Friend not Foe
Opening Spaces for Civil Society Engagement
to Prevent Violent Extremism
A report to Cordaid from the Fourth Freedom Forum and
the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies
at the University of Notre Dame
David Cortright, with Alistair Millar, Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf,
George A. Lopez, Eliot Fackler, and Joshua Weaver
2 n D E D i t i On |
M A y 2 0 11

Friend not Foe
Opening Spaces for Civil Society Engagement
to Prevent Violent Extremism
A report to Cordaid from the Fourth Freedom Forum and
the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies
at the University of Notre Dame
David Cortright, with Alistair Millar, Linda Gerber-Stellingwerf,
George A. Lopez, Eliot Fackler, and Joshua Weaver
2 nD E D i t iOn |
M A y 2 0 11

AC k n OW L ED G EM E n tS
Many colleagues helped in the research and writing of this report. We are most
grateful to our partners at bordaid, especially Lia van Broekhoven and Fulco van
Deventer, who set the policy and intellectual framework for this study, guided its
development, and provided the resources that made it possible. We thank those
who provided substantive input and commented on all or portions of the report,
including Lama Fakih, Kay Guinane, Janna Hunter-Bowman, Andrea Laidman,
Myla Leguro, Babloo Loitongbom, Harriet Namisi, Francisco De Roux, and
George Wachira. We acknowledge the valuable assistance of those who helped
produce the previous edition of the report, including Jennifer bhapman, beleste
Kennel-Shank, Frank van Lierde, Peter Quaranto, Rick van der Woud and Landon
Yoder. We benefitted greatly from the support of our respective institutions, the
Fourth Freedom Forum and the Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at
the University of Notre Dame. Many people contributed to this report, includ-
ing hundreds of people who participated in bordaid-sponsored conferences and
consultations on the subject. The authors alone take responsibility for any errors
of fact or interpretation.
david cortright, wit h alistair millar ,
linda gerber-stellingwerf, george a. lopez,
eliot fackler , and joshua we aver
O n t h E C OV E r
Afghan women attend a gathering to mark International Womenfs Day
at babur Gardens in Kabul on 10 March 2011.
S h Ah MA rAi/AFP/G Etty iMAGES

CONTENTS
Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Fr iEn D n Ot F O E . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Role of Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2
Defining Terrorism and Counterterrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4
How (Not) to Counter Terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5
Good CTMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .7
Bad and Ugly CTMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8
Gender Impacts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Case Studies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .10
Colombia: Conflict without End . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .11
Kenya: Battling Impunity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12
Manipur: Facing Repression . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .13
Mindanao: Struggling for Justice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Securitizing Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
‘Money as a Weapons System’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Civil-military Cooperation? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
De-funding Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
NGOs as partners? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Protecting Civil Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23
A Voice for Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
r EC O M M EnDA t iOnS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
United Nations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .28
CSOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30

Friend not Foe v
Foreword
O
ne of the less known effects of the tragic 9/11 events and the subsequent
global war on terror is the chilling impact counterterrorism measures have
had on civil society and citizens’ agency. Ten years later the phrase ‘war
on terror’ is no longer used officially, but measures that curtail the operational and
political freedoms of civic organizations worldwide in the name of countering ter –
rorism continue to be real, tangible, and strongly counterproductive. Through their
efforts for development, human rights, peacebuilding, and conflict transformation
civil society groups address political grievances, socio-economic injustices, and power
imbalances that are among the root causes of violent armed conflict. Understandably
these groups do not want to label their work as counterterrorism, but it is exactly
what is needed to cwounter violent extremism. The report by David bortright et al, Friend not Foe: Opening Spaces for Civil
Society Engagement to Prevent Violent Extremism, gives a comprehensive and vivid
account of the challenges that civil society groups continue to face worldwide in
protecting and expanding their political voice and operational space. The first edi –
tion of this report focused primarily on the effects of counterterrorism measures
on civil society in the Global South. This updated version places the closing of
civil society space in a wider global context of securitization of aid, de-funding of
civil society, and civil militar y cooperation. It gives a cr ystal clear account of the
persistent shift in international cooperation policy from sustainable development
as an intrinsic public good to development as an instrument for national and geo –
political security and economic goals. The authors recommend concerted civil society engagement on behalf of human
security policies to prevent violent extremism. The UN Global Counter-Terrorism
Strategy is considered to be a legitimate anchor for the international community
and civil society alike to work on civil society engagement, particularly in the areas
of development, conflict prevention, and human rights. The overriding conclusion
of the report is that security policies in general and counterterrorism measures
in particular are making the threat of violent extremism worse when they are
developed and implemented without civil society participation and civic agency.

vi Friend not Foe
The report comes at an auspicious time. The fight for greater civic and political
freedoms in the Magreb and Middle East has posed unprecedented challenges to
repressive governments across the region. It has also laid bare the double stan –
dards of the international community´s foreign policies and underlying motives.
In the name of national and geopolitical stability international power-holders
actively support repressive leaders and authorities to the detriment of fundamental
rights of a great number of people. The cases presented in the report reveal similar
repressive tendencies in other regions. In Kenya, bolombia, northeast India, and
the Philippines unresponsive (local) governments have sought to restrict and close
down civil society rather than provide solutions to the many historically rooted
political, social, and economic grievances that affect the lives and livelihoods of
millions. Stable and secure societies need an expansion of public and relational
spaces where citizens and their organizations can express voice and choice and
hold their governments accountable. The cases show that repressive responses
often lead to more extreme violence. The cases also show that engagement mech –
anisms from a human security perspective offer alternative solutions. Hardworking
and courageous civil society advocates are building relationships and pursuing
dialogue across political and societal divides in communities around the world. The Friend not Foe report is one of the outcomes of an initiative that the Dutch
international development organization bordaid started four years ago.
* The aim
has been to get a better understanding of the effects of the global war on terror
on civil society worldwide and in a number of selected countries and to document
and analyze these impacts in view of the worldwide trend toward the securization
of development aid. bordaid and civil society partners organized in 2008 and
2009 international working conferences in Maastricht, the Netherlands; Davao,
the Philippines; Kampala, Uganda; and Bogotá, bolombia.
† Over 400 participants
from civil society, including grassroots organizations, intermediar y organizations,
global networks, universities, think tanks, government, the diplomatic corps and
the security sector participated and shared experiences, views, and thoughts. The
Friend not Foe report is based on the findings of these conferences and many addi –
tional inter views. The report is the product of collaboration between colleagues in
the United States and the Netherlands, in cooperation with civil society activists
on the ground in many countries. A number of the persons, organizations, and networks engaged in this initiative
are now working closely together in what may be called a “global community of
change.” This emerging community aims to increase civil society´s participation
and engagement in shaping security and counterterrorism policies, focusing on
the UN Strategy. It is active at global, regional, national, and local levels. It con –
nects local agendas with global policy and vice versa. It seeks common ground in
relation to issues of security, development, and peacebuilding through the lens of
* bordaid is the batholic Organisation for Relief and Development, with head offices in the Hague
the Netherlands. It works with and supports civil society organizations and networks in twenty-
nine countries worlwdwide.
† The Maastricht conference was organized with IbbO (Interchurch Development booperation),
the Davao session with IID (Institute for International Dialogue), the Kampala conference
with DENIVA (Development Network of Indigenous Voluntar y Associations), and the Bogota
conference with bINEP (benwtre for Investigationw and Popular Educawtion).

Friend not Foe vii
human security. It is driven by knowledge and agency rooted in on-the-ground
realities of women, men, and children living in communities affected by violence.
It aims to transcend the politics and culture of fear that have poisoned the global
response to the events of and since 9/11.
bordaid commends this report and views its publication as timely and impor –
tant, a valuable and significant resource for the interconnected community of
change seeking to build global human security.
l i a va n broek hov en a n d f u l co va n de v en t er
Corporate Strategy and Innovation
Civil Society Political Space initiative
Cordaid, the Hague

Friend not Foe ix
Executive Summary
I
n the name of fighting terrorism governments have curtailed political freedoms
and imposed restrictive measures against human rights defenders and civil society
activists in many countries. Repressive counterterrorism measures (bTMs) have
undermined civil liberties and contributed to a climate of suspicion and hostility
toward nongovernmental groups. Many of the organizations that work against vio –
lent extremism by promoting human rights and sustainable development are them –
selves being labeled extremist and are facing constraints on their ability to operate.
The positive work of civil society to alleviate social and political marginalization
helps to reduce grievances that can lead to political violence. Measures taken in the
name of counterterrorism that limit the political space of such groups have the ironic
result of inhibiting wwork on the ground to address conditions thawt fuel terrorism. bounterterrorism measures include a wide range of policies with differing
impacts, which can be loosely characterized as the good, the bad, and the ugly.
Good measures are those that enhance international cooperation and encourage
support for equitable development and human rights, as recommended in the UN
Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy (the Strategy). In the bad and ugly categories
are measures that are often overly militarized and have led to extrajudicial kill-
ings, intensified state repression, and human rights abuse. Also in this categor y are
policies that curtail universally recognized human rights, including fundamental
freedoms of expression, association, and assembly, and that restrict the funding and
operational space of charities and civil society groups. Repression against civil soci-
ety activists has intensified in dozens of countries, according to Freedom House.
Political freedom has steadily eroded in recent years, as measured by the organi-
zation’s annual ratings, making this the longest period of consecutive worldwide
setbacks for freedom in nearly 40 years.
*
The global trend toward using humanitarian aid and development funding for
security-related purposes has accelerated. Aid programs are being integrated into
* Arch Puddington, Freedom in the World 2011: The Authoritarian Challenge to Democracy,
Freedom House, 2011, 4, https://www.freedomhouse.org/images/File/fiw/FIwW%202011%20
Booklet_1_11_11.pdwf (accessed 18 Januar y 2011); Freedom House Press Release, “Freedom in
the World 2010: Global Erosion of Freedom,” 12 Januar y 2010, https://www.freedomhouse.org/
template.cfm?page=70&release=1120 (acceswsed 13 Januar y 2011).

x Friend not Foe
counterinsurgency operations. In the United States a quarter of USAID funds
are channeled through the Pentagon.
† In the United Kingdom and other donor
states a growing portion of development assistance is being directed toward con –
flict zones such as Afghanistan and Pakistan. Aid policies increasingly ser ve selec-
tive security purposes rather than the universal goals of overcoming global poverty
and empowering marginalized communities. Development advocates recognize the
connections that exist between development and the prevention of armed conflict,
but they oppose the diversion of aid funding to ser ve the security interests of
governments in the global North rather than the human needs of people in the
global South. In December 2010 UN Secretar y-General Ban Ki-moon dedicated the annual
obser vance of International Human Rights Day to the many human rights defend-
ers around the world who are attacked and threatened for their efforts to protect
and promote political freedom. He reminded governments of their obligations
under international law to protect human rights advocates and uphold fundamen –
tal freedoms of expression and assembly.
‡
The following rights, derived from UN conventions by the International benter
for Not-for-Profit Law, are the essential requirements for assuring political freedom
and protecting the operational space of civil society:
 the right to associate and form organizations;
 the right to operate without unwanted state interference;
 the right to free expression;
 the right to communicate and cooperate freely internally and externally;
 the right to seek and secure resources; and
 the right to have these freedoms protected by the state.
Through their efforts for development, conflict transformation, and human
rights, civil society groups are working to dr y up the wells of extremism from
which violence springs. bivic organizations address political grievances, socio-eco –
nomic injustices, and power imbalances that are among the roots causes of armed
conflict. This work is not labeled counterterrorism, nor should it be, but it is
exactly what is needed to counter violent extremism. International policymakers
must recognize and protect this vital civil society mission and take action to elimi-
nate counterproductive bTMs. In the global struggle against terrorism civil society
groups should be welcomed as friends, not hounded as foes.
International
policymakers
must recognize
and protect this
vital civil society
mission and take
action to eliminate counterproductive CTMs . In the
global struggle
against terrorism civil society
groups should be welcomed
as friends, not
hounded as foes .
† benter for Global Development, “Defense and Development,” https://www.cgdev.org/section/
topics/aid_effectivweness/defense_and_dwevelopment (accessewd 1 March 2011).
‡ Ban Ki-moon, “Secretar y-General’s Message,” United Nations Human Rights Day 2010, https://
www.un.org/en/events/humanriwghtsday/2010/sg.shtml (accessed 14w Januar y 2011).

