* Category includes ratification, accession, or succession to the treaty

Sudan currently has no single functioning constitutional order. The 2019 Constitutional Charter, signed by the Transitional Military Council and the civilian Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC) following the ouster of Omar al-Bashir, was intended to govern a 39-month democratic transition. However, the Charter was substantially suspended by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan’s October 2021 coup, which dissolved the civilian component of the Sovereignty Council and ended the power-sharing arrangement on which the Charter was based. Although the Sovereignty Council was nominally reconstituted several weeks later, it has since operated under military control.

Since the outbreak of civil war between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) in April 2023, Sudan’s constitutional landscape has fragmented further into competing tracks:

SAF-aligned track: On February 23, 2025, the SAF-aligned Transitional Sovereignty Council and Cabinet unilaterally amended the 2019 Constitutional Charter, with the amendments published in the Official Gazette. The amendments remove references to the RSF and FFC, extend the transitional period by 39 months, expand the powers of the Sovereignty Council, including over key appointments and foreign policy, and bar dual nationals from holding government positions. The Transitional Legislative Council envisioned under the original Charter has never been formed. As a result, the Sovereignty Council and Cabinet continue to function as a de facto Transitional Legislative Authority.

RSF-aligned track: On March 3-4, 2025, the RSF and allied groups, operating under the Sudan Founding Alliance, signed a rival transitional constitutional framework establishing the “Government of Peace and Unity,” with administrative headquarters across RSF-held areas of Darfur and parts of Kordofan. This framework proposes a secular, decentralized federal structure across eight administrative regions, with a Presidential Council chaired by RSF commander Mohamed Hamdan “Hemedti” Dagalo and a bicameral Constituent Legislative Body. It has no international recognition and coexists with, rather than replaces, the SAF-aligned framework, reflecting Sudan’s de facto territorial partition.

Chapter 14 of the original 2019 Charter, which contains the bill of rights, including Article 56 on freedom of expression and press and Article 57 on freedom of assembly and organization, remains formally cited by SAF-aligned authorities as being in force. Article 41(2) also continues to nominally incorporate Sudan’s ratified international human rights instruments into domestic law. In practice, however, the state of emergency framework retained since 2021, the militarization of state administrations, and ongoing wartime conditions have rendered these guarantees largely aspirational. Trade unions and professional associations dissolved by decree in 2021 remain banned, while civil society coordination bodies, including local Emergency Response Rooms, have faced periodic dissolution orders. No functioning constitutional court, election commission, or constitution-drafting conference, all of which were envisioned under the original transitional framework, has been established under either track.

Sudan’s principal statutory framework governing civil society remains the Voluntary and Humanitarian Work (Organization) Act of 2006 (“VHO Act”). The Act remains in force and has not been repealed or substantially amended. It provides the primary basis for CSO registration and oversight, including through the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) in areas controlled by the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF). The Act defines “humanitarian work” narrowly, focusing on emergency and disaster relief, rehabilitation, reconstruction, capacity-building, and the implementation of relief projects. This framework does not clearly protect organizations engaged in broader rule-of-law, democratic transition, justice, governance, or human rights work, leaving such groups vulnerable to discretionary restrictions by registration and security authorities.

The National Intelligence and Security Act of 2010 also remains relevant to the operating environment for civil society. It grants security agencies broad powers of search, arrest, and detention, with limited judicial oversight. These powers have contributed to a restrictive environment for activists, journalists, humanitarian workers, and rights-based organizations.

Since the outbreak of war in April 2023, enforcement of the legal and regulatory framework has become fragmented across areas controlled by different armed actors. In SAF-held areas, the VHO Act continues to be administered primarily through HAC. In practice, however, HAC procedures and directives have reportedly contributed to bureaucratic obstruction, including delays, suspension orders, and restrictions affecting national and international NGOs and local humanitarian initiatives such as Emergency Response Rooms.

In areas controlled by the RSF, aid and CSO oversight has developed through a separate and competing administrative structure. The RSF has established or supported entities such as the Sudanese Agency for Relief and Humanitarian Operations (SARHO) and the National Humanitarian Access Authority (NAHA) to regulate humanitarian access and registration in RSF-held areas. This has created a dual-compliance problem for organizations operating across front lines, particularly where SAF-aligned authorities warn organizations against engagement with RSF-linked bodies while RSF authorities impose their own registration, permit, procurement, and access requirements.

A third regulatory environment exists in areas controlled by the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement-North/Abdelaziz al-Hilu (SPLM-N/al-Hilu), including parts of South Kordofan and Blue Nile. In these areas, humanitarian access and civil administration are handled through the SPLM-N’s de facto governance structures rather than through the VHO Act or HAC. No published CSO registration law equivalent to the VHO Act has been identified for this track, and oversight appears to depend on local administrative arrangements and bilateral humanitarian access agreements.

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Section 4 of the Voluntary and Humanitarian Work (Organization) Act (“VHO Act”) defines three organizational forms.

