Not-for-Profit Law and Culture in Asia

Globalization, Glocalization, and Galápagos Syndrome: Public Interest Corporations in Japan

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International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 18, no. 1 , May 2016 / 5

Not -for -Profit Law and Culture in Asia
Globalization, Glocalization, and Galápagos Syndrome: Public Interest Corporations in Japan


To facilitate public interest activities by private entities, some countries, including
Ireland and New Zealand, have inaugurated Charity Commission -style independent
regulators of the type that originated in England and Wales. In the first attempt far from
the Commonwealth’s culture, Japan has launched the Public Interest Corporation (PIC)
Commission. The aim of the Japan’s reforms, the first revision since establishment of the
Civil Code 1886, is to abolish unclear discretionary regulations and to make clearer
stipulations in the laws. The author witnessed the policy as Commissioner in Japan for
six years. This article summarizes and evaluates the reforms, with a focus on the
interplay between globalization, “glocalization,” and “ Galápagos Syndrome.”

I. Introduction
There is a consensus in many countries around the importance of public interest activities
by private entities (Cordery & Morgan 2013). Encouraging the public interest sector is an aspect
of public policy. It is, however, difficult to define “public interest .” Some countries assign the
task to independent agencies, such as the Charity Commission in England and Wales (Cordely

Japan has adopted the independent commission style by launching Koeki Ninteinto Iinkai
(Public Interest Corporation Commission or PIC Commission) as part of the reforms of Koeki
hojin (Public Interest Corporation or PIC). The reform in 2006 was the first substantial change to
the Civil Code on nonprofit corporations since the establishment of old Civil Code in 1896.
This article provides an overview of Japan’s PIC reforms, with particular focus on the
influence of globalization, “glocalization,” and “Galápagos Syndrome. ”

II. History of the Nonprofit Legal System in Japan
Japan’s legal system for “public interest ”2 and for not -for profit organizations dates back
to the old Civil Code, adopted in 1896, and carries forward into the 2006 Civil Code.

1 Professor, National Museum of Ethnology, and SOKENDAI (the Graduate University for Advanced
Studies), Japan; former Commissioner, Public Interest Corporation Commission; former President, ISTR (2005 –

A version of this paper was presented at the 11th International Conference of the International Society for
Third Sector Research in 2014, in Muenster, Germany. Travel expenses were supported by the MINPAKU Director –
General’s Leadership Program. The author would like to thank Professor Kenich Kudo, Director -General of
MINPAKU, for generous support.


Article 34 divides Public Interest Corporations (PICs) 3 into two categories: the shadan hojin, or
incorporated association; and the zaidan hojin, or incorporated foundation (Amemiya 1998). The
association is formed as a group of members, whereas the foundation is formed around an
endowment and, legally, does not have members (Larratta & Mason 2010).

Some PICs pursue only a quasi-public interest ( Moriizumi 1977; Tanaka 1980; London
1991). In addition, the concept of the public interest has varied over time. The activities of some
PICs, accordingly, have been almost indistinguishable from those of for-profit organizations
(London 1991; Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2008).

After World War II, Japan enacted special laws to give organizations different types of
legal personalities: religious corporation s ( the Religious Corporations Act 1951), school
corporation s ( the Private Educational Institutions Act 1949), social welfare corporation s ( the
Social Welfare Services Act 1951), and medical corporation s ( Revised Medical Care Act 1949) .
Hatsutani (2001) emphasizes that the diversification of legal personalities was affected by the
new Constitution. Article of 89 of the Constitution of Japan states that “no public money or other
property shall be expended or appropriated for the use, benefit or maintenance of any religious
institution or association, or for any charitable, educational or benevolent enterprises not under
the control of public authority .” Just after the war, it was necessary for some type s of PICs to
receive public money in order to survive. One aim of the acts was to have a robust legal
background for “under the control of public authority ” in the Constitution.

Despite these special laws, most grassroots-level organizations in Japan had no legal
status, because they lacked the level of assets that PICs require ( London 1991; Deguchi 2001).
The great Hanshin Awaji Earthquake in 1995 unveiled the defects of the legal system. Many
volunteers were active as members of uninstitutionalized nonprofit organizations that had no
legal status (Deguchi 2001; Pekkanen 2000, 2001; Kawashima 2006). In 1998, the Diet enacted a
new act so that citizens ’ groups could form and operate with legal personality (Deguchi 2001).
The law created the Specific Nonprofit Activity Corporation (SNC), usually called NPO hojin
(NPO corporation) . The act was called the NPO law.

In 2001, yet another category of organization was created. A nonprofit and non -public
benefit organization could be incorporated as Chukan -hojin (Intermediate Juridical Person, or

The various types of organizations are overseen by different government agencies, each
with its own accounting standards and regulation s: School Corporation Accounting Standard for
school corporations, Social Welfare Corporation Accounting Standard for social welfare
corporations, Religious Corporation Accounting Guideline for religious corporations, Medical
Corporation Accounting Standard for medical corporations, and SNC Accounting Standard for

The reform of the legal framework targeted only PICs and IJPs. School Corporations,
Social Welfare Corporations, Medical Corporations, Religious Corporations, and SNCs continue
to exist. The complicated situation of Japan’s nonprofit organizations, as Figure 1 illustrates,
might be called an example of “ Galápagos Syndrome ” ( Deguchi 2015).

2 Reflecting the Japanese legal context, this article uses the term “public interest” rather than the more
common term in the academic literature, “public benefit.”
3 Sometimes referred to as Public Interest incorporated Persons (PIPs).

Nakamura explains, “Galápagos syndrome is a frequently used term in Japanese business circles to mockingly refer
to technologies and specifications advancing in a form that lacks compatibility with other
countries, much like how animals on the Galapagos Islands evolved uniquely in a closed
environment ” ( Nakamura 2013: 66). Cellular phones represent one example of Galápagos
Syndrome in Japan. Each company produces phone that address different consumer needs, and
they are very difficult to standardize.

Figure 1: “ Galápagos Syndrome” of Japan ’ s Nonprofit Legal Personality

Source: author ’s analysis from the version written in Japanese (Deguc hi 2015). Kaikei -kijyun is translated into
Accounting Standard, and Kaikei -jyunsoku is translated into Accounting Guideline. Each accounting standard and
guideline is different.

