CONSEILDEL’EUROPECOUNCILOFEUROPECOUREUROPÉENNEDESDROITSDEL’HOMMEEUROPEANCOURTOFHUMANRIGHTS
SECOND SECTION CASE OF PATYI AND OTHERS v. HUNGARY (Application no. 5529/05) JUDGMENTSTRASBOURG7 October 2008FINAL 07/01/2009 This judgment may be subject to editorial revision.

PATYI v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT1 In the case of Patyi v. Hungary,The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a
Chamber composed of: Françoise Tulkens, President, Antonella Mularoni, Vladimiro Zagrebelsky,
()&: ;,):2 Dragoljub
’”,=2András Sajó, @A5 B((6(@2 judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos, Deputy Section Registrar, Having deliberated in private on 16 September 2008,Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case originated in an application (no. 5529/05) against the
Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
(“the Convention”) by forty-eight Hungarian nationals, (“the applicants”),
on 4 February 2005.2. The applicants were represented by Mr I. Barbalics, a lawyer
practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government was represented by
Mr. L. Höltzl, Agent, Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.3. The applicants alleged that the prohibition on holding a demonstration
in front of the Prime Minister’s house violated their right to freedom of
assembly, enshrined in Article 11 of the Convention.4. On 4 January 2008 the Court decided to give notice of the application
to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at the same
time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5. The applicants are forty-eight Hungarian nationals (see Appendix).

2PATYI v. HUNGARY JUDGMENTA. The circumstances of the case6. The facts of the case, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised
as follows.7. The applicants were creditors, together with 40,000 other individuals,
of an insolvent private company. Since they were unable to obtain their
outstanding claims, they intended to hold a series of demonstrations
between 7 July and 20 August 2004 in front of the Prime Minister’s private
residence in Budapest. The applicant submitted photographs of the scene of
the proposed events. According to these photographs, the Prime Minister’s
house is situated on a two-lane road in a residential area composed of villas.
Across the street from that property, between parked cars and the fence of
another villa, there is a footpath parallel to which is a strip of grass which is
over five metres wide. The applicant stated that the participants in the
planned demonstrations intended only to occupy this pedestrian zone.8. The first applicant, István Patyi (“the applicant”), was the main
organiser of the events. He notified the Budapest Police Department as
prescribed by the law. On 5 July 2004 the police prohibited the
demonstrations. The applicant sought judicial review. On 8 July 2004 the
Budapest Regional Court quashed the decision and remitted the case to the
police.9. In the resumed proceedings, the police again prohibited the
demonstrations on 10 July 2004. The applicant sought judicial review. The
Budapest Regional Court dismissed his action on 15 July 2004.10. In the meantime, the applicant and some fifteen other private
individuals – according to the applicant’s submissions, “disguising
themselves as tourists” – appeared before the Prime Minister’s house. The
police were also present, but since the applicant informed them that they did
not intend to “demonstrate”, they were not prevented from walking in front
of the Prime Minister’s house and they then left the scene undisturbed. They
did not cause any hindrance or inconvenience to the traffic or other
pedestrians.11. Subsequently, the applicant notified the police of another
demonstration planned for 1 November 2004 for the same reasons and at the
same spot. The planned number of demonstrators was twenty. The head of
the Budapest Police Department, relying on section 8 of Act no. III of 1989
on the Right of Assembly (“the Assembly Act”), prohibited the event on
28 October 2004.12. The police were of the view that the pavement was not wide enough
to secure the necessary space for the demonstrators and other pedestrians at
the same time. Therefore, in order to prevent possible accidents and
confrontations between the demonstrators and passers-by, it would be
necessary to close half the street. They pointed out that on the street in
question three bus services operated on a regular basis and that on