1. A “national voluntary organization” is a Sudanese non-governmental voluntary organization registered under the Act that is neither a company under the Companies Act, 1925, nor a political party.
2. A “charitable organization” is an organization established by citizens, groups, or individuals with the financial capacity to sustain charitable activities.
3. A “civil society organization (CSO)” is an entity engaged in voluntary and humanitarian work for not-for-profit purposes and registered under the Act. Section 4 further defines “voluntary and humanitarian work” as not-for-profit activity by a registered national or foreign voluntary or charitable organization aimed at providing humanitarian aid, relief, public services, human rights services, environmental protection, or improving beneficiaries’ economic and social conditions.

This taxonomy remains the current statutory framework. In practice, however, its scope has narrowed considerably since the outbreak of conflict in 2023. The VHO Act’s three-form taxonomy, and the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) registration process built around it, are enforceable primarily in areas under SAF-aligned administration. Organizations operating in RSF-controlled territory are instead required to engage with the Sudanese Agency for Relief and Humanitarian Operations (SARHO), established in August 2023. Registration with SARHO appears to function more as an operational permitting process than as a formal legal classification system for CSOs.

This creates a practical problem for CSOs operating across contested areas, particularly as front lines shift in Kordofan and elsewhere. An organization legally constituted as a “civil society organization” under Section 4 of the VHO Act in SAF-held territory may have no equivalent recognized status in RSF-held areas, including much of Darfur. To operate there, the organization may need to register separately with SARHO, while also facing risks from SAF-aligned authorities, which have warned against engagement with RSF-linked bodies, as noted in the National Laws section.

There are no clear rules about tax exemptions or public benefit status in Sudan. However, according to the VHO Act, “the Minister of Finance and National Economy, upon the recommendation of the Minister [of Humanitarian Affairs],” may grant exemptions from duties, taxes, and privileges to “national, foreign voluntary organizations, or civil society organizations registered under the Act.” In addition, anyone who provides funds for “voluntary or charitable work” may be exempted from taxation (Section 29(1),(2), and (3)).

Sudan’s civic environment experienced some expansion during the 2019–2021 transitional period, including legal reforms such as the repeal of public order laws and changes to public morality laws, which benefited marginalized groups, including women’s rights advocates. However, this progress was sharply reversed after the October 25, 2021 military coup, which led to renewed mass arrests and detention of activists, journalists, and opposition figures. The transition toward participatory democracy has since been effectively halted by the 2021 military takeover and the civil war that began in April 2023. Formal avenues for civic engagement, including the planned constitutional conference and Transitional Legislative Council, have been suspended, abandoned, or replaced by ad hoc military decrees.

The ongoing civil war has further exacerbated human rights violations and severely restricted public participation. Both the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) have reportedly detained, tortured, and killed civilians, activists, and political actors, often treating dissent, independent organizing, or community mobilization as collaboration with opposing forces. A local rights group reported more than 3,000 detentions in Gezira state, primarily involving political activists. Despite these risks, public participation has persisted, including through women-led activism and protests in dangerous areas such as Kadugli.

In this fragmented environment, civic engagement has increasingly shifted to decentralized and informal networks, including Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), neighborhood resistance committees, and mutual aid groups. These entities now serve as primary vehicles for civic action, focusing on frontline humanitarian assistance, community protection, and the delivery of essential services in areas where state infrastructure has collapsed. However, volunteers face extreme risks, including arbitrary detention, harassment, enforced disappearance, and targeted violence by warring factions that view independent community influence as a security threat.

International humanitarian strategy has also shifted toward greater reliance on local responders through a “Humanitarian Reset,” which prioritizes localization and support for informal community-based networks. While this approach may create limited space for community-led participation, the operating environment remains extremely dangerous. Diplomatic frameworks, including the 2025–2026 Quad Peace Plan and initiatives by the Quintet — composed of the African Union, the Intergovernmental Authority on Development, the League of Arab States, the European Union, and the United Nations — continue to call for a return to civilian-led governance and emphasize that Sudan’s future should be determined by its people rather than by military force.

Sudan’s continued non-ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) also underscores the persistence of institutional resistance to formalizing women’s rights protections. Efforts to ratify CEDAW during the transitional period faced opposition and have not been revived since the coup and outbreak of war.

Under the Voluntary and Humanitarian Work (Organization) Act, 2006 (“VHO Act”), registration remains mandatory for civil society organizations (CSOs). Unregistered practice of voluntary or humanitarian work is punishable under Sections 23–24 of the Act. The Act also imposes several formal barriers to entry. A national voluntary or charitable organization must have at least 30 founding members under Section 9(1)(a), although Section 9(2) allows the Minister of Humanitarian Affairs to approve organizations with fewer members if they demonstrate financial capacity, sustainability, and clear funding sources. Foreign voluntary organizations face additional requirements, including proof of financial and technical capacity for their intended activities in Sudan and a prohibition on registration if their headquarters are located in a country at war with, or under boycott by, Sudan.