III. Overview of Reforms
One impetus behind the reforms was to encourage activities by the Third Sector, whose
importance is recognized by the government (Expert Meeting 2004, Tax Commission 2005). The
reform process began with a Cabinet Decision released as Reform of the System of Public
Interest Corporations in 2002 (Cabinet Decision 2002). After a confusing start, the Tax
Commission issued a report in 2005 (Tax Commission 2005) that proposed that new PICs should
be tax -exempt and tax deductible .4

A particular problem was the Kyoka (permission) system for establishment of PICs
(Expert Meeting 2004) . Organizations seeking PIC status had trouble finding the appropriate
agency and then finding the appropriate person or division within the agency, and once they
succeeded in doing so, a laborious series of consultations, negotiations, and compromises would
follow ( London 1991). The system set no time limits and no clear criteria for agency decisions
(Pekkanen 2006 ). Further, the public interest element of some PICs seemed questionable, such as
4 As a member of the Tax Commission from 2003 to 2009, the author contributed to the report.

Corporations Act
Welfare Service
Act 1951

Revised Medical
Care Act

Private School
Act 1949
Old JCC article 34: any association or foundation
relating to any academic activities, art, charity,
worship, religion, or other public interest


parking lots and golf courses ( London 1991). In addition, retired government officials sometimes
took high -paying positions in the PICs that they had previously overseen ( Kaihara 2008;
Deguchi 2009).

The reform process resulted in three related PIC acts in 2006, which abolished the Kyoka
(permission ) system: first, the Act on General Incorporated Associations (GIA ) and General
Incorporated Foundations ( GIF ) ( Act No . 48 of 2006); second, the Act on Authorization of
Public Interest Incorporated Associations (PIIA ) and Public Interest Incorporated Foundations
(P IIF ) ( Act No . 49 of 2006) ; and third, the Act Concerning Special Measures for Enforcement
(Act No . 50 of 2006) . While the old civil code on PICs consisted of only 56 articles, these laws
amount to 868 articles.

In order to authorize PICs among GIA s and GIFs, which are considered nonprofit
organizations that do not always operate in the public interest, the laws established two new
entities: the Public Interest Corporation Commission (PIC Commission), for national
organizations; and the Council Organization Established in Prefectures (COEP), for local ones.
The PIC Commission’s function resembles that of the Charity Commission in England
and Wales .5 The PIC Commission has seven commissioners appointed by the Prime Minister
with the consent of both houses of the Diet (Act. No. 49, Article 35) .6 In operation, the
Commission is independent of ministerial government. It has a staff of almost 100. 7 Article 5 of
Act No. 49 sets forth clear criteria for the Commission to apply, addressing an organization’s
purpose, financial operations, and governance and accountability.

In addition, the tax system underwent major positive changes. An organization approved
by the PIC Commission is exempt from corporate tax and enjoys tax-deductible status, except
that its for-profit businesses (which are permitted) are taxed. Under another law, donors to
certified PICs can choose tax deduction or tax credit.

The reform s drew applause from stakeholders (JCIE 2005; JACO 2014).

IV. Globalization and the Shadow of the Business Sector
In 2008, the PIC Commission issued a new accounting standard: Public Interest
Corporation Accounting Standard 2008 (PICAS -2008). Previous standards had been issued in
1977, 1985, and 2004. PICAS -2004 reflected the trend of “financial accounting ” that spread
following enactment of the Sarbanes -Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) in the United States ( Ribstein
2003; Shirley 2004). SOX influenced nonprofit organizations internationally (Stone & Ostrower
2007; Johnson 2009; Breen 2013). Although Kawashima (2006) points out that nonprofit
organization s in Japan paid less attention to SOX than those in some other countries, SOX did
make a substantial impact on accounting standards in Japan. One effect was felt through the
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No . 117 (FASB 1993), issued by the Financing
5 Commissioners do not have a free hand to change charitable purposes, as the Charity Commission is a
government body and the discretion of Commissioners remains confined by established precedent (O’Halloran,
McGregor -Lowndes, & Simon 2008).

6 The PIC Commission operates at the nationwide level. Local authorities are responsible for each council
organization. Article 50 of Act. No. 49 of 2006 stipulates that council organizations shall be established in
prefectures for the purpose of dealing with the matters assigned to it by this Act.
7 As of the end of March 2013


Accounting Standards Board in the U.S. (FASB), 8 which emphasized fiduciary duty (On
Revision of PICAS 2004). Among other things, PICAS -2004 created categories paralleling those
in American tax law.

PICAS -2008 represents a hybrid of principles from the Charity Commission in England
and Wales, American accounting practices, and Japanese tradition. Critics contend that it
facilitates control by government rather than serving users ( Tetsuyoshi Hasegawa 2012).
PICAS -2008 resulted from a process of working groups of stakeholders, which has also
been used in New Zealand ( Sinclair & Bolt 2013). The PIC Commission set up a research
meeting with accountants and representatives from constituents. They discussed accounting
standards to be applied under the new acts. The result of the discussion was a proposal submitted
to the PIC Commission. Some commissioners were startled with the revision of the accounting
standard (PIC Commission the 33rd Official Minutes 2008).

When the Cabinet Office opened the proposal to public comment, the influential Japan
Association of Charitable Organizations said that the standards-setting body should not be the
PIC Commission (JACO 2008). Similar comments came from academia (Hasegawa 2013). The
Japan Institute Certified Public Accountants (JICPA) filed a petition with the PIC Commission in
2013, questioning whether Japan’s Generally Accepted Accounting System should be applied to
PICs, given that their mission s and activities differ from those of for-profit corporations (JICPA

V. “Glocalization ” of Standards
Tatsuo Ohta, a representative of the Japan Association of Charitable Organizations, said
that the reforms were based on “free, fair and global ” points (Ohta 2006, JACO 2014a),
reflecting the fact that legislation, tax, and accounting all are moving toward global standard s
(JACO 2014a: 15).

Although globalization is an influence, as Ohta pointed out, the reforms continue to
reflect particularization. PICAS -2008 applies only in Japan, for example. So do specific PIC
accounting rules and regulations. Accordingly, experts in nonprofit entities of other types from
other countries will not be familiar with the Japanese rules. In this respect, the PIC reforms
simply extend Galápagos Syndrome.

Related to Galápagos Syndrome is what has been called the “ glocalization ” of the
nonprofit system . Glocalization is a Japanese term that, in a journalistic context, reflects the
notion of thinking globally and act ing locally (Sudo 2012). The concept has bee n further
developed by academics (Robertson 1995; Maekawa 2004; Sudo 2012; Fukukawa & Teramoto
2009). Generally, the term means that local cultures and the forces of globalization interpenetrate
and interpret each other, resulting in both universalizing and particularizing tendencies
(Thompson & Arsel 2004; Fukukawa & Teramoto 2009) . Even the law shows glocalization
(Randeria 2003) . PICAS -2008 is an example.