Friend not Foe 1
Friend not Foe
Opening Spaces for Civil Society Engagement
to Prevent Violent Extremism
M
any of the policies carried out in the name of counterterrorism are mak-
ing the terrorist danger worse. An overemphasis on security measures has
eroded civil liberties and human rights in many countries and diverted
attention from the policies needed to counter the complex challenge of transna –
tional terrorism. Preventing terror attacks requires not only improved security but
better efforts to address the underlying conditions that give rise to violent extrem –
ism. Resolving conflicts, ending foreign occupations, overcoming oppression, eradi-
cating poverty, supporting sustainable development, empowering the marginalized,
defending human rights, promoting good governance—all are vital to the struggle
against terrorism, yet addressing these challenges is made more difficult by repressive
counterterrorism policies. The repercussions have been felt most keenly by civil society actors in the develop –
ing world. Over the decades nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) in the global
South have multiplied in number and assumed growing importance in defend-
ing human rights, promoting development, and mediating conflicts. Transnational
civil society networks have emerged to bring new voices onto the stage of global
policymaking and diplomacy.
1 When civil society actors attempt to reform policies
or hold government leaders accountable to human rights standards, they may face
criticism and repression. In some countries governments have imposed regulations
and conditions that are disproportional to the threat and restrict the operational
space of independent citizen groups. Repressive counterterrorism policies have
added to these restrictions and created a climate of suspicion, especially toward
groups that challenge social exclusion and unequal power relations. Many who
work against extremism by promoting human rights and development are them –
selves being labeled extremist and are facing constraints on their ability to operate. This report examines the contradiction of counterterrorism measures (bTMs)
that hinder the work of countering terror. It is based on a series of workshops and
consultations sponsored by the Dutch development agency bordaid, in coopera –
tion with the U.S.-based research team of the Fourth Freedom Forum and the
Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies at the University of Notre Dame.
It draws from the work of dozens of civil society partner groups in Europe, Asia,

2 Friend not Foe
Latin America, and Africa and is based on
inter views and meetings with hundreds of
representatives of civil society organizations
(bSOs), donor agencies, research centers, and
governments. It benefits especially from the
work of bIVIbUS, the International benter
for Not-for-Profit Law, and the bharity and
Security Network. The purpose of the report
is to examine the impact of bTMs on local
development and human rights activities and
to identify appropriate government, intergov –
ernmental, and nongovernmental responses. The report begins with a look at the role
of civil society in addressing the root causes
of violent extremism and the debate over
the meanings of “terrorism” and “counter –
terrorism.” It offers a critical analysis of the
so-called war on terror and examines the
consequences of repressive counterterrorism
policies, including their gender impacts—
illustrated with a review of four cases: bolombia, Kenya, Manipur, and Mindanao.
It questions the subordination of development to the logic of security objectives,
and the wisdom of counterterrorism financial measures that impede the funding
of development and humanitarian NGOs. The paper proposes strategies for the
United Nations, national governments, and civil society to protect the ability of
citizen networks to advance human security.
The Role of Civil Society
The growth and development of civil society is “one of the greatest accomplish –
ments of our age,” according to a recent World Bank study. The worldwide non –
profit sector is huge, with annual expenditures of more than $1.3 trillion.
2 The
UN Secretar y-General’s Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-bivil Society
Relations defines the term ‘civil society’ as encompassing associations of citizens
(outside of families, friends, government, and businesses) entered into voluntarily
to advance interests and ideas. The definition encompasses professional associa –
tions, social movements, indigenous people’s organizations, religious and spiritual
bodies, women’s organizations, academic centers, and NGOs that operate in indi-
vidual countries or transnationally.
3
The bentre for bivil Society at the London School of Economics describes
civil society as “the arena of uncoerced collective action characterised by shared
interests, purposes, and values.”
4 NGOs are a distinct part of civil society as for –
mally registered organizations, some membership-based, which engage in develop –
ment, humanitarian relief, policy advocacy, poverty reduction, and other forms
of nonprofit activity. Some organizations adopt an empowerment-based approach
to development and human rights. They work in partnership with marginalized
Gwaltabi, Manipur. On 7 September 2009 security troops ambushed a pickup
truck and executed five passengers. “Rebels” according to the army, “civil-
ians” according to the demonstrators. Out of protest these women blockade
the road the army frequently uses.
hELAM hAO kiP

Friend not Foe 3
communities to shift power relations so that the previously excluded have a voice
in political decision making and can gain access to resources and assets needed for
autonomous development.
From a state perspective some government officials view civil society organiza –
tions merely as assistance providers and implementing agencies for ser vice deliver y,
capacity building, and technical assistance. This instrumentalist approach does not
reflect the diversity of civil society in which many groups prefer to operate inde-
pendently through bottom-up rather than top-down programs. bitizen movements and NGOs have become major players in public advocacy
on a range of social and economic issues and have articulated moral and politi-
cal standards that in some cases have cr ystallized into policy. bivil society groups
have been prime movers of some of the most innovative initiatives for dealing
with emerging global challenges.
5 Examples of significant civil society movements
include the Nobel Prize–winning campaign to ban land mines and efforts to
advance the role of women in international peacemaking through the implementa –
tion of UN Security bouncil Resolution 1325. At times civil society may rise up
in mass resistance to tyranny, as in the historic 2011 overthrow of the Mubarak
regime in Egypt in early 2011. Mohamed ElBaradei and other obser vers have suggested that a successful out –
come of the unarmed revolution in Egypt may help to undermine the appeal of
al-Qaida and “could be the best medicine to get rid of radicalism.”
6 The dem –
onstrated power of nonviolent resistance in the heart of the Arab world helps to
undermine the central narrative of al-Qaida, which claims that terrorist violence
is necessar y to bring down autocratic governments. In Egypt and Tunisia people
ended tyranny through nonviolent means, not bombings and assassinations. They
showed a different and more successful path toward ending oppression, in contrast
to the utter failure of al-Qaida to achieve anything while killing countless fellow
Muslims. The opening of democratic political space may be the best antidote to
terrorism. It provides alternatives for those who might be tempted by the lure of
militancy. It gives aggrieved people civic outlets for addressing political demands,
making it less likely that they will turn toward violent extremism. bSOs can play a significant role in helping to resolve armed conflict and address
conditions conducive to violent extremism. They provide early warning of poten –
tial conflict and in many settings have ser ved as election obser vers and human
rights monitors. bivil society groups often have a wealth of knowledge concern –
ing the human rights and development situations in specific countries and may be
better informed than governments and intelligence agencies about the causes of
armed conflict. Too often, however, civil society actors are limited in their ability
to ser ve as mediators or interlocutors because of legal prohibitions against contact
with groups designated as terrorist.
7
Some political leaders, especially in authoritarian regimes and “managed democ-
racies,” are hostile toward independent civil society groups. They distrust bSOs
that work among marginalized populations, suspecting them of supporting politi-
cal opponents. Governments sometimes create ersatz nongovernmental organiza –
tions, dubbed “GONGOs,” which ser ve to reinforce official positions and often
obfuscate the authentic voice of civil society.
8 Organizations and movements that
The opening of
democratic political
space may be
the best antidote
to terrorism .
It provides
alternatives for
those who might be
tempted by the lure
of militancy . It gives
aggrieved people
civic outlets for
addressing political
demands, making it
less likely that they
will turn toward
violent extremism .

4 Friend not Foe
challenge the abusive policies of unaccountable governments inevitably arouse the
ire of those in power, but in the past decade pressures against such groups have
mounted as policymakers have appropriated the language of counterterrorism to
intensify their attacks against civil society-based critics.
Defining Terrorism and Counterterrorism
No universally accepted definition exists for the meaning of the word “terrorism.”
Analysts examining the question have counted more than one hundred different
definitions.
9 The lack of an agreed definition allows those in power to interpret the
term for their own purposes. Political leaders often take advantage of the term’s
ambiguity to label their opponents terrorists. While there is no universal definition, terrorism is generally understood as politi –
cally motivated violence perpetrated against civilians.
10 The 2004 report of the UN
Secretary-General’s High-level Panel on Threats, bhallenges and bhange defined
terrorism as “any action . . . that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm
to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such an act, by its nature or
context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an interna –
tional organization to do or to abstain from doing any act.”
11 The definition can be
broadened to include not only physical attacks but acts designed to coerce people
and sow fear, including incitement and glorification of terrorist acts via the internet. bounterterrorism is also a contested concept. The term embodies a wide range
of measures with differing impacts, which can be loosely characterized as the good,
the bad, and the ugly. In the bad and ugly categories are bTMs that overempha –
size security and distort development and aid priorities, and that lead to extraju-
dicial killings, greater state repression, and increased human rights abuse. Overly
restrictive counterterrorism measures constrain the social, political, and operational
capacity of civil society actors and impede the work of groups promoting improve-
ments in governance, human rights, and development. These are all important
elements for reducing conditions, such as political marginalization, repression, and
despair that can fuel grievances and lead to expressions of political violence. On
the positive side are cooperative nonmilitar y measures that enhance the capacity
of governments to thwart terrorist attacks while promoting and protecting human
rights. Also in the good categor y are policies that encourage support for sus-
tainable development and good governance, as recommended in the UN Global
Counter-Terrorism Strategy. The proposed categorization is figurative and not meant to suggest absolute
judgments about particular policies. The range of counterterrorism measures is
extremely wide, and specific policies can have differing impacts in varying conditions
and settings. Strengthened law enforcement efforts are good when they prevent
attacks and bring perpetrators to justice, but these same measures can be bad if they
lead to abuses and increased repression. Efforts to prevent the financing of terrorism
are positive, yet programs intended to interdict such funding often have negative
implications for nongovernmental groups and charities seeking to overcome oppres –
sion. The evaluation of particular counterterrorism measures depends greatly on
context and the way in which specific actors implement policies. Judgments about

Friend not Foe 5
particular policies should be based on the degree to which they contribute to genu-
ine security and democratic governance, while also upholding the rule of law and
protecting the work of peacebuilders and human rights defenders. bounterterrorism measures are usually weighted toward the executive branch
of government, with little attention to enhancing judicial independence, legisla –
tive oversight, and citizen involvement. Emergency measures passed in the name
of fighting terrorism have had the effect of undermining civil liberties, restricting
the ability of civil society groups to operate, and impeding development and relief
activities in marginalized communities. Repressive bTMs have reversed progress
achieved in recent years toward the integration of human rights and accountable
governance into development policy. Individual rights and political freedoms have
eroded as states have accumulated greater security powers. The nongovernmental monitoring organization Freedom House has reported
an alarming erosion of global political freedom in recent years. In its 2010 annual
sur vey the organization noted “intensified repression against human rights defend-
ers and civic activists” and reported declines for political freedom in 40 countries
representing 20 percent of the world’s total polities. The last few years have wit –
nessed the longest continuous period of decline for global freedom in the orga –
nization’s nearly 40-year histor y of publishing annual ratings.
12 In 2011 Freedom
House noted a further decline in political freedom and a reduction in the number
of countries defined as politically free. The report highlighted the continued poor
performance of countries of the Middle East and North Africa, although this trend
may be partially reversed if the democratic revolutions in Egypt, Tunisia, and other
countries produce freer societies and more representative governments.
How (Not) to Counter Terrorism
President Obama declared in his bairo address “America is not—and never will
be—at war with Islam.”
13 His administration ended the use of the phrase ‘war on
terror’ and began rolling back some of its excesses, pledging to ban torture and
close Guantanamo Bay and secret bIA prisons. The administration’s new tone has
not been matched by substantive changes on the ground, however. The wars in
Afghanistan and Iraq have been relabeled ‘overseas contingency operations,’ but
U.S. policies remain heavily militarized, and have become more so with recent
troop increases in Afghanistan and increasing use of drone strikes and cross bor –
der special forces operations in Pakistan. In the global fight against terrorism the
United States continues to rely on policies of targeted killing, lawless apprehen –
sion, rendition, warrantless sur veillance, and indefinite detention. The language is
changed but the means are the same. A war on terror by another name. Waging war to counter terrorism and insurgency is inappropriate and ineffective.
Overcoming political violence requires a combination of diplomatic, economic, and
social responses that go beyond and in many cases are incompatible with the use
of armed force. Security specialists have long recognized that counterinsurgency
is primarily a civilian task. Success depends on diminishing sociopolitical sources
of support that enable militant groups to operate. The classic study by David
Galula calls for a struggle that is 80 percent nonmilitar y.
14 The U.S. Army 2006

6 Friend not Foe
counterinsurgency field manual, co-authored by General David Petraeus, echoes
the need to prioritize civilian efforts. The international mission in Afghanistan is
exactly the opposite. A May 2009 bongressional Research Ser vice study reports
that some 94 percent of all U.S. funds for the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have
been spent by the Pentagon, with only 6 percent devoted to foreign aid and dip –
lomatic operations.
15 Empirical evidence confirms that war is not an effective means
of countering terrorist organizations. A 2008 RAND borporation study, How
Terrorist Groups End, shows that terrorist groups usually end through political
processes and effective law enforcement, not the use of militar y force. An examina –
tion of 268 terrorist organizations that ended during a period of nearly forty years
found that the primar y factors accounting for their demise were participation in
political processes (43 percent) and effective policing (40 percent). Militar y force
accounted for the end of terrorist groups in only 7 percent of the cases examined.
Terrorist groups end most often when they trade bombs for ballots and join a
political process, or when they are suppressed by local law enforcement agencies.
Policing works best when law enforcement officials are rooted in local communi-
ties, and have the confidence and trust of local residents that enables them to
penetrate criminal networks.
16
War policies are not only inappropriate, they are counterproductive. When
Western nations invade and occupy Muslim countries, this has the unintended
effect of validating the ideology of extremists who claim to be saving Islam from
foreign infidels. A widely accepted narrative now per vades much of the world. It is
a stor y of invasion and militar y occupation; abuses at Abu Ghraib and other pris-
ons; torture, water boarding, and extrajudicial killings; drones raining terror from
the sky; the inevitable killing of civilians—all broadcast by Arab and Muslim media.
Polls in Muslim countries have shown 80 percent agreement with the view that
Western militar y inter ventions are directed against Islamic society, that they are a
war against Islam itself.
17 As long as these attitudes prevail there will be no end of
recruits willing to blow themselves up to kill foreign troops and their supporters. Most governments and international officials have emphasized the necessity of
cooperative law enforcement to counter transnational terrorism. Especially effective
are programs that emphasize community policing and respect for the rule of law
and the rights of citizens. International police cooperation and intelligence sharing
have been successful in thwarting attacks, perhaps most dramatically in foiling an
alleged plot to bomb flights from London to the United States in August 2006.
The head of the brown Prosecution Ser vice in the United Kingdom said, “The
fight against terrorism on the streets of Britain is not a war. It is the prevention of
crime, the enforcement of our laws, and the winning of justice for those damaged
by their infringement.”
18
An emphasis on preventing violent extremism is more accurate and less politi-
cally loaded than the rhetoric of war. It encompasses economic and social responses
in addition to needed security protections. It emphasizes the removal of political
grievances and support for sustainable development and responsive governance.
19
This approach also elevates the importance of development and human rights
NGOs. Through their efforts to dr y up the wells of extremism, bSOs are address-
ing the root causes of terrorism and armed conflict. They are unequivocal in

