The Government ’s assertions as to the
circumstances of the case were nothing but assumptions which were based
on the mere fact that she had signed the record s of an administrativ e
offence. The se record s were a fake and so w ere the resulting court decision s
which contained nothing but a stand ard text. Even assuming that the se
record s could be regarded as a confession, in the absence of any oth er
evidence they could not have served as a sufficient basis for her conviction s.
64 . As regards the publicity of the hearing s, the applicant argued that it
was the de facto , rather than the de jure , aspect of this phenomenon which
should be taken into account. Hearing s held at 12 midnight and 11 p.m. in a
judge ’s office could not be considered as “public”.
2. The Court ’s assessment
65 . Since both sets of administrative proceedings against the applicant
have practically identical circumstances, the Court considers it pos sible to
examine them together.
66 . The Court notes from the outset that similar facts and complaints
have already been examined in the above -mentioned case of Gal styan in
which the Court found a violation of Article 6 § 3 (b) taken together with
Article 6 § 1 ( see Galstyan , cited above, §§ 86 -88). The circumstances of
the present case are practically identical. Both administrative cases against
the applicant were e xamined in an expedited procedure under Article 277 of
the CAO. On both occasions the applicant was similarly taken to and kept in
a police station – without any contact with the outside world – where she
was presented with a charge and in a matter of hour s taken to a court and
convicted. The Court therefore does not see any reasons to reach a different
finding in the present case and concludes that in the proceedings of both
7 and 9 April 2003 the applicant did not have a fair hearing, in particular on
acc ount of not being afforded adequate time and facilities for the
preparation of her defence .

14 ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT
67 . There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 3 taken
together with Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
68 . In view of the finding made in the preceding paragraph, the Court
does not consider it necessary to examine also the other alleged violations of
Article 6.
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 10 AND 11 OF THE
CONVENTION
69 . The applicant complained that the sanction imposed on h er by the
decision s of 7 and 9 April 2003 unlawfully interfered with h er rights to
freedom of expression and freedom of peaceful assembly guaranteed by
Articles 10 and 11 respectively, which read as follow s:
Article 10
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers…
2. The exercise o f these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of
national security, ter ritorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or
crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence,
or for main taining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary. ”
Article 11
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly…
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of [this right] other than such as
are prescribed by law and are necessa ry in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the
protection of health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others…”
A. Admissibility
70 . The Court notes that the se complaints are not manifestly ill -founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that
they are not inadmissible on any other grounds. They must therefore be
declared admissible.

ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT 15
B. Merits
1. The scope of the applicant ’s complaints
71 . The Court notes that, in the circumstances of the case, Article 10 is
to be regarded as a lex generalis in relation to Article 11, a lex specialis . It is
therefore unnecess ary to take the complaints under Article 10 into
consideration separately (see Ezelin v. France , judgment of 26 April 1991,
Series A no. 202, § 35; and Galstyan , cited above, § 95).
72 . On the other hand, notwithstanding its autono mous role and
particular sphere of application, Article 11 must, in the present case, also be
considered in the light of Article 10. The protection of personal opinions,
secured by Article 10, is one of the objectives of freedom of peaceful
assembly as ens hrined in Article 11 (see Ezelin , cited above, § 37, and
Galstyan , cited above, § 96).
2. The demonstration of 7 April 2003
(a) Whether there was an interference with the exercise of the freedom of
peaceful assembly
73 . The Government claimed that there was no interference with the
applicant ’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly guaranteed by Article 11
as far as the decision of 7 April 2003 was concerned . The applicant was
convicted of a public order offence and the refore the penalty imposed was
not connected with the exercise by the applicant of her right to freedom of
peaceful assembly. According to the Government, the applicant was far
away from the demonstration and, simply for hooligan reasons, blocked a
street that had nothing to do with it. Such actions, however, cannot be
considered as necessary for the exercise of one ’s right to freedom of
peaceful assembly.
74 . The applicant submitted that the Government ’s assertions did not
correspo nd to the reality. She was brought to the police station because of
her active participation in the demonstration. This was done despite the fact
that she had not committed anything illegal in the course of the
demonstration. By making such assertions, the Government were trying to
present the applicant as an ordinary hooligan as opposed to an active
participant in a demonstration.
75 . The Court notes that it is apparent from the court decision that the
applicant was convicted for v iolating public order during a demonstration
and, more specifically, the demonstration of 7 April 2003 held on the
Mashtots Avenue. The actions which led to a penalty being imposed on the
applicant, according to the judge ’s findings, were the “obstruction of street
traffic” and the “loud noise” she made during this demonstration which, in
the Court ’s opinion, were the direct result of her participation in it. Thus,

