International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 1

Aid Barriers and the Rise of Philanthropic Protectionism

DOUGLAS RUTZEN 1

A Russian bird group was deemed a “foreign agent .”2 Ethiopian human rights
organizations were forced to curtail their activities because of a government -imposed
cap on foreign funding. 3 In India, the Sierra Club was barred from receiving funding
from abroad. 4

Around the world, countries are burdening the ability of civil society
organizations to receive cross -border philanthropy. This article presents the macro –
political context underlying these restrictions. It then categorizes constraints, summarizes
governmental justifications, and analyzes restrictions under inte rnational law. The final
section summarizes conclusions and areas for further scholarship.

Background
Twenty years ago, the world was in the midst of an “associational revolution.” 5
Internationally, civil society organizations (C SOs) 6 had a generally positive aura, recognized for
their important contributions to health, education, culture, economic development, and a host of
other publicly beneficial objectives. In addition, political theorists associated civil society with

1 The author is President and CEO of the International Center for Not -for -Profit Law (ICNL,
www.icnl.org ). The author is grateful to Brittany Grabel, Betsy Buchalter Adler, Gabrielle Gould, Nilda Bullain,
David Moore, Mar garet Scotti, Rebecca Ullman, Dima Jweihan, Katerina Hadzi -Miceva Evans, Claudia Guadamuz,
Jocelyn Nieva, and Emerson Sykes for their guidance and comments on this article.
An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2014 Annual Conference of the National Center on
Philanthropy and the Law, New York University, on “Regulation or Repression: Government Policing of Cross –
Border Charity,” October 26, 2014.
2 “Russian Bird Support Group Branded ‘Foreign Agent,’” RIA Novosti , March 5, 2013, accessed
September 25, 2014, https://en.ria.ru/russia/20130503/180967677/Russian -Bird -Support -Group -Branded -Foreign –
Agent.html .
3 Amnesty Internationa l, “Ethiopia: The 2009 Charities and Securities Proclamation as a serious obstacle to
the promotion and protection of human rights in Ethiopia,” Amnesty International’s written statement to the 20th
Session of the UN Human Rights Council, June 11, 2012,
https://www.amnesty.org/fr/library/asset/AFR25/007/2012/en/5b3d4e94 -56c5 -4044 -9b73 –
93b55cd13e61/afr250072012en.pdf .
4 “RBI Impos es Curbs on 4 American NGOs,” India West , January 6, 2015, accessed January 12, 2015,
https://www.indiawest.com/news/ind ia/rbi -imposes -curbs -on -american -ngos/article_520532b6 -9599 -11e4 -84b9 –
33473a4b2e33.html .
5 Lester Salamon, “The Rise of the Nonprofit Sector,” Foreign Affairs 74(109) (July – August 1994),
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/50105/lester -m-salamon/the -rise -of-the -nonprofit -sector .
6 For purposes of this article, the term “civil society organization” or “CSO” encompasses not -for -profit,
nongover nmental organizations, whether or not they are eligible for tax benefits in a particular country.

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 2

social justice, such as the civil rights movement in the United States, the dissident movement in
Central Europe, and the anti-apartheid movement in South Africa.

As the 20th century closed, commentators noted the fall of the Berlin Wall, the rise of the
Internet, and the renaissance of civil society. Political, technological, and social developments
were weaving themselves together into an era of civic empowerment. Reflecting this era, in
September 2000, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the Millennium Dec laration .
Among other provisions, the Declaration trumpeted the importance of human rights and the
value of “non -governmental organizations and civil society, in general.” 7

One year later, the zeitgeist changed. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001,
discourse shifted away from human rights and the positive contributions of civil society.
President Bush launched the War on Terror, and CSOs became an immediate target:
Just to show you how insidious these terrorists are, they oftentimes use nice -sounding,
non -governmental organizations as fronts for their activities…. We intend to deal with
them, just like we intend to deal with others who aid and abet terrorist organizations. 8
President Bush then launched a “Freedom Agenda” to advance democratic t ransitions in the
Middle East. 9 In many circles, the Freedom Agenda was greeted with skepticism because of the
increased militarization of U.S. foreign policy, concerns about U.S. unilateralism, and the decline
of U.S. “soft power” after the human rights a buses at Abu Ghraib.

On the one hand, the sector was targeted under the War on Terror. On the other, the Bush
Administration embedded support for civil society into the Freedom Agenda. For both reasons —
the association of civil society with terrorism and th e association of civil society with Bush’s
Freedom Agenda — governments around the world became increasingly concerned about civil
society, particularly CSOs that received international support.
Concern heightened after the so -called “color revolutions” tha t occurred shortly after the
Freedom Agenda was announced. The 2003 Rose Revolution in Georgia roused Russia, but the
turning point was the 2004 Orange Revolution in Ukraine. President Putin viewed Ukraine as a
battleground state in the contest for geopoli tical influence between Russia and the West.
President Putin also seemed to have an exaggerated sense that the Orange Revolution was the
result of Western funding of Ukrainian civil society, rather than an authentic, indigenous
response to electoral fraud. 10

The Orange Revolution caught the attention of other world leaders. While protesters were
on the streets of Kiev, President Lukashenka of Belarus famously warned, “There will not be any
rose, orange, or banana revolutions in our country.” During the same period, Zimbabwe’s

7 United Nations General Assembly, United Nations Millennium Declaration , para. 30, UN Doc. A/55/L.2
(September 8, 2000), https://www.un.org/millennium/declaration/ares552e.htm .
8 President Bush, “President Freezes Terrorists’ Assets,” Remarks on Executive Order, U.S. Department of
State Archive, September 24, 2001, https://2001 -2009.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2001/5041.htm .
9 Sarah E. Yerkes & Tamara Cofman Wittes, “What Price Freedom? Assessing the Bush Administration’s
Freedom Agenda,” Center for Middle East Policy Analysis Papers, Number 10 of 34, Brookings , September 2006,
https://www.brookings.edu/research/papers/2006/09/middleeast -wittes .
10 William Schneider, “Ukraine’s ‘Orange Revolution,’” Atlantic , December 2004, accessed September 16,
2014, https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2004/12/ukraines -orange -revoluti on/305157/ .

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 3

Parliament adopted a law restricting CSOs. Soon thereafter, Belarus enacted legislation
restricting the freedoms of association and assembly. If there was a global “associational
revolution” in 1994, by 2004 the global “associational count errevolution” 11 had begun.
In 2005, the counterrevolution gained prominence when Russia adopted a high -profile
law restricting civil society. The same year, Eritrea, Uzbekistan, and other countries followed
suit.

The zeitgeist also changed because there was less appetite for civil society support in
countries that had undergone political transformations after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Years had
passed, and governments no longer considered themselves to be in “transition.” Rather, they had
transitioned as far as they were inclined to go, and they were now focused on the consolidation
of governmental institutions and state power. This was particularly true in so -called “semi –
authoritarian” or “hybrid” governments that held elections but had little attract ion to the rule of
law, human rights, and other aspects of pluralistic democracy. 12

Governments were also able to coat restrictions with a veneer of political theory.
Governments with autocratic tendencies touted variants of Vladimir Putin’s theory of “Man aged
Democracy,” which seamlessly morphed into notions of “Managed Civil Society.” Essentially
two models emerged in these countries. In some countries, CSOs were given latitude to operate,
provided they stayed away from politics. In others, the government sought to co -opt CSOs and to
shut down groups that resisted, particularly those that received international funding.
Restrictions also gained momentum from efforts to promote the effectiveness of foreign
aid. In March 2005, ninety countries endorsed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, which
incorporate d the concepts of host country ownership (which was soon co -opted into “host
government ownership”) and the “alignment of aid with partner countries’ priorities.” 13 Soon
thereafter, a number of governm ents introduced restrictive measures to regulate international
funding, covering not only bilateral aid but also cross -border philanthropy.
Buffe ted by these and other factors, civic space quickly contracted. According to data
from the International Center for Not -for -Profit Law (ICNL), between 2004 and 2010, more than
fifty countries considered or enacted measures restricting civil society. 14
A second wave of legislative constraints then emerged after the so -called “Arab
Awakening,” which began in late 2010. Once again, countries around the world took notice and
initiated measures to restrict civil society. Since 2012, more than ninety laws constraining the
freedoms of association or assembly have been proposed or enacted. This trend is consistent wit h
a continuing decline in democracy worldwide. Freedom in the World 2015 reveals that 2014 was
the ninth consecutive year of decline in freedom globally, with sixty -one countries showing

11 Douglas Rutzen & Cathy Shea, “The Associational Counter -Revolution,” Alliance , September 2006,
https://www.alliancemagazine.org/en/content/associational -counter -revolution .
12 Thomas Carothers & Saskia Brechenmacher , Democracy and Human Rights Support Under Fire
(Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2014).
13 The Organisation for Economic Co -ope ration and Development (OECD), “The Paris Declaration on Aid
Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action,” OECD, 2005/2008, 1,
https://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness/34428351.pdf .
14 A trend analysis only tells part of the story, for many countries (such as Syria, Eritrea, Saudi Arabia,
Cuba, Laos, etc.) remained “stably restrictive” throughout this period.

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overall declines. 15 As demonstrated in the chart below based on ICNL’s tracking data, there was
a spike in ac tivity between 2012 and 2014, with the number of restrictive initiatives doubling
each year:

Restrictions on association and assembly are more common in certain regions, but this a global
phenomenon , as shown by t he chart below also based on ICNL’s tracking data :

16
Among these restrictive initiatives, approximately half constrain the incorporation/registration, 17
operation, and general lifecycle of CSOs (so -called “framework” legislation). 18 Approximately
15 Please see Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2014 , https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom –
world/freedom -world -2014#.UxEVs4Xnmf0 .
16 Regions are defined based on State Department Bureau classifications. It is interesting to note how
regional trends change based on classification. For example, if the states of the former Soviet Union were to be
classified as their own regional category, they would lead all other regions with 21 restrictive initiatives.
17 In many civil law countrie s, “registration” is the process by which an organization incorporates and
becomes a legal entity.
13
26
59
2012 2013 2014
Restrictive Initiatives Over Time
14 15 16 17 17 19
Restrictive Initiatives Since
2012

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one -third constrain international funding of CSOs, including cross -border philanthropy. The
remaining initiatives restrict the freedom of assembly.

Parameters of Th is Article
This article focuses on legal restrictions impeding the inflow of international funding to
CSOs, including cross -border philanthropy. Part I categorizes and surveys constraints. Part II
summarizes arguments frequently presented by governments to justify constraints. Part III
analyzes constraints and justifications under international law. Pa rt IV summarizes conclusions
and suggests areas for further research. Part IV also references the engagement of the U.S.
Government, the Community of Democracies, and other members of the international
community on this issue, but a mapping of these initia tives is provided elsewhere. 19
Though this article references fifty -five countries, it is intended to present an illustrative
rather than exhaustive list of country examples. For conciseness, this article presents top -line
summaries; details are available e lsewhere. 20 In addition, this article focuses primarily on
constraints impeding the inflow of philanthropy, rather than constraints on the outflow of
philanthropy, which also exist in many countries. 21 Finally, while this article focuses on legal

18 In recent years, however, there has been an uptick in the percentage of legislative initiative seeking to
constrain the international funding of civil soc iety. This may be due to the fact that many countries have already
enacted restrictive framework legislation, or the fact that many countries are now focused on international funding.
19 ICNL, “Mapping Initiatives to Address Legal Constraints on Foreign Fu nding,” August 20, 2014,
https://www.icnl.org/news/2014/20 -Aug.html .
20 For more detailed information about specific country environments, please see ICNL’s NGO Law
Monitor at https://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/index.html and ICNL’s Online Library at
https://www.icnl.org/research/library/ol/online/search/en , which as of January 2015 contains 3,400 documents from
205 countries and territories.
21 For more information about outflow constraints, please see: David Moore & Douglas Rutzen, “Legal
Framework for Global Philanthropy: Barriers and Opportunities,” International J ournal for Not -for -Profit Law 13
(1-2) (April 2011), https://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol13iss1/special_1.htm .
45%
36%
19%
Lifecycle International
Funding
Assembly
Restrictive Initiatives Since
2012

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impediments , it is important to note that cross -border philanthropy is still possible in most
contexts.