Friend not Foe 7
condemning all forms of terrorism. In the global struggle against violent extrem-
ism civil society groups should be welcomed as friends, not hounded as foes.
Good CTMs
Security protections are necessar y but not sufficient to overcome global terror –
ist dangers. A comprehensive approach is needed that balances security concerns
with the rule of law and the defense of human rights. In his March 2005 report,
In Larger Freedom, UN Secretar y-General Kofi Annan emphasized the need for a
holistic strategy: “development, security, and human rights go hand in hand . . . .
we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security with –
out development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights.
Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed.”
20
In 2006 the UN General Assembly unanimously adopted a Global Counter-
Terrorism Strategy that embodies Annan’s call for a more comprehensive and inte-
grated approach. The Strategy transcends the narrow security-oriented focus of
earlier Security bouncil resolutions and links the struggle against terrorism to a
broader set of principles for avoiding violent conflict through development, democ-
racy, and diplomacy. The Strategy identifies four pillars of international policy:
i. Measures to address the conditions conducive to the spread of terrorism;
ii. Measures to prevent and combat terrorism;
iii. Measures to build States’ capacity to prevent and combat terrorism and to
strengthen the role of the United Nations system in this regard; and
iv. Measures to ensure respect for human rights for all and the rule of law as the
fundamental basis of the fight against terrorism.
It is significant that the first of the pillars focuses on conditions conducive to the
spread of terrorism. This places the primar y emphasis on efforts to advance devel-
opment and good governance, not on security measures. The Strategy defines ‘con-
ditions conducive’ as “prolonged unresolved conflicts, dehumanization of victims
of terrorism in all its forms and manifestations, lack of rule of law and violations
of human rights, ethnic, national and religious discrimination, political exclusion,
socio-economic marginalization, and lack of good governance.” The way to fight
terrorism, according to the Strategy, is not only to enhance security, through such
measures as improving border controls, but to adopt preventive measures such as
resolving conflict, ending foreign occupation, overcoming oppression, eradicating
poverty, and promoting sustainable economic development and good governance.
The Strategy notes that success in realizing development objectives and improving
human rights and governance could “reduce marginalization and the subsequent
sense of victimization that propels extremism and the recruitment of terrorists.”
21
While the Strategy is an improvement over approaches that are focused narrowly
on security, it can be interpreted as subordinating development and human rights
imperatives to the logic of security. bivil society groups have expressed concern
about linking development policies to security agendas and militar y strategies.
22

8 Friend not Foe
Development and human rights are critically important in their own right, they
argue, and should be supported fully without reference to other priorities.
The UN Strategy is nonetheless important because it helps to shift the focus of
international policy away from a narrow focus on security toward a more holis-
tic approach that prioritizes development, human rights, and democratic gover –
nance. Because it is approved by all UN member states, the Strategy has enormous
political legitimacy. It gives prominence to conflict prevention rather than security
protection. Pillar I pays specific attention to the advancement of development,
while Pillar IV emphasizes the promotion of human rights and the rule of law.
The protection of human rights cuts across all four pillars of the Strategy with
the instruction “that States must ensure that any measures taken to combat ter –
rorism comply with their obligations under international law, in particular human
rights law, refugee law and international humanitarian law.”
23 The Strategy provides
opportunities for promoting these goals through the cooperation of states and the
support of multiple stakeholders, including specific mention of civil society as hav –
ing an important role to play when implementing the Strategy.
bivil society groups play an indispensable role in advancing human rights.
Repressive governments by their ver y nature lack effective mechanisms for consid-
ering these issues. They are loath to consider policy changes that can lead to more
representative governance and greater economic and political equity. These are pre-
cisely the areas where bSOs can be most helpful. Development and human rights
groups can prevent violent extremism by pursuing their core mission of rights-
based development. The nonprofit sector of a countr y is a force for good, accord-
ing to the World Bank study; it should be “protected, rather than unnecessarily
curtailed.”
24
Bad and Ugly CTMs
bounterterrorism measures and governmental distrust of bSOs have had adverse
impacts on civil society groups. In December 2009 the UN Special Rapporteur
on the situation of human rights defenders reported “worrying trends” globally
in the “stigmatisation of human rights defenders and their growing categorisation
as ‘terrorists’, ‘enemies of the State’ or ‘political opponents.’” States “systematically
invoke national security and public safety to restrict the scope” of civil society activi –
ties.
25 In many countries special legislative and regulatory measures have been used
to crack down on NGOs and activists who criticize government policies. These
measures make it more difficult for civil society actors to operate freely and effec –
tively. Negative impacts have been especially noticeable in conflict zones and among
groups that challenge government policies through their work in peace building,
democratization, and human rights. bTMs, counterinsurgency operations, emer –
gency measures, and repressive actions have combined, with the distinctions often
blurred, to create hardships for those who contest unequal power relations. Governments have tightened controls over civil society groups by imposing
onerous registration requirements and in some cases denying organizations the
right to operate. bIVIbUS reported in December 2010 a pattern of “arbitrar y

Friend not Foe 9
denials of registration for many organizations” in the Euro-Mediterranean region.
Governments have established new requirements for bSO reporting on finances,
governance structures, and the identities of partner organizations and clients.
In some countries fear-based rhetoric has had a chilling effect that hinders the
operational freedom of nongovernmental groups
.26
In the United States laws against ‘material support’ for terrorism prohibit aiding
or engaging with groups that are designated as ‘foreign terrorist organizations.’
Under the Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project ruling, charities could be con –
victed under the law for providing ‘material support’ to a group that the govern –
ment determines has diverted funds for terrorist purposes, even if the group in
question has not been officially designated as terrorist-related and the charity has
no knowledge of or intent to support the alleged diversion. Such an expansive
definition of ‘material support’ creates legal jeopardy for organizations involved
in humanitarian assistance and conflict mediation efforts. It places roadblocks in
the way of delivering aid to designated groups or the communities they control.
27
Some governments view groups working for peace and reconciliation as sympathiz-
ers or supporters of terrorism. In the Philippines, bolombia, Uganda, Ethiopia,
and other countries, civil society groups attempting to overcome violence and
marginalization face pressures from both armed rebels and the government—a
problem described as fire below and fire above. Some conflict areas have been
declared off limits, and NGOs have been denied access. In other areas—such as
Mogadishu and parts of Afghanistan—bSO operations have become untenable
because of extreme dangers. In a number of countries the creation of special security forces and intensified
operations against insurgents and alleged criminals and terrorists have led to a sharp
rise in the number of extrajudicial killings and abductions of human rights workers
and political activists. The bommonwealth Human Rights Initiative expressed con –
cern in 2009 that rights defenders are “being spied on or defamed . . . or being sub –
ject to arbitrar y arrest, physical violence and death.”
28 The UN High bommissioner
for Human Rights noted in September 2010 that “human rights defenders, jour –
nalists, and civil society activists in all regions of the world face threats to their lives
and security because of their work.”
29
Gender Impacts
Women suffer directly from counterterrorism pressures when they are unlawfully
detained or ill-treated to gain information about a male family member. They often
face harassment because of their attempts to win freedom for those imprisoned
men or gain information about the disappeared. As noted by the UN Working
Group on Enforced or Involuntar y Disappearances, women are often at the fore-
front of efforts to resolve abductions and deportations of family members, and as
a result they are themselves “susceptible to intimidation, persecution and repri-
sals.”
30 Extremist groups have targeted women by restricting their public mobility
and imposing harsh codes of behavior in the regions they control. During the
period of Taliban rule in Afghanistan and in some communities in Afghanistan

10 Friend not Foe
and Pakistan today, women face restrictions on their movement and participation
in public life. The West’s support of women’s rights in Afghanistan since 2001 has
created a backlash against Afghan women’s rights defenders. In Afghanistan as in
other countries human rights defenders are often caught between militant group
pressures and government counterterrorism measures.
Abusive interrogation methods have a gendered dimension. At Abu Ghraib and
other prisons, U.S. contractors and soldiers manipulated gender and cultural ste-
reotypes as means of coercive interrogation, including the use of female inter –
rogators to torment and question naked male Arab prisoners. In some countries
that are allies of the United States and where prisoners are rendered, officials have
resorted to the threat or use of violence and sexual abuse against prisoners and
their relatives as a means of extracting information. In the United States and other
countries hyper-masculine imager y and language may play a role in motivating
overly aggressive militar y and counterterrorism actions.
31
In some countries women who wear visible religious garb are subjected to dis-
crimination and profiling. France has banned the wearing of the hijab in schools,
and government officials in other countries have adopted or are considering similar
measures to restrict the wearing of religious clothing and symbols in public places.
Political and social pressures against Muslim immigrants have increased in Europe
and other regions in recent years. So have misperceptions and stereotypes falsely
equating the wearing of the hijab with terrorist sympathies. In some instances anti-
terrorism posters have included images of veiled women.
32 Populist politicians have
exploited such distortions to fan the flames of intolerance and gain electoral advan –
tage. As a result Muslim women are often stigmatized for following religious and
cultural traditions. This can generate feelings of humiliation and anger among the
affected women and their family members and may exacerbate tensions between
social communities. Women have important contributions to make in combating violent extremism.
In some of the world’s most dangerous settings they have proven to be courageous
and effective advocates for peace. Yet women often are not heard or adequately
represented in policymaking bodies. The denial of women’s voices in counterter –
rorism policy is contrar y to the intent of UN Security bouncil Resolution 1325
and related measures, including Resolution 1960 (2010), which emphasize the
importance of female participation in conflict prevention and peacemaking. The
active involvement of women is essential to the crafting of effective and balanced
means of countering armed violence.
Case Studies
The following cases illustrate the consequences of repressive security measures in
specific countries and the challenges civil society groups face in their work for
justice and human rights.

Friend not Foe 11
CO LO M b iA: C OnFL iC t W i t h Ou t En D
For more than four decades bolombia has been the stage for an internal armed
conflict involving guerilla groups, paramilitaries, and government security forces.
Each has been responsible for gross human rights abuses and the killing of civil-
ians. The United States has channeled nearly $5 billion in militar y assistance to
bolombia over the past two decades. Since 2001 this aid has been justified partly
in the name of counterterrorism. Most of the assistance has gone to bolombian
security forces and has had the effect of intensifying violence in regions where
the aid is concentrated. A recent study by the benter for Global Development
in Washington, D.b. found that U.S. militar y aid is being diverted to paramili-
tar y groups, leading to an increase in killings and electoral manipulation, with no
apparent reduction in drug production or guerilla attacks.
33
In this turbulent context, civil society organizations have faced difficulty from
all sides. bommunity groups working for justice and peace have been accused of
supporting terrorism and aiding the insurgents. The International benter for Not-
for-Profit Law stated that “bolombia is one of the most dangerous countries in the
world in which to be a human rights defender, with dozens of labor rights activ –
ists, lawyers, indigenous activists and community and religious leaders being mur –
dered ever y year.”
34 The major guerilla groups, the Revolutionar y Armed Forces
of bolombia (FARb) and the National Liberation Army (ELN), and the paramili-
tar y groups succeeding the former Self-Defense Forces of bolombia (AUb) are
known to target human rights defenders. Also subject to attack are community
leaders and peace activists who criticize guerilla and paramilitar y violence and resist
illegal land expropriations. Women’s groups have documented widespread sexual
abuse by the warring parties, including government forces. In 2009 the local NGO
Justapaz documented sixty-nine cases of violations of human rights and humanitar –
ian law against hundreds of pastors, church
leaders, and other members of Protestant and
Evangelical churches in bolombia. Seventeen
of the cases included documented homicides,
including three pastors and two Protestant
church leaders.
35
Members of the bolombian armed forces
have been investigated recently for killing
unarmed civilians and covering up the crimes
by claiming that the deceased were guerillas
killed in a firefight. The civilian intelligence
ser vice was shut down in September 2010
for colluding with paramilitaries in spying on
judges, opposition politicians, journalists, and
human rights defenders. More than eighty
members of the bolombian bongress, many
of them members of the ruling coalition,
have been jailed or placed under investigation
for ties with paramilitar y groups.
36
r Eut Er S/A Lb Eir O L OPE rA (COLOM biA)
Colombian rebels of the ERG surrender their weapons in El Carmen de
Atrato Choco Province, 21 August 2008.