16 ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT
the Government ’s assertion that the applicant blocked a street which had
nothing to do with t he demonstration has no basis in the findings of the
domestic court. It follows that the applicant was convicted for her behaviour
at the demonstration.
76 . The Court further notes that the demonstration in question is the
same dem onstration in which the applicant in the above -mentioned case of
Galstyan participated. In that case, the Court established that the
demonstration in question was neither intended to be not peaceful nor was it
prohibited . Furthermore, the authorities never attempted to disperse the
demonstration or to order its participants, including the applicant, to leave
on account of it being illegal or unauthorised or obstructing traffic (ibid.,
§ 101) . It is true that , in the present case, the police report stated th at the
applicant had participated in an unauthorised march heading from the
Research Institute towards the Constitutional Court (see paragraph 10
above). However, first of all, this allegation was not confirmed in the course
of the court proceedings since the applicant was not convicted for her
participation in an allegedly unauthorised march , but for certain actions
committ ed at the demonstration on the Mashtots Avenue located in front of
the Research Institute (see paragraph 17 above). Secondly, it is not clear on
what grounds such an allegation was made by the reporting police officer
taking into account that at the material time there was no legal act
applicable in Armenia contain ing rules for organising and holding rallies
and street marche s, including the rules for authorising such events (see
Mkrtchyan v. Armenia , no. 6562/03, § 43, 11 January 2007). The Court
further notes that the Government did not allege that the demonstration was
unauthorised or unlawful either. There is therefore nothing in the m aterials
of the present case that would prompt the Court to depart from the findings
made in the case of Galstyan . Thus , by joining the demonstration , the
applicant availed herself of h er right to freedom of peaceful assembly and
the sanction that followed amounted to an interference with that right.
77 . The Court accordingly concludes that the applicant ’s conviction for
her participation at a lawful demonstration amounted to an interference with
her right to freedom of peaceful ass embly.
(b) Whether the interference was justified
78 . An interference will constitute a breach of Article 11 unless it is
“prescribed by law”, pursues one or more legitimate aims under paragraph 2
of that Article and is “necessary in a democratic society” for the
achievement of those aims.
(i) “Prescribed by law”
79 . The Government submitted that, if the Court were to conclude that
there had been an interference with the applicant ’s right to freedom of
peaceful assembly, this interference was prescribed by law. The applicant

ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT 17
blocked Mashtots Avenue with a group of people and, by doing so, violated
public order, which was qualified as minor hooliganism and fell within the
ambit of Article 1 72 of the CAO.
80 . The applicant submitted that these actions could not be considered as
falling within the ambit of Article 172 of the CAO. According to this
Article, minor hooliganism meant obscene swearing or an offensive
annoya nce of a person in public, as well as other similar actions disturbing
public order. However, obstruction of a street could not be considered as an
action similar to the ones mentioned above.
81 . The Court notes that the applicant was convicted for an offence
envisaged by Article 172 of the CAO. It further reiterates that this norm was
formulated with sufficient precision to satisfy the requirements of Article 11
(see Galstyan , cited above, § 107).
82 . It fo llows that the interference was prescribed by law.
(ii) Legitimate aim
83 . The Government submitted that the interference was necessary for
the prevention of disorder and for the protection of the rights of others, since
the appl icant was personally involved in committing unlawful actions
during the demonstration.
84 . The applicant did not specifically address this issue.
85 . The Court notes that it is apparent that the applicant i ncurred the
sanction for actions which were qualified by the authorities as violating
public order. The interference was therefore in p ursuit of a legitimate aim,
namely “the prevention of disorder”.
(iii) “Necessary in a democratic society”
86 . The Government submitted that the interference was necessary in a
democratic society and proportionate to the aim pursued. It was aimed at
preventing the applicant ’s unlawful actions and avoiding social disorder.
The sanction i mposed was at the lowe r end of the scale of penalties
prescribed for the offence committed by the applicant . The Contracting
Parties enjoyed a margin of appreciation as far as the necessity of an
interference was concerned and the reasons given by the dome stic
authorities were relevant and sufficient.
87 . The applicant denied having blocked a street during the
demonstration. She further submitted that, even assuming th at she had done
so, this action by its essence, degree of danger to the society and possib le
consequences could not be considered as posing a threat to the values
protected by Article 11 of the Convention and thus requiring a sanction.
88 . The applicant further submitted that she had not committ ed any
unlawful acts during the demonstration of 7 April 2003, and her arrest and
conviction were mainly aimed at preventing her active participation in
future demonstrations. She finally referred to her earlier submissions,