At the same time, though, globalization is having a substantial effect on rules that apply
to the for-profit sector ( Kikuya, M . 2001). The legal reform of governance of business
companies in Japan is influenced by global trends ( Okabe 2009). In a sense, Japanese rules for
8 See Kaneko 2009 (in Japanese).


the nonprofit sector are not under the direct sway of globalization, but they are undergoing
globalization through the for-profit sector.

VI. Conclusion: Complication, Regulation, and Globalization
Have the reforms succeeded? They can be evaluated in terms of the major purposes
underlying them. Three purposes are particularly significant.

One purpose is to strengthen PIC self – governance. Here, the system has fallen short. It is
difficult for many PICs to understand. With three acts, the new accounting standard, and new
acronyms and jargon, even government officials have had trouble.

Especially for small PICs, further, the requirements are an overload (JACO 2014). Except
for the requirement of an accounting auditor, the same rules apply to small and large PICs. Many
PIC are small. In 2014, the median staff size was just five, and a third of PICs had two or fewer
full -time staff members ( Cabinet Office 2014c ). In addition, Japan has few PIC experts. Experts
in law and accounting typically focus on for-profit businesses. Nonprofit systems are different —
at least, they should be.

A second purpose of the reform is “implementing such programs in a suitable manner ”
(Article 1 of APPI) — imposing the face of the regulator. With the PIC Commission, the reform
succeeded in this regard.
Unfortunately, the regulator has not always helped fulfill a third purpose of the reform: to
change unclear rules into clear ones. For example, the PIC Commission issued a statutory
recommendation to a sports organization in 2014 .9 The organization had set up a third -party
committee to investigate an internal scandal and issue a report to their legal member s and the
administrative agency. These steps followed the PIC rulebook, but the PIC Commission was
dissatisfied. It explained that “because the ultimate stakeholder is all Japan’s citizen as the
taxpayers,” reporting to legal members and the cabinet office was insufficient. Instead,
“according to the guideline of the Japan Federation of Bar Associ ations, the report by the third –
party committee of a public -listed company should be open to the public ” ( Cabinet Office
“Kan koku ” 2014).

This is a typical example. Even if an organization masters all 868 articles of the new
laws, the Cabinet Order, the Cabinet Office Ordinance, the new financial standard, and the PIC
guideline s, the government may still step in and impose the standards of large for -profit
companies on small PICs. In this respect, globalization seems to be prevailing over glocalization
and Galápagos Syndrome.

The current problems of Japanese society are serious, and tax funds alone cannot solve
them. The role of the PIC Commission should be to ensure that PICs perform flexibly in
addressing social problems that the government cannot resolve, rather than imposing
unnecessary restrictions on them.

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interference in Bolivia.” 119
 A September 2014 article in the New York Times asserted that foreign “money is
increasingly transforming the once -staid think -tank world into a muscular arm of foreign
governments’ lobbying in Washington.” 120 The following week, United States
Representative Frank Wolf wrote a letter to the Brookings Institution, in which he urged
them to “end this practice of accepting money from … foreign governments” so that its
work is not “compromised by the influence, whether real or perceived, of foreign
governments.” 121
Some governments assert that foreigners are not only seeking to meddle in domestic
political affairs, but also seeking to destabilize the country or otherwise engage in “regime
change.” Accor dingly, they argue that foreign funding restrictions are necessary to thwart efforts
to destabilize or overthrow the government currently in power.
 In 2013 in Sri Lanka , the government justified a recent registration requirement for all
CSOs on the grounds that it was necessary to “thwart certain NGOs from hatching
117 Jonathan Lis, “Draft bill: NGOs with foreign funding to be defined ‘foreign agents,’” Haaretz , May 26,
2013, accessed September 8, 2014, -1.592754 .
118 “Some Azerbaijani NGOs Cooperated with Armenian Special Services Under ‘People’s Diplomacy,’”
Trend, August 15, 2014, accessed September 8, 2014, 3147.html .
119 Agence France -Presse, “Bolivia expels Danish NGO for meddling,” Global Post , December 20, 2013,
accessed September 16, 2014, -expels -danish -ngo –
meddling -1.
120 Eric Lipton, Brooke Williams, & Nicholas Confessore, “Foreign Powers Buy Influence at Think Tanks,”
New York Times , September 6, 2014, accessed September 17, 2014, -powers -buy -influence -at-think -tanks.html?_r=0 .
121 Letter from Representative Frank Wolf to Strobe Talbott of the Brookings Institution, September 9,
2014, accessed September 17, 2014, org/documents/1301186/rep –
frank -wolfs -letter -to-strobe -talbott -at.pdf .

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 23

conspiracies to effect regime change by engaging in politics in the guise of doing social
work.” 122
 A drafter of the Russian “foreign agents” law justified the initiative when it was pending
in pa rliament, stating, “There is so much evidence about regime change in Yugoslavia,
now in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, in Kosovo — that’s what happens in the world, some
governments are working to change regimes in other countries. Russian democracy needs
to be prot ected from outside influences.” 123
 In 2005, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia expelled civil society organizations, explaining,
“there is not going to be a ‘Rose Revolution’ or a ‘Green Revolution’ in Ethiopia after the
election” 124 — a reference to the so -called “color revolutions” that had recently occurred
in Georgia and elsewhere.
 In June 2012, Uganda’s Minister for Internal Affairs justified the government’s threats to
deregister certain CSOs, stating that CSOs “want to destabilize the country because that
is what they are paid to do…. They are busy stabbing the government in its back yet they
are supposed to do humanitarian work.” 125
 In the process of driving civil society organizations out of Zimbabwe , President Mugabe
justified his policies by claiming that the CSOs were fronts for Western “colonial
masters” to undermine the Zimbabwean government. 126 Similarly, the central committee
of Mugabe’s party claimed, “Some of these NGOs are working day and night to remove
President Mugabe and ZANU PF from power. They are being funded by Britain and
some European Union countries, the United States, Australia, Canada and New
Zealand.” 127
 In a March 2014 interview justifying a draft “foreign agents” law, Kyrgyzstan’s
President Atembaev argued, “Activities conducted by CSOs are obviously aimed at
destabilization of the situation in the Kyrgyz Republic…. Some CSOs do not care about
how they get income, whose orders to fulfill, which kind of work to execute…. There are
122 Xinhua, “Sri Lanka to Investigate NGOs Operating in Country,” Herald , June 13, 2013, accessed
September 8, 2014, -lanka -to-investigate -ngos -operating -in-country/ .
123 “Russian parliament gives first approval to NGO bill,” BBC , July 6, 2012, accessed September 8, 2014, -europe -18732949 .
124 Darin Christensen & Jeremy M. Weinstein, “Defunding Dissent,” Journal of Democracy 24(2) (April
2013): 80.
125Pascal Kwesiga, “Govt gets tough on NGOs,” New Vision , June 19, 2012, accessed Septembe r 9, 2014, -govt -gets -tough -on-ngos.html .
126 Thomas Carothers, “The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion,” Foreign Affairs , March/April 2006,
accessed September 9, 2014, -carothers/the -backlash -against –
democracy -promotion .
127 “29 NGOs banned in crackdown,” New Zimbabwe , February 14, 2012, accessed September 9, 2014, -7189 -29+NGOs+banned+in+crackdown/new s.aspx .