12 Friend not Foe
Under the “Seguridad Democratica” policy of former President Juan Uribe,
bolombia significantly increased its security forces and targeted insurgent groups
for militar y defeat. This has led to a significant reduction in the number of kid-
nappings and killings in the last two years, but little progress has been made in
addressing the underlying causes of armed conflict. The government has partially
tamed right wing militias and isolated FARb-led insurgents, but it has not amel-
iorated the conditions of social exclusion and inadequate development that fuel
extremism. The government that took power in 2010 started to return land to
displaced families, but this policy has faced strong right wing opposition. The government’s ‘consolidation’ strategy, backed by the United States, gives
the militar y a central role in promoting development. bivil society actors are
advancing an alternative strategy in the form of Development and Peace Programs
that are participator y, democratic, and respectful of human rights. These programs
have the support of the batholic bhurch and some private enterprises, as well as
international development NGOs. They are consistent with international efforts to
reorient counterterrorism policy away from a war paradigm toward a more holistic
approach that addresses the social, economic, and political roots of extremism.
k E n y A: bA t tLi n G i M P u n i t y
Kenya’s role as a strategic ally of the West intensified following the August 1998
terror bombing in Nairobi. Kenya has expanded its counterterrorism programs
with British and American aid and has supported U.S. operations against armed
actors along the border region with neighboring Somalia. Suspected insurgents
have been detained and rendered to neighboring countries for interrogation by
U.S. intelligence agents.
37
Kenya has a sophisticated civil society and comparatively strong institutions, yet
the countr y faces many deeply rooted problems and unresolved conflicts. Since
the 1990s the countr y has gradually evolved toward a more democratic political
system after a period of one-party rule, but little has been done to address under –
lying grievances stemming from socio-eco –
nomic inequality and disputes over land use
and control. These tensions exploded in the
aftermath of the disputed December 2007
presidential election between incumbent
President Mwai Kibaki and challenger Raila
Odinga. More than 1,100 Kenyans were
killed during the tumult. According to the
government’s own investigative commission,
35.7 percent of those who died in the post-
election violence were killed by the police.
38
bivil society groups played an impor –
tant role in facilitating and encouraging the
post-election settlement mediated by former
UN Secretar y-General Kofi Annan in 2008
in which Kibaki and Odinga agreed to rule
Women raise their hands and shout slogans during a march for peace in
Nairobi, 10 January 2008.
r Eut Er S/ rAD u SiGhEti ( kEny A)

Friend not Foe 13
together in a coalition government. bivil society groups have also sought an end to
government impunity and were cheered when the prosecutor for the International
briminal bourt charged six high ranking Kenyan officials for crimes related to the
post-election violence, including Deputy Prime Minister Uhuru Kenyatta and three
cabinet members.
39
Although bSOs have been at the forefront of efforts to create multiparty democ-
racy and constitutional reform, they are sometimes accused of sympathizing with
violent extremists. When bSOs speak out against extrajudicial killings or human
rights abuses, they are harassed, intimidated, and threatened by security officials.
40
In October 2008 a Kenyan police whistleblower was assassinated after providing
information to the Kenya National bommission of Human Rights. In 2009, two
human rights defenders were assassinated because of their criticism of police kill-
ings.
41 Legislation designed to prevent support for terrorism has contributed to a
climate of suspicion toward NGOs, especially Muslim charities, which have found
it more difficult to operate.
42
Despite the many obstacles they face, Kenya’s bSOs continue to struggle for
justice. In August 2010, Kenyans voted to adopt a new constitution with 67 per –
cent approval
and the highest voter turnout in the nation’s histor y. 43 This success
followed an advocacy campaign and public review process in which citizen groups
played an active role. Voting patterns did not follow standard ethnic, regional,
or tribal lines—a sign that the constitutional process may be able to quell some
of the tensions that have led to violence in the past.
44 The new constitution lim –
its the power of the presidency and strengthens parliamentar y oversight. It pro –
vides structures for weeding out corruption and addressing political grievances.
45
Whether these changes will be sufficient to open space for greater democracy and
civil society engagement remains uncertain.
MAn i Pu r: F ACi nG r EP rES S iO n
Following the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United States, India joined the
war-on-terror bandwagon by enacting the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA).
The act labeled as terrorist any person who “threaten(s) the unity, integrity, security
or sovereignty of India.”
46 Following strong public pressure POTA was repealed
in 2004, but its key provisions are incorporated into the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention) Act (UAPA), originally adopted in 1967 and made more stringent
following an amendment process in 2008. The repressive measures contained in
UAPA and other laws have been used to suppress movements for autonomy and
independence among indigenous peoples. The impacts have been felt acutely in the state of Manipur, where nationalist
groups have challenged India’s 1949 annexation of the region and have struggled
for decades to achieve an independent state, often resorting to violent insurgency
and terror attacks.
47 The Indian government has attempted to maintain central rule
by relying on the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), initially enacted in
1958, which allows the national armed forces to detain suspects, conduct warrant –
less searches, and shoot to kill to maintain public order.
48 The AFSPA essentially
grants impunity to the armed forces and over the decades has led to countless

14 Friend not Foe
incidents of unlawful arrest, torture, and
extrajudicial killing.
Supplementing national militar y forces
are the large Manipur state security forces,
which number one in ever y 20 citizens.
These forces have also committed widespread
human rights violations. Abuses by national
and local security forces have fueled politi-
cal resentment and greater demands for local
autonomy. This in turn has prompted further
crackdowns from the security forces, perpet –
uating a vicious cycle of continuous violence
and political discontent.
49
Insurgent nationalist forces have also com –
mitted many abuses and killed innocent civil-
ians. Human Rights Watch estimates that at
least 20,000 people have been killed by either
government or nationalist forces since the beginning of the conflict in the 1950s.
In recent years killings have continued on an almost daily basis in the region.
50
According to Human Rights Watch, “The situation in Manipur is nothing less than
a breakdown in the rule of law.”
51
Further fueling the conflict in the region and disrupting indigenous communi-
ties are attempts by large corporate and government interests to take over land and
exploit the region’s resources. Plans are in place to build as many as seventy dams
in Manipur. These efforts are exacerbating popular anger and discontent, leading
in some cases to further armed attacks.
52
Local civil society groups are attempting to resolve political disputes in the
region through political and legal means. Government repressive measures and
insurgent violence have made their work extremely difficult. balls for an end to
land seizures and the easing of government repressive measures have been largely
ignored. Advocates for human rights or local self-determination are often labeled
terrorists and accused of collusion with armed nationalists. In September 2010, nine Manipuri police officers accused of killing an unarmed
man were arrested.
53 This appears to be the first instance of security personnel
being charged with crimes related to human rights abuse. Whether this incident
presages a turn toward greater legal accountability remains uncertain. The overall
pattern of government policy in the region remains one of repression and impunity.
M i n DAnAO : St r u G G Li nG FO r J u St i C E
Political violence in Mindanao has multiple dimensions—armed conflict between
the government and various revolutionar y groups, tensions between local political
chiefs and clans, disputes over land and identity issues, and the arming of civil-
ian militias as part of the government’s counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
policies. The conflict in the region is rooted in centuries-old disputes between
mostly bhristian populations in the northern part of the countr y, which dominate
Womenfs protest against excessive army violence in Imphal, Manipur.
hELAM hAO kiP

Friend not Foe 15
the Philippine government, and indigenous and Moro communities in Mindanao.
Government-sponsored settlement programs over the decades have encroached
upon local lands and marginalized their populations. Numerous attempts have
been made to negotiate autonomy and power sharing agreements, but these have
often failed.
The Philippine government response to these challenges has focused on secu-
rity measures and enhanced counterterrorism authority. In 2007 the government
enacted the Human Security Act (HSA), which was opposed by civil society groups
because of its overly broad definitions of terrorism and harsh punishments for
even minor offenses.
54 The national alliance for human rights in the Philippines,
Karapatan, criticized the HSA for giving the state a legal framework to suppress
civil and political liberties.
55 The bonsortium of Bangsamoro bivil Society, the
largest umbrella civil society network for Muslim NGOs in Mindanao, said the
law would jeopardize efforts to negotiate an end to violent conflict in the region.
The HSA empowered militar y and police forces that in some cases have been
responsible for violent abuse. A number of studies have documented extrajudicial
killings, torture, and gross violations of human rights by government forces, militia
members, and death squads, most of which go unpunished.
56
During the 2009 provincial elections, fifty-seven unarmed civilians were massa –
cred, including women and members of the press. Relatives of Ismael Mangudadatu
were attacked while attempting to file a certificate of candidacy on behalf of his
campaign for governor in the predominantly Muslim province of Maguindanao.
Implicated in the killings were local police officers and paramilitar y forces,
and members of the Ampatuan clan, a wealthy political family allied with then
President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. In response, the government declared a state
of martial law and resorted to large-scale arrests and warrantless searches across
Maguindanao.
57
bivil society organizations and human rights defenders in the Philippines have
pressed for greater democratic rights and an end to extrajudicial killings. They
have sought to reform the security forces and establish greater legal protections
for those subject to the criminal justice sys-
tem.
58 They have sponsored dialogue and
mediation efforts to help resolve armed con –
flict. These efforts have been made more
difficult by counterterrorism legislation that
prohibits engagement with those designated
as terrorists. In 2010 Mindanao Peaceweavers pub –
lished a Mindanao Peoples’ Peace Agenda,
based on dialogue and consultations with
multiple local constituencies.
59 The docu –
ment offers policy suggestions and ser ves
as a roadmap for overcoming violence,
injustice, and oppression in the region.
It affirms the right of self-determination
and highlights the need for human rights,
Vi CtO r Vi LLAnuEVA (PhiLiPP inES)/F LiC kr
Youth Protest Against Ampatuan Massacre, 26 November 2009.

16 Friend not Foe
humanitarian accountability, good governance, sustainable development, and a
national peace policy.
The 2010 election of Benigno ‘Noynoy’ Aquino III as President of the
Philippines created hope for a reduction of corruption and political violence, but
to date few changes have occurred.
60 Whether the promises of a better future are
realized for the people of Mindanao will depend on the nurturing and strengthen –
ing of human rights and the resolution of deeply rooted injustices and conflicts in
the region.
Securitizing Aid
The global trend toward using aid and development funds for militar y purposes
has accelerated. This approach subordinates traditional goals of mitigating pov –
erty to the agenda of counterterrorism and defeating insurgency. It blurs the ana –
lytic boundaries between security and development while politicizing both and
detracting from efforts to improve the lives of the world’s most disadvantaged
communities. The process works in two ways: a growing proportion of the aid budget is chan –
neled directly through militar y institutions, and funds are allocated increasingly in
support of militar y operations. The percentage of U.S. ODA allocated through the
Pentagon has increased in recent years from 3.5 percent in 1998 to approximately
25 percent ten years later.
61 Aid budgets have increased around the world, but
fully two-fifths of the increase since 2002 has gone to just two countries—Iraq and
Afghanistan.
62 Major recipients of U.S. development assistance are countries central
to security and counterterrorism objectives. In some of the countries where for –
eign assistance is provided, police forces are highly repressive and unaccountable.
Assistance provided to such forces in the absence of needed structural reforms may
simply reinforce repressive tendencies and undermine civil society efforts to defend
human rights and establish democratic oversight.
63
The British Department for International Development announced in October
2010 a 35 percent increase in development funding over a four year period, with
a major boost in spending in countries affected by conflict, especially Afghanistan
and Pakistan. Over the four year period funding to support fragile and conflict-
affected states will increase from 22 percent to 30 percent of ODA.
64 British devel-
opment advocates welcomed the increased commitment to development assistance
but questioned the greater prioritization of security concerns. Labor MP Joan
Ruddock asked how the aid budget would be able to maintain its focus on helping
women and children and reducing poverty if a third of the budget is reallocated
to conflict prevention. “Aid money should go toward poor nations rather than
countries that present a security threat,” said one aid official.
65
Oxfam argued in a Februar y 2011 report that aid is being politicized to the
detriment of people with the greatest need. Lifesaving humanitarian assistance and
long-term efforts to reduce poverty “are being damaged where aid is used primar –
ily to pursue donors’ own narrow political and security objectives.” While huge
sums are devoted to countries where Western nations have direct security inter –
ests, “equally poor and conflict-afflicted countries from the Democratic Republic
The percentage
of U .S . ODA
allocated through the Pentagon
has increased in
recent years from
3 .5 percent in 1998
to approximately 25 percent ten
years later . Aid
budgets have
increased around
the world, but fully two-fifths of the
increase since 2002 has gone to just
two countries—Iraq and Afghanistan .

Friend not Foe 17
of bongo to the bentral African Republic have received far smaller shares of aid
relative to their needs.” Aid provided through a security lens overlooks the plight
of some of the world’s most marginalized populations.
66
The securitization of aid has generated deep concerns in the development com –
munity. Development advocates have sought to shield aid programs from mili-
tar y encroachments, even as they recognize the deep and inexorable connections
that exist between development and security. Accepting the need for a more inte-
grated and coherent approach to development and security does not justify “the
slow bleeding of financing for development purposes into security-related militar y
activities,” declared a report for bIDSE, the coalition of batholic development
agencies in Europe and North America.
67 Nor does it mean that all development
and security goals are compatible. APRODEV, the Association of World bouncil
of bhurches-related Development Organizations in Europe, acknowledged that
development can contribute to security, but only if the integrity and autonomy
of development activities are respected fully. Faith-based agencies emphasize their
commitment to the preferential option for the poor and the powerless, and to the
vision of a more just and peaceful world. They support a holistic human security
strategy that prioritizes the well-being of individuals and communities rather than
a narrow approach that protects the interests of states. They argue that human
rights and development should be seen as ends in themselves, not as means to
other purposes. Development cooperation should not be subsumed to an idea of
security based on defending the interests and preser ving the way of life of states in
the global North. Peace cannot be imposed “from above.” For peace to be sustain –
able, it must grow “from below.”
68
‘Money as a Weapons System’
The development aid that is provided in Afghanistan and other war zones is not
for the purpose of alleviating poverty and supporting long-term sustainability. Its
strategic objective is to gain the sympathy of local populations and win politi-
cal support for militar y missions. Aid programs from the U.S. and other NATO
countries generally flow to regions and communities where militar y and counter –
terrorism operations are taking place. In Afghanistan funding is concentrated in
southern provinces where insurgency and counterinsurgency are most prevalent,
while other previously less turbulent parts of the countr y receive fewer develop –
ment resources. U.S. militar y leaders are explicit in describing development assis-
tance as an element of war. A U.S. Army manual for Iraq and Afghanistan was
entitled “A bommander’s Guide to Money as a Weapons System.” It described aid
as “a nonlethal weapon” utilized to “win the hearts and minds of the indigenous
population to facilitate defeating the insurgents.”
69
In Afghanistan and Iraq U.S. and allied forces have established militar y Provincial
Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that play a direct role in providing humanitarian and
development assistance. PRTs have been criticized as “over whelmingly militar y
in scope and operation,” with a primar y focus on force protection and security
assistance. Problems identified with the PRTs include “generally poor develop –
ment practice” and “relative lack of attention to promoting good governance
Development
cooperation should
not be subsumed to
an idea of security
based on defending
the interests and
preserving the way
of life of states in
the global North .
Peace cannot be
imposed “from
above .” For peace
to be sustainable,
it must grow “from
below .”