The VHO Act also grants implementing authorities broad discretion. The Registrar may refuse registration where an organization’s activities are deemed inconsistent with the principles set out in Section 5, including non-discrimination, due regard for local community participation, and non-interference by foreign organizations in Sudan’s internal affairs. These terms are undefined and can be applied expansively, creating risks for independent, rights-based, or advocacy-oriented organizations. Registration refusals may be appealed to the Minister within 15 days, but the Act does not provide a clear timetable for decision or a subsequent appeal to an independent body. Registration may also be revoked for contravention of the Act, unjustified inactivity for more than one year, or “unlawful gains” from humanitarian aid, with key terms again left undefined.

All registered organizations must renew their licenses annually under Section 11. In practice, the Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) continues to enforce compulsory annual re-registration in SAF-controlled areas, creating recurring opportunities for delay, administrative obstruction, or denial. HAC has reportedly introduced new procedural directives, vetting requirements, and permit conditions that have made it more difficult for national and international NGOs to maintain legal status and deliver aid. Organizations not aligned with the authorities remain particularly vulnerable to suspension, non-renewal, or revocation under vague provisions such as contravening the principles of the Act or failing to carry out activities for a full year without acceptable justification.

Since the outbreak of conflict in 2023, these formal barriers have been overlaid with, and in many areas superseded by, wartime access restrictions and territorial fragmentation. The VHO Act’s registration framework remains enforceable primarily in SAF-controlled territory through HAC. Organizations seeking to operate in RSF-held areas must instead navigate separate registration and permitting requirements imposed by RSF-linked bodies, including the Sudanese Agency for Relief and Humanitarian Operations (SARHO) and the National Humanitarian Access Authority (NAHA). Organizations operating in SPLM-N/al-Hilu-held areas appear to be subject to separate local administrative arrangements, although no equivalent published CSO registration framework has been identified. For CSOs whose work spans multiple areas of control, formation and operation are no longer a single registration process under Section 9, but a multi-authority negotiation involving competing and sometimes conflicting requirements.

In practice, these conditions have made domestic civic organizing increasingly difficult. Many Sudanese CSOs, activists, and professional networks have relocated activities or coordination outside Sudan, partly because of registration barriers and state harassment, and partly because of broader wartime displacement and security risks. As a result, CSO formation and operation are constrained not only by the VHO Act’s restrictive statutory provisions, but also by fragmented territorial control, ad hoc security directives, bureaucratic obstruction, and the absence of reliable judicial review.

The Voluntary and Humanitarian Work (Organization) Act, 2006 (“VHO Act”) imposes several operational obligations on registered organizations. These include annual license renewal, mandatory semi-annual and annual reporting, submission of an auditor-certified annual budget, and Registrar authority to supervise elections of national organizations. The latter requirement, set out in Section 22(2)(d), permits direct interference in the internal governance of CSOs. In addition, CSOs have long been required in practice to obtain prior security clearance before conducting proposed activities, travel, workshops, meetings, or other public programming.

The General Intelligence Service (GIS), the successor to the former National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS), remains central to this restrictive operating environment. Although the agency’s mandate was narrowed after the 2019 transition, a May 2024 amendment to the GIS Law restored broad arrest, search, and detention powers, along with immunity provisions, largely returning the agency to its pre-2019 scope. Sudanese civil society monitors have challenged the constitutional legitimacy of the amendment, noting that it was enacted without a functioning constitutional body empowered to amend the 2019 Constitutional Document and is inconsistent with Sudan’s obligations under the ICCPR and the Convention Against Torture.

These formal restrictions operate alongside a longstanding pattern of extra-legal pressure. Since at least 2012, HAC and NISS/GIS have used dissolution orders, security designations, unauthorized raids, and arbitrary detention to restrict organizations perceived as politically inconvenient, including women’s rights groups, cultural organizations, independent media, and human rights organizations. Ordinary civic activities, such as press conferences, constitutional workshops, cultural events, and advocacy meetings, have been treated as national security concerns. Activists, artists, and civil society representatives have also faced arrest under broadly framed Penal Code provisions relating to incitement, public order, and public nuisance. This pattern persisted through the pre-2019 period, the 2019–2021 transitional opening, and the post-2021 coup reversal, indicating that discretionary security practice has often functioned independently of changes in the formal legal framework.

Since the outbreak of conflict in 2023, these operational barriers have intensified and fragmented. In SAF-controlled territory, HAC continues to regulate CSOs and humanitarian organizations under the VHO Act, but its role has increasingly included broad suspension directives and bureaucratic obstruction. For example, in 2025, authorities in SAF-controlled South Kordofan reportedly suspended the operations of 30 national and three international NGOs, severely affecting aid delivery. Visa and permit restrictions have also impeded international humanitarian operations, with approval rates for international NGO personnel reportedly falling well below those for UN staff. These practices have contributed to delays in the delivery of life-saving assistance and have limited the ability of senior humanitarian personnel to reach affected areas.

