International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 1 6, no. 2, December 2014 / 53

Civil Society in Africa
The Impact of Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 on Addressing HIV/AIDS Issues in Ethiopia

DANIEL MESSELE BALCHA 1

This study explores the effects of the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation on
addressing HIV/AIDS issues in Ethiopia. The proclamation and the subsequent regulation
ratified by the council of ministers provide guidelines for registering and regulating charities
and societies. Many stakeholders maintain that the law reflects the government’s interest in
strictly controlling NGOs (nongovernmental organizations) and limiting their area of
engagement, particularly concerning human rights. The study relies on document analysis, a
partner tool survey, and semi-structured interviews with the public, private, and NGO sector
representatives at the national level and in the three regions. It concludes that the 2009 law
has significant effects on partnership endeavors to address HIV/AIDS issues.

1 Daniel Messele Balcha , danielmessele@gmail.com , is an Ethiopian Ph.D. student of public and social
policy at Charles University in Prague.

1. Introduction
In 2009, the government of Ethiopia ratified the Charities and Societies Proclamation.
The proclamation and the regulation subsequently endorsed by the council of ministers provide
guidelines for the registration and regulation of charities and societies. The law gives the
government vast control over NGO activities. It prohibits national organizations that receive
more than 10 percent of their funding from abroad from undertaking human rights activities. It
also prohibits human rights activities by foreign NGOs, including campaigning for gender
equality, children’s rights, disabled persons’ rights, and conflict resolution.
Though the law does not explicitly refer to HIV/AIDS, work on the issues is affected by
this law. A number of human right issues are attached to HIV/AIDS (Beagle 2013 ; Utyasheva &
Pradichit 2013). Even the HIV/AIDS policy itself suggests combining HIV/AIDS work with
other issues (MOH 1998).

This study explores the effects of the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation in
addressing the HIV/AIDS issue in general and partnership forums in particular.
The Rawls principle of justice emphasizes the necessity of maximizing the advantages of
the least preferred. It underlines that fair treatment of citizens results when a society insures
equal opportunity to all to succeed and when there is equality in the eyes of the law. Rawls
suggests two principles to regulate the distribution of social and economic advantages across
society. The first principle states that “Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive
basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others.” The second principle states that social and economic qualities are to be arranged so that they are both reasonably expected to be to
everyone’s advantage and attached to positions and offices open to all (Rawls 1971).
Another important consideration of the normative model is that of reducing inequality.
This model draws attention to the undesirable aspects to the functioning of market relations. The
market does not concern itself with the type of resource individuals use to assert themselves or to
the needs of the individual. Under otherwise similar circumstances, some people are gifted with
large resources while others lack the resources to satisfy their basic needs. Therefore, the market
alone doe s not promote justice. According to the human dignity model, further, each person has
innate value, regardless of his or her contributions to society’s well -being. The concept of
dignified survival depends on concrete cultural and economic realities of a given country
(Potůček et al. 2003). Tarantola (2008) and Tarantola et al. (2008) discuss the interdependent
nature of health and human rights.

Providing equal opportunities regardless of state of health or social background is
essential when it comes to H IV/AIDS victims. The needs of HIV/AIDS -affected communities
are high. HIV/AIDS affects the fundamental human attachments of family life and exposes
children to stigma and discrimination. Stigma and discrimination prevent governments and
communities from effectively responding by intensifying violations of these children’s rights —
particularly their access to education, social services, and community and family support
(UNAIDS/WHO 2004). Because the prevalence of HIV/AIDS has resulted in high numbers of
orphans and vulnerable children, not only those who are directly affected by HIV/AIDS but also
increasing number of children face social problems.

Children orphaned or made vulnerable by AIDS are more likely to be malnourished, less
likely to be educated, and more likely to be abused and suffer severe psychosocial distress. In
many communities, traditional ways of caring for orphans and vulnerable children, such as the
extended family, are being severely strained by the impacts of HIV/AIDS. As the number of
orphans and vulnerable children increases and an ever larger number of adults is affected by
HIV/AIDS, family networks have come under severe strain (Strobbe et al. 2010).
Therefore, there needs to be a legal environment that helps communities care for the
children and families left vulnerable by HIV/AIDS. Moreover, due to the magnitude and
multifaceted nature of the HIV/AIDS problem, there is a high need for multi-sectoral ways of
addressing the problem. These can only be achieved by strong partnership relat ions among the
major actors involved, including the public, the for-profit sector, and the not -for -profit sector,
which is the main concern of this study.

2. Methodology
The research makes use of interviews with representatives of the major actors, a partner
tool survey, 2 and document analysis. The key informants are individuals representing the three
sectors — the public sector, business (for profit), and the NGO (not -for -profit) sector — as well as
HIV/AIDS Prevention and Control Office (HAPCO) representatives both at the national level
and at three regions: Oromia Region, 3 Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region 4
(SNNPR), and Addis Ababa. 5 Though HAPCO is a government institution, it is included among
the key informants because it is coordinating the HIV/AIDS partnership forums. A total of 13
key informants and four others who provided important information have been interviewed using
semi-structured interviews. Additionally, a partnership tool online and a paper survey were used
to collect data fro m the key informants representing the partnership subforums and HAPCO.
Both primary and secondary data are used in the research. The partner tool social -network
analysis and thematic analysis are used to identify and analyze the dominant themes. Using these
themes as categories of the analysis, the partnership practice has been compared, to understand
how partnerships among the public, business, and the NGO sectors are affected by the Charities
and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009.

 

3. Result
The Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 is the most recent NGO law,
which was adopted by the Ethiopian Parliament in January 2009. It gives the government broad,
unrestricted control over NGO activities , which allows government to interfere in the operati on
and management of NGOs . This power is exercised particularly against those NGOs focusing on
human rights. Most HIV/AIDS programs are interrelated with human rights and other programs
carried out by national and international organizations, so the law ha s hindered efforts to address
the problem of HIV/AIDS. The following sections present a short description of the partnership forums, the results for the major outcomes of the HIV/AIDS partnership forum, the effe cts of the
law in limiting financing for HIV/AIDS partnership forums, the mismatch between expectations
from partnerships and the working environment, and finally the effects of reregistering.

Graph 1 – HIV/AIDS Partnership Forums Map

2 PARTNER tool survey is a Social Network Analysis Tool to Collect, Analyze, & Interpret Data to
Improve Collaboration within Community Networks which is available at https://www.partnertool.net/ .
3 The Oromia Region is selected because it is one of the nine ethnically based regions of Ethiopia. It covers
284,538 square kilometers. The 2007 census reported its population at more than 27 million, making it the large st
state in both population and area.
4 Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples’ Region (SNNPR) is selected because it is one of the nine
ethnic divisions of Ethiopia. It is also referred as little Ethiopia. Nearly 50 ethnic groups live in the region. Diversity
is a the symbol of the region.
5 Addis Ababa is selected because it is the capital of Ethiopia. It is the largest city in Ethiopia, with a
population of 3,384,569, according to the 2007 census, with an annual growth rate of 3.8%.

3.1. Description of the Partnership Forums
Before looking at the major outcomes reported of the HIV/AIDS partnership forums, it is
worth describing the HIV/AIDS partnership forums. As we can see from graph 1, the partnership
forums are mainly working in their respective areas and have no or limited connections with
partnership forums that exist in other parts of the country.