18 Friend not Foe
and the rule of law.” 70 A subcommittee of the House Armed Ser vices bommittee
in the U.S. bongress reported that PRTs tend to pursue “short-term, feel-good
projects . . . without consideration of larger strategic and capacity-building implica –
tions.”
71 A Januar y 2010 report by seven humanitarian agencies in Afghanistan
argued that PRTs often lack the capacity to manage effective development initia –
tives.
72 In many cases, PRTs rely on wasteful and corrupt contractors with limited
capacities and have weak links to local communities. PRTs are unable to gain the
trust of local populations and thus cannot foster the sense of community own –
ership and local empowerment that are needed to achieve sustainable develop –
ment. Many Afghans are afraid to work with the PRTs for fear of insurgent attacks
directed against these foreign-run militar y institutions. The U.S. militar y has also established the bommander’s Emergency Response
Program (bERP), which allows field commanders to dispense payments of tens of
thousands of dollars or more on projects intended to generate goodwill among
local populations. bERP spending in Afghanistan has increased sharply over the
years, from $40 million in 2004 to $1 billion in 2010.
73 The program has been
criticized by the U.S. General Accounting Office for a lack of management and
oversight and the absence of metrics for evaluating the impact of local projects.
74 A
report of the bommittee on Appropriations of the U.S. House of Representatives
described bERP as a program with “few limits and little management.”
75
Militar y forces are not appropriate providers of development assistance. Aid
inappropriately delivered by militar y forces “has proved expensive and ineffective,”
according to Oxfam. Militar y ser vice members do not have the mandate and are
not trained or equipped to address problems of underdevelopment, alienation, and
instability in marginalized communities. Few soldiers possess the needed expertise
in matters of governance, development, and the rule of law.
76 Assigning these tasks
to militar y rather than civilian actors displaces the role of civil society and under –
mines the principles of local self-reliance and grassroots empowerment that are
vital to genuine development and democratic governance. It also militarizes inter –
national policymaking. U.S. Defense Secretar y Robert Gates described this process
as the “creeping militarization” of U.S. foreign policy and said that concerns about
this trend are “not an entirely unreasonable sentiment.”
77
The Januar y 2010 report by humanitarian agencies in Afghanistan summarized
the dire consequences of militarizing aid:
More and more assistance is being channeled through militar y actors to “win
hearts and minds” while efforts to address the underlying causes of poverty and
repair the destruction wrought by three decades of conflict and disorder are being
sidelined. Development projects implemented with militar y money or through
militar y dominated structures aim to achieve fast results but are often poorly
executed, inappropriate, and do not have sufficient community involvement to
make them sustainable. There is little evidence this approach is generating stability
and, in some cases, militar y involvement in development activities is, paradoxically,
putting Afghan lives further at risk as these projects quickly become targeted by
antigovernment elements.
78
Direct attacks on aid workers have increased, according to Oxfam—225 killed,
kidnapped, or injured in 2010, compared to eighty-five in 2002. This increase
Military service
members do not
have the mandate
and are not trained or equipped to address
problems of
underdevelopment, alienation, and instability in
marginalized
communities .

Friend not Foe 19
reflects a greater number of aid workers operating in insecure areas but also results
from an apparent rise in politically motivated attacks, which account for nearly half
the total.
79
The Director of Operations for the International bommittee of the Red bross
(IbRb) warned recently that linking humanitarian action and security operations
endangers aid agencies and diminishes their ability to ser ve populations in need.
Subordinating humanitarian assistance to militar y purposes is a violation of the
IbRb bode of bonduct, which provides for a strict separation of humanitarian
assistance from any militar y or political agenda. Separation is necessar y to safe-
guard aid workers and the communities they ser ve, and to uphold the principle of
prioritizing humanitarian assistance according to need.
80
Civil-military Cooperation?
Interaction between civilian and militar y actors is increasingly common in UN
operations and in development, humanitarian, counterterrorism, and peace-
building activities. Militar y forces, civilian government agencies, and civil society
groups share operational space in many conflict-affected regions, often uneasily.
Establishing appropriate mechanisms of civil-militar y cooperation is a major chal-
lenge for civil society and government. Some NGOs tr y to avoid involvement
with armed forces. Others adopt a more pragmatic approach under the dictum ‘as
civilian as possible, as militar y as necessar y.’ The 3-D Security Initiative has been
a pioneer in reaching out to militar y actors on behalf of civil society. It seeks to
protect the integrity of civilian-based development and peacebuilding activities,
and to transform security and counterterrorism policies through the incorporation
of human security principles.
81
Differences in militar y and civilian purposes create inherent tensions between the
two communities. Security forces often focus on short-term, quick-impact efforts
to reduce immediate threats. bivil society organizations generally take a long-term,
relationship-based approach and question the legitimacy of militar y and counter –
terrorism missions that do not have the consent of local populations. The short-
term security emphasis at times jeopardizes longer term human security objectives. A bordaid-commissioned report identified principles for managing civilian-
militar y interactions.
82 The report highlights the valuable protection that security
forces can provide but emphasizes the importance of civil society actors performing
functions for which civilians are uniquely suited, such as providing humanitarian
assistance and promoting human rights. bSOs are often better able to identify and
address local grievances, reconcile divided communities, and foster more participa –
tor y and accountable governance. The coordination of militar y and civil society activities is necessar y in some
settings, but in many instances it is neither feasible nor desirable. The general
goal of civil-militar y dialogue is communication rather than integration. The 3-D
Security Initiative has convened a number of civil-militar y forums for exchanging
information, reviewing civil-militar y guidelines, and considering options for more
coordinated conflict assessment and program coordination. These sessions have

20 Friend not Foe
identified the following principles for maintaining the integrity of civilian-based aid
and peacebuilding activities:
 Humanitarian imperative: to save lives, alleviate suffering, and uphold human
dignity.
 Independence and neutrality: to avoid taking sides in political or militar y
struggles.
 Impartiality: to provide resources regardless of the identity of those suffering.
 Do no harm: to avoid harmful secondar y effects.
 Accountability: to consult and be accountable to local people.
83
De-funding Civil Society
Tighter restrictions on international financial transactions are a central element
of international counterterrorism policy. The intended purpose is to prevent the
financing of terrorism, but these measures have had the effect of hindering the
work of foundations and charitable agencies that support humanitarian and peace-
making activities. Some donors have become risk averse and reluctant to fund
initiatives that address controversial issues or challenge inequalities. The new rules
have had a chilling effect on donors and charities and have left vulnerable popula –
tions underser ved. The targeting of civil society financing is rooted in the Special Recommendations
against the Financing of Terrorism issued by the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF). Recommendation VIII instructs governments and financial institutions to
“ensure that nonprofit organizations cannot be misused to finance terrorism.” In
its Interpretive Note on Recommendation VIII, FATF claims, without supportive
evidence, that nonprofit organizations are vulnerable to terrorist group manipula –
tion and exploitation.
84
Officials of foundations and charitable funding agencies contest these claims
and refute assertions that charities are a significant source of funding for terrorist
organizations. Rob Buchanan, Managing Director of International Programs at the
U.S. bouncil on Foundations, stated in a March 2009 presentation in Washington,
D.b. that there is no evidence of U.S. charitable funds falling into the hands of al-
Qaida or other global terrorist groups. Of the 1.8 million charitable organizations
in the United States, Buchanan noted, only a handful have been alleged to have
links with terrorism financing. To date the Treasur y Department has designated
eight U.S. charities for alleged terrorist financing, only four of these for connec-
tions to al-Qaida. The most recent Treasur y designations of U.S. charities have
been for alleged support of Hizbollah and Tamil organizations. No claims of U.S.
charitable support for al-Qaida have been registered since 2004.
85
Allegations of wrongdoing and restrictions on nonprofit financing have eroded
trust and cooperative relations between donors and overseas partners in many
countries.
86 They have created a “cloud of suspicion” over the entire nonprofit
sector.
87 Programs in Arab and/or Muslim countries are particularly susceptible to

Friend not Foe 21
critical scrutiny and in many cases have been subjected to asset freezes and legal
or administrative barriers to continued operation. A 2004 sur vey by the U.S.-
based Foundation benter found that international grant making has become more
difficult due to a “more demanding and uncertain regulator y environment” and
“increased security risks abroad.”
88
Laws against terrorist financing have had negative impacts on organizations
working for gender equality, including women’s rights organizations. As obser ved
by the UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights
and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, “The small scale and grass
roots nature of such organizations means that they present a greater ‘risk’ to for –
eign donors.” Development agencies are increasingly choosing to fund a limited
number of centralized, large-scale organizations for fear of having their charitable
donations stigmatized as financing terrorism.
89
The Office of Foreign Assets bontrol of the U.S. Treasur y Department has
established a Risk Matrix that stigmatizes and labels as “high risk” any charity that
“engages in work in conflict zones or in countries/regions known to have a con –
centration of terrorist activity.”
90 USAID has established a requirement dating from
2002 that all grantees obtain a worldwide Anti-Terrorism bertification, dissociating
themselves from dealings with any entity designated by the U.S. government as
terrorist-related. Prohibitions on engaging with armed actors have led to reduced
support for track two diplomacy and informal peace processes in conflict zones.
91
In several countries, governments have adopted legislation and implemented
regulations curbing remittances and imposing conditions on foreign funding. In
Bangladesh the government notified NGOs that at least half of all foreign grants
must be spent on visible development projects such as roads and canals. In Jordan
government approval is needed to receive foreign funds.
92 In some countries local
groups are required to raise “counterpart funds” to match a percentage of the
funding offered from external sources, a condition that is difficult to meet in low-
income countries. Hardest hit by such restrictions are communities in war-torn
areas, such as the Gaza Strip in Palestine, which depend upon the support of chari-
table agencies and funding from diasporas and external donors. Islamic NGOs have experienced particular difficulties because of bTMs and
tighter restrictions on transnational funding. The Oxford-based International
NGO Training and Research bentre (INTRAb) has reported that Muslim NGOs
“in the USA and elsewhere . . . are finding it harder to raise funds” and fulfill their
religious duty of almsgiving, the Zakāt, which is one of the five pillars of Islam.
93
Since 2001, three of the largest Islamic organizations in the United States—the
Holy Land Foundation, Global Relief Foundation, and Benevolence International
Foundation—have had their assets frozen. Muslim charities and trusts in the UK
also have been exposed to high levels of scrutiny under anti-terror legislation. The
overall effect of such measures is a decline in giving to Islamic charities and chal-
lenges to the religious obligation to ser ve the needy.
94

22 Friend not Foe
NGOs as partners?
The U.S. government has attempted to enlist foundations and charities in its war on
terror. The Treasur y Department’s Anti-Terrorist Financing Guidelines calls upon
charities to collect information about their grantees, to investigate possible links
with terrorism, and to report ‘suspicious information’ to the Treasur y Department
or the FBI.
95 Foundation executives are highly critical of such provisions and have
described them as “useless and embarrassing, damaging trust . . . with the ver y
groups that could make a difference” in addressing conditions that lead to terror –
ism.
96 Requiring nonprofit groups to collect personal information on their partners
puts them at risk of being perceived as law enforcement or intelligence agents. It
attempts to turn philanthropists into spies. A coalition of more than seventy U.S. nonprofit agencies, led by the bouncil on
Foundations, attempted for more than seven years to persuade Treasur y officials
to change the guidelines, without success. In November 2010, the coalition called
off the talks and criticized the government for its “unwillingness to make any
substantive changes to its approach—or to recognize the important role of global
philanthropy in increasing national security through funding to address poverty,
inequality, disease, and other pressing needs.” The coalition has called for the with –
drawal of the Guidelines and their replacement by the “Principles of International
bharity” adopted voluntarily by the nonprofit sector in 2005 as an alternative
means of assuring accountability.
97  
bharitable agencies have also sharply criticized USAID’s proposed Partner
Vetting System (PVS), which would require all USAID grant applicants to submit
detailed personal information on key individuals within partner organizations. The
information could be shared with intelligence agencies in the event of a ‘risk to
national security,’ which is not defined. If implemented PVS would impose new
data collection obligations on charities and divert staff and funding from grant
making. It would compromise the independence of nonprofits operating in con –
flict zones and further endanger aid workers and their local partners. A major
health care NGO warned that the new procedures “can only ser ve to incite animus
and increase the likelihood of attacks” against donor agencies and their partners.
98
bharitable groups have been successful so far in challenging the PVS proposal and
as of this writing have delayed its implementation. While many governments follow the U.S. model of establishing onerous vet –
ting and registration requirements on charities, other governments take a more
cooperative approach to addressing the risks of terrorist financing. The European
bommission has issued guidelines and a draft code of conduct for engaging with
civil society groups.
99 The EU Justice and Home Affairs bouncil seeks to safeguard
the integrity of the nonprofit sector and assure greater dialogue among states,
civil society groups, and relevant stakeholders. Accountability and transparency are
“at the heart of donor confidence,” according to the Justice and Home Affairs
bouncil. The challenge of preventing terrorist finance requires “effective, propor –
tionate measures of oversight,” which are best achieved through cooperation rather
than accusation.
100

Friend not Foe 23
The recent World Bank study on nonprofit organizations questioned whether
government regulation is the best way of preventing the diversion of charitable
funding to terrorist purposes. It noted the existence of self-regulator y mechanisms
within the nonprofit sector that have the force of contract and can impose penalties
on organizations that violate the law and agreed codes of conduct. Because they
cannot succeed without public trust, nonprofit agencies are subject to peer pres-
sure and have strong incentives to eliminate fraud and abuse within their sector.
The World Bank study urges governments to “recognize the need felt in the sector
to demonstrate its good governance . . . and use that aspiration to also address ter –
rorism financing concerns,” allowing nonprofits to take ownership of the problem
through greater transparency.
101
Protecting Civil Society
In response to the repressive pressures and restrictions that have been imposed
on civil society groups and their supporters, NGOs have established a set of core
principles for protecting the ability of civil society groups to promote develop –
ment, good governance, and conflict prevention. To uphold the rights of people
in the communities they ser ve, civil society groups must have the ability to operate
freely without government interference and harassment. The International benter
for Not-for-Profit Law and the World Movement for Democracy spelled out these
principles in their landmark report, Defending Civil Society. The principles, based
on universal human rights conventions and declarations, are as follows:
 the right to entr y, defined as the freedom to associate and form organizations;
 the right to operate without unwanted state interference;
 the right to free expression;
 the right to communicate and cooperate freely internally and externally;
 the right to seek and secure resources; and
 the right to have these freedoms protected by the state.
102
As UN Secretar y-General, Ban Ki-moon emphasized in his December 2010
Human Rights Day message, states “bear the primar y responsibility to protect
human rights advocates.”
103 Governments are obligated to guarantee fundamen –
tal freedoms by numerous international legal agreements, including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International bovenant for bivil and Political
Rights, and the UN Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals,
Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms.
104 States that take actions to limit
the exercise of these freedoms are violating international law and acting contrar y
to covenants and legal agreements they themselves have adopted. They are also
undermining the essential work of countering violent extremism.