In RSF-controlled territory, parallel operational restrictions have emerged through RSF-linked bodies, including the Sudanese Agency for Relief and Humanitarian Operations (SARHO) and related access mechanisms. These authorities reportedly impose registration freezes, movement-permit requirements, procurement interference, access restrictions, and informal payments. Organizations operating across front lines face conflicting demands, including SAF warnings against engagement with RSF-linked bodies and RSF requirements for authorization in areas under its control. In SPLM-N/al-Hilu-controlled areas, humanitarian and civic operations are subject to separate local administrative arrangements rather than the VHO Act framework.

Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), neighborhood resistance committees, and other decentralized humanitarian networks are especially vulnerable. Although ERRs have become essential providers of food, medicine, evacuation support, and basic services in areas where state infrastructure has collapsed, volunteers have faced harassment, arbitrary detention, enforced disappearance, and targeted violence. Warring factions have often treated independent community relief work as evidence of collaboration with the opposing side. Reports from 2025 and 2026 indicate that SAF-aligned forces, RSF forces, and allied militias have all restricted or attacked humanitarian actors, including local volunteers and aid workers.

The physical security environment has also become a major barrier to operations. Humanitarian infrastructure, including hospitals, clinics, warehouses, convoys, and food distribution networks, has repeatedly been attacked, looted, obstructed, or rendered inaccessible. Attacks on healthcare facilities and humanitarian supply chains have forced many facilities to close and have left large populations without basic medical care. In areas such as El Fasher and surrounding displacement camps, obstruction of aid has contributed to famine conditions and extreme civilian suffering.

Barriers to International Contact

No legal provision expressly prohibits domestic CSOs from contacting or communicating with international counterparts. In practice, however, Sudanese authorities have long restricted international engagement by civil society. For example, in March 2016, four CSO representatives were intercepted by security officials at Khartoum International Airport while traveling to Geneva for a high-level human rights meeting with diplomats. This example remains illustrative of the broader pattern, although the current conflict has changed the mechanics of such restrictions. Since Khartoum International Airport has been closed to commercial traffic since April 2023, similar restrictions now occur through Port Sudan, land border crossings, security clearances, exit controls, or the fragmented travel arrangements required to move through SAF-, RSF-, or SPLM-N-controlled territory.

Foreign organizations also face continuing statutory restrictions under the VHO Act. Section 5(f) requires foreign voluntary organizations not to interfere in Sudan’s internal affairs in a manner that may infringe on national sovereignty. Section 9 imposes additional conditions on foreign organizations, including proof of financial and technical capacity, a prohibition on registration for organizations based in countries at war with or boycotted by Sudan, signature of a country agreement, and compliance with any further conditions imposed by the Minister. These provisions remain subject to broad and arbitrary interpretation and have not been reformed since 2006.

The expectation that the post-2019 transition would produce a more enabling environment for foreign and international civil society engagement has not materialized. Instead, the restoration of GIS powers, the collapse of civilian transitional institutions, and the war have created a more dangerous and fragmented operating environment. Both SAF- and RSF-aligned actors increasingly characterize international or cross-line civil society engagement as evidence of alignment with the opposing side. As a result, domestic and international CSOs face a compounding set of barriers: restrictive statutory registration requirements, discretionary security clearance, fragmented territorial authorities, physically degraded access routes, attacks on humanitarian infrastructure, and a polarized environment in which international engagement itself can carry reputational and physical security risks.

Section 7 of the Voluntary and Humanitarian Work (Organization) Act, 2006 (“VHO Act”) requires CSOs to obtain prior government approval for domestic and foreign funding. In the current conflict, this authority has increasingly functioned as a tool of political control. In January 2026, the acting Minister of Federal Governance reportedly issued a decree banning civil society groups established during or after the revolution, ordering an inventory of their assets and the freezing of their bank accounts. The measure targeted grassroots and mutual aid groups by accusing them of cooperation with rival forces, thereby restricting their access to financial resources.

Financial restrictions have also affected high-profile political and civic leaders involved in pro-democracy and humanitarian coordination. In October 2025, Sudan’s Central Bank reportedly ordered the seizure and freezing of bank accounts belonging to dozens of political and civil society figures, including former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok. The measures were reportedly justified on the basis of alleged support for paramilitary forces, but had the effect of cutting off financial channels used by civilian political actors, pro-democracy coalitions, and community support initiatives.

The broader civil society sector also faces the near-collapse of functional banking services. Organizations with active accounts are subject to strict limits on cash withdrawals, affecting both individuals and corporate entities. This liquidity crisis has forced some NGOs to convert bank-held funds into physical cash at punitive commission rates in order to pay staff, procure local supplies, or sustain operations. These restrictions are especially harmful for cash-based assistance, which many affected communities have identified as their preferred form of aid.

The sector has also been affected by abrupt reductions in international funding. In early 2025, a freeze on U.S. foreign aid programs led to the cancellation or suspension of critical humanitarian support. This funding shock contributed to the closure of health centers and the scaling back of nutrition, health, and other life-saving programs across Darfur, Kordofan, and other conflict-affected areas. As a result, CSOs and humanitarian responders face a combination of statutory funding controls, politically motivated asset freezes, banking-system collapse, liquidity constraints, and declining international donor support.