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 24

forces interested in destabilizing the situation in Kyrgyzs tan and spreading chaos across
Central Asia and parts of China.” 128
 In July 2014, the vice chairman of the China Research Institute of China -Russia Relations
argued that China should “learn from Russia” and enact a foreign agents law “so as to
block the way for the infiltration of external forces and eliminate the possibilities of a
Color Revolution.” 129
2. Transparency and Accountability
Another justification commonly invoked by governments to regulate and restrict the flow
of foreign funds is the importance of upholding the integrity of CSOs by promoting transparency
and accountability through government regulation. Consider, for example, the following
responses by government delegations to the UNSR’s Resource Report:
 Egypt : “We agree with the principles of accountability, transparency, and integrity of the
activities of civil society organisations and NGOs. However, this should not be l imited to
accountability to donors. National mechanisms to follow -up on activities of such entities,
while respecting their independence have to be established and respected.” 130
 Maldives : “While civil societies should have access to financing for effective operation
within the human rights framework, it is of equal importance that the organizations must
also ensure that they work with utmost integrity and in an ethical and responsible
manner.” 131
 Azerbaijan : “The changes and amendments to the national legisl ation on NGOs have
been made with a view of increasing transparency in this field…. In that regard, these
amendments should only disturb the associations operating in our country on a non –
transparent basis.” 132
Similarly, in response to a United Nations Hum an Rights Council panel on the promotion
and protection of civil society space in March 2014, the following government delegations
responded with justifications invoking transparency and accountability:
128 “Алмазбек Атамбаев: “Хочу максимально успеть,” , March 23, 2014, accessed September
9, 2014, translated by Aida Rustemova, .
129 Simon Denyer , “China taking the Putin approach to democracy,” Washington Post, October 1, 2014,
130 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Clustered ID with the WG on HR and
Transnational Corporations and the SR on The Rights to Freedom of Assembly an d Association: Intervention
delivered by the Permanent Delegation of Egypt,” May 30, 2013, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extran .
131 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Interactive Dialogue with the Special
Rapporteur on the Rights to Peaceful Assembly and of Association, M aldives Oral Statement,” May 31, 2013,
accessed September 9, 2014, 23rdSession/OralStatements/Maldives_12.pdf .
132 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Remarks by Azerbaijan,” May 31, 2013,
accessed September 9, 2014, .

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 25

 Ethiopia , on behalf of the African Group: “Domestic l aw regulation consistent with the
international obligations of States should be put in place to ensure that the exercise of the
right to freedom of expression, assembly and association fully respects the rights of
others and ensures the independence, accou ntability and transparency of civil society.” 133
 India, on behalf of the “Like Minded Group”: “The advocacy for civil society should be
tempered by the need for responsibility, openness and transparency and accountability of
civil society organizations.” 134
 Pa kistan , on behalf of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation members : “It may be
underscored that securing funding for its crucial work is the right of civil society,
maintaining transparency and necessary regulation of funding is the responsibility of
sta tes.” 135
Kyrgyzstan has also employed this argument to justify a draft “foreign agents” law. The
explanatory note to the draft law claims that it “has been developed for purposes of ensuring
openness, publicity, transparency for non -profit organizations, inc luding units of foreign non –
profit organizations, as well as non -profit organizations acting as foreign agents and receiving
their funds from foreign sources, such as foreign countries, their government agencies,
international and foreign organizations, fo reign citizens, stateless persons or their authorized
representatives, receiving monetary funds or other assets from the said sources.”
3. Aid Effectiveness and Coordination
A global movement has increasingly advocated for greater aid effectiveness, including
through concepts of “host country ownership” and the harmonization of development
assistance. 136 However, some states have interpreted “host country ownership” to be
synonymous with “host government ownership” and have otherwise co -opted the aid
effectivene ss debate to justify constraints on international funding. For example:
133 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Statement by Ethiopia on behalf of the
African Grou p at the 25th session of the Human Rights Council On the Panel Discussion on the Importance of the
Promotion and Protection of Civil Society Space,” March 11, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
ehalf%20of%20African%20Group_PD_21.pdf .
134 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Joint Statement: India on behalf of like –
minded countries,” March 11, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
%20of%20LMG_PD_21.pdf . The “Like Minded Group” consists of Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus,
Chi na, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam , and Zimbabwe .
135 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Statement by Pakistan on be half of OIC:
Panel Discussion on Civil Society Space,” March 11, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
https ://
ehalf%20of%20OIC_PD_21.pdf .
136 See the Aid Effectiveness Agenda of the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008),
and the Busan Partn ership for Effective Development Cooperation (2011).

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 26

 In July 2014, Nepal ’s government released a new Development Cooperation Policy 137
that will require development partners to channel all development cooperation through
the Ministry of Fi nance, rather than directly to CSOs. The government argued that this
policy is necessary for aid effectiveness and coordination: “Both the Government and the
development partners are aware of the fact that the effectiveness can only be enhanced if
the owne rship of aid funded projects lies with the recipient government.” 138
 Sri Lanka ’s Finance and Planning Ministry issued a public notice in July 2014 requiring
CSOs to receive government approval of international funding. Justifying the
requirement, the Ministry claimed that projects financed with international funding were
“outside t he government budget undermining the national development programmes.” 139
 In response to the UNSR’s Resource Report, the representative of Egypt stated, “The
diversification of the venues of international cooperation and assistance to States towards
the fund ing of civil society partners fragments and diverts the already limited resources
available for international assistance. Hence, aid coordination is crucial for aid
effectiveness.” 140
 At the recent Africa Leaders Summit, the Foreign Minister of Benin s poke a t a workshop
on closing space for civil society. He asserted that CSOs “don’t think they are
accountable to government but only to development partners. This is a problem.” He said
Benin needs “a regulation to create transparency on resources coming from a broad and
the management of resources,” stating that the space for civil society is “too wide.” 141
 The Intelligence Bureau of India released a report in June 2014 claiming that foreign –
funded CSOs stall economic development and negatively impact India’s GDP growth by
2 to 3 percent. 142 The report stated, “a significant number of Indian NGOs, funded by
some donors based in the US, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Scandinavian
137 Government of Nepal Ministry of Finance, “Development Cooperation Policy, 2014,” unofficial
translation, accessed September 9, 2014, .
138 Government of Nepal Ministry of Finance, “Development Cooperation Policy, 2014,” unofficial
translation, Article 2.2, acces sed September 9, 2014, .
139 “No foreign funds without approva l: Ministry,” Daily Mirror , July 22, 2014, accessed September 9,
2014, -no -foreign -funds -without -approval -ministry.html .
140 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Clustered ID with the WG on HR and
Transnational Corporations and the SR on The Rights to Freedom of Assembly and Association: Intervention
delivered by the Permanent Delegation of Egypt,” May 30, 2013, accessed September 9, 2014, 0_1.pdf .
141 Personal notes of author.
142 “Foreign -funded NGOs stalling development: IB report,” Times of India , June 12, 2014, accessed
September 9, 2014, -funded -NGOs -stalling -development -IB –
report/articleshow/36411169.cms .