The partnership forums map shows that the Federal Government HIV/AIDS Forum
(FGF) has only the single connection with the Federal HAPCO (FH). Even if the partnership
forums are created in accordance with where they are located, there is no question about the
FGF’s strong influence over regional government subforums (SGF, OGF, and AAGF).
Therefore, creating new connections will be highly beneficial. This is true also for both the
federal NGO HIV/AIDS f orum (FNF) as well as the federal business HIV/AIDS forum (FBF).
Even if there is no active representation of the business sector in the Oromia region or in
SNNPR, the federal business HIV/AIDS forum claims to have representatives in these regions
who work together. In the case of Addis Ababa, the same people representing FBF also represent
Addis Ababa business HIV/AIDS forum (AABF). Moreover, we see that only the FH has
established a relationship with regional HAPCOs.

3.2. Major Outcomes of the HIV/AIDS Partnership Forum
All of the stakeholders believe that the HIV/AIDS partnership forums have a number of
benefits. Principal benefits cited include improvements in knowledge -sharing, resource -sharing,
community support, public awareness, and communication. According to stakeholders, these
benefits result largely from the HIV/AIDS partnership forums’ success in bringing together
diverse stakeholders, meeting regularly, exchanging information and knowledge, fostering
informal relationships among partnership members, facilitating collective decision -making, and
enabling shared goals and efforts to achieve them.

Table 1 – Major Outcomes of the HIV/AIDS Partnership Forum
Major Outcomes of the HIV/AIDS Partnership Forum Percentage
Health education services, health literacy, educational
resources 8.6%
Improved services 8.6 %
Reduction of health disparities 2.9%
Improved resource sharing 11.4%
Increased knowledge sharing 25.7%
Community support 11.4%
Public awareness 11.4%
Policy, law, and/or regulation 5.7%
Improved health outcomes 2.9%
Improved communication 11.4%

Table 2 shows the specific aspects of the HIV/AIDS partnership forum identified as
having contribute d to the outcomes presented in table 1. The assumption that partnership paves
the way for resource-sharing was not reflected in the survey. But some have indicated that they
have benefited from particular forms resource -sharing, such as sharing experts during trainings
and workshops. A large number of those surveyed also believe that exchanging information and
knowledge have contributed substantially to the success of the partnerships (33.3%) .

Table 2 – Important Aspects of the HIV/AIDS Partnership Forum
Important Aspects Percentage
Bringing together diverse
stakeholders 25%
Meeting regularly 8.3%
Exchanging info/knowledge 33.3%
Sharing resources 0%
Informal relationships created 16.7%
Collective decision -making 4.2%
Having a shared mission, goals 12.5%
However, most of the respondents believe that the success of the HIV/AIDS partnership
forum is being tested due to the law. The following sections provide details.

3.3. Limitation of Finance for HIV/AIDS Partnership Forums
The major effect of the Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 is related to
accessing finances from foreign sources. Without such funds, many NGOs could not carry out
their work.

The 30/70 percent guideline introduced in this legislation directly affects partnership
efforts. According to Article 88, No. 1, “Any charity or society shall allocate not less than 70
percent of the expenses in the budget year for the implementation of its purpose and an amount
not exceeding 30 percent for its administrative activities.” This law has affected initiatives to
form partnerships or consortiums of NGOs working to address HIV/AIDS. The 30/70 percent
limit makes running such partnerships as independently registered organizations difficult,
because they tend to incur higher administrative costs.

One effort to establish a partnership in the Oromia region failed, according to a
respondent: “We had planned to create consortium of NGOs working on HIV and health issues
and to have legal status from federal charities and society agency. We talked to them and the
reply was, because it has no program of its own, if you create consortium you can r un only using
members’ contribution for admin cost. You cannot pool other funding. You cannot get funding
for this purpose because you are working on coordination and capacity -building. It has been a
year now. For this reason, we are discouraged and we lef t the idea of creating consortium. There
is negative effect of the new law if you want to register and operate on legal basis.”
With the 30/70 percent law as well as the government’s initiative to “confer various
incentives to a charity or society that al locate more than 80% of its total income for operational purposes or demonstrate outstanding performance” (Article 88, No. 2 of CSP), the government
seeks to minimize administrative costs and maximize benefits for project beneficiaries. However,
because th e law does not carve out exceptions for partnerships or “consortiums,” as the law calls
them, there is the unintended effect of discouraging such partnerships. One interviewee said,
“There are many rules and guideline for CSOs to follow … but in general it seems 30/70
guideline [law] affects partnership forums [because] partnership, networking, capacity building
and related activities are conducted by admin costs.”

The data from the partner tool survey also confirms how significantly the Charities and
Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 has affected HIV/AIDS partnership forums. Even though
only 19.2% of respondents expressly cited the law’s effect on partnerships, the qualitative data
shows a substantial decrease in funding since the law came into effect. Here it is also worth
noting other causes for the limitations in funding (46.2%), which is indicated as the major factor
affecting HIV/AIDS partnership forums.

Table 3 – Major Factors Affecting HIV/AIDS Partnership Forums
Major Factors Affecting HIV/AIDS Partnership Forums Percentage
Limited funding 46. 2%
Lack of trust 7.7%
Unhealthy competition for funding among members 15. 4%
Lack of interest 11.5%
The new NGO law 19.2%

3.4. The Question of Survival
The principal cause of the limitations on funding is the restriction on foreign funding.
The Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 limits the funding that NGOs can receive
from international sources. Under Article 2 of the law, “‘ Ethiopian Charities’ or ‘Ethiopian
Societies’ shall mean those Charities or Societies that are formed under the laws of Ethiopia, all
of whose members are Ethiopians, generate income from Ethiopia and wholly controlled by
Ethiopians. However, they may be deemed as Ethiopian Charities or Ethiopian Societies if they
use not more than ten percent of their funds which is received from foreign sources.” This
restriction hobbles many local NGOs, which are working effectively with communities.
There are two important issues to stress here. One is the lack of local financial sources
and the significant dependence of local or Ethiopian NGOs on foreign funding, which is
discussed here. The other is the limitation on Ethiopian charities’ and societies’ areas of work,
which is discussed in section 3.5 in more detail.

The lack of local financial sources and the dependence on foreign funding has been the
practice for local and Ethiopian NGOs for quite a long period of time. Due to this fact, many
NGOs undertake income -generating activities (IGA). Moreover, some NGOs are able to cover
their training and other project -related costs by selling their products. For instance, some produce
furniture while training AIDS orphans and vulnerable children in wood and metal work, and
others produce agricultural products or cloths by training HIV/AIDS -positive people in urban agriculture and tailoring. As a result, most favor efforts to help such products come to market
and to enable the NGOs to be self -sufficient and even expand their number of beneficiaries.
But the same law that limits NGOs’ foreign funding also sets tough criteria for
conducting income -generating activities. Article 103 of the CSP sets forth prerequisites that must
be met in order to engage in income -generating activities. Under the law, the NGO must receive
written approval of the agency; proceeds must not be distributed among members or
beneficiaries; proceeds must be used to further the purposes for which the charity or society is
established; and the work must be incidental to achieving the NGO’s purposes. Moreover, the
law make s it difficult for NGOs to engage in IGA activities. Under the CSP, charities and
societies must follow the registration and licensing requirements and procedures laid down in
other laws for activities related to trade, investment, and other profit -making activities. These
factors make it exceedingly difficult for Ethiopian NGOs to generate 90% of their funding
locally. For these reasons, the law creates a difficult environment for Ethiopian NGOs to
generate income from local sources.