Restrictions Impeding the Inflow of Philanthropy
An increasing number of countries constrain the ability of CSOs to receive international
funding, including cross -border philanthropy. Common constraints include:
(1) requiring prior government approval to receive international funding;
(2) enacting “foreign agents” legislation to stigmatize foreign funded CSOs;
(3) capping the amount of international funding that a CSO is allowed to receive;
(4) requiring that international funding be routed through government -controlled entities;
(5) restricting activities that can be undertaken with international funding;
(6) prohibiting CSOs from receiving international funding from specific donors;
(7) constraining international funding through the overly broad application of
counterterrorism and anti -money laundering measures;
(8) taxing the receipt of international funding, including cross -border philanthropy;
(9) im posing onerous reporting requirements on the receipt of international funding; and
(10) using defamation laws, treason laws, and other laws to bring criminal charges
against recipients of international funding.

Illustrative examples of each constraint are presented below.

1. Prior Government Approval
A number of countries require advance governmental approval before a CSO may receive
international funding, including cross -border philanthropy. Two common variants of this
approach are: (a) prior approval of eve ry foreign contribution ,22 and (b) prior approval of every
organization permitted to receive foreign contributions.

A. Prior Approval of Every Foreign Contribution
This approach is common in the Middle East/North Africa (MENA), and Egypt is
perhaps the most well -known example. Under Egyptian law, a CSO must obtain the approval of
the Ministry of Social Solidarity before receiving funds from any foreign source, including
foreign foundations. 23 In 2013, an Egyptian court imposed jail senten ces 24 on forty -three CSO
22 In this article, the terms “foreign contribution,” “cross -bor der philanthropy,” and “global philanthropy”
encompass donations, contributions, grants, social investments, and other forms of financial support provided by a
philanthropist in one country to a civil society organization in another country. In addition, t he terms “international
funding” and “foreign funding” are used interchangeably, with a preference for the term “international funding”
since certain governments have used the word “foreign” to stigmatize and delegitimize resources coming from other
countries.

23 A draft CSO law issued in late June 2014 retains a similar requirement, stipulating that advance approval
from a government committee is required before an organization may receive international funding.
24 Alastair Beach, “US anger as 43 NGO worker s are jailed in Egypt crackdown,” The Independent, June 4,
2013, accessed September 9, 2014, https://www.independent.co.u k/news/world/africa/us -anger -as-43 -ngo -workers –
are -jailed -in-egyptian -crackdown -8644660.html .

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representatives for failing to comply with foreign funding requirements and other provisions of
Egyptian law. 25
Other MENA countries requiring contribution -by -contribution approval include
Algeria, 26 Jordan, 27 and Bahrain. 28
This constraint also appears in countries outside of MENA: For example:
 In Uzbekistan , before a CSO may receive a foreign grant, a Commission under
the Cabinet of Ministers must decide that the project to be supported by the grant
is indeed worthy of support. 29
 In Turkmenistan , a foreign organization interested in funding a CSO must send a
request to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Relevant government agencies then
decide if the proposed international funding is necessary. If government agencies
support the request, the Turkmen CSO must then submit an application to a State
Commission, which makes the final decision. 30
 In Belarus and Azerbaijan , CSOs must register grant agreements. 31 In both
countries, the process is complex and subjects the receipt of internat ional funding
to political vetting.
 In Bangladesh and Nepal , CSOs must obtain the prior approval of government
ministries to receive international funding. 32
 In Eritrea , international CSOs may fund or otherwise engage in relief or
rehabilitation work only if the Ministry of Labor and Human Welfare determines
that the government cannot undertake the specific task. 33
25 Illustrating the breadth of discretion vested in government officials, in 2011 the Egyptian government
blocked the New Woman Foundation from receiving a $5,000 “Nelson Mandela – Graça Machel Innovation Award”
from CIVICUS, citing unspecified “security concerns.” See Kareem Elbayar, “Egypt’s restrictions on NGOs violate
international law,” Washington Post Letter to the Editor, March 13, 2012, accessed September 9, 2014
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/egypts -res trictions -on -ngos -violate -international –
law/2012/03/12/gIQA1hHDAS_story.html .
26 ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: Algeria, last modified April 26, 2014,
https://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/algeria.htm l
27 ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: Jordan, last modified January 29, 2014,
https://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/jordan.html
28 Government of Bahrain, Law 21 on Associations, Social and Cultural Club s, Special Committees
Working in the Field of Youth and Sports, and Private Foundations, Article 20.
29 ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: Uzbekistan, last modified February 8, 2014,
https://www.icnl.o rg/research/monitor/uzbekistan.html
30 ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: Turkmenistan, last modified May 5, 2014,
https://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/turkmenistan.html .
31 ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: Belarus, last modified September 7, 2014,
https://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/belarus.html and ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: Azerbaijan, last modified
December 2, 2014, https://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/azerbaijan.html
32 ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: Bangladesh, last modified October 29, 2014,
https://www.icnl.org/res earch/monitor/bangladesh.html and ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: Nepal, last modified August
26, 2014, https://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/nepal.html

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B. Prior Approval of Organizations Permitted to Receive Foreign Contributions
Some countries take a slightly different approach: they require the approval of
organizations entitled to receive foreign contributions. India is perhaps the most well -known
example of this approach. CSOs that meet certain requirements for three years are eligible to
register under the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act (FCRA) 2010. 34 If FCRA registration
is approved, the organization is authorized to receive foreign contributions for up to five years. 35
Other countries in South Asia have consider ed simil ar registration requirements for CSOs
seeking to receive international funding. For example:
 In February 2014, the government of Pakistan prepared a bill on foreign funded CSOs.
Among other provisions, domestic CSOs seeking to use at least 50 million rupee s
(approximately $476,000) in foreign contributions per year would have to apply for a
certificate from the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan. International CSOs
seeking to use any amount of foreign contributions would have to register with th e
Economic Affairs Division. Under the bill, applications for registration would undergo
vetting by the Ministry of Interior, local and provincial governments, and “other
concerned government authorities.” 36
 In July 2014, the government of Sri Lanka announ ced that it was drafting a law
requiring all CSOs to register with the Ministry of Defence; organizations failing to
comply with this requirement would be ineligible to receive international funding. 37
2. Stigmatization of International Funding Through “Foreig n Agents” Legislation
Other countries do not require prior government approval to receive international
funding, but they have stigmatized the receipt of such funding. At present, the former Soviet
Union is the geographic locus of new legislation in this a rea. Specifically, several countries in
33 Government of Eritrea, Proclamation No. 145/200 5, A Proclamation to Determine the Administration of
Non -governmental Organizations , No. 145/2005, May 11, 2005, Article 9(1), available at:
https://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/493507c92.ht ml
34 According to the Centre for the Advancement of Philanthropy, new CSOs must apply for “FCRA Prior
Permission to receive a specific sum of money from a specific foreign source.” After meeting certain spending
requirements over three fiscal years, the CSO ma y apply for FCRA registration to “receive unlimited sums of funds
from unlimited foreign sources for a period of 5 years.” Organizations “of a political nature” —and associations
engaged in the production or broadcast of news or current affairs programming —are prohibited from accepting
foreign contributions. For more information on the FCRA, please see CAP India’s website,
https://www.capindia.in/resource_bank.htm .
35 The FCRA also contains restrictions on the utilization of foreign contributions and vests the Central
Government with broad powers to regulate foreign contributions. In addition, the FCRA provides the government
with the power to cancel an organization’s FCRA registration. For example, in on e month in mid -2012, the
government revoked permission to receive foreign funding of 4,139 CSOs due to FCRA violations, amounting to 9.5
percent of all registered CSOs in India. See Shyamlal Yadav, “4,139 NGOs lose FCRA license, most in TN,” Indian
Express , August 10, 2012, accessed September 10, 2014, https://archive.indianexpress.com/news/4139 -ngos -lose –
fcra -licence -most -in-tn/986398/ .
36 Government of Paki stan, Draft Foreign Contributions Act, 2014 , Article 3.
37 Tamil Guardian, “Government to Close Bank Accounts of NGOs not Registered with MoD,” Tamil
Guardian , July 10, 2014, accessed September 8, 2014, https://www.tamilguardian.com/article.asp?articleid=11504 .

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this region have enacted or proposed laws roughly modeled 38 on the 1938 United States Foreign
Agents Registration Act. For example:
 In July 2012, President Putin of Russia signed a law requiring 39 all non -commercial
organizations that receive funds from abroad and engage in “political activities” to
register with the Ministry of Justice as “foreign agents.” Under the law, “political
activities” are broadly defined as “attempts to influence official decision -making or to
shape public opinion for this objective.” 40 Moreover, the “foreign agents” label attaches
even if the international funding is used for purposes entirely unrelated to the “political
activities” of the organization. This label is particularly problematic fo r Russian CSOs
because, in Russian, the term “foreign agent” is synonymous with “foreign spy.” 41
 In 2013, the Parliament of Kyrgyzstan introduced a draft law nearly identical to the
Russian “foreign agents” law. The bill, if enacted, would require CSOs rec eiving foreign
funding and engaging in “political activity” to register as “foreign agents.” 42
 In January 2014, the Yanukovych Government in Ukraine enacted a legislative package
of so -called “dictatorship laws,” 43 which included a “foreign agents” law simi lar to
Russian legislation. 44
Countries outside of the former Soviet Union have also considered this approach. For
example, a bill in Israel would require certain foreign funded CSOs to state on their website and
official documents that they are foreign agents. 45 In addition, the vice chairman of the China
Research Institute of China -Russia Relations has argued that China should enact a law sim ilar to
Russia’s foreign agents law. 46 In the United States , some lawyers have called for a review of
38 For example, the U.S. Foreign Agents Registration Act applies to all “persons” and contains an
exemption for organizations engaged in “religious, scholastic, academic, or scientific pursuits or of the fine arts.”
The Russian law solely targets CSOs. In addition, US law requires a connection between the international funding
and the organization’s political activities. Russian legislation does not. For additional differe nces, see, e .g.,
Vladimir Kara -Murza, “FARA and Putin’s NGO Law: Myths and Reality,” Institute of Modern Russia , May 9,
2013, accessed September 8, 2014, http: //imrussia.org/en/politics/455 -fara -and -putins -ngo -law -myths -and -reality
and https://www.fara.gov/indx -act.html .
39 In June 2014, President Putin signed into law amendments allowing the Ministry of Justice to register
non -commercial organizations as foreign agents without their consent.
40 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, para. 28, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39 (April 24, 2013) at
https://freeassembly.net/wp -content/uploads/2013/04/A.HRC_.23.39_EN -funding -report -April -2013.pdf .
41 ICNL, NGO L aw Monitor: Russia, last modified May 7, 2014,
https://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/russia.html .
42 “Kyrgyzstan: Reject ‘Foreign Agents’ Law,” Human Rights Watch, Dec. 5, 2013, accessed Septe mber 8,
2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2013/12/05/kyrgyzstan -reject -foreign -agents -law .
43 Andrew E. Kramer, “Ukrainian Prime Minister Resigns as Parliament Repeals Rest rictive Laws,” New
York Times , January 28, 2014, accessed September 8, 2014,
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/29/world/europe/ukraine -prime -minister -resign .html?_r=2 .
44 This law never went into force because of the political changes in Ukraine.
45 Gril Ronen, “New Version of ‘NGO Bill’ Headed for Knesset,” Arutz Sheva , May 25, 2014, accessed
September 8, 2014, https://www.israelnationalnews.com/News/News.aspx/181022#.U_O4RvldWbM .
46 Simon Denyer, “China taking the Putin approach to democracy,” Washington Post, October 1, 2014, A7.

