As a reminder, within this and other briefers in this series, we identify which bodies perform which of several key functions related to civic space using the following icons: 

Open Government Partnership 

The Open Government Partnership (OGP) is a multi-stakeholder initiative, founded in 2011, that brings together government and civil society reformers to improve government transparency and accountability and promote public participation. OGP is comprised of 73 national governments and 135 local governments that work with civil society to co-create and implement action plans setting forth commitments to strengthen open government. Since its inception, OGP has been attuned to the importance of civic space to promoting open government. The Open Government Declaration, endorsed by all OGP countries, declares members’ commitment “to protecting the ability of not-for-profit and civil society organizations to operate in ways consistent with our commitment to freedom of expression, association, and opinion.” OGP advances this commitment in three principal ways.  

The first modality relates to accession to OGP. Before countries may join OGP, they must attain eligibility by meeting a set of minimum performance criteria. This includes attaining “passing scores” on indicators relating to fiscal transparency, access to information, and asset disclosure, as well as citizen engagement: an eligibility dimension that focuses on protection of civil liberties within a country. Countries wishing to join OGP must also pass its “values check” by receiving satisfactory scores on third-party indicators measuring control by government over CSO entry into and exit from public life, and repression of CSOs by the government. These eligibility tests, while crucial to maintaining OGP’s commitment to empowering civil society, do not incorporate formal opportunities for civil society input or participation. 

The core of OGP’s work is the action plans referenced above. OGP member countries establish multi-stakeholder fora (MSFs), often co-chaired by government and civil society representatives, that oversee participatory processes to develop open government commitments. OGP has consistently encouraged its members to adopt commitments that empower civil society and address key constraints on their operations. OGP’s 2023-2028 strategy, for instance, includes as one of five overarching strategic goals “protect[ing] and expand[ing] civic space.” The Open Gov Challenge, designed to incentivize OGP members to undertake more ambitious commitments in key issue areas, included as priority themes civic space, public participation, media freedom, and digital governance. The OGP co-creation process, then, can provide a structured environment for civil society to engage with government counterparts to advocate for reforms that expand civic space.  

To learn more about and participate in OGP co-creation processes, civil society partners can reach out to the OGP point of contact listed on OGP webpage of each country member, or contact the country support leads listed in the staff section of OGP’s website. Many country MSFs also maintain websites with information about co-creation processes and opportunities for participation.

A third modality by which OGP advances its commitment to civic space is its Response Policy, which aims to address situations where OGP members appear to be taking actions that undermine the values and principles of OGP. This can include – and in fact, in practice often has involved – creating an environment that undermines or hinders civil society participation in open government.  

The Response Policy is triggered through submission of a letter of concern; such letters can be submitted by members of OGP’s governing body (the Steering Committee), a multilateral partner of OGP, or any organizational entity that has been engaged in the OGP process in the country of concern. CSOs engaged in the OGP process are thus eligible to submit letters of concern initiating Response Policy proceedings.  

Upon receipt of such a letter, the OGP Secretariat (known as the Support Unit) will conduct an initial review of the alleged concerns, and in most cases request a formal response from the government in question. The Response Policy then prescribes processes for the Steering Committee to take appropriate responsive actions, which can range from working with the OGP member to address the concerns raised, to temporary or permanent suspension of the member from OGP.  

The OGP response policy has been triggered nine times, and provides a means for civil society partners to seek responsive action to address deterioration of the environment for civil society in an OGP country. More information on the Response Policy and processes for initiating a case thereunder can be found on the OGP website.  

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Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) is a multi-stakeholder initiative that seeks to advance responsible and inclusive governance of natural resource extraction. More than 50 countries have joined EITI by committing to adhere to the EITI Standard: a framework for disclosure and multi-stakeholder oversight promoting transparency and accountability in the natural resource sector. Each EITI member is required to establish a multi-stakeholder group, composed of government, companies, and civil society, to oversee implementation of the Standard. 

As with OGP, EITI is predicated on the recognition that an empowered civil society is essential to the transparent and accountable governance of the natural resource sector. The EITI Standard thus mandates that “[c]ivil society must be fully, actively, and effectively engaged in the EITI process.” Member governments are required to ensure that “there is an enabling environment for civil society participation with regard to relevant laws, regulations, and administrative rules as well as actual practice in implementation of the EITI,” and that “there are no obstacles to civil society participation in the EITI process.” Stakeholders must “[b]e able to speak freely on transparency and natural resource governance issues” and “[h]ave the right to communicate and cooperate with each other,” among other guarantees. 