24 Friend not Foe
A Voice for Change
In recent years civil society groups have become increasingly engaged in the debate
over counterterrorism strategy and the proper approach to overcoming violent
extremism. bordaid, bIVIbUS, INTRAb, International benter for Not-for-Profit
Law, the Interchurch Organisation for Development bo-operation, the bharity and
Security Network, and many other nongovernmental action and research groups
are working to end harmful bTMs and protect the operational and political space
of rights-based development organizations.
Some civil society actors have called for more substantial and coordinated
international advocacy and allied communications efforts to change government
policies. They advocate more holistic and effective counterterrorism policies that
address the conditions conducive to violent extremism, and that align the quest
for security with the necessity of social justice, the protection of human rights, the
resolution of conflict, and sustainable economic development. The civil society mission of reducing poverty and overcoming social exclusion is
exactly what is needed to ameliorate the root causes of terrorism. Through their
direct experience working in conflict zones and among marginalized communities,
civil society actors have important knowledge about the causes and cures of armed
violence. They can speak with authority about the importance of development and
conflict transformation strategies in overcoming the conditions that give rise to
violent extremism.
105
bivil society actors also help to advance the goal of greater accountability and
transparency in the deliver y of international aid. bivil society groups and develop –
ment NGOs fully support the need for greater accountability in their finances and
program operations and have adopted a number of voluntar y codes for greater due
diligence and transparency. These include the following: 
 InterAction’s Private Voluntar y Organization standards,
106
 Principles of International bharity, developed specifically to address the threat of
diversion of resources for terrorism by a working group of grantmakers, NGOs,
civil society organizations, and legal experts,
107 and
 An accreditation program developed and operated by Muslim Advocates.
108  
One World Trust has identified an extensive set of standards and principles for
enhancing the accountability of nongovernmental organizations, ensuring that
international laws are equitably applied, and strengthening the capacity of civil
society to engage in global policy and decision-making processes.
109
As transparency and accountability are demanded of NGOs, the same are
required of governments and donor agencies. Political leaders must be held to
account for the harmful consequences of militarized development strategies and
overly repressive counterterrorism measures. In the absence of verifiable evidence
public officials should withdraw claims of alleged NGO association with terrorism
and revoke policies based on such assertions.
The civil society
mission of reducing poverty and
overcoming social
exclusion is exactly what is needed to
ameliorate the root
causes of terrorism .

Friend not Foe 25
Conclusion
bivil society groups are performing work that is essential to the challenge of coun-
tering global terrorism by advancing development, human rights, and conflict pre-
vention. This work is not labeled counterterrorism, nor should it be, but it is what
the UN Strategy proposes as the key to preventing terrorism. International policy –
makers should recognize and protect this vital mission and take action to eliminate
counterproductive bTMs. bivil society groups themselves must engage more actively in the counterter –
rorism debate and take necessar y steps to strengthen their role in eliminating con –
ditions conducive to violent extremism. Independent citizen groups must stand
together to protect their operational space and assert their right to ser ve commu-
nity needs free of state interference. bSOs can respond most effectively to repres-
sive counterterrorism measures by continuing to expose and challenge abuses and
by building public support for more accountable governance based on the rule of
law. They can contribute to the struggle against global terrorism by pursuing their
core mission of human rights and economic empowerment and by emphasizing
that development, freedom, and security are indivisible.
Civil society
groups are
performing work
that is essential
to the challenge
of countering
global terrorism
by advancing
development,
human rights,
and conflict
prevention . This
work is not labeled
counterterrorism,
nor should it be,
but it is what
the UN Strategy
proposes as the
key to preventing
terrorism .

Friend not Foe 27
Recommendations
T
he following actions are recommended for the United Nations, individual
states, and civil society organizations:
un i t ED n A t iOnS
 Establish an independent civil society advisor y committee for the UN
Cobnterterrorism Implementation Task Force (CTITF), with a mandate to
provide informal research and policy inpbts to the work of the Task Force.
The proposed civil society advisor y committee would provide guidance to the
Task Force and its working groups, akin to the guidance provided by analogous
bodies elsewhere in the UN system, such as the UN Development Programme’s
bivil Society Advisor y bommittee and a similar body that provides input on
the UN’s work on women and armed conflict. The civil society advisor y com –
mittee should ser ve as a strategic body and sounding board on key policy and
programming issues. Its members should be invited to propose mechanisms
for increased engagement of civil society in the Task Force’s working groups
and projects. The advisor y committee should have the opportunity to brief the
bTITF and submit a written record of best practices and challenges facing civil
society groups as they perform work that helps to advance the goals of the UN
Strategy. bTITF should invite this submission from the civil society advisor y
committee on the occasion of the review of the Strategy in the spring of 2012
and at each review thereafter.
 Ask the proposed independent civil society advisor y committee to estab –
lish hbman rights benchmarks for UN cobnterterrorism implementation.
The advisor y committee should craft standards for implementing the Strategy
that focus on preser ving the operational space of civil society groups and that
measure the progress of states and regional organizations in realizing human
rights, development, good governance, and conflict prevention objectives. The
benchmarks should include indicators of compliance with international conven –
tions on human rights and guarantees of fundamental rights such as freedom

28 Friend not Foe
of association, access to information, and due process legal protections. The
indicators should also measure direct and indirect gender impacts. The proposed
benchmarks and indicators could become a tool for the United Nations to pro –
vide member states guidance and concrete criteria for protecting human rights
while implementing counterterrorism mandates.
St AtES
 Adopt the ‘do no harm’ principle by ensbring that cobnterterrorism poli-
cies do not restrict or cabse hardships for legitimate civil society organiza –
tions working for charitable or hbmanitarian pbrposes. bonduct a review of
existing counterterrorism legislation to amend or eliminate provisions that are
shown to have adverse impacts on the political space and operational capacity
of legitimate civil society organizations. Avoid policies or administrative mea –
sures that impede humanitarian, development, peacebuilding, and human rights
activities of lawful civil society organizations. Amend ‘material support’ laws to
enable impartial nonviolent humanitarian and conflict transformation groups to
engage in peacemaking dialogue and mediation support activities. bonsult with
civil society networks in reviewing legislation and policies to identify adverse
measures that need to be altered or eliminated.
 Ensbre that measbres to prevent the financing of terrorism do not hinder
legitimate hbmanitarian, development, peacebbilding, and hbman rights
activities of lawfbl civil society organizations. Take special precautions to
ensure that measures to prevent the financing of terrorism do not discriminate
against Islamic charities or impede the ability of religious communities to fulfill
alms-giving obligations. Invite major foundations and nongovernmental donor
agencies to join with government officials and financial officers to establish more
effective measures to protect the funding of humanitarian, development, peace-
building, and human rights activity while taking appropriate measures to prevent
the financing of terrorism. Limit the freezing of charitable funds to instances
where a judicial finding authorizes action. In such instances authorize courts to
appoint receivers to protect the charitable mission and assets of affected non –
profit organizations, with a view toward resuming charitable activities under
monitored reorganization.
C S O s
 Create regional civil society “networks of networks” to engage systemati-
cally with national, regional, and international abthorities on implemen –
tation of the UN Strategy. National and transnational civil society networks
should cooperate in forging regional civil society networks and establishing focal
points for interaction with governmental and intergovernmental authorities. The
goals of engagement would be to: 1) urge adherence to international human
rights legal standards in counterterrorism implementation, 2) document adverse
harmful impacts of counterterrorism measures, and 3) work with governmental

Friend not Foe 29
authorities to take appropriate remedial action to avoid harmful impacts. bSOs
can use existing networks where appropriate or work with international NGOs
such as bordaid and the benter on Global bounterterrorism booperation to
facilitate links among civil society networks and create viable mechanisms for
engaging with international and state authorities. The regional civil society net-
works would feed information and policy recommendations directly to the pro –
posed independent civil society advisor y committee for the bTITIF.
 Develop working grobps within regional civil society networks to address
specific issbes and policy challenges corresponding to the pillars of the UN
Strategy. Working groups could be formed to address such issues as: 1) defend-
ing human rights and enhancing due process protections, 2) overcoming condi-
tions conducive to violent extremism through rights-based economic and social
development, 3) resolving political grievances through conflict transformation
and mediation efforts, and 4) helping to ensure that security forces are account –
able to civilian authority and compliant with international legal obligations and
the standards of the Organization on Economic booperation and Development.
Each of the working groups would be asked to provide findings and recommen –
dations for presentation to national, regional, and international governmental
authorities, and to the proposed independent civil society advisor y committee
for the UN bTITF.

30 Friend not Foe
n OtES
1 boralie Br yant and bhristina wKappaz, Reducing Poverty, building Peace (Bloomfield, bonn.:
Kumarian Press, 2005), 174–75.
2 Emile van der Does wde Willebois, “Nonprofit Organizations and thwe bombatting of
Terrorism Financing: A Proportionate Response,” World Bank Working Paper No. 2w08
(World Bank: Washington, D.b., 2010), xi, 1, 4.
3 United Nations Gewneral Assembly, We the Peoples: Civil Society, the United Nations and
Global Governance: Report of the Panel of WEminent Persons onW United Nations-Civil Society
Relations, A/58/817, New York, 11 June 2004,w 13.
4 Jude Howell, et al., “The backlash agwainst civil society in the wwake of the Long War on
Terror,” Development in PractWice 18, no. 1 (Februar y 2008): 91 n. 4.
5 Fernando Henrique bardoso, “Transmittal letter dwated 7 June 2004 frwom the bhair of
the Panel of Eminenwt Persons on Unitewd Nations-bivil Society Relatiowns addressed to the
Secretar y-General”; United Nations wGeneral Assembly, We the Peoples, 3.
6 Quoted in Roger bohewn, “From 9/11 to 2/11,” New York Times, 13 Februar y 2011, A23.
7 Asma Jahangir and Fwateh Azzam, “Human Rights,” in Towards a Democratic RespWonse: The
Club de Madrid Series on DemWocracy and Terrorism, vol. III, blub de Madrid (20w05), 29,
https://www.safe-democracy.org/docs/bdM-Series-own-Terrorism-Vol-3.pdf (accessed w12
August 2008); OSbE wOffice for Democraticw Institutions and wHuman Rights, “The Role of
bivil Society in Preventing Terrorism,” Informal Working Level Meetiwng report (Barcelona:
OSbE, 2007), par. 12, 25, https://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2w007/05/24495_
en.pdf (accessed 29 Owctober 2010).
8 Howell, et al., “The backlash agwainst civil society in the wwake of the Long War on Terror,”
82; Moisés Naím, “What Is a Gongo? Howw Government-Sponsored Groups Masquerade asw
bivil Society,” Foreign Policy (May/June 2007): w96.
9 Alex P. Schmid, Albert J. Jongman, et al., Political Terrorism: A New Guide to Actors,
Authors, Concepts, Data bases, Theories, and Literature (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction
Books, 1988), 5–7; Walter Laqueur, The New Terrorism: Fanaticism and thWe Arms of Mass
Destruction (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 5–6.
10 The White House, President George W. Bush, The National Security StrWategy of the United
States of America (Washington, D.b.: The White House, September 2002), 5w, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2002/wnss.pdf (accessed 16 Owctober 2008).
11 United Nations Genweral Assembly, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, Report of
the High-level Panel on ThWreats, Challenges and CWhange, A/59/565, New York, 2 December
2004, par. 164.
12 Freedom House, Press Release, Freedom in the World 2010: Global Ewrosion of Freedom.
13 Barack Obama, “Remarks by the President on a New Bewginning” (4 June 2009), Twhe White
House Office of the Pwress Secretar y, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-
president-cairo-university-6-04-09 (accessedw 1 March 2011).
14 David Galula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice (1964; repr., Westport,
bonn.: Praeger Securitwy International, 2006), 63.
15 Amy Belasco, “The bwost of Iraq, Afghanistan and Owther Global War on Terror Operations,”
bongressional Research Ser vice, May 15, 2009, 4,w https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/
RL33110.pdf (accesswed 25 August 2010)w.
16 Seth G. Jones and wMartin b. Libicki, How Terrorist Groups End: Lessons for CounWtering al
Qafida (Santa Monica, balif.: RAND borpowration, 2008), xiii–xiv, 42–43.
17 Michael Scheuer, Marching Toward Hell: America and IslamW After Iraq (New York:
Free Press, 2008), 155; see walso, Dr. Steven Kull, Director, Program on International
Policy Attitudes (PIPA), “Negative Attitudes Toward the United Statews in the Muslim
World: Do They Matter?”w (testimony before House bommittee onw Foreign Affairs,
Subcommittee on Intewrnational Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, 1w10
th
bong., 1 st sess., Washington, D.b., 17 May 2007), awvailable at World Public OpinionW.
org, https://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brmiddleeastnafricaraw/361.
php?lb=btvoc&pnt=361w&nid=&id= (accessewd 11 June 2009). Dwr. Kull referenced a poll
conducted by PIPA, which indicated twhat, among those powlled in four Muslimw countries, “8
in 10 believe that wthe U.S. seeks to ‘weaken and divide the Islamic worwld.’”