Such restrictions, accordingly, are contrary to the principle that social and economic
qualities are to be arranged so that they are reasonably expected to be to everyone’s advantage
(Rawls 1971). Moreover, in reducing inequality, the law does not give adequate consideration t o
the undesirable aspects of market relations. For example, the market is not concerned with the
type of resources used by individuals. Under similar circumstances, some people are gifted with
large resources while others lack the resources to satisfy their basic needs. Th is signifies the
importance of supplementing the market with a redistribution of resources (Potůček et al. 2003).
But the restrictions discussed above not only put the existence of some NGOs in
question. They also discourage those socially and economically disadvantaged citizens from
actively engaging in the betterment of their socioeconomic status.

3.5. Big Expectation in a Restricted Environment
In addition to all its other hindrances on NGOs, the Charities and Societies Proclamation
No. 621/2009, Article 1 4 limits particular fields of engagement to Ethiopian charities. It specifies
fifteen areas of work that “ only Ethiopian Charities and societies” can engage in; Ethiopian
residents and foreign charities cannot take part. Those areas include “the advancement of human
and democratic rights,” “the promotion of equality of nations, nationalities and peoples and that
of gender and religion,” “the promotion of the rights of the disabled and children’s rights,” “the
promotion of conflict resolution or reconciliation,” and “the promotion of the efficiency of the
justice and law enforcement services.”

Many respondents question how Ethiopian charities can take on these big challenges,
especially in light of the financial and legal restrictions. As a result, many NGOs are abandoning
their programs addressing these issues and shifting to other areas where such restrictions do not
apply. If any areas of work are to be limited to Ethiopian charities, most respondents believe that
the law must be changed to provide a more positive environment for their work.
As was earlier discussed, there is significant interdependence between human rights and
HIV/AIDS. Most of the domains restricted to Ethiopian charities overlap with HIV/AIDS work.

Table 4 shows the effects of the Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 on
HIV/AIDS partnership forums. As we can see, the law clearly played a negative role. It
decreased the number of HIV/AIDS partnership forum members (37.5%). It discouraged
HIV/AIDS partnership forums (25%). It had some unintended negative effects on HIV/AIDS
partnership forums, such as limiting funding (18.8%).
Table 4 – Effects of the Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009
on HIV/AIDS Partnership Forums
Effects of the Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009 Percentage
Has some unintended negative effects on HIV/AIDS partnership forum (e .g., by
limiting funding) 18. 8%
Has no effect at all on the HIV/AIDS partnership forum 12.5 %
Encouraged/ strengthened the HIV/AIDS partnership forum 6.3 %
Discouraged/ weakened the HIV/AIDS partnership forum 25%
Decreased the number of HIV/AIDS partnership forum/sub -forum members 37.5%
Increased the number of HIV/AIDS partnership forum/sub -forum members 0%

In sum, even though HIV/AIDS is not explicitly mentioned in the Charities and Societies
Proclamation No. 621/2009, the general restrictions in the law make it harder for HIV/AIDS
partnership forums as well as local and nationwide NGOs to fulfill what is expected of them.

3.6. Effects of Reregistration
Under Charities and Societies Council of Ministers Regulation No. 168/2009, Article 10,
No. 2, “The effects of re -registration shall commence only a year after the effective date of the
proclamation and not immediately after re -registration.” Because of this provision, most
international NGOs can no longer continue being members of consortiums with Ethiopian
charities. The effect is well presented by one of the respondents: “Soon after its establishment we
had about 107 members because we are mainly working on capacity building like proposal
writing, fund raising, fund management, and project management and the number of members
kept increasing due to these benefits …. Now there are 45 members because we are reregistered
at the national level as Ethiopian Residents’ Charity Organization 6 Network. Since we have this
new registration, the institutions which can be members to us are only Ethiopian Resident
Charity Organizations.”

6 According t o Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009, based on where the organization was
established, its source of income, the composition of its membership, and its membership residential status, a charity
or society is given one of three legal designati ons:
1. Ethiopian Charities or Societies : Charities or Societies formed under the laws of Ethiopia, whose members
are all Ethiopians, generate income from Ethiopia, and are wholly controlled by Ethiopians. These
organizations may not receive more than 10% of their resources from foreign sources (Article 2 of CSP).
2. Ethiopian Resident Charities or Societies : Ethiopian Charities or Societies that receive more than 10% of
their resources from foreign sources (Article 2 of CSP).
3. Foreign Charities : Charit ies formed under the laws of foreign countries, or whose membership includes
foreigners, or foreigners control the organization, or the organization receives funds from foreign sources
(Article 2 of CSP).

In the survey, 69.2% of respondents indicated that the number of HIV/AIDS forum
member s is decreasing. In the process, partnership institutions have lost significant opportunities
to gain experience from well -established foreign charities. They have lost financial resources as
well, with fewer members making contributions. The major reasons for these declines are the
restrictions in the Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009.

4. Conclusion
The study concludes that the 2009 Charities and Societies Proclamation No. 621/2009
has both implicit and explicit effects on addressing HIV/AID S issues in general and on creating
and running HIV/AIDS partnership forums in particular. Even though HIV/AIDS is not
explicitly mentioned in the law, the general restrictions make it harder for HIV/AIDS partnership
forums to fulfill what is expected of t hem. When organizations withdraw , the partnership forums
lose finances, in -kind resources like meeting space, community connections, paid staff,
facilitation and leadership, data resources, information and feedback, and specific expertise.
Accordingly, the law has had the unintended effect of weakening HIV/AIDS partnership forums
and, in turn, diminishing the effectiveness of NGOs’ efforts to address HIV/AIDS.
Currently, the partnership forums work mainly in their respective areas or regions, with
limited o r no connections to partnership forums in other parts of the country. Only the federal
HAPCO has an established relationship with regional HAPCOs. Nurturing such links also among
similar sub -partnership forums across regions and the federal HIV/AIDS sub -partnership forums
can promote the sharing of resources and experiences.

The law must create an environment more favorable to addressing HIV/AIDS issues.
First, it should create exceptions for HIV/AIDS partnership forums, so that they can be created at
var ious levels. Second, understanding their unique nature, the law should let independently
created partnership forums seek funding and use it to coordinate their efforts. This could include
aiding their income -generating activities in consideration of their vulnerability to compete in the
market, as long as they use their financial gains to further their objectives. Third, in light of the
interdependence between HIV/AIDS and human rights, the law should ease the 10 percent limit
for not -for -profit organizations working exclusively on HIV/AIDS issues.