PATYI v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT3 1 November, All Saints’ Day, the traffic was expected to be heavier since
many people would visit cemeteries that day. The police, therefore, having
obtained the expert opinion of the Department of Traffic Administration,
held that the demonstration would cause a disproportionate hindrance to the
traffic, which could not be secured by alternative means. The applicant
sought judicial review.13. On 5 November 2004 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the
applicant’s action. It established that the police decision had been in
compliance with the law and in particular with Article 11 of the Convention.14. Subsequently, the applicants intended to organise other
demonstrations limited to twenty persons. On 18 November 2004 the
applicant notified the police that on 30 November, 1 December,
14 December and in the afternoon of 24 December 2004 demonstrations
were to take place, again in front of the Prime Minister’s house. On
19 November 2004 the head of the Budapest Police Department prohibited
these events.15. The police reiterated that the pavement was not wide enough to
secure the necessary space for the demonstrators and other pedestrians at the
same time. Therefore, in order to prevent possible accidents and
confrontations between them, half the street would need to be closed. It
pointed out that on the street in question three bus services operated on a
regular basis and, in winter, the traffic was expected to be heavier since
many people left for the ski resorts around Budapest via that street. It added
that there was also a possibility of heavy snowfalls and that it would be
difficult to secure alternative routes.16. The police, therefore, obtaining the expert opinion of the Department
of Traffic Administration, held that the demonstrations would cause a
disproportionate hindrance to the traffic, in particular to the buses, which
could not be secured by alternative means.17. The applicant sought judicial review. He stated that his aim was to
hold peaceful, silent demonstrations lasting only twenty minutes. The only
‘action’ planned was to stand in line in front of the Prime Minister’s house,
with twenty participants.18. On 26 November 2004 the Budapest Regional Court dismissed the
applicant’s motion. It established that the police decision had been in
compliance with the law and the Convention.19. On 12 December 2004 the Budapest Public Transportation Company
officially informed the applicant that on 24 December 2004 no buses would
be running after 4.19 p.m.

4PATYI v. HUNGARY JUDGMENTB. Relevant domestic law
1. Constitution of the Republic of Hungary
20. The Constitution of the Republic of Hungary (Act no. 20 of 1949 as
amended) provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:
Article 62 “The Republic of Hungary acknowledges the right to peaceful assembly and secures
its free exercise.”2. Act no. 3 of 1989 on Freedom of Assembly
21. The relevant provisions of Act no. 3 of 1989 on Freedom of
Assembly (“the Assembly Act”) read as follows:
Section 2 “(3) The exercise of freedom of assembly shall not constitute a crime or an
incitement to crime; moreover, it should not result in the infringement of the rights
and freedoms of others.” Section 6 “The organisation of an event held in the public domain shall be notified to the
competent police headquarters according to the place of the event, and in Budapest to
the Budapest Police Headquarters, three days prior to the planned date of the event.
The obligation to notify the police lies with the organiser of the event.” Section 8 (as in force at the relevant time) “(1) If the holding of an event subject to prior notification seriously endangers the
proper functioning of the representative bodies or courts, or the circulation of traffic
cannot be secured by another route, the police may ban the holding of the event at the
place or time indicated in the notification, within forty-eight hours of receipt of the
notification by the authority.” Section 9 “(1) No appeal shall lie against the decision of the police, but the organiser may seek
judicial review of the administrative decision within three days of its notification.” Section 14 (as in force at the relevant time) “(1) The police shall disperse the event if the exercise of the right to freedom of
assembly contravenes subparagraph 3 of section 2 or if the participants appear at the