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whether think tanks receiving funding from foreign governments should register as “foreign
agents” under the 1938 Foreign Agent Registration Act. 47
3. Caps on International Funding
Ethiopia serves as the seminal example of caps on international funding. Under the 2009
Proclamation to Provide for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and Societies ,
“Ethiopian” charities and societies may not receive more than 10 percent of their total income
from foreign sources. In addition, only “Ethiopian” charities and societies are legally allowed to
work on disability rights, children’s rights, gender equality, conflict resolution, the efficiency of
the justice syste m, and certain other objectives.
“Income from foreign sources” is broadly defined as “a donation or delivery or transfer
made from foreign source of any article, currency or security. Foreign sources include the
government agency or company of any foreign country; international agency or any person in a
foreign country.” 48
The Proclamation has had a significant impact on civil society in Ethiopia. Between 2009
and 2011, the number of registered CSOs in Ethiopia decreased by 45 percent. 49 In addition,
most lo cal human rights groups have been forced to close or scale back their operations. 50 As but
one example, the Human Rights Council, Ethiopia’s first independent CSO that monitored
human rights, was forced to close nine of its twelve offices in 2009 due to lac k of funding. 51
Other countries have also considered caps on international funding. For example, in
October 2013, the Kenyan Parliament considered an omnibus bill, which — among other
provisions — would have presumptively 52 limited CSOs from receiving more than 15 percent of
their budgets from a foreign source, regardless of the activities undertaken by the CSO. Based on
international advocacy efforts and other provisions of the omnibus bill unrelated to CSOs,
Parliament declined to pass the bill in December. It is currently being reconsidered, and the
outcome remains uncertain.
4. Mandatory Routing of Funding through Government -Controlled Channels
In an effort to monitor and control the flow of international funding to CSOs, some
countries require that funding be routed through a governmental body, ministry, or government –
47 See, for example, Eric Lipton, Brooke W illiams, & Nicholas Confessore, “Foreign Powers Buy Influence
at Think Tanks,” New York Times , September 6, 2014, accessed September 17, 2014,
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/us/politics/foreign -powers -buy -influence -at-think -tanks.html .
48 Government of Ethiopia, Proclamation to Provide for the Registration and Regulation of Charities and
Societies, 2009, Article 2(15).
49 Kendra Dupuy, James Ron, & Assem Prakash, “Who Survived? Ethiopia’s Regulatory Crackdown on
Foreign -Funded NGOs,” (March 10, 2014). Review International Political Economy, Forthcoming: 19. Available at
SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstrac t=2407001 .
50 Ibid., 14.
51 African Union, “African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights Study Group on Freedom of
Association: Freedom of Association and Freedom of Assembly in Law and Practice in Africa,” April 2014.
52 CSOs would only be able to receiv e more than the 15 percent of their budget from foreign sources if they
demonstrate that they require the funds due to “legitimate and compelling reasons.”

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controlled bank. In practice, this allows the government greater ability to constrain the inflow of
funding to CSOs. For example:
 In July 2014, Nepal released a new Development Cooperation Policy 53 requiring
development partners to channel all development cooperation through the Ministry of
Finance, essentially terminating all direct funding of CSOs. CSOs seeking to use
development assistance must be registered with the Social Welfare Council (SWC) and
seek prior approval from the SWC on the programs for which they seek funding.
 CSOs in Uzbekistan must route any foreign grant funding through one of two state –
owned banks which then determine if the money will be released to the CSO, often
resulting i n blocked disbursements. 54
 Eritrea ’s Proclamation No. 145/2005 requires that international CSOs engage in
activities only through “the Ministry or other concerned Government entity.” 55
 In Sierra Leone , “assets transferred to build the capacity of local NGOs should be done
through” the government -controlled Sierra Leone Association of Non -Governmental
Organizations and the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development. 56
 In Uganda , CSOs receiving foreign funding must receive and disburse funds through an
accou nt with the government -controlled Bank of Uganda. According to a recent study,
this requirement has been used by the government to constrain the flow of international
funding to a think tank involved in governance and extractive industry work. 57 Far from
an isolated incident, Human Rights Watch reports that this obstruction of funds is
symptomatic of increasing government constraints on CSOs in Uganda “whose focus
includes oil revenue transparency, land acquisition compensation, legal and governance
reform, and protection of human rights.” 58
53 Government of Nepal Ministry of Finance, “Development Cooperation Policy, 2014,” unofficial
trans lation, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://www.mof.gov.np/uploads/document/file/DCP_English_20140707120230_20140721083326.pdf .
54 ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: Uzbekistan, last modified February 8, 2014,
https://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/uzbekistan.html .
55 Government of Eritrea, Proclamation No. 145/2005, A Proclamati on to Determine the Administration of
Non -governmental Organizations , No. 145/2005, 11 May 2005, Article 9(1), available at:
https://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/493507c92.html
56 ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: Sierra Leone, last modified June 29, 2014,
https://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/uzbekistan.html .
57 Darin Christensen & Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Defunding Dissent: Restrictions on Aid to NGOs,” Journal
of Democracy 24(2) (April 2013): 83.
58 Human Rights Watch, “Uganda: Growing Intimidation, Threats to Civil Society,” August 21, 2012,
accessed September 10, 2014, https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/08/21/uganda -growing -intimidation -threats -civil –
society .

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 Kenya recently rejected amendments to the Public Benefit Organisations (PBO) Act that
would have required all funding to PBOs to be routed through one central federation
comprising all PBOs operating in Kenya. 59
 A draft bi ll pending in Nigeria would require “assets transferred to build the capacity of
an organization” to pass through the regulatory agency “which will identify the operation
criteria.” 60
5. Burdensome Reporting Requirements
After the receipt of funding from abro ad, recipients may be subject to additional
requirements — such as the obligation to notify the government or comply with burdensome
reporting rules — which, while less severe than the requirement to secure advance governmental
approval, may nonetheless impose administrative and other burdens on the receipt of
international philanthropy. For example:
 In Uzbekistan , after obtaining approval to receive grant funding, CSOs must provide
monthly and transactional reports to the Ministry of Finance. Transactional re ports must
be submitted by the next business day following each financial transaction with grant
funding. This requirement applies to each transaction, no matter how small, even
including the purchase of pens. 61
 On June 18, 2010, President Martinelli of Pan ama issued Executive Decree No. 57, 62
which requires every Panamanian not -for -profit association to publish online extensive
information about all donations received on a monthly basis.
 In Turkey , the law imposes notification requirements relating to the r eceipt of
international funding. Foundations must notify public authorities within one month of
receiving international funding, and associations must provide notification before using
the funds. 63
 In India , the Foreign Contribution (Regulation) Act 2010 re quires CSOs to report to the
Central Government all foreign contributions received within thirty days of receipt. CSOs
must also file annual reports with the Home Ministry that include information on the
amount, source, and intended purpose of the contribu tion, as well as the ways in which it
was received and used. 64
59 ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: Kenya, last modified December 16, 2014,
http:/ /www.icnl.org/research/monitor/kenya.html .
60 Nigeria, NGO Regulatory Agency Bill , 2014, Article 28(3).
61 ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: Uzbekistan, last modified October 4, 2014,
https://www.icnl. org/research/monitor/uzbekistan.html
62 Executive Decree No. 57, accessed January 12, 2015, :
https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=3&ved=0CDAQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%
2Fwww.impuestospanama.com%2Fleyes_fiscales%2FImpuest osPanama_2010_Ley_033.docx&ei=yzu0VInRK4Kg
gwSC5IKYDw&usg=AFQjCNFTKANRImo6RUFwtLQttjIHdzkB2Q&bvm=bv.83339334,d.eXY
63 ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: Turkey, last modified July 3, 2014,
https://www.icnl. org/research/monitor/turkey.html .
64 Council on Foundations, Global Grantmaking: India, last modified April 2014,
https://www.cof.org/content/india .

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 Associations in Tunisia must not only notify the government of all international funding
sources but must also inform the media about the receipt of international funding. 65
6. Restrictions on Act ivities Supported by International Funding
Some countries explicitly prohibit certain activities from being supported by international
funding. In Sudan , CSOs must seek approval from the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC)
before receiving international fund ing, and the HAC will only grant approval for CSOs that
provide narrowly defined “humanitarian services,” excluding other types of activities of interest
to the international philanthropic community. 66 In Zimbabwe, existing law prohibits the use of
internat ional funding for voter -education projects conducted by independent CSOs; instead, such
funds may be contributed directly to the Electoral Commission. 67 Notably, this provision was
enforced before the July 2013 presidential election, when the government rai ded the offices and
arrested the staff of ten CSOs involved in nonpartisan voter education activities. 68
Other countries have vague statutory formulations that give the government broad
discretion to prohibit activities that can be supported through international funding. For example,
in Indonesia , a 2008 regulation prohibits foreign assistance causing “socia l anxiety.” 69 In
Bolivia , Supreme Decree No. 29308 bans foreign assistance that carries “implied political or
ideological conditions.” Similarly, Venezuela’s 2010 Law on Defense of Political Sovereignty
and National Self -Determination prohibits organization s with “political objectives” or
organizations for the defense of “political rights” from having assets or income other than
“national” goods and resources. 70 These undefined terms vest broad discretion in government
officials to restrict certain activities from being supported by international funding.
7. Restrictions on Funding from Certain Countries or Donors
Certain countries impose outright bans on funds from specific countries or donors. For
example:
 In 2012, Russia enacted a law specifically targeting U .S. donors after the U.S. enacted
the so -called “Magnitsky Law.” 71 Among other provisions, the Russian law calls for the
65 Government of Tunisia, Decree Number 88 of 2011 Pertaining to Regulation of Associations , September
24, 2011, Article 41, https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Tunisia_88-2011-Eng.pdf .
66 ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: Sudan , last modified December 12, 2014,
https://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/sudan.html
67 Government of Zimbabwe, Electoral Commission Act , Article 40F,
https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Zimbabwe_consolidatedelectoralact.pdf .
68 ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: Zimbabwe, last modified August 8, 2014,
https://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/zimbabwe.html .
69 Government of Indonesia, Regulation of the Ministry of Home Affairs Number 38 of 2008 Regarding
Acceptance and Granting of Social/Charity Organization’s Assistance from and to Foreign Parti es, Article 6(2)(e),
https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Indonesia_indonesia01.pdf .
70 Government of Venezuela, Law on Defense of Political Sovereignty and National Self -Determination,
Article 4, https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Venezuela_Leysober.pdf .
71 The Sergei Magnitsky Rule of Law Accountability Act, passed by the U.S. Congress in December 2012,
allows the U.S. to deny visas and freeze the assets of Russian officials involved in the murder of lawyer Sergei
Magnitsky and in other human rights violations. See David Kramer & Lilia Shevtsova, “What the Magnitsky Act

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 14

suspension of CSOs that engage in vaguely defined political activities and receive funds
and other assets from U.S. citizens or organiza tions. 72
 In Eritrea , all CSOs are effectively prohibited from receiving funding from the United
Nations or its affiliates. 73
 In Tunisia , associations are prohibited from receiving funding or any other type of
assistance from “countries not linked with Tunisia by diplomatic relations, or from
organizations which defend the interests and policies of those countries.” 74 In practice,
this would prevent Israeli philanthropists and organizations from providing funds to
Tunisian civil society.
8. Taxation of Inte rnational Funding
In several countries, income from foreign grantmakers is subject to taxation unless the
foreign grantmaker is included on a government -approved list. For example, in Russia , grants
can be extended from foreign or international organizatio ns to Russian citizens or CSOs on a tax –
exempt basis only if the grantmaker is included on a list of organizations approved by the
Russian Government and the grant is made for an approved public benefit purpose. The
government list is tightly controlled an d the number of approved organizations was reduced in
2008 by Decree #485. Before the issuance of Decree #485, approximately one hundred
organizations were on the list, including several private foundations. The decree was
subsequently amended to eliminate all private foundations. As a result, grants from private
foundations are potentially liable to a 24 percent tax. 75
Similar rules have been in place, at varying times, in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and
Turkmenistan .76 In addition, in December 2014, Nicaragua ena cted legislation subjecting
CSOs to income tax on international funding unless the international donor has a formal
agreement with the government. 77

Means,” Freedom House , December 12, 2012, accessed September 8, 2014,
https://www.freedomhouse.org/article/what -magnitsky -act -means .
72 International Center for Not -for -Profit Law, “Overview of Restrictions on Non -Commercial
Organizations Imposed by the ‘Dima Yakovlev’ Law,” January 27, 2013.
73 Rebecca B. Vernon, “Closing the Door on Aid,” International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law 11(4)
(August 2009), https://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol11iss4/special_1.htm .
74 Government of Tunisia, Decree Number 88 of 2011 Pertaining to Regulation of Associations , September
24, 2011, Article 25, https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Tunisia_88-2011-Eng.pdf .
75 A “grant” and a “donation” are distinct concepts under Russian law, and this rule applies to foreign
“gra nts.” Among other differences, grants can be provided only for the purposes enumerated in Article 251(1)(14)
of the Tax Code. In addition, unlike a donor, a grantor is obligated to require reports from the recipient on the use of
the grant. For further i nformation on the difference between “grants” and “donations” under Russian law, please see
https://www.cof.org/content/russia .
76 Correspondence on file with the author.
77 Article 77, Ley No. 891: Ley de Reformas y Adiciones a la Ley No. 822, “Ley de Concertación
Tributaria.”