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 A September 2014 article in the New York Times asserted that foreign “money is
increasingly transforming the once -staid think -tank world into a muscular arm of foreign
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governments.” 121
Some governments assert that foreigners are not only seeking to meddle in domestic
political affairs, but also seeking to destabilize the country or otherwise engage in “regime
change.” Accor dingly, they argue that foreign funding restrictions are necessary to thwart efforts
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International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 23

conspiracies to effect regime change by engaging in politics in the guise of doing social
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 A drafter of the Russian “foreign agents” law justified the initiative when it was pending
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now in Libya, Egypt, Tunisia, in Kosovo — that’s what happens in the world, some
governments are working to change regimes in other countries. Russian democracy needs
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 In 2005, the Prime Minister of Ethiopia expelled civil society organizations, explaining,
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are supposed to do humanitarian work.” 125
 In the process of driving civil society organizations out of Zimbabwe , President Mugabe
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President Mugabe and ZANU PF from power. They are being funded by Britain and
some European Union countries, the United States, Australia, Canada and New
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 In a March 2014 interview justifying a draft “foreign agents” law, Kyrgyzstan’s
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International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 24

forces interested in destabilizing the situation in Kyrgyzs tan and spreading chaos across
Central Asia and parts of China.” 128
 In July 2014, the vice chairman of the China Research Institute of China -Russia Relations
argued that China should “learn from Russia” and enact a foreign agents law “so as to
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2. Transparency and Accountability
Another justification commonly invoked by governments to regulate and restrict the flow
of foreign funds is the importance of upholding the integrity of CSOs by promoting transparency
and accountability through government regulation. Consider, for example, the following
responses by government delegations to the UNSR’s Resource Report:
 Egypt : “We agree with the principles of accountability, transparency, and integrity of the
activities of civil society organisations and NGOs. However, this should not be l imited to
accountability to donors. National mechanisms to follow -up on activities of such entities,
while respecting their independence have to be established and respected.” 130
 Maldives : “While civil societies should have access to financing for effective operation
within the human rights framework, it is of equal importance that the organizations must
also ensure that they work with utmost integrity and in an ethical and responsible
manner.” 131
 Azerbaijan : “The changes and amendments to the national legisl ation on NGOs have
been made with a view of increasing transparency in this field…. In that regard, these
amendments should only disturb the associations operating in our country on a non –
transparent basis.” 132
Similarly, in response to a United Nations Hum an Rights Council panel on the promotion
and protection of civil society space in March 2014, the following government delegations
responded with justifications invoking transparency and accountability:
128 “Алмазбек Атамбаев: “Хочу максимально успеть,” Slovo.kg , March 23, 2014, accessed September
9, 2014, translated by Aida Rustemova, https://slovo.kg/?p=35019 .
129 Simon Denyer , “China taking the Putin approach to democracy,” Washington Post, October 1, 2014,
A7.
130 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Clustered ID with the WG on HR and
Transnational Corporations and the SR on The Rights to Freedom of Assembly an d Association: Intervention
delivered by the Permanent Delegation of Egypt,” May 30, 2013, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extran et.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/23rdSession/OralStatements/Egypt_10_1.pdf .
131 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Interactive Dialogue with the Special
Rapporteur on the Rights to Peaceful Assembly and of Association, M aldives Oral Statement,” May 31, 2013,
accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/ 23rdSession/OralStatements/Maldives_12.pdf .
132 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Remarks by Azerbaijan,” May 31, 2013,
accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/23rdSession/OralStatements/Azerbaijan_12.pdf .

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 Ethiopia , on behalf of the African Group: “Domestic l aw regulation consistent with the
international obligations of States should be put in place to ensure that the exercise of the
right to freedom of expression, assembly and association fully respects the rights of
others and ensures the independence, accou ntability and transparency of civil society.” 133
 India, on behalf of the “Like Minded Group”: “The advocacy for civil society should be
tempered by the need for responsibility, openness and transparency and accountability of
civil society organizations.” 134
 Pa kistan , on behalf of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation members : “It may be
underscored that securing funding for its crucial work is the right of civil society,
maintaining transparency and necessary regulation of funding is the responsibility of
sta tes.” 135
Kyrgyzstan has also employed this argument to justify a draft “foreign agents” law. The
explanatory note to the draft law claims that it “has been developed for purposes of ensuring
openness, publicity, transparency for non -profit organizations, inc luding units of foreign non –
profit organizations, as well as non -profit organizations acting as foreign agents and receiving
their funds from foreign sources, such as foreign countries, their government agencies,
international and foreign organizations, fo reign citizens, stateless persons or their authorized
representatives, receiving monetary funds or other assets from the said sources.”
3. Aid Effectiveness and Coordination
A global movement has increasingly advocated for greater aid effectiveness, including
through concepts of “host country ownership” and the harmonization of development
assistance. 136 However, some states have interpreted “host country ownership” to be
synonymous with “host government ownership” and have otherwise co -opted the aid
effectivene ss debate to justify constraints on international funding. For example:
133 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Statement by Ethiopia on behalf of the
African Grou p at the 25th session of the Human Rights Council On the Panel Discussion on the Importance of the
Promotion and Protection of Civil Society Space,” March 11, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/25thSession/OralStatements/Ethiopia%20on%20b
ehalf%20of%20African%20Group_PD_21.pdf .
134 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Joint Statement: India on behalf of like –
minded countries,” March 11, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/25thSession/OralStatements/India_on%20behalf
%20of%20LMG_PD_21.pdf . The “Like Minded Group” consists of Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus,
Chi na, Cuba, Egypt, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri
Lanka, Sudan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, Vietnam , and Zimbabwe .
135 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Statement by Pakistan on be half of OIC:
Panel Discussion on Civil Society Space,” March 11, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
https ://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/25thSession/OralStatements/Pakistan%20on%20b
ehalf%20of%20OIC_PD_21.pdf .
136 See the Aid Effectiveness Agenda of the Paris Declaration (2005), the Accra Agenda for Action (2008),
and the Busan Partn ership for Effective Development Cooperation (2011).

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 In July 2014, Nepal ’s government released a new Development Cooperation Policy 137
that will require development partners to channel all development cooperation through
the Ministry of Fi nance, rather than directly to CSOs. The government argued that this
policy is necessary for aid effectiveness and coordination: “Both the Government and the
development partners are aware of the fact that the effectiveness can only be enhanced if
the owne rship of aid funded projects lies with the recipient government.” 138
 Sri Lanka ’s Finance and Planning Ministry issued a public notice in July 2014 requiring
CSOs to receive government approval of international funding. Justifying the
requirement, the Ministry claimed that projects financed with international funding were
“outside t he government budget undermining the national development programmes.” 139
 In response to the UNSR’s Resource Report, the representative of Egypt stated, “The
diversification of the venues of international cooperation and assistance to States towards
the fund ing of civil society partners fragments and diverts the already limited resources
available for international assistance. Hence, aid coordination is crucial for aid
effectiveness.” 140
 At the recent Africa Leaders Summit, the Foreign Minister of Benin s poke a t a workshop
on closing space for civil society. He asserted that CSOs “don’t think they are
accountable to government but only to development partners. This is a problem.” He said
Benin needs “a regulation to create transparency on resources coming from a broad and
the management of resources,” stating that the space for civil society is “too wide.” 141
 The Intelligence Bureau of India released a report in June 2014 claiming that foreign –
funded CSOs stall economic development and negatively impact India’s GDP growth by
2 to 3 percent. 142 The report stated, “a significant number of Indian NGOs, funded by
some donors based in the US, the UK, Germany, the Netherlands and Scandinavian
137 Government of Nepal Ministry of Finance, “Development Cooperation Policy, 2014,” unofficial
translation, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://www.mof.gov.np/uploads/document/file/DCP_English_20140707120230_20140721083326.pdf .
138 Government of Nepal Ministry of Finance, “Development Cooperation Policy, 2014,” unofficial
translation, Article 2.2, acces sed September 9, 2014,
https://www.mof.gov.np/uploads/document/file/DCP_English_20140707120230_20140721083326.pdf .
139 “No foreign funds without approva l: Ministry,” Daily Mirror , July 22, 2014, accessed September 9,
2014, https://www.dailymirror.lk/news/50038 -no -foreign -funds -without -approval -ministry.html .
140 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Clustered ID with the WG on HR and
Transnational Corporations and the SR on The Rights to Freedom of Assembly and Association: Intervention
delivered by the Permanent Delegation of Egypt,” May 30, 2013, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/23rdSession/OralStatements/Egypt_1 0_1.pdf .
141 Personal notes of author.
142 “Foreign -funded NGOs stalling development: IB report,” Times of India , June 12, 2014, accessed
September 9, 2014, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/Foreign -funded -NGOs -stalling -development -IB –
report/articleshow/36411169.cms .