18 ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT
according to which she could no t have obstructed street traffic because the
traffic on the relevant stretch of the Mashtots Avenue had been suspended
by the traffic police prior to the commencement of the demonstration.
89 . The Court observes that the right to freedom of assembly is a
fundamental right in a democratic society and is one of the foundations of
such a society (see G. v. the Federal Republic of Germany , cited above, and
Rai, Allmond and “Negotiate Now” v. the United Kingdom , no. 25522/94,
Commission decision of 6 April 1995, DR 81 -A, p. 146). This right, of
which the protection of personal opinion is one of the objectives, is subject
to a number of exceptions which must be narrowly interpreted and the
necessity for any restrictions must be convincingly established. When
examining whether restrictions on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the
Convention can be considered “necessary in a democratic society” the
Contracting States enjoy a certain but not unlimit ed margin of appreciation.
It is, in any event, for the European Court to give a final ruling on the
restriction ’s compatibility with the Convention and this is to be done by
assessing the circumstances of a particular case (see Osmani and Others v.
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (dec.), no. 50841/99,
11 October 2001).
90 . The Court further reiterates that the freedom to take part in a
peaceful assembly is of such importance that a person cannot be subjected
to a sancti on – even one at the lower end of the scale of disciplinary
penalties – for participation in a demonstration which has not been
prohibited, so long as this person does not himself commit any
reprehensible act on such an occasion (see Ezelin , cited above, p . 23, § 53).
Furthermore, any demonstration in a public place may cause a certain level
of disruption to ordinary life, including disruption of traffic, and where
demonstrators do not engage in acts of violence it is important for the public
authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful gatherings
if the freedom of assembly guaranteed by Article 11 of the Convention is
not to be deprived of all substance (see Oya Ataman v. Turkey ,
no. 74552/01, § § 38 -42 , ECHR 2006 -…).
91 . The Court notes from the outset that the judgment of 7 April 2003
convicting the applicant in the present case is identical in wording to the one
convicting the applicant in the case of Galstyan , with a small exception as
regards the time (see Galstyan , cited above, § 18). Furthermore, the
applicant in the present case was convicted for her participation in the same
demonstration of 7 April 2003, by the same judge and on the same date. The
actions which led to a sanction being imposed were simi larly “obstruction
of street traf fic” and “making a loud noise”.
92 . The Court has already established in the case of Galstyan that the
street where the demonstration of 7 April 2003 took place, namely Mashtots
Avenue , was packed with a huge crowd, the number of people reaching up
to 30,000. It has been further established that the street traffic was

ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT 19
suspended beforehand by the traffic police with the intention of facilitating
the conduct of the demonstration and the a uthorities did not make any
attempts at any point to disperse the demonstration on account of unlawful
obstruction of traffic (ibid., § 116). The Court notes that there is nothing in
the materials of the present case that would prompt it to depart from the se
findings. I t follows that the “obstruction of street traffic”, which the
applicant was found guilty of, similarly amounted to her physical presen ce
at the demonstration. As to the loud noise made by the applicant, there is
similarly no suggestion that t his noise involved any obscenity or incitement
to violence. The Court therefore concludes that the applicant in the present
case was similarly sanctioned for the mere fact of being present and
proactive at the demonstration in question, rather than for com mitting
anything illegal, violent or obscene in the course of it.
93 . The Court reiterates that the very essence of the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly would be impaired, if the State was not to prohibit a
demonstration but was then to impose sanctions on its participants, even one
at the lower end of the scale of penalties, for the mere fact of attending it,
without committing anything reprehensibl e, as happened in the applicant ’s
case (ibid., § 117). The Court therefore con cludes that the interference with
the applicant ’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly was not “necessary in
a democratic society”.
94 . Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 11 of the
Convention.
3. The demonstration of 9 April 2003
(a) The parties ’ submissions
95 . The Government made submissions similar to the ones related to the
demonstration of 7 April 2003, claiming that the interference with the
applicant ’s freedom of expression and free dom of peaceful assembly was
prescribed by law, pursued a legitimate aim and was necessary in a
democratic society (see paragraphs 79, 83 and 86 above ).
96 . The applicant also repeated her submissions. She further contested
the findings of fact made by the domestic courts, claiming that she had not
used any swear words or hit anybody during the demonstration. These lies
were invented by the authorities to justify the imposition of administrative
detention. The only “offence” committed by her was that she refused to
hand over the flag to the police officers when they started dispersing the
demonstration. In support of her arg uments, the applicant pointed out the
fact that the domestic court stated in its decision tha t she had no depend ants
despite the fact that she had three children.