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9. Counterterrorism/Anti -Money Laundering
In a number of countries, the inflow of cross -border philanthropy is constrained as a
result of counterterrorism and anti -money laundering measures. Governments have an obligation
to address legitimate concerns relating to terrorism and money laundering, but many of these
measures are overly broad, burdening lawful cross -bo rder philanthropy. For example:
 In Bangladesh , the government recently approved a draft “ Foreign Contributions
(Voluntary Activities) Regulation Act 2014, which seeks to eliminate militant and terror
financing and ensure a terrorism -free Bangladesh by 2021 .”78 This law would reinforce
and codify a number of restrictions on international funding, including prior approval of
organizations allowed to receive cross -border philanthropy.
 In Azerbaijan , the government imposed grant registration requirements to help “enforce
international obligations of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the areas of combating money –
laundering.” 79
 In Kosovo , an anti -money laundering measure prevents CSOs from receiving more than
1,000 Euro from a single source in a single day without gover nmental permission. 80
10. Other Laws and Measures Used to Restrict the Inflow of Philanthropy
Certain governments have also used other laws to target internationally funded civil
society organizations and activists. For example, in July 2014, authorities in Az erbaijan charged
human rights defender Leyla Yunus with illegal entrepreneurship, tax evasion, falsifying
documents, fraud, and treason — which three UN Special Rapporteurs concluded were “trumped
up charges,” part of a “ wave of politically -motivated repression of activists in reprisal for their
legitimate work in documenting and reporting human rights violations.” 81 In other countries,
defamation laws, treason laws, tax laws, and national security laws — among other legislation —
have also been used to bri ng criminal charges against recipients of international funding. 82 For
78 “Cabinet Approves Foreign Donation Regulation Act,” The Independent , June 3, 2014, accessed
September 8, 2014,
https://www.theindependentbd.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=217526:cabinet -approves –
foreign -donation -regulation -act&catid=132:bac kpage&Itemid=122 .
79 Charity & Security Network, “How the FATF Is Used to Justify Laws That Harm Civil Society, Freedom
of Association and Expression,” May 16, 2013,
https://www.charityandsecurity.org/analysis/Restrictive_Laws_How_FATF_Used_to_Justify_Laws_That_Harm_Civ
il_Society .
80 See USIG Country Note for Kosovo, accessed January 12, 2015, https://www.cof.org/content/kosovo .
81 United Nations Human Rights, “Persecution of Rights Activists Must Stop —UN Experts Call on the
Government of Azerbaijan,” Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, August 19, 2014, accessed
Septemb er 8, 2014,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=14952&LangID=E#sthash.bg1H8K65.dp
uf. In August 2014, at l east three other activists were detained on criminal charges: Arif Yunus, Rasul Jafarov, and
Intigam Aliyev. See RFE/RL’s Azerbaijani Service, “Azerbaijani Rights Activist jailed for Three Months,” Radio
Free Europe Radio Library , August 8, 2014, accessed September 10, 2014, https://www.rferl.org/content/azerbaijan –
rights -activist -detain -intigam -aliyev/26520249.html .
82 A prom inent example is Egypt, where 43 CSO employees faced prosecution, criminal conviction, and
prison sentences for illegal receipt of foreign funding in Egypt in 2013. Additionally, in Belarus, human rights
activist Ales Belyatski was sentenced to four and a half years in prison on charges of tax evasion in 2013 (see
“Belarus Activist Ales Belyatski Jailed for Tax Evasion,” BBC, November 24, 2011, accessed September 8, 2014,

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 16

example, in September 2014, Egypt amended its Penal Code to punish with life imprisonment
and a fine anyone who receives funding or other support from a foreign source with the intent to
“harm the national interest,” “compromise national sovereignty,” or “breach security or public
peace.” The amended law likewise imposes the penalty of life imprisonment on anyone who
gives or offers such funds, or “facilitates” their receipt. 83 In many co untries, we are witnessing
an uptick in the criminalization of international funding accompanying a more general uptick in
the criminalization of dissent.
Laws Impeding the Formation and Operation of Recipient CSOs
An analysis of legal barriers to the infl ow of philanthropy would be incomplete without a
discussion of laws that impede the formation and operation of CSOs. If a country bans or
severely restricts the formation or operation of local CSOs, foundations have fewer choices when
seeking to express th eir philanthropic intent. Taken together, cross -border philanthropy is
impeded by laws regulating the cross -border flow of funding as well as by laws affecting the
ability of host country CSOs to form, operate, and engage internationally.
Because other r eports have comprehensively surveyed restrictions on CSOs, 84 this section
addresses only three illustrative barriers, namely: (1) barriers to the formation of CSOs, (2)
barriers to the operation of CSOs, and (3) restrictions on the ability of CSOs to have i nternational
contact.
1. Barriers to Formation of CSOs.
In some countries, the law is used to discourage, burden, and even prevent the formation
of CSOs. Barriers include burdensome registration or incorporation requirements, vague grounds
for denial, and lim itations on permissible program activity. As but a few examples:
 Limited right to associate . In Saudi Arabia , the only CSOs that exist were established by
royal decree. 85
 Restrictions on founders . In Turkmenistan , national -level associations can only be
established with a minimum of 400 founders. 86
 High minimum capital requirements . In Eritrea , Proclamation No. 145/2005 requires
that local CSOs engaged in relief and/or rehabilitation work must have “at their disposal

https://www.bbc.com/news/ world -europe -15871582 ). In August 2014, the Thai army brought a criminal defamation
suit against human rights activist Pornpen Khongkachonkiet (see “Thai Activists Say Army’s Legal Actions Aim to
Silence Rights Workers,” Reuters Africa, August 28, 2014, ac cessed September 8, 2014,
https://af.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idAFKBN0GS1HB20140828 ).
83 Government of Egypt, 2014 Amended Penal Code, Article 78, unofficial translation.
84 International Center for Not -for -Profit Law & World Movement for Democracy Secretariat, “Defending
Civil Society Report, Second Edition,” June 2012,
https://www. icnl.org/research/resources/dcs/DCS_Report_Second_Edition_English.pdf .
85 Kareem Elbayar, “NGO Laws in Selected Arab States,” International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law 7(4)
(September 2005), https://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol7iss4/special_1.htm .
86 ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: Turkmenistan, last modified June 13, 2014,
https://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/turkm enistan.html .

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 17

in Eritrea one million US dollars or it s equivalent in convertible currency.” This amount
is approximately 15,000 average monthly per capita GDP in Eritrea. 87
 Geographic registration requirements . Associations in Burundi must register in the
capital city, Bujumbura. However, the cost of travel p revents many groups from
registering. 88 Similarly, organizations in Panama must travel to Panama City to apply for
Legal Personality, for recognition in the Public Registry, and for registration in the
Registry of Organizations maintained by the relevant mi nistry. 89
 Burdensome registration procedures . In China , registration procedures are complex and
cumbersome for many kinds of CSOs, with extensive documentation and approval
requirements. Recent reforms have piloted more streamlined registration for some soc ial
services groups in some regions, particularly in southern China. For advocacy and other
kinds of organizations, however, registration remains difficult and long. In many cases
organizations are required to operate under a system of “dual management,” i n which
they must generally first obtain the sponsorship of a specialized government ministry or
provincial government agency in their line of work. They must then seek registration and
approval from the Ministry of Civil Affairs in Beijing or a local civi l affairs bureau and
remain under the dual control of both agencies. 90
 Vague grounds for denial . In Bahrain , the government can refuse registration of an
association if “society does not need its services or if there are other associations that
fulfill soci ety’s needs in the [same] field of activity.” This provision has been used to
deny registration of human rights groups and other groups disfavored by the government,
and then to arrest activists who continue to carry out activities without registration. 91 In
Venezuela , officials routinely deny registration requests of CSOs with terms such as
“democracy” or “human rights” in their names. For example, in 2010, officials denied the
registration request of Asociación Civil Civilis “on the grounds that the docume nt could
not make reference to terms like democracy and politicians.” 92
87 Lindsay Coates & Douglas Rutzen, “Policy Brief: Safeguarding Civil Society,” InterAction, January
2013, accessed September 8, 2014, https://www.interaction.o rg/files/FABB%202013_Sec5_CivilSociety.pdf .
88 ICNL, “NGO Laws in Sub -Saharan Africa,” Global Trends in NGO Law 3(3) (June 2011): 5,
https://www.icnl.org/research/trends/trends3 -3.pdf .
89 Ali anza Ciudadana Pro Justicia, Entorno Legal de las Organizaciones de Sociedad Civil en Panamá,
2011, 14 -15.
90 ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: China, last modified July 1, 2014,
https://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/turkmenistan.html .
91 On August 30, Bahraini authorities arrested Maryam al -Khawaja, a prominent human rights activist.
Among others, she faces charges relating to her involvement with the rights campaign “Wanted for Ju stice,” which
was organized by the Bahrain Center for Human Rights. Her father, Abdulhadi al -Khawaja, is the co -founder of the
Bahrain Center for Human Rights and is currently serving a life sentence in prison. See Samia Errazzouki, “Maryam
al-Khawaja, the Inconvenient Activist,” Foreign Policy , September 4, 2014, accessed September 10, 2014,
https://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2014/09/04/maryam_al _khawaja_the_inconvenient_activist .
92 Annual Report of the Inter -American Commission on Human Rights 2010, Chapter IV Venezuela, 534,
https://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2010eng/Chap.IV.VENEZUELA.doc .

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2. Barriers to Operational Activity
If CSOs are able to form, legislation may also limit the space in which CSOs can operate.
Legal restrictions include direct prohibitions on certain area s of activity, invasive supervisory
oversight, and arbitrary termination and dissolution. For example:
 Direct prohibitions on spheres of activity . In Nigeria , the registration of any “gay club,
society, organization” is banned. Any founder or member of a g ay club may be jailed for
up to 10 years. 93 In Eritrea, CSOs are limited to “relief and/or rehabilitation works,”
thereby preventing CSOs from engaging in other issues that may be of interest to the
philanthropic community. 94
 Advance notification and approva l. In Cambodia , local CSOs that wish to conduct
activities in a province other than where they are registered must inform the local
authority five days in advance, according to Ministry of Interior guidelines; in some
provinces the guidelines are interpret ed as directives that require approval by provincial
authorities. 95 CSOs in Uganda must provide the local government with seven days’
advance written notice before making any direct contact with people in rural areas. 96 A
draft law in Nigeria would require approval before the implementation of a project or any
variation from the project estimate. The bill imposes additional pre -approval
requirements for projects addressing the needs of “targeted groups,” an undefined term. 97
 Invasive supervisor y oversight . In Senegal , the Law on Foundations (Law No. 95 -11 of
1995) authorizes the State to designate representatives who sit on the foundation councils
(internal governing bodies) with a deliberative vote. These representatives are
accountable to the administrative authority that named them. In Ecuador , the
government may request any document related to the operations of CSOs. 98 In Rwanda ,
the government may intervene when there is a dispute among a CSO’s board members. 99
The government exercised this au thority, most notably, in replacing the leadership of a
prominent human rights organization, LIPRODHOR, in July 2013. In Russia , the law
allows governmental representatives to attend all of the organization’s events, without
restriction, including internal strategy sessions. The government also has the power to
conduct audits and demand documents dealing with the details of an organization’s
93 ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: Nigeria, last modified August 8, 2014,
https://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/nigeria.html .
94 Government of Eritrea, Proclamation No. 145/2005, A Proclamation to Determine the Administration of
Non -governmental Organizations , No. 145/2005, May 11, 2005, available at:
https://www.unhcr.org/ref world/docid/493507c92.html
95 ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: Cambodia, last modified August 1, 2014,
https://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/cambodia.html .
96 Republic of Uganda, NGO Registration Regul ations 2009, Regulation 13(a),
https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Uganda_NGOReg2009.pdf .
97 Nigeria, NGO Regulatory Agency Bill, 2014 , Article 24(1).
98 Government of E cuador, Presidential Decree No. 16, Article 7.2 -7.3.
99 Government of Rwanda, Law No. 4/2012 Article 27.