International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law / vol. 17 , no. 1, March 2015 / 27

countries, have been noticed to be using people centric issues to create an enviro nment
which lends itself to stalling development projects.” 143
4. National Security, Counterterrorism, and Anti -Money Laundering
As discussed above, governments also invoke national security, counterterrorism, and
anti -money laundering policies to justify restr ictions on international funding, including cross –
border philanthropy. For example, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF), an
intergovernmental body that seeks to combat money laundering and terrorist financing, stated:
The ongoing international campaign against terrorist financing has unfortunately
demonstrated however that terrorists and terrorist organisations exploit the NPO
sector to raise and move funds, provide logistical support, encourage terrorist
recruitment or otherwise support terrorist organi sations and operations. This
misuse not only facilitates terrorist activity but also undermines donor confidence
and jeopardises the very integrity of NPOs. Therefore, protecting the NPO sector
from terrorist abuse is both a critical component of the globa l fight against
terrorism and a necessary step to preserve the integrity of NPOs. 144
Governments have leveraged concerns about counterterrorism and money laundering to
justify restricting both the inflow and outflow of philanthropy. For example: 145
 The governm ent of Azerbaijan justified amendments relating to the registration of
foreign grants, stating that the purpose of the amendments was, in part, “ to enforce
international obligations of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the area of combating money –
laundering.” 146
143 Rake sh Krishnan Simha, “Why India Should Follow Vladimir Putin’s Lead on NGOs,” Russia & India
Report, June 15, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://in.rbth.com/blogs/2014/06/15/why_india_should_follow_vladimir_putins_lead_on_ngos_35945.html .
144 Financial Action Task Force, “International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the
Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations,” Financial Action Task Force Report, 2013,
54, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://www.fatfgafi.org/media/fa tf/documents/recommendations/pdfs/FATF_Recommendations.pdf . See also
Financial Action Task Force, “Risk of Terrorist Abuse in Non -Profit Organisations,” Financial Action Task Force
Report, June 2014, https://www.fatf -gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Risk -of-terrorist -abuse -in-non -profit –
organisations.pdf .
145 Constraints by donor governments on the outflow of cross -border donation s, albeit beyond the scope of
this article, similarly present significant barriers to cross -border philanthropy. These states assert that they have an
international responsibility to regulate the outflow of cross -border donations in order to ensure that fu nding destined
for other countries will not support criminal or terrorist activities in those foreign jurisdictions. For more information
about the justifications employed and the implications for civil society, please see: Ben Hayes, “Counter -Terrorism,
‘Policy Laundering’ and the FATF: Legalizing Surveillance, Regulating Civil Society,” Transnational
Institute/Statewatch Report, February 2012, https://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no -171 -fafp -report.pdf .
146 Charity & Security Network, “How the FATF Is Used to Justify Laws That Harm Civil Society,
Freedom of Association and Expression,” Charity & Security Network , May 16, 2013, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://www.charityandsecurity.org/analysis/Restrictive_Laws_How_FATF_Used_to_Justify_Laws_That_Harm_Civ
il_Society .

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 The British Virgin Islands (BVI) enacted a law requiring that CSOs with more than five
employees appoint a designated Anti -Money Laundering Compliance Officer. 147 The
law also imposes audit requirements for CSOs that are not required of businesses. These
burdens were justified with explicit reference to FATF’s recommendation on nonprofit
organizations and counterterrorism. 148
 In response to the UNSR’s Resource Report, a group of thirteen African states responded,
“It is the responsibility of governments to ensure that the origin and destination of
associations’ funds are not used for terrorist purposes or directed towards activities which
encourage incitement to hatred and violence.” 149
 In 2013, a Sri Lankan government representative similarly stated, “While w e agree that
access to resources is important for the vibrant functioning of civil society, we observe
that Mr. Kiai does not seem to adequately take into account the negative impact of lack of
or insufficient regulation of funding of associations on natio nal security and counter –
terrorism.” 150
 In a National Security Analysis released in August 2014, Sri Lanka’s Ministry of
Defence claimed that some civil society actors have links with the Liberation Tigers of
Tamil Eelam, a group with “extremist separatist i deology,” and that these CSOs thereby
pose “a major national security threat.” 151 During the same period, the Sri Lankan
government announced that it was drafting a law requiring CSOs to register with the
Ministry of Defence in order to have a bank account and receive international funding.
5. Hybrid Justifications
While these categories and examples represent the types of justifications offered by
governments for restricting foreign funding, in practice, official statements often combine
multiple justifications. A recent example is the statement made at the UN Human Rights Council
by India on behalf of itself and twenty other “like minded” states, including Cuba, Saudi
147 “Non -Profit Organisations,” British Virg in Islands Financial Investigation Agency, accessed September
9, 2014, https://www.bvifia.org/non -profit -organisations .
148 Charity & Security Network, “How the FATF Is Used to Justify Laws That H arm Civil Society,
Freedom of Association and Expression,” May 16, 2013,
https://www.charityandsecurity.org/analysis/Restrictiv e_Laws_How_FATF_Used_to_Justify_Laws_That_Harm_Civ
il_Society
149 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Oral Statement — Gabon on behalf of the
African Group,” 30 May 2013, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/23rdSession/OralStatements/Gabon%20on%20be
half%20ofAG_10_1.pdf .
150 UN Office of the High Co mmissioner for Human Rights, “23rd Session of the HRC Statement by Sri
Lanka —Item 3: Clustered ID with the SR on the rights to peaceful assembly & of association,” May 31, 2013,
accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/23rdSession/Pages/OralStatement.aspx?MeetingN
umber=12.0&MeetingDat e=Friday,%2031%20May%202013 .
151 Gotabaya Rajapaksa, “Sri Lanka’s National Security,” Ministry of Defence and Urban Development of
Sri Lanka, August 19, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://www.defence.lk/new.asp?fname=Sri_Lankas_National_Security_20140819_02 .