Barriers to freedom of expression in Sudan have escalated from systematic harassment to the near-total destruction of the country’s independent media ecosystem. The ongoing civil war has turned the information environment into a sphere of conflict, with both the SAF and the RSF using media narratives as tools of war and treating independent journalists as potential adversaries.

Freedom of expression is formally protected under the 2019 Constitutional Charter, but these guarantees have been rendered largely ineffective by emergency decrees, the collapse or fragmentation of judicial institutions, and wartime security practices. In October 2025, the Sudanese Cabinet approved amendments to the Cybercrime Law that introduced heavy fines of up to ten million Sudanese pounds and prison sentences of up to ten years for certain online offenses. The amendments use broad terms such as threatening “social peace” or harming the “prestige of the state,” creating significant risks that online criticism of military or political authorities will be criminalized. They also expand authorities’ ability to conduct digital searches, remove content, and pursue online speech.

The physical targeting of journalists has also intensified. By early 2026, at least 14 journalists had reportedly been killed since the start of the conflict, while hundreds more had been attacked, arrested, threatened, or displaced. Both warring parties have treated independent reporting as a security threat. In one high-profile case in October 2025, RSF forces reportedly abducted freelance journalist Muammar Ibrahim as he attempted to flee El Fasher, later circulating a video of his detention.

Mass displacement and the destruction of infrastructure have created a severe media vacuum. A large share of Sudan’s media houses have been damaged, destroyed, or forced to close, including newspapers, broadcasters, and archives. Hundreds of journalists have fled the country, while many of those who remain work anonymously or under pressure to align their reporting with the faction controlling their area. In SAF-controlled eastern regions, journalists have reportedly been required to obtain security permits to travel, gather information, or report on sensitive developments.

Digital rights have also been sharply curtailed by internet blackouts, surveillance, and coordinated disinformation. Both factions and their supporters have used social media to spread propaganda and discredit independent reporting, while online complaint systems have reportedly been manipulated to suspend or silence journalistic accounts. Throughout 2025 and 2026, widespread internet disruptions, including prolonged blackouts in areas such as Wad Madani, prevented citizens from accessing reliable information, communicating with family members, and documenting possible abuses. In early 2026, the GIS reportedly increased surveillance of online activity and carried out arrests of civilians based on social media posts.

Barriers to assembly in Sudan have evolved from localized crackdowns into a broader pattern of militarized control, in which public gathering, community mobilization, and even mutual aid can be treated as security threats. Sudan’s statutory framework for restricting assembly rests on several longstanding instruments. Section 127 of the 2005 Interim National Constitution empowers governors and commissioners to prohibit assemblies deemed likely to cause a “breach of the peace,” without providing a clear right of appeal. In practice, a Ministry of Interior circular has also imposed a prior-notification and consent requirement for demonstrations, which has rarely been granted. Sections 67–69 and 77 of the 1991 Criminal Act criminalize broadly defined conduct such as breach of the peace and public nuisance, with penalties including imprisonment, fines, and flogging. These provisions have long enabled authorities to suppress peaceful gatherings on vague public order or national security grounds.

This framework has supported a documented pattern of lethal suppression, including the 2013 anti-austerity protests, the 2018–2019 revolution, the June 3, 2019 Khartoum massacre, and the post-2021 coup crackdown, during which protesters, activists, and children were killed, arrested, or injured. The restoration of broad arrest, search, and detention powers to the General Intelligence Service (GIS) in 2024 further strengthened the security apparatus available to restrict assemblies and preempt organizing.

The outbreak of civil war in April 2023 fundamentally altered the nature of assembly-related civic space. Mass street protests of the kind seen between 2018 and 2022, including organized marches, sit-ins, and coordinated urban demonstrations, have become largely impractical in many areas because of active combat, displacement, insecurity, and the collapse of basic services. Resistance Committees that had previously organized anti-coup protests have in many places transformed into Emergency Response Rooms (ERRs), redirecting the same civic infrastructure from protest mobilization toward humanitarian service delivery. This represents a functional shift in civic activity, rather than the disappearance of public participation altogether.

Assembly activity has nevertheless persisted in altered, localized, and often higher-risk forms. Examples since 2023 include women-led protests in contested areas, such as Kadugli in South Kordofan, localized demonstrations against political developments or deteriorating living conditions, and diaspora-organized solidarity actions in cities such as London and Geneva. These activities reflect both the continued demand for civic participation and the geographic displacement of organizing capacity that previously operated inside Sudan.

Inside Sudan, however, gatherings are frequently treated by both the SAF and the RSF as potential evidence of political collaboration or support for the opposing side. Community meetings, food distributions, neighborhood protection efforts, and other forms of collective action can trigger harassment, detention, or violence. In some areas, security forces and armed actors have reportedly used excessive or lethal force against protesters, neighborhood committees, and community groups, reinforcing a climate of impunity and discouraging public assembly.