20 ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT
(b) The Court ’s assessment
97 . The Court notes that it was not in dispute between the parties that
there had been an interference with the applicant ’s freedom o f peaceful
assembly. It considers that the applicant ’s conviction of 9 April 2003
undoubtedly amounted to an interference with her freedom of peaceful
assembly. Furthermore, the Court notes that the applicant was convicted
under the same Article of the CAO as on 7 April 2003. Therefore the
interference was prescribed by law (see paragraph 82 above). The Court
further considers that the interference pursued the legitimate aims of “the
prevention of disorder” and “the protection of the rights and freedoms of
others”.
98 . As regards the necessity of the interference, the Court once again
reiterates its case -law to the effect that a person cannot be subjected to a
sanction for participation in a demonstration which has not been prohibite d
so long as this person does not himself commit any reprehensible act on
such an occasion (see Ezelin , cited above, p. 23, § 53). It follows that the
imposition of a sanction for committing such acts , including violence and
obscenities , may be a justified interference . In assessing whether a particular
interference was justified , the Court must ascertain that it was prompted by
a pressing social need and that the reasons given by the national authorities
were relevant and sufficient .
99 . In the present case, the Court notes that the applicant was found
guilty of certain acts which may be considered reprehensible. It is, however,
mindful of the striking paucity of the findings of fact made by the domestic
court in penalising the app licant . These virtually amounted to the following
phrase: “[the applicant], swearing loudly and hitting passers -by, obstructed
street traffic and violated public order”. No further details of these
allegations were provided, such as the actual obscenities involved , who they
were addressed at and in which circumstances , the manner in which the
applicant had allegedly used any violence and whether anybody had been
injured. No evidence was taken from any victims or witnesses, other than
the arresting police of ficers, and these findings were made following a trial
which las ted not more than five minutes. The Court further notes that the
materials of the applicant ’s administrative case contain no further factual
details either. The charge against her simply stated that she had “made a
loud noise with a group of people, and randomly insulted and hit passers –
by” and even the police report did not provide any substantial details of the
applicant ’s allegedly reprehensible behaviour. In spite of this, thes e
materials were relied upon by the domesti c court when convicting the
applicant, while her submissions made in court in her defence did not find
any reflection in the court ’s findings. In view of the above, t he Court
conclude s that the domestic court fail ed to make a thorough and objective
assessment of the circumstances surrounding the applicant ’s behaviour at

ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT 21
the demonstration of 9 April 2003 , including the alleged commission by her
of any violent and offensive acts.
100 . As to t he “obstruction of street traffic” of which the applicant was
also found guilty, t he Court notes that there is no evidence to suggest that
this went beyond the level of disruption to ordinary life inherent in any
peaceful assembly and permissible under Art icle 11 of the Convention if the
freedom of peaceful assembly guaranteed by that Article is not to be
deprived of all substance (see , mutatis mutandis , Oya Ataman , cited above,
§§ 38 -42) .
101 . In the light of the above , t he Court concludes that the reasons
adduced by the domestic court were not sufficient to justify the interference
with the applicant ’s freedom of peaceful assembly , especially in the form of
such a harsh penalty as five days of detention. The Court notes that in
im posing this penalty the domestic court took into account as an
aggravating factor the applicant ’s repetition of behaviour at the earlier
demonstration of 7 April 2003 which it interpreted as “anti -social”.
However, there is nothing to indicate that the app licant ’s behaviour had
involved anything reprehensible within the meaning of Article 11 (see
paragraph 93 above).
102 . Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 11 of the
Convention.
V. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2 OF P ROTOCOL NO. 7
103 . The applicant complained that she had no right to contest the
decision of 9 April 2003. The same issue was also raised ex officio in
respect of the decision of 7 April 2003. The Court considers it necessary to
examine th ese issues under Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 which reads as
follows:
“1. Everyone convicted of a criminal offence by a tribunal shall have the right to
have his conviction or sentence reviewed by a higher tribunal. The exercise of this
right , including the grounds on which it may be exercised, shall be governed by law.
2. This right may be subject to exceptions in regard to offences of a minor
character, as prescribed by law…”
A. Admissibility
104 . The Court recal ls that, where an offence is found to be of a criminal
character attracting the full guarantees of Article 6 of the Convention, it
consequently attracts also those of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 (see Gurepka
v. Ukraine , no. 61406/00, § 55 , 6 September 200 5; and Galstyan , cited
above, § 120 ). In the present case, Article 6 of the Convention was found to
be applicable to both sets of proceedings in question (see paragraph 51