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Arabia , Belarus, China, and Vietnam ,152 which weaves together a number of different
justifications, including foreign interference, accountability, and national security:
[C]ivil society cannot function effectively and efficiently without defined
limits…. Civil society must also learn to protect its own space by guarding against
machinations of donor groups guided by extreme ideologies laden with hidden
politicized motives, which if allowed could potentially bring disrepute to the civil
society space…. There have also been those civil society organizations, who have
digressed from their original purpose and indulged in the pursuit of donor -driven
agendas. It is important to ensure accountability and responsibility for their
actions and the consequences thereof and also guard against compromising
national and international security. 153
Similarly, Ethiopia, in its statement in response to the UNSR’s Resource R eport,
referenced justifications relating to state sovereignty, aid coordination, and accountability and
transparency:
It is our firm belief that associations will play their role in the overall
development of the country and advance their objectives, if a nd only if an
environment for the growth of transparent, members based and members driven
civil society groups in Ethiopia providing for accountability and predictability is
put in place. We are concerned that the abovementioned assertion [about
lightening the burdens to receive donor funding] by the special rapporteur
undermines the principle of sovereignty which we have always been guided by. 154
Similarly constructed statements have also been put forward by Pakistan and other states. 155
152 The “Like Minded Group” consisted of Algeria, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, China, Cuba, Egypt,
India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Pakistan, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Uganda,
UAE, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe. UN Office of the Hig h Commissioner for Human Rights, “Joint Statement: India on
behalf of like -minded countries,” March 11, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/25thSession/OralStatements/India_on%20behalf
%20of%20LMG_PD_21.pdf .
153 Ibid.
154 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Oral Statement: Ethiopia,” May 31, 2013,
accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/23rdSession/OralStatements/Et hiopia_12.pdf .
155 See, e.g., UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Statement by Pakistan on Behalf of
OIC: Panel Discussion on Civil Society Space,” March 11, 2014, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://extranet.ohchr.org/sites/hrc/HRCSessions/RegularSessions/25thSession/OralStatements/Pakistan%20on%20b
ehalf%20of%20OIC_PD_21.pdf : “By virtue of its dynamic role civil society is well poised to build convergences
with the view to develop synergies between state institutions and their own networks. These synergies would
facilitate proper utilization of resources at the disposal state institutions an d civil society actors. In this regard, it
may be underscored that securing funding for its crucial work is the right of civil society, maintaining transparency
and necessary regulation of funding is the responsibility of states…. Within this social space, the civil society can
play its optimal role by working in collaboration with state institutions. Better coordination between civil society
actors and state institution [sic] would also facilitate enhancement of international cooperation in the field of hu man
rights.”

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In this section, the a rticle briefly surveyed justifications presented by governments to
constrain the inflow of international funding, including philanthropy. In the following section,
we analyze constraints and their justifications under international law.
International Legal Framework
1. International Norms Protecting Access to Resources and Cross -Border Philanthropy
Article 22 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) states,
“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of association with others….” 156 Acco rding to the
UNSR: 157
The right to freedom of association not only includes the ability of individuals or legal
entities to form and join an association 158 but also to seek, receive and use resources 159 —
human, material and financial — from domestic, foreign and in ternational sources. 160
The United Nations Declaration on Human Rights Defenders 161 similarly states that
access to resources is a self -standing right:
“[E]veryone has the right, individually and in association with others, to solicit, receive
and utilize reso urces for the express purpose of promoting and protecting human rights
and fundamental freedoms through peaceful means….” 162
According to the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, this right
specifically encompasses “the receipt of funds from abroad.” 163
156 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 22, December 16, 1966,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx .
157 While reports of the UNSR are not binding international law, his reports are referenced here because
they provide a comprehensive articulation and explanation of international law.
158 International law generally recognizes the freedom of association, and t his section follows that
formulation. Addressing the applicability of international law to non -membership organizations is beyond the scope
of this article, but for more information, please see: International Center for Not -for -Profit Law & World Movement
for Democracy Secretariat, “Defending Civil Society Report, Second Edition,” June 2012, 35,
https://www.icnl.org/research/resources/dcs/DCS_Report_Second_Editi on_English.pdf .
159 The UNSR defines “resources” as a broad concept that includes financial transfers (e.g., donations,
grants, contracts, sponsorship, and social investments), loan guarantees, in -kind donations, and other forms of
support. See United Nation s Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, para. 10, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39 (April 24, 2013) at
https://freeassembly.net/wp -content/uploads/2013/04/A.HRC_.23.39_EN -funding -report -April -2013.pdf .
160 Ibid., para. 8.
161 The UNSR notes that while “the Declaration is not a binding instrument, it must be recalled tha t it was
adopted by consensus of the General Assembly and contains a series of principles and rights that are based on
human rights standards enshrined in other international instruments which are legally binding. Ibid., para. 17.
162 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups
and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ,
UN Res. 53/144, Article 13, https://www.un.org/Docs/asp/ws.asp?m=A/RES/53/144 .
163 United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, “Declaration on Human Rights
Defenders,” UN OHCHR, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/SRHRDefenders/Pages/Declaration.aspx .

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Reinforcing this position, 164 in 2013 the United Nations Human Rights Council passed
resolution 22/6, which calls upon on States “[t]o ensure that they do not discriminatorily impose
restrictions on potential sources of funding aimed at supporting the work of human rights
defenders,” and “no law should criminalize or delegitimize activities in defence of human rights
on account of the origin of funding thereto.” 165
The freedom to access resources extends beyond human rights defenders. For example,
the Declaration on the Elimination of A ll Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief states that the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion includes
the freedom to “solicit and receive voluntary financial and other contributions from individuals
and in stitutions.” 166 Access to resources is also an integral part of a number of other civil,
cultural, economic, political, and social rights. As the UNSR states: 167
For associations promoting human rights, including economic, social and cultural rights,
or those involved in service delivery (such as disaster relief, health -care provision or
environmental protection), access to resources is important, not only to the existence of
the association itself, but also to the enjoyment of other human rights by those benef itting
from the work of the association. Hence, undue restrictions on resources available to
associations impact the enjoyment of the right to freedom of association and also
undermine civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights as a whole. 168
Acc ordingly, “funding restrictions that impede the ability of associations to pursue their statutory
activities constitute an interference with article 22” of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights. 169
2. Regional and Bilateral Commitments to Pro tect Cross -Border Philanthropy
164 This article briefly examines international norms governing global philanthropy. But it also recogniz es
that there are distinct limits to the impact of international law. For example, there is often an implementation gap
between international norms and country practice. In addition, there are few binding international treaties, such as
the ICCPR, and de tails are often left to “soft law,” such as the reports of the UNSR. At the same time, there is
concern that any effort to create a new global treaty on cross -border philanthropy or foreign funding would lead to a
retrenchment of existing rights.
165 United Nations General Assembly, Protecting Human Rights Defenders, March 21, 2013, UN Human
Rights Council, Resolution 22/6, para. 9, https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC /RES/22/6 .
166 United Nations General Assembly, Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief , November 25, 1981, UN General Assembly Resolution A/RES/36/55,
Article 6(f), https://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r055.htm .
167 In similar fashion, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognized the link
between access to resources and economic, social and cultural rights, when it expressed “deep concern” about an
Egyptian law that “gives the Government control over the right of NGOs to manage their own activities, including
seeking external funding.” See Egypt, ICESCR, E/2001/22 (2000) 38 at paras. 161, 176,
https://www.bayefsky.com/themes/public_general_concluding -observations.php .
168 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, para. 9, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39 (April 24, 2013) at
https://freeassembly.net/wp -content/uploa ds/2013/04/A.HRC_.23.39_EN -funding -report -April -2013.pdf .
169 Human Rights Committee, communication No. 1274/2004, Korneenko et al. v. Belarus, Views adopted
on October 31, 2006, para. 7.2.

