Civil society activists, journalists, artists, lawyers, academics, and others who promote and protect human rights for all, play important roles in safeguarding democracy, rule of law, and sustainable development. Through their activities, they may contribute across multiple fields, such as documenting and ensuring accountability for human rights violations and abuses, redress to victims and survivors, protection of the environment, stronger and more inclusive institutions, and better public policies and laws.

Notwithstanding, human rights defenders are often exposed to stigmatization and smearing owing to their work, which are contributing and sometimes enabling factors for other violations and abuses, including threats, harassment, surveillance, and attacks, online and offline. Women human rights defenders are even more at risk and are disproportionately impacted by threats and attacks, which are often more gendered and sexualized than threats against their male counterparts, due to how they challenge social gender norms and stereotypes.

2023 marks 25 years since the adoption, by consensus, of the UN Declaration on Human Rights Defenders in the General Assembly. It is also the 75-year anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  The Special Rapporteur on the situation of Human Rights Defenders will present the achievements of human rights defenders in her forthcoming report[1] to the Human Rights Council. The report will be presented at the 52nd session in March 2023.

We propose to use these anniversaries to strengthen the awareness of human rights defenders’ contributions to the realization of human rights, rule of law, democracy, peace, and inclusive and sustainable development. This is important to counter negative stereotypes and narratives.

[1] A/HRC/52/29

Civil society activists, including human rights defenders and independent journalists, remain at risk for their activities in too many countries. The number of reported attacks against them is increasing, including through smear campaigns, violence, harassment both online and offline, arbitrary detentions, torture, enforced disappearances, and even extrajudicial killings. Those representing marginalized groups are often targeted. These threats force many HRDs in different parts of the world to leave their home countries and force them into exile.[1]

While in exile, civil society organizations, activists, and HRDs are forced to adapt to the new circumstances. On the one hand, the situation provides them with an opportunity to continue their work. It may even allow them to acquire new skills and experiences, which would be highly valuable if they are ever able to return to their home countries. On the other hand, being in exile generates a wide variety of challenges that not only restrain the ability of civic actors to work effectively but also negatively affect their everyday life, including their personal security.

Examples of areas in which civil society in exile faces significant challenges:

• Legal entry into the country of exile (visa facilitation, etc.)
• Regularisation of the immigration status (residence permits, work permits, etc.)
• Access to services provided by the government (health insurance, mental health and psychological support services, financial benefits, etc.)
• Ability to work effectively in the country of exile (registration of new civil society organizations, banking, etc.).
• Ability to work effectively in the country of origin; for example:
  • Reaching internal audiences in the country of origin in light of censorship, resulting in unstable dependence on tech solutions.
  • Refreshing civil society contact networks and sources in their country of origin in a way that is safe for all parties.
• Financial support from donors
• Personal security – including their families (physical security, online security, etc.)
• Misuse by the government of the country of origin of legitimate tools (exchange of banking information, international legal cooperation, Interpol Red Notices, etc.)

[1] The cohort recognizes that providing support to civil society organizations, activists, and HRDs who continue their work in the country of origin remains crucial.

On the 6 of July 2021, after an extensive consultation process, the OECD DAC adopted the Recommendation on Enabling Civil Society in Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Assistance. The Recommendation provides the first international framework to guide and incentivize development cooperation and humanitarian assistance providers in advancing their policies and practices to support civic space and civil society actors at home as well as in partner countries or territories. Adherents to the DAC Recommendation are committed to its three pillars:

1. Respecting, protecting, and promoting civic space;
2. Supporting and engaging with civil society;
3. Incentivizing CSO effectiveness, transparency, and accountability.

CSOs and national human rights institutions contribute to promoting good governance, transparency, and accountability of public authorities in different ways and are increasingly active in promoting democratic participation at national and local levels. Safe, non-discriminatory, inclusive, and transparent rules, channels, and processes for participation and access to information allow civil society actors to contribute meaningfully and effectively to law- and policymaking.

CSOs are concerned about their access to and participation in decision-making processes. Concerns refer to a lack of adequate information about participation and consultation processes, a lack of trust between civil society and public authorities, a lack of feedback on what happened with the input provided, and different obstacles, including discriminatory ones, to accessing and participating in decision-making processes. Fast-track and emergency legislative procedures during the pandemic exacerbated existing issues.

A nonviolent social movement is defined as a widespread, voluntary, civilian-led, collective effort to bring about consequential change in a social, economic, or political order using a diverse repertoire of tactics such as protests, boycotts, and sit-ins. Social movement and nonviolent movement are used interchangeably. The term “movement” is used as shorthand for both. Movements may undertake one or more campaigns. A campaign is defined as a series of observable, continuous, purposive mass tactics or events in pursuit of a political objective. ^[1]

An established body of research finds that popular nonviolent movements have been one of the most powerful drivers of democracy over the last century. They have also fostered democratic resilience–promoting inclusion and effective governance and countering democratic backsliding. From local grassroots action to national social movements, citizens continue to use nonviolent collective action to demand greater rights, justice, and inclusive development, for example, by calling on governments to enact policies that combat corruption, end child marriage, increase services for indigenous peoples, protect lands from exploitation and defending democratic institutions against illiberal erosion.

In the face of a rising global wave of a clamp down on universal human rights and increased authoritarianism, there is an urgent need to find new and innovative ways to enable and support communities waging nonviolent collective action to advance human rights and democracy.  Between 2000 and 2017, nonviolent collective action created space for democratic transitions in 10 autocracies and prompted democratic elections in a further 19 authoritarian regimes, with women and youth leading many of these movements. However, the early 21st century has presented serious deliberate and incidental challenges to nonviolent collective action. Authoritarian actors deliberately seize on increasingly sophisticated tactics to maintain an undemocratic status quo and to erode respect for human rights as well as democratic institutions, laws, and norms.  They also coordinate with each other to effectively use disinformation, surveillance, and infiltration to undermine civic actors and weaponize legislation to attack and restrict civic actors, including human rights defenders. Historic currents such as the rise of social media and the prevalence of technology create opportunities for quick action but also pose challenges to sustained and strategic nonviolent collective action.

[1] (Naimark-Rowse, Benjamin. “Dollars and Dissent: Donor Support for Grassroots Organizing and Nonviolent Movements.” Washington: ICNC Press, 2022.)

In September 2020, under the leadership of the Secretary-General, the United Nations adopted a Guidance Note on Protecting and Promoting Civic Space.^[i] The Guidance Note recognizes civic space as a threshold issue to successful implementation of all three pillars of the United Nations and, building on the Secretary-General’s Call to Action for Human Rights, committed to take concrete steps in protecting and promoting civic space at the country, but also the global level.

Numerous reports and guidance documents have been produced aiming to advance inclusion in UN processes and prevent reprisals[ii] against those who participate in them. Eighty countries signed a statement to the Third Committee of the General Assembly in 2022 calling on “all States to take proactive steps to address reprisals” and the UN “to continue its efforts to improve data collection, analysis and documentation of cases, and to use this information to actively improve policies and practices so that the gaps existing in our collective efforts are closed”.[iii] However, more must be done to ensure that the UN is an open, safe, and inclusive environment for civil society to participate in.

[i] United Nations (2020) United Nations Guidance Note: Protection and Promotion of Civic Space

[ii] Human Rights Council (2022) Cooperation with the United Nations, its representatives and mechanisms in the field of human rights – Report of the Secretary-General. A/HRC/51/47:

[iii] United Nations General Assembly. Joint Statement on Reprisals – UNGA 77 Third Committee