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governance, including day -to-day policy decisions, supervision of the organization’s
management, and oversight of its finances. 100
 Termination and dissolution . According to Bolivia ’s 2013 Law on Granting Legal
Personality and its implementing regulation, the government may dissolve a CSO if the
Legislature passes a law stating that termination is necessary or in the publi c interest,
vague terms that can be used to close down CSOs disfavored by the government. 101
3. Barriers to International Engagement
Global philanthropists and the international community are not just a source of financial
resources. They are also a source of i nformation and ideas. In some countries, governments have
supplemented restrictions on international funding with restrictions on international engagement.
As but a few examples:
 In the United Arab Emirates , the Federal Law on Civil Associations and Founda tions of
Public Benefit restricts CSO members from participating in events outside of the country
without the prior authorization of the Ministry of Social Affairs. 102
 In Uzbekistan , CSOs seeking to invite international participants to a conference must
secu re advance approval from the Ministry of Justice. 103 Governmental approval is also
required for CSOs to organize certain international conferences in Vietnam .
 Egypt ’s Law 84/2002 restricts the right of CSOs to join with non -Egyptian CSOs and “to
communicate with non -governmental or inter -governmental organizations.” Under the
law, CSOs that interact with foreign organizations without prior approval face
dissolution. 104
 A 2010 Ministry Decree in Libya requires international organizations to go through a
complica ted registration process to train, provide technical advice, or implement joint
activities with local CSOs. 105
 In July 2014, the Prime Minister of Swaziland threatened civil society representatives
who attended the recent African Leaders Summit in Washington , DC. The Prime Minister
100 ICNL, NGO Law Monitor: Russia, last modified November 24, 2014,
https://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/russia.html
101 Supreme Decree No. 1597 implementing Bolivian Law No. 351 of 2013 on Awarding Legal
Personalities, Article 19b.
102 International Center for Not -for -Profit Law & World Movement for Democracy Secretariat, “De fending
Civil Society Report, Second Edition,” June 2012,
https://www.icnl.org/research/resources/dcs/DCS_Report_Second_Edition_English.pdf .
103 ICNL, NGO Law Mon itor: Uzbekistan, last modified February 8, 2014,
https://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/uzbekistan.html .
104 See Government of Egypt, Law No. 84 of the Year 2002 on Non -Governmental Organiz ations,
https://www.icnl.org/wp-content/uploads/Egypt_law84-2002-En.pdf .
105 Ministry of Culture and Civil Society, Controls on the Activities of International Organizatio ns
Supporting Civil Society in Libya, June 1, 2010 (on file with author).

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 20

told lawmakers, “You must strangle them” when they return to Swaziland. 106 In response,
the United States Department of State expressed deep concern about these “threatening
remarks” and that stated that “such remarks have a chilling effect on labor and civil rights
in the Kingdom of Swaziland.” 107
In sum, cross -border philanthropy is impeded by laws directly regulating the flow of
funding as well as by laws affecting the underlying ability of CSOs to form, operate, and engage
internat ionally.
Government Justifications
This section examines common justifications offered by governments to defend
restrictions placed on international funding. These justifications fall into four broad categories:
(1) state sovereignty; (2) transparency and accountability in the civil society sector; (3) aid
effectiveness and coordination; and (4) national security, counterterrorism, and anti -money
laundering concerns.
This section draws heavily upon an April 2013 report by the UN Special Rapporteur
(UNSR) o n the freedoms of peaceful assembly and of association, where the UNSR articulated
international norms protecting the ability of CSOs to access resources from international and
foreign sources (hereinafter the “UNSR’s Resource Report”). 108
1. State Sovereignty
Some governments invoke state sovereignty as a justification to restrict cross -border
philanthropy. The most blunt form of the argument is that sovereignty entitles a government to
enact whatever law it deems appropriate. This seems to be the position adv anced by UN Human
Rights Council representatives from Gabon, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Namibia and seven
other African countries in response to the UNSR’s Resource Report. These governments
appeared before the UN Human Rights Council and argued that “it is f or each state in a
sovereign and legitimate manner to define what constitutes a violation of its legislation with
respect to human rights.” 109 Similarly, in response to a “civil society space” resolution
introduced by the Irish Government at the September 20 14 session of the UN Human Rights
Council, the representative from India asserted:
Civil society must operate within national laws. To treat national laws with
condescension is not the best way to protect human rights, even by civil society with the
106 Christopher Torchia, “Swazi PM Reportedly Threatens Activists,” Yahoo News, August 12, 2014,
accessed September 8, 2014, https://news.yahoo.com/swazi -pm -reportedly -threatens -activists -111618589.html .
107 Marie Harf, “Threatening Remarks by Swazi Prime Minister Cause for Concern,” U.S. Department of
State, Press Statement, August 9, 2014, acces sed September 8, 2014,
https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2014/230455.htm .
108 For more information, please see United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the right s to freedom of peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39
(April 24, 2013) at https://freeassembly.net/wp -content/up loads/2013/04/A.HRC_.23.39_EN -funding -report -April –
2013.pdf .
109 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Oral Statement — Gabon on behalf of the
African Group,” May 30, 2013, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/23rdSession/OralStatements/Gabon%20on%20be
half%20ofAG_10_1.pdf .

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best o f intentions. We wish that caution should be exercised in advocacy of the causes of
civil society. The Resolution is unduly prescriptive on what domestic legislation should
do and should not do. This is the prerogative of the citizens of those countries. 110
Other officials have presented a related but narrower argument that restrictions are
necessary to protect the sovereignty of their states from foreign interference in domestic political
affairs. 111 For example:
 In justifying the Russian “foreign agents” law, President Putin said, “The only purpose
of this law after all was to ensure that foreign organisations representing outside interests,
not those of the Russian state, would not intervene in our domestic affairs. This is
something that no self -respecting c ountry can accept.” 112
 In July 2014, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban lauded the establishment of a
parliamentary committee to monitor civil society organizations: “We’re not dealing with
civil society members but paid political activists who are trying to help foreign interests
here…. It’s good that a parliamentary committee has been set up to monitor, document,
and publish foreign influence” by CSOs. 113
 In Egypt , forty -three CSO staff members were “charged with ‘establishing unlicenced
chapters of inte rnational organisations and accepting foreign funding to finance these
groups in a manner that breached the Egyptian state’s sovereignty.’” 114 Egyptian officials
claimed that the CSOs were contributing to international interference in Egypt’s domestic
politi cal affairs. 115
 One of the sponsors of a 2011 draft “foreign agents” law in Israel defended the bill,
claiming it represented a “major hurdle en route to cleansing Israel’s policies from
foreign influence, of the kind that do not wish Israel’s favour…. It i s the right and duty
of the State of Israel to conduct itself according to the will of the Israeli public, as
opposed to succumbing to foreign attempts to buy influence within Israel.” 116
110 Permanent Mission of India, Geneva, “Statement by India in Explanation of Vote before the Vote,”
September 26, 2014 (on file with the author). In the same statement, India also challenged first principles, asserting,
“the resolution fallaciously seeks to make civil society a s ubject of law.”
111 Ibid.
112 President of Russia, “Remarks at Meeting of Council for Civil Society and Human Rights,” November
12, 2012, accessed September 8, 2014 https://eng.kremlin.ru/news/4613 .
113 Zoltan Simo n, “Orban Says He Seeks to End Liberal Democracy in Hungary,” Bloomberg News , July
28, 2014, accessed September 8, 2014, https://www.bloomb erg.com/news/2014 -07 -28/orban -says -he-seeks -to-end –
liberal -democracy -in-hungary.html .
114 Agence France Press, “Egypt Says Working to End NGO Row: McCain,” AlterNet, accessed September
8, 2014, https://www.alternet.org/rss/breaking_news/804643/egypt_says_working_to_end_ngo_row%3A_mccain .
115 Josh Levs & Saad Abedine, “Egypt sentences American NGO workers to jail,” CNN, June 4, 2013,
accessed September 8 , 2014, https://www.cnn.com/2013/06/04/world/africa/egypt -ngos/index.html .
116 Paul Vale, “Israel Moves to Limit Foreign Funding of ‘Liberal’ NGOs,” Huffington Post UK , January
13, 2012, accessed September 8, 2014, https://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2011/11/13/netanyahu -limits -ngo –
funding_n_1091047.html .

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 22

 A member of the Israeli Knesset sponsoring a similar bill in 2014 jus tified the
restrictions, arguing that “[t]here are dozens of organizations active in Israel that receive
funding from foreign government entities in exchange for the organization’s promise to
promote the interests of these entities, or of those who are not Israeli citizens…. As of
today, these organizations have no obligation of proper disclosure, in which they have to
present themselves as clearly representing foreign interests that do not accord with Israeli
interests.” 117
 In August 2014, a presidential off icial in Azerbaijan justified the crackdown on civil
society, asserting, “some NGOs under the guise of ‘people’s diplomacy,’ established
cooperation with local organizations controlled by special services of aggressive
Armenia, and became spokesmen for the enemy country’s interests.” 118
 In December 2013, Bolivia expelled IBIS, a Danish education CSO, for meddling in
domestic affairs. Announcing the expulsion at a news conference, Minister of the
Presidency Juan Ramon Quintana said, “

e are tired of tolerating IBIS’ political
interference in Bolivia.” 119
 A September 2014 article in the New York Times asserted that foreign “money is
increasingly transforming the once -staid think -tank world into a muscular arm of foreign
governments’ lobbying in Washington.” 120 The following week, United States
Representative Frank Wolf wrote a letter to the Brookings Institution, in which he urged
them to “end this practice of accepting money from … foreign governments” so that its
work is not “compromised by the influence, whether real or perceived, of foreign
governments.” 121
Some governments assert that foreigners are not only seeking to meddle in domestic
political affairs, but also seeking to destabilize the country or otherwise engage in “regime
change.” Accor dingly, they argue that foreign funding restrictions are necessary to thwart efforts
to destabilize or overthrow the government currently in power.
 In 2013 in Sri Lanka , the government justified a recent registration requirement for all
CSOs on the grounds that it was necessary to “thwart certain NGOs from hatching
117 Jonathan Lis, “Draft bill: NGOs with foreign funding to be defined ‘foreign agents,’” Haaretz , May 26,
2013, accessed September 8, 2014, https://www.haaretz.com/news/national/.premium -1.592754 .
118 “Some Azerbaijani NGOs Cooperated with Armenian Special Services Under ‘People’s Diplomacy,’”
Trend, August 15, 2014, accessed September 8, 2014, https://en.trend.az/news/politics/230 3147.html .
119 Agence France -Presse, “Bolivia expels Danish NGO for meddling,” Global Post , December 20, 2013,
accessed September 16, 2014, https://www.gl obalpost.com/dispatch/news/afp/131220/bolivia -expels -danish -ngo –
meddling -1.
120 Eric Lipton, Brooke Williams, & Nicholas Confessore, “Foreign Powers Buy Influence at Think Tanks,”
New York Times , September 6, 2014, accessed September 17, 2014,
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/us/politics/foreign -powers -buy -influence -at-think -tanks.html?_r=0 .
121 Letter from Representative Frank Wolf to Strobe Talbott of the Brookings Institution, September 9,
2014, accessed September 17, 2014, https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud. org/documents/1301186/rep –
frank -wolfs -letter -to-strobe -talbott -at.pdf .