PATYI v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT5 event … in possession of arms, or if an event subject to prior notification is held
without notification, … or despite a decision banning the event. …(3) If an event is dispersed, the participants may seek judicial review within fifteen
days with a view to the establishment of the illegality of the dispersal.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 11 OF THE CONVENTION
22. The applicants complained that the domestic authorities had banned
the demonstrations planned for 1 and 30 November and 1, 14 and
24 December 2004 without any valid reasons, in breach of Article 11 of the
Convention, which reads as relevant:“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly …2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as
are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society … for the prevention
of disorder or crime … or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. …”
A. Admissibility
23. The Court observes at the outset that it has to satisfy itself that it has
jurisdiction in any case brought before it, and it is therefore obliged to
examine the question of its jurisdiction at each stage of the proceedings
(see, inter alia, Azinas v. Cyprus [GC], no. 56679/00, § 32, ECHR 2004-III,
Odièvre v. France [GC], no. 42326/98, § 22, ECHR 2003-III;
012 v. Croatia [GC], no. 59532/00, § 67, ECHR 2006 -…).24. In the Court’s view, although the respondent Government have not
raised any objection as to the Court’s competence ratione personae, this
issue requires the Court’s consideration for the following reasons.25. The Court notes that Mr Patyi was the organiser of the
demonstrations planned and that he signed all the documents submitted to
the competent authorities. It follows that the latter’s refusal to authorise
these demonstrations undoubtedly concerned, in a personal and direct
manner, his Convention rights. His victim status for the purposes of
Article 34 of the Convention is therefore not open to doubt. Moreover, the
Court considers that his complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the
meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further notes that it is not
inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.

6PATYI v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT26. However, the Court observes that the intention of the other forty-
seven applicants actually to participate in the banned demonstrations is not
supported by any evidence. These applicants have based their complaints on
the mere fact that they were amongst the thousands of people who lost
money due to the insolvency at issue (see paragraph 7 above). Furthermore,
notwithstanding the obvious difficulties of proving an intention to
participate in events which never materialised, the Court must attach weight
to the fact that, in Mr Patyi’s submissions to the authorities, the number of
prospective participants was consistently limited to twenty persons (see
paragraphs 11, 14 and 17 above). For the Court, it has not been possible to
determine which of the applicants would have been involved in a particular
event.27. The Court stresses that because freedom of assembly also protects
the abstract possibility of holding an undisturbed peaceful assembly, its
organisers may claim to be directly concerned by any negative decision of
the authorities. This approach was reflected in the case of 03-4 54 and
Others v. Poland (no. 1543/06, ECHR 2007-…) in which the applicants
were organisers of the demonstration in question and the Court found a
violation of Article 11 of the Convention without specifically addressing the
situation of the participants other than the organisers.28. For these reasons, the Court is unable to conclude in the present case
that the forty-seven other individuals were victims of a violation of their
Convention rights. It follows that the complaint in their respect is
incompatible ratione personae with the provisions of the Convention within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3, and must be rejected, pursuant to
Article 35 § 4.
B. Merits1. Whether there was an interference with the exercise of freedom of
peaceful assembly
29. The Government did not dispute that Mr Patyi could rely on the
guarantees contained in Article 11; nor did they deny that the ban on the
demonstrations had interfered with the exercise of his rights under that
provision. The Court sees no reason to hold otherwise. The Government
contended, however, that the interference was justified under the second
paragraph of Article 11.
2. Whether the interference was justified
30. It must therefore be determined whether the measure complained of
was “prescribed by law”, prompted by one or more of the legitimate aims