EITI assesses whether its members are discharging these responsibilities through regular assessments known as “validations”. Countries receiving lower scores are subject to more frequent validations and may be temporarily suspended or permanently de-listed for receiving very low scores or failing to make progress between validations. If an EITI member country receives a “poor” or “very poor” score respecting “stakeholder engagement” – which includes the civil society engagement requirements described above – then the country will be temporarily suspended. Receiving a somewhat higher “limited” score in this area results in the EITI Board prescribing corrective actions that the country must take to avoid suspension. 

EITI validations thus provide a concrete means of monitoring and assessing efforts by EITI members to create an enabling environment for civil society, and can trigger recommendations for positive reforms and tangible consequences where a member fails to adequately ensure such an environment. Civil society can participate in these assessments. During validations, representatives of the EITI Secretariat will travel to the country under assessment to gather information and meet with stakeholders, including civil society. Moreover, three months before the commencement of each validation, the Secretariat launches a public call for views on stakeholder engagement in EITI, as to which civil society can provide submissions and even shadow reports. 

To learn more about the schedule of upcoming validations, civil society partners can check the EITI website. Calls for views in advance of validation are generally posted on the EITI website and social media channels, and disseminated through national multi-stakeholder groups. ICNL has also developed guidance for civil society partners on how to provide inputs into EITI validations on civil society engagement.

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Financial Action Task Force 

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) is an intergovernmental organization that aims to promote the enforcement of legal and regulatory measures against money laundering and terrorist financing (known as “AML/CFT measures”). FATF, and its network of FATF-Style Regional Bodies (FSRBs), count more than 200 countries and jurisdictions among their members.  

FATF has issued 40 recommendations to guide its members in their implementation of AML/CFT measures. These standards, and FATF’s work to promote compliance with them, carry significant influence. Non-compliance with FATF recommendations, which may entail being placed on FATF’s “black list” or “grey list”, can cost countries and jurisdictions access to international financial markets.  

FATF’s Recommendation 8 aims to protect non-profit organizations (NPOs) from abuse for terrorist financing. In its own words, FATF recognizes that NPOs “play a vital role in the world economy and in many national economies and social systems,” and that “well-functioning NPOs may … help to prevent terrorism”. FATF also acknowledges that though NPOs may be misused and exploited by terrorists in rare cases, not all NPOs are particularly vulnerable to terrorist financing abuse and only a subset of NPOs identified by countries should be subject to Recommendation 8.  

Recommendation 8 – as revised, following extensive engagement between FATF and civil society, and other multilateral bodies – requires its members to: 

• periodically identify organizations which fall within the FATF definition of NPOs and assess their terrorist financing risks; 

• have in place focused, proportionate, and risk-based measures to address the identified risks; and 

• not unduly disrupt or discourage legitimate NPO activities. 

Nonetheless, in practice, governments sometimes disrupt legitimate NPO activities through the misapplication of Recommendation 8. FATF itself has conceded as much, stating in 2023 that it had “observed instances of overly broad application and misapplication of R.8,” along with instances of “financial institutions terminating or restricting access of legitimate NPOs to financial services.” Civil society has three primary modes of engaging with FATF and FATF-related processes to ensure that NPOs in their country and around the world are not subject to burdensome and invasive AML/CFT measures due to misapplication of Recommendation 8. 

The first mode of engagement is to participate in a country-based risk assessment. FATF members are supposed to identify organizations that fall within the FATF definition of NPO and assess their terrorist financing risk, and then tailor regulation of NPOs to this assessment. Civil society actors, especially those in-country, can urge government representatives to conduct a risk assessment if they have not yet done so; participate, and coordinate civil society participation, in meetings, consultations, surveys, and questionnaires organized by government agencies as part of a risk assessment; and, where appropriate, especially in the presence of a hostile or non-collaborative government, develop a shadow risk assessment to evaluate and challenge government policy and any official risk assessment. Depending on circumstances, such a shadow assessment can be shared with the government or with FATF or can be published as part of a public advocacy campaign.  

The government departments responsible for conducting a risk assessment usually sit within the financial intelligence agency, the central bank, or the ministry or department with authority to regulate the civil sector. 