Digital and administrative controls further restrict the ability to organize peaceful gatherings. Expanded cybercrime powers and GIS surveillance have increased the risks associated with coordinating protests or meetings through social media and messaging applications. Internet shutdowns and communications disruptions, often coinciding with military operations or periods of unrest, have prevented citizens from organizing safely, documenting abuses, or accessing reliable information. In SAF-controlled areas, security permit systems and military intelligence oversight have also limited public meetings not expressly sanctioned by the authorities.

As a result, freedom of assembly in Sudan is constrained by overlapping statutory restrictions, emergency and security measures, wartime fragmentation, surveillance, communications blackouts, and the threat of violence by armed actors. While collective civic action continues, it has largely shifted from open public protest toward localized, informal, humanitarian, and diaspora-based forms of organizing.

Aid workers trapped in Sudan’s parallel states (May 2026)
As Sudan’s war enters its fourth year, the country’s humanitarian catastrophe is no longer merely a collection of figures circulated in international aid reports. It has evolved into an entire geography of displacement camps, migration corridors, and emergency shelters stretching from Darfur and Kordofan to the Northern, River Nile, Al-Gadarif, and Khartoum states. Amid this increasingly fragmented landscape, humanitarian organizations now face a new crisis that could fundamentally reshape the aid sector itself, as access to millions of civilians becomes entangled in a growing battle over legitimacy between the warring parties. Following the Rapid Support Forces’ (RSF) takeover of most of the Darfur region and large parts of Kordofan after the fall of Al-Fashir, the SAF’s last stronghold in Darfur, and later Babanusa in West Kordofan, the territorial reach of the Ta’sis alliance, led by the RSF, expanded considerably.

Sudan warns aid groups against dealing with RSF relief agency (January 2026)
The Sudanese Agency for Relief and Humanitarian Operations (SARHO) oversees aid distribution and issues permits to international organizations in RSF-controlled regions across Darfur and Kordofan. Sudanese Humanitarian Aid Commissioner (HAC) Salwa Adam Benya directed international aid groups to adhere to national legislation and policies. She urged organizations to avoid interfering in internal affairs and to maintain strict neutrality in their humanitarian activities. The directive follows reports that some foreign organizations registered with the HAC have engaged in institutional dealings with SARHO.

Sudan’s protesters built networks to fight a tyrant – today they save lives in a war (December 2025)
Sudan has a long history of civilian-led resistance, with young people playing a key role. For example, informal neighborhood networks established in 2013 to survive repression under three decades of authoritarian rule have since transformed into vibrant support systems. These groups helped mobilize mass protests in 2018. They have provided a lifeline for communities in the ongoing civil war, which started in 2023. During the mass protests, youth-led networks organised political sit-ins and demonstrations against the Islamist regime of Omar al-Bashir. They were ultimately successful in overthrowing a 30-year dictatorship. Since the outbreak of war in April 2023, Emergency Response Rooms, which are community-led networks, have been providing crucial humanitarian relief.

Sudan’s Khartoum strives to recover amid ongoing civil war (July 2025)
After more than two years of devastating conflict, Sudan’s capital Khartoum is slowly emerging from the ruins of war, inching toward a return to normal life. Across much of the city, scars of battle remain visible, widespread destruction plagues neighborhoods, and bullet holes mar homes and high-rises like grim reminders of violence. Despite this, the gradual return of residents is breathing life back into the city, while government and grassroots efforts continue to restore critical services. The local community and civil society organizations played a major role in the city’s recovery. By combining official and grassroots efforts, we were able to bring back essential services like water, electricity, healthcare, and education,” Siddiq Hassan Freini, Minister of Social Development for Khartoum State, said.

Sudan rejects accusations of blocking aid (October 2024)
Sudan dismissed Western accusations that it hinders aid access, saying travel permits for humanitarian workers are necessary to ensure their safety in the conflict-ridden country. The statement comes after Sudanese authorities expelled a UN delegation led by Deputy Humanitarian Coordinator Toby Harward and barred them from visiting South and East Darfur. The delegation had previously visited West Darfur. “Claims by Western countries that we are disrupting entry visas and movement permits are baseless,” the foreign ministry said in a statement.

NGOs urge authorities to facilitate humanitarian access (July 2023)
More than 40 international NGOs have urged the leadership in Sudan to support and intervene in facilitating humanitarian access to thousands of civilians displaced by conflict. The group called for overcoming the critical issue of pending visa applications and travel notifications and approvals for humanitarian agencies. Fighting between Sudan’s army and the Rapid Support Forces (SAF) has reportedly has killed over 3,000 civilians and displaced nearly 3 million other people since April 15, amid reports that 25 million people need humanitarian aid and protection.

Key Date Set in Sudan Government Transition (March 2023)
Sudan’s military leaders and pro-democracy forces vowed to begin establishing a new civilian-led transitional government on April 11, a spokesperson representing both parties said. Sudan has been plunged into chaos after a military coup, led by the country’s top Gen. Abdel-Fattah Burhan, removed a Western-backed government in October 2021, upending its short-lived transition to democracy. The takeover came more than two years after a popular uprising forced the removal of Omar al-Bashir and his Islamist government in April 2019.