PATYI v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT7 set out in paragraph 2, and was “necessary in a democratic society” to
achieve them.
(a) Prescribed by law
31. There was no dispute between the parties that the restriction imposed
on Mr Patyi’s freedom of peaceful assembly was based on sections 6, 8 and
14 of the Assembly Act, the wording of which is clear (see paragraph 21
above). Therefore, the requirement of lawfulness was satisfied.
(b) Legitimate aim
32. The Government submitted that the restrictions on the right of
peaceful assembly in public areas served to protect the rights of others, for
example the right to freedom of movement or the orderly circulation of
traffic. They further submitted that freedom of peaceful assembly could not
be reduced to a mere duty on the part of the State not to interfere. On certain
occasions, positive measures had to be taken in order to ensure that an
assembly was peaceful.33. Mr Patyi did not address this issue.34. In the light of these considerations, the Court is satisfied that the
measure complained of pursued the legitimate aims of preventing disorder
and protecting the rights of others.
(c) Necessary in a democratic society(i) The arguments of the parties
35. The Government submitted that the location of the planned
demonstrations was in an extremely busy area of Budapest where the
demonstrators would have hampered the free movement of passers-by and
three bus services, with the attendant risks of an accident. They also
submitted that the decisions of the domestic authorities had been adopted
after a thorough examination of all the relevant circumstances. They cannot
therefore be said to have been arbitrary or wrong.36. Mr Patyi contested the Government’s view. He stated in particular
that the location of the demonstrations would not have been a busy area at
the time it was planned to hold them, and that the pavement was wide
enough for the event to go ahead without causing any hindrance to traffic.
He also drew attention to the fact that on 24 December after 4 p.m. there
were no buses running at all due to the bank holiday. He submitted several
photographs of the scene to support his contentions.
(ii) The Court’s assessment
37. The Court reiterates that Article 11 of the Convention must also be
considered in the light of Article 10. The protection of opinions and the

8PATYI v. HUNGARY JUDGMENTfreedom to express them is one of the objectives of the freedoms of
assembly and association enshrined in Article 11 (see Freedom and
Democracy Party (ÖZDEP) v. Turkey [GC], no. 23885/94, § 37, ECHR
1999-VIII.).38. The expression “necessary in a democratic society” implies that the
interference corresponds to a “pressing social need” and, in particular, that it
is proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. The Contracting States have
a certain margin of appreciation in assessing whether such a need exists, but
it goes hand in hand with European supervision, embracing both the
legislation and the decisions applying it, even those given by an
independent court. The Court is therefore empowered to give the final ruling
on whether a “restriction” is reconcilable with the rights protected by the
Convention (see Stankov and the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden
v. Bulgaria, nos. 29221/95 and 29225/95, § 87, ECHR 2001-IX.).39. When the Court carries out its scrutiny, its task is not to substitute its
own view for that of the relevant national authorities but rather to review
under Article 11 the decisions they took. This does not mean that it has to
confine itself to ascertaining whether the respondent State exercised its
discretion reasonably, carefully and in good faith; it must look at the
interference complained of in the light of the case as a whole and determine,
after having established that it pursued a “legitimate aim”, whether it was
proportionate to that aim and whether the reasons adduced by the national
authorities to justify it are “relevant and sufficient”. In so doing, the Court
has to satisfy itself that the national authorities applied standards which
were in conformity with the principles embodied in Article 11 and,
moreover, that they based their decisions on an acceptable assessment of the
relevant facts (see United Communist Party of Turkey and Others v. Turkey ,
judgment of 30 January 1998, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1998-I,
p. 22, § 47).40. The Court finds that, in the domestic court decisions dealing with the
events, the basis for the ban on the applicant’s assemblies related
exclusively to traffic hazards. It also observes that the Government’s
submissions were confined to the affirmation that the demonstrations would
have seriously hampered the free movement of passers-by as well as the
running of three bus services. In this connection, the Court reiterates that
any demonstration in a public place may cause a certain level of disruption
to ordinary life (see, Nurettin Aldemir and Others v. Turkey , nos. 32124/02,
32126/02, 32129/02, 32132/02, 32133/02, 32137/02 and 32138/02, § 43,
18 December 2007).41. Examining the materials in the present case submitted by the parties,
the Court perceives strong and concordant indications militating against the
Government’s contentions. Mr Patyi planned to organise demonstrations
with twenty participants, whose only action would have been to stand
silently in line on the pavement in front of the Prime Minister’s house. It is