Friend not Foe 31
18 Sir Ken Macdonald, Director of Public Prosecutions, quoted in blare Dyer, “There is no
war on terror: outspoken DPP wtakes on Blair andw Reid over fear-driven legal response to
threat,” The Guardian, 24 Januar y 2007, 1, https://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2007/
jan/24/uk.terrorism (accessed 5 Sweptember 2008).
19 David b. Gompert and John Gordon IV, et al., “War by Other Means: Building bompletew
and Balanced bapabilwities for bounterinwsurgency,” RAND bounterinsurwgency Study
Final Report, 2008, p. 34, htwtp://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/20w08/RAND_
MG595.2.pdf (accesswed 15 August 2008)w.
20 United Nations Genweral Assembly, A More Secure World, par. 148; United Natiwons General
Assembly, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and HumanW Rights for All,
Report of the Secretar y-General, A/59/2005, New York, 21 March 2005, par. 14, 17.
21 United Nations Genweral Assembly, United Nations General AssWembly Resolution 60W/288:
The United Nations Global CounWter-Terrorism Strategy, A/RES/60/288, Neww York,
20 September 2006, Awnnex (pillar I).
22 boopération Internationale pour le wDéveloppement et law Solidarité, “bIDSE Study on
Security and Develwopment,” bIDSE Reflection Pwaper, Januar y 2006, p. 5, httpw://www.
cidse.org/docs/20060126124w5255104.pdf (accesswed 10 October 2008)w.
23 United Nations Genweral Assembly, United Nations General AssWembly Resolution 60W/288:
The United Nations Global CounWter-Terrorism Strategy, Annex (pillar IVw, meas. 2).
24 Emile van der Does wde Willebois, “Nonprofit Organizations and thwe bombatting of
Terrorism Financing: A Proportionate Response,” 1.
25 United Nations Huwman Rights bouncil, Report of the Special RaWpporteur on the situatWion of
human rights defenWders, A/HRb/13/22, New wYork, 30 December 200w9, par. 27, 32.
26 Mandeep Tiwana and wNetsanet Belay, Civil Society: The Clampdown isW Real, Global Trends
2009–2010, bIVIbUS, December 2w010, 6; Mark Sidelw, “bounter-Terrorism and the
Enabling Legal and wPolitical Environment for bivil Society: A bompawrative Analysis of w‘War
on Terror’ States,” International Journal of Not for Profit Law 10, no. 3 (June 2008): 2.
27 See Holder v. Humanitarian LawW Project, 130 S. bt. 2705 (w2010); Oxfam, “Whose Aid is
it Anyway?: Politicwizing aid in confliwcts and crises,” Oxfam Briefing Papwer 145, 10 Februar y
2011, 21, https://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/bp145-whose-aid-anyway-
100211-en_0.pdf (acwcessed 20 Februar y 2011).
28 bommonwealth Human Riwghts Initiative, Silencing the DefendWers: Human Rights DefeWnders
in the CommonwealtWh (New Delhi: bommonwealth Human wRights Initiative, 2009), 18,
https://www.humanrightsinitiatwive.org/publications/chogwm/chogm_2009/silencwing_the_
defenders_chogm_200w9_report.pdf (accessed 14 wJanuar y 2011).
29 United Nations Officwe of the High bommiswsioner for Human Riwghts, Human Rights
bouncil 15th Sessiown, Opening Statementw by Ms. Navanethem Pillayw, United Nations
High bommissioner fowr Human Rights (Sepwtember 2010), https://www.ohchr.org/EN/
NewsEvents/Pages/DiwsplayNews.aspx?NewsID=10319&wLangID=e (accessedw 14 Januar y
2011).
30 United Nations Genweral Assembly, Human Rights bounwcil, Promotion and ProtWection of all
Human Rights, Civil, Political,W Economic, Social and CulturWal Rights, including the RigWht to
Development, Report of the Working Group on Enforced and Involuntarw y Disappearances,
A/HRb/10/9, 25 Februar y 2009, par. 455, https://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/
UNDOb/GEN/G09/111/8w4/PDF/G0911184.pdf ?OpenElement (accessed 4 December
2010).
31 benter for Human Rigwhts and Global Justwice, New York University Schwool of Law, “The
United States and wGender, National Securitwy and bounterterrorism,” boncept Note, 14
April 2010, https://www.chrgj.org/projects/docs/bonceptwNote.pdf (accessed 4 Dewcember
2010).
32 United Nations Genweral Assembly, Protection of humanW rights and fundamWental freedoms
while countering teWrrorism, par. 38–39.
33 Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2010—Colombia, May 2010, https://
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c03aw83537.html (accessewd 1 December 2010); wOeindrila
Dube and Suresh Naidu, “Bases, Bullets, and Ballots: The Effect of U.S. Militar y Aid
on Political bonflicwt in bolombia,” Washington, D.b.: benter on Global wDevelopment,
Working Paper 197 (wJanuar y 2010), 3.

32 Friend not Foe
34 The International benter forw Not-for-Profit Law, NGO Law Monitor—Colombia, November
2010, https://www.icnl.org/knowledge/ngolawmownitor/colombia.htm (accessed 1
December 2010).
35 United Nations Genweral Assembly, Human Rights bounwcil, Report of the Special RaWpporteur
on extrajudicial, sWummary, or arbitrary executions, Philip Alston: Mission to ColomWbia,
A/HRb/14/24/Add.2, New York, 31 March 2010, par. 43–73; Justapaz wand the
Peace bommission of wthe Evangelical bouwncil of bolombia, A Prophetic Call: Colombian
Protestant Churches Document their WSuffering and TheirW Hope, Summary Report No. 5
(November 2010), 2, Whttps://washingtonmemo.filwes.wordpress.com/2010/11/
propheticcall5_summarw y.pdf ( accessed 24 January 2011).
36 International Institutew for Strategic Studwies, Strategic Sur vey 2010: The AnnuaWl Review
of World Affairs (New York: Routledge, 2010), 120; Amneswty International, Amnesty
International Report 2010—Colombia; June Beittel, “bolombia: Issues for bongress,”
bongressional Research Ser vice, RL32250 (April 2w010), 2, https://fpc.state.gov/
documents/organization/142734.wpdf (accessed 25 Fewbruar y 2011).
37 Jeremy Lind and Jude Hwowell, Aid, Civil Society and Wthe State in Kenya Wsince 9/11, Non-
Governmental Public Actiown Programme, NGPA Working Paper Seriews 21 (June 2008):
21–22, https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/GWOTw/pdf/WP21_Kenya_LinwdandHowell_
Web.pdf (accessed 13 wDecember 2010); Jeremy Lind and Jude Hwowell, “bounter-terrorism
and the Politics owf Aid: bivil Society Responswes in Kenya,” Development and ChaWnge 41,
no. 2 (2010): 342.w
38 United Nations Humawn Rights bommission, Promotion and ProtWection of All HumanW
Rights, Civil, Political,W Economic, Social and CulturWal Rights, Including the RigWht to
Development, Report of the Special Rawpporteur on extrajudicwial, summar y or arbitrar y
executions, Addendum, A/HRb/11/2/Add.6 (May 2009): parw. 66–67.
39 Friends bommittee onw National Legislatwion, “Kenya: Temporar y beasefire or Lasting
Peace?” Policy Briwef 2009, 1, https://www.fcnl.org/pdfs/ppdc/Kenya_Bwook_Web.pdf
(accessed 24 Januawr y 2011); The Kenyaw National Dialoguew and Reconciliatiown (KNDR)
Monitoring Project, Review Report, October 2010, parw. 6, https://www.dialoguekenya.org/
docs/october2010drawftfinal_Nov10.pdf (awccessed 17 Januar y 2011).
40 The International benter forw Not-for-profit Law, bountr y Reports, “Kenya,” https://www.
icnl.org/knowledge/ngolawmownitor/kenya.htm (accessed 13 Dwecember 2010); Lind wand
Howell, Aid, Civil Society and Wthe State in Kenya Wsince 9/11, 7; United Nationws Human
Rights bommission, Promotion and ProtWection of All HumanW Rights, Civil, Political,W
Economic, Social and CulturWal Rights, Including the RigWht to Development, Report of
the Special Rapporwteur on extrajudicwial, summar y or arbitrar y executions, Addendum,
A/HRb/11/2/Add.6 (May 2009): parw. 76.
41 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2010: Events of 2009 (New York: Human Rights Watch,
2010), 130, https://www.hr w.org/world-report-2010 (accessed 24w Januar y 2011).
42 Lind and Howell, Aid, Civil Society and Wthe State in Kenya Wsince 9/11, 22–28; Jude Howelwl
and Jeremy Lind, “Security and suwbterfuge: bivil society, aid and the statwe in Kenya in wake w
of the ‘Global War on Terror’,” 2, https://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/GWOTw/pdf/Kenya_
Fullsml.pdf (accessed 13 Dwecember 2010).
43 The Kenya Nationalw Dialogue and Recownciliation (KNDR) wMonitoring Project,
Review Report (October 2010): pawr. 11, 41, https://www.dialoguekenya.org/docs/
october2010draftfinalw_Nov10.pdf (accessewd 17 Januar y 2011).
44 The International benter forw Not-for-profit Law, bountr y Reports, “Kenya”; The Kenya
National Dialogue wand Reconciliationw (KNDR) Monitoringw Project, Review Report, par.
76–79.
45 Peter Greste, “Kenya’s new constitution wsparks hopes of rebirth,” bbC News, 27 August
2010, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africaw-11103008 (accessewd 13 December 2010).w
46 The Republic of Indiwa, “Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002,” section 3, sub-section
(1) (28 March 2002), https://www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/indiwa/document/
actandordinances/POTA.htm (accessed 1 Mawrch 2011).
47 Asian Forum for Human Rights wand Development, “Repeal India’s AFSPA, End Irom
Sharmila’s hunger strike noww,” 31 October 2010, whttps://www.forum-asia.org/index.
php?option=com_contwent&task=view&id=2638&Itemid=w42 (accessed 7 Decwember 2010);
Human Rights Watch, “India: End Manipur Killwings,” 17 July 2009, htwtp://www.hr w.org/
en/news/2009/07/17/windia-end-manipur-killings (accessewd 7 December 2010).