Civil society can also contribute to country mutual evaluations, which are overseen by FATF and FSRBs and assess FATF members’ compliance with its recommendations. Countries are evaluated every six years and are then subject to post-assessment monitoring to ensure they address shortcomings identified in the evaluation report. Civil society can engage in the mutual evaluation process by providing information to the FATF Secretariat regarding country compliance with FATF recommendations, including Recommendation 8. Civil society partners can also participate, and facilitate broad civil society participation, in stakeholder meetings conducted by FATF evaluators during the visit they are required to undertake to the country. And, civil society can engage with governments following an evaluation, particularly around any “enhanced follow-ups” scheduled by FATF with the country to push the government to revise regulatory frameworks to comply with Recommendation 8. A calendar of upcoming mutual evaluations is maintained on the FATF website.

FATF Guidance

Finally, FATF periodically issues guidance on the interpretation and implementation of its standards, and may afford opportunities for public input into these normative processes. When FATF updated its best practices paper on Combating the Terrorist Financing Abuse of NPOs in 2023, for instance, it conducted a public consultation soliciting views from interested stakeholders. To learn more about any upcoming opportunities for input, civil society partners can reach out to the FATF Secretariat or the Global NPO Coalition on FATF, which works to ensure that civil society is effectively engaged in discussions on AML/CFT measures. 

ICNL has developed a toolkit on FATF that provides guidance on engaging in FATF processes. The toolkit is available in English and Portuguese here. 

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OECD Development Assistance Committee 

The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is an international organization founded in 1961 to advise governments on policies to support sustainable and inclusive growth. The OECD has 38 member countries, drawn from around the world, and provides a forum for standard setting and exchange of data, analysis, and best practices in public policy. In the year it was founded, the OECD also established the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) to promote co-operation and policies contributing to sustainable development. The DAC now has 34 members, comprising most of the principal bilateral aid providers. Among other activities, the DAC collects, verifies, and publishes data on Official Development Assistance (ODA); establishes standards for best practices in development cooperation; and conducts peer reviews of its members’ policies and practices. 

The DAC has come increasingly to recognize the role of civil society actors as critical contributors in their own right to inclusive and sustainable development, and has reflected this recognition in its standard-setting activities. In 2021, the DAC unanimously adopted new guidance for its members on support for civil society and civic space, in the form of the DAC Recommendation on Enabling Civil Society in Development Co-operation and Humanitarian Assistance (hereinafter, the “Recommendation”). The Recommendation sets out 28 key commitments that provider governments should follow to respect, protect, and promote civic space; support and engage with civil society; and incentivize CSO effectiveness, transparency, and accountability. Since the Recommendation’s adoption, the DAC has developed multiple toolkits[2] intended to support its members in advancing the Recommendation’s commitments. The DAC is also completing a five-year review of the Recommendation’s implementation in 2026, which will assess progress, gaps, and opportunities in DAC members’ efforts to enable civil society and describe next steps that should be taken to further support the Recommendation’s implementation.

The development of the Recommendation, as well as the DAC’s efforts to promote its effective implementation, have generally been open to input and participation from interested civil society representatives. Given the somewhat specialized nature of the DAC’s work, the Committee has substantially relied on the DAC CSO Reference Group (CSORG) to facilitate and coordinate civil society engagement with the DAC, including on issues related to the Recommendation and the enabling environment for civil society. Draft documents and opportunities for input and consultation are often circulated through the CSORG. CSORG membership is open to any interested CSOs from development assistance provider or partner countries. To learn more about the CSORG and receive invitations to its meetings, civil society partners can reach out to Brian Tomlinson of AidWatch Canada, at brian.t.tomlinson@gmail.com.

The DAC also conducts peer reviews meant to assess its members’ performance against commitments and international standards as reflected in DAC Recommendations. Each DAC member undergoes review every six years, with a mid-term review to track interim progress. Reviews are conducted by other DAC members, who develop assessments that concentrate on three to five focus areas agreed between the member undergoing review and the reviewing team. Many of the DAC members undergoing reviews since adoption of the Recommendation have agreed to a focus on their efforts to enable civil society in development cooperation as part of their reviews.  

The reviewing team conducts visits to the headquarters of the member undergoing review and to selected partner countries, to gather information on the reviewed member’s policies, practices, and programs. All visits prioritize stakeholder meetings, including with civil society platforms and partners. Meetings with civil society stakeholders, at headquarters and in partner countries, are usually facilitated by the member under review. The reviewing team then develops a report summarizing key findings and recommendations, which is made publicly available. The DAC reports that since 2014, 83% of recommendations from peer reviews have been fully or partially implemented by DAC members. To learn more about the schedule of upcoming peer reviews, civil society partners should consult the dates noted for recent reviews on the DAC website, and can reach out to DAC member countries or the DCD at DAC.contact@oecd.org to inquire about opportunities to participate in upcoming reviews.