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 23

conspiracies to effect regime change by engaging in politics in the guise of doing social
work.” 122
 A drafter of the Russian “foreign agents” law justified the initiative when it was pending
in pa rliament, stating, “There is so much evidence about regime change in Yugoslavia,
now in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, in Kosovo — that’s what happens in the world, some
governments are working to change regimes in other countries. Russian democracy needs
to be prot ected from outside influences.” 123
 In 2005, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia expelled civil society organizations, explaining,
“there is not going to be a ‘Rose Revolution’ or a ‘Green Revolution’ in Ethiopia after the
election” 124 — a reference to the so -called “color revolutions” that had recently occurred
in Georgia and elsewhere.
 In June 2012, Uganda’s Minister for Internal Affairs justified the government’s threats to
deregister certain CSOs, stating that CSOs “want to destabilize the country because that
is what they are paid to do…. They are busy stabbing the government in its back yet they
are supposed to do humanitarian work.” 125
 In the process of driving civil society organizations out of Zimbabwe , President Mugabe
justified his policies by claiming that the CSOs were fronts for Western “colonial
masters” to undermine the Zimbabwean government. 126 Similarly, the central committee
of Mugabe’s party claimed, “Some of these NGOs are working day and night to remove
President Mugabe and ZANU PF from power. They are being funded by Britain and
some European Union countries, the United States, Australia, Canada and New
Zealand.” 127
 In a March 2014 interview justifying a draft “foreign agents” law, Kyrgyzstan’s
President Atembaev argued, “Activities conducted by CSOs are obviously aimed at
destabilization of the situation in the Kyrgyz Republic…. Some CSOs do not care about
how they get income, whose orders to fulfill, which kind of work to execute…. There are
122 Xinhua, “Sri Lanka to Investigate NGOs Operating in Country,” Herald , June 13, 2013, accessed
September 8, 2014, https://www.herald.co.zw/sri -lanka -to-investigate -ngos -operating -in-country/ .
123 “Russian parliament gives first approval to NGO bill,” BBC , July 6, 2012, accessed September 8, 2014,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world -europe -18732949 .
124 Darin Christensen & Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Defunding Dissent,” Journal of Democracy 24(2) (April
2013): 80.
125Pascal Kwesiga, “Govt gets tough on NGOs,” New Vision , June 19, 2012, accessed Septembe r 9, 2014,
https://www.newvision.co.ug/news/632123 -govt -gets -tough -on-ngos.html .
126 Thomas Carothers, “The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion,” Foreign Affairs , March/April 2006,
accessed September 9, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/61509/thomas -carothers/the -backlash -against –
democracy -promotion .
127 “29 NGOs banned in crackdown,” New Zimbabwe , February 14, 2012, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://www.newzimbabwe.com/news -7189 -29+NGOs+banned+in+crackdown/new s.aspx .

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 24

forces interested in destabilizing the situation in Kyrgyzs tan and spreading chaos across
Central Asia and parts of China.” 128
 In July 2014, the vice chairman of the China Research Institute of China -Russia Relations
argued that China should “learn from Russia” and enact a foreign agents law “so as to
block the way for the infiltration of external forces and eliminate the possibilities of a
Color Revolution.” 129
2. Transparency and Accountability
Another justification commonly invoked by governments to regulate and restrict the flow
of foreign funds is the importance of upholding the integrity of CSOs by promoting transparency
and accountability through government regulation. Consider, for example, the following
responses by government delegations to the UNSR’s Resource Report:
 Egypt : “We agree with the principles of accountability, transparency, and integrity of the
activities of civil society organisations and NGOs. However, this should not be l imited to
accountability to donors. National mechanisms to follow -up on activities of such entities,
while respecting their independence have to be established and respected.” 130
 Maldives : “While civil societies should have access to financing for effective operation
within the human rights framework, it is of equal importance that the organizations must
also ensure that they work with utmost integrity and in an ethical and responsible
manner.” 131
 Azerbaijan : “The changes and amendments to the national legisl ation on NGOs have
been made with a view of increasing transparency in this field…. In that regard, these
amendments should only disturb the associations operating in our country on a non –
transparent basis.” 132
Similarly, in response to a United Nations Hum an Rights Council panel on the promotion
and protection of civil society space in March 2014, the following government delegations
responded with justifications invoking transparency and accountability:
128 “Алмазбек Атамбаев: “Хочу максимально успеть,” Slovo.kg , March 23, 2014, accessed September
9, 2014, translated by Aida Rustemova, https://slovo.kg/?p=35019 .
129 Simon Denyer , “China taking the Putin approach to democracy,” Washington Post, October 1, 2014,
A7.
130 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Clustered ID with the WG on HR and
Transnational Corporations and the SR on The Rights to Freedom of Assembly an d Association: Intervention
delivered by the Permanent Delegation of Egypt,” May 30, 2013, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extran et.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/23rdSession/OralStatements/Egypt_10_1.pdf .
131 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Interactive Dialogue with the Special
Rapporteur on the Rights to Peaceful Assembly and of Association, M aldives Oral Statement,” May 31, 2013,
accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/ 23rdSession/OralStatements/Maldives_12.pdf .
132 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Remarks by Azerbaijan,” May 31, 2013,
accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/23rdSession/OralStatements/Azerbaijan_12.pdf .

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 25

 Ethiopia , on behalf of the African Group: “Domestic l aw regulation consistent with the
international obligations of States should be put in place to ensure that the exercise of the
right to freedom of expression, assembly and association fully respects the rights of
others and ensures the independence, accou ntability and transparency of civil society.” 133
 India, on behalf of the “Like Minded Group”: “The advocacy for civil society should be
tempered by the need for responsibility, openness and transparency and accountability of
civil society organizations.” 134
 Pa kistan , on behalf of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation members : “It may be
underscored that securing funding for its crucial work is the right of civil society,
maintaining transparency and necessary regulation of funding is the responsibility of
sta tes.” 135
Kyrgyzstan has also employed this argument to justify a draft “foreign agents” law. The
explanatory note to the draft law claims that it “has been developed for purposes of ensuring
openness, publicity, transparency for non -profit organizations, inc luding units of foreign non –
profit organizations, as well as non -profit organizations acting as foreign agents and receiving
their funds from foreign sources, such as foreign countries, their government agencies,
international and foreign organizations, fo reign citizens, stateless persons or their authorized
representatives, receiving monetary funds or other assets from the said sources.”
3. Aid Effectiveness and Coordination
A global movement has increasingly advocated for greater aid effectiveness, including
through concepts of “host country ownership” and the harmonization of development
assistance. 136 However, some states have interpreted “host country ownership” to be
synonymous with “host government ownership” and have otherwise co -opted the aid
effectivene ss debate to justify constraints on international funding. For example:
133 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Statement by Ethiopia on behalf of the
African Grou p at the 25th session of the Human Rights Council On the Panel Discussion on the Importance of the
Promotion and Protection of Civil Society Space,” March 11, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/25thSession/OralStatements/Ethiopia%20on%20b
ehalf%20of%20African%20Group_PD_21.pdf .
134 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Joint Statement: India on behalf of like –
minded countries,” March 11, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/25thSession/OralStatements/India_on%20behalf
%20of%20LMG_PD_21.pdf . The “Like Minded Group” consists of Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus,
Chi na, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam , and Zimbabwe .
135 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Statement by Pakistan on be half of OIC:
Panel Discussion on Civil Society Space,” March 11, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
https ://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/25thSession/OralStatements/Pakistan%20on%20b
ehalf%20of%20OIC_PD_21.pdf .
136 See the Aid Effectiveness Agenda of the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008),
and the Busan Partn ership for Effective Development Cooperation (2011).

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 In July 2014, Nepal ’s government released a new Development Cooperation Policy 137
that will require development partners to channel all development cooperation through
the Ministry of Fi nance, rather than directly to CSOs. The government argued that this
policy is necessary for aid effectiveness and coordination: “Both the Government and the
development partners are aware of the fact that the effectiveness can only be enhanced if
the owne rship of aid funded projects lies with the recipient government.” 138
 Sri Lanka ’s Finance and Planning Ministry issued a public notice in July 2014 requiring
CSOs to receive government approval of international funding. Justifying the
requirement, the Ministry claimed that projects financed with international funding were
“outside t he government budget undermining the national development programmes.” 139
 In response to the UNSR’s Resource Report, the representative of Egypt stated, “The
diversification of the venues of international cooperation and assistance to States towards
the fund ing of civil society partners fragments and diverts the already limited resources
available for international assistance. Hence, aid coordination is crucial for aid
effectiveness.” 140
 At the recent Africa Leaders Summit, the Foreign Minister of Benin s poke a t a workshop
on closing space for civil society. He asserted that CSOs “don’t think they are
accountable to government but only to development partners. This is a problem.” He said
Benin needs “a regulation to create transparency on resources coming from a broad and
the management of resources,” stating that the space for civil society is “too wide.” 141
 The Intelligence Bureau of India released a report in June 2014 claiming that foreign –
funded CSOs stall economic development and negatively impact India’s GDP growth by
2 to 3 percent. 142 The report stated, “a significant number of Indian NGOs, funded by
some donors based in the US, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Scandinavian
137 Government of Nepal Ministry of Finance, “Development Cooperation Policy, 2014,” unofficial
translation, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://www.mof.gov.np/uploads/document/file/DCP_English_20140707120230_20140721083326.pdf .
138 Government of Nepal Ministry of Finance, “Development Cooperation Policy, 2014,” unofficial
translation, Article 2.2, acces sed September 9, 2014,
https://www.mof.gov.np/uploads/document/file/DCP_English_20140707120230_20140721083326.pdf .
139 “No foreign funds without approva l: Ministry,” Daily Mirror , July 22, 2014, accessed September 9,
2014, https://www.dailymirror.lk/news/50038 -no -foreign -funds -without -approval -ministry.html .
140 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Clustered ID with the WG on HR and
Transnational Corporations and the SR on The Rights to Freedom of Assembly and Association: Intervention
delivered by the Permanent Delegation of Egypt,” May 30, 2013, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/23rdSession/OralStatements/Egypt_1 0_1.pdf .
141 Personal notes of author.
142 “Foreign -funded NGOs stalling development: IB report,” Times of India , June 12, 2014, accessed
September 9, 2014, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Foreign -funded -NGOs -stalling -development -IB –
report/articleshow/36411169.cms .

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 27

countries, have been noticed to be using people centric issues to create an enviro nment
which lends itself to stalling development projects.” 143
4. National Security, Counterterrorism, and Anti -Money Laundering
As discussed above, governments also invoke national security, counterterrorism, and
anti -money laundering policies to justify restr ictions on international funding, including cross –
border philanthropy. For example, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an
intergovernmental body that seeks to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, stated:
The ongoing international campaign against terrorist financing has unfortunately
demonstrated however that terrorists and terrorist organisations exploit the NPO
sector to raise and move funds, provide logistical support, encourage terrorist
recruitment or otherwise support terrorist organi sations and operations. This
misuse not only facilitates terrorist activity but also undermines donor confidence
and jeopardises the very integrity of NPOs. Therefore, protecting the NPO sector
from terrorist abuse is both a critical component of the globa l fight against
terrorism and a necessary step to preserve the integrity of NPOs. 144
Governments have leveraged concerns about counterterrorism and money laundering to
justify restricting both the inflow and outflow of philanthropy. For example: 145
 The governm ent of Azerbaijan justified amendments relating to the registration of
foreign grants, stating that the purpose of the amendments was, in part, “ to enforce
international obligations of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the area of combating money –
laundering.” 146
143 Rake sh Krishnan Simha, “Why India Should Follow Vladimir Putin’s Lead on NGOs,” Russia & India
Report, June 15, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://in.rbth.com/blogs/2014/06/15/why_india_should_follow_vladimir_putins_lead_on_ngos_35945.html .
144 Financial Action Task Force, “International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the
Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations,” Financial Action Task Force Report, 2013,
54, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fa tf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf . See also
Financial Action Task Force, “Risk of Terrorist Abuse in Non -Profit Organisations,” Financial Action Task Force
Report, June 2014, https://www.fatf -gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Risk -of-terrorist -abuse -in-non -profit –
organisations.pdf .
145 Constraints by donor governments on the outflow of cross -border donation s, albeit beyond the scope of
this article, similarly present significant barriers to cross -border philanthropy. These states assert that they have an
international responsibility to regulate the outflow of cross -border donations in order to ensure that fu nding destined
for other countries will not support criminal or terrorist activities in those foreign jurisdictions. For more information
about the justifications employed and the implications for civil society, please see: Ben Hayes, “Counter -Terrorism,
‘Policy Laundering’ and the FATF: Legalizing Surveillance, Regulating Civil Society,” Transnational
Institute/Statewatch Report, February 2012, https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no -171 -fafp -report.pdf .
146 Charity & Security Network, “How the FATF Is Used to Justify Laws That Harm Civil Society,
Freedom of Association and Expression,” Charity & Security Network , May 16, 2013, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://www.charityandsecurity.org/analysis/Restrictive_Laws_How_FATF_Used_to_Justify_Laws_That_Harm_Civ
il_Society .