HAC unlawfully cancels registration on Sudanese Consumer Protection Society (November 2022)
On October 24, 2022, the office of the Sudanese Consumers Protection Society (SCPS) received a delegation of seven employees from HAC delivering a letter of cancellation of registration and seizure of all its assets. The group confiscated property such as seals, headed paper, and other documents.

Nine people arrested by police during an art exhibition (October 2022)
On October 20, 2022, a group of Sudanese Federal Police arrived in five vehicles and raided an art gallery during an exhibition by Ahmed Esam held at Civil Lap house (NGO building) located in Alzhoor neighborhood, Khartoum. Mr. Ahmed is a 21 year old Human rights defender and an artist. During the raid, the police officers arrested nine guest majority of whom are young artists, and designers. They also confiscated 9 out of 12 art pieces and damaged one art piece in the process. Those arrested were taken to the federal Police office where they were detained until 06:00pm and later transferred to Northern Police Station located in Central Khartoum where they spent a night.

Sudanese authorities continue to crack-down on freedom of expression (September 2022)
The African Centre for Justice and Peace Studies (ACJPS) has documented several incidents where Sudanese authorities have interfered with the exercise of media freedom and free expression. The authorities attacked and/or judicially harassed journalists during the course of their work. Sudanese authorities continue to harass made make it difficult for journalists to do their work in Sudan.

One protester shot dead by security forces in Sudan’s Khartoum (April 2022)

Sudanese authorities raid offices of 2019 massacre tribunal (March 2022)

18 members of the Dismantle and Anti-Corruption Committee detained incommunicado (March 2022)

Women’s rights leader detained in Sudan capital (January 2022)

Sudan forms 11-member sovereign council (August 2019)

TMC, FFC add text on peace in Sudan to constitutional declaration (August 2019)

Sudan factions initial pact ushering in transitional government (August 2019)

Women and Children’s Rights NGO’s Khartoum Office Ransacked (July 2019)

268 people killed during Sudan’s peaceful revolution (July 2019)

Sudan’s Mobile Internet Restored After Power Sharing Deal (July 2019)

The Situation Regarding the Dialogue with the Transitional Military Council (April 2019)

Hundreds of Peaceful protesters and activists released from detention (April 2019)

Arbitrary arrests and detention by Sudanese authorities (December 2018)

Security service confirms hand over of Sudanese activist from Egypt (November 2018)

Sudan Journalists Protest Restrictive Press Bill (July 2018)

Activist Faces Trumped-Up Charges in Sudan (July 2018)

Sudan must release Sakharov Laureate Salih Mahmoud Osman (February 2018)

Incommunicado detention of 8 human rights defenders and others for participating in peaceful protests (February 2018)

Sudan’s human rights activist receives amnesty (August 2017)

Sudanese security service arrests human rights defender (May 2017)

Opposition Leaders Barred From Flying to Paris (January 2017)

Sudan Activists Charged with Death Penalty Crimes (August 2016)

Sudan blocks civil society participation in UN-led human rights review (August 2016)

Civil Society Barred From Holding Press Conference (December 2015)

Leading human rights defender released from prison (April 2015)

Sudan Government stifling media and civil society (April 2015)

In anniversary of September 2013 uprising, regime cracks down on freedoms (September 2014)

End Arbitrary Detention of Activists – Investigate Allegations of Torture, Abuse (June 2014)

Sudan’s VP reiterates government’s determination to hold national dialogue (January 2014)

UN Expert deeply concerned at mass arrests and heavy media censorship during protests (October 2013)

At Least 32 Killed, 700 Arrested In Worst Unrest In Years (October 2013)

Sudan to further restrict work of foreign aid groups including UN agencies (August 2013)

Crackdown on civil society in Sudan emboldens hardliners (March 2013)

On the closure of Al Khatim Adlan Center for Enlightenment and Human Development (KACE) (December 2012)

The origins of civil society in Sudan date back to the colonial period under Anglo-Egyptian rule, when small cultural, literary, and artistic societies emerged in Khartoum. By the mid-1940s, political movements had formed to advocate either for Sudan’s independence or for union with Egypt. These movements are often considered among Sudan’s earliest civil society organizations and played an important role in shaping the country’s post-colonial future.

Following independence in 1956, CSOs working on civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights proliferated, particularly in Khartoum. The legal and operating environment for civil society fluctuated over the following decades, as Sudan alternated between parliamentary democracies and military regimes. Civil society generally enjoyed greater space under civilian governments, while periods of military rule were marked by repression and restrictions on association, expression, and assembly.