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 27

countries, have been noticed to be using people centric issues to create an enviro nment
which lends itself to stalling development projects.” 143
4. National Security, Counterterrorism, and Anti -Money Laundering
As discussed above, governments also invoke national security, counterterrorism, and
anti -money laundering policies to justify restr ictions on international funding, including cross –
border philanthropy. For example, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an
intergovernmental body that seeks to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, stated:
The ongoing international campaign against terrorist financing has unfortunately
demonstrated however that terrorists and terrorist organisations exploit the NPO
sector to raise and move funds, provide logistical support, encourage terrorist
recruitment or otherwise support terrorist organi sations and operations. This
misuse not only facilitates terrorist activity but also undermines donor confidence
and jeopardises the very integrity of NPOs. Therefore, protecting the NPO sector
from terrorist abuse is both a critical component of the globa l fight against
terrorism and a necessary step to preserve the integrity of NPOs. 144
Governments have leveraged concerns about counterterrorism and money laundering to
justify restricting both the inflow and outflow of philanthropy. For example: 145
 The governm ent of Azerbaijan justified amendments relating to the registration of
foreign grants, stating that the purpose of the amendments was, in part, “ to enforce
international obligations of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the area of combating money –
laundering.” 146
143 Rake sh Krishnan Simha, “Why India Should Follow Vladimir Putin’s Lead on NGOs,” Russia & India
Report, June 15, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014, .
144 Financial Action Task Force, “International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the
Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations,” Financial Action Task Force Report, 2013,
54, accessed September 9, 2014, tf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf . See also
Financial Action Task Force, “Risk of Terrorist Abuse in Non -Profit Organisations,” Financial Action Task Force
Report, June 2014, https://www.fatf -of-terrorist -abuse -in-non -profit –
organisations.pdf .
145 Constraints by donor governments on the outflow of cross -border donation s, albeit beyond the scope of
this article, similarly present significant barriers to cross -border philanthropy. These states assert that they have an
international responsibility to regulate the outflow of cross -border donations in order to ensure that fu nding destined
for other countries will not support criminal or terrorist activities in those foreign jurisdictions. For more information
about the justifications employed and the implications for civil society, please see: Ben Hayes, “Counter -Terrorism,
‘Policy Laundering’ and the FATF: Legalizing Surveillance, Regulating Civil Society,” Transnational
Institute/Statewatch Report, February 2012, -171 -fafp -report.pdf .
146 Charity & Security Network, “How the FATF Is Used to Justify Laws That Harm Civil Society,
Freedom of Association and Expression,” Charity & Security Network , May 16, 2013, accessed September 9, 2014,
il_Society .

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 28

 The British Virgin Islands (BVI) enacted a law requiring that CSOs with more than five
employees appoint a designated Anti -Money Laundering Compliance Officer. 147 The
law also imposes audit requirements for CSOs that are not required of businesses. These
burdens were justified with explicit reference to FATF’s recommendation on nonprofit
organizations and counterterrorism. 148
 In response to the UNSR’s Resource Report, a group of thirteen African states responded,
“It is the responsibility of governments to ensure that the origin and destination of
associations’ funds are not used for terrorist purposes or directed towards activities which
encourage incitement to hatred and violence.” 149
 In 2013, a Sri Lankan government representative similarly stated, “While w e agree that
access to resources is important for the vibrant functioning of civil society, we observe
that Mr. Kiai does not seem to adequately take into account the negative impact of lack of
or insufficient regulation of funding of associations on natio nal security and counter –
terrorism.” 150
 In a National Security Analysis released in August 2014, Sri Lanka’s Ministry of
Defence claimed that some civil society actors have links with the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam, a group with “extremist separatist i deology,” and that these CSOs thereby
pose “a major national security threat.” 151 During the same period, the Sri Lankan
government announced that it was drafting a law requiring CSOs to register with the
Ministry of Defence in order to have a bank account and receive international funding.
5. Hybrid Justifications
While these categories and examples represent the types of justifications offered by
governments for restricting foreign funding, in practice, official statements often combine
multiple justifications. A recent example is the statement made at the UN Human Rights Council
by India on behalf of itself and twenty other “like minded” states, including Cuba, Saudi
147 “Non -Profit Organisations,” British Virg in Islands Financial Investigation Agency, accessed September
9, 2014, -profit -organisations .
148 Charity & Security Network, “How the FATF Is Used to Justify Laws That H arm Civil Society,
Freedom of Association and Expression,” May 16, 2013, e_Laws_How_FATF_Used_to_Justify_Laws_That_Harm_Civ
149 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Oral Statement — Gabon on behalf of the
African Group,” 30 May 2013, accessed September 9, 2014,
half%20ofAG_10_1.pdf .
150 UN Office of the High Co mmissioner for Human Rights, “23rd Session of the HRC Statement by Sri
Lanka —Item 3: Clustered ID with the SR on the rights to peaceful assembly & of association,” May 31, 2013,
accessed September 9, 2014,
umber=12.0&MeetingDat e=Friday,%2031%20May%202013 .
151 Gotabaya Rajapaksa, “Sri Lanka’s National Security,” Ministry of Defence and Urban Development of
Sri Lanka, August 19, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014, .