22 ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT
above). Consequently, Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 is similarly applicable in
this cas e.
105 . The Court further notes that this part of the application is not
manifestly ill -founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must ther efore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
106 . The Government repeated their arguments raised in their
preliminary objection and submitted that the applicant had the right to have
her conviction reviewed under Article 294 of the CAO.
107 . The applicant similarly repeated h er arguments made in reply to the
Government ’s preliminary objection and submitted that the decision s of
7 and 9 April 2003 could be conteste d only by the prosecutor.
108 . The Court notes that an identical complaint was examined in the
above -mentioned case of Galstyan . In that case, the Court first considered
that the offence of which the applicant was convicted was not of a “minor
character” within the meaning of Article 2 § 2 of Protocol No. 7 , since
Article 172 of the CAO prescribed up to 15 days of detention as a maximum
penalty . The Court went on to conclude that the applicant did not have at his
disposal an appeal procedure which would satisfy the requirements of
Ar ticle 2 of Protocol No. 7 (see Galstyan , cited above, §§ 124 -127).
109 . In the present case, as already indicated above, the applicant on
both occasions was convicted of the same offence and under the same
procedure as in the Galstyan case. The Court therefore does not see any
reasons to depart from its finding in that case.
110 . Accordingly, there has been a violation of this provision in respect
of the d ecisions of 7 and 9 April 2003 .
VI. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
111 . The applicant finally complained that both her apprehensions were
accompanied by physical abuse by the police officers. She invoked Article 3
of the Convention , which provides:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.”
Admissibility
112 . The Court observes that the re is no evidence in the case file,
including any medical proof, to suggest that the applicant was subjected to
treatment incompatible with the requirements of Article 3.

ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT 23
113 . It follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill -founded
and must be rejected in accordance with A rticle 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the
Convention.
VI I. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
114 . Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols
thereto, a nd if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to
the injured party.”
115 . The applicant did not submit a claim for just satisfaction.
Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award her any sum
on that account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares unanimously admissible the complaints concerning the lack of
fair and public hearings by an impartial tribunal, the violation of the
rights of the defence, the interference with the right to freedom of
expression and freedom of peaceful assembly, and the lack of possibility
to appeal against the decisions imposing administrative penalties, under
Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (b) and (c) and Artic les 10 and 11 of the Convention
and Article 2 of Protocol No. 7, and inadmissible the remainder of the
application;

2. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 taken together with
Article 6 § 3 (b) of the Convention in that the applicant did not have a
fair hearing, in particular on account of the fact that she was not afforded
adequate time and facilities fo r the preparation of her defence in the
proceedings of both 7 and 9 April 2003 ;

3. Holds that there is no need to examine the other complaints under
Article 6 of the Convention;

4. Holds that there is no need to examine the complaint under Article 10 of
the Convention;

5. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention as
regards the applicant ’s right to freedom of peaceful assembly in respect
of the demonstrations of both 7 and 9 April 2003 ;

24 ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT
6. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol No. 7 in
respect of the decisions of both 7 and 9 April 2003 .
Done in English, and notified in writing on 17 July 2008 , pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Josep Casadevall
Deputy Registrar President

In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of
the Rules of Court, the concurring opinion of Judge Fura -Sandström is
annexed to this judgment.
J.C.M.
S.H.N.

ASHUGHYAN v. ARMENIA JUDGMENT 25
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE FURA -SANDSTRÖM
The Court found a violation of Article 6 paragraph 3 taken together with
Article 6 paragraph 1 of the Convention in respect of t he proceedings of
both 7 and 9 April 2003, since the applicant did not have a fair hearing, in
particular on account of not being afforded adequate time and facilities for
the preparation of her defence (paragraph 66). While accepting this
approach, I woul d have preferred to examine the complaints relating to the
lack of legal assistance separately. The applicant was allegedly not asked
whether she wanted to have a lawyer (paragraph 62). For the same reasons
as expressed in my partly dissenting opinion in Galstyan v Armenia, to
which I refer, I find that there has been a violation of Article 6 paragraph 1
taken together with Article 6 paragraph 3 (c) in this respect.

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