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 28

 The British Virgin Islands (BVI) enacted a law requiring that CSOs with more than five
employees appoint a designated Anti -Money Laundering Compliance Officer. 147 The
law also imposes audit requirements for CSOs that are not required of businesses. These
burdens were justified with explicit reference to FATF’s recommendation on nonprofit
organizations and counterterrorism. 148
 In response to the UNSR’s Resource Report, a group of thirteen African states responded,
“It is the responsibility of governments to ensure that the origin and destination of
associations’ funds are not used for terrorist purposes or directed towards activities which
encourage incitement to hatred and violence.” 149
 In 2013, a Sri Lankan government representative similarly stated, “While w e agree that
access to resources is important for the vibrant functioning of civil society, we observe
that Mr. Kiai does not seem to adequately take into account the negative impact of lack of
or insufficient regulation of funding of associations on natio nal security and counter –
terrorism.” 150
 In a National Security Analysis released in August 2014, Sri Lanka’s Ministry of
Defence claimed that some civil society actors have links with the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam, a group with “extremist separatist i deology,” and that these CSOs thereby
pose “a major national security threat.” 151 During the same period, the Sri Lankan
government announced that it was drafting a law requiring CSOs to register with the
Ministry of Defence in order to have a bank account and receive international funding.
5. Hybrid Justifications
While these categories and examples represent the types of justifications offered by
governments for restricting foreign funding, in practice, official statements often combine
multiple justifications. A recent example is the statement made at the UN Human Rights Council
by India on behalf of itself and twenty other “like minded” states, including Cuba, Saudi
147 “Non -Profit Organisations,” British Virg in Islands Financial Investigation Agency, accessed September
9, 2014, https://www.bvifia.org/non -profit -organisations .
148 Charity & Security Network, “How the FATF Is Used to Justify Laws That H arm Civil Society,
Freedom of Association and Expression,” May 16, 2013,
https://www.charityandsecurity.org/analysis/Restrictiv e_Laws_How_FATF_Used_to_Justify_Laws_That_Harm_Civ
il_Society
149 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Oral Statement — Gabon on behalf of the
African Group,” 30 May 2013, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/23rdSession/OralStatements/Gabon%20on%20be
half%20ofAG_10_1.pdf .
150 UN Office of the High Co mmissioner for Human Rights, “23rd Session of the HRC Statement by Sri
Lanka —Item 3: Clustered ID with the SR on the rights to peaceful assembly & of association,” May 31, 2013,
accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/23rdSession/Pages/OralStatement.aspx?MeetingN
umber=12.0&MeetingDat e=Friday,%2031%20May%202013 .
151 Gotabaya Rajapaksa, “Sri Lanka’s National Security,” Ministry of Defence and Urban Development of
Sri Lanka, August 19, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Sri_Lankas_National_Security_20140819_02 .

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Arabia , Belarus, China, and Vietnam ,152 which weaves together a number of different
justifications, including foreign interference, accountability, and national security:
[C]ivil society cannot function effectively and efficiently without defined
limits…. Civil society must also learn to protect its own space by guarding against
machinations of donor groups guided by extreme ideologies laden with hidden
politicized motives, which if allowed could potentially bring disrepute to the civil
society space…. There have also been those civil society organizations, who have
digressed from their original purpose and indulged in the pursuit of donor -driven
agendas. It is important to ensure accountability and responsibility for their
actions and the consequences thereof and also guard against compromising
national and international security. 153
Similarly, Ethiopia, in its statement in response to the UNSR’s Resource R eport,
referenced justifications relating to state sovereignty, aid coordination, and accountability and
transparency:
It is our firm belief that associations will play their role in the overall
development of the country and advance their objectives, if a nd only if an
environment for the growth of transparent, members based and members driven
civil society groups in Ethiopia providing for accountability and predictability is
put in place. We are concerned that the abovementioned assertion [about
lightening the burdens to receive donor funding] by the special rapporteur
undermines the principle of sovereignty which we have always been guided by. 154
Similarly constructed statements have also been put forward by Pakistan and other states. 155
152 The “Like Minded Group” consisted of Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, China, Cuba, Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uganda,
UAE, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. UN Office of the Hig h Commissioner for Human Rights, “Joint Statement: India on
behalf of like -minded countries,” March 11, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/25thSession/OralStatements/India_on%20behalf
%20of%20LMG_PD_21.pdf .
153 Ibid.
154 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Oral Statement: Ethiopia,” May 31, 2013,
accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/23rdSession/OralStatements/Et hiopia_12.pdf .
155 See, e.g., UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Statement by Pakistan on Behalf of
OIC: Panel Discussion on Civil Society Space,” March 11, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/25thSession/OralStatements/Pakistan%20on%20b
ehalf%20of%20OIC_PD_21.pdf : “By virtue of its dynamic role civil society is well poised to build convergences
with the view to develop synergies between state institutions and their own networks. These synergies would
facilitate proper utilization of resources at the disposal state institutions an d civil society actors. In this regard, it
may be underscored that securing funding for its crucial work is the right of civil society, maintaining transparency
and necessary regulation of funding is the responsibility of states…. Within this social space, the civil society can
play its optimal role by working in collaboration with state institutions. Better coordination between civil society
actors and state institution [sic] would also facilitate enhancement of international cooperation in the field of hu man
rights.”

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In this section, the a rticle briefly surveyed justifications presented by governments to
constrain the inflow of international funding, including philanthropy. In the following section,
we analyze constraints and their justifications under international law.
International Legal Framework
1. International Norms Protecting Access to Resources and Cross -Border Philanthropy
Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states,
“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others….” 156 Acco rding to the
UNSR: 157
The right to freedom of association not only includes the ability of individuals or legal
entities to form and join an association 158 but also to seek, receive and use resources 159 —
human, material and financial — from domestic, foreign and in ternational sources. 160
The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders 161 similarly states that
access to resources is a self -standing right:
“[E]veryone has the right, individually and in association with others, to solicit, receive
and utilize reso urces for the express purpose of promoting and protecting human rights
and fundamental freedoms through peaceful means….” 162
According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, this right
specifically encompasses “the receipt of funds from abroad.” 163
156 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 22, December 16, 1966,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx .
157 While reports of the UNSR are not binding international law, his reports are referenced here because
they provide a comprehensive articulation and explanation of international law.
158 International law generally recognizes the freedom of association, and t his section follows that
formulation. Addressing the applicability of international law to non -membership organizations is beyond the scope
of this article, but for more information, please see: International Center for Not -for -Profit Law & World Movement
for Democracy Secretariat, “Defending Civil Society Report, Second Edition,” June 2012, 35,
https://www.icnl.org/research/resources/dcs/DCS_Report_Second_Editi on_English.pdf .
159 The UNSR defines “resources” as a broad concept that includes financial transfers (e.g., donations,
grants, contracts, sponsorship, and social investments), loan guarantees, in -kind donations, and other forms of
support. See United Nation s Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, para. 10, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39 (April 24, 2013) at
https://freeassembly.net/wp -content/uploads/2013/04/A.HRC_.23.39_EN -funding -report -April -2013.pdf .
160 Ibid., para. 8.
161 The UNSR notes that while “the Declaration is not a binding instrument, it must be recalled tha t it was
adopted by consensus of the General Assembly and contains a series of principles and rights that are based on
human rights standards enshrined in other international instruments which are legally binding. Ibid., para. 17.
162 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups
and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ,
UN Res. 53/144, Article 13, https://www.un.org/Docs/asp/ws.asp?m=A/RES/53/144 .
163 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Declaration on Human Rights
Defenders,” UN OHCHR, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/SRHRDefenders/Pages/Declaration.aspx .

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Reinforcing this position, 164 in 2013 the United Nations Human Rights Council passed
resolution 22/6, which calls upon on States “[t]o ensure that they do not discriminatorily impose
restrictions on potential sources of funding aimed at supporting the work of human rights
defenders,” and “no law should criminalize or delegitimize activities in defence of human rights
on account of the origin of funding thereto.” 165
The freedom to access resources extends beyond human rights defenders. For example,
the Declaration on the Elimination of A ll Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief states that the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion includes
the freedom to “solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals
and in stitutions.” 166 Access to resources is also an integral part of a number of other civil,
cultural, economic, political, and social rights. As the UNSR states: 167
For associations promoting human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights,
or those involved in service delivery (such as disaster relief, health -care provision or
environmental protection), access to resources is important, not only to the existence of
the association itself, but also to the enjoyment of other human rights by those benef itting
from the work of the association. Hence, undue restrictions on resources available to
associations impact the enjoyment of the right to freedom of association and also
undermine civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights as a whole. 168
Acc ordingly, “funding restrictions that impede the ability of associations to pursue their statutory
activities constitute an interference with article 22” of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. 169
2. Regional and Bilateral Commitments to Pro tect Cross -Border Philanthropy
164 This article briefly examines international norms governing global philanthropy. But it also recogniz es
that there are distinct limits to the impact of international law. For example, there is often an implementation gap
between international norms and country practice. In addition, there are few binding international treaties, such as
the ICCPR, and de tails are often left to “soft law,” such as the reports of the UNSR. At the same time, there is
concern that any effort to create a new global treaty on cross -border philanthropy or foreign funding would lead to a
retrenchment of existing rights.
165 United Nations General Assembly, Protecting Human Rights Defenders, March 21, 2013, UN Human
Rights Council, Resolution 22/6, para. 9, https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC /RES/22/6 .
166 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief , November 25, 1981, UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/36/55,
Article 6(f), https://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r055.htm .
167 In similar fashion, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognized the link
between access to resources and economic, social and cultural rights, when it expressed “deep concern” about an
Egyptian law that “gives the Government control over the right of NGOs to manage their own activities, including
seeking external funding.” See Egypt, ICESCR, E/2001/22 (2000) 38 at paras. 161, 176,
https://www.bayefsky.com/themes/public_general_concluding -observations.php .
168 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, para. 9, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39 (April 24, 2013) at
https://freeassembly.net/wp -content/uploa ds/2013/04/A.HRC_.23.39_EN -funding -report -April -2013.pdf .
169 Human Rights Committee, communication No. 1274/2004, Korneenko et al. v. Belarus, Views adopted
on October 31, 2006, para. 7.2.