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 29

Arabia , Belarus, China, and Vietnam ,152 which weaves together a number of different
justifications, including foreign interference, accountability, and national security:
[C]ivil society cannot function effectively and efficiently without defined
limits…. Civil society must also learn to protect its own space by guarding against
machinations of donor groups guided by extreme ideologies laden with hidden
politicized motives, which if allowed could potentially bring disrepute to the civil
society space…. There have also been those civil society organizations, who have
digressed from their original purpose and indulged in the pursuit of donor -driven
agendas. It is important to ensure accountability and responsibility for their
actions and the consequences thereof and also guard against compromising
national and international security. 153
Similarly, Ethiopia, in its statement in response to the UNSR’s Resource R eport,
referenced justifications relating to state sovereignty, aid coordination, and accountability and
It is our firm belief that associations will play their role in the overall
development of the country and advance their objectives, if a nd only if an
environment for the growth of transparent, members based and members driven
civil society groups in Ethiopia providing for accountability and predictability is
put in place. We are concerned that the abovementioned assertion [about
lightening the burdens to receive donor funding] by the special rapporteur
undermines the principle of sovereignty which we have always been guided by. 154
Similarly constructed statements have also been put forward by Pakistan and other states. 155
152 The “Like Minded Group” consisted of Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, China, Cuba, Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uganda,
UAE, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. UN Office of the Hig h Commissioner for Human Rights, “Joint Statement: India on
behalf of like -minded countries,” March 11, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
%20of%20LMG_PD_21.pdf .
153 Ibid.
154 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Oral Statement: Ethiopia,” May 31, 2013,
accessed September 9, 2014, hiopia_12.pdf .
155 See, e.g., UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Statement by Pakistan on Behalf of
OIC: Panel Discussion on Civil Society Space,” March 11, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
ehalf%20of%20OIC_PD_21.pdf : “By virtue of its dynamic role civil society is well poised to build convergences
with the view to develop synergies between state institutions and their own networks. These synergies would
facilitate proper utilization of resources at the disposal state institutions an d civil society actors. In this regard, it
may be underscored that securing funding for its crucial work is the right of civil society, maintaining transparency
and necessary regulation of funding is the responsibility of states…. Within this social space, the civil society can
play its optimal role by working in collaboration with state institutions. Better coordination between civil society
actors and state institution [sic] would also facilitate enhancement of international cooperation in the field of hu man

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 30

In this section, the a rticle briefly surveyed justifications presented by governments to
constrain the inflow of international funding, including philanthropy. In the following section,
we analyze constraints and their justifications under international law.
International Legal Framework
1. International Norms Protecting Access to Resources and Cross -Border Philanthropy
Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states,
“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others….” 156 Acco rding to the
UNSR: 157
The right to freedom of association not only includes the ability of individuals or legal
entities to form and join an association 158 but also to seek, receive and use resources 159 —
human, material and financial — from domestic, foreign and in ternational sources. 160
The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders 161 similarly states that
access to resources is a self -standing right:
“[E]veryone has the right, individually and in association with others, to solicit, receive
and utilize reso urces for the express purpose of promoting and protecting human rights
and fundamental freedoms through peaceful means….” 162
According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, this right
specifically encompasses “the receipt of funds from abroad.” 163
156 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 22, December 16, 1966, .
157 While reports of the UNSR are not binding international law, his reports are referenced here because
they provide a comprehensive articulation and explanation of international law.
158 International law generally recognizes the freedom of association, and t his section follows that
formulation. Addressing the applicability of international law to non -membership organizations is beyond the scope
of this article, but for more information, please see: International Center for Not -for -Profit Law & World Movement
for Democracy Secretariat, “Defending Civil Society Report, Second Edition,” June 2012, 35, on_English.pdf .
159 The UNSR defines “resources” as a broad concept that includes financial transfers (e.g., donations,
grants, contracts, sponsorship, and social investments), loan guarantees, in -kind donations, and other forms of
support. See United Nation s Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, para. 10, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39 (April 24, 2013) at -content/uploads/2013/04/A.HRC_.23.39_EN -funding -report -April -2013.pdf .
160 Ibid., para. 8.
161 The UNSR notes that while “the Declaration is not a binding instrument, it must be recalled tha t it was
adopted by consensus of the General Assembly and contains a series of principles and rights that are based on
human rights standards enshrined in other international instruments which are legally binding. Ibid., para. 17.
162 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups
and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ,
UN Res. 53/144, Article 13, .
163 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Declaration on Human Rights
Defenders,” UN OHCHR, accessed September 9, 2014, .

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 31

Reinforcing this position, 164 in 2013 the United Nations Human Rights Council passed
resolution 22/6, which calls upon on States “[t]o ensure that they do not discriminatorily impose
restrictions on potential sources of funding aimed at supporting the work of human rights
defenders,” and “no law should criminalize or delegitimize activities in defence of human rights
on account of the origin of funding thereto.” 165
The freedom to access resources extends beyond human rights defenders. For example,
the Declaration on the Elimination of A ll Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief states that the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion includes
the freedom to “solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals
and in stitutions.” 166 Access to resources is also an integral part of a number of other civil,
cultural, economic, political, and social rights. As the UNSR states: 167
For associations promoting human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights,
or those involved in service delivery (such as disaster relief, health -care provision or
environmental protection), access to resources is important, not only to the existence of
the association itself, but also to the enjoyment of other human rights by those benef itting
from the work of the association. Hence, undue restrictions on resources available to
associations impact the enjoyment of the right to freedom of association and also
undermine civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights as a whole. 168
Acc ordingly, “funding restrictions that impede the ability of associations to pursue their statutory
activities constitute an interference with article 22” of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. 169
2. Regional and Bilateral Commitments to Pro tect Cross -Border Philanthropy
164 This article briefly examines international norms governing global philanthropy. But it also recogniz es
that there are distinct limits to the impact of international law. For example, there is often an implementation gap
between international norms and country practice. In addition, there are few binding international treaties, such as
the ICCPR, and de tails are often left to “soft law,” such as the reports of the UNSR. At the same time, there is
concern that any effort to create a new global treaty on cross -border philanthropy or foreign funding would lead to a
retrenchment of existing rights.
165 United Nations General Assembly, Protecting Human Rights Defenders, March 21, 2013, UN Human
Rights Council, Resolution 22/6, para. 9, /RES/22/6 .
166 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief , November 25, 1981, UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/36/55,
Article 6(f), .
167 In similar fashion, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognized the link
between access to resources and economic, social and cultural rights, when it expressed “deep concern” about an
Egyptian law that “gives the Government control over the right of NGOs to manage their own activities, including
seeking external funding.” See Egypt, ICESCR, E/2001/22 (2000) 38 at paras. 161, 176, -observations.php .
168 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, para. 9, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39 (April 24, 2013) at -content/uploa ds/2013/04/A.HRC_.23.39_EN -funding -report -April -2013.pdf .
169 Human Rights Committee, communication No. 1274/2004, Korneenko et al. v. Belarus, Views adopted
on October 31, 2006, para. 7.2.