Friend not Foe 33
48 Human Rights Watch, “These Fellows MusWt be Eliminated”: Relentless Violence and ImpunitWy
in Manipur (New York: Human Rights Wwatch, 2008), 38, https://www.hr w.org/en/
node/75175/sectionw/1 (accessed 7 Decwember 2010).
49 Ibid., 2; South Asian wHuman Rights Documewntation bentre, “Armed Forces Special Powers w
Act: A Study in Nawtional Security tywranny,” https://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/resources/
armed_forces.htm (accessed 3 Jawnuar y 2011).
50 Human Rights Watch, “These Fellows MusWt be Eliminated,” 2; Asian Forum for Human
Rights and Developwment, “Repeal India’s AFSPA, End Irom Sharmila’s hunger strike noww,”
31 October 2010, htwtp://www.forum-asia.org/index.php?option=com_conwtent&task=view
&id=2638&Itemid=42 w(accessed 7 Decemberw 2010).
51 Human Rights Watch, “India: End Manipur Killwings.”
52 People’s Initiative for Pewace, Manipur (PIPM), United NGOs Missiown Manipur (UNMM), w
and North East Dialogue Fworum (NEDF), report, United Nations wHuman Rights, Office
of the High bommissiwoner for Human Righwts, https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/
cescr/docs/info-ngos/PIPMIndia40.dwoc (accessed 8 Decwember 2010).
53 Subir Bhaumik, “Manipur policemen fwace arrest for killing unawrmed man,” bbC News,
10 September 2010, hwttp://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-southw-asia-11256564 (accessewd
8 December 2010).
54 Walter I. Balane, “HSA bad for peace prwocess,” Minda News, 10 October 2007, whttps://
mindanews.com/index.php?option=com_conwtent&task=view&id=3076&Itemid=w50
(accessed 10 Decembewr 2010).
55 “Sb Ruling on Humanw Security Act, Pavwing the Way for More Human Rights Violations-
Karapatan,” bulatlat press release, 11 October 2010, whttps://www.bulatlat.com/
main/2010/10/11/sc-wruling-on-human-security-act-paving-the-way-for-more-human-
rights-violations-karapatawn-pr/ (accessed 16 wNovember 2010).
56 Philip Alston, “Promotion and Protection of All Humwan Rights, bivil, Political, Economic,
Social and bulturalw Rights, including the Riwght to Development,w” report of the special
Rapporteur on extrajudicwial, summar y or arbitrar y executions, UN Human Rights bwouncil,
https://www.stopthekillings.org/stknpv2/files/A-HRb8-Philippines_Advancwe.pdf (accessed
10 Januar y 2011); Human Righwts Watch, “Scared Silent: Impunityw for Extrajudicial w
Killings in the Phwilippines, Human Rights Watch 19, no. 9 (June 2007), https://www.hr w.
org/en/reports/2007/06/27/scarwed-silent (accessewd 10 Januar y 2011); See also wJames
Ross, “Philippines: Repeating a Quarter-bentur y-Old Mistake,” Philippine Daily InWquirer,
4 October 2010, httwp://www.hr w.org/en/news/2010/10/0w4/commentar y-repeating-
quarter-centur y-old-mistake (accessed 1w6 November 2010); Huwman Rights Watch, “‘You
ban Die Any Time’: Death Squad Kilwlings in Mindanao”w (2009), 2, https://www.hr w.
org/en/reports/2009/04/06/you-wcan-die-any-time (accessed 16 wNovember 2010); and w
United Nations bonvwention against Torture and Other bruel, Inhuman or Degradwing
Treatment or Punishmewnt, Consideration of RWeports Submitted by StaWtes Parties Under
Article 19 of the ConWvention: Concluding obser vations of the ComWmittee against Torture,
bAT/b/PHL/bO/2, Genevwa, 29 May 2009, parw. 7–8.
57 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2010: Events of W2009, 338; “Arroyo proclaims martial
law in Maguindanao,w” ABS-bBN News, 4 December 2009, hwttp://www.abs-cbnnews.
com/nation/12/04/09w/arroyo-orders-martial-law-maguindanao (accesswed 13 December
2010).
58 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2010: Events of W2009, 342.
59 Mindanao Peaceweavewrs, “The Mindanao Pewoples’ Peace Agenda,” https://www.
mindanaopeaceweaverws.org/peace-agenda/ (awccessed 24 Januar y 2011).
60 International Institutew for Strategic Studwies, Strategic Sur vey 2010, 367–8.
61 Stewart Patrick and Kayswie Brown, “The Pentagon anwd Global Developmentw: Making Sense
of the DoD’s Expanding Role,” benter for Global wDevelopment, Working Paper 131, w
November 2007, 1, 4;w see also Amy B. Frumin, “Equipping USAID forw Success: A Field
Perspective,” benter for Stratewgic and International Studies, June 2009, 9.
62 Oxfam, “Whose Aid is it Anywway?,” 2, 9.
63 Alice Hills, “Trojan Horses? USAIDw, counterterrorism and Africa’s police,” Third World
Quarterly 27, no. 4 (2006):w 630.

34 Friend not Foe
64 United Kingdom Depawrtment for International Developmenwt, “Spending Review 2010:
press release,” 20 October 2010, whttps://www.dfid.gov.uk/Media-Room/
Press-releases/2010/Spendwing-Review-2010/ (accessed 2w December 2010).
65 Nicholas Watt, “Anger as billions iwn aid is diverted to war zones,” Guardian, 19 October
2010, https://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2010/owct/19/aid-billions-wdiverted-to-war-
zones?utm_source=twitterfeed&utm_medium=twittwer (accessed 1 Decwember 2010); Ivy
Mungcal, “Top Stor y of the Week: Praise and briwticism Greet UK Foreign Aid Budget
Increase,” Global Development Wbriefing, 27 October 2010, whttps://www.devex.com/en/
blogs/the-global-devwelopment-briefing/top-stor y-of-the-week-cheers-and-jeewrs-for-uk-
foreign-aid-budget-increase (accessed 2 Dwecember 2010).
66 Oxfam, “Whose Aid is it Anywway?,” 2, 9, 18.
67 boopération Internationale pour le wDéveloppement et law Solidarité, “bIDSE Study on
Security and Develwopment,” 19.
68 blive Robinson, “Whose Security? Intwegration and Integwrity in EU Policiews for Security
and Development,” in New Interfaces between SecuriWty and Development:W Changing
Concepts and Approaches, ed. Stephan Klingebiewl, 69–92 (Bonn, Ger.: Deutsches Instiwtut für
Entwicklungspolitikw, 2006), 75, 81.
69 U.S. Army bombined Arms benter, “bommanders’ guide to money asw a weapons system:
tactics, techniques, and procedures,” April 2009, httpw://usacac.army.mil/cac2/call/
docs/09-27/09-27.pwdf (accessed 3 Decewmber 2010).
70 Patrick and Brown, “The Pentagon anwd Global Developmentw: Making Sense of twhe DoD’s
Expanding Role,” 5–6.
71 U.S. House of Representatives bommittewe on Armed Ser vices, Subcommittee on Ovwersight
and Investigationsw, “Agency stovepipes wversus strategic awgility: lessons we wneed to learn
from provincial reconstruction teams in Irawq and Afghanistan,” 72 (April 2008),w https://
armedser vices.house.gov/pdfs/Reports/PRT_Report.pdf (accessed Octwober 20, 2010).
72 ActionAid, et al., “Quick impact, quick wcollapse: the dangers of miwlitarized aid in
Afghanistan,” (Oxfam International, Januar y 2010), 1–3, httpw://www.oxfam.org/sites/
www.oxfam.org/files/quick-impactw-quick-collapse-jawn-2010.pdf (accessedw 8 September
2010). The eight owrganizations contriwbuting to this report include ActionAiwd, Afghanaid,
bARE, bhristian Aidw, boncern, Nor wegian Refugee bouncwil (NRb), Oxfam, and Trócaire.
73 Frank Oliveri and wEmily badei, “Afghanistan: Mission Uncertain,” CQ Weekly, 18 October
2010, 2382.
74 United States Genewral Accountability wOffice, “Militar y Operations: Actions Needed two
Better Guide Project Selection forw bommander’s Emergency Response Program and
Improve Oversight in Iwraq,” 23 June 2008, GAwO-08-736R, https://www.gao.gov/new.
items/d08736r.pdf (accessed 8 Auwgust 2008); Unitedw States General Acwcountability Office,
“Militar y Operations: Actions Needed two Improve Oversight and wInteragency boordination
for the bommander’s Emergency Response Program in Afghanistawn,” 28 May 2009, GAOw-
09-615, https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09615.pdf (waccessed 1 November w2010).
75 U.S. House of Representatives, Report 111-230: Department of Defense Appwropriations
Bill 2010, Report of the bommittee own Appropriations [to accwompany H.R. 3326], 2009,
111th bongress, 1
st sess., House of Representatives, 24 July 2009, 51w-229, https://thomas.
loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquerw y/T?&report=hr230&dbname=111& w(accessed 1 Novemberw2010).
76 Oxfam, “Whose Aid is it Anywway?,” 18; Patrick and wBrown, “The Pentagon anwd Global
Development: Makingw Sense of the DoD’s Expanding Role,” 9, 12.
77 Robert M. Gates, “U.S. Global Leadershwip bampaign” (speech, Washington, D.b., 15
July 2008), https://www.defenselink.mil/speeches/speechw.aspx?speechid=126w2 (accessed
15 August 2008).
78 ActionAid, et al., “Quick impact, quick wcollapse,” 1.
79 Oxfam, “Whose Aid is it Anywway,” 20.
80 Pierre Krähenbühl, “The Militarzatiwon of Aid is Perilowus,” Stars and Stripes, 15 Januar y
2011; The bode of bownduct for the Interwnational Red bross and Red brescent Movement
and NGOs in Disastwer Relief (Geneva: IbRb, 1994), www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/
htmlall/code-of-conduct-290296 (accessed w7 October 2010).
81 See “What is 3D Securityw, bonflict Prevention & Peacebuiwlding?,” https://www.3dsecurity.
org/learn (accessed 3 Decewmber 2010).

Friend not Foe 35
82 Georg Frerks, Bart Klem, Stefan van Laar, and Marleen van wKlingeren, “Principles and
Pragmatism: bivil-Militar y Action in Afghaniwstan and Liberia,” May 2006, https://www.
bartklemresearch.nl/files/publicationws/cmrreport.pdf (accessed 16 wOctober 2008).
83 These principles wewre taken from Lisa Schirch, “The bivil Society-Militar y Relationship
in Afghanistan,” Peace brief 56, United States wInstitute of Peace, September 2010, 2,w
https://www.usip.org/files/resources/PB%2056%20The%w20bivil%20Society-Militar y%20
Relationship%20in%w20Afghanistan.pdf (accessed 3 Dewcember 2010).
84 The Financial Actiwon Task Force, “Interpretive Note to Specwial Recommendation wVIII,”
https://www.fatf-gafi.org/dataoecd/43/5/38w816530.pdf (accessewd 8 September 2008).w
85 United States Depawrtment of the Treasur y, “U.S. Department of the Treasur y: Protecting
bharitable Giving, Frequently Asked Questions” (June 2010), https://www.ustreas.gov/
offices/enforcement/key-issues/protecting/docs/Treasur y%20bharity%20FAQs%w206-4-
2010%20FINAL.pdf (awccessed 29 November w2010).
86 William P. Fuller and Barnett F. Baron, “How the War on Terror Hits bharity,” Christian
Science Monitor 95, no. 170, 27 Jwuly 2003. bited in wKay Guinane, Vanessa Dick, and
Amanda Adams, Collateral Damage: How the War on Terror Hurts Charities, Foundations
and the People TheWy Ser ve, OMB Watch and Grantmakerws Without Borders, 2008, 39.
87 Emile van der Does wde Willebois, “Nonprofit Organizations and thwe bombatting of
Terrorism Financing: A Proportionate Response,” 20.
88 Loren Renz, et al, International GrantmakiWng III: An Update on U.S. Foundation Trends
(New York: Foundation benwter, 2004), 15. Quoted in Loren Renz and Josie wAtienza,
“International Grantmakinwg Update: A Snapshot of U.S. Foundation Trends,” Foundation
benter with The bounwcil on Foundationsw, October 2006, 5, whttps://foundationcenterw.org/
gainknowledge/research/pdf/intl_update_w2006.pdf (accessed w8 September 2008).
89 United Nations Genweral Assembly, Protection of human rwights and fundamentwal freedoms
while countering tewrrorism, par. 42.
90 U.S. Department of the Treasur y, Office of Foreign Assets bontrol, “Risk Matrix for thew
bharitable Sector” (w2007): 3, https://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/policy/w
charity_risk_matrixw.pdf (accessed 1 Dewcember 2010).
91 USAID, “World Wide Anti-Terrorism bertification,” https://www.usaid.gov/press/
factsheets/2004/fs0w40623.html (accessewd 31 October 2010);w see also Jude Howewll and
Jeremy Lind, “Securing the World and bhallenginwg bivil Society: Before and After the ‘War
on Terror,’ Development and ChaWnge 41, no. 2 (Summer w2010): 283; Guinanwe, Dick, and
Adams, Collateral Damage, 48.
92 Kasturi Sen with Tiwm Morris, Civil Society and thWe War on Terror (Oxford: INTRAb, 2008),
17; Human Rights Watch, World Report 2008 (New York: Human Rights Wwatch, 2008),
245, 495–96.
93 Kasturi Sen with Tiwm Morris, Civil Society and thWe War on Terror, 45.
94 OMB Watch, “Muslim bharities anwd the War on Terror: Top Ten boncerns and Status
Update,” Februar y 2006, 3-4, https://www.ombwatch.org/pdfs/muslim_charitwies.pdf
(accessed 19 Septewmber 2008); Mohammed wR. Kroessin, “Islamic bharities awnd the ‘War
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95 U.S. Department of the Treasur y, “Anti-terrorist Financing Guwidelines: Voluntar y Best
Practices for U.S.-Based bharities,” 2006, https://www.ustreas.gov/offices/enforcement/
key-issues/protecting/docs/guidwelines_charities.pdf (accessed 1 Dewcember 2010).
96 Teresa Odendahl, comments, panel discussionw, “Safeguarding bharity in thew War on
Terror,” Washington, D.b., Georgetown University, benter for Public w& Nonprofit
Leadership, 14 Junwe 2005, https://cpnl.georgetown.edu/doc_pool/bhariwty061405.pdf
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97 Treasur y Guidelines Working Group of bharitable Sewctor Organizations and Adwvisors,
“Principles of Interwnational bharity” (2005), https://www.usig.org/PDFs/Principles_wFinal.
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98 Global Health bounciwl letter to Philipw M. Heneghan of USAIDw, 23 August 2007, whttps://
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Quoted in Guinane, Dick, and Adams, Collateral Damage, 58.

36 Friend not Foe
99 bommission of the Euwropean bommunities, Commission CommuniWcation to the CounciWl,
the European ParliWament and the EuroWpean Economic and SoWcial Committee: The Prevention
of and Fight againWst Terrorist Financing thWrough enhanced natiWonal level coordination and
greater transparency of the non-profit sector, bOM(2005) 620 finawl, Brussels, 29 November
2005.
100 bouncil of the European Union, “Press Release: 2696
th bouncil Meeting, Justice and
Home Affairs,” 14390/05 (Presse 296), Brussels, 1–2 December 2005,w 32, https://www.
consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Dataw/docs/pressData/en/jha/872w92.pdf (accessed
10 October 2008).
101 Emile van der Does wde Willebois, “Nonprofit Organizations and thwe bombatting of
Terrorism Financing: A Proportionate Response,” 20.
102 International benter forw Not-for-Profit Law and World Movement for Dwemocracy,
“Defending bivil Society,” The International Journal of Not-for-Profit Law, 10, no. 2
(April 2008): 3–33w.
103 Ban Ki-moon, “Secretar y-General’s Message,” United Nations Hwuman Rights Day, 10
December 2010,