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While this article is focused on global norms, cross -border philanthropy is also
protected at the regional level. For example:
 The Council of Europe Recommendation on the Legal Status of NGOs states:
“NGOs should be free to s olicit and receive funding — cash or in -kind donations —
not only from public bodies in their own state but also from institutional or
individual donors, another state or multilateral agencies ….” 170
 According to the Inter -American Commission on Human Rights, “states should allow and
facilitate human rights organizations’ access to foreign funds in the context of
international cooperation, in transparent conditions.” 171
 In May 2014, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)
adopted, in draft for m, a report of the ACHPR Study Group on Freedom of Association
and Peaceful Assembly, with a specific recommendation that States’ legal regimes should
codify that associations have the right to seek and receive funds. This includes the right to
seek and re ceive funds from their own government, foreign governments, international
organizations and other entities as a part of international cooperation to which civil
society is entitled, to the same extent as governments.
 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has issued a series of important decisions about the
free flow of philanthropic capital within the European Union. 172
In addition, many jurisdictions have concluded bilateral investment treaties, which help
protect the free flow of capital across borders. Some treaties, such as the U.S. treaties with
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, expressly extend investment treaty protections to organizations not
“organized for pecuniary gain.” 173 Indeed, the letters of transmittal submitted by the White
House to the U.S. Senate sta te that these treaties are drafted to cover “charitable and non -profit
entities.” 174
170 Council of Europe, “Recommendation CM/Rec (2007)145 of the Committ ee of Ministers to member
states on the legal status of non -governmental organisations in Europe,” adopted October 10, 2007, Article 50,
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1194609 .
171 Inter -American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in
the Americas , March 7, 2006, Recommendation 19, https://www.icnl.org /research/resources/assembly/oas -human –
rights -report.pdf .
172 For more information on these decisions, see: European Foundation Center and Transnational Giving
Europe, “Taxation of Cross -Border Philanthropy in Europe After Persche and Stauffer: From landloc k to free
movement?”, European Foundation Center Report, 2014,
https://www.efc.be/programmes_services/resources/Documents/TGE -web.pdf ; European Foundation Centre, “ECJ
rules in favour of cross -border giving ,” EFC briefing, January 27, 2009, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://www.efc.be/programmes_services/resources/Documents/befc09 08.pdf .
173 U.S. -Kyrgyz Bilateral Investment Treaty, Article 1(b); U.S. -Kazakh Bilateral Investment Treaty, Article
1(b). See also Article 1(2) of the China – Germany BIT: “the term ‘investor’ means … any juridical person as well
as any commercial or other c ompany or association with or without legal personality having its seat in the territory
of the Federal Republic of Germany, irrespective of whether or not its activities are directed at profit.”
174 Letters of Transmittal available at the U.S. State Departm ent website:
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43566.pdf and
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/4 3567.pdf .

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A detailed discussion of investment treaty protection for cross -border philanthropy is
beyond the scope of this article. This issue is presented in brief form, however, beca use it is a
significant avenue for further exploration, as it expands the international legal argument beyond
human rights and implicates bilateral investment treaties with binding enforcement
mechanisms. 175 For further information on this issue, please see International Investment Treaty
Protection of Not -for -Profit Organizations 176 and Protection of U.S. Non -Governmental
Organizations in Egypt under the Egypt -U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty. 177
3. Restrictions Permitted Under International Law
Continuing the discussion of global norms, ICCPR Article 22(2) recognizes that the
freedom of association can be restricted in certain narrowly defined conditions. According to
Article 22(2):
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those wh ich are
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 178
In other words, international law allows a government to restrict access to resources if the
restriction is:
(1) prescribed by law;
(2) in pursuance of one or more legitimate aims, specifically:
o national security or public safety;
o public order;
o the protection of public health or morals; or
o the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; and
175 In addition, the European Court of Human Rights has held that Article 1 of the First Protocol of the
European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions. (Article 1 of
the First Protocol of the Euro pean Convention reads: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to
the conditions provided for by law and by the general p rinciples of international law. The preceding provisions shall
not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of
property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment o f taxes or other contributions or
penalties.” In addition, the right to property includes the right to dispose of one’s property (Clare Ovey & Robin
White, The European Convention on Human Rights , 3rd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)), which
would seem to embrace the right to make contributions to CSOs for lawful purposes.
176 Luke Eric Peterson & Nick Gallus, “International Investment Treaty Protection of Not -for -Profit
Organizations,” International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law 10(1) (December 2007),
https://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol10iss1/art_1.htm .
177 Nick Gallus, “Protection of U.S. Non -Governmental Organizations in Egypt under the Egypt -U.S.
Bilat eral Investment Treaty,” International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law 14(3) (September 2012),
https://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol14iss3/art2.html .
178 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 22, December 16, 1966,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx . Article 22, ICCPR

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(3) “necessary in a democratic society to achieve those aims.” 179
Moreover :
States should always be guided by the principle that the restrictions must not im pair the
essence of the right … the relations between right and restriction, between norm and
exception, must not be reversed. 180
The burden of proof is on the government. 181 In addition:
When a State party invokes a legitimate ground for restriction of freed om of expression,
it must demonstrate in specific and individualized fashion the precise nature of the threat,
and the necessity and proportionality of the specific action taken, in particular by
establishing a direct and immediate connection between the [ activity at issue] and the
threat. 182
The following section amplifies this three -part test contained in Article 22(2).
A. Prescribed by law
The first prong requires a restriction to have a formal basis in law. This means that:
restrictions on the right to free dom of association are only valid if they had been
introduced by law (through an act of Parliament or an equivalent unwritten norm of
common law), and are not permissible if introduced through Government decrees or other
similar administrative orders. 183
As discussed above, in July 2014, the Sri Lankan Department of External Resources of
the Ministry of Finance and Planning disseminated a notice to the public, declaring that any
organization or individual undertaking a project with foreign aid must have appro val from
relevant government agencies. Similarly, in July 2014, Nepal’s government released a new
Development Cooperation Policy that will require development partners to channel all
development cooperation through the Ministry of Finance, rather than directly to civil society. In
both cases, the restriction s were based on executive action and not “introduced by law (through
179 Case of Vona v. Hungary (A pp no 35943/10) (2013) ECHR para. 50,
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -122183 .
180 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rappo rteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, para. 16, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/27 (May 21, 2012),
https://www.ohchr .org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A -HRC -20 -27_en.pdf .
181 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Fact Sheet No. 15, Civil and
Political Rights: The Human Rights Committee, May 2005,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet15rev.1en.pdf .
182 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, para. 35, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/34 (September 12, 2011), https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/GC34.pdf .
183 See UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Commentary to the Declaration
on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Fre edoms, July 2011, 44,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Defenders/CommentarytoDeclarationondefendersJuly2011.pdf : “It would
seem reasonable t o presume that an interference is only “prescribed by law” if it derives from any duly promulgated
law, regulation, order, or decision of an adjudicative body. By contrast, acts by governmental officials that are ultra
vires would seem not to be ‘prescribe d by law,’ at least if they are invalid as a result.”

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 35

an act of Parliament or an equivalent unwritten norm of common law).” Accordingly, they
appear to violate the “prescribed by law” standard required under Article 22(2) of the ICCPR.
This prong of Article 22(2) also requires that a provision be sufficiently precise for an
individual or NGO to understand whether or not intended conduct would constitute a violation of
law. 184 As stated in the Johannesburg Principles, “The law must be accessible , unambiguous,
drawn narrowly and with precision so as to enable individuals to foresee whether a particular
action is unlawful.” 185
This prong helps limit the scope of permissible restrictions. As discussed above, certain
laws ban funding of organizations that cause “social anxiety,” have a “political nature,” or have
“implied ideological conditions.” These terms are undefined and provide little guidance to
individuals or organizations about prohibited conduct. Since they are not “unambiguous, drawn
narrowl y and with precision so as to enable individuals to foresee whether a particular action is
unlawful,” there is a reasonable argument that these sorts of vague restrictions fail the
“prescribed by law” requirements of international law.
B. Legitimate aim
The second prong of Article 22(2) requires that a restriction advance one or more
“legitimate aims,” 186 namely:
 national security or public safety;
 public order;
 the protection of public health or morals; or
 the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
This prong provides a useful lens to analyze various justifications for constraint. For
example, governments have justified constraints to promote “aid effectiveness.” As the UNSR
notes, aid effectiveness “is not listed as a legitimate ground for restricti ons.” 187 Similarly, “[t]he
protection of State sovereignty is not listed as a legitimate interest in the [ICCPR],” and “States
cannot refer to additional grounds … to restrict the right to freedom of association.” 188
Of course, assertions of national security or public safety may, in certain circumstances,
constitute a legitimate interest. Under the Siracusa Principles, however, assertions of national
security must be construed restrictively “to justify measures limiting certain rights only when
184 Though not a fully precise comparison, this concept is somewhat similar to the “void for vagueness”
doctrine in U.S. constitutional law.
185 Article 19, Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Fre edom of Expression and Access to
Information (London: Article 19, 1996), Principle 1.1(a),
https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/joburgprinciples.pdf . The Johannesburg Principles were
developed by a meeting of international experts at a consultation in South Africa in October 1995.
186 Case of Vona v. Hungary (App no 35943/10) (2013) ECHR para. 50,
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -122183 .
187 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, para. 40, UN Doc . A/HRC/23/39 (April 24, 2013) at
https://freeassembly.net/wp -content/uploads/2013/04/A.HRC_.23.39_EN -funding -report -April -2013.pdf .
188 Ibid., pa ra. 30.

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they are taken to protect the existence of the nation or its territorial integrity or political
independence against force or threat of force.” 189 In addition, a state may not use “ national
security as a justification for measures aimed at suppressing opposition … or at perpetrating
repressive practices against its population.” 190 This includes defaming or stigmatizing foreign
funded groups by accusing them of “treason” or “promoting regime change.” 191
Accordingly, under international law, governments cannot rely on generalized claims of
“state sovereignty” to justify constraints on global philanthropy. In the words of the UNSR:
Affirming that national security is threatened when an association receives funding from
foreign sources is not only spurious and distorted, but also in contradiction with
international human rights law. 192
This brief analysis is not intended to explore the details of the aid effectiveness and
sovereignty justifications. Rather, the goal is to illustrate how the “legitimate aim” requirement
of in ternational law can help inform the analysis of certain justifications presented by
governments, such as arguments based on “aid effectiveness” and “sovereignty.”
C. Necessary in a Democratic Society
Even if a government is able to articulate a legitimate aim , a restriction violates
international law unless it is “necessary in a democratic society.” As stated by the Organization
for Security and Co -operation in Europe, the reference to necessity does not have “the flexibility
of terms such as ‘useful’ or ‘conv enient’: instead, the term means that there must be a ‘pressing
social need’ for the interference.” 193 Specifically, “where such restrictions are made, States must
demonstrate their necessity and only take such measures as are proportionate to the pursuance of
legitimate aims in order to ensure continuous and effective protection of Covenant rights.” 194
As stated by the UNSR:
In order to meet the proportionality and necessity test, restrictive measures must be the
least intrusive means to achieve the desired ob jective and be limited to the associations
189 See the “Siracusa Principles” [United Nations, Economic and Social Council, U.N. Sub -Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex, UN Doc E/CN.4/1985/4 (1984)],
which were adopted in May 1984 by a group of international human rights experts convened by the International
Commission of Jurists, the International Association of Penal Law, th e American Association for the International
Commission of Jurists, the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, and the International Institute of Higher
Studies in Criminal Sciences. Though not legally binding, these principles provide an authoritative s ource of
interpretation of the ICCPR with regard to limitations clauses and issue of derogation in a public emergency. They
are available at: https://graduateinstitute.ch/f aculty/clapham/hrdoc/docs/siracusa.html .
190 Ibid.
191 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, para. 27, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39 (April 24, 2013) at
https://freeassembly.net/wp -content/uploads/2013/04/A.HRC_.23.39_EN -funding -report -April -2013.pdf .
192 Ibid., para. 30
193 OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Key Guiding Principles of
Freedom of Association with an Emphasis on Non -Governmental Organizations , para. 5
194 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 (2004), para. 6, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Ad d. 13, May 26, 2004.

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falling within the clearly identified aspects characterizing terrorism only. They must not
target all civil society associations…. 195
Consider, for example, Ethiopian legislation imposing a 10 percent cap on the for eign
funding of all CSOs promoting a variety of objectives, including women’s rights and disability
rights. As discussed above, Ethiopia has asserted a counterterrorism rationale to justify foreign
funding constraints. Ethiopia does not establish a “ direct and immediate connection between the
[activity at issue] and the threat.” 196 In addition, the cap is not the “least intrusive means to
achieve the desired objective and … limited to the associations falling within the clearly
identified aspects characterizi ng terrorism.” Accordingly, the counterterrorism objective fails to
justify the Ethiopian cap on foreign funding.
The UNSR also applied this test to the “aid effectiveness” justification. In response, he
stressed that:
even if the restriction were to purs ue a legitimate objective, it would not comply with the
requirements of “a democratic society.” In particular, deliberate misinterpretations by
Governments of ownership or harmonization principles to require associations to align
themselves with Government s’ priorities contradict one of the most important aspects of
freedom of association, namely that individuals can freely associate for any legal
purpose. 197
In addition, “longstanding jurisprudence asserts that democratic societies only exist
where ‘pluralis m, tolerance and broadmindedness’ are in place,” 198 and “minority or dissenting
views or beliefs are respected.” 199
Applying this test, the UNSR has note