The OECD DAC’s primary government engagement is with its members, and many civil society partners working to defend and expand civic space may be focusing their efforts on countries that are not DAC members. However, standards developed by the DAC have significant influence over how its members implement policies, programs, and practices in a wide range of partner countries around the world. The Recommendation even urges provider governments to “engage in dialogue with partner country or territory governments and raise public awareness on the value of an inclusive and independent civil society and civil society participation and on respecting, protecting, and promoting civic space.” Civil society partners seeking to defend and expand civic space in their countries may thus find engagement with the DAC to be a means of encouraging broader conditions that support these efforts. 

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Multilateral Development Banks

The multilateral development banks (MDBs) – which include the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), the African Development Bank (AfDB), and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) – are supranational institutions established by states to foster economic and social progress in developing countries. The MDBs advance this goal by financing projects and supporting investment in partner countries.

MDBs have generally not considered efforts to foster an enabling environment for civil society to fall within their mandates,[3] though they have acknowledged, as the World Bank states, that “meaningful civic and citizen engagement (CCE) and civil society and social sector partnerships can strengthen governance, empower citizens, improve citizen-state relations, enhance public service delivery, and … contribute to more effective development and greater well-being.” MDBs have accordingly established facilities meant to encourage civil society participation in project activities, as with the World Bank’s Civil Society and Social Innovation Alliance (CIVIC), or the ADB’s Civil Society Approach. Another opportunity that does provide space for civil society to engage in dialogue with World Bank officials, member governments, and other stakeholders is the Bank’s biannual Civil Society Policy Forum, which takes place each spring and fall.

MDBs have also sought to identify, avoid, and minimize social and environmental harms of their projects, through safeguard policies mandating that partner governments conduct environmental and social impact assessments before projects commence. These assessments should therefore include consultations with affected communities about potential project impacts. Examples of such policies include the World Bank’s Environmental and Social Framework and the IADB’s Environment and Social Safeguards Framework. There are thus opportunities for civil society partners to participate in MDB activities, though these activities will not usually focus directly on defending and expanding civic space.

Where MDB-financed projects generate specific social and environmental harms, however – including violations of civic freedoms and threats or attacks upon civil society representatives – MDBs have established accountability and redress mechanisms that may afford relief in some individual cases. The IDB created an independent accountability mechanism in 2010 – the Independent Consultation and Investigation Mechanism (MICI) – to receive and address complaints about environmental and social harm arising from IDB-financed projects. MICI offers a dispute resolution and independent investigation process for persons who feel they may have been harmed by operations financed by the IDB and has since its establishment handled more than 230 complaints. The World Bank established its own Accountability Mechanism in 2020. This mechanism houses the Inspection Panel, created in 1993 to receive and assess complaints from local affected communities, to determine whether Bank-funded projects have complied with its policies and procedures, including environmental and social policies; and the Grievance Redress Service, established in 2020 to hear complaints from individuals and communities believing that a World Bank project has or is likely to have adverse effects on them, their community, or their environment. The EBRD similarly created an Independent Project Accountability Mechanism in 2019 with the mandate to independently review issues raised by individuals or organisations in relation to projects financed by the EBRD that are understood to have caused harm or are likely to do so. And the AfDB has established the Independent Recourse Mechanism, and the ADB its Accountability Mechanism, to address complaints from persons and communities that they have been adversely affected by AfDB and ADB projects. Each of these mechanisms provides an opportunity for civil society to seek recourse for violations of civic freedoms and other rights, where these violations stem from MDB-financed projects.

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In our next and final briefer in this series, we will explore opportunities for civil society partners to engage with regional mechanisms to defend and expand civic space. This final briefer will be available later in 2026.

This briefer was produced with support from the Government of Ireland – Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT). The ideas, opinions and comments therein are entirely the responsibility of ICNL and do not necessarily represent or reflect DFAT policy.

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[1] As noted in the first briefer, in considering engagement with any multilateral processes including those described in this briefer, civil society partner should consider the risk of reprisals for participation and availability of protective mechanisms. ICNL and other international civil society organizations can be a helpful source of information and assistance on navigating risks related to participation in multilateral processes. 

[2] These toolkits have addressed Funding Civil Society in Partner Countries (2023), Shifting Power with Partners (2024), and Co‑ordinating Action for Civic Space (2025).

[3] An exception to this statement is the EBRD, which identified “Developing the safety and openness of the civic space” as a strategic objective under its 2024-2029 approach to civil society engagement.