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 32

While this article is focused on global norms, cross -border philanthropy is also
protected at the regional level. For example:
 The Council of Europe Recommendation on the Legal Status of NGOs states:
“NGOs should be free to s olicit and receive funding — cash or in -kind donations —
not only from public bodies in their own state but also from institutional or
individual donors, another state or multilateral agencies ….” 170
 According to the Inter -American Commission on Human Rights, “states should allow and
facilitate human rights organizations’ access to foreign funds in the context of
international cooperation, in transparent conditions.” 171
 In May 2014, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)
adopted, in draft for m, a report of the ACHPR Study Group on Freedom of Association
and Peaceful Assembly, with a specific recommendation that States’ legal regimes should
codify that associations have the right to seek and receive funds. This includes the right to
seek and re ceive funds from their own government, foreign governments, international
organizations and other entities as a part of international cooperation to which civil
society is entitled, to the same extent as governments.
 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has issued a series of important decisions about the
free flow of philanthropic capital within the European Union. 172
In addition, many jurisdictions have concluded bilateral investment treaties, which help
protect the free flow of capital across borders. Some treaties, such as the U.S. treaties with
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, expressly extend investment treaty protections to organizations not
“organized for pecuniary gain.” 173 Indeed, the letters of transmittal submitted by the White
House to the U.S. Senate sta te that these treaties are drafted to cover “charitable and non -profit
entities.” 174
170 Council of Europe, “Recommendation CM/Rec (2007)145 of the Committ ee of Ministers to member
states on the legal status of non -governmental organisations in Europe,” adopted October 10, 2007, Article 50, .
171 Inter -American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in
the Americas , March 7, 2006, Recommendation 19, /research/resources/assembly/oas -human –
rights -report.pdf .
172 For more information on these decisions, see: European Foundation Center and Transnational Giving
Europe, “Taxation of Cross -Border Philanthropy in Europe After Persche and Stauffer: From landloc k to free
movement?”, European Foundation Center Report, 2014, -web.pdf ; European Foundation Centre, “ECJ
rules in favour of cross -border giving ,” EFC briefing, January 27, 2009, accessed September 9, 2014, 08.pdf .
173 U.S. -Kyrgyz Bilateral Investment Treaty, Article 1(b); U.S. -Kazakh Bilateral Investment Treaty, Article
1(b). See also Article 1(2) of the China – Germany BIT: “the term ‘investor’ means … any juridical person as well
as any commercial or other c ompany or association with or without legal personality having its seat in the territory
of the Federal Republic of Germany, irrespective of whether or not its activities are directed at profit.”
174 Letters of Transmittal available at the U.S. State Departm ent website: and 3567.pdf .

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A detailed discussion of investment treaty protection for cross -border philanthropy is
beyond the scope of this article. This issue is presented in brief form, however, beca use it is a
significant avenue for further exploration, as it expands the international legal argument beyond
human rights and implicates bilateral investment treaties with binding enforcement
mechanisms. 175 For further information on this issue, please see International Investment Treaty
Protection of Not -for -Profit Organizations 176 and Protection of U.S. Non -Governmental
Organizations in Egypt under the Egypt -U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty. 177
3. Restrictions Permitted Under International Law
Continuing the discussion of global norms, ICCPR Article 22(2) recognizes that the
freedom of association can be restricted in certain narrowly defined conditions. According to
Article 22(2):
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those wh ich are
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 178
In other words, international law allows a government to restrict access to resources if the
restriction is:
(1) prescribed by law;
(2) in pursuance of one or more legitimate aims, specifically:
o national security or public safety;
o public order;
o the protection of public health or morals; or
o the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; and
175 In addition, the European Court of Human Rights has held that Article 1 of the First Protocol of the
European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions. (Article 1 of
the First Protocol of the Euro pean Convention reads: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to
the conditions provided for by law and by the general p rinciples of international law. The preceding provisions shall
not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of
property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment o f taxes or other contributions or
penalties.” In addition, the right to property includes the right to dispose of one’s property (Clare Ovey & Robin
White, The European Convention on Human Rights , 3rd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)), which
would seem to embrace the right to make contributions to CSOs for lawful purposes.
176 Luke Eric Peterson & Nick Gallus, “International Investment Treaty Protection of Not -for -Profit
Organizations,” International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law 10(1) (December 2007), .
177 Nick Gallus, “Protection of U.S. Non -Governmental Organizations in Egypt under the Egypt -U.S.
Bilat eral Investment Treaty,” International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law 14(3) (September 2012), .
178 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 22, December 16, 1966, . Article 22, ICCPR

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(3) “necessary in a democratic society to achieve those aims.” 179
Moreover :
States should always be guided by the principle that the restrictions must not im pair the
essence of the right … the relations between right and restriction, between norm and
exception, must not be reversed. 180
The burden of proof is on the government. 181 In addition:
When a State party invokes a legitimate ground for restriction of freed om of expression,
it must demonstrate in specific and individualized fashion the precise nature of the threat,
and the necessity and proportionality of the specific action taken, in particular by
establishing a direct and immediate connection between the [ activity at issue] and the
threat. 182
The following section amplifies this three -part test contained in Article 22(2).
A. Prescribed by law
The first prong requires a restriction to have a formal basis in law. This means that:
restrictions on the right to free dom of association are only valid if they had been
introduced by law (through an act of Parliament or an equivalent unwritten norm of
common law), and are not permissible if introduced through Government decrees or other
similar administrative orders. 183
As discussed above, in July 2014, the Sri Lankan Department of External Resources of
the Ministry of Finance and Planning disseminated a notice to the public, declaring that any
organization or individual undertaking a project with foreign aid must have appro val from
relevant government agencies. Similarly, in July 2014, Nepal’s government released a new
Development Cooperation Policy that will require development partners to channel all
development cooperation through the Ministry of Finance, rather than directly to civil society. In
both cases, the restriction s were based on executive action and not “introduced by law (through
179 Case of Vona v. Hungary (A pp no 35943/10) (2013) ECHR para. 50, -122183 .
180 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rappo rteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, para. 16, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/27 (May 21, 2012),
https://www.ohchr .org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A -HRC -20 -27_en.pdf .
181 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Fact Sheet No. 15, Civil and
Political Rights: The Human Rights Committee, May 2005, .
182 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, para. 35, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/34 (September 12, 2011), .
183 See UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Commentary to the Declaration
on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Fre edoms, July 2011, 44, : “It would
seem reasonable t o presume that an interference is only “prescribed by law” if it derives from any duly promulgated
law, regulation, order, or decision of an adjudicative body. By contrast, acts by governmental officials that are ultra
vires would seem not to be ‘prescribe d by law,’ at least if they are invalid as a result.”