The Voluntary and Humanitarian Work (Organization) Act, 2006 (“VHO Act”) was adopted shortly after the Comprehensive Peace Agreement. From the outset, civil society actors criticized the law for granting authorities broad discretion over registration, funding, supervision, and dissolution of organizations. Under the al-Bashir regime, the VHO Act and related security laws were used to restrict independent civil society, expel international NGOs, and shut down national organizations. The Humanitarian Aid Commission (HAC) used its mandate to suspend, dissolve, or liquidate organizations perceived as politically sensitive. In 2009, authorities froze the bank accounts of the Khartoum Center for Human Rights and Environmental Development (KCHRED). In 2014, HAC ordered the liquidation of the Salmmah Women’s Resource Centre and the seizure of its assets. In 2022, HAC cancelled the registration of the Sudanese Consumers Protection Society (SCPS) and gave staff only 72 hours to hand over organizational property.

The pre-2019 security apparatus also played a central role in restricting civic space. The National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) required prior permission for many CSO activities and used its powers to raid offices, detain staff, and label ordinary civic activity as a national security threat. Authorities also restricted international engagement. In March 2016, four CSO representatives were intercepted by security officials at Khartoum International Airport while traveling to Geneva for a human rights meeting. NISS also enforced post-print censorship by confiscating entire newspaper print runs after publication, imposing severe financial losses on independent media outlets. Authorities further used funding controls and accusations of “illegal” foreign funding to justify raids, staff detentions, and administrative action.

In late 2018, mass protests erupted demanding an end to Omar al-Bashir’s 30-year rule, during which political parties, organizations, professional associations, trade unions, societies, newspapers, and magazines had faced extensive restrictions or bans. On April 11, 2019, then-Defense Minister and Vice President Lt. Gen. Awad Ahmed Ibn Auf announced al-Bashir’s arrest and the creation of a Transitional Military Council (TMC). Ibn Auf suspended the Constitution, declared a three-month state of emergency, and ordered the release of political prisoners. After widespread criticism of the TMC’s composition, Ibn Auf resigned and was replaced by Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Led by members of the Sudanese Professionals Association (SPA), protesters continued to demand a civilian transitional government and structural reforms. The Forces of Freedom and Change (FFC), a coalition of political actors and civil society groups, pressed the TMC for a democratic transition. On July 17, 2019, the TMC and FFC reached an agreement establishing a transitional power-sharing arrangement, and on August 4, 2019, they signed the Constitutional Charter, which provided a framework for a 39-month transitional period and future elections.

The 2019–2021 transitional period created a brief opening for civil society. Several previously banned organizations were allowed to re-register, and there were expectations that the restrictive VHO Act would be revised or repealed. Women’s rights groups and other marginalized communities were able to advocate more openly for legal reforms and a new constitutional order centered on public participation. However, media freedom and civic space remained fragile. Shortly before the June 3, 2019 sit-in massacre, the TMC shut down Al Jazeera’s bureau in Sudan, and on June 3 security forces violently dispersed the peaceful sit-in at military headquarters in Khartoum, killing more than 100 people.

On October 3, 2020, the transitional government signed the Juba Peace Agreement with the Sudan Revolutionary Front to address conflicts in Darfur, South Kordofan, and Blue Nile. The agreement called for a permanent ceasefire, integration or demobilization of rebel forces, compensation for displaced persons, expanded state powers, and transitional justice processes. Rebel leaders received seats on the Sovereign Council and in the cabinet, and the transitional period was extended by two years.

The October 25, 2021 military coup reversed many gains of the transitional period. General al-Burhan dissolved the transitional government, declared a nationwide state of emergency, and announced that elections would be held in July 2023. Military forces arrested former Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, members of the Sovereign Council, cabinet ministers, state governors, political leaders, journalists, and human rights defenders. On November 11, 2021, al-Burhan appointed a new Sovereign Council dominated by military figures, former rebels, and selected civilians, with himself as chair. The coup was followed by mass arrests, incommunicado detentions, and violent repression of protesters, activists, and journalists.

The intelligence apparatus also regained much of its prior authority. In 2019, NISS had been renamed the General Intelligence Service (GIS), with a formally narrowed mandate. However, by 2024, amendments to the GIS legal framework restored broad powers of arrest, search, detention, and asset seizure, reversing many earlier transitional reforms.

In December 2022, more than 40 political parties, armed movements, professional associations, CSOs, and the military signed a Framework Agreement in Khartoum to restore the democratic transition. However, the agreement did not prevent Sudan’s descent into full-scale conflict. In April 2023, open war broke out between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General al-Burhan, and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (“Hemedti”). The conflict rapidly escalated, producing mass displacement, humanitarian collapse, and widespread human rights abuses. Sudanese and international CSOs have documented atrocities by both sides, including ethnic cleansing, sexual violence, attacks on civilians, and other war crimes.

Since the outbreak of civil war, Sudan’s civic space has deteriorated further. Earlier patterns of administrative obstruction, funding restrictions, travel bans, censorship, dissolution orders, and security harassment have persisted, but now operate within a fragmented wartime environment marked by competing authorities, mass displacement, humanitarian collapse, and extreme risks to activists, journalists, aid workers, and community volunteers.