PATYI v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT9 clear from the pictures attached to the case file that the space in question
was wide enough – approximately five metres – to allow other pedestrians
to walk by during a demonstration.42. Moreover, the Court is not persuaded that, in the given
circumstances, the demonstrators would indeed have hindered traffic. In its
view, the Government’s blanket argument about hampering the bus services
(see paragraph 35 above) is not all together convincing, particularly as
regards the demonstration scheduled for 24 December 2004, in view of the
information produced by the Budapest Transportation Company (see
paragraph 19 above). In the Court’s view, it appears unlikely that a limited
number of demonstrators would have needed more space at the scene than
the five-metre-wide pedestrian area, or that they would have significantly
impeded the traffic, especially on Christmas Eve when the town buses
ceased to run soon after 4 p.m. Consequently, the Court concludes that the
authorities, when issuing repetitive prohibitions on the demonstrations,
mechanically relying on the same reasons and not taking into account
Mr Patyi’s factual clarifications, failed to strike a fair balance between the
rights of those wishing to exercise their freedom of assembly and those
others whose freedom of movement may have been frustrated temporarily,
if at all.43. Moreover, the Court notes that there is no evidence in the case file to
suggest that the demonstrations would have been violent or would have
represented a danger to public order. The Court reiterates that, “where
demonstrators do not engage in acts of violence, it is important for the
public authorities to show a certain degree of tolerance towards peaceful
gatherings if the freedom of assembly guaranteed by Article 11 of the
Convention is not to be deprived of all substance” (Oya Ataman v. Turkey,
no. 74552/01, 5 December 2006, §§ 41-42). Such tolerance is warranted
also in the notification process; however, it has not been shown in the
present case.44. Having regard to the above considerations, the Court finds that the
basis for the ban on the planned peaceful assemblies was neither relevant
nor sufficient to meet any pressing social need. The ban has therefore not
been shown to have been necessary in a democratic society in order to
achieve the aims pursued.45. Accordingly, there has been a violation of Article 11 of the
Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 10 OF THE CONVENTION
46. Mr Patyi also relied on Article 10, which provides insofar as relevant
as follows:

10PATYI v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT”1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without
interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. …2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities,
may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, … for the prevention of
disorder or crime, [or] … for the protection of the … rights of others, …”47. The Court considers that, whilst this complaint is admissible,
nevertheless, in the light of its finding above of a violation of Article 11 of
the Convention (see paragraph 45), it is unnecessary to examine the merits
of the matter separately under Article 10 (see Ezelin v. France , judgment of
26 April 1991, Series A no. 202, § 35).
III. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATION OF THE CONVENTION
48. The Court observes that Mr Patyi also complained under Article 11
of the Convention that his first request to hold a demonstration had been
refused by the domestic authorities. However, the final decision in this
matter was given on 15 July 2004, more than six months before the
application was introduced on 4 February 2005. It follows that this aspect of
the application has been introduced outside the six-month time-limit
prescribed by Article 35 § 1 and must be rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4
of the Convention.49. The Court further observes that Mr Patyi made complaints under
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (the outcome and fairness of the various
proceedings), Article 9 (concerning his freedom of thought and conscience)
Article 13 (an absence of effective remedies) and Article 14 (freedom from
discrimination). However, even assuming that such provisions could be of
pertinence to the present case, the Court notes that these complaints are
wholly unsubstantiated and do not disclose any appearance of a violation of
the Convention. In particular, as regards the Article 13 complaint, the Court
notes that the applicant was able to pursue adequate remedies against the
decisions of the administrative authorities before the courts. It follows that
this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of
Article 35§ 3 and must be rejected pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the
Convention.