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While this article is focused on global norms, cross -border philanthropy is also
protected at the regional level. For example:
 The Council of Europe Recommendation on the Legal Status of NGOs states:
“NGOs should be free to s olicit and receive funding — cash or in -kind donations —
not only from public bodies in their own state but also from institutional or
individual donors, another state or multilateral agencies ….” 170
 According to the Inter -American Commission on Human Rights, “states should allow and
facilitate human rights organizations’ access to foreign funds in the context of
international cooperation, in transparent conditions.” 171
 In May 2014, the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)
adopted, in draft for m, a report of the ACHPR Study Group on Freedom of Association
and Peaceful Assembly, with a specific recommendation that States’ legal regimes should
codify that associations have the right to seek and receive funds. This includes the right to
seek and re ceive funds from their own government, foreign governments, international
organizations and other entities as a part of international cooperation to which civil
society is entitled, to the same extent as governments.
 The European Court of Justice (ECJ) has issued a series of important decisions about the
free flow of philanthropic capital within the European Union. 172
In addition, many jurisdictions have concluded bilateral investment treaties, which help
protect the free flow of capital across borders. Some treaties, such as the U.S. treaties with
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, expressly extend investment treaty protections to organizations not
“organized for pecuniary gain.” 173 Indeed, the letters of transmittal submitted by the White
House to the U.S. Senate sta te that these treaties are drafted to cover “charitable and non -profit
entities.” 174
170 Council of Europe, “Recommendation CM/Rec (2007)145 of the Committ ee of Ministers to member
states on the legal status of non -governmental organisations in Europe,” adopted October 10, 2007, Article 50,
https://wcd.coe.int/ViewDoc.jsp?id=1194609 .
171 Inter -American Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Situation of Human Rights Defenders in
the Americas , March 7, 2006, Recommendation 19, https://www.icnl.org /research/resources/assembly/oas -human –
rights -report.pdf .
172 For more information on these decisions, see: European Foundation Center and Transnational Giving
Europe, “Taxation of Cross -Border Philanthropy in Europe After Persche and Stauffer: From landloc k to free
movement?”, European Foundation Center Report, 2014,
https://www.efc.be/programmes_services/resources/Documents/TGE -web.pdf ; European Foundation Centre, “ECJ
rules in favour of cross -border giving ,” EFC briefing, January 27, 2009, accessed September 9, 2014,
https://www.efc.be/programmes_services/resources/Documents/befc09 08.pdf .
173 U.S. -Kyrgyz Bilateral Investment Treaty, Article 1(b); U.S. -Kazakh Bilateral Investment Treaty, Article
1(b). See also Article 1(2) of the China – Germany BIT: “the term ‘investor’ means … any juridical person as well
as any commercial or other c ompany or association with or without legal personality having its seat in the territory
of the Federal Republic of Germany, irrespective of whether or not its activities are directed at profit.”
174 Letters of Transmittal available at the U.S. State Departm ent website:
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/43566.pdf and
https://www.state.gov/documents/organization/4 3567.pdf .

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A detailed discussion of investment treaty protection for cross -border philanthropy is
beyond the scope of this article. This issue is presented in brief form, however, beca use it is a
significant avenue for further exploration, as it expands the international legal argument beyond
human rights and implicates bilateral investment treaties with binding enforcement
mechanisms. 175 For further information on this issue, please see International Investment Treaty
Protection of Not -for -Profit Organizations 176 and Protection of U.S. Non -Governmental
Organizations in Egypt under the Egypt -U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty. 177
3. Restrictions Permitted Under International Law
Continuing the discussion of global norms, ICCPR Article 22(2) recognizes that the
freedom of association can be restricted in certain narrowly defined conditions. According to
Article 22(2):
No restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right other than those wh ich are
prescribed by law and which are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of
national security or public safety, public order (ordre public), the protection of public
health or morals or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 178
In other words, international law allows a government to restrict access to resources if the
restriction is:
(1) prescribed by law;
(2) in pursuance of one or more legitimate aims, specifically:
o national security or public safety;
o public order;
o the protection of public health or morals; or
o the protection of the rights and freedoms of others; and
175 In addition, the European Court of Human Rights has held that Article 1 of the First Protocol of the
European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to peaceful enjoyment of one’s possessions. (Article 1 of
the First Protocol of the Euro pean Convention reads: “Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful
enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to
the conditions provided for by law and by the general p rinciples of international law. The preceding provisions shall
not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of
property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment o f taxes or other contributions or
penalties.” In addition, the right to property includes the right to dispose of one’s property (Clare Ovey & Robin
White, The European Convention on Human Rights , 3rd edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002)), which
would seem to embrace the right to make contributions to CSOs for lawful purposes.
176 Luke Eric Peterson & Nick Gallus, “International Investment Treaty Protection of Not -for -Profit
Organizations,” International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law 10(1) (December 2007),
https://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol10iss1/art_1.htm .
177 Nick Gallus, “Protection of U.S. Non -Governmental Organizations in Egypt under the Egypt -U.S.
Bilat eral Investment Treaty,” International Journal of Not -for -Profit Law 14(3) (September 2012),
https://www.icnl.org/research/journal/vol14iss3/art2.html .
178 United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 22, December 16, 1966,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/professionalinterest/pages/ccpr.aspx . Article 22, ICCPR

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(3) “necessary in a democratic society to achieve those aims.” 179
Moreover :
States should always be guided by the principle that the restrictions must not im pair the
essence of the right … the relations between right and restriction, between norm and
exception, must not be reversed. 180
The burden of proof is on the government. 181 In addition:
When a State party invokes a legitimate ground for restriction of freed om of expression,
it must demonstrate in specific and individualized fashion the precise nature of the threat,
and the necessity and proportionality of the specific action taken, in particular by
establishing a direct and immediate connection between the [ activity at issue] and the
threat. 182
The following section amplifies this three -part test contained in Article 22(2).
A. Prescribed by law
The first prong requires a restriction to have a formal basis in law. This means that:
restrictions on the right to free dom of association are only valid if they had been
introduced by law (through an act of Parliament or an equivalent unwritten norm of
common law), and are not permissible if introduced through Government decrees or other
similar administrative orders. 183
As discussed above, in July 2014, the Sri Lankan Department of External Resources of
the Ministry of Finance and Planning disseminated a notice to the public, declaring that any
organization or individual undertaking a project with foreign aid must have appro val from
relevant government agencies. Similarly, in July 2014, Nepal’s government released a new
Development Cooperation Policy that will require development partners to channel all
development cooperation through the Ministry of Finance, rather than directly to civil society. In
both cases, the restriction s were based on executive action and not “introduced by law (through
179 Case of Vona v. Hungary (A pp no 35943/10) (2013) ECHR para. 50,
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -122183 .
180 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rappo rteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, para. 16, UN Doc. A/HRC/20/27 (May 21, 2012),
https://www.ohchr .org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/RegularSession/Session20/A -HRC -20 -27_en.pdf .
181 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), Fact Sheet No. 15, Civil and
Political Rights: The Human Rights Committee, May 2005,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FactSheet15rev.1en.pdf .
182 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 34, para. 35, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/GC/34 (September 12, 2011), https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/GC34.pdf .
183 See UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Commentary to the Declaration
on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally
Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Fre edoms, July 2011, 44,
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Defenders/CommentarytoDeclarationondefendersJuly2011.pdf : “It would
seem reasonable t o presume that an interference is only “prescribed by law” if it derives from any duly promulgated
law, regulation, order, or decision of an adjudicative body. By contrast, acts by governmental officials that are ultra
vires would seem not to be ‘prescribe d by law,’ at least if they are invalid as a result.”