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an act of Parliament or an equivalent unwritten norm of common law).” Accordingly, they
appear to violate the “prescribed by law” standard required under Article 22(2) of the ICCPR.
This prong of Article 22(2) also requires that a provision be sufficiently precise for an
individual or NGO to understand whether or not intended conduct would constitute a violation of
law. 184 As stated in the Johannesburg Principles, “The law must be accessible , unambiguous,
drawn narrowly and with precision so as to enable individuals to foresee whether a particular
action is unlawful.” 185
This prong helps limit the scope of permissible restrictions. As discussed above, certain
laws ban funding of organizations that cause “social anxiety,” have a “political nature,” or have
“implied ideological conditions.” These terms are undefined and provide little guidance to
individuals or organizations about prohibited conduct. Since they are not “unambiguous, drawn
narrowl y and with precision so as to enable individuals to foresee whether a particular action is
unlawful,” there is a reasonable argument that these sorts of vague restrictions fail the
“prescribed by law” requirements of international law.
B. Legitimate aim
The second prong of Article 22(2) requires that a restriction advance one or more
“legitimate aims,” 186 namely:
 national security or public safety;
 public order;
 the protection of public health or morals; or
 the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
This prong provides a useful lens to analyze various justifications for constraint. For
example, governments have justified constraints to promote “aid effectiveness.” As the UNSR
notes, aid effectiveness “is not listed as a legitimate ground for restricti ons.” 187 Similarly, “[t]he
protection of State sovereignty is not listed as a legitimate interest in the [ICCPR],” and “States
cannot refer to additional grounds … to restrict the right to freedom of association.” 188
Of course, assertions of national security or public safety may, in certain circumstances,
constitute a legitimate interest. Under the Siracusa Principles, however, assertions of national
security must be construed restrictively “to justify measures limiting certain rights only when
184 Though not a fully precise comparison, this concept is somewhat similar to the “void for vagueness”
doctrine in U.S. constitutional law.
185 Article 19, Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Fre edom of Expression and Access to
Information (London: Article 19, 1996), Principle 1.1(a), . The Johannesburg Principles were
developed by a meeting of international experts at a consultation in South Africa in October 1995.
186 Case of Vona v. Hungary (App no 35943/10) (2013) ECHR para. 50, -122183 .
187 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, para. 40, UN Doc . A/HRC/23/39 (April 24, 2013) at -content/uploads/2013/04/A.HRC_.23.39_EN -funding -report -April -2013.pdf .
188 Ibid., pa ra. 30.

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they are taken to protect the existence of the nation or its territorial integrity or political
independence against force or threat of force.” 189 In addition, a state may not use “ national
security as a justification for measures aimed at suppressing opposition … or at perpetrating
repressive practices against its population.” 190 This includes defaming or stigmatizing foreign
funded groups by accusing them of “treason” or “promoting regime change.” 191
Accordingly, under international law, governments cannot rely on generalized claims of
“state sovereignty” to justify constraints on global philanthropy. In the words of the UNSR:
Affirming that national security is threatened when an association receives funding from
foreign sources is not only spurious and distorted, but also in contradiction with
international human rights law. 192
This brief analysis is not intended to explore the details of the aid effectiveness and
sovereignty justifications. Rather, the goal is to illustrate how the “legitimate aim” requirement
of in ternational law can help inform the analysis of certain justifications presented by
governments, such as arguments based on “aid effectiveness” and “sovereignty.”
C. Necessary in a Democratic Society
Even if a government is able to articulate a legitimate aim , a restriction violates
international law unless it is “necessary in a democratic society.” As stated by the Organization
for Security and Co -operation in Europe, the reference to necessity does not have “the flexibility
of terms such as ‘useful’ or ‘conv enient’: instead, the term means that there must be a ‘pressing
social need’ for the interference.” 193 Specifically, “where such restrictions are made, States must
demonstrate their necessity and only take such measures as are proportionate to the pursuance of
legitimate aims in order to ensure continuous and effective protection of Covenant rights.” 194
As stated by the UNSR:
In order to meet the proportionality and necessity test, restrictive measures must be the
least intrusive means to achieve the desired ob jective and be limited to the associations
189 See the “Siracusa Principles” [United Nations, Economic and Social Council, U.N. Sub -Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex, UN Doc E/CN.4/1985/4 (1984)],
which were adopted in May 1984 by a group of international human rights experts convened by the International
Commission of Jurists, the International Association of Penal Law, th e American Association for the International
Commission of Jurists, the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, and the International Institute of Higher
Studies in Criminal Sciences. Though not legally binding, these principles provide an authoritative s ource of
interpretation of the ICCPR with regard to limitations clauses and issue of derogation in a public emergency. They
are available at: aculty/clapham/hrdoc/docs/siracusa.html .
190 Ibid.
191 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, para. 27, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39 (April 24, 2013) at -content/uploads/2013/04/A.HRC_.23.39_EN -funding -report -April -2013.pdf .
192 Ibid., para. 30
193 OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Key Guiding Principles of
Freedom of Association with an Emphasis on Non -Governmental Organizations , para. 5
194 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 (2004), para. 6, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Ad d. 13, May 26, 2004.

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falling within the clearly identified aspects characterizing terrorism only. They must not
target all civil society associations…. 195
Consider, for example, Ethiopian legislation imposing a 10 percent cap on the for eign
funding of all CSOs promoting a variety of objectives, including women’s rights and disability
rights. As discussed above, Ethiopia has asserted a counterterrorism rationale to justify foreign
funding constraints. Ethiopia does not establish a “ direct and immediate connection between the
[activity at issue] and the threat.” 196 In addition, the cap is not the “least intrusive means to
achieve the desired objective and … limited to the associations falling within the clearly
identified aspects characterizi ng terrorism.” Accordingly, the counterterrorism objective fails to
justify the Ethiopian cap on foreign funding.
The UNSR also applied this test to the “aid effectiveness” justification. In response, he
stressed that:
even if the restriction were to purs ue a legitimate objective, it would not comply with the
requirements of “a democratic society.” In particular, deliberate misinterpretations by
Governments of ownership or harmonization principles to require associations to align
themselves with Government s’ priorities contradict one of the most important aspects of
freedom of association, namely that individuals can freely associate for any legal
purpose. 197
In addition, “longstanding jurisprudence asserts that democratic societies only exist
where ‘pluralis m, tolerance and broadmindedness’ are in place,” 198 and “minority or dissenting
views or beliefs are respected.” 199
Applying this test, the UNSR has note