PATYI v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT11 IV. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION50. Article 41 of the Convention provides:“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols
thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to
the injured party.”
A. Damage
51. The applicant claimed 2,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-
pecuniary damage.52. The Government deemed the applicant’s claims to be excessive.53. The Court considers that the finding of a violation constitutes
sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage the applicant may
have suffered.
B. Costs and expenses
54. The applicant also claimed EUR 1,800 for the costs and expenses
incurred before the Court. He submitted an itemised statement of the hours
billable by his lawyer. According to his statement, this corresponds to
fifteen hours of work (consultation with clients – four hours; studying the
file – four hours; site inspection – one hour; preparation of the submissions
and correspondence with clients – six hours) spent by his lawyer on the case
charged at an hourly rate of EUR 100 (altogether EUR 1,500), plus 20%
VAT (EUR 300).55. The Government again considered the claim to be excessive.56. According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown
that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as
to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the information in its
possession and the above criteria, the Court finds it reasonable to award the
sum claimed in its entirety under this head.
C. Default interest
57. The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which
should be added three percentage points.

12PATYI v. HUNGARY JUDGMENTFOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY1. Declares admissible the complaints of Mr Patyi concerning freedom of
assembly and freedom of expression;2. Declares the remainder of the application inadmissible;3. Holds that there has been a violation of Article 11 of the Convention;4. Holds that there is no need to examine separately the merits of the
complaint under Article 10 of the Convention;5. Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just
satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by Mr Patyi;6. Holds(a) that the respondent State is to pay Mr Patyi, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,800 (one thousand eight
hundred euros) in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into the
national currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the
date of settlement, plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant;(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until
settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate
equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during
the default period plus three percentage points;7. Dismisses the remainder of Mr Patyi’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 7 October 2008, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Françoise Elens-Passos Françoise Tulkens
Deputy RegistrarPresident

PATYI v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT13 Appendix List of the applicants Name Date of birth 1. Patyi István 16.09.1965. 2. Hargitai Józsefné 15.05.1934. 3. Torda Zoltán 11.11.1937. 4. Péntek Balázsné 05.03.1935. 5. Bakos Oszkárné 17.07.1938. 6. Kertiné Beke Edit 21.02.1946.. 7. Rosenberg Zsuzsa 10.08.1937. 8. Bese Lajos 24.05.1931. 9. Marton Józsefné 19.03.1942. 10. Varga Vilmos 03.06.1927. 11. Szakálos Lászlóné 14.10.1940. 12. Róka Miklósné 04.12.1936. 13. Róka Miklós 22.07.1923. 14. Békésiné Orbán Jolán 27.06.1959. 15. Sárossy Zoltán 24.02.1936. 16. Sárossy Zoltánné 14.09.1941. 17. Sudár Jánosné 26.08.1930. 18. Szombathy Gyuláné 1927 19. Vida Aladárné 10.01.1940. 20. Harle Vilmos no data 21. Szabó József 05.03.1962. 22. Solti Imre 08.07.1922. 23. R. Lajos 13.04.1949. 24. Csabankó Jánosné 12.10.1939. 25. Gulyás Lajosné 01.10.1933. 26. Kiss Györgyné 22.05.1937. 27. Börzsönyi ))[ 07.07.1930. 28. Börzsönyi Mariann 25.08.1952. 29. Becsei József 09.08.1936. 30. Kiss Vilmosné 07.02.1937. 31. Balczer Györgyné 29.12.1947. 32. Detári Sándorné 11.06.1938. 33. Guba István 04.06.1936. 34. Bíró Zoltánné 09.11.1952. 35. Timotity Miklósné 01.08.1394. 36. Timotity Miklós 17.09.1936. 37. Varga Zsolt 22.06.1959. 38. Kovács Margit 13.12.1928. 39. Csáki Miklósné 30.09.1925.

14PATYI v. HUNGARY JUDGMENT40. Molnár Szilveszter 01.01.1926. 41. Molnárné Retek Zsuzsanna 22.04.1934. 42. Kondás Györgyné 19.05.1955. 43. Jankó Lászlóné no data 44. Korozmán Imréné no data 45. Korozmán Zsolt no data 46. M.,6 Tivadar no data 47. Hulinai Józsefné 12.09.1943. 48. Megyesi László 30.12.1943.