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an act of Parliament or an equivalent unwritten norm of common law).” Accordingly, they
appear to violate the “prescribed by law” standard required under Article 22(2) of the ICCPR.
This prong of Article 22(2) also requires that a provision be sufficiently precise for an
individual or NGO to understand whether or not intended conduct would constitute a violation of
law. 184 As stated in the Johannesburg Principles, “The law must be accessible , unambiguous,
drawn narrowly and with precision so as to enable individuals to foresee whether a particular
action is unlawful.” 185
This prong helps limit the scope of permissible restrictions. As discussed above, certain
laws ban funding of organizations that cause “social anxiety,” have a “political nature,” or have
“implied ideological conditions.” These terms are undefined and provide little guidance to
individuals or organizations about prohibited conduct. Since they are not “unambiguous, drawn
narrowl y and with precision so as to enable individuals to foresee whether a particular action is
unlawful,” there is a reasonable argument that these sorts of vague restrictions fail the
“prescribed by law” requirements of international law.
B. Legitimate aim
The second prong of Article 22(2) requires that a restriction advance one or more
“legitimate aims,” 186 namely:
 national security or public safety;
 public order;
 the protection of public health or morals; or
 the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
This prong provides a useful lens to analyze various justifications for constraint. For
example, governments have justified constraints to promote “aid effectiveness.” As the UNSR
notes, aid effectiveness “is not listed as a legitimate ground for restricti ons.” 187 Similarly, “[t]he
protection of State sovereignty is not listed as a legitimate interest in the [ICCPR],” and “States
cannot refer to additional grounds … to restrict the right to freedom of association.” 188
Of course, assertions of national security or public safety may, in certain circumstances,
constitute a legitimate interest. Under the Siracusa Principles, however, assertions of national
security must be construed restrictively “to justify measures limiting certain rights only when
184 Though not a fully precise comparison, this concept is somewhat similar to the “void for vagueness”
doctrine in U.S. constitutional law.
185 Article 19, Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Fre edom of Expression and Access to
Information (London: Article 19, 1996), Principle 1.1(a),
https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/joburgprinciples.pdf . The Johannesburg Principles were
developed by a meeting of international experts at a consultation in South Africa in October 1995.
186 Case of Vona v. Hungary (App no 35943/10) (2013) ECHR para. 50,
https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/sites/eng/pages/search.aspx?i=001 -122183 .
187 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, para. 40, UN Doc . A/HRC/23/39 (April 24, 2013) at
https://freeassembly.net/wp -content/uploads/2013/04/A.HRC_.23.39_EN -funding -report -April -2013.pdf .
188 Ibid., pa ra. 30.

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they are taken to protect the existence of the nation or its territorial integrity or political
independence against force or threat of force.” 189 In addition, a state may not use “ national
security as a justification for measures aimed at suppressing opposition … or at perpetrating
repressive practices against its population.” 190 This includes defaming or stigmatizing foreign
funded groups by accusing them of “treason” or “promoting regime change.” 191
Accordingly, under international law, governments cannot rely on generalized claims of
“state sovereignty” to justify constraints on global philanthropy. In the words of the UNSR:
Affirming that national security is threatened when an association receives funding from
foreign sources is not only spurious and distorted, but also in contradiction with
international human rights law. 192
This brief analysis is not intended to explore the details of the aid effectiveness and
sovereignty justifications. Rather, the goal is to illustrate how the “legitimate aim” requirement
of in ternational law can help inform the analysis of certain justifications presented by
governments, such as arguments based on “aid effectiveness” and “sovereignty.”
C. Necessary in a Democratic Society
Even if a government is able to articulate a legitimate aim , a restriction violates
international law unless it is “necessary in a democratic society.” As stated by the Organization
for Security and Co -operation in Europe, the reference to necessity does not have “the flexibility
of terms such as ‘useful’ or ‘conv enient’: instead, the term means that there must be a ‘pressing
social need’ for the interference.” 193 Specifically, “where such restrictions are made, States must
demonstrate their necessity and only take such measures as are proportionate to the pursuance of
legitimate aims in order to ensure continuous and effective protection of Covenant rights.” 194
As stated by the UNSR:
In order to meet the proportionality and necessity test, restrictive measures must be the
least intrusive means to achieve the desired ob jective and be limited to the associations
189 See the “Siracusa Principles” [United Nations, Economic and Social Council, U.N. Sub -Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation of
Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Annex, UN Doc E/CN.4/1985/4 (1984)],
which were adopted in May 1984 by a group of international human rights experts convened by the International
Commission of Jurists, the International Association of Penal Law, th e American Association for the International
Commission of Jurists, the Urban Morgan Institute for Human Rights, and the International Institute of Higher
Studies in Criminal Sciences. Though not legally binding, these principles provide an authoritative s ource of
interpretation of the ICCPR with regard to limitations clauses and issue of derogation in a public emergency. They
are available at: https://graduateinstitute.ch/f aculty/clapham/hrdoc/docs/siracusa.html .
190 Ibid.
191 United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the rights to freedom of
peaceful assembly and of association, Maina Kiai, para. 27, UN Doc. A/HRC/23/39 (April 24, 2013) at
https://freeassembly.net/wp -content/uploads/2013/04/A.HRC_.23.39_EN -funding -report -April -2013.pdf .
192 Ibid., para. 30
193 OSCE/Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Key Guiding Principles of
Freedom of Association with an Emphasis on Non -Governmental Organizations , para. 5
194 United Nations Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 (2004), para. 6, UN Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Ad d. 13, May 26, 2004.

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falling within the clearly identified aspects characterizing terrorism only. They must not
target all civil society associations…. 195
Consider, for example, Ethiopian legislation imposing a 10 percent cap on the for eign
funding of all CSOs promoting a variety of objectives, including women’s rights and disability
rights. As discussed above, Ethiopia has asserted a counterterrorism rationale to justify foreign
funding constraints. Ethiopia does not establish a “ direct and immediate connection between the
[activity at issue] and the threat.” 196 In addition, the cap is not the “least intrusive means to
achieve the desired objective and … limited to the associations falling within the clearly
identified aspects characterizi ng terrorism.” Accordingly, the counterterrorism objective fails to
justify the Ethiopian cap on foreign funding.
The UNSR also applied this test to the “aid effectiveness” justification. In response, he
stressed that:
even if the restriction were to purs ue a legitimate objective, it would not comply with the
requirements of “a democratic society.” In particular, deliberate misinterpretations by
Governments of ownership or harmonization principles to require associations to align
themselves with Government s’ priorities contradict one of the most important aspects of
freedom of association, namely that individuals can freely associate for any legal
purpose. 197
In addition, “longstanding jurisprudence asserts that democratic societies only exist
where ‘pluralis m, tolerance and broadmindedness’ are in place,” 198 and “minority or dissenting
views or beliefs are respected.” 199
Applying this test